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CHAPTER TEN

CAPABILITY AND ORGANISATIONAL CLIMATE: COMMAND AND CONTROL

INTRODUCTION

Introduced in 1988, Directive Control is a term used to describe the application of decentralised command and control in the Australian Army. Directive Control is considered appropriate to overcoming the problems inherent in planning for dynamic situations. Correct application affords maximum responsibility for decision making to the lowest possible level in the organisation. This is based on the understanding that it is at this level that initiative is required to recognise and exploit opportunity. In this approach, the senior commander outlines their intention in terms of what is to be achieved, they allocate tasks to junior commanders, the resources they have to carry it out, and the constraints on their ability to achieve the tasks. How the junior commander then achieves the task is entirely a matter for them. In this environment, if there is a need to alter the immediate aim in accordance with changing circumstances the junior commander is expected to make the necessary changes. The only reference point in making alterations in process is to the senior commanders intention in the operation, which remains sacrosanct (Simpkin, 1985).

The adoption of this philosophy is fundamental to the climate of the organisation. It is the philosophy which drives leadership in the Australian Army, its practice should not be context specific, but a fundamental feature of the organisation's operation. The similarity between Directive Control and Capability is striking. Both approaches aim to produce individuals who have the confidence and initiative to adapt to changing circumstances. Both

concepts are based on the notion that success is derived from developing confidence and understanding, and that learning from errors is an essential part of the process. Correct application of this philosophy in the Australian Army should contribute significantly to the development of capable individuals. Peace operations provide an opportunity to examine the application of Directive Control in an environment that can be defined in Capability terms as Position Z (Figure 5.2), providing some insight into the contribution Directive Control makes to organisational capability and individual performance.

FINDINGS

DECISION COMPRESSION

One of the features of the literature on peace operations is that the traditional distance between tactical and strategic level decision making is compressed (Duncan, 1993a, 1993b; Inspector General, 1994) such that a decision taken at the tactical level by a section commander can have significant consequences for the force commander. This effect is attributed to the political nature of these operations, and the tendency of the belligerents to manipulate the UN force and the media for political gain in the resolution process. It describes the peace operations environment as one in which the application of the principles of Directive Control are a prerequisite for success, as significant responsibility for decision making rests at relatively junior levels of the force.

The review of the literature suggests that the method for overcoming the problem of decision compression is to provide education on the nature of the operation, and training in skills to overcome these situations to all levels of the force (Dobbie, 1994b; Duncan, 1993a, 1993b; D.P. Eyre, 1994)). An approach that is in keeping with the fundamentals of Directive Control. However, when the participants in this study were presented with this as an option there was concern that by making too much of this element of the operation, there was the possibility that the additional training and information would stifle the soldiers military instinct, or paralyse their confidence to make a military decision.

Participants in this study generally agreed that decision compression was a feature of peace operations, however, they were not convinced that at the junior level of the organisation that it was fully understood, or that it should be. The participants expressed opinions, in line with the principles of Directive Control, that the individual on the spot must be trusted to make a decision based on the evidence of his immediate surroundings.

When it comes down to it the section commander on the ground is the one

going to make the decision, and he is going to be concerned with his

immediate surroundings not what others will think about his decision after the

fact. ...OP SOLACE

...the section commander reacts to an incident. He will react if the troops

under his command are in danger. The outcome of his decision could cause

all sorts of political problems and concerns. I would just highlight one case

where one of my section commanders was leading a convoy, and he put troops

on the ground because the RPA let the infantry through, and then closed the

road block. He took his section out of the vehicle and deployed them across

the road with machine guns pointing back down the road. He then walked

back down the road and spoke directly to the drivers of the rest of the vehicles.

The RPA had obviously noticed the deployment to the soldiers on the ground,

weapons had been placed such that they could bring fire to their area. If this

had turned nasty there would have been political questions and consequences,

and you would have asked questions of the section commander, but the thing

is that with our training the section commanders are aware of the rules of

engagement, and they know when they can fire and when they can not. If they

do fire it must be in self protection.   ...UNAMIR

The young soldier is not a politician, and if he hesitates to think about the

ramifications it can all be too late for him. Treat him as a soldier. Don't tell

him to do this and this and this and this. Let him use his initiative as a

general rule, they did this in Cambodia. There were some very tense

situations where the finger was squeezing the trigger, and then everything was

diffused the last thing the guy needs in the back of his mind is the element of

doubt that he will not be supported if he goes for it. ...UNTAC

The last comment intimates at an issue that was a theme through other participants

comments, that is, the problem in applying the principles of directive control was not an issue

at the tactical or operational levels, but was seen to be a problem for senior commanders.

There was a perception, particularly with regard to the application of the ROE, that if a

mistake was made by a soldier the perception was that senior command would not support the

principle that it was the soldiers responsibility to make the decision. The observations were

made by officers involved in the operation in-country, and those who observed operations as

staff officers in Australia.

... if Corporal Smith makes the wrong decision and kills a gunman in a crowd

and a couple of civilians, which we could have done, you would find that the

ROE would change because of media influence, and because somebody's job

would be on the line higher up, and rather than make the stand and say, 'no,

that had to be done', they would probably not be there to back us up.

...OP SOLACE

I was in Army Office when Somalia was on. I was working in the section that

received all their contact reports via LHQ. It seemed to me that a section

would give, 'contact wait out' and that came all the way back to Australia,

and the CGS would give the command, 'gun group to the high ground on the

right', and it would go all the way back, that is what it seemed like. The

problem is with our senior officers. We have been out of conflict for so long

that we want to be involved in everything. They should keep their noses out of

it. We would get a daily sitrep but maybe we should only be getting a weekly

sitrep in some of those missions. Or we only send a sitrep when there is

something happening. The actual situation was that we got one every time a

shot rang out, it was a bit silly in that respect.   *...UNAMIR*

These comments give an indication of two possible problems, first, that at times there

has been the suggestion of a mutual lack of trust between junior and senior commanders, and

second, that there is a difference between the way the organisation operates in peace and on

peace operations, and that this difference can be a source of frustration, and potentially

confusion between levels of command.

PEACETIME CLIMATE OR "THE ABSENCE OF DIRECTIVE CONTROL"

Chapter Seven highlighted that there is a perception that senior officers tend to micro-

manage or interfere in the details of operations. A perception that has again been expressed

above. As an overview to the following section on leadership issues in peace operations it is

important to explore whether a difference exists between the organisational climate defined by

command and control in peacetime and on operations. In theory, the transition should be

relatively seamless. The principles of Directive Control should be applied at all levels

regardless of the situation encountered. Yet, regularly comments were made by participants

that reflected that there was a difference in the command and control environment in which

personnel found themselves, and that a period of adjustment was required before they became

fully effective in the new environment.

Operational deployment forces a change in the culture because people feel

that it has to change . Remoteness of the locality helps. This change in

culture is a initially disturbing to the individual, and has the potential to

paralyse action. The adjustment occurs quickly. ...MINURSO

We had a lot more flexibility over there than we had back here. The military

system imposes certain limits or restrictions on you, but over there you were

given a job, and you did it how you saw fit. The consequences, if there were

any fell on your head. It seemed to bring out the best in people. I think there

is a lot of restrictions placed on people back here, safety for example, which

did not seem to exist when I first joined up. But they have become more

apparent over the past five or six years. Maybe, I was just not aware of them.

...UNTAC

The consequences of this shift in the application of command and control, and the

subsequent expansion in the level of responsibility, and increased control the individual has

over their environment was associated with a fundamental change in their level of personal and

professional confidence.

People do grow at a personal and professional level. They are more confident

in the skills they possess, and more aware of their potential. When they return

to a peacetime military environment they feel constricted and restrained in

realising their new potential. The problems that stem from this should not

occur. They should have the opportunity to grow and develop in the

peacetime Army as they find on deployment. The system, or bureaucracy

should not be restricting the soldier in developing his or her talents, but it

does. We should be encouraging a level of personal growth and responsibility

in everything that we do.   ...MINURSO

As will be detailed in Chapter Twelve, this is one of the sources of individual problems on return to Australia. The restrictive peacetime climate does not appear to apply Directive Control appropriately, and consequently is seen as overly confining, and not able to cater for the changes that have occurred in these personnel. Operational deployment has made them more aware of their personal potential and they are reluctant, or unable to operate in an environment that does not allow for continued growth, or does not recognise and use their skills, knowledge and abilities.

Figure 10.1, adapted from the work of Handy (1994), graphically represents this personal change. The centre of the donuts represents the core features of a persons work life, those things that might be included in a job description or duty statement. These features of a persons work life are relatively constant. Deployment on peace operations does not alter the key function or role of the individual, but merely dictates that the employment occurs in a different environment. The area surrounding this represents the level of control the individual has in carrying out the tasks defined in the central core. In the peacetime climate described by the participants in this study, the level of control over the environment is low, particularly for soldiers. However, on operational deployment the level of control over the way in which they

are able to achieve their core tasks expands greatly. This phase represents the true application

of Directive Control. As described by the participants, it is in the initial stages of this

transition that a level of personal and cognitive adjustment is required. A conscious

understanding that they have the responsibility for making decisions in their area of influence.

