CHAPTER EIGHT

CAPABILITY AND ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the contribution organisational culture makes to the development of capable individuals. Organisational capability was seen as an appropriate theoretical standpoint from which work, learning and organisation could be considered. The architecture of organisational capability is composed of organisational culture, climate and structure. Organisational culture in the ADF, and the Australian Army in particular, is heavily influenced by the features of the Anzac legend. The basic features of the legend has much in common with the features of individual capability described by Stephenson (1992, 1995). The cultural role of the legend in influencing the behavioural standards and norms in performance in the Australian Army suggested that it may be a significant organisational factor in the development of individual capability.

Examination of the data showed that this approach was too limiting. Australian national character and the Anzac legend did prove to be significant issues in determining individual behavioural standards and norms of performance, but it was necessary to broaden the context in which it is considered. The participants often referred to the features of organisational culture, and the subsequent impact on performance, in terms of cross-cultural contact. That is, they were referring to the way Australian national character and Australian military culture influence performance in a cross-cultural setting. In capability terms, they were referring to the role features of Australian national character and organisational culture play in determining cross-cultural capability.

The issues of cross-cultural contact were pervasive to the whole study and required further definition prior to the discussion of other areas. In terms of organisational capability it was still appropriate to consider the role organisational culture plays in the development of capable individuals, but the peace operations context required the researcher to expand the frame of reference to consider cross-cultural contact as an instance that requires the demonstration of independent capability by ADF personnel, and examine the features of organisational culture that contribute to effective performance in that environment.

To effectively describe and interpret the participant's perceptions the following issues were considered and developed :

a. the nature of cross-cultural contact on peace operations;

b. a model of cross-cultural contact for ADF peace operations contingents that could describe the features revealed in the study;

c. mission evolution of an Australian peace operations contingent, and the implications for leadership, performance and cross-cultural contact;

d. 'task orientation' as a feature of Australian national character; and

e. the role of the Anzac legend plays in influencing performance on peace operations.

CULTURAL INTERACTION IN PEACE OPERATIONS

In reviewing the peace operations literature it is apparent that cultural contact is seen primarily as occurring between the host culture and the military force. The results of this study suggest that while this is an important element of the cultural interaction that takes place, it is not the whole story. The sense from the participants is that the individual is faced with a series of consecutive cultural immersions each of which make some impact on individual and group performance. Moreover, each has distinct features and characteristics. Figure 8.1 represents the different cultural experiences of the individual. The ability of the individual to effectively overcome, adapt to, or incorporate the new behaviours and norms required of each new cultural experience ultimately impacts on the success of the individual in the field.



Figure 8.1. Cultural immersion in a peace operations deployment.

Figure 8.1 shows six separate "cultural hurdles" that must be meet in the course of peace operations deployment. The first, for many Australian soldiers and officers is the formation of a composite unit. As discussed by Bartone and Adler (1994) this process can be a significant source of stress for the individual. While the military constants of organisation remain, the composition of the force can have a significant impact on overall performance.

For the Australian Army, the formation of a composite force for deployment in Rwanda (UNAMIR) comprised of medical, logistic and infantry personnel, highlighted some of the difficulties that can be encountered. In conventional operations, medical and infantry personnel in the organisational configurations deployed to this mission would rarely work this closely together, and certainly not on this scale. Consequently, cultural as well as procedural

adjustments were required prior to departure as evidenced by the following comment:

It was not only medics mixing with infantry, there was a lot of Army Reservists mixing with regulars which brought about people saying this is my full time job, and this is my friends full time job, it is your hobby, why are you going and he is not. The final element was the Army versus the Air Force and the Navy. And something that surprised me was that infantry blokes had absolutely no experience in working with females, this was totally new culture for them. These four or five things created obstacles for people to get on, and then there were questions of professionalism which is where the Infantry-Medic-Army Reserve problems occurred. ...UNAMIR

... but it did create a problem in that I had to tell my guys that our job was to look after them. And it really was to look after them. At first, especially when you have a force thrown together they did not know each other had not worked together as individuals, or as a group. But if it had been a bad situation when we first got there my guys would have had their rings hanging out looking after these people. As it was it was not a problem. ... They were not cohesive, they had not had the weapon training, and I was not confident that they could use the weapon in a pressure situation. They could get through the test, but other than that it was a problem. ...UNAMIR

My soldiers were pretty proud of the standards they set for themselves. We had our problems, but no more than you would expect of one hundred infantry soldiers on deployment. What was disappointing was the fairly lax, 'she'll be right' attitude of the others in the contingent. Certain groups were great, but generally it was the fault of commanders on the ground, and the training that they have received. ...UNAMIR

At the same time as the internal Army adjustments are being made, similar adjustments must be made for the incorporation of other service personnel (RAN and RAAF) into the contingent. Cultural differences do exist between the three services, and these require some adjustment on the part of the individuals involved. In the small group environment these differences can be exacerbated.

One of the biggest problems facing the contingent both in Australia and over there was the mixing of the services within our own contingent. Who was responsible for what etc. ... One of the problems with that is that it stems from a lack of training on a tri-service level. It also comes down to single service attitude. ...UNOSOM

It was a discipline thing with us. The Air Force do not have discipline and they could not get used to the fact that they were calling everyone sir. To me it was a discipline problem. Army were a little more flexible in adapting to living in a small group for so long, and the OR side of the Navy it was not a

problem ... There were three distinctive cultures and people had to try to adapt. The way we worked over there is different to the way we operate here, because you have a small group living on each others doorstep, you had to be flexible in the way you approached things. The relationship between the senior officers and the private soldier was a little closer than you would expect here in Australia. ...UNOSOM

One insight as to why these problems exist is offered below:

It was a problem stemming down from the top, from HQ ADF. They saw this thing coming on and it had to be a tri-service mission. The people who were trained to do this job were Army people. However, because this was seen as a logistic effort the RAAF and RAN pushed to have serious numbers in the contingent. The fact that it was not trade specific thing was neither here nor there. My argument is that if they are going to deploy a ship are they suddenly going to put Army seaman on the ship to make it a tri-service operation. No they are not. Now that problem is likely to have been overcome by the formation of the new Joint Movements Group. It was a problem to me because there was a forced tri-service element to the operation simply to create tri-service group. Not for any logical work reason.

...UNOSOM

The next phase is immersion into a UN culture that is organisationally foreign for the majority of ADF personnel. It is a large, predominantly civilian organisation, that has little compatibility with military organisation and operation. For those ADF personnel that come into contact with the UN there is a period of adjustment to new organisational culture and norms before any effective integration can be achieved. The following comment shows the depth of feeling and frustration that occurs when the perceived culture of the UN and the expectations of the individual make contact.

... the social shock was going in thinking that I was doing something good for humanity and mankind, something worthwhile. That lasted about two weeks. Once you saw how the UN up close, how it operated, it was 'forget that' and concentrate on doing the best job that you could do. That is where most of our guys got their satisfaction they did a very good job as the movement coordinators. ... the UN is probably was one of the frustrating times. Their procedures are archaic. The waste is astronomical. When the auditors went through they were not interested in the efficiencies that could be made they were only interested in whether the procedures were being followed. That was the whole attitude of the UN, it was like an old boys club, you don't rock the boat ... In fact, when the cell commander went down to brief them on the Egyptian battalion and he told them what was happening, he was given a slap on the wrist and told that operational requirements will never take precedence over UN procedures. So you had a HQ looking after everything that is going on saying that what is going on over there will not take precedence over the

bureaucratic procedures, and the fact that the UN were in no way shape or form set up to support them. The UN sitting in New York you had Bosnia going, Cambodia winding down and Somalia starting up in totally different time zones, but the HQ people in New York continued to operate 9 to 4 on New York time. Their daily routine was not related in any way to the hours that were being worked in the various missions. So if the mission wanted to talk to the HQ they had to do the weird hours, the HQ didn't. That was the whole attitude of the place. ...UNOSOM

Similarly, for ADF personnel peace operations is the first contact they are likely to have made with HRO's. Increasingly, modern peace operations involve extensive contact between HROs and the military, the following comments give a sense of the cultural differences that must be overcome, and the problems that occur when the two organisations meet:

It is being very broad brush, there were some very good operators there, but in the main they were more interested in whether they were getting the right level of allowances or they were in the right accommodation. It was very disappointing the double standards they displayed. The military were there to be utilised until it turned to poop then they [HROs] *all ran away and left the military behind. There were no civilians in Somalia for the first month I was there. They pulled out and went to Nairobi, on full allowances, and went on safari while they waited for it to quieten down. ...UNOSOM*

I think so, because they have a totally different way of operating to us. they have a different way of looking after their own well being or their welfare to us. We tend to go around with our weapons, flak jacket and helmet, and we like to move as more than one person at a time, whereas you quite often find them operating on their own surrounded by the local people. They do have their own protection parties, and when things do get hairy they do tend to congregate in a major city. But outside of those times they are on their own. They tend to laugh at the way we conduct ourselves. Again we were on different missions. I think what we were doing was more appropriate.

...UNOSOM

The thing that I found frustrating at some points was the UN civilians when they did not care about the military side of it. But as soon as they needed your protection you were the worlds best people. That is a bit frustrating for the soldiers because for them it is either black or white, [they see it as] *double standards, because that is all they see. For us, it is easier to see and understand that people are like that. But when they are getting a stream of abuse from an NGO, and then all of a sudden they are asking you to protect them ...* *...UNAMIR*

For most personnel, interaction with the host culture forms the greatest adaptive challenge. These are the people the contingent is there to help. Expectations and perceptions of this culture are created prior to departing Australia through the media and predeployment

briefings. Occasionally the reality may be different, challenging the individuals perceptions and expectations:

> *Nothing can really prepare you for the attitudes you experience with the locals. Some of the locals were very good and you got on well with them, but the 'you owe us' types of attitudes, and things like we had a feeding station going and that afternoon they raided and killed four of the Pakistanis' that were guarding the feeding station. They could not understand why the next day we were not out there feeding them again. This is free food handout sort of stuff, they raided and killed four guys trying to do their job and then they could not understand why we were not out there again.* [Their attitude was] *that was yesterday when we killed four people, the attitude, the value of life etc. ... You are not called a warlord because you have a kind and humane outlook on life. That was what they were used to, and their whole ethos was living for today - for what you could get. For democracy you need a sense of common purpose, a sense of tomorrow, and of something for you're children. The general population had no concept of that and in my opinion they were not prepared for it.* ...*UNOSOM*

The cultural contact with other peacekeepers forms the next wave of cultural interaction. Contact of this type includes an added element of differences in professional culture that must be overcome for the multinational force to operate effectively. For some members of larger contingents they may have more contact with the cultures of other military

nations than they will with the host culture. The following comment gives a sense of the difficulties that can be experienced, and the need for understanding, compromise and acceptance:

> *I came into contact with the officers from Ghana and India at various stages throughout the tour because we shared a barracks with them. The relationship between us was fairly strained at times because there was a cultural difference that was difficult to overcome. I think there was a reluctance on either part to bridge that gap. There were a couple of incidences where people were offended on both sides.* ...*UNAMIR*

Finally, there may also be some interaction with the cultures of the surrounding countries as the force takes leave and recreation in the surrounding area. The impact of this is likely to be less than those noted above; however, it remains as a potential source of further cultural adaptation, in that the conditions, people and culture, may stand in stark contrast to the conditions in the country they have just left.

The model presented here is designed to raise the reader's awareness as to the nature and extent of cultural interaction that takes place in a peace operation. There is a tendency to consider cultural interaction purely in terms of the host culture. The sense of interaction provided by the participants in this study is that it involves a great deal more than this.

The next section focuses on the interaction between the host culture and the contingent to determine how cross-cultural contact is managed by the ADF, and the implications this has for predeployment preparation.

CROSS-CULTURAL CONTACT AND THE ADF

Egalitarianism and respect were seen as the defining features of interaction between ADF personnel and the host population. Participants believed that this approach was a key element in establishing trust, mutual respect and rapport that were necessary to complete the task. For example:

> *The Australian attitude was to treat a spade as a spade. The French believed that Cambodia was still a French colony, and they treated the Khmers accordingly. The French Canadians had a similar attitude, but not as bad. The Anglo-Canadians were more like us but still had a little bit of arrogance about them. Certainly, the Dutch and the Belgics were like that. We tended to treat the locals as normal human beings, and as a result we got a reciprocal approach from them. As such we were more effective in the job. We would get more from the Khmers than most anyone else simply because we treated them as normal human beings. ...CMAC*

The strength of the relationship with the host population was seen by some as a key factor in Australian performance:

One good thing about the Australian soldier is that they do not divorce themselves from the people, and one thing the Australians are well thought of for, is that we are sympathetic to the population. ...UNSCOM

The negative side of this is that sympathy may lead individuals toward choosing sides and potentially breaches of impartiality. Empathy may be a more appropriate term to describe this feature. Participants who responded to the Cohesion, Morale and Satisfaction Survey suggested that operating in an environment that involved consideration of impartiality had no effect of the contingent. There was no qualitative evidence in this study to suggest that ADF personnel did not understand the issues of impartiality in peace operations. However, for future studies it may be important to know how well the concept is understood by Australian contingents.

Respect for the local population was a feature of Australian interaction with the host culture:

When you are working closely with the local population it is particularly important that you create some sort of rapport. We followed this line far more than other nations, Australians and New Zealanders took a lot of pride in the men that they trained. We gave them dignity and respect that others did not seem to give them. ...ONUMOZ

Most Australians made an effort, and that was appreciated by the locals because you had taken the time. The rapport that was built up through our activities in this area was an advantage. We did not seem to have the problems others had with the locals. ...UNOSOM

The long term benefit of this approach to Australian personnel was noted in Somalia by those in the UNOSOM contingent, after the OP SOLACE contingent had left the Baidoa region. OP SOLACE put a lot of effort into re-establishing the police and judicial system in their region (Van Der Donckt and Wilson, 1993).

It soon became apparent that in the long term it was important for the Somalis to provide their own security. We tried to build up the law and order structure. This was a UNITAF initiative. In Baidoa we used Australian military police and the legal officer, as well as soldiers in the battalion group, to train Somalis as police. They were called the Auxiliary Security Force. Slowly but surely we built up the confidence of these people. They went on patrols with us, then they were able to patrol by themselves; they could search buildings and detain people for alleged serious crimes up to 48 hours. ... Our relations with the local population were increasingly warm and productive, and generous in spirit. We had a Civil Military Operations (CMO) team of 20 people, led by Major Dick Stanhope. They started dealing with the political leaders, the clan elders and the NGOs, building up confidence. It was important that we were not seen to be running the town, that wasn't our job at

all. Nor were we running the relief effort, nor did we impose curfews or anything like that. Early on we could see some things, such as food distribution for example, were not well organised, and later on, when we were invited, we helped with some coordination of the relief effort. ...OP SOLACE

The long term benefits of this approach were noted by member of the remaining UNOSOM contingent that remained in Somalia after the Op Solace contingent had left Baidoa:

They [the Australian contingent] *were very very highly regarded. The number of people on the staff who said that they would like an Australian battalion back to do the job was numerous. They were very impressed with the way the guys had conducted themselves. The locals were very impressed with them. The French were up there, and we went up for the French national day and Lieutenant Colonel Jones is the* [Australian] *contingent commander got off the plane and was virtually mobbed by the locals. The Australians were back. It was embarrassing actually, the attention that was paid to him by the locals above the French, who were there for their national day. ...UNOSOM*

The way in which cross-cultural contact is managed by the ADF on peace operations clearly has implications for the effective performance of the force and the individual. As described in Figure 8.1, the individual is faced with, and must adjust to, a series of cross-cultural contact experiences at a variety of levels in a remarkably short space of time. Nor are the features of these contacts similar, some require confrontation with cultures in the broadest

sense, others confront issues of military professionalism, skill and practice, and still others confront organisational and structural expectations. In each case, the individual is asked to confront the problem, and adapt to the environment, and then perform their tasks effectively.

To better prepare military personnel for this experience it is necessary to understand the nature of the problem, and then devise some method by which it might be addressed. The first problem in peace operations is the variety in the size of the contingents, and the nature of the tasks which they are asked to perform, both within mission and between missions. Figure 8.2 has emerged as a model that might allow trainers to better understand the impacts on culture on the size of the contingent deployed, and thereby better prepare them to understand and manage cross-cultural contact on deployment. The nature of the model and the consequences for personal behaviour are best explained in the following comment:

> *Certainly, the smaller the unit that you were in, the more you got involved because the more dependent you were on it. The diggers on the border post for 3 to 6 months did not have much of a choice. If you wanted to speak to anyone else you had to start speaking the lingo, and a lot of them did, and did very well. But of course as you step up through the scales the more of your own type that you have around you the less the requirement you have on the locals. But within that group there would be individuals who would actively search for the culture and integrate into the community. We had examples where people set themselves up doing private English teaching or were involved with local families. They would be more the exception than the rule*

in larger groups, because you had your own culture around you. You had your own culture, your own people and your own camp. The problem with that, is that after a long period of time there starts to be a contempt of the local population, and that became quite evident the longer you were there. For the first six months everybody was saying we are representing Australia, and we are here to help, but after six months people became tired and less tolerant of those changes and cultural differences, and the friendly nature, and openness and willingness to help, turned to frustration with, ignorance of, and contempt of those people. And you can sort of see that happen.

...UNTAC



Figure 8.2. The relationship between contingent size and the level of interaction with, and dependence on the host culture.

The essential features of the model are that as the size of the contingent increases the level of dependence on, and interaction with, the host population decreases. Correspondingly, the level of control over the environment increases. Larger Australian missions such as those deployed to Somalia (OP SOLACE) and Rwanda (UNAMIR) were less dependent on the host culture, and in general terms were homogenous, self-sufficient groups within a larger mission environment. Contact with the host population was controlled through formal military activities. Those who did come in contact with the host population did so within this formal context, making the experience somewhat superficial. The size of the mission allows a substantial part of Australian military and national culture to be established within the confines of a formal military structure. In this environment, it is possible for individuals to occupy positions which have little contact with the host culture, or the formal structure offers the opportunity to avoid contact. As described by Hirschi (1969), the group plays a large part in forming behavioural norms of conduct, and given the military socialisation process this is likely to be a powerful determinant of behaviour. As such, those who do not have regular contact with the culture are less likely to have their approach or beliefs significantly challenged, as there is a source of continual reinforcement Australian cultural norms.