This transition takes a small amount of time and is not considered difficult at the individual

level.

The real problems occur when the reverse transition occurs that is, from a level of

greater control and responsibility, to a lower level of control and responsibility. It is this

transition that is the most difficult to make. In theory, the level of adjustment required of

personnel should be minimal. That such an adjustment is necessary, is large enough to cause

initial confusion, and finally, requires significant re-adjustment to re-enter 'normal' conditions,

all suggest that there is a significant difference between the command and control environment

applied in peacetime and on operations.

Peacetime Climate   Operational Climate   Peacetime Climate

Figure 10.1. The application of directive control in peacetime and on peace operations
(Adapted from: Handy, 1994).

In capability terms the process of transition from Position Y to Position Z is associated

with personal growth and cognitive change to meet the requirements of the new situation. If

the foundations of competency established by the organisation are sound, then this transition is

relatively simple for the majority of people. However, once the individual has made the

transition to operation in a Position Z, or independently capable, environment the change is

permanent and any return to the previous organisational conditions results in reduced

individual and organisational performance. It is clear that once an organisation opens the door

to developing individual or organisational capability it cannot be closed without a performance

cost. This finding clearly underlines that the development of a capable organisation requires a

philosophical change in the operation of that organisation and as such should be a fundamental

feature of every aspect of that organisation's policy and practice.

LEADERSHIP

Leadership, its development and application is of particular interest to the military.

The interest in this study is focussed on the nature of individual leadership when a capable

organisation confronts a new situation. If the environment requires individuals to develop and

employ skills and understanding outside the domain of their normal experience, what impact

does this have on leadership style and approach? What are the key issues for a capable

military leader deployed on peace operations?

As we have already seen (Chapter Seven), participants identified poor leadership on peace operations as a negative individual selection characteristic. Most often it was associated with the terms "micro-management" and "authoritarianism". This perception likely reflects other personal qualities that were also held in low regard, such as, a "dogmatic" approach and "inflexible" thinking. The analysis of leadership in this study can be divided into two related concerns: leadership issues in small and large groups, and the main leadership challenges of peace operations. The purpose of the analysis is to highlight those features of peace operations that either defined or impacted on leadership style.

LEADERSHIP ISSUES IN SMALL AND LARGE GROUPS

The major issues in leadership were raised by leaders of small groups. That main reason for this appears to be that for officers, small group leadership is a relatively unfamiliar task. After graduating to a command, most officers find themselves responsible for a group of around 30 personnel. Command in this situation is supported by a recognised structure with clear roles and responsibilities. For officers in this environment, much of the role is associated with administration, acting as a buffer between the next higher command and the soldiers. Leadership is a definite responsibility and requirement of the position, but it is qualitatively different from the small group environments they find themselves in on peace operations. In terms of the context they operate in, and the problems they face, leadership on peace operations is clearly in Position Z of the Capability Model (Figure 5.2).

It was learning to be a team leader because I had never been trained for it.

The smallest group I had ever commanded was a troop. To now command a

warrant officer and five SGTs essentially as a section commander, the

leadership skills and requirements are totally different. No longer are you the

intermediary between your OC and your troop, you are now the it. If you

couple that with the fact that we were living on top of each other for seven

months, and that you were dealing with each others problems, you learnt

where you could detach yourself.   *...CMAC*

For large groups, the command structure and culture of the organisation in Australia

are transported with the contingent and established in the context of the deployment. Senior

commanders from these missions expressed relatively few leadership concerns, generally

supporting the view that current theory and practice was appropriate. In terms of capability

this is appropriate, as commanders of larger groups are predominantly operating in Position Y

of the Capability Model (Figure 5.2), supported by the familiarity of common routines and

contexts.

No, I don't think so. Consistency is the key. It comes back to all those things

that you get taught anyway, as long as you apply them you will be alright.

...UNAMIR

Junior commanders in this environment, also supported by a familiar structure, were

the mid-ground between the two groups. They found that while most of the principles of

command held true, other issues also assumed unexpected priority, suggesting that in the main

they were required to make an administrative adjustment (Position X, Figure 5.5) or a

procedural change to meet the demands of the new environment.

> *Participative has never been my style to a huge degree and it was not really*
>
> *over there either, but I did more of it.*   *...UNTAC*

The following section will focus on the comments of small group commanders, and

where appropriate highlight areas of related concern for large group commanders.

Close Living Arrangements

> *You are very much closer to your soldiers. You live with them, eat with them*
>
> *and shit with them. At home there is some separation between the ranks and a*
>
> *distance to be maintained. Even in the field you can escape by visiting other*
>
> *units. On these deployments there is no where to go, and you are the sole*
>
> *decision maker. You live closely with the consequences of your decisions.*
>
> *This is different to all our training. The isolation of the contingent makes it*
>
> *very difficult. I had a friend who returned from a similar deployment who*
>
> *said that he now understood what was meant by the cliche 'the loneliness of*
>
> *command'.*   *...CMAC*

Small group leadership on peace operations is clearly a change in role for officers that places them in a situation where previously learned and applied skills are not wholly appropriate. Moreover, there is need for both soldiers and officers to recognise that some of the organisations traditional cultural and structural boundaries are challenged in this environment. For the officers, there is the additional social and professional pressure associated with living and working closely with the consequences of the decisions they make. All the small group leaders in this study believed that they adjusted to the demands of the new environment, but not without making mistakes that initially reduced the effectiveness of the group.

> *... It was me that had to adapt. I made lots of mistakes in doing it in the first*
>
> *couple of months.   ...CMAC*

What does predeployment preparation and/or general leadership contribute to preparing leaders for peace operations duties?

The Role of Preparation and Training

Small group leaders considered predeployment preparation as an opportunity to establish the general approach to leadership, and the personal and professional standards that were going to be followed in-country. The purpose was to establish common expectation and understanding among the group before they became immersed in the operation.

Again, we can see that in adopting this approach prior to leaving Australia these commanders were, wittingly or unwittingly, establishing a conceptual framework that would govern behaviour in-country. They were creating a group reference point against which individuals could determine the appropriate behaviour in-country. In large groups, this is not such an issue, as cultural and organisational norms that govern behaviour in Australia travel with them overseas. The organisational architecture reinforces adherence to behavioural standards as it would in Australia.

I made efforts to discuss the way we should operate in-country. So we decided as a group the standards of behaviour. How we would live together. How we would handle problems of attraction to the local women, as we were all married, how was the group going to handle it. We talked it through. The next stage is reacting when something happens.   ...ONUMOZ

We should consider doing what we did before we left. Or that we raise it as an issue in predeployment training. I would not suggest that you get a leadership lecture from some guy who gets up and gives a spiel on the experiences, and these are the pros and cons, you make the decisions for yourself. I think that it is something that is raised to the contingent commander.   ...CMAC

Consistently, small group commanders suggested that it was important to breakdown the formal boundaries of the traditional hierarchy. Typically, this involved the adoption of a "no rank" policy. This approach was seen to facilitate group bounding, dynamics and internal

communication. It was not seen to change the power relationship within the group, nor is it designed to override the traditional distance maintained between leader and follower, but it softens the edges of the distinction such that living and working closely together is more effective.

... I deliberately adopted policy from the outset that in the home environment to call me by my first name, and that was to promote them being relaxed in the time off and to keep the communication channels open. In terms of that it worked for some but not for others. Whatever happens or however your decide to play it you must maintain a principle centred leadership style that says if you cross the line the problem must be squared away regardless of the situation, if you need to charge them or send them away then you do it. Commitment is important. You can never have a chummy best mate relationship. ...ONUMOZ

We did one thing, which you always do anyway, and guys have been doing it for ten to fifteen years now, we threw rank out the window in the team.
...CMAC

It would appear that for the majority of Army officers small group leadership requires them to adapt previously learned skills and experience, and develop new skills. Further, predeployment preparation has a role to play in facilitating the development of small group leadership, and providing the conditions in which the group can determine its professional and

behavioural guidelines. Given that participants see this type of leadership as clearly beyond

traditional leadership training for officers, what then are the general perceptions officers have

of leadership training, and the contribution it makes to effective performance on peace

operations?

Positive views on leadership training:

The Army system is that leaders are made not born. I think you can help

someone along, but I think if you can cut the mustard, then you can cut the

mustard anywhere. If the situation changes it is not a problem.   ...UNTAC

Integrity, telling the truth. Exercising foresight. General leadership training

that we have been given is appropriate for that environment.   ...UNTSO

Yes, I was pretty confident about my ability. We are what we are, if you did

not perform then we would be sent home.   ...UNOSOM

These views express confidence that the current training approach refines natural

ability that can be readily transferred between different environments. For these participants,

there should be no difficulties in adapting the skills acquired in training for a conventional

leadership role to the small group environment found on peace operations. In capability terms,

they suggest an administrative adjustment (Position X, Figure 5.5) is all that is required.

The evidence provided above suggests that this assumption is only partially correct. Small group commanders shows that procedural changes can be made to adapt existing skills and knowledge to meet the demand of the new environment, however, there is also a requirement to make a cognitive adjustment (Position W, Figure 5.5). Essentially, they have defined a situation in which small group leadership for conventionally trained Army officers as a situation that requires the demonstration of individual capability.

Negative views of leadership training:

Practical aspects to leadership. Leadership is not using authority, leadership is using personal skills and getting people to bond and to achieve task needs while satisfying group needs, that is leadership. I don't know whether we teach people to use those skills to use their skills like that. We allow rank to get us there. I do not think that we have made the leap between recognising when as an Army officer you used to be in charge of a group of people which had varying stages of education. These days it is not like that. In my command I have got a lot of people who have done tertiary education, people who have done further education, there are a lot of intelligent people there. If I come out there and say I am a Major and therefore you will do what I want, it is not going to work. The face of leadership is changing. I think that we need to adapt that. It needs to be started at a lower level and then it needs to be continued on. We don't reinforce our leadership teaching. After RMC, that is it unless you have a progressive person in charge of you. Where it

should be an ongoing thing.   ...UNTSO

I do not think that they do in most of the aspects. Part of the problem is that we do not train our leaders to be courageous both morally and physically. Adventurous training is a good activity if you can give people that sense of fear and get them out of their comfort zone, but we don't do it often enough. People are not morally courageous enough. We tend to opt out for the easy solution, we tend to be too many 'yes men' and their tends to be sycophants. Too many people do not want to rock the boat. They do not want to disturb soldiers too much.   ...UNAMIR

In general, in the peacetime Army we are creating a risk aversive culture in which soldiers and officers are not prepared to take a chance because they believe they will be punished. We are producing a culture of 'yes men' and this attitude is flowing through to the soldier level where the soldier does not have the confidence to raise important issues to the chain of command. Leaders are not trained in terms of guidance of soldiers, the provision of goals or goal setting. In part, our promotion system contributes to the problem because it is based on a set of subjective judgements. The ability to say 'yes' is a measure of performance. The problem starts at the top where we have become micro-managed as senior leaders seem to be reluctant to give junior commanders responsibility. We are reluctant to give them the opportunity to make mistakes and learn from them. This filters down through

Those participants that expressed negative sentiments about the current approach to leadership training tended to embed their criticism within the recognition of wider systemic problems associated with the Australian Army in peacetime. They further reinforce the perception that Directive Control is not applied within the peacetime Army. Further, the problems they highlight go to the heart of Directive Control, for example, the current environment is seen to produce "yes men" and a "risk aversive culture". These outcomes are an anathema to the appropriate application of Directive Control.

Throughout the analysis we have seen a clear contrast between participants' perceptions of the organisational command and control climate on peace operations and in Australia. Peace operations are associated with increased responsibility for task determination and decision making, while the perception of the peacetime environment is often associated with micro-management, and a clear lack of willingness among senior commanders to pass responsibility to junior commanders.

While individuals easily make the adjustment from a restrictive system to a more open system, the reverse is not so easy (Figure 10.1). In reality, the transition between peacetime employment and operational deployment should be relatively seamless in either direction. The principles of command and control as expressed in the philosophy of Directive Control should apply equally in both environments. The perceptions of the participants in this study is that this is not the case, and that the wider implications of the approach taken in peacetime is that

the organisation is producing individuals who are competent (Position Y, Figure 5.2) but not

capable (Position Z, Figure 5.2). In this case study, a change in organisational context created

an environment in which individuals were allowed the opportunity to develop as capable

individuals (peace operations), the foundation of which was competency. However, because

the usual operation of the organisation (peacetime) did not support this change at the

individual level these gains were not consistently consolidated or incorporated into the existing

system likely resulting in reduced organisational and individual performance. Clearly, the

organisational architecture, in this case organisational climate, plays a significant role in

establishing and maintaining independent capability.

THE CHALLENGES OF LEADERSHIP ON PEACE OPERATIONS

The major leadership challenges associated with peace operations were the

maintenance of personal and professional standards in an environment that appeared to lack

overt threat. Discussion of these issues was addressed in Chapter Eight (Figure 8.3). This

section will focus on the remaining leadership challenges observed by participants.

It is interesting to note in the above comments that leadership training after initial

indoctrination, was not seen to be an ongoing element of officer training. The conclusion is

that leadership skills are not formally developed as a function of the changes in the

professional and personal development of the individual. It could be argued that leadership

training is implicitly a function of every activity undertaken in the Army, and therefore is

reinforced culturally through work-based learning. However, as we saw in the development

and reinforcement of task orientated behaviour, the culture and associated systems may be biased toward providing personnel with situations that require an administrative adaptation of procedural knowledge (Position X). In this way, the organisations architecture may have a tendency to support a predominant approach or orientation, at the expense of developing cognitive insight into the adoption of alternative approaches to task achievement (Position W).

We have already seen that the leadership environment on peace operations, for small groups in particular, can be represented by Position Z of the capability model (Figure 5.2). We have also seen that there may be systemic problems associated with the peacetime military environment that may inhibit a capable response. The application of leadership in response to the challenges posed by peace operations has the potential to provide further insight into the nature of capability, and the role organisational climate has in developing capable individual.

If you accept that leadership is the ability to get somebody to do something

that they do not want to do, and then feel happy about doing it, and achieve

the needs of the task then you have done your job as a leader. So I used it all

the time. Whether it is a guy sitting beside you in the car who does not want to

go down a particular road but you know that you have to, or you have to find

a way for a nationality who does not necessarily do something a certain way

to do it that way, that is what your job as a leader is. That is something that I

think some Australians have some difficulty with, the broader concept of

leadership, as opposed to saying follow me. That may not be the best thing to

do. You have to find the best way to get them to do the job at hand. It is

certainly more participative than authoritative. It is all participative.

...UNTSO

The need to adopt a more participative style of leadership when working as part of a multinational group in a peace operations was a consistent feature of the challenges faced by leaders. This observation clearly identifies the way in which differences in the nature of these operations require conventionally trained military personnel to adopt approaches and attitudes that may not be in keeping with their previous training or experience.

Within a military hierarchy there are implicit and explicit assumptions of behaviour and performance, these assumptions are reinforced in training, education and professional experience. On peace operations, these assumptions may no longer be completely appropriate or valid. Military personnel are then faced with the prospect of developing new approaches that may be the anthesis of their trained experience, and for which they have no established domain knowledge. That the perception of participants of this study was that they were required to develop a participative approach to leadership is an outcome of this process. Many officers have had little opportunity to develop skills and experience in this leadership style prior to deployment because the conventional military organisational architecture does not support it.

A participative approach to leadership is a fundamental feature of cross-cultural interaction on peace operations. The skills associated with it encapsulate many of the positive

cross-cultural skills noted by Wehr (1979) (see Table 4.1). Further, in support of the breadth

of cross-cultural interaction described in Figure 8.1, the application of these skills does not

only apply to interaction with ethnically different cultures, but also to cross-cultural interaction

within the Australian contingent.

The hardest thing I found in the UN in the job that I had was how you work to

get everybody working together. Getting the civilians onside and not

antagonise them, because they were a lazy bunch. So you had to work out how

to do that. You had to learn to accept some of their standards that you would

not accept here. I think that went into how you dealt with the officers on the

HQs, some were there just to get the allowances and that was how they

approached it. It was difficult to get the to pull in the same direction as you

and with the same enthusiasm as you. These were all special problems.

...UNAMIR

We had a tri-service organisation. It is a different ethos for the RAAF and the

RAN in terms of physical training and weapon handling, that sort of thing.

But again, I think that we are all smart enough to recognise that when we see

them bucking a little bit that you need to take a little more time to explain to

them that they need to appreciate the environment they are working in.

...UNOSOM

That an understanding of this approach was required by all level of the contingent was noted in the following comment:

My service in Army office gave me an insight and the skills to deal with a

political bureaucracy. Others may have had more problems adjusting

because in general terms officers and soldiers are sheltered from the

bureaucracy, but in a UN deployment the bureaucracy is a feature of the

deployment. You also need to understand that there are different ways of

doing things. ...MINURSO

Again, there is reference to the need to recognise that the nature of these operations requires military personnel to consider other approaches to solving problems. In this case, closeness to the bureaucracy is a feature of the deployment (also in noted Chapter Nine) that requires a change in approach and style.

CONCLUSION

Directive Control as a feature of organisational climate in the Australian Army does appear to make a significant contribution to the development of capable individuals. However, it is the application of the philosophy in an operational environment that has the greatest impact. Operating under the conditions of increased responsibility for task achievement and increased scope for decision making associated with peace operations results

in a growth in individual professional and personal confidence.