> *...probably got the least out of it because we had limited contact with the local population. A number of people went out on routine tasks, however, the drivers were generally moving from admin area to admin area, and their movement was very tightly controlled by the Infantry. Whereas the Infantry and Arms Corps soldiers tended to have a little more contact with the local population.* *...OP SOLACE*

I was based in the capital, there were guys in the Q-Store who did not understand what our role was over there. That was pretty sad. It obviously was not stressed in their training, and they could not be bothered to find out for themselves when they were there. They tried to keep it as Australian as possible, so they missed a lot I think. ...UNTAC

At the small contingent end of the scale (Figure 8.2) are the UNMO's, who are deployed as individuals to work as part of a small multinational group, and other small group deployments such as the de-mining operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and Cambodia (CMAC). These groups are often immersed in the host culture, because as part of their role they work and live closely with the local community. As noted in the participant comment (p. 372) that introduced the model (Figure 8.2), the size of the group and the nature of their task makes them more dependent on the local community for support than is the case for larger contingents. Similarly, because of the size of the group there is a less rigid military structure, and a higher level of informal contact with the local population. These groups have a less formal control over their environment, and are therefore more likely to be challenged and confronted by the cultural differences that surround them, and they develop appropriate adaptive strategies.

Just sort of living and operating in that country and with other nations soldiers that was where the problems started after the initial honeymoon period. ...MFO

The mission in Cambodia (UNTAC) provides a useful example of a hybrid larger mission. In Cambodia, the nature of the task assigned to the Australian contingent required the significant HQ element to operate out of the capital city. The remainder of the force were dispersed to all parts of the country in varying group sizes from a single soldier working with a group of UNMO's, to groups of three or four, and upwards. In this case, some elements of the mission were operating at the large contingent end of Figure 8.2, while others were operating at the small contingent end. Accordingly, perceptions of the Cambodian mission provided by the participants in this study varied depending on their role and deployment. Consequently, the provision of homogenous training in cultural issues was seen as inadequate by some members, who required a more detailed and accurate understanding of cross-cultural issues, and as too detailed for those who were employed in larger organisations.

The development and interpretation of the features of Figure 8.2 show that the members of small groups are more likely to be required to demonstrate cross-cultural capability than the members of large groups. For larger groups, less cross-cultural demand is made of personnel, or there is more opportunity to structure the environment such that the impact of the demand is negated. Individuals in larger groups may therefore adapt to the environment by making predominantly procedural, or Position X adjustments, to their attitude and behaviour. In smaller groups, where the demand is much greater and the ability to structure the environment to reduce the demand is not available, individuals are required to make both administrative and cognitive adjustments to their attitudes and behaviours, and are therefore operating in Position Z (Figure 5.5).

The implications for preparation and training are that the information and skill requirements of the contingent is a function of group size, as well as task performance. Larger groups may be able to function appropriately with preparation that is fact-based, as their interaction with the environment is likely to be structured. Additionally, they are able to use the familiar military and national culture that is transplanted with them as a 'touchstone' against which they can measure new experiences. Smaller contingents, however are more exposed, less structured, and must adapt to the demands of the environment. Their ability to do this effectively and efficiently is likely to be facilitated by the provision of more detailed information, and specific skills training than is required by larger groups.

At present, the format, content and structure of predeployment is essentially the same regardless of contingent size and operation. The findings from this investigation suggest that more consideration should be given to a more sophisticated approach to predeployment preparation that tailors information and skills development to the role of the contingent, the operation of the contingent, and its size.

Figures 8.1 and 8.2 provide an insight into the nature of cross-cultural interaction that occurs on peace operations. Cross-cultural interaction should not be limited to contact with other national cultures but must also be considered in terms of contact with unfamiliar organisational cultures, both within the organisation and external to the organisation. Similarly, contact between the host culture and the force is a function of a variety of factors, some of which are determined prior to deployment. The following section develops a stage model of operational deployment that examines the individual behaviour within the broader

context of the evolution of a peace operation and immersion in the cross-cultural environment described above.

A Stage Model of Operational Deployment

In an early interview a participant who had commanded a small group operation in Africa described a feature of the deployment that he termed the "feral factor". His observation was made in relation to the particular challenges of small group command in isolated environments. He described the "feral factor" as:

> *For all these operations there is the "feral factor" that comes into play. This is the tendency of a group of blokes to go overseas into an environment where there is an element of danger and the opportunity to throw away some of the rules that bind their behaviour at home, and that is what they do. There is a tendency for them to sink to the lowest common denominator. Standards of safety, personal discipline and behaviour are thrown out the window.*
>
> *...ONUMOZ*

This issue was raised spontaneously by the participant in response to questions on leadership, but to the researcher it carried additional interest in that the "feral factor" might represent not only an insight into the challenges of command, but also an indicator of a particular stage in the evolution of the deployment. As we have seen from the review of the

literature in peace operations, little has been written on mission evolution in peace operations and the subsequent implications this might have for personal behaviour. The available models of psychological adaptation to peace operations (Bartone & Adler, 1994; Miller & Moskos, 1995) offer some limited understanding of the topic, but do not extend the models in terms of the consequences for individual behaviour. If the "feral factor" could be established as a generic cultural feature of peace operations deployment, then a model of individual behaviour in this environment might be established. The "feral factor" concept appears to extend the participants perceptions of a "lack of moral principle" noted in Chapter Seven. This was established in the negative selection criteria (Table 7.2) as a feature of individual behaviour that is linked to reduced effectiveness on peace operations. The consistency of the concept across missions suggests that there is some utility in further understanding the issues surrounding the relationship between these factors and performance.

From a capability perspective, examination of the "feral factor" may provide some insights into the leadership response to a context that is unfamiliar, and a problem that is unfamiliar. In the main, Australian units deploy and exercise in a conventional military context, in that they are self-sufficient, and their contact with the Australian population takes place within that context, as does their contact with foreign soldiers who may be part of the deployment. Those units that exercise overseas operate in a similar conventional context. Consequently, deployment to an operational environment where they are immersed in a foreign culture, and to varying degrees according to the size and nature of the contingent, they are dependent on that culture, represents a unique situation that could be represented by Position Z of the Capability Model (Figure 5.2). The findings of this study indicate that

principled behaviour that is guided by an appropriate individual value and belief system is associated with success on peace operations, and is also a factor attributed to the behaviour of capable individuals (Stephenson, 1992, 1995; Weaver, 1994). Understanding the influence this behaviour has on performance in peace operations may provide some insight into the role of the organisation in influencing the development of personal values, and subsequent performance in response to unfamiliar problems in an unfamiliar context (Position Z).

Further examination of the evolution of peace operations deployments with other participants showed that the "feral factor" concept could be identified by personnel from most missions. The common features of the concept was that it:

a. occurs in the routine or systems maintenance phase of the deployment;

b. is associated with a sense of dislocation from 'normal' moral and ethical standards of personal behaviour (this was more often an observation of small group operations); and

c. is associated with a lowering of professional standards of military behaviour (this was more often an observation of large group operations).

There were differences in interpretation and labelling, but these key features tended to remain constant. Figure 8.3 represents the main features of the evolution of an Australian contingent on peace operations.



Figure 8.3. A stage model of operational deployment.

Deployment and notification to deploy (Stage 1), is associated with a higher level of personal and work intensity, than the norm. It is during this stage that many of the expectations for the deployment, appropriate and inappropriate, are formed and reinforced. This level of intensity is maintained until arrival in-country. After arriving in location (Stage 2) the general consensus is that the intensity of personal and workplace activity associated with establishing the mission, if it is the first contingent, or adjusting to the new environment and procedures, if it is a subsequent contingent, is extreme. This period is generally described as physically and mentally exhausting, and individuals are said to have "saucers for eyes" as they adjust to a new work and living environment. Personnel are immersed in their work and have limited time for anything other than superficial contact with the local culture outside a work context. The level and nature of the contact varies according to the size of the work group or

contingent, and in larger contingents the individual's role.

This period reaches a peak that has been variously put at around six to ten weeks in a six month deployment. At this point, the contingent's role in the mission has been established, and the group and individual tasks involve less establishing new procedures and more the maintenance of newly established systems (Stage 3), and accordingly, over time the intensity of the operation decreases to a steady state.

In capability terms, the group has moved from Position Z to Position Y (Figure 5.2). In this new phase the personal and work intensity of the operation falls to a maintenance level. The individual has more time for interaction with the culture outside the work context. Figure 8.3 depicts this period as a flat line, but in reality it would be better represented as a sigmoid curve showing a series of peaks and troughs, as the contingent reacts to variations in the environment. A feature of Stage 3 is that during this period for officers and soldiers there is a drop in intensity, but not to the same level. Officers maintain a higher level of intensity because of their involvement in forward planning and higher level maintenance tasks. Soldiers on the other hand assume a purely systems maintenance role.

> *The biggest risk you face is letting your guard down. A lot of things that you do as a matter of routine might be dangerous to Joe Blow back in Australia but over there it is day-to-day activity. So I guess the leadership issue is trying to maintain the motivation of people over a long period of time and maintaining their focus on things. In the first 6 months, this is not a problem*

because you are focused on what has to be done. It went from a high level of requirement, and over six months it went down while the infrastructure that was created was handed over to civilians, and then you started monitoring the situation, the workload decreased and when this happens you start looking for other things to do. People start doing things that they would not normally do to escape the routine of the situation. ... I do not think that you take more risks that get you killed through military action, you probably start doing things that are silly at a personal level, like skylarking in vehicles, getting pissed in places that you should not, going into places that you should not go into, and people start cheating on their wives and taking those risk. Maybe those things start developing at a certain point. I would say six months in Cambodia, because that is when we got to a steady state in terms of workload. It would have been the reverse for the other contingent because it went from a boring mediocre deployment to the point where they started to pack up to come home which was a big job. When the activity rate dropped that was when the morale, leadership and command issues started to go up.

...UNTAC

As the deployment draws to a close the activity and intensity of the contingent starts to rise as they move towards either closing the mission down, or handing it over to an incoming contingent. However, the participants suggest that this activity does not reach the earlier peaks. Individual focus at this time is firmly fixed on the return home, and may occur four to six weeks from the end of the deployment.

The middle period (Stage 3) is of most interest in terms of the evolution of the deployment, as it is during this time that "feral" behaviour is likely to occur. Larger contingents noted a rise in the number of disciplinary problems during this time that they attributed to soldier boredom. Small contingents noted a higher incidence of inter-group problems, and for some individuals a tendency to move away from culturally accepted norms of personal and professional behaviour.

One senior officer described the stage model of deployment in the following terms:

People on deployment move through three stages in their attitude to the deployment, shock to routine to fantasy. Shock and routine are self explanatory. Fantasy is where the individual feels that their personal environment has changed. They don't feel bound by the normal moral and ethical rules. They need to be constantly reminded of the fact that they must live with the consequences of their actions once they go home. The commander needs to be aware of this problem. If it is the commanders first time overseas, he may also be prone to this sort of behaviour. The problems generally relate to alcohol and women. ...*MINURSO*

The "fantasy" stage that he describes is similar to the description of "feral" behaviour. The general features appear to be the belief that an individual can temporarily suspend the cultural belief and value systems that bind their behaviour in Australia, and that in this "fantasy" stage the consequences of their actions are only relevant to their current

environment. Another participant attempting to explain the behaviour suggested that it was similar to putting a "man in a mask":

> *It is like you put a man in a mask and they are not recognisable they will do a lot of different things; things they would not normally do.* ...*UNTAC*

It was suggested that officers were less likely to participate in "feral" behaviour because of the consistently higher level of work intensity. For the same reasons, it was difficult for them to recognise the change in intensity of the operation, and consequently the onset of "feral" behaviour in soldiers. This was particularly true in missions where command and control are decentralised, as the contingent may be dispersed over large geographical regions. Consequently, officers focused on task achievement; features such as a higher incidence of disciplinary problems, or a lowering of personal and professional standards may not have been appropriately associated with a change in the nature of the mission.

It should be stressed that "feral" behaviour occurs to varying degrees in different people; it does not affect all personnel. The examples provided in this study appear to represent the extreme end of the scale. Generally, the term describes the process whereby individuals and the contingent become lulled, by the lack of overt threat, into the rhythm of the host culture. It appears to be particular to the peace operations' context because after initial expectation of perceived or real threat, the threat level can decrease markedly, to the point where the mission may seem to be "holiday campish". In this environment, soldiers are expected to maintain a high standard of vigilance in an environment that provides all

indications that it is safe. One junior officer made the following comment:

> *... for the first six weeks we were very busy, and we were still going through the various task. As soon as we had dominated the area and we got into a routine it was the most dangerous time because people slackened off. ... That was one of the biggest leadership challenge: to continually maintain the standards set when you first deployed throughout the deployment. ...OP SOLACE*

In particular, this participant referred to the "little things", for example, not wearing flak jackets because they were heavy and hot and making minor changes to routines and methods of operation without reference to the chain of command.

Effectively, the onset of "feral" behaviour is associated with the individual becoming lulled into the rhythm of the surrounding culture. Individual response to this phenomenon varies greatly. That the role of threat to group or individual security is a key feature was highlighted by participants; they noted when the local situation deteriorated rapidly or unexpectedly the incidence of "feral" behaviour dropped noticeably and professional standards were again restored to high levels. One participant noted:

> *...when there was a sense of corporate or personal threat and things became much more serious, the rate of sexually transmitted diseases dropped markedly. The principle was that they had enough time for a few beers, but*

not enough time to go to the brothel. That was quite significant. Also the rate of dissatisfaction dropped off as well as people had less time to think.

...UNTAC

The most obvious signs that the contingent has entered this phase is the lack of maintenance of generally accepted professional standards, and at a personal level the response may be a shift in the individuals moral and ethical standards. The consequences for the contingent are the same, reduced effectiveness. But it goes further than this, as the following comments highlight:

One of the local NGOs was living with a local woman with the intention of marriage, and he would get a lot of feedback from his wife about the views of the local community. He would tell me that the locals hated people coming over and having their way with the local girls. We were all considered millionaire whites. It was all noted by the local people.

...ONUMOZ

The other baggage they brought home that caused a lot of martial discord was the guilt about their own moral behaviour while they were overseas.

...UNTAC

I solved the problem by forcing everybody to live-in, and banning women from the accommodation, that is, treating it like a Mess. There was a lot of

whingeing from people along the lines that at home they would be allowed women in their lines and or allowed to live out. Some of the opposition was rubbish. You didn't want these people in your home anyway, firstly, from a security point of view, and second, there is all the moral problems associated with their behaviour. ...CMAC

These three comments give a clear indication of the negative consequences of "feral" behaviour. The impact on the local community that is likely to result in negative feeling and potential reduced effectiveness; the consequences of emotional guilt carried by individuals and the impacts on family life and consequent work performance on return to Australia; and finally, a misrepresentation of the threat and willingness to engage in behaviours that could jeopardise the safety of the individual or group.

Reinforcing the importance of the "feral" phase in the evolution of the deployment is provided by the leader's perceptions of the major challenges they faced on peace operations. The most often expressed sentiment was that it was difficult to maintain professional standards and routines in a low threat environment.

Strength of character and action taken in accordance with a relevant set of principles was seen as the assets of leadership in this environment. The major issues concerned the maintenance of morale, and professional, moral and ethical standards. In large groups, the focus of commanders was on consistency and the maintenance of professional standards for the duration of the deployment. In small groups, the focus was often on the maintenance of

moral and ethical standards of personal behaviour. The contrast is apparent in the comments below:

> *I think a lot of countries start out alert, but over time they start to relax, and a few weeks later they say, "we don't need this", so they start to drop it off, and all of a sudden it becomes a tourist type activity. Even though the threat might be reduced over time we were there, we maintained the same standard of professionalism throughout. I think that was the way to go. People like consistency, soldiers like to know what the standard is, it is easier to control them when the standard is set. Once you start to compromise the standard, people start to lose their way and things don't work as well.* ...UNAMIR

> *There is a need for the leader to maintain some principle based leadership style. What becomes important, particularly in small teams, is to get somebody who has sufficient strength of character to maintain the standard expected at home.* ...ONUMOZ

The difference is one of emphasis. All commanders expressed concerns in both areas, however, each rated the relative importance these two factors differently. Both comments express a similar sentiment, that is, over time there is a potential for standards to become eroded. However, in the small group environment the concern is more often focussed on standards of personal behaviour, while in the large group the concern is with standards of professionalism. The leader's role in the solution is similar, they are responsible for setting

and maintaining the appropriate standard. In large groups, the maintenance of consistency in professionalism is the responsibility of the chain of command, in small groups the demand on the leader is greater, they live closer to the consequences of their decisions, the decisions are more likely to be more complex as they concern personal behaviour, and they have little recourse to second or alternate opinions. In such an environment the premium is placed on interpersonal skills of leaders, as one contingent commander commented:

> *I had problems with one sergeant and two officers, and all the problems stemmed from a lack of personal skills. The sergeant's approach to the troops was authoritarian and gruff, consequently he was ostracised by his subordinates and this caused problems in the group and impacted on our effectiveness. In the officers case, one insisted on his individuality in the way he behaved. This caused the perception of double standards within the troop. The second officer, had a detached style which again impacted on the soldiers. In each of these cases the problems were caused by a lack of interpersonal skills.* ...MINURSO

Some of the junior commanders in larger contingents noticed that in the early phase of the operation noted that they were particularly task or mission orientated, that is, they were primarily concerned with achieving the tasks set for them. As one platoon commander described it:

> *...I put the mission as superior to everything else. I was consequently too hard*

as far as the welfare of the troops was concerned. I was not aware of the impact of other factors such as duties, living conditions, and the abuse of fraternisation rules within the contingent were having. ...UNAMIR

Neglect of these issues resulted in problems within the platoon that reduced performance. This platoon commander found that a change in his focus to address these issues restored effective performance. This comment highlights the transition between phases of the model (Figure 8.3) for leaders. On deployment (Stage 2), task focus is paramount, with time the transition to the systems maintenance phase (Stage 3) is associated with a shift in leader focus to personnel issues. It also highlights the difference in the level of intensity between officers and soldiers during the maintenance phase, and the implications this has for leadership within the contingent.