There is a strong perception among the participants that Directive Control is not appropriately applied in the peacetime Army, and this has a negative impact on individual and organisational performance in the transition between a peacetime organisation and operational organisation. Clearly the greatest impact occurs on the return to a more restrictive organisational environment (operations to peacetime).

Generally this is seen to be a problem of senior command which in turn pervades the culture of the peacetime Army. Evidence from participants that support this concern is found in observations of the conduct of peace operations from Australia and in-country, and the difficulties these personnel have in re-integrating into the restrictive climate of the peacetime Army (further discussed in Chapter Twelve). In theory, the transition from one environment to the other should be relatively seamless, that this is not the case suggests that the operational performance and effectiveness of individuals in-country could be improved through the better application of Directive Control at home. Further, improved comparability between command and control philosophy employed in the two environments would improve the reverse transition (operations to home), potentially negating one the elements that may contribute to the high rate of dissatisfaction (82 percent) among Australian personnel noted in the Cohesion, Morale and Satisfaction Survey (Chapter Seven).

Again, we have seen peace operations as an environment that challenges the fundamentals of conventional military training, that requires personnel to make both a

cognitive and procedural change to their existing skills and experience. Again, we have seen

that conventional military training appears to prepare personnel well for making the

administrative or procedural changes to their existing skills, but does not equip them

effectively for making cognitive or attitude adjustments. The organisational climate of the

military prepares personnel well for operating in Position Y and X of the capability model

(Figure 5.5), but not so well for Position W, and therefore not so well for independent

capability (Position Z). The shortfall is one of degree. The organisational climate identified in

the literature review as potentially contributing to the development of capable individuals in

the Army and the ADF remains valid. However, it is the incomplete application of the

conceptual fundamentals that contributes to the deficiencies observed by participants in this

study.

The observations in this chapter support those in Chapter Nine that conventional

military preparation and training patterns individual orientations and attitudes that are

appropriate to conventional operation. Peace operations represents a fundamentally different

type of operation, for which the military organisations response is fundamentally different. In

previous chapters we have seen the negative impact of cross-cultural issues associated with

creating composite units from elements of the organisation that previously had little exposure.

In this chapter, we have seen officers placed in small group situations that require them to

develop skills that are different from those developed in training.

In all cases, the individuals and organisation have adapted to the new conditions, but

not without the observation that in the critical early stages of the deployment both were less

effective than they should have been. Similarly, the extent and appropriateness of the

adaptation can not be measured in this study. The reader should note that in the complex

peace operations environment, the measure of success is not just that the task was achieved, it

is equally important to consider the manner in which it was achieved.

The next chapter explores the contribution organisational structure makes to the

development of organisational capability, and the development of capable individuals.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

CAPABILITY AND ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

INTRODUCTION

Organisational structure was defined in the review of the literature as the arrangement and inter-relationship of parts in the construction of the organisation in response to the specified operational domain of the organisation. In this sense the structure of the organisation is taken to be more than the arrangement of elements in an organisational wiring diagram. It is more closely related to the fabric of the organisation, those factors that hold the organisational parts together. It is the construction of the fabric that potentially contributes to the development of capable individuals.

Investigations of the fabric of the ADF in this study centred on factors that could be easily understood and interpreted by the participants. Three major issues were explored that were either considered to be a direct consequence of organisational structure (cohesion, morale and satisfaction); a feature of the deployment that influenced organisational structure (the amount of internal contingent contact); or a potential problem in organisational structure (the operational deployment of women).

Each of these factors was seen to reflect organisational structure on deployment, and in turn to provide some insight into the influence on the development of individual capability.

separated into the following five categories:

       a.   the mission conditions;

       b.   the administrative management of the contingent from Australia;

       c.   the performance or maintenance of the team;

       d.   the performance of individuals; and

       e.   the influence of family.

Of these five categories three (administrative management, team skills, and individual performance) are a function of, or influenced by, the approach to preparation and management of the contingent prior to departure from Australia.

Participant observations of cohesion, morale and satisfaction did not consistently cluster around particular topic areas within each category. Consequently, the representations provided below are quite disparate. Analysis will highlight those features that showed the greatest consistency or were more widely accepted, and draw attention to the general trends in the data.

FINDINGS

INFLUENCES ON CONTINGENT COHESION

Positive influences on contingent cohesion showed a trend toward clustering around issues associated with the mission conditions and team performance, while the negative influences tended to be more widespread and less distinct. In terms of consistency the only factor to be identified as a positive influence, the absence of which was considered a negative, was knowledge of the other group members prior to the deployment.

Only those areas that showed the most widespread comment by participants will be discussed below. These are the positive influences of: shared conditions and hardship; knowledge of others prior to departure; and patriotism; and the negative influences of: task restriction; and poor team and communal living skills.

Table 11.1

Positive Influences on Contingent Cohesion.

Mission	Administrative	Team	Individual	Family
Shared conditions and hardships Shared objectives Geographic proximity Support of host population Isolation	Recognition from Australia Good logistic support	Knowledge of others prior to departure Being part of a formed unit Social contact Understanding the roles of others Reliability/ mateship	Patriotism Privacy Professional standards Respect	Regular contact

Table 11.2

Negative Influences on Contingent Cohesion

Mission	Administrative	Team	Individual	Family
Task restriction Geographic dispersion Lack of knowledge of role	Poor administration Perception of interference in mission from Australia	No knowledge of group Poor team communal living skills Perception of double standards	Problems that involved alcohol, money or local women Personality clashes People with a prior history of welfare or alcohol problems	

Mission Conditions

Shared mission conditions was consistently supported as a positive influence in establishing effective unit cohesion. There were two perspectives, the first, was that shared hardship and isolation developed cohesion

Shared suffering, nothing like it to bond a group. Our living conditions were crap. ...ONUMOZ

There is very much an isolation factor operating within a force of two and a half thousand tends to bond the team very quickly. ...MFO

The second approach was the active involvement of the contingent in a project that created a distinctly Australian communal facility that benefited all. The team nature of the project, and the communal reward associated with the activity facilitated group bonding and cohesion.

The best thing we ever did was to build Australia House. That happened day two or three in-country, the other blokes had their various residences in Somalia which were basically shut the gate and hide inside. We took over what was the old Canadian area when UNITAF was there. We got in and cleaned it out. That to me was the difference between us and most of the other contingents. We worked together but we also came back and lived as a little

group. We had a communal area where you could sit and talk, the brew

things, and we lived as a group.   ...UNOSOM

The perception that restrictive nature of the task had a negative impact on group cohesion also closely related to the maintenance of morale. The observation was that over time the restrictive nature of task defined for the contingent led to frustration as individuals could see other roles that they could perform, in addition to their assigned role, that would benefit the mission or the host population. Often the tasks or roles desired by personnel offered greater opportunity for professional validation and/or personal challenge.

One of the negative features is trying to hold people back from doing things

that are outside the aims of the mission.   ...UNSCOM

The other problem was the desire they all had to get involved in the

operational side rather than just the training. This proved to be bit

frustrating. They were being held back from doing all that they could do.

...ONUMOZ

Team Performance

The most consistent feature in establishing and maintaining cohesion was the level of cohesion within the group prior to departure from Australia. The members of the infantry rifle company in Rwanda were able to compare and contrast the perceived lack of cohesion in the

medical company, that was formed at short notice from a large number of medical units, with their own solidarity as a previously formed unit. The benefits were particularly obvious to those in the second Australian contingent to Rwanda who noted that after the Kibeho massacre, which had a significant impact on the Australians, the infantry unit because of the strength of their internal cohesion were better able to deal with the mental and emotional impact of the event.

This was a bonus to us after the massacre because when a few others were suffering the rifle company had lived, eaten, trained together before they had left the country they know each other. They could bounce ideas and thoughts and talk to each other. There was no feeling of being an individual or having to be thrown together and develop the team work we were and organisation by itself. ...UNAMIR

The strength of the infantry came from being a formed unit. Others did not have that bond, and were worse off. They were coming to grips with the deployment, the culture, the unit, new people and procedures and different types of work.   ...UNAMIR

Small composite contingents also placed an emphasis on getting to know each other in Australia prior to deployment. It is apparent that it is important to the performance and well-being of the group that the bonding process begin in Australia. Deploying formed units appears to be the best option, but if that it is not possible then consideration must be given to

providing an opportunity for the contingent to establish the foundations of this bond prior to departure. This opportunity is more than attending a series of predeployment briefings together, it is a need for the contingent to bond at a less superficial level than common military training and experience.

...getting to know people before the deployment. Making an effort to get to know the whole person and not just the military person assists cohesion. Showing care for how that person will be looked after in-country is important.

...ONUMOZ

The most consistent negative influences on forming and maintaining group cohesion was poor communal living skills. This was more often associated with the UNOSOM tri-service contingents. The Air Force members were more often than not identified as the offenders, but it was also readily acknowledged that small group living under the conditions that prevailed in Somalia was generally outside their training and experience. In tri-service contingents it may be necessary to consider providing some insight into the individual requirements of small group living as part of contingent preparation.