The stage model of the evolution of a peace operations contingent outlined here is a broad brush approach to capturing the features of personal and professional behaviour commented on by the participants in this study. Further research is required to determine its utility as a model of peace operations, but in this study it provides a useful mechanism for exploring the relationship between individual behaviour and the evolution of a deployment, and therefore may be of value to future commanders. The general features of the model are that, the smaller the group, and/or the greater the decentralisation in command and control, the greater the problem, and this also likely reflects the differences in emphasis between personal and professional standards noted in small and large groups. Ultimately, the impact of "feral" behaviour on performance was negative for the individual and the organisation. In

personal terms, there was likely to be greater exposure to risk than was appropriate, and in organisational terms, the ramifications of individual behaviour had the potential to influence the relationship between the contingent and the host population, such that it impacted on the principle of consent.

The ability of the organisation to establish an appropriate conceptual framework for its operation, that influences the development of appropriate individual behaviours is a feature to success in this context. The leadership response to the "feral factor" was to reinforce expected standards of military professionalism. That is, general standards associated with the culture of the organisation. It may have been more appropriate for commanders to be able to reinforce a conceptual framework that was specific to the peace operations environment, one element of which was reference to broader military professionalism. That is behavioural and performance expectations that were anchored to a conceptual framework that reflected the current mission and task environment. The tactical guidance provided by the British Army's (1994) principles of consent appears to offer such a model. At present, limited conceptual guidance is provided to ADF personnel, and this may be contributing factor to "feral" behaviour. Similarly, greater understanding of the evolution of a peace operation noted in this study may provide commanders with the conceptual framework and understanding to be able to address the problem in-theatre.

For conventionally trained military personnel the cross-cultural aspects of peace operations represent Position Z of the Capability Model (Figure 5.2). A "lack of moral principled behaviour" has a negative impact on effectiveness in this environment. This

indicates that an appropriate value and belief system is an important feature in the development of the person operating in Position Z. Moreover, the organisation can play a significant role in influencing the formation of that system, and ultimately behaviour, by providing an appropriate conceptual framework from which individuals can define appropriate and inappropriate behaviour. In this way the organisation can influence the development of individual capability.

In the examination of the model described above (Figure 8.3) it was noted that officers in particular, were task focused for much of the deployment, presumably preventing some from observing the changes that were taking place in the nature of the contingent. One comment above describes the surprise associated with insight into the extent of this orientation, to the neglect of other influences on individual and group performance. Participants consistently described "task orientation" as a feature of Australian national character that is reinforced and developed by military training. The strength and consistency of the observation, and the link to organisational culture suggested that it was a factor worthy of further exploration.

TASK ORIENTATION AS A FEATURE OF AUSTRALIAN CHARACTER

The task orientated approach was considered to be a predominant feature of Australian character generally, and military character in particular. This characteristic was most noticed by those who were able to measure and compare their performance and style with other peacekeepers operating in the same environment faced with the same problems. In this study,

the UNMOs serving for 12 months in Israel were best able to articulate the features of the characteristic, but it was observed in the comments of representatives from all types of missions. Triangulation of the concept showed that it was an accurate portrayal of a general characteristic. The following comment from a participant best describes the characteristic, but also shows the surprise associated with personal insight into Australian national character that can result from intense cross-cultural interaction. The participant is discussing the frustration of dealing with the UN bureaucracy:

> *...as an Australian military person it is even more frustrating because we are extremely task orientated. All military people are, but we seem to be more so. We are brash, and a lot of other countries, even the Anglo-European countries like the Irish and Canadians, would sometimes be put off by Australian brashness and forcefulness - forwardness. This is not in just one individual but across the board. I do not consider myself to be a brash or pushy type of person, but when you see something that needs to be fixed and you are powerless to fix it, you become frustrated. I was surprised at how we came across to others. I looked at myself in terms of my team, and I was hard head. ...UNTSO*

In terms of this study the questions that arise from the discovery of this characteristic are: What are its advantages and disadvantages? What role does it play in the development of independent capability? It should be noted that task orientation was seen as a negative characteristic for people involved in cross-cultural interaction (Hannigan, 1990). If

Australians are predisposed to this type of behaviour what impact does this have on our performance in a peace operations environment that relies heavily on operating in conjunction with the different military and national cultures and with the consent of the local population?

Consistently, a task oriented approach was presented in a positive light. It was seen as quality that was respected and rewarded by other cultures. It was associated with the willingness to undertake any task assigned to them. In the absence of assigned tasks, it is the ability to identify problems and develop solutions with the underlying purpose of improving existing conditions, process or policy. It was conceded that this is also a feature of other military forces, but in Australian military personnel it is the predominant characteristic. Other nations with a similar task orientated intensity were primarily New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) personnel, and while different in application, the U.S. forces. The following comments by participants provide some insight into the quality

Our training is a very good, but I can't put it down to training. It is almost a cultural thing. I think our whole approach to our mission was that nothing was a problem. We were focussed on achieving the mission. We all knew that nothing was too hard, whereas some of the UN organisations would forget about it. ...*UNTAC*

It is in our nature that when we get to a new position we want to improve it, many of the officers over there had experience with the UN, or come from the Scandinavian countries are not really interested in changing, or improving the

situation because they see that the mission will roll on long after they have gone. ...*UNTSO*

I think that Australians are looked at as being the best around. For instance, when we left from a contingent of 29 working with the MFO, seven of us received commendations, and we were all working for different nationality bosses. It is just the way we do things. They appreciate that once we get a job, we get in and do it. It is in our nature. ...*MFO*

While a task orientated approach was seen by the participants as a product of military training, it was frequently defined as a feature of Australian national character that military training enhances and refines. It is therefore an assumed part of Australian performance in most environments, military and civilian. The predominant feature of the characteristic is the ability to identify problems and develop solutions that contribute to the positive development of the situation or environment, or alternatively, a willingness in the absence of clear task definition to create an environment that is structured and goal directed.

There was a general perception that while this quality was inherent to most professional military organisations, however, the participants believed that the intensity of this quality in ADF personnel was particularly appreciated by other military cultures. Similarly, it formed part of the criteria by which ADF personnel judged the professionalism of military personnel from other nations. The less task orientated the less professional, or the more task orientated the more professional.

The negative side of the task orientated approach was spontaneously raised by one participant. Subsequent attempts to triangulate the negative impacts of intense task orientation confirmed that there was potential for this characteristic to be a problem in a cross-cultural environment, and a potential 'blindspot' for Australians assessing their performance in a cross-cultural setting. For many of those involved in the triangulation process, consideration of the negative impacts of this characteristic was a novel concept. The following comment was made in support of the positive benefits of the task orientation without consideration of the potential negative implications of the approach for the force as a whole:

> *For example, the introduction of an Australian commander to the MFO was a shock to the other nations. They now had a commander who said, "this is what I want, and I want it now". This approach caused considerable resentment and back-biting, particularly among senior officers from other nations. It is what I expected a military commander to do, his approach was military and professional. It was a clash of military cultures. ...MFO*

At an individual level the negative impact of an intensely task orientated approach was noted in the following description:

> *Because your task is so loose over there, for example work on an OP for seven days doing nothing more than observe. Because we are linear thinkers and very task orientated, some Australians will go over there and restrict themselves further by saying I need some parameters to work in here,*

otherwise I am lost. Therefore, this is the task that I will set for myself and which I will apply to all others. These are the parameters which I will work in and therefore you have to work inside my square, because if you are outside it you are doing something wrong. When in reality all they have done is set their own tasks and parameters and then they are using that as a basis to judge others. They have created their own comfort zone. That is when the friction will come. What I am talking about is a philosophy of attitude or approach. ...UNTSO

In this case, the task orientated approach is seen as a method of defining the environment such that the unwanted variability is reduced. While this may be appropriate in some situations, over-reliance on it to the exclusion of other alternatives may be a significant limitation. When viewed from this perspective an overly task orientated approach is seen as dogmatic, and reduces the probability of lateral thinking and flexibility in a new environment. All these factors were noted as negative selection indicators by participants in Chapter Seven (Table 7.2).

In terms of capability, an intensely task orientated approach to problem definition may not be a supportive environment for the development of independent capability. It suggests that in the peace operations environment ADF personnel may be disposed toward defining the problems they encounter in terms of Position X (Figure 5.5) That is, rather than considering alternative approaches there is a tendency to redefine the environment that appears to be similar to those they may have been experienced in training. The apparent solution is to adjust

previous procedural knowledge (problem solving techniques) to the new context. This approach may preclude consideration that the new context also requires a cognitive adjustment as well as a procedural adjustment, and is therefore an independently capable (Position Z) situation.

The negative impact of over-reliance on task orientation as a method of operation in peace operation is that is does not allow for the cultural differences that exist between nations or their military forces. Consequently, alternate perceptions of the situation that would provide alternate (and equally appropriate) solutions may be excluded by ADF personnel as they define the environment in terms of task orientation. As with the issues in the evolution of a deployment, this aspect of Australian national and military character is likely to have greater impact on those operating as part of a small multinational team, for example UNMO's, or those operating as small Australian units operating and living closely with the local population. In larger Australian contingents the negative impact of the approach may not be noticed, or understood, as the impact on the contingent in the environment is likely to be diffuse, and consequently not recognised. Alternatively, the impact will be highly localised, and therefore self-fulfilling. Either way, the force may not have the ability to register the negative implications of this approach to the operation, and there is greater internal support, recognition and reinforcement of the need for a task orientated approach.

It is interesting to note that at the strategic level, military nations have continually pressed the UN to define tasks and end states prior to undertaking the mission. Both the

Australian (Australian Government, 1994) and American (PDD 25, 1994) offer political guidance on peace operations supports a task orientated approach. The multi-dimensional complexity of problems faced by all those who participate in peace operations suggests that the short-term thinking associated with defining end states prior to undertaking a mission is inappropriate and fanciful (Fetherston, 1994). That task orientation also predominates at the tactical level is not surprising, however, it is at this level, the 'coal face', that the positive and negative impacts will be felt.

For ADF personnel, who may be disposed toward an over-reliance on task orientation, training and experience may be required that allows for the consideration of other methods and approaches. Education, training and varied experience are the key to providing soldiers and officers with broader domain knowledge that will allow them to develop appropriate solutions to problems that are unfamiliar, in environments that are unfamiliar. In these environments there is no standard solution, and individuals must have the confidence, courage and knowledge to develop and implement their own solutions.

The model depicting the development of capability in the Australian Army (Figure 5.4) suggested that after establishing basic competence, the training and education system then exposed personnel to situations, through workplace and scenario based training, that required them to continually adapt and develop their basic competence such that ultimately they were better prepared for situations that required the demonstration of independent capability (Position Z). In this model, a task orientated approach and the skill set that is associated with it, might be developed as a basic competency (Position Y). It is an attitude and approach

compatible with the achievement of objectives and goals, and therefore well suited to most conventional military operation. However, exposure to a cross-cultural (peace operations) context highlights deficiencies that suggest the training and education path detailed in Figure 5.4 may be accurate in theory rather than practice.

It is possible that task orientation remains a constant feature of performance that is continually reinforced by the organisations culture, training and education. These influences combine to ensure that there is a 'method bias' such that scenario and workplace training focuses on the development of administrative capability (Position X) rather than cognitive capability (Position W). That is, the organisational culture represented in the education and training system does not provide situations in which the predominant cognitive approach to problem solving, task orientation, is challenged as inappropriate in some circumstances. Consequently, task orientation is continually reinforced as appropriate without consideration for those situations in which it may be inappropriate. This deficiency may be linked to the increasing requirement to define and justify training in terms of reductionist methods associated with CBET. The principles of Administrative Capability can be readily catered for within the existing framework of CBET procedure, but the more complex Cognitive Capability addresses issues that are either considered outside the framework of CBET, or not easily catered for by the reductionist method.

The advantage of the Capability Model (Figure 5.5) is that it incorporates the best features and practices of CBET, but does not impose methods that limit individual

development. Consideration of the task orientation issue within the framework of the Capability Model shows that when placed into a Position Z scenario (peace operations) ADF personnel are not experienced in recognising that they must make a cognitive adjustment to the rules that govern their behaviour, in response to a situation where established procedures or approaches (task orientation) limits their effectiveness. The ability to recognise the need for a cognitive change in approach, and then implement it comes from prior exposure through training and education and is reinforced by organisational culture.

In a similar way, a task orientated culture that attempts to define mission 'end-states' for complex environments like peace operations may result in individual expectations of mission success that are unlikely to be realised. The consequence at the individual level is that, in a task orientated culture, failure to achieve the task is likely to be equated with overall failure. The culture of the organisation and the definition of the mission combine to provide an expectation that a global solution, and therefore success is achievable and measurable. In peace operations this is unlikely to occur. Success is often redefined many times in the course of the operation, or may be seen as localised to a region or an event.

> *My impression is that this particularly affects Australians, in that you go over there to do a job and then you come home. You don't keep on sending people over there, and over there. ...UNTSO*

Involvement in peace operations requires a different perception of the measures of success and failure, and additional methods, skills and abilities to meet the demands of the

environment. The negative side of an over-reliance on task orientation is that it limits the scope of adaptive approaches that might otherwise be used by the individual, and thereby limits the possibility for individual or organisational independent capability. It is a feature of national and military character that can be of great advantage, but its limitations must also be recognised.

The Australian Army's approach to training and education modelled in Figure 5.4 is appropriate for developing capable individuals, however, as it is currently applied there may be a dependence on training for procedural (Position X) rather than cognitive capability (Position W). If this is the case, the predominant mindset of 'task orientation' is continually reinforced as the only appropriate cognitive solution. As we have seen here, in cross-cultural contexts other cognitive approaches are encountered, some of which may be more appropriate to the context. The findings on task orientation as a national characteristic opens a window on possible research directions in education and training in the military.

THE LEGACY OF THE ANZAC LEGEND

Task orientation was seen as one aspect of Australian national and military character, however, as noted in Chapter Five the nature of military culture in terms of history and traditions may be a significant contributing factor toward the development of independently capable individuals. For the ADF generally, and the Australian Army particularly, the Anzac legend has been a consistent feature of Australian military culture influencing individual behaviour. Established at Gallipoli and fostered through the First World War, it's features can

be traced through every conflict in which ADF personnel have participated. Moreover, it is regularly reinforced in general military training at all levels. As the following comments demonstrate the emotion of the legend is alive and well, and deployed with ADF personnel to peace operations:

> *It is not with a little pride that I made the realisation - that I made the connection - between my approach, my national identity and my military professionalism. You really become aware of your place in Australian military heritage.* ...*UNTSO*

> *Seeing Australians operate, and seeing how when things required planning or required resources, generally, you ended up with an Australian in a key position. ... you join the military, and you are a part of the Anzac legend, we went overseas and we did a job, and we have maintained what people think of Australians. I think that small things like wearing a slouch hat around was great.* ...*UNAMIR*

Comments of the utility of Australian national character in a peace operations environment were either associated directly with the legend, or were expressed in terms that outlined the main features of national character consistent with the legend. ADF personnel generally see themselves as "easy going", and this is seen as an asset in developing relationships with people from other cultures. It should be noted at this point that Canadians (Pinch, 1994a) and Irish (Haberl-Zemljic et al, 1996) also see this as an asset of their national

character, and the Swedish see it as a part of the culture of their defence force (Haberl-Zemljic et al, 1996). The following comments give a sense of the Australian interpretation:

> *... combined with a natural, easy going nature allowed them to develop good relationships with different nationalities in the area, and that helps. ...MFO*

> *I dealt with every different nationality, and the Australians would have been the best received of the countries there. It comes down to a couple of reasons; they were easy going and have a genuine interest in what is going on around them. ...MFO*

The main features of the Anzac legend are the uniquely egalitarian nature of the Australian society and the concept of mateship. An "easy going nature" can be interpreted as a feature of egalitarianism, in that, it suggests an ability to relate appropriately to people all levels of society, regardless of status or cultural heritage. The following comment reinforces this interpretation:

> *I believe that we are a pretty classless society. For Australians it does not matter whether you are a Major General, or a bricklayer, or a businessman, or a car salesman, you all stand in the crowd at the football, cheer and boo at the same time, rub shoulders and carry on. It does not happen in other societies, there is a greater distinction. That is where the Australian Corporal*

will relate to the senior UN official just as he would any other person, he will listen with respect, but he will not be intimidated because he knows that the other person is no better than he is, and he knows that he is good at his job. ...UNTAC

Egalitarianism is seen as a definite asset in that it allows Australian soldiers to move easily between the political and hierarchical layers of the UN and the multinational force efficiently and effectively. The advantage is that they are unlikely to be diverted by the self-interest of others because they have the independence of mind to remain focused on the task and their role. However, like the concept of task orientation, the notion that Australians are "easy going" people hailing from a remarkably "egalitarian" society is not without it's critics:

I would say that the equal and fair attitude is where I would disagree. It is something that has been promulgated in military training. We have never had any intention to be anything other than equal and fair to anyone other than ourselves. ... From a realistic Aussie point of view, having done a bit of travel, the Aussie is a bit of an arsehole wherever he visits, because he thinks he is pretty good, and he tends to put others down a fair bit. ... From what I have seen it is one area where we are quite weak, and that is in putting up with other people and other cultures. Certainly, I have come across cultures who put up with us far more than we put up with them. ...MFO

I think there is a lot of twaddle spoken about Australian culture and how

adaptable we are, I think we build ourselves up to be more adaptable than we are... *...UNTSO*

I am not convinced that we are so easy going. I think we like to say that we are to other people. *... UNTSO*

The sense from these comments is that while the features of the Anzac legend are well ingrained into Australian military psyche, they may not translate effectively into practice. In a similar way to the issue of task orientation, the positive features of Australian character are well understood, but the strength of the perception may be hindering objective assessment of actual performance in cross-cultural settings. Similarly, it may be acting as a limitation to alternate forms of behaviour.

Surprisingly, 'mateship' was not consistently raised as a cohesive concept of Australian national character in this study. Participants often noted the differences in mateship found in formed units (particularly Arms Corps), and the difficulties associated with forming composite units. The following participant was commenting on the difficulties associated with forming a composite unit comprised of one large formed body, in this case an infantry company, and medical and logistic companies, whose members were drawn from some 60 separate units. The differences he notes are based on the concept of teamwork, the root of which is the concept of mateship:

When the main body arrived we went through the same learning process

again. I found that even though they had been in Australia two weeks longer than us, when they came across they still did not have a schmick. No cohesion. It took us six weeks before things were functioning smoothly. Teamwork wise the "us and them" attitude continued to crop up. It was really difficult to lead these guys [infantry] *when they are getting a lot of flak from people in their own force* [medical]. *There is no question of loyalty in the Arms corps, there is dependence on your mates. I found that others do not have that same approach or attitude. ...UNAMIR*

Another officer noted his disappointment at the apparent lack of mateship, particularly among some members of the Army element of the contingent:

...the 8 to 4 syndrome, that to me was very disappointing and in the Army in particular, they would come back to their home vegetate, they did not put in any extra, they would do their rostered work but that was it. They would not help their mates. Not everybody was like that and most people adjusted to doing that, but in the main the Navy were probably better at that, and that goes against the ilk a bit to have to admit. ...UNOSOM

Mateship remains an integral part of the Australian national and military character, however, it may be that the fundamental change in society, noted by some authors (Hill, 1995; Toffler & Toffler, 1980, 1995), toward a society that caters for the individual is having a negative impact on the concept of mateship in society, and the military. This notion may be

worthy of further investigation.

A previous comment noted a period of "six weeks" after deployment before the force began to function satisfactorily. As we have seen in Figure 8.3, this period of the operation is the most intense (Stage 2), and it would be suspected that it calls for the greatest level of internal cohesion to ensure effective performance. This observation emphasises the importance of predeployment preparation in developing cohesion in composite units. In situations where the composite unit contains an established or formed unit, the differences in cohesion within the force can create an obstacle to force cohesion. Present indications suggest that often there is little effort made to overcome these obstacles in the time available. This issue may be worthy of further consideration as a feature of predeployment preparation. As we have seen in Figure 8.1 internal cohesion and mateship are not concepts that can be relied to exist within an contingent of ADF personnel, composite units involve as many cross-cultural issues as contact with a foreign culture, these are issues that must be addressed in general training, and consolidated in predeployment preparation prior to deployment.

Other individual qualities ascribed to Australian soldiers as part of the Anzac legend are: independence of mind, inquisitiveness and eagerness to learn, resourcefulness, and the ability to make decisions (Beaumont, 1995). All of these features were raised by the participants. A common feature was the observation that Australians at all levels often became the centre of planning or organisation, possibly further reflecting our task orientated nature:

The most important person is the section commander because he controls what is actually happening. You get section commanders going overseas on these deployments, and there are many examples from Cambodia, where it was the digger or the section commander with four military observers from three or four different countries, and the guy who is pulling the strings is the digger, because in Cambodia he controls the communication, but more importantly he could make a decision. If you asked for a decision he was able to make it.

...UNTAC

Seeing Australians operate and seeing how when things required planning or required resources, generally, you ended up with an Australian in a key position. *...UNAMIR*

Willingness to learn was a key perception of Australian effectiveness on peace operations. In some of the participants comments made earlier, a genuine interest in the environment and a willingness to take the time to learn about it is seen as complementary to an "easy going nature". The sentiment was expressed either as a willingness to use the opportunity to advance professional knowledge, in that, the opportunity to learn from other peacekeepers operating in the mission area was readily taken at an informal level. However, more often it was expressed in terms of a willingness to learn about the host culture through the local language. Quite often individual operational effectiveness was seen to be enhanced by the ancillary benefits of attempting to converse with the host population in the local language. The benefits were seen to be increased mutual respect and greater rapport (consent

building activities), which in turn translated into increased effectiveness in achieving the task. The following is representative of the sentiment expressed by the participants:

> *Where Australians come into their own is that they are willing to learn the basics. We attempted to speak the language, and they* [the local population] *seemed to take great pride in that. The other side was the U.S. who had their own U.S. Somalis who did the interpreting, which for them did not work out, because in the end they tended to support Aideed. They were very clinical in their approach to the Somalis* [population]. *We always sought out someone who could speak English, and we learned to speak a bit of Somali.*
>
> *...UNOSOM*

The Anzac legend remains a powerful feature of Australian military culture that contributes to individual motivation, attitude and behaviour modelling, and therefore a useful organisational tool in influencing the development of individual capability. The basic characteristics, behaviours and attitudes associated with successful performance in a cross-cultural environment are the similar to those valued by the ADF and Australian culture generally. In preparing for peace operations, the role of predeployment training may be to emphasise those attitudes that are most appropriate, and de-emphasise those that are least appropriate. The former might be incorporated into an appropriate conceptual framework that features an Australian approach to characteristics, attitudes and behaviours that are valued in the conduct of peace operations. The latter strikes upon a feature a general feature on cross-cultural interaction, in that it is important to know yourself and the impact of your approach

and style on others before you can be effective. Some participants in this study suggest that the features of the Anzac legend more closely represent how Australians would like to see themselves, rather than how they actually are. This is an important insight that warrants further consideration.

In terms of organisational capability the findings of this study suggest that if organisational culture is defined in terms that reflect the desired characteristics of individual capability, then the conditions are created that provide guidance for individuals to develop and model appropriate behaviours. This is not a new concept, behaviour modelling for individuals was introduced as a psychological concept and treatment method by Bandura (1969), however, the importance of organisational culture in influencing individual behaviour is an important concept in the development of capability, and therefore an important consideration in the development of organisational capability.

CONCLUSION

The terms of reference in which the understanding of capability and organisational culture were to be originally interpreted was expanded by the participants in the study. They described their experiences of Australian national character and ADF culture in terms of cross-cultural contact. For many, this provided their first insight into the 'dark side' of their character, in that those characteristics that their previous experience had led them to believe were positive qualities could be interpreted as limitations in other contexts.

The apparent propensity Australians have for task orientation as a mental frame of

reference is revealed as a good example of this insight. While generally accepted as an extremely positive characteristic in most situations, its application in some cross-cultural contexts highlights its inadequacies. Consideration of the problems associated with task orientation in terms of the capability model suggest that ADF personnel have limited experience in changing their cognitive frame of reference.

Independent capability is associated with the ability to make an administrative and cognitive adjustment to orientations, attitudes and behaviours to resolve unfamiliar problems in unfamiliar contexts. The analysis of task orientation as a cultural characteristic governing behaviour in peace operations suggests that when confronted with a cross-cultural environment ADF personnel are adept at making an administrative adjustment, but not so adept at making a cognitive adjustment, and this may reflect organisational culture, training and education.

The participants also highlighted that cross-cultural contact in a peace operations environment is more complex than purely the interaction between the contingent and the host culture. The concept of cross-cultural contact must be expanded to include differences within the ADF, differences between different types of organisational structures and cultures, and differences in the application of professional skills by different nations. Peacekeepers are immersed in all these types of cross-cultural contact in the course of preparing for, and participating in, a peace operation. The role of appropriate predeployment education and training in reducing the cross-cultural impact, and thereby improving individual performance and organisational effectiveness is vital.

The theme that runs through all the issues raised in this chapter is that peace operations requires some form of conceptual framework from which the understanding that guides action can be developed. The present approach is to translate purely military concepts to the new environment, and while this has been successful, it is not the complete answer. Military professionalism remains the cornerstone of successful performance on peace operations, but it does not adequately provide a framework from which the issues of cross-cultural contact on the scale described in this chapter can be understood. The issues raised here are outside the domain of a conventional military approach. The capability model has proved useful in understanding and describing the shortfalls that exist between the current approach and the participants observations. It may also prove useful as a model of training and education that could be used to support an appropriate peace operations framework.

Investigation of the role organisational culture plays in the development of individual capability suggests that a strong internal culture that reflects and reinforces the fundamentals of capability, such as exists within the Australian Army, does influence the development and demonstration of individual capability. The primary role of culture in the peace operations context was as a guide to appropriate value and belief systems. Individual belief systems that resulted in behaviour that was not in accord with the purpose of the organisation resulted in reduced individual performance and organisational effectiveness. The development of an appropriate conceptual framework described above would accurately reflect those attitudes, values and beliefs that the organisation valued in the peace operations context. The next chapter takes these issues further by considering organisational climate, the second element in developing organisational capability.

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CHAPTER NINE

CAPABILITY AND ORGANISATIONAL CLIMATE: TRAINING AND EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

Organisational climate was defined in Chapter Five as those leadership and human resource policies and practices that constitute the prevailing trend for guiding individual action within the domain of the organisation. Two features of military organisational climate were highlighted in the review of the literature as factors that potentially contribute to the development of individual capability. These were: the training and education system, and the use of directive control as a command and control system.

This chapter will address the role of the training and education system in developing capable individuals, using peace operations as a case study. The military training system comprises three elements: individual, team and collective training all three of which contribute to an organisational climate that develops capable individuals. In preparing for peace operations, training and education for ADF personnel can be provided through participation in either predeployment preparation or the ADF Peacekeeping Seminar. In this study, only one participant had completed the ADF Peacekeeping Seminar, and that had occurred after his deployment. Given this situation, the focus of the study was on an evaluation of the contribution that predeployment preparation, which is essentially individual training, and some elements of general collective training make to performance on peace operations. This study represents the first external evaluation of predeployment training conducted by the ADF. The purpose was to evaluate how much transfer of knowledge, skills and attitudes occurred as a

result of the training. This approach represents a Level Three or 'behavioural' evaluation in Kirkpatrick's (1994) model of training evaluation.

A second, and broader approach, to examining participants perceptions of peace operations training was to address whether the topic should be included in professional all Corps or Corps based individual training. It was expected that this approach would provide an insight into the alternatives that may be available to current approaches, and provide participants with a frame of reference against which they could consider their predeployment experience.

PREDEPLOYMENT PREPARATION

A brief history of DFSU was provided in Chapter Five, but it did not give an insight into how the content of the course is derived. The range of participants in this study allowed the pattern of predeployment content development to emerge. The participants ranged from those who were deployed overseas prior to the formation of RHC, to those who had commanded RHC and DFSU, and finally, to those who had been deployed most recently.

Prior to the formation of a dedicated unit to conduct predeployment training, deployment administration and preparation was controlled either centrally through Army Office (Canberra) for individual deployments (UNTSO), or where a unit was to be deployed, the unit was responsible for developing appropriate training (UNTAC). In both cases the

development of training content appears to have been somewhat ad hoc. Instruction was conducted over a week for individuals, and over a period of three months for some units. For the units in particular, the training focussed on military skills development with some basic add-on fact based instruction in cultural issues. The participants who observed this training commented that the participation rate varied according to other unit preparation priorities, consequently, some elements of the force did not receive the full benefits of the preparation that was available.

The formation of RHC resulted in some tightening of procedure, process and content. However, alterations to course content continued to be ad hoc, driven by the training perceptions of the mission environment, rather than the application of recognised training need and content analysis techniques. Content continued to be predominantly fact based, but the addition of team building skills and activities designed to facilitate group bonding in composite contingents was conducted for some deployments prior to departure.

The formation of DFSU was seen by participants as another positive stage in the development of predeployment preparation, more recent missions appear to be more positive about their predeployment preparation than those deployed earlier. The information continues to be predominantly fact-based, but the depth, quality and consistency of information has improved. Changes in training content are more considered, and to some extent based on more effective research, although there continues to be limited application of recognised training development techniques.

Predeployment preparation content specification and course design has since its inception been based on the experience of the practitioners, and developments overseas. There has been little, or no attempt to adopt the concepts and processes of the ATS to assist in the development of preparation content. While the rigid application of the ATS model would not be entirely appropriate in this setting, it would add a level of consistency to the future developments in content design and delivery.

In addition to this, there is a need for some conceptual framework on which to hang much of the information provided in predeployment. A consistent theme of the participant's comments was the view that the role of predeployment preparation was to provide some form of conceptual framework that could be used as a guide to initial action in the mission area. The nature of the framework was expressed in terms of a cognitive understanding, or model, from which the issues to be confronted in the mission area could be interpreted and understood.

As we have seen in Chapter Eight, the Capability Model (Figure 5.5) has some utility as an umbrella framework that could be used to incorporate the relevant features of the ATS to be considered in content and design development, and as a broader framework for knowledge and skills development that would assist in the development of an improved conceptual understanding of peace operations.

FINDINGS

The review of the literature (Chapter Three) regarding predeployment preparation content suggested that the following five generic areas were of particular importance to deployed personnel: orientation and attitude; cultural knowledge; negotiation; stress management; and military related skills. The findings of this study each of these areas will be addressed in turn.

ORIENTATION AND ATTITUDE

The literature review highlighted that an attitude different from that required for conventional operations was required for peace operations. Attitude was seen as a precursor to behaviour, where an inappropriate attitude predisposed personnel to inappropriate behaviours. The attitude appropriate for peace operations was seen to be one that emphasised an understanding of the need for consent and impartiality, and the role of human relationships in facilitating effective achievement of the mission.

The majority of participants believed that combat training was appropriate for participation in peace operations. However, it is necessary to place a caveat on this statement. Many of the participants also noted that collective training and preparation for conventional operations in Australia is focussed on low level or SWC scenarios, a key feature of which is the ability of the military to work effectively with the local civil infrastructure. Additionally, training for these scenarios places significant emphasis on ROE and LOAC training. Similarly,

preparation for SPE activities emphasises the importance of ROE and develops skills in crowd control, and limited human contact skills that participants saw as appropriate to the peace operations context. Consequently, training for conventional military operations in Australia involves developing some skills that are appropriate, and potentially transferable to, a peace operations environment.

> *I suspect also that our low level short warning training leads us to that anyway. We are constantly pushing the line of Rules of Engagement, and correct identification of targets. None of the conventional warfare thought of, 'if you see something move shoot it'. ...OP SOLACE.*

> *I believe that we have a balance of operations, where we might inflict maximum chaos on the enemy, and then we will do an SPE operation, or a low level operation. I believe that what we are doing at that level is adequate. ...UNAMIR*

> *I do not think that the soldiers were in the warrior frame of mind before they left. Going back to the SPE and low level training, because of that training we were all trained up for a low level operation we were not keyed up for the 'kill type' conventional scenario. ...OP SOLACE*

In the large missions, it was generally acknowledged that combat training in the Australian context provided officers and soldiers with some of the basic skills and attitudes

appropriate to effective performance on peace operations. That the transition was not seamless was noted by a number of participants, but it was generally acknowledged that the Australian infantry adapted quickly and appropriately to the difficult circumstances they encountered on these operations.

It appears that the conventional scenario based training undertaken by the Australian infantry is well suited to their operation in peace operations. However, it should be noted that the infantry element employed for both OP SOLACE and UNAMIR came from the Ready Deployment Force (RDF) based in Townsville. It is these units that are most likely to participate in SPE type activities, where the emphasis on these type of contact skills is the most advanced. Also, it should be noted that the contact skills associated with this activity are at a gross level, and primarily involve dealing with Australian nationals. The finer human contact skills that have been associated with peace operations (Fetherston, 1994), such as the maintenance of consent and impartiality through negotiation or mediation, are outside the domain of this training. So, while this type of conventional preparation is well suited to orientating members of the infantry, particularly the RDF, for peace operations duties. It should not be seen as providing the complete set of skills, or as the only preparation required by ADF personnel, or as preparing all ADF personnel.

More research is required on which skills from this type of collective training are transferable, and which are not. In broad terms, the attitudes and skills developed in this type of training appear to serve Australian infantry personnel well overseas. Later in this Chapter the analysis shows that there is a need to further develop the scope of these contact skills.

Moreover, there is a need to develop training in these skills that can be provided to other elements of the force outside the infantry.

The issue of developing an appropriate orientation and attitude is implicit to predeployment training through the delivery of cultural and mission specific briefings. In the main, generation and transmission of an appropriate attitude has been a command responsibility. Most participants, more so in larger missions, recalled continual reminders along the line that, 'while it was potentially a high threat situation it was not a war', and 'their role was to assist the local population'. The message in all cases seems to have been global in nature, lacking specific information on the elements that constitute the basis for action in such an environment. The tactical principles of consent developed by the British Army (1994) provide one method to link the global message delivered by commanders, the mission specific information provided in predeployment preparation, and action taken in-theatre by soldiers. In the Australian context, instruction in these principles in predeployment, general training, or both may provide an appropriate mechanism for the development of finer human contact skills, and thereby reduce the adjustment and adaptation time currently required in-country.

In the smaller missions, where the application of professional skills is similar to that which would be provided in a war role, in that they are supporting the operations of a larger mission through the provision of a specific professional function, the distinction between combat and peace operations orientation is less valid. The issues for these contingents was more closely focused interpersonal interaction with the surrounding cultures, implicit to which was the maintenance of consent and impartiality. This reflects the earlier finding (Chapter

Eight, Figure 8.2) concerning the distinction between the type of skills and level of preparation required by small and large contingents.

Weapon handling by the locals was poor. As we were supposedly unarmed we were required to travel with guards. These guards were provided by the RCAF or the police. Most of time the guards weapons were in very poor condition, for example some had cracked barrels, all of them were dirty. The guards had no idea on how to use the weapon let alone maintain it. They often asked us as trained soldiers to teach them how to fire these weapons. These guys were supposed to protect us. Realistically, in a contact they were holding your weapon. Worse was the fact that when you travelled with them their weapons would unexpectedly discharge, or they would travel with the weapon in a dangerous state. It was beyond our role to train them in the use of their weapons, even for our own safety. It was decided that to do this would have be a breach of our impartiality.

...CMAC

In Gaza, the UN did not have a mandate. Our official rationale for being there was to assist in the evacuation of UN and other internationals from the area if things exploded. So we had to very careful about what we were doing. We didn't work very much with the Palestinian Civil Police. The aim of the contact was so that they knew who we were, and we knew who they were. Basically, we were working their patch. ...UNTSO

Clearly, in smaller contingents it is important for individuals to have some understanding of the principles that should guide their behaviour in situations that are not readily evaluated from a purely military frame of reference. Moreover, they need the appropriate skills to successfully achieve the tasks set for them in this environment.

CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE

Language

D.P. Eyre (1994) noted that positive comments on the utility and increased effectiveness of soldiers who were able to rapidly pick up essential bits of the local language. Attempting to work with host population in their local language was seen to enhance local effectiveness. This was one approach to developing cultural understanding, others included appropriate consideration for local customs and religions, modes of communication and conflict resolution.

The cultural information provided in predeployment preparation involves fact-based briefings detailing local customs and religions, and appropriate forms of behaviour in response to those customs. In some cases language training has been provided, but it is the exception rather than the rule. A handbook issued to all ADF personnel deploying to a particular region provides written information on culture and religion to supplement the briefings. It also provides a range of potentially useful phrases, spelt phonetically, in the host language.