I think the biggest cohesion problem that we had (after a period it diminished) was related to the tri-service nature of the deployment. The Air Force was the biggest problem with it. The RAN and the Army have regular exposure to small group work and living under harsh conditions, Air Force do not. It is a different environment for them.   ...UNOSOM

One or two personalities. They were always causing conflict. They objected

to the menial tasks that they had to do. We all had to get in and burn off the

crap left from the toilets, we all had to take turns cleaning the ablutions,

cleaning the rec room, acting as barman.   ...UNOSOM

Individual

Patriotism was readily identified as a factor influencing group cohesion. It is closely

linked to the 'group identification' factor observed as a positive influence on morale. The

presence and strength of this feature further reinforces previous findings that national and

organisational culture plays a significant role in individual and group processes of deployed

contingents. A reflection of this is the Anzac legend is more than a source on individual

motivation, but as we have seen in previous examination (Chapter Eight), continues to provide

a cultural norm or model for individual behaviour and performance.

One of the most moving nights for me was when we acquired a flag pole and a

big Australian flag and we managed to put it up with spot lights and the like,

to a man everybody made comment on just how great it was. To see the flag

up, what we suffered was nothing, you were doing something and you just

could not contemplate how somebody could think of changing the flag. It

gave you an insight into what the war veterans must feel about the flag and

what it means. The sense of belonging was unreal. ...UNOSOM

Influences on contingent morale did not show a tendency for comment to cluster around one topic area. Comment was widespread, possibly reflecting the more individual nature of the issue.

Table 11.3

Positive Influences on Contingent Morale.

Mission	Administrative	Team	Individual	Family
Task achievement Possibility of danger or action Novelty of the environment	Recreational facilities Leave from mission area Money and allowances	Group identification as Australian Affiliation with Anzac legend Positive leadership	Opportunity to expand professional knowledge	Regular contact with family

Table 11.4.

Negative Influences of Contingent Morale

Mission	Administrative	Team	Individual	Family
Oppressiveness of local culture	Lack of recognition from Australia	Perception of double standards	Poor team skill	
Death or injury of own soldiers	Poor administrative support	Pressures of communal living	Problems related to money and local women	
Treatment by UN civilians	Micro-management	Fraternisation		
Uselessness of mission		Inconsistency		

Mission Conditions

The role of task achievement in the maintenance of morale was significant. This is further supported by the influence on individual satisfaction discussed below. The sentiment was that group morale was buoyed by the opportunity to see results from the effort that was put into completing the job. The 'realness' of the work and the outcomes as compared to work performed in Australia was a consistent feature of the comment.

> *Morale while we were over there was high most of the time because we were*
>
> *doing a real job with real resources and good recognition...   ...UNTAC*

That you thought that you were doing something positive, despite the obvious

limitations of the UN. The chance to help people or the community was a

positive, on some occasions this was outside the role of the job, eg running

raffles for the local fund raisers etc. ...UNTSO

The mission condition most likely to have a negative effect on the morale was the oppressiveness of the culture or the situation generally. Participants spoke of being worn down by the conditions that prevailed in the country, and the role the culture of the host population appeared to play in supporting the continuation of the problems.

Bored with the oppressiveness of the culture after time. The conservative

nature of the society could be a problem. Despairing at the problems in the

place was a negative. ...UNOSOM

Team Performance

In one case, morale was seen to stem from the contingent's involvement in a project outside of their mission tasks, that involved the entire contingent, and from which they would all gain some benefit (described above). In this case cohesion and morale are seen to be clearly related, the flag raising ceremony described above is one outcome from involvement in the project described below. The comment also describes the participants perceptions of the impact the loss of this facility had on the cohesion and morale of subsequent contingents. Support for this observation was found from the members of the subsequent UNOSOM

contingents that also participated int his study.

... Australia House provided a communal environment and this was critical to

maintaining morale, and from what I can gather fro the guys who followed on

behind us, when it went to ANZAC House, and then further away they lost

that, and the contingent got divided up they lost that sense of belonging.

...UNOSOM

The following observation on the negative impact on contingent morale is highlighted because it shows the impact close communal living can have on morale. It was not a consistent finding in this section of the study but it is supported by the findings on the evolution of the mission and the subsequent influences on personal behaviour discussed in Chapter Eight

It got a bit evident about the three month mark that people were overreacting

to things that would not have been a problem about two months ago.

Somebody would drop the ball and there would be an argument and a fight.

Because they all lived together in one room there was no escape from the

others. ...MFO

Administration

The issue of recognition was a significant feature in all missions, however the point
was most forcefully made by the participants who had been deployed to UNOSOM. The
participants in the early contingents of this mission felt that their experience had been
somewhat soured by a number of significant recognition issues.

They were in Somalia before the arrival of OP SOLACE and felt swamped by the
influx of "warriors" and the associated media attention that mission received. They were there
after OP SOLACE was withdrawn, and noted that it was disconcerting to read in an
Australian newspaper while still in Somalia that, all Australian soldiers had been withdrawn
from the area. However, the greatest problem stems from the arguments that prevailed over
the award of medals for the deployment in which the UNOSOM were to receive a lesser
award than OP SOLACE for operation in the same mission conditions. This issue took 18
months to resolve, and is the cause of significant bitterness among these personnel. The main
issue is the lack of initial recognition for the service they completed.

It was the forgotten mission. When we came back the recognition was lacking.
To give an example, I got my double ASM in a brown paper package that the
registry clerk walked in put on my desk and said this is for you. So there was
a distinct lack of recognition for your achievements when you were over there
and a distinct lack of recognition of the contingent when it got back.
...UNOSOM

...[when] we came back to a lot of fighting about whether we were going to get

what type of medal and that was very disheartening, it took 18 months to sort

it out, that should never has happened. We felt a bit cheated. We were

logistic guys and we don't count. We came back to nothing and that was

disappointing. ...UNOSOM

Recognition proved to be a complex issue that was considered to be beyond the scope of this study. Issues in recognition from home identified in this study were: good logistic support, visits to the contingent by high ranking officers, participation in the psychological debrief, and the opportunity to put the experience they had gained from the mission back into the organisation. The absence of appropriate recognition had a significant impact on the participants perceptions of the organisation on return to Australia and may have implications for post-deployment effectiveness. It is an issue worthy of further investigation.

SOURCES OF INDIVIDUAL SATISFACTION

Sources of individual satisfaction showed the most significant clustering among the three measures of organisational structure. Task achievement was by far the most significant source of individual satisfaction. Similarly, task restriction or being restrained from contributing more to the mission area was a source of dissatisfaction.

One other source of dissatisfaction that is described below is, 'limited impact on the mission area'. This is raised as an area of interest because it highlights the role of mission

expectation prior to departure plays in the individual assessments of success and achievement, and ultimately individual satisfaction.

Table 11.5.

Sources of Individual Satisfaction.

Mission	Administrative	Team	Individual	Family
Task achievement Working with other nations Realism of operation Consistent task focus Impact of mission on local population	Renewed faith in general training Better understanding of the relationship between military and politics		Professional validation Experience Improved knowledge of self Increased responsibility Recognition	

Table 11.6.

Sources of Individual Dissatisfaction.

Mission	Administrative	Team	Individual	Family
Limited overall impact on mission area Task restriction Working with the UN		Poor leadership Micro-management Limited opportunity for handover	Expectation not meet	Separation from family

Mission Conditions

The following clusters of participant comment are all related to the same theme of task achievement as a feature of individual satisfaction: realism of operation; consistent task focus; and the impact of the mission on the local population (Table 11.5). Task achievement in the sense described here appears to be different from the characteristic of task orientation described in Chapter Nine, in that task achievement is seen as a comparison between work conducted in a peacetime Army in Australia and work conducted in an operational environment, whereas task orientation is a consistent characteristic applied to both situations.

Task achievement as a source of individual satisfaction incorporates the issue of professional validation that has been raised throughout the thesis as a feature of peace operations deployment. The deployment provides military personnel with their first, and for

many what is perceived to be their only, opportunity to validate that they can perform their

roles under adverse conditions in real-time. Success in this environment is then a critical

factor in personal awareness and development and likely is a contributing factor to the

personal growth described in Figure 10.1.