Most participants considered basic language skills an asset. In most cases it was not seen as essential because the language of the mission was English and/or the local population had sufficient understanding of English to ensure the reliable exchange of information. However, the majority of participants believed that they were more effective if they had a basic colloquial understanding of the local language. For example:

> *I sent back to Australia for a good package of* [language] *tapes. I could have got by without it, but I was more effective for having it. Even down to reading road signs.* ...*UNTSO*

> *...the more that you got to know the more useful it was to you. Dealing on a day-to-day basis with the locals, there were ugly incidents where rifles were pointed, and a lot of that was because they did not understand what you were on about, and you could not understand them. The guys who were really good at it would just gibber away and swap drinks out of canteens and whatever, and everything became smooth. It was an advantage to know what you were talking about.* ...*UNTAC*

> *For infantry sergeants to come to grips with language the way that they did, I was most impressed with some of them. Some were better than others, some just blundered their way through. Some guys went out of their way and did an excellent job, it was as if they wanted to become Arabic, the way they went at it. They became more integrated with the Columbians and the Arabs so that*

they could do their job better. A couple of others had no idea and didn't want to know and were treated accordingly, they were less effective. ...MFO

Attempts to include language as part of predeployment training has had mixed success. Given the short time frames that generally exist between notification and deployment, the main difficulties encountered include: determining the appropriate language and level; finding an appropriately experienced instructor; and determining what words and phrases to include.

Most participants were able to learn the basics of the language in-country through daily interaction with the host population, or through their own efforts they educated themselves. In these cases the effectiveness gains, outlined in the comments above, to be made in learning the language were not available until some time into the deployment. It is important to note that increased effectiveness is referred to in both a professional and social framework. Knowledge of the language has immediate benefits in facilitating understanding and the passage of information, but it also contributes to an improved understanding of the cultural issues. Finally, it contributes to a reduction in the negative aspects of culture shock as the individual is able to negotiate the basics of, for example, navigation or purchasing food.

As an example of the problems associated with introducing language into predeployment training, the following comments give an insight in the consequences of providing an inappropriate level, and the dangers of using a third party language:

There was high Khmer and low Khmer if you like, and some of the lingo that we were taught was not how it is said over there to normal people. It was like we were learning the Royal version of the language, which even if you could pronounce it correctly (and some guys were good at it) the locals would look at you as if you were an idiot anyway. ...*UNTAC*

The use of French, I thought that would have been a basic one. We sat down and did some French. Well, we got there and the invading Army was speaking English, so the whole country was speaking English. It caused a few problems when you started to use French because all the local people were too afraid to use French. ...*UNAMIR*

Interpreters

The use of interpreters is common practice in peace operations. In larger contingents the ADF has attached military interpreters to the force, and smaller contingents hire interpreters from the local population. No instruction or information on the skills involved in selecting or using interpreters is provided in predeployment preparation. In this study, where the participant mentioned that they had used an interpreter, they were asked whether there were any specific skills necessary. The purpose was to determine whether this topic was appropriate for inclusion in predeployment training, and if it was, to provide some guidelines on the nature of the skills required.

The first finding is that the use of interpreters is not limited to contact with the host population. In the MFO in particular, interpreters are more often used to facilitate communication within the force.

> *The problem with that was I had a boss who was a Columbian. Now they have a smattering of English, which is the language in the MFO, but it was extremely difficult to make him understand, so we had a young national Servicemen who used to be with us all the time, he was a Clerk and every time you would want to talk to the boss you would ask him to relay the message, or he would sit with us and he would interpret. ...MFO*

The general consensus was that the skills involved in using an interpreter could be acquired in-country. However, two information issues were raised, first, a level of cultural awareness or familiarisation is required, and in some cases where there is a requirement to use technical language there may be difficulties with both Australian and local interpreters.

> *Culturally, you need to be really aware. ...* [in] *a number of situations in which we asked the interpreter to play hard ball, he didn't, and it was culturally based. We had a number of full linguists across there who we had to take with us because they would often correct the* [local] *interpreter. The role of interpreters needs to be highlighted in predeployment training. ...UNTAC*

The biggest problem in using an Australian was him having a depth of knowledge of the words. The other side was the intent of what I wanted to say to people using a Khmer interpreter, I suspected there was a re-interpretation of what I wanted to say culturally. One had to be careful in choosing words because of the structure of their language. I found the best way was to ask the question twice in different ways. You needed to be aware that you had to do that often. ...UNTAC

The findings of this study suggest that the inclusion of information on the use on interpreters in predeployment preparation is 'nice to have' rather than 'essential'. Most participants suggest that the skills are easily acquired, but there does need to be some awareness of the host culture.

Religion and Culture

Just as attempting to prepare personnel with language skills is difficult, preparing personnel to deal with the culture, customs and religions of another country is a task fraught with hidden traps. Information on these subjects can be difficult to obtain, and accuracy difficult to verify. However, as noted by D.P. Eyre (1994) a basic knowledge of, and sensitivity to, the customs and culture of the host population can lead to significant gains in terms of establishing rapport and consent.

I think going to a country like that, particularly a Muslim country, you have the potential to really embarrass yourself if you are not aware of some of the cultural refinements. You need to know the stuff about not pointing bare feet, and not touching somebody with the wrong hand. These are basic survival skills for operating in the culture, those were the things that were learned on the ground. Even down to the women, we had Muslim girls who provided all the cleaning. As a male here in Australia you would get a cleaner and you would chat about things and get to know her, over there it is not the right thing for you to be talking to Muslim women unaccompanied. If you were not aware of it you could get into some trouble. ...UNOSOM

An alternate opinion is expressed in the following comment suggesting that while this information is worthwhile, the time spent on these topics might be better spent:

We had a number of time consuming - or not time consuming, some training that required a large amount of time directed from higher headquarters and that was worthwhile in the sense it was the country briefs, cultural explanations, and the medical, health and psychological preparation. They were directed for Land Headquarters, Army Office level but, really, they did take up a significant amount of time given the nature of those topics. ...OP SOLACE

The difficulty is in striking a balance between essential military operational preparation and training, and the no less essential, but more intangible topics surrounding cultural knowledge. The benefits of realistic and relevant cultural knowledge is provided in the participant comment above, however, there is a broader benefit associated with providing an effective mental framework for adjustment to a new environment. At a higher level, cultural preparation gives personnel a set of guidelines from which they can adjust their expectations, perceptions and ultimately behaviours in response to the new experiences.

The provision of an appropriate mental framework reduces the dimensions of the problem, or in terms of the capability model reduces the size of Position Z (see Figures 5.3 and 5.5). The framework gives people a guide against which to measure the experiences of the environment and make the appropriate procedural or cognitive adjustments (Position X and W, Figure 5.5) in their attitudes and behaviours. The following participant comments give an indication of the importance of such a framework.

> *In fact I did not know a lot about Cambodia before I arrived. My understanding of the history of the place, the cause and effect that brought it all about, I did not know about that. I basically found out after, by reading and going through a lot of stuff. That would have all been very helpful to understand the countries problems to start with and their political problems. I think a lot of people would benefit from that.* ...UNTAC

I developed a great dislike for them as a race. It would have made it a lot easier to understand why they are so inhumane to each other, I suppose, if I had known what had brought it all about. Therefore, when I did become tense with them I would probably have been a little more understanding. ...UNTAC

Most participants believed that the content of the fact based briefings given by DFSU prior to deployment were adequate within the limitations of the unit and the situation. For example:

With the political situation I suppose that once you got in-country you understood the practicalities of how it really operates, so I do not hold it against RHC that there were some inaccuracies because they had obviously done as well as they could with the best information they had. ...UNAMIR

They spoke about the three main groups, they spoke about their cultures, their background, how the current problems had developed over many, many years. I believe it gave us good focus in what was happening in the country before we got there. But what we did have to do, there was a number of videos that became available to us just after the massacre, where the news footage which showed the slaughter during the genocide. We were never shown any of this footage or information before we arrived and I think if, to be honest we should get our hands on videos like that and people need to be made aware. Because when we arrived the RPA were the evil doers, they were the bad guys. After

showing the videos of what the Hutus had been doing to the Tutsis, it did give some measure of balance to what was happening. ...UNAMIR

This last comment shows the importance appropriate cultural and background information plays in the formation of mission expectations, and the subsequent impact on mission orientation and attitude. Empathy with the host population appears to be a feature in establishing an effective relationship, and therefore a feature in establishing and maintaining tactical consent. If the information provided in the predeployment briefings is inaccurate or incomplete, unwittingly resulting in the presentation of bias toward one party in the conflict, then potentially this can have a negative impact on attitude formation and effective performance of the individual or the unit.

When we arrived in-country the information that she had given us was wrong and as such next to irrelevant. We were given the fire and brimstone hard line picture of Moslem culture, when in fact the Somalis' are not like that. They are much more laid back. ...OP SOLACE

Predeployment preparation provides the mental schema or framework by which individuals judge their new environment. The greater the inaccuracy in the information the greater the adjustment, procedural, cognitive, or both that is required. From Figure 8.3, this occurs at a time when the intensity of the deployment is at its greatest. Moreover, the adjustment time can be extensive (as much as six weeks), and ultimately has a negative impact on the contingents effectiveness.

Most participants recognised the limitations inherent in the ability of DFSU to provide a detailed and accurate picture of the host population. They suggested that much of what is important to personnel deployed to peace operations is learned through experience and contact with the environment.

...how the RPA would treat the locals, that was just unbelievable. I still think people found it difficult to comprehend how they could hate each other so much and treat each other the way that they did. ...UNAMIR

It really did not hit home until you got there. Nothing can really prepare you for the attitudes you experience with the locals. ...UNOSOM

...the passion they have about these subjects has to be seen to be believed the more that you can learn about it before you arrive the more you can understand why Israel is the way it is, and why Moslems are the way they are. ...UNTSO

For some this is seen as a very personal reaction which can not be anticipated by the individual or prepared for by the organisation. The initial contact, reaction and subsequent adaptation to the experience is seen as the key factor in adjusting to the new environment.

When you talk about culture I think that it is a very individual thing. It is the ability of an individual to adapt to new circumstances. In my case I have had

a lot of involvement in Asia, my wife is Asian, so going into that environment was not a problem. But for other young diggers or old warrant officers who had never been anywhere or not had much exposure to it, certain people did find that very difficult to go through. I do not think that is a command thing so much, I just think that is a personal issue. Some people are just not comfortable with going overseas and seeing different things. They react in different ways. You can do your cultural awareness things, a few basic rules on customs, that is all very useful because you can remember those few basic things. But anything more extensive than that is a waste of time because it has to be up to the individual, you can not teach people how to culturally integrate. ...UNTAC

For those with previous experience in different cultures, either through personal travel or previous military service, the benefits of this experience had a positive impact on their subsequent ability to cope with the cross-cultural issues in a peace operations environment. This supports the importance of creating an appropriate conceptual framework in predeployment preparation. Those with previous cross-cultural experience, considered that they were more adaptive once deployed than those who had not. For the later, predeployment preparation provides the only insight into their new environment, and as such can play a significant role in the time it takes them to adjust.

Distinctions in the Type and Level of Preparation

If we accept that the purpose, and consequence, of cultural predeployment briefings is to assist individuals to develop an appropriate set of mental models, orientations and attitudes that will reduce the impact of the culture shock and adjustment. That is, it is preventative in nature. Then it is necessary to consider the levels of the organisation, and the amount and type of information that might be appropriate to each.

If Figure 8.2 holds true, then the different deployments will require different types and levels of information on the host population. In larger deployments, specific elements of the force may require more, or different information, to other elements. In this study, it became apparent that the majority of Australian personnel working in the MFO were fulfilling roles that were similar to those they could be expected to fulfil in a large HQs in Australia. In the current approach to predeployment preparation there is a blanket assumption that all levels of the contingent will require the same level of information. However, consistently one element of the MFO deployment was described as being distinctly different from the rest. The Australians (four Sergeants and one Major) who fill the role of supervising security for the camp. In this role the four Sergeants in particular, have extensive daily contact with the host population, and the other nations that constitute the force, in particular, the Columbian battalion. For these members of the contingent, the cultural information acquired in predeployment is put to effective use every day of their deployment, while others in the contingent do not require this level of information as their positions do not lead to extensive (formal or informal) contact with the host culture.

In preparing personnel for the MFO, adjustments to the preparation for individual personnel or groups is a relatively simple matter because the mission, and the Australian commitment, is essentially static. For other missions, that are formed and deployed on shorter notice, or with less defined employment details, anticipating the levels of skills and information required by the contingent is difficult.

Should there be a distinction in general terms between the type of information given to soldiers and officers, given that they fulfil different roles in the organisations, operating at different levels? At present, predeployment training makes no distinctions between officers of soldiers in the provision of information on the mission, or the host population. Within larger contingents there may be some partitioning of operational information, but this is generally confined to issues of organisational process and procedure.

Participants suggested that there should be no distinction between officers and soldiers in the general features of predeployment preparation briefings, however, there was scope to tailor information within this distinction. The benefits of no distinction between the groups was seen as, first, there was a large amount of common information that was useful to both groups, and it should be delivered as efficiently as possible. Second, in composite groups in particular, it is part of the team building process. However, distinctions in the level, depth and type of information could be made. The following comments give some indication of the distinctions between officers and soldiers in terms of briefing requirements:

It depends on what the soldiers are going to do. There is obviously going to be a suite of briefs that everybody needs to do, like the in-country briefs. But depending on where you are going and what you are actually doing there is a vast difference in what you need to know. For example, the soldiers who went over with AUSMED, the rifle company, what they did for six months was basically guard pickets and provided security for others. So the in-country briefs about both sides and the health hazards were good, and what they could expect. I think for some of the officers the briefing that we should have been given should have been more targeted towards the relationship between the UN and the Government of the day in the country, because that was my biggest concern the whole time that I was there, because they actually hated us, and that made my task of rotating troops in and out of the country difficult, that was not obvious before we got there. There was certainly no briefings saying that the UN is hated by the Government. We need to construct our briefs more at the higher level for the officers. It must include the political aspects of the situation, especially in-country, everything is political. ...UNAMIR

For me personally a lot of the country briefs were exceptionally interesting and gave me a good idea of things, and for the SNCOs and section commanders. I think a lot of it went over the soldiers head, with regards to the political situation in the country and that sort of thing. The diggers were more looking for who can you trust, who are the key players around the area,

how are we supposed to react to various people, what other agencies expect of us, things like aid agencies and NGOs were skipped over I felt when actually a bit more briefing on working between aid agencies and the military. ...aimed at the diggers to say that in some cases you will be working with the local people, and in some cases with the UN or NGOs. A lot of the time you were doing something in conjunction with the other NGOs, and there were quite a few civilians with the UN. We wanted to know how everybody fits into the picture. I think a lot of them got there and said, "where do I start" there are so many different people involved in this process to help the country, but where does everybody stand? Can I tell an NGO to get out of my area? What exactly are they trying to do?. ...UNAMIR

Regularly officers were seen as needing more information on the political situation within the country, the force and the UN. This reflects their roles in working closely with this level of the multinational organisation, and the soldiers role in working closely with the host population. As one officer put it:

We need to concentrate on officer training. Soldiers have all they need to complete the task . Officers need to be aware of the bureaucracy. Many of them have not been exposed to it at their level, or they have been sheltered from it. They are not prepared for a political bureaucracy.

...MINURSO

Similarly,

> *The soldiers are going to be operating at a different level, they are going to have more interface with the local people, than the officers, so they need to have a strong sense of their purpose there as well as an understanding of their environment, and then be aware with some of the difficulties associated with working for the UN. Whereas the officers need to have those two, as well as strong understanding of the operations within the UN and how to best serve the mission and look after your people.* ...UNTAC

Clearly, a distinction can be made between the type and level of information that is provided to officers and soldiers within a contingent. Officers focus on the need for a greater understanding of the political issues in the operation, reflecting the nature of modern peace operations (Chapter Two). Soldiers were seen to require more concrete information on the relationships between themselves and the other groups that might be encountered in-country. Again, the comments reflect the need for predeployment to build the conceptual picture of the mission so that those deployed can clearly understand not only their role, but their relationship to others. The homogenous approach to the preparation that is currently employed may be economical, but in the long term it may be inadequate. In this study we have now discovered two paths along which the nature of predeployment preparation can distinguished, between small and large groups (Figure 8.2) and between officers and soldiers. It is likely that with further specific enquiry other distinctions can be made, particularly in the area of skill requirements.

CONTACT WITH OTHER PEACEKEEPERS

Contact with other elements of the multinational force is not considered an issue in Australian predeployment preparation, or from the review of the literature, in the predeployment preparation of most other forces. Given that the UN makes a significant effort to gain broad international representation when constructing a multinational force it stands to reason that culture shock within the force could be an issue. The majority of participants in this study recognised it as an issue. As was noted in an earlier comment it is not only a matter of working closely with another culture, but also living closely with another culture. Those members of the larger contingents in this study commented that they lived closely with other nations for periods from a "couple of days" to "months". The comment below places the issues of contact into a broader perspective. In Africa, for example, some Western nations carry considerable national 'baggage' with them in terms of their relationship with the local population; the French and British are the most frequently cited. This supports similar observations made by Swedish and Irish peacekeepers (Haberl-Zemljic et al, 1996).

The following comment gives some insight into the broader ramifications and subtleties of this 'baggage' for all Western nations. This can be quite an insight for ADF personnel who have little understanding of this relationship. The participant goes on to comment on a personal experience of the problems that can be encountered when Australian based cultural and professional assumptions are used as a basis for action in a cross-cultural context.

There was a feeling in a number of the Western countries that they were better

and they were smarter, and so everybody else should do as they are told. There was a feeling from the African countries that the Western countries knew better, so they acted and felt like they were lower. And then among the Africans when it suited them they would use the race feelings against you to be able to argue against you doing something, the argument was not relevant. Then there was the cultural way things happen. For example, I was all sorted out to get a briefing from the Nigerian battalion, but when I arrived the Nigerian intelligence officer was not there, but one of the operations Captains was, and we were introduced and I asked for a briefing on their area as he was the only one there. So, he said OK and I was directed to their intelligence cell, and one of their Corporals started to give me a briefing - which was really good. About half way through another operations Captain came through and 'reefed' the Corporal about the inappropriateness of his briefing an officer. Then he went off his nut at me, that I was an officer and would only be briefed by another officer, so he went and grabbed a Major who gave a briefing. They were most upset that an officer had been briefed by someone who was not an officer. There was just no way of knowing that without dealing with them. ...*UNAMIR*

Similarly, the assumptions do not hold when dealing with nations that are considered to be essentially the same as our own. Occasional reference was made about the U.S. approach to command and control in multinational contingents.

The U.S. adhere to the idea of contingent command. They will not respond to the contingent commander. They will respond to the senior U.S. commander on the spot. The force commander will issue an order on the spot and the U.S. soldier will turn to the senior U.S. member on the spot and ask if that is . . correct. It is quite evident that the U.S. always considers that it has the lead role, which it does in the MFO because it pays the bills. ...MFO

There were some countries who blatantly refused to do anything the force commander asked them to do. The Americans for example could not be commanded by anyone other than an American. ...UNOSOM

While this was not seen as a major problem by participants, it was regarded as an insight into U.S. national character that they had not encountered previously, and was generally not considered to be in the spirit of the multinational operation, and certainly contrary to Australian expectations. In terms of preparing the ADF for this type of cross-cultural contact some suggested that it was not necessary:

It is something that you work out on the ground. With other military forces there is some common ground from which to work, and the need for preparation is not as great. ...CMAC

However, others suggest that, if it is possible, some preparation would be appropriate.

...they had a different set of standards and they operated on African time. The only way to have an understanding of that is to go there and work with them. Again, it could well be a case in predeployment training to have someone who has worked with them before. That is the only way you would ever get it explained properly. It can't be prepared for structurally, but if you have the information people can ask you questions. *...UNAMIR*

I think being aware of some of their cultural differences is important. We had a battalion of Tunisians in one area, and culturally they were grubs. They were arrogant, sexist, difficult people to deal with, and I had a number of run-ins with their commanders on a number of issues. Their soldiers were just grubs, and they harassed a number of my signallers to the extent that we just could not send females into that area. We conducted a number of formal investigations in that environment, and it was always from the point that I did not understand their culture or where they were coming from. Maybe their needs to be a number of levels of training. So that if you are at my level you need an understanding of the command structure and how they do business, and at the soldier level a general understanding of their culture would be sufficient. *..UNTAC*

It is difficult in an initial deployment to identify which elements of the multinational force the ADF will have regular contact with. However, with subsequent deployments the number variables is reduced, and could conceivably form a part of predeployment preparation for subsequent contingents. While some participants suggest that this is a lesser issue in cultural preparation, the following comments give some insight into the negative impact this contact can have on individuals and smaller elements of the force.

...what ends up happening is that soldiers become incredibly curious, frustrated and eventually contemptuous of the other contingents because they are different... *...UNTAC*

I was [prepared for dealing with other military cultures] *which probably says something about the length of my military service and previous exposure. But the soldiers certainly were not and that caused quite a degree of resentment, anger and frustration with the inefficiencies and poor standards of others. ... It says something about Australia and our naive understanding of the larger world, particularly for those who have never been overseas, particularly as we do not have other nations on our borders. We are isolated in that sense. It is a healthy naive in some ways, but the downside is that we do not have an awareness of others. ... It caused quite a degree of, sometimes quite justified, frustration and anger. It was a considerable source of stress, particularly where the Tunisians were. The* [Australian] *troop commander there was particularly frustrated with the professional and moral standards of that*

battalion. *...UNTAC*

The final point to be highlighted in examining the cross-cultural contact between peacekeepers is that, again the propensity for ADF personnel to adopt an intensely task orientated approach can cause friction with other cultures. Similarly, it is again highlighted as the standard by which ADF personnel judge other military forces.

[The problem solving approach used by the Australian Army] *is very linear in concept, and its flaw is that you come up with a course of action, but you never test that course of action. And this is what we do all the time. We do not think what our end state should be prior to starting. We are not very good at that. We reinforce bad lessons, we punish people for doing something different, for taking a risk. We preach conservatism. In some ways we have lost our sense of what we are here for. People turn up for work to clear their in-tray. People are not turning up to work to think about how they should be advancing, or where we should be going. And this is where you get the clash of cultures, where you meet over there, a lot of other people don't think like that. The Italians for example, think that work is a means to enjoy life. Italians going out on patrol to Southern Lebanon they would ask, why should we take risks? We will do the job, but why take risks? The people who we are here for would not care whether we lived or died.* *...UNTSO*

I worked with the Canadians, Ghanians, Melowes, Indians, Ethiopians, Senegalese, British, etc. On the HQs we had 65 officers, now the ones who kept UNAMIR rolling along were the Canadians, British and Australians. There were some of the African officers who were very good and had spent a lot of time in England and the States and those sorts of places, but there were a lot there picking up their UN allowances and sort of treated it as a nine-to-five job, and that is how they approached it, even in a six month operation. Some of those were there for twelve months, but they approached as they would at home, they went to work at nine and left at four.

...UNAMIR

Cross-cultural issues in contact with other peacekeepers does present as a relevant topic for preparing peacekeepers. The practicalities of collecting accurate information in a short space of time currently associated with deploying contingents requires further examination.

UNITED NATIONS

The majority of participants suggested that a better working knowledge of the United Nations would have been a benefit to them once deployed. Two areas were highlighted as being of particular interest: the structure of the organisation, that included where the Australian contingent fitted in; and the culture of the organisation.

The following two comments capture the bewilderment and frustration expressed by participants who had no previous experience with the UN.

> *I don't think you could really prepare people for that. Even when you leave Australia feeling that your public service are not angels, and your Army is not the most efficient in the world, after you have been there, you really do think that our public service are not that bad. ...UNOSOM*

> *... one thing that sort of amazed me a lot was that, you have been in the Army and you think that you have been fucked around a fair bit, but when you start working for the UN you realise that the Army is not even in the game. That really amazed me. The amount of waste, the money wasted because they were doing things so inefficiently. ...UNTAC*

Lack of knowledge of the culture of the UN was a frequent comment by participants. Some expressed surprise at the number of civilians in the organisation, and that peace operations are often civilian missions with the military in support. This misunderstanding exposes a conceptual flaw in predeployment preparation, and the lack of wider knowledge of these types of operations. However, the information that participants saw as important in relation to the UN was an understanding of the culture of the organisation, and the interaction between it and Australian military culture. In particular, the very political, bureaucratic nature of the organisation, and the persistent comment that the military are treated as second class citizens.

For most of us who went, it was the first time that we had worked with the United Nations, and we went totally devoid of information on how the UN works. On the military side perhaps it was neither here not there because it is structured hierarchically, and we are used to that situation even though at times it is very frustrating. But working in the positions that we worked in, I mean I worked to two masters the military boss and the UN civilian. He was basically the head man for the operation, more so than the UN representative. I worked for him, but I had no knowledge of how they worked or how they were structured, or how I was supposed to get things done. The simple fact that the way we worked in Australia is to push a lot of responsibility down to the junior ranks, over there they will not accept that. Even at my level, as OC of the movement unit, to most of the UN civil employees I was just another soldier. The fact than I ran the unit was neither here nor there. In real terms, we had no authorisation to spend any funds, we were treated by the UN as second class citizens which was a big shock. It came down to something as simple as allowances, for example, if you were a UN civilian you would get full allowances, if you were a military member then got 80 percent of your travel allowance, and then you had to come back and claim the extra. That is the sort of attitude they had. ...UNOSOM

We had been told by people who had deployed before that working with the UN was a bit of a nightmare administratively. I was not prepared for it. Getting anything approved that was not written in a book. If it was 'grey' they

would pass it up the line. If it was 'three-quarters black', and you wanted a 'yes' answer, they would say 'no' because it would not impact on their future.

...UNOSOM

Some participants were concerned about the impact the lack of understanding of this environment among soldiers, and the subsequent impact on their motivation and attitude toward the operation. As the following participant explains, in Australia, junior officers and soldiers are sheltered from the bureaucratic process, on peace operations they are immersed in it:

I will talk about the Cambodian experience as an example. Signallers in an RASIGS unit go off and wire up tents in the bush etc as their job, and Canberra is the "Great Grey Sponge" that people get posted to at the officer level, but not really at the soldier level. Canberra is a thought and no more, it does not impact on their day-to-day job. Go to Cambodia, and the Signallers have got to set up the communications structure, including wiring the HQs of the UN. All of a sudden your diggers are dealing with UN civilian contractors, the UN civilian staff, officers and soldiers from other nations. They would have the equivalent of portfolio ministers coming down and talking to them individually about their communications, demanding that it be done now, attempting to set his priorities. So there is this real closeness to this bureaucracy. ...the UN is a big bureaucracy, and it is the soldiers first time exposure to a bureaucracy, they are a lot closer to it than they are in

Australia, that can be frustrating. It would be beneficial if someone could come in and say, 'this is the nature of the UN', and 'this is why it is like that', because it is made up of different countries and cultures it can not be as dictatorial, quick and efficient as we might like. I do not know that it would make any difference. It would help the guys by giving them a conceptual starting point. ...UNTAC

The negative consequence of not understanding the culture of the UN is that the morale of the individual or the contingent becomes undermined by what they observe:

It is the junior NCOs that I worry about because they become quite bitter about what they see and how they are treated by the UN civilians, that was my experience in Rwanda. They went there thinking that they were doing something good for Rwanda, and all the efforts that they put in seemed to be cancelled out by these people on the HQs, who believed that the mission was there to support them. This was apparent at section commander level. ...UNAMIR

The previous comment again stresses the need for a 'conceptual starting point' from which some understanding of these issues might be addressed. Predeployment preparation is the appropriate point to develop and display this framework from which individuals can adapt to their new situation.

A second feature of information on the UN that was perceived to be absent from predeployment preparation was the mission and structure of the UN operation, and the role and place of the Australian contingent in the "bigger picture". This comment is somewhat surprising given the rank level of those interviewed (officers to sergeant when deployed), but it persisted as a consistent comment throughout the data.

That was something that was never brought home to us. Something that was lacking in the lead up training. What was the UNs mission there. Really what was the UNs true mission in the area? What was the focus of it? ...UNAMIR

We should have had lessons on the UN. If we are going to work for the UN we need to understand how they operate. As it was we just learnt along the way. We needed to know their mission, their goals within the environment of Cambodia, and the spin off to where the FCU fitted into that organisation. Then there was the cultural aspects of working within a multinational environment that had its own idiosyncrasies and nepotism etc. That is the sort of thing that you need to know and be aware of before you go. The fact that you were working for the UN and they were your masters. We went across thinking that it was a military operation when in fact it was not, it was a civilian operation with military support. ...UNTAC

There appears to be an information gap in predeployment preparation on the issues

surrounding the UN. Moreover, there also appears to be a gap in wider education on these types of operations. ADF Peacekeeping Seminar provides the type of information that participants in this study are requesting. It may be worthwhile to consider providing wider access to this information.

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF ORGANISATIONS

HROs are an integral part of the peace operations landscape. In some cases they are operating in the area well before the military force arrives, and some operate well after it has left. In the time that the military are in the area the two groups must work together to achieve common objectives. However, unlike the situation of coming into contact with peacekeepers from different cultures, where there is a common understanding of military culture, the HROs are fundamentally different from the military in most respects. On first glance, there appears to be little in common between the two groups. Background information on HROs is provided in predeployment preparation for ADF personnel. One approach is to invite a cross-section of HRO representatives to present a forty minute brief on their organisation, and their operations in the host country. For example, the contingents deployed to Rwanda (UNAMIR) received three such briefings from various HROs.

Participant attitudes towards the HRO briefings was mixed. Some considered that the current level of knowledge provided in predeployment was appropriate, others suggested that there are so many HROs operating in some missions that it would be impossible to provide an accurate briefing that would prepare personnel for operating with them. There was a general

consensus that HROs were volatile, in that they were not confined to a particular geographic region and the numbers and types of organisations operating in one area could change rapidly in the course of the operation. This led to the understanding that the role of predeployment preparation on this subject should be to provide a general overview on the HROs, and the contingent could then gather it's own information on the current situation in the country. Orientation on the topic was consistently perceived as relevant once in-country.

A consistent theme from the participants was that this information should be presented in predeployment preparation as an understanding of the relationship between the contingent and the HROs.

> *...there was a lot of white people walking around the country, all in civilians all basically driving flash four wheel drives, all believing that they were there to save the world, and that they had a right to direct the military and to tell the military what was happening and what the military should be doing about it. The soldiers on the ground need to be aware of their rights in regard to NGOs, and NGOs rights with regard to the military. Basically, who can do what, when and where. ...UNAMIR*

> *A lot of the NGOs were in their big time trying to do their own thing, humanitarian and other agendas. I suppose we never really understood our relationship with them, we were just trying to do our job. Often we would give them assistance and it was never clear to us whether we should be doing this*

or not. The policy was never clear, but we would help them anyway.

...UNTAC

In terms of how the information is imparted in predeployment preparation some participants commented that exclusive exposure to the views of HROs, in what was generally seen as an opportunity for self promotion, should be qualified by some educated military input to balance the equation.

I think what would be valuable for others in the future would be to get someone who is experienced and get them to give a brief and perhaps say from both sides say from CARE Australia and them get them out the door and get the military side from someone who has done it before, because there is a difference. I got a bit of stuff from the CARE Australia guy in Somalia and he lays a bit of criticism about young platoon commanders and young soldiers, and that is fair enough. It was interesting to see his perspective because we had the same type of problems with some of them over there. I think that you need to have both perspectives put to the soldiers before you take them away.

...UNAMIR

Some participants saw the information as important in their professional role.

...the information that I have now which is a bit more detailed than is given on the ADF Peacekeeping Seminar would have been very useful. The NGOs are

the people who are going everywhere so they were of real interest to me in my role. They were one of the only sources we had because they were looking at things from a Western point of view which was easy for us to relate to. We could then take care of that. If there was trouble around there was an NGO near it, they were the people who were everywhere, who we were able to talk to understand how what was going on. Understanding where they were coming from right from the word go, and knowing what it was that they were trying to achieve would have been a big help in approaching them for the first time, and trying to explain who were and what we were trying to do and this is how we can help each other. ...*UNAMIR*

In this case, the acquisition of background information on these organisations in greater detail than is provided predeployment training, or the strategic level ADF Peacekeeping Seminar, is seen as the basis for improving effectiveness in this professional area. At a broader level, the information allows individuals to determine relationships between themselves, their organisation and the HROs. It is another element of the overall framework on which interaction can be determined and developed. The provision of information that can be important to the contingent need not start in-country, one participant explained how HRO organisations could provide important detail on the conditions and geography in the host country.

We had a lot from the intelligence side, and we also had civilians from the NGOs and they spoke on the how they perceived everything she also gave us a

fairly detailed layout of Baidoa. ...OP SOLACE

This type of interaction prior to departure is useful, and suggests that effort should be made to establish and maintain links between these organisations and the military at all levels. To some extent this is occurring through the ADF Peacekeeping Centre, but the findings of this study suggest that wider exposure to this type of information and contact may be warranted.

NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION AND LIAISON

Negotiation, mediation, liaison and conflict resolution are terms often associated with the skills required of peacekeepers, and while there is general recognition of the need for preparation in these skills in predeployment preparation, the skill requirements have not been clearly defined in the peace operations context. In the literature these skills are referred to as 'tactical negotiation skills' (Blechman & Vaccaro, 1994). D.P. Eyre (1994) suggested that these skills were used in two ways: first, negotiation skills were required when the peacekeeper required something; and second, mediation skills were required when the peacekeeper acted to assist parties to arrive at a solution that was stable and satisfactory. This study attempted to identify the need for these types of skills within ADF contingents.

The majority of participants in this study suggested that negotiation, mediation and conflict resolution are important skills. These are not generally covered within predeployment preparation, nor are they a consistent feature of professional military education. Participants

suggested that while they managed with the skills they had, their overall effectiveness would have been improved with more information and skills development.

There was some general confusion over the nature of the terms used. Those employed with UNTSO pointed out that their role was more likely to involve liaison, in that they had little scope to seek conflict resolution. Participants from other contingents also saw the role as one of negotiation with reduced emphasis on conflict resolution. The skills in their current form are used to gain advantage or access for the military member, and are rarely used to bring about conflict resolution. Participants found the use of the term mediation the most difficult, in that they identified with the concept of liaison, but were uncomfortable with the additional implications associated with the term mediation (for example, the requirement to achieve some form of resolution).

The consistent theme was that these skills were required at all levels of the organisation. Senior officers noted that they were negotiating with senior government and UN officials and commanders noted that their soldiers needed some level of these skills to perform their tasks.

> *Conflict-resolution should be a part of military education at all levels - Somalia showed how much an operation like that depends on soldiers of all ranks, but particularly corporals and junior officers, having good skills of that kind.* ...OP SOLACE

I did it myself. For myself, and on the behalf of other people. I was not prepared for that professionally. ...UNTAC

It is certainly something that should be considered. It is appropriate to section commander level. I would not like to see the training to be given to corporals and soldiers to then take away the responsibility of calling on senior staff if the situation is getting out of hand. But for any initial negotiation, assistance and training in that area would be helpful. Because the soldier and corporal are involved in the interface on a day-to-day basis. ...UNAMIR

I had not had any formal training in them. It may be useful to get some training predeployment. It depends on the individual I suppose, but we were going to meetings with the Chief of the local police and talking about political problems, fairly sensitive stuff, similarly we were dealing with the problem of press ganging kids into military service in Southern Lebanon, we had to mediate between different groups. It would have been useful to have a knowledge base or skill base from which to draw for this process. I think most people got by, but maybe we would have done better with some additional training. ...UNTSO

Negotiation skills are reasonably important, not only for the officers, because they are not always going to be the ones making the decision. Certainly all the rank structure in the force needs to be given these skills. That is not to say

that the soldier does not need them either. I think that a lot of those negotiation skills people have got anyway, but they don't use those words to describe it. Certainly, I think you need a bit more prior to going on any deployment, because I think there were times when having a bit more experience would have helped. ...*UNAMIR*

ADF peacekeepers do recognise a need for preparation in these types of skills prior to deployment. This study does little to further define the boundaries of the skills that seems to appropriately termed 'tactical negotiation'. Further research in this area is required.