I also did more there in 6 months than in twenty years in the Army. The

ability to say to a Colonel that this is frogshit. To identify a problem and then

implement the solution and see it work on a large scale was extremely

satisfying. The opportunity to use your skills in an international environment

and have them recognised by others was also important.   ...UNOSOM

Greatest form of satisfaction is to be able to do a job in an operational setting

that is actually physically achieving something. I mean we actually saw the

results of our work everyday. It was very satisfying. Not being constrained by

the factors of the peacetime Army, time and money, to be able to concentrate

of the job and get that done. ...ONUMOZ

The big features were that you went away without any distractions with your

company and you were the man. Being responsible for the security aspects of

the force I was tasked to do other tasks that in real life that I would not

normally get to do.   ...UNAMIR

I was on duty on Christmas day and I had arranged for my wife to ring me, I

had been in-country for 15 days, when my wife rang I said to her that I felt

like I had been here for three months, because so much had happened, and

that's because you only had one task, and because the only thing that really

matters to you is the thing that you have to do.   ...CMAC

For most participants working with other nations was seen as a positive source of satisfaction, but it was often expressed in terms of professional validation. That is, it was seen as a opportunity for professional skills comparison with other military nations. However, as highlighted in the comment below this type of superficial comparison has the potential to limit individual and group effectiveness in a cross-cultural environment.

For soldiers the opportunity to show their professionalism and talent on a

world scale was definitely satisfying. However, this can be both a positive and

a negative. On the negative they can start to get a feeling of superiority that

develops an attitude of: "what am I doing working with these other

incompetents?". This attitude then affects their interaction with the soldiers

and officers of other nations and has the potential to limit their effectiveness.

...MINURSO

Others saw that if the opportunity to learn from cross-cultural interaction is taken then it is one of the major sources of satisfaction to be gained from the deployment.

The greatest benefit should be your interaction with other cultures, that more than anything else is the greatest thing you can come back with, if you have allowed yourself to do it.   ...UNTSO

As with task achievement, task restriction was closely associated with professional validation in an operational environment. Participants described the dissatisfaction of watching other national contingents performing roles that Australians perceived they could have performed more effectively if given the opportunity. This appears to have been more of a problem for the infantry personnel deployed to Rwanda than for any other mission represented in the study.

We had our fixed tasks but because we were short on in the security elements and other nations could see that we were good so the Australians were asked to do extra things. But Land Command made it clear that we were not going to get involved beyond our task. The soldiers could see that we could have done those tasks better than others and that were opportunities to get involved and have more operational 'fun' so to speak. But we couldn't do that. This created some resentment among the soldiers. Particularly when they could see that others were not taking the tasks seriously. The Australian soldiers were generally desperate to get involved, and show their skills to the other contingents to show what they could do as professional soldiers, and that was a big disappointment that my soldiers had.   ...UNAMIR

The dissatisfaction was seeing all the things that you could be doing better

with a little bit more. It would not have taken a great deal more to make a

major impact on the situation. ⋅ *...UNAMIR*

Individual Influences

Professional validation was the most significant source of individual satisfaction. As the relationship this factor has to the task achievement has already been discussed above no further comment will be made here.

The major negative influences on dissatisfaction that can be attributed to the individual was also related to an assessment of the mission conditions. Perceptions of the limited overall impact the contingent, and the mission, had on the situation in the host country after a six month deployment was a problem some participants found hard to resolve.

There was one instant where I saw one child come screaming into the CAOs

office and this child has just been to school for the first time in two years. It

was only for a morning but there had been no incidents of shooting when the

child had walked to school and walked back. I realised at that stage that we

had done some good was gratifying. Dissatisfaction - the state that the

country was in when we left, in that, there was no school when we left.

Freedom of movement for us had decreased and I assume the locals as well.

Any impact that we had was short term. You could see it going back to square

This issue is clearly related to individual expectations of UN deployments generally and humanitarian missions particularly. The media and force build-up associated with the deployment tends to create high expectations among participants that they are able to "save the world" during their six month deployment. When the reality of the situation clearly does not meet this expectation, individuals begin to question the mission and their role in it. This then becomes a source of personal dissatisfaction. For the participants in this study, and one suspects for Australian military personnel generally, the issue was not so great because of the role professional validation plays in individual satisfaction. However, it is not difficult to see that with continued deployment that this factor could grow in importance.

As has been discussed in previous chapters, mission expectations are created in predeployment preparation. Through the provision of accurate information, appropriate skills development, within a sound conceptual framework, expectations of the mission can be put into perspective.

> *The dissatisfaction is the inability of the mission to live up to what people*
>
> *expected it to be. You can never prepare anybody for this sort of mission.*
>
> *You can give them all the mission information in the world but they will never*
>
> *take enough in. Their expectation of the mission will always be too high.*
>
> *...UNSCOM*

I don't think we changed a whole lot about the general situation but certainly

we made thousands of peoples lives more pleasant fro a short time. that is

satisfying. If you went over believing that you would change everything then

you would be pissed off. You have got to have realistic expectations of what

you are likely to achieve.   ...UNAMIR

CONCLUSION

The examination of organisational structure was designed to determine to identify the fabric that holds the organisational elements together, and the contribution this makes to the development of capable individuals. This was to be achieved by examining the factors that contribute to the establishment and maintenance of cohesion, morale and satisfaction in contingents deployed on peace operations.

Analysis of the data failed to show a clear pattern, within or between, the three factors. The general trend is that the nature of each mission makes a distinct impression on the formation and maintenance of cohesion, morale and satisfaction. The distinctness of the impact suggests that further examination of these factors, and the implications they may have for organisational capability, may need to be pursued by exploring individual missions, or possibly even sub-groups within missions to reduce the amount of variability observed in this study.

Two clear findings can be drawn from the analysis of the data described above. First, the concept of task achievement is closely linked to a sense of professional validation for military personnel, and this is a significant source of individual satisfaction. Moreover, it's status with individuals ensures that it is also a significant feature in the formation and maintenance of cohesion and morale. The durability of this concept with individuals on subsequent exposure to operational deployment, and the impact on its apparent role in cohesion and morale is worthy of further consideration. It would be expected that with subsequent deployment and experience this factor would decline in importance, and other motivating and sustaining factors would fill the gap.

The second finding of importance is the role predeployment preparation plays, or should play, in the facilitating group cohesion prior to departure from Australia, and creating appropriate expectations of the mission environment. These issues have been raised and discussed in previous chapters (Chapters Eight and Nine). Here a successful approach to predeployment preparation ultimately contributes to group cohesion and individual satisfaction, and thereby performance in-country. There is also an influence on individual satisfaction and the possibility that this facilitates re-integration to the organisation post-deployment.

The concept of organisational structure as a feature of organisational capability has not been clarified in this study. There are a number of reasons for this:

a.   the concept organisational structure was too closely related to the concepts of

organisational culture and climate, and therefore the examinations of structure

in this study are merely reflections of the latter constructs;

b.   the nature of the case study was too broad to sufficiently clarify the issues; and

c.   the concepts of cohesion, morale and satisfaction as employed here were too

obtuse to be effective measures of organisational structure.

The issue is worthy of further investigation but may require significant re-modelling

before it can be developed further.

The next chapter 'closes the loop' by exploring issues that arise when ADF personnel

return to take their place in the peacetime organisation. The purpose is to determine what

features of organisational architecture contribute to the process of re-integration.

Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER TWELVE

RETURN TO AUSTRALIA

INTRODUCTION

Returning home after operational deployment has long been recognised as an experience that is difficult for some personnel. The ADF, and many other defence forces, have adopted a preventative approach to the problem by providing stress management advice as a feature of predeployment preparation, and offering of psychological support to returning personnel and their families.

In this thesis, exploration of these issues was seen as an opportunity to delineate the differences between the ADF in peacetime and on operations. If the features of organisational architecture that were seen to contribute to the development of individual capability were accurate, then the process of re-integration into the larger structure of the organisation would be relatively seamless. It was anticipated that the issues raised would relate to personal adjustment issues rather than issues that centred on the organisation. That is, there should be consistency between the organisational architecture employed in peacetime and on operations.

The topics areas covered in the interval schedule that reflected this assumption related to the individuals experience of re-integration into a peacetime unit, and the impact of operational deployment on subsequent career expectations. The latter topic addresses a general understanding that shortly after ADF's involvement in larger missions (Cambodia, Somalia and Rwanda), there has been a

high level of discharge at all levels, based on the following individual assumptions:

    a.   that once you have been deployed overseas with the ADF the opportunity for subsequent redeployment is unlikely; and

    b.   having been on an operational deployment, there is little left to achieve by remaining in the organisation, and therefore they leave the service (the "been there, done that" syndrome).

Both assumptions provide an insight into the "unwritten" features of organisational architecture that may be incompatible with the development of individual capability. The first suggests restrictive human resource practices that ultimately result in the loss of experienced personnel. The second, suggests that once personnel become operationally experienced, the organisation is unable to provide sufficient incentive to retain them, and thereby integrate their experience into corporate knowledge.

The intention here is not to provide a detailed understanding of the organisational issues surrounding these assumptions, but to provide an understanding of the issues as they relate to the concept of organisational capability, and to provide some qualitative understanding for ongoing or future research within the ADF.

FINDINGS

The findings revealed information on the two broad areas of unit integration and military career issues, however, three other areas of interest and importance emerged:

a.   individual attitudes to risk and the subsequent need for cognitive adjustment;

b   issues associated with the capture of operational information in the organisation; and

c.   the importance of operational psychological debriefing to individuals.