Consideration of the nature of the preparation that might be required suggests that in the time constraints often associated with predeployment preparation it would be difficult to achieve basic competence in these areas. These skills have general application in the working life of military personnel outside peace operations, so it may be appropriate to consider training and education in 'tactical negotiation' as a feature of general training and education. If this approach was adopted, the role of predeployment preparation remains information and skills awareness raising that orientates personnel toward the peace operations context.

STRESS MANAGEMENT

Stress management is consistently raised as an issue in the literature on peace operations. Stress is associated with the ambiguous nature of the operation, the nature of composite units, immersion in a foreign culture, and the variety of novel tasks associated with

the deployment (Applewhite, 1994; Pinch, 1994a; Shorey, 1994). Preparation in the ability to cope with these stressors is seen as an important feature of predeployment preparation. The alternate approach is to consider the post-deployment stress that is evident on return home (Ward, 1995). This study hypothesised that the combination of the cognitive tasks (for example, negotiation and mediation, maintenance of impartiality and consent) often associated with the peace operations environment, and second, the high workload demand of the environment, would contribute to a more rapid degradation in peacekeeper performance than would be expected in conventional operations (Figure 4.2). The purpose was not to explicitly test this hypothesis, but to gather additional understanding of the issues that might further refine the theory.

Boredom and cultural immersion were inter-related issues most commonly referred to as stressors. Participants clearly linked boredom to "feral" behaviour (Stage 3, Figure 8.3), with one participant commenting that behaviour associated with Stage 3 of the deployment was a "coping mechanism". That boredom can be a stressor supports the findings of Applewhite (1994), and in the context of the hypothesis highlighted above, it suggests that rather than focussing on the impact of stressors on the high end of workload demand, peace operations may provide an environment that allows further clarification of the impact of these stressors on the lower end of workload demand (Figure 4.2). The information provided in this study suggests that the behaviours associated with Stage 3 (Figure 8.3) are potentially associated with the cultural immersion stress in a low workload demand environment. This places Figure 8.3 in a different perspective that may be worthy of further investigation.

Operational psychological debriefing is a post-deployment requirement for all ADF personnel returning from peace operations. This results of the evaluation of this (see Chapter Twelve) suggest that not only is the practice well accepted by ADF personnel, but it is also seen as an essential requirement in re-adjusting to work and life in Australia. That this process is fundamentally associated with addressing issues of stress, and its acceptance by Australian peacekeepers suggest that there is stress associated with these operations that needs to be addressed. It is likely that any attempts to define particular stressors associated with peace operations is better completed on deployment, as opposed to post-deployment, or post-debriefing. There is scope for further research in this area.

MILITARY RELATED SKILLS

Predeployment preparation for most nations involves refresher training in basic military skills, and/or exposure to military skills or information that might be relevant to the mission area. In many cases this type of information and training constitutes the bulk of preparation, and the only areas of true skills development. The literature highlights that in the peace operations context there needs to be greater consideration as to the nature of the skills, and the application in-country. The following military related skills were either raised as part of the interview schedule, to evaluate predeployment preparation, or were raised spontaneously by participants as an area that required further attention.

Rules of Engagement

If a soldier on a peace operation is armed, then he is bound by a range of legal agreements that are eventually reduced to a simple understanding of the conditions under which he can use his weapon. Two pieces of information impact on the individual the ROE and OFOF. When training for low level conflicts, the Australian Army spends considerable time teaching ROE and OFOF to soldiers. The benefit of the training in a peace operations environment is that for Australian contingents dealing with a restrictive ROE does not require a significant period of adjustment. The bulk of participants in this study were Arms Corps who were serving with the RDF when they were deployed. They were at the peak of their training in these skills. They recognised the importance of ROE training, and included it as part of unit training. Therefore, the scenarios collectively trained for by the ADF provide potential peacekeepers with knowledge and skills in this area which are seen by the participants as readily transferred to peace operations.

However, outside the infantry the understanding of ROE, and familiarity with its application is less complete. If the contingent is armed, then all members of the contingent are armed, and therefore all should have a thorough understanding of the conditions under which that weapon can be used. In smaller armed missions, composed primarily of specialists such as UNOSOM or UNTAC the level of concentration on issues in the use of force assumed increased importance.

The following comment gives some indication of the leadership difficulties that can be encountered when the individuals perceptions of safety is at odds with the application of ROE in the contingent.

> *I think that those who are going to be leading, at whatever level, need to be made more aware of the ramifications of the ROE and the OFOF. The reason is that it is very hard to convince soldiers up to the rank of Warrant Officer that they will leave the compound at the 'load' only, as opposed to 'action' or 'instant'. The reasons are self evident you don't want to instigate anything. But they also have their own life to consider, and the life of their mate, and it is very hard at times to convince them. It was never a major issue because there was only a couple of times where they had to go to 'instant'. But just talking to the guys informally after-hours in the first few days, few weeks, few months it always comes up in discussion. You need to be aware of what your guys are doing, because you will find that there are different readiness level to you in their own weapon handling. Whether you stated it or not, or whether your OC stated it or not, their own feeling of safety dictates that you need to be able to explain to them the reasons for it. If you cannot explain it, then they are not going to worry about what you are saying. ...UNOSOM*

Every individual in the contingent needs to be aware of the reasons behind the ROE which will guide them in the use of their weapon. Without such information, they will be guided by their own assessment of the situation, and perceptions of their personal safety.

Commanders must be able to explain and reinforce that understanding.

Training in ROE among infantry personnel was generally seen to be sound, as it was an extension of their usual training. In terms of the Capability Model (Figure 5.2) these individuals were moving, appropriately, from Position Y at a high level of individual skills and knowledge competence, to Position X where the change required was administrative or procedural in nature. For, personnel who rarely come into contact with ROE in the course of their training it's introduction in predeployment preparation can be confusing and complicated. They are about to enter an environment where knowledge and skill in this area will be tested at Position Z in Capability terms. One participant noted the following experiences with regard to training:

> *Somebody else did ROE. It was pretty useless. It was done but it was repeated again in-country and that was more valuable. In fact a couple of days training that we did in-country with all the sights, sounds and smells around us was far more valuable in some of those areas than the training that was done at RHC. People were more focused because things were going bang in the background. That is not to say that it all should have been done there but there were things like ROE that are more appropriate in-country.*
>
> *...UNTAC*

For the Australian infantry, peace operations require only a minor adjustment in weapon skills and associated knowledge provided by conventional military training. In fact,

this training develops an appropriate orientation to weapon use, and some of the general concepts associated with the use of force on peace operations. However, personnel who do not have regular exposure to this type of training have limited background in the use of force in this context, and therefore require more detailed preparation. This training is most likely to be effective if it is scenario based, and specifically devised for peace operations. Moreover, consideration should be given to methods that further develop this type of training and orientation once in-country.

Mine Awareness

Mine awareness training is a prominent feature of predeployment training for all ADF personnel. For some, this type of training is a useful refresher prior to departure, while for others it is the first exposure. For the majority of participants it was seen as "potentially" useful information. While it may not be directly relevant to a particular mission there was always the possibility that it would be used. The level of importance of this topic is often not realised until after arrival in-country.

> *Probably a lot of the mine information and personal security came home to be fairly relevant in a few areas. You go through an initial wide eyed experience after you first arrive but after a few weeks you settle down and look more closely at the environment you tend to relate to that people had said to you before.* ...MFO

The type of information that was relevant inspired the following comment from one of the earlier missions. It shows the difficulty in the rigid application of the skills and the type of information that is required by personnel. The problems noted here have been rectified in subsequent training packages.

All the mine training showed us big bangs but the actual way the Cambodians mark mines was with broken trees, the relevant stuff, that was not shown. The mine training for roads said if you are on a bitumen road and you see a pile of dirt off to the side then you should be suspicious. Well, that was great until you got there and found that everything was suspicious. You would only travel ten foot and stop. Basically, you had to ignore all the stuff that they said were 'mine signs'. If you did what they said you would not get there for four years. I am not really sure what happened there, it was probably relevant to something, but it was not relevant to the country we went to. ...UNTAC

The present approach to mine awareness training in the predeployment preparation is accepted as appropriate and relevant.

Medical

Shorey (1994) found that Canadian peacekeepers felt that there was a need for peacekeepers to have advanced first aid skills. They highlighted that they were often deployed in situations where the potential for injury through either mine incidents or vehicle accidents

was high. The findings of this study support this sentiment. It should be noted that Shorey's (1994) study examined peacekeepers working in small, isolated groups in Cambodia, and that observations regarding the inadequacy of predeployment medical training in this study was more often made by participants who had been deployed individually, or as members of small, isolated groups.

Smaller contingents or individuals working in isolation were particularly assertive about the inadequacy of the predeployment medical briefing and skills development. This further highlights the relationship between the small contingent and the host population introduced in Figure 8.2.. Small contingents are acutely aware that they must be as self-sufficient in medical treatment as possible. They are aware that the standard of local treatment is likely to be inadequate, or at times inaccessible. The following comments give a sense of their concerns.

> *The training in medical issues was inadequate. You should take the medical kit you are taking with you apart in their presence while they explain all the pieces and how they are used. We found that what the contents said was in there, and what appeared to be in there were two different things. In some cases something that did the same job as the contents listed item was there, but in-country it takes time to work out what does what. Some of the supplies were out of date. You cannot rely on the resupply of the kit that is in-country so a new kit should be taken with each contingent and then written off. The location and isolation of the contingent means that you could be put in a*

situation where you were relying on that equipment, you need to know what is in it and how to use it. This seems to have been a common complaint from a lot of other missions. ...CMAC

Medical training was a deficiency. I never felt that we were adequately medically prepared. We did not have anybody who had any great expertise, and in the country itself, medical facilities were extremely poor.
...ONUMOZ

... I was alone for all but three month, in terms of first aid in treatable sort of things that was probably more important to me, and that was something that they did not prepare us well for. What I am about to suggest is probably impractical, but what you really need is to have formal medical training for an unlimited period. If they knew how to inject, if they knew how to cope with all the variety of diseases that you can encounter over there, people would feel far more confident. When you get a Medical Equipment Kit Foreign Service, which is good, it contains a lot of prescribed drugs. The only guide for using those drugs a piece of paper that gives a two line symptom and a dosage. I think that a sort of advanced collective medical training had some application. The things that you have to deal with are probably more medically related more than anything else. Notionally, a bloke might get his leg blown off, you might be the first person on the scene to deal with it. I saw numerous vehicle accidents while I was over there, that is the sort of stuff you

have to deal with. You also have to be able to treat yourself over there, continually. I think it is impractical but it is important, and it was reinforced by my position, where I was alone for nine months of my deployment.

...UNTSO

I think the thing, maybe not for myself, but others were not prepared for was the medical side of the house. We did some revision, but we needed something a little bit more advanced. I mean we were going into an operational situation and I was not absolutely satisfied that they would have been evacuated as we would have expected. That is taking a very negative view of it. Generally speaking the CASEVAC procedures would have been adequate, but I see no harm in giving people maybe a bit further revision in trauma medicine. You are not going to produce combat medics but giving them something more that the basic skills. ... There are a couple of books out that are very useful. They give all the signs and symptoms, and either indicates that you can do it yourself, or you need to go and see a doctor. All you would have to do is put one into the top of the box. *...UNTSO*

The findings support the provision of advanced medical training for members of small, isolated contingents. They also highlight the differences in preparation needs between small and large groups. A homogenous approach to the preparation of all contingents is not appropriate given the different skills and information requirements identified in this study.

Media

The media is a significant feature of the peace operations environment and accordingly there have been numerous calls for media awareness training for all levels of the peacekeeping force (Badsey, 1994; Duncan, 1996; Shorey, 1996). A media brief is provided as part of the preparation of an ADF contingent, and on larger contingents a uniformed Public Relations Officer is deployed. Generally, participants were well aware of the importance of the media on peace operations, and they were equally supportive of the briefings and training they had been provided. The focus of the comments is on the mission to Rwanda, because it was a high profile mission in which the media played a significant role, and it is the most recent application of the Australian approach to media relations. The issue of media awareness was more often associated with larger contingents than with smaller contingents, reflecting the differences profile among the Australian and international community. Again, the size of the contingent and the type of mission influences the relative importance of the information and skills provided in predeployment.

> *I think the setup we had in Rwanda was perfect. Everything went through a media officer and he controlled access. We did some media training prior to going. We got soldiers up to be interviewed. Everyone sat around and had a bit of a laugh about it, but they realised that it was not an easy thing to do. We were prepared sufficiently to cope with any problems they might have had. My soldiers would say if they were not in a position to answer that question but would point out the correct person and this worked well. Very well.*

...UNAMIR

Some participants commented that they benefited from the training they had received in general training, in particular SPE, while one senior officer noted that he had completed the Senior Officer Media Awareness Course (SOMAC) since his deployment and felt that the skills he gained here would have been useful overseas. There may be some scope to develop a skills course to prepare the middle and senior ranking members of the force prior to deployment.

The media brief was good. I knew what I had to do because we had been exposed to it on SPE. Media crews would come in and interview us etc. In-country the media focus was on the hierarchy. It is definitely important though. *...UNAMIR*

One of the contingent made the blunder of telling the media that there were 8000 killed at Kibeho when he should not have said anything. The problem with that is that we had a briefing by the PR officer before we left. But really to prepare you for something like that you should do the Senior Officer Media Awareness Course. I think I would have benefited from doing that.

...UNAMIR

Media awareness is critical knowledge for those participating in peace operations. Participants perceptions of the predeployment briefings, and the process employed in-country

suggest that the current approach is satisfactory, however, there may be some scope to adapt and develop skill based training for middle and senior officers in a contingent.

Job Specific Information

This topic emerged as an issue among individuals who had been posted individually or to small groups. There was an expectation among these participants that the focus of predeployment preparation would be on the operational nature of the mission, and that this would include some specific information on the nature of the tasks they were to perform. That is, participants expected predeployment preparation to provide some job specific information. This perception was particularly strong among those deployed to Israel (UNTSO).

In small groups the absence of any clearly defined role or tasks resulted in what might be described as 'niche finding behaviour'. That is, once in-country the group adopted a task orientated approach, defining their roles and tasks in terms of their higher command and the environment. In this professional context a task orientated approach serves the ADF and the mission well, and it is likely that it is this sense of the concept that is reflected so strongly by the participants in this study (see Chapter Eight). It is the method by which the contingent is able to quickly and reliably establish the professional boundaries of it's activities, and accurately communicate this situation to others.

We were setting up a new role and task. We were not actually sure what we

were going to do. It was not until we were on the ground that we decided what the niche was. Basically it was to stop the disconnect between the Ops and the Log planners, and to give a strategic overview for the stuff coming into the country, and the planning of the movements within the country.

...UNOSOM

An understanding of what needed to be done. The one problem that we had when we deployed from here is that we did not know what our mission was. We didn't get that until we arrived in-country. We got one that was a hand-me-down from the previous mission. Although that is a systemic fault, I don't think it is a fault of the lead joint commander here. Because our predecessors were so concerned to make sure that we got our administration right that they forgot to tell us what our task was. We overcame that when we handed over to the guys who followed us, because we handed over the administration and the task. We did not know what our mission was, and so in real terms we did develop our own mission because no one would really tell us what they wanted us to do, so we looked at the situation, looked at what CMAC was supposed to be achieving and developed it from their. *...CMAC*

For individuals deployed to more established missions, such as UNTSO, the ability to define tasks and roles in this way is not available. Job specific information in this context is seen by participants as contributing to construction of an appropriate mental framework for the mission. The information these participants require centres on what roles and duties they

are going to perform, and some indication of how that occurs. The information they require seems to be procedural, a sense of what will be expected of them.

> *The best way is to get somebody who has just been there to provide that information. The practical aspects of UNTSO are what recently returned people should provide. Somebody writes to you saying that you will be on an OP for 2 weeks out of every four, my response is: Doing what? I went across there very naive as to what I was actually doing over there. I new I was going over to the middle east, I knew I was on an OP, I knew that I was probably going to Southern Lebanon, but what did that mean? ...UNTSO*

This information seems to be particularly important in an environment where the peacekeeper may be exposed to completely different operational situations within the one mission, that may require a substantial increase in activity, and a shift in the nature of the role that requires a different skill set.

> *I guess it is important that they know that peace is working there and the job that you are doing is still important, but it is going to be a very stationary quite time for you. There were situations where people would get so bored that they would feel guilty, and anything that would happen they would try to flame it up, or beat it up into something far more dramatic than it really was. It is quite an unusual feeling to go from the Golan to Lebanon where there were rockets firing, and people were being killed a stones throw from where*

you were driving and living. That was quite a change. ...UNTSO

This finding adds further to the notion that different missions require different approaches to preparation. The requirement for job specific information is associated with longer term, static missions, for example the MFO and UNTSO, where the Australian contingent operates on an individual basis within a larger organisation. It should be noted that SWEDINT run scenario based training courses on the duties of an UNMO that includes much of the procedural content apparently missing from Australian preparation. Participants in this study commented that while this approach seemed excessive given the simple nature of the observer task in particular, they observed that the UNMOs who had attended this type of training were initially in a better position than their Australian counterparts because they understood what was going on. On the basis of this information, it may be appropriate to consider the development of preparation packages on the roles and duties of UNMO's deployed to UNTSO that could be included as part of predeployment preparation.

CONTINGENT FEEDBACK AND PREDEPLOYMENT PREPARATION

In evaluating the adequacy of current predeployment preparation is was also considered important to determine the adequacy of the process by which information from the mission environment was incorporated into the preparation of subsequent contingents. The participants revealed that there were two processes, formal and informal.

The formal system was a part usual reporting procedures that exist between an Australian contingent overseas and LHQ in Australia. This information was then passed to the appropriate predeployment preparation and training practitioner. This process was generally accepted to be adequate by the participants in this study. In the case of the five UNOSOM missions it was apparent that improvements were made in preparation and training of subsequent contingents.

> *I think that you will find that the training that I did was a little more refined than the ASC 1, because as the third rotation we had gained experience from the previous two. Our country briefs for example were in a lot more detail than ASC 1. ...UNOSOM*

> *... we had a meeting with the COMASC and he ran through the training or the predeployment package and we suggested some improvements and he sent it back. There was a lot of repetition in the package and I knew that they were doing a review of it at the time and we were a part of that. ...UNTSO*

There was also a substantial amount of information passed between individuals. This information tended to be the 'nuts and bolts' of the position. For static missions, where the incoming peacekeeper could be identified in advance, for example in the MFO, the passage of information started early, and included information on recreation activities in the mission area. In larger contingents, this type of contact was restricted to contingent 'handover' in-country. That the Australian Army is relatively small facilitates informal information exchange among

officers in particular. Many participants commented that it would be unusual that they would not either know their replacement personally, know somebody who knew them, or had heard of them. This type of background knowledge supports the informal passage of information.