ATTITUDES TO RISK

On the return home there is an exaggerated sense of risk. In-country we could not possibly abide by the standards of safety that we apply at home, so you get into the habit of risk taking. The environment lends itself to this attitude as well. The concern is that you tend to take to additional risks when you are in-country, and when you return home you become casual with risk assessment and safety at home. So you do things that you know from your own experience are safe, but in Australia it is not considered safe for very good reasons. I have noticed this in myself and in others. It is definitely something to be warned about and be on guard against.   ...ONUMOZ

The exaggerated sense of risk noted by this participant was also noted by others in the study as an unexpected feature of the return to peacetime unit employment. On deployment, the nature of the operation and the environment requires the individual to adjust the notions of risk and safety that are an ingrained feature of military training and exercise in Australia. In capability terms, individuals are making a transition from Position Y to Position Z (Figure 5.2) in that re-assessment of safety requires not only an administrative adjustment in procedural operation but a cognitive adjustment in that they must abandon or adjust the guidelines they have previously used to assess of safety and risk. Those unable to make this transition were seen as being ineffective at worst and less effective at best. When highlighting the characteristics associated with poor performance as a peacekeeper (Chapter Seven), a dogmatic style was associated with an inability to adjust or abandon organisational norms of operation. That is, an inability to "throw away the rule book" in favour of a tendency to rely on personal judgement and experience.

For those who have successfully made this cognitive adjustment the reverse is the problem on return to Australia. They have clearly demonstrated to themselves that they are able to adjust, adapt and bend rules to meet the operational requirement. On return to Australia they find their confidence has no place in the prescriptive approach to risk assessment and safety in Australia. Consequently, in the early stages of their adjustment back into the peacetime organisation the experienced peacekeeper is caught between knowing what is possible within the limits of commonsense, and what is allowed within the boundaries of military regulations and civilian law. In all cases, there was clear recognition that the safety standards applied in Australia are appropriate. However, the operational confidence they

gained from their experience on deployment was not reinforced on their return to training in a peacetime defence force, and in turn this was a source of personal frustration that was initially difficult to overcome.

... you could get away with a lot of things and still be safe. You get used to operating at a different level in a different environment, you are on action all the time, whereas if you were on action on exercise you know there is no one in front of you. But it is probably silly to say that we should therefore lower the level of safety back here. ...OP SOLACE

These comments suggest that in terms of exercise and training safety the ADF clearly operates in Position Y, that is the approach to the issue is designed to produce a controlled environment where performance is heavily regulated by adherence to procedure. In this environment there is little opportunity for individuals to become comfortable with the assessment of risk and safety outside these heavily prescribed boundaries. Moreover, attempts to do so are likely to be punished. However, operational deployment immediately places all personnel in a situation where they must be able to make regular and reliable assessments of risk and safety in situations that may not be catered for by the regulations. In these cases there may be limited ability to refer to previous procedural or contextual experience, because there is no opportunity to develop experience in making these assessments within the heavily regulated approach to these issues in Australia.

An understanding of the issues in risk assessment gives another taste of the recurring theme, introduced with Figure 10.1, that occurs throughout the thesis, and continues through the issues involved in re-integrating into a peacetime unit described in this chapter. The impression is that it is not as difficult for an individual to move from Position Y to Position Z, as it is to move from Position Z to Position Y (Figure 5.2). Once the individual becomes aware of their personal potential, and develops confidence in their ability to make decisions and take action outside the boundaries defined by their previous training and experience, they find movement back into the restrictions of that environment difficult.

RETURN TO UNIT

The same broad issue is apparent in unit integration. However, because of the broader nature of the experience, participants raised additional features that better describe the general finding. In terms of unit integration there were two competing but complimentary factors in defining the experience, these were:

a.   change in emotional intensity and level of work activity; and

b.   change in their level of personal responsibility.

To a greater or lesser extent all participants expressed some concerns about re-integrating back into a peacetime unit. The adjustment that was required from an emotionally and professionally intense experience was clearly a concern for participants.

The interesting thing is the change in the level of activity. Over there you were working until the job was finished, it was not 9-to-4. You were hyped up for 6 months. It was hard getting used to not having that same level of activity.   ...UNAMIR

There was a general perception that following the deployment the work available within the unit was mundane, routine and trivial. This led to feelings of frustration and a loss of interest in their work.

It is a real culture shock. It is an educative process. I am still experiencing it now four months after I returned. I find it had to get excited about the things going on around me. ...MFO

I had a motivational crisis for a little while. I came back to the reams and reams of paperwork, and I thought that this is crap. Why am I doing this? It seemed to have no relevance. I had a bit of a problem settling back in for a little while.   ...UNOSOM

...you come back from an activity like this and you have this build up that you want to go home, and you think that you have done a good job, and you have had an experience that is very valuable, and you come back into an Army the way it is today, I came back to a unit where it was basically groundhog day, it was the same unit I had left from. I felt such an enormous pressure gauge

release that I almost went into depression, and it took me some time to get out

of it. It took me a good six months to get back into the swing of things.

...UNAMIR

You spend all of your time training, you do exercises but there is not the

urgency. Over there it was a real job, there was an operational requirement,

if you did not do your job then somebody went hungry, or somebody could

have died. So from that side, it was the most rewarding part of it. You finally

get everything in place and you actually achieve a real result that you have

been trained to achieve. Whereas, it does not matter what you do over here,

even on exercise, the underlying thing is that it is only an exercise.

...UNOSOM

The intensity of the operational experience in terms of its professional and emotional

demands has a significant impact on performance within the unit in the first twelve months

after their return. As one participant noted of himself, and his observations of others:

It was harder personally. The price was personally greater than they would

have expected. The price paid by family and self at an individual level was

greater. My experience of life was not such that I would have expected the

pain to be so great.   ...UNTAC

Normal military training cannot prepare people for the personal toll that participation in these types of operations make on them. Consequently, the descriptions of adjustment difficulties described above more likely reflect a period of post-deployment emotional and mental exhaustion that takes a significant period of time (possibly up to twelve months) to recover from. It is likely that during this period of time people must rebuild their ties with the peacetime organisation in a similar way that they must rebuild the ties with their families. For some this is easier than for others.

A concurrent theme that is more relevant to the operation of the peacetime organisation is the reduced responsibility found in a peacetime organisation as compared to an operational organisation. This adds further weight to the argument that the organisational architecture is employed differently in these environments.

I was fortunate that I was coming back into a demanding job where I had a lot of responsibility, but despite that it took me a good six months to settle back in. I realised that after the six months was over. For all the reasons that I said the job was great in the UN, they are the things that you don't have when you come back, they are the frustrations. For example, in-country I walked around with $US40000 in my backpack, and a satellite communications computer. When I came home, the CO said that I could take the lap top computer home, if I asked him first. ...ONUMOZ

It was difficult at first because I came from an environment in which what I said happened, and red tape was not an issue. You would pass something to your boss, and it was a case of yes or no. It was not a case of improve on this, or make it better. What you wrote went out as written, it was not red penned because there was not the time. If the message was clear that was the end of it. You had a financial delegation, as long as you could justify what you spent that was the end of it. Whereas there is big justification to spend very little money back home. There I could spend large amounts with little formal approval. ...UNOSOM

They had an incredible individual responsibility requirement and they come back to a unit in Australia which is operating under peacetime training constraints, and suddenly you have got all these people saying that you have got to do this it this way. They now have to play by the book, whereas for the last twelve months they have been breaking a lot of rules in the book. I think lower down the level the harder it is to readjust because the restrictions have suddenly become reimposed. ...UNTAC

That the adjustment was likely to be more difficult at the soldier level was a general feeling. Officers were seen to have greater control over their environment in the peacetime structure. For some soldiers, the operational experience of increased responsibility was unexpected and required a cognitive shift in the early stages of the deployment. On return to Australia, the adjustment back to old routines was seen to be greater still, because initially,

they had been required to make a greater 'mental' shift.

The soldiers certainly had far more responsibility than they would have

otherwise been given at home, and that had the reverse effect when they came

home. They returned to a far more rigid and regimental background, for the

soldier, far more than the officer. They had difficulty coping with the freedom

that they had in-country in terms of the decision making and responsibility.

Most people adapted to that very quickly, but the freedom that they had was

unexpected and left them floundering a little bit.   ...UNTAC

Clearly, participants perceive that there is a difference in the way the organisation

operates at home and on deployment, and that it takes time for individuals to recognise the

difference and perform effectively in the new environment. The transition period is not due to

a skill deficit, but is 'cultural hesitancy', in that, the individual perceives that the organisations

cultural norms and expectations of performance have changed and it takes some time to

confirm the reliability and validity of the change.

This has been a continuing theme throughout the findings of this study. The

organisational architecture as espoused in Australia is perceived to only find true application

on deployment. As the following participant notes this perception would not exist, or not be

as strong, if the philosophy of Directive Control was being appropriately and consistently

applied in Australia.

People do grow at a personal and professional level. They are more confident in the skills they possess and more aware of their potential. When they return to a peacetime military environment they feel constricted and restrained in realising their new potential. The problems that stem from this should not occur. They should have the opportunity to grow and develop in the peacetime Army as they find on deployment. The system or bureaucracy should not be restricting the soldier in developing his/her talents, but it does. We should be encouraging a level of personal growth and responsibility in everything that we do.   ...MINURSO

The fact remains that from a capability perspective these individuals do appear to successfully make the transition to meet the demands of an environment that presents unfamiliar problems in an unfamiliar context. This suggests that the foundations of capable performance exists within ADF personnel, and that deployment to a peace operations environment is the realisation of that foundation. The change noted in the above comment, and described in Figure 10.1, suggest that there are implications for the organisation as a result of individuals realising that potential. The system, or conditions that established the foundation is less able to contain, reward or challenge the capable individual on their return to Australia. This may be a large part of the adjustment difficulties experienced by personnel re-integrating into a peacetime Army.

The Need for a New Challenge at Home

We have now identified two features of post-deployment adjustment problems experienced by ADF personnel. First, is the mental and physical exhaustion that occurs as a result of the deployment that can last up to twelve months, and second, is that many individuals they have grown both personally and professionally as a result of the deployment but are now required to move back into a restrictive organisational environment. Why should the organisations do for them? How should they be treated? What support do they need? These are the questions that the participants will address in the following sections.

The following comments relate to the need for a new challenge. Participants described the need for a graduated reduction in intensity. That is, they suggest that on their return to work many experienced a situation where they were sheltered from responsibility or challenge. In fact, they suggest that it should be quite the opposite. The challenge is seen as an opportunity to quickly re-new ties with the issues in a peacetime Army, and an opportunity re-align personal and career expectations.

They didn't seem to understand that the best thing to do was to give people

who got back work. Instead they protected me, buffered me, gave me stuff all.

The position was the senior Captains position, but I was not allowed to get on

and do that work.   ...OP SOLACE

You must be provided with some sort of challenge when they get back. It can be something very small. There has got to be something there that you can hit running and you can keep going. Not come down so much. You come back very tired from one of these things, both mentally and physically, unless you have something to work for and start to reassess your goals in the military, and understand that you still have a career and things that you still want to achieve, unless you do that I think that people are necessarily going to fall off.
...UNAMIR

However, when I look back on it and one of my biggest problems was that I came back to a job where I was only going to be there for seven months, so they did not really want to give me anything to get involved with. So in retrospect there was no challenge left in the job. In Somalia, there was something going on, and there was a challenge every single day, whereas I came back here the challenge was not there. At the time I did not notice, I look back on it now and can see that I was very bored. That was the big thing.
...UNOSOM

Participants who reported that they had moved into a challenging or different role on their return to Australia were less likely to report adjustment problems on return to Australia. For some, this involved promotion and new responsibilities, for others a move into a different type of work. Those who were moved into training institutions, particularly Corps schools, were the most satisfied, as they perceived that they were passing their experience on to others.

I might have had an advantage in coming back to a training establishment. I

might have a different view if I had returned to my old unit and deployed on

K95. ...UNAMIR

Local Support Networks

The bond that is formed between members of the contingent can be intense and strong.

For six months, the members of the group is the only source of professional and personal

reference to validating emotions, experience, behaviour and performance. When confronting

the problems of re-adjustment it seems sensible that individuals will continue to use the

contingent group as a reference point to validate their experiences, emotions and behaviour.

The first comment below describes the strength of the bond that is developed, while the

second describes the informal contact that is developed between the group after they return to

Australia, and its evolution as adjustment occurs. It should again be noted that complete

adjustment in this case is seen as a period of approximately six to eight months.

It is the way of life even when it comes down to the communal living

environment, when you suddenly come out of it where you are in an

environment where everybody is relying on everybody else, to come out of it,

you miss that. I am married and I have no problems at home, and I had none

when I came back, you still miss that environment and bond. While this might

sound cliched, the underlying thing is that you relied on the rest of your

contingent to survive at all times. That is the sort of bond that you establish

with people.   ...UNOSOM

Speaking to the guys when you got back you developed a bit of a support network, for a while you were on the phone to each other fairly regularly. Most were having similar problems which was good to know. After about six to eight months the phone calls got less and less and it is only to keep in touch, not for the support.   ...UNOSOM

It should be noted that for some there is a deliberate attempt to cut ties with the group so that they can re-new their ties with the organisation without reference to their deployment experience. This approach was seen as a coping mechanism by those who were having considerable difficulty reconciling their deployment experiences with their role in a peacetime organisation. By cutting all ties with their contingent group they immersed themselves in the peacetime culture and attempted to pick up where they left off. For the individual described below this approach was not successful in that he continued to experience many of the adjustment difficulties reported by other participants, but did not take the opportunity to validate his experiences against those of others. Consequently, his personal confidence suffered.

To be honest I have not spoken to too many people I went over with. I think that has been a deliberate thing, unconscious, but deliberate. It is not related to what we did, or what we saw, I just needed to put it in my past because I felt I was suffering so much in coming back. I just wanted to get back to what I

thought I was doing before I went. ...UNAMIR

We have seen throughout the examination of participants comments that formed units are superior in a number of ways to composites. The experiences on returning home is no different. Those from formed units noted that in the initial months of re-adjustment in Australia that those who stayed in the unit adjusted together. Their observations were that those who did not have this opportunity did not fair as well. There was some support for this conclusion among the other participants of this study, however, it should be tempered by the understanding, as noted earlier, that those who took on new roles within the organisation also coped well.

The advantage for us was that we went back to our old unit as a group. It was important that they had that support base in the area. Speaking to others who got sent out of the area it was more difficult. I found it easy to go back to camp because most of the people I knew were there. ...UNAMIR

The final point raised by one participant was the role the contingent played in facilitating its own return. The comment below notes that the contingent must spend time focusing on understanding its successes and achievement prior to returning to Australia. This fits closely with the concept of creating appropriate expectations in individuals prior to moving between different contexts. The impact of expectations formed in predeployment preparation of individual and group performance was discussed earlier. The comment below suggests that a similar process should be undertaken by the contingent prior to returning to Australia, with

the implicit assumption that this plays a role in facilitating re-adjustment and re-integration.

In some missions after six months it appears that you may have had no impact

on the situation. It is important to remind people what they have achieved in

their time. To focus them on their achievements in relation to their goals and

the mandate of the mission. ...MINURSO

In this section we have found that on return to Australia:

a.   peacekeepers suffer from a period of mental and physical exhaustion that can

last up to a period of twelve months in some individuals; and

b.   peacekeepers discover that they have grown personally and professionally, and

this is a source of difficulty in reintegrating into a restrictive organisational

culture and climate.

Re-integration into a peacetime organisation is facilitated by a posting to a new or

different position that provides new challenges or the provision of substantial challenge in an

current position; informal or formal contact between contingent members as a reference point

to validating experience; and the creation of appropriate expectations among contingent

members prior to departing the host country.

These results provide the basis for understanding the nature of the problem and some potential solutions. More specific research is required into the extent and severity of the problem, and the specific human resource actions that might be used to ameliorate the negative impact on individual effectiveness.

The next section takes these issues one step further to consider the impact on career expectations and decisions. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, and throughout the participants comments in this study, there is a perception that high levels of separation from the service are experienced, based on the following individual assumptions:

a.   that once you have been deployed overseas with the ADF the opportunity for subsequent redeployment is unlikely; and

b.   having been on an operational deployment, there is little left to achieve by remaining in the organisation, and therefore they leave the service.

That the assumptions are correct or incorrect is not the issue, it is level to which they are understood to be truisms by the members of the organisation. We have seen indications of the acceptance of both assumptions at various times throughout the analysis, the following section will address the participants perceptions of impact of the assumptions on career decisions.

The perception that once you have been deployed overseas with the ADF the opportunity for redeployment is unlikely was observed by participants to be a widely held belief ADF personnel, and also a belief held by some participants.

I think that there is an expectation in the ADF that I've been on one trip and I'll never get it again so why should I stay in. The impression is that all the doors are closed for future deployments. That is a problem. ...UNAMIR

It does predispose you to reconsidering your career because of the way the system works. I have had my one UN posting so that is it. I went through a period where I was unhappy with my current job, I was concerned about the ability of the Army to provide me with a rewarding career. I believe that this was a general perception among those who were there with me. ...UNTSO

One participant offered the following official validation of the assumption by describing his recent (within the twelve months prior to this interview) contact with his career adviser, representing the Soldier Career Management Agency (SCMA), the central posting and planning agency for soldiers.

I have had SCMA sit there and say that you have been overseas once, and therefore you will not be considered for another overseas trip. I thought it

was supposed to be on merit. I was told this by my career adviser. It also

effects your overseas postings because I have been in the running for an

exchange posting, and