> *I suppose that the only thing we had in place was my guys keeping notes for the next contingent. They made notes to themselves and at the end of tour we would hash over them and produce a document for our replacements. Things we found difficult when we first got their. Not everyone did that. I felt that was really rewarding for the new guys coming over. Indeed it made the transition for our people that much easier. The notes contained their feelings about a situation, how they solved it, some notes for others who would come after them.* ...MFO

The current system of information passage between the contingent and Australia appears to be effective. A minority of participants commented that they were surprised to find that what they had believed to be important information they had relayed home had not been included in the preparation of subsequent contingents. Where possible contingent 'handovers' were seen as an important part of preparation for an incoming contingent.

Overview of Relevance Predeployment Preparation In-Country

In considering the overall relevance of the preparation they had received prior to deployment most participants agreed, that with some caveats, that it was broadly appropriate.

However, the theme that emerged through the comments was that the preparation was seen to be administratively focused. That is, the purpose of the training appeared to be to ensure that the individual was administratively prepared for deployment, at the expense of an understanding of the mission and their role. Moreover, the individual focus of the preparation contributed little to the preparation of the contingent as a team.

> *There was an enormous amount that could have been done to better prepare us for working with the UN. The predeployment training that was done through RHC, as far as I could see, was focused on the idea that the individual was prepared to go across. It almost seemed that they were not concerned about the operation that was going on in Cambodia, they did not have a feel for that. ...UNTAC*

> *There were certainly there was a large proportion of the information that was passed on to me that was relevant. I mean I was a little bit dissatisfied because I thought that the briefings were more of an administrative nature rather than preparing us for operations. I was a little bit concerned that the emphasis was on explaining how the families would get on in-country, which I understand is a necessary part, but it was light on in providing detail of the operational situation and preparing us for service in that environment. ...UNTSO*

As we have seen throughout this examination of predeployment content, the preparation provided in Australia plays a significant role in the peacekeepers expectations and perceptions of the environment. The greater the disparity between this information and reality, the greater the adjustment time that is required in-country before the peacekeeper becomes effective in their role. For participants, contact during predeployment with those who had recently returned from the mission areas was the most credible and informative aspect of the preparation.

I think that we should get people who have been to speak to these groups because once you have someone who has been giving the presentation they have credibility and you listen. We need to talk to groups of soldiers and officers because every time I have done that the group seems to have got something out of it. ...ONUMOZ

I felt reasonably confident, mainly because of the briefings by people who had served there previously, and we had a number of these guys talk to us, and that was really useful because they gave us an insight into what would be required of us. They gave us confidence that we were well equipped to cope with what would present itself. ...UNTSO

[They] *dispel a lot of the hype. I mean it is very much an in-country mentality you become very accustomed to seeing people walking around with weapons but until your told that is normal, because it is so removed from your*

Australian experience. Southern Lebanon is not a dangerous place. It appears that way. All Arabs are not vicious baby killers, but at times they are portrayed that way. This is where there is the greatest benefit from someone coming in and calming the situation down. This is what it is actually like. If a bomb goes off three streets away it is not the end of the world. It happens. It is just people living, unfortunately. That sort of information is a big benefit. ...UNTSO

This type of contact plays a significant role in the construction of the peacekeepers mental framework prior to deployment. As noted in the comments, who have been deployed to the mission area are able put information into perspective from a common reference point readily understood by those about to be deployed. They gain confidence in their ability to perform the role because they can see and talk with others who have the same background and professional experience who have completed the task. Contact with ex-mission peacekeepers is a significant foundation of the mental framework that is created in predeployment.

Selection and employment of those who provide the briefings in predeployment then is a significant issue, because the information they provide carries additional credibility. It is important that they present a realistic and accurate picture of the situation. Moreover, participants noted that information on the mission environment dates very quickly, such that contact with personnel whose information is more than six months old may not be valid.

The following comment provides an additional note of caution on employing those who have very recently returned from the mission area.

> *There was a problem with having the previous contingent member briefing the following was that, first it was generally presented as a personal slide show, and second, that person has returned from the region accustomed to the level of threat, and I believe understates it. It is natural over time to be accustomed to the level of threat and treat it as routine, but to pass this feeling or attitude to the following contingent is a problem. They must be very aware of the threat and then adjust by themselves. ...MINURSO*

The selection and management of the briefings provided by ex-mission personnel is an issue that requires further examination. They are a significant element in the preparation process, in that they are able to provide a broad range of information on professional and personal issues. However, the added weight those being deployed place on this information carries with it added responsibility in terms of accuracy.

CONCLUSION

Overall, the evaluation of predeployment preparation provided to ADF personnel shows that it has improved significantly over time. It was apparent that the earlier contingents were more dissatisfied with their preparation than the later contingents. However, the examination highlights that deficiencies in the preparation persist at a conceptual level. This

may reflect the absence of meaningful and appropriate peacekeeping doctrine in the ADF until recent times. The consistent theme throughout the comments made by participants is that in the current format predeployment preparation does not provide an appropriate conceptual framework for personnel to understand the nature of the deployment, and the other elements they are likely to encounter in that environment.

This evaluation provides some insight into participant's perceptions of the content of predeployment preparation, and gives an indication of the deficiencies in the current approach. Predeployment preparation is about more than simply providing information, it is about building appropriate understanding, expectations and perceptions in potential peacekeepers such that when they arrive in-country they can more effectively adapt to the environment. In capability terms, it reduces the requirement for peacekeepers to adapt to Position Z (Figure 5.2) on arrival in-country, while at the same time ensuring that they better prepared to meet the challenges of that environment if it does occur. To be able to do this peacekeepers need an accurate and appropriate frame of reference that goes beyond fact-based information. They need to understand the concepts associated with the operation such that they have a realistic guide against which to determine the appropriate actions and behaviours in-country.

This theme is further supported in the following examination of participant's perceptions on the appropriateness of including peace operations into the content of general professional military training.

SCHOOL BASED PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING

In the present format, predeployment training attempts to introduce new conceptual and cross-cultural knowledge on a novel environment on the understanding that individuals will be able adapt the skills they have learned in a different context to meet the demands of the new environment. The validity of this assumption varies according to: the professional background of the individual; the type of mission; the size of the contingent; the role of the individual; and the nature of the skill required. In the two weeks or less that are allocated to predeployment training it is necessary to take an homogenous approach to information presentation and skill development. The aim is to achieve consistency at a base level in military skill development, and provide mission specific information in a format that can be quickly assimilated at all levels, in a high arousal environment.

The findings of this study suggest that those deployed to peace operations require a well constructed conceptual framework that can appropriately accommodate the information they are provided within predeployment preparation. Moreover, the framework also provides the conceptual basis from which the development of new skills can be justified, and the appropriate adaptation of previously learned skills can take place. It was hypothesised that to successfully employ such a framework the foundation must be laid in the context of broader military training at the individual training level. If this were the case, the limited time available to conduct predeployment training would aim to refresh the concepts of the framework, and deliver content that would compliment its basic features.

From an educational perspective, the capability model (Figure 5.5) was seen as an appropriate starting point for such a framework. To be effective on peace operations, it is clear that all personnel need to be competent in basic military skills (Position Y). These skills are developed in the course of normal military career progression. However, peace operations require the development of a range of broad skills that are complimentary to professional development, but that are presently either not addressed, or are covered at a superficial level. It is these knowledge and skills that should be developed within the boundaries of the conceptual framework. Further, skill and knowledge development through workbased learning or professional development should involve exposure to training scenarios or workplace situations that challenge the individual to make administrative or cognitive adjustments as highlighted in Figure 5.5. As we have seen, the present approach to delivering professional education and training in the ADF has mechanisms in place that support this model.

To explore the validity of this model participants were asked to comment on the appropriateness or otherwise of introducing features of peace operations education and training into professional career development courses.

FINDINGS

Participant response to this topic was evenly divided on whether peace operations education and training should be included into individual training. Those who had worked in Corps schools were able to report that peace operations scenarios were now used to expose

students to basic military skills in a different context. These participants argue that the use of these scenarios adds relevance and realism to the development of basic military knowledge and skills. Some pointed to the development of the LOAC lane in Townsville as a practical example of the integration of concepts that have been given prominence by ADF involvement in peace operations that are now a formal part of individual training. That this has occurred on an ad hoc level shows the similarities that exist between these types of operations and the concept of operations for the ADF.

> *First, because if there is a likelihood that if they are going to deploy anywhere they are going to deploy to some form of peace operation. Second, I see many similarities between the peace operations we get involved in and operations in Northern Australia. The same sort of thing where the military may not have primacy. We were operating where there was a legal government, recognised by the UN, we were operating with the police, and they essentially had primacy. We were in the country under a SOFA, so technically we did not have to follow their law and rules, but if you didn't, you soon couldn't do your job. Same thing if you were working in Australia. Same sort of environment. Looking at it as a student, where you wonder what the point is, they will look at it from a realistic point of view. Just about all of our courses have some sort of UN scenario in them. Because for whatever we are doing the procedures and skills are the same only the information changes, but it is real and that gives it credibility with the students.* ...UNAMIR

For those who supported introducing peace operations concepts into individual training the focus was primarily on providing background or foundation information on the nature of the operations, the procedures involved in raising and establishing an operation, and details of the ADF approach to peace operations. In part, the information the participants have highlighted reflects the information that is currently presented in the Seminar provided by the ADFPKC. The difference is one of level. The ADFPKC aims to provide strategic level information to senior officers who are likely to be involved in planning Australian involvement in peace operations. The participants in this study identified the same broad topic areas as those addressed by the ADFPKC, but saw a need for its introduction at a lower level in the organisation.

To make the Australian soldier far more aware of the bigger picture of the UN and the world, instead of thrusting people into it without any knowledge and saying here is two weeks to learn as much as you can. It can't be done.

...UNTAC

It would be good for your own education to understand how the UN works, its inefficiencies and the achievements it makes within those inefficiencies. But at what level to put in is difficult. Probably in initial training.

...UNOSOM

I think we need to know the truth about UN operations. To know what it is like because when you go, you know very little. ... I would think that you really

need to start to doing that on the officer side at the ISC level because they all have to attend that, and they should attend on their promotion to Captain, which is just before they will be considered for a UN operation anyway. On the Other Ranks side it should be looked at in predeployment. Because in the past we have not had that many junior NCOs go on UN operations, it has been more the SNCO specialists (mine clearers). ...UNAMIR

There certainly needs to be some level of education about the activities of the UN. I certainly think that there is some scope for that. As I say, it would not need to be too long, but they would need to be aware of the way the UN is structured, the way they raise these types of forces, and indications of how we would fit into this type of force. ...UNAMIR

The need for this type of education and training at a lower level in the organisation than has previously been provided is noted in the following observation:

We need to capture it at a greater level. At a command level. Officer training at RMC. Further development through career courses maybe. I don't know, but it needs to be looked at. From my point of view, I had a young platoon commander who graduated from RMC in December 1994 and February 1995 he was in Rwanda. If he had some information he would have been better off. ...UNAMIR

It is important to note that the information highlighted as important by these participants is conceptual in nature. Their comments appear to support the notion that the current form of preparation does not provide an adequate conceptual basis for those deployed. The information they require is designed to provide a more comprehensive framework for understanding the environment, the mission, the role of the ADF, and ultimately their role.

Those who opposed the introduction of such information into individual professional training predominantly took one of two complimentary lines of argument. The first, argued that general training was an adequate base for preparation, and the second was that, predeployment preparation in its current form was all that was required.

On the adequacy of general training:

> *I think that sort of comment is a bit like saying we have just come back off a mission and the UN is the total focus of our mission at the moment, and so we need to do more of it. The thing to keep in mind is that the UN is not our primary function. UN missions are an aberration in our daily lives, function and purpose. If they come up that is great because we get the opportunity to do something worthwhile and interesting, but they are not going to come up that often. So, it is a bit silly to move our training focus away from our primary aim. It is the same reason why we are not posting people to a UN standby force, we provide on a case by case examination of the situation. I think that within our training programs in preparing for that deployment we*

should include briefings on: 'this is the UN', 'this is the UN military and how it works', 'this is who it is composed of', and by the way, 'their soldiers do things differently to us, and this is why'. ...UNAMIR

No, it is not appropriate. All the information required is that which was relevant and specific to my mission area. A concept of what I was to achieve, a brief on the area, and some background to the politics to the situation. In-depth knowledge of the UN is not appropriate, nor would it have made me any more effective in achieving the task. ...MINURSO

No. Because I believe that what we do from RMC right through to what I am doing now gives enough exposure. I know from my point of view, I had never worked with the UN before, and I had my perceptions of what it would be like, and it was totally different, but I believe that, in particular, our leadership could adapt to it. For the infantry, we train to be adaptable to the situation and the environment. ...UNAMIR

On the adequacy of predeployment training:

I can see situations where it is good to have a general understanding of how the UN operates, but it is the sort of information that you get it once at the school you will do a 'data dump' on before it comes time to use it. I think it is good in predeployment training because you are focussed on the issue, it does

not take that long to brief people up on these things, to me it would just be redundancy to do it at other stages as well? ...UNAMIR

No. I would see that as a predeployment task. We don't need to intimately how they work. We need to know what their mission is and where they are. That can be provided in a couple of one hour briefings. ...OP SOLACE

The arguments of both sides are strong and valid. In particular, the role of the ADF is to defend Australia's national interests, realistically how much training resource should be devoted to operations that are normally infrequent, but that in recent times appear to have gone through a 'fad type' revival, only to fall into the background again. The Defence Minister's (McLachlan, 1996) statement on the topic appears to limit the scale of ADF involvement in future missions, thereby further reducing the need to allocate training resource to the problem.

An equally strong counter argument is that, if we are going to participate in these operations at any level then we should prepare our personnel in the best way possible. At present, there appears to be a conceptual and skills shortfall that may be having a limiting effect on the performance of ADF personnel involved in these operations. Given that predeployment preparation is designed to fulfil other tasks outside of training prior to deployment, for example administrative preparation, the provision of understanding and additional skills required to improve ADF effectiveness requires more time than is currently allocated to predeployment preparation. To overcome this other longer term solutions need to

be found.

One approach canvassed here was the inclusion of such topics into formal individual training at the Corps school level. Another possible solution is to develop standard training packages on the key topics for all levels of the organisation for introduction into unit individual training. In this approach the training resource demand is reduced while maintaining a level of consistency in the information provided, the conceptual framework, and potentially the skill development.

As has already been noted in this study, the key additional skills required by personnel on peace operations essentially involve the development of advanced interpersonal skills and techniques that have practical application in the peacetime military environment. Many of the key contact skills required in cross-cultural communication, negotiation and liaison are similar. As noted earlier, it is restrictive to consider cross-cultural communication as only applicable to situations where there is interaction with an ethnically different culture. Cross-cultural communication in the peacetime military occurs on a daily basis as the civilian and military sides of defence are required to work more closely together. Additionally, with the increasing emphasis on joint operations, there is evidence from this study to suggest that cross-cultural boundaries must be overcome before the three services can operate effectively together.

These are all situations involving cross-cultural clash that will require individuals with advanced cross-cultural contact skills to facilitate communication and improve organisational effectiveness. That knowledge and skills development in this area must have broader appeal

than peace operations is highlighted in the following comment made by a participant who is now a unit commander:

> *I guess they need to have some kind of familiarity with it. In my present position, I would be loathed to devote training time to peace operations. Particularly in the light of scarce resources.* ...*UNTSO*

In terms of the Capability Model (Figure 5.5), the broader approach to the development of the additional skills required on peace operations ensures that the conceptual understanding and basic skills competence, or dependent capability (Position Y), is established as a base feature of professional development. The broader application and development of the skills ensures that they are not just limited to application in one environment. They are introduced as military domain knowledge that can be applied to a wide range of environments that in some cases will require a procedural change in approach (Position W), or a cognitive change in attitude (Position X). In this way the individual is better prepared to deal effectively with situations that require and independently capable response (Position Z), wherever that need arises.

When considering skill development in this light, ADF involvement in peace operations has exposed areas of weakness in the education and training base of ADF personnel that would not otherwise have been exposed or recognised. As with the findings of the Karpin (1995) report, it may be necessary for the ADF to consider the development of 'soft skills', as equally important and complimentary to, the development of warfighting skills.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter was to examine the contribution organisational climate as defined by the training and education system made to the development of capable individuals. The findings suggest that conceptual understanding of the organisations operational environment is the basis of individual capable performance. Conceptual understanding is the framework within which the adaptation of existing skills and the development of new skills occurs. The framework acts a guide or reference for the development of attitudes and behaviours that are appropriate to the context, and is therefore fundamental to the individual's performance when confronted with unfamiliar problems in an unfamiliar context.

In Chapter Eight the importance of this framework emerged in the definition of appropriate moral, ethical and professional behaviour as related by the organisation's culture and operation. In this chapter, another dimension has been added, a conceptual understanding of the organisations operation, and it's relationship with other organisations within the environment.

Organisational culture appears to be an inward guide to attitude and behaviour, in that, it is defined by those values and beliefs that are supported and rewarded by the organisation, whereas organisational climate, in the context described in this chapter, appears to be externally orientated, in that it defines the relationships between the organisation and elements external to the organisation. At the individual level, the provision of a training and education structure that would support this type of understanding is seen to facilitate cognitive

adjustment to a new environment. In terms of peace operations, the ability to make an administrative adjustment in terms of previously trained attitudes and skills is appropriate to adequate performance, but the addition of the conceptual understanding described here provides the basis for effective cognitive adjustment. That is, it provides contextual starting point from which the new skills and attitudes associated with peace operations can be understood and translated into effective behaviours.

In Chapter Ten, the second element of organisational climate to potentially contribute to the development of capable individuals, directive control, has as one of its features the ability of commanders to establish the concept of operations for subordinate commanders. The findings of this chapter, and Chapter Eight, suggest that it is this type of broader conceptual understanding that is currently a deficiency in peace operations preparation. What implications does this have for the application of command and control in peace operations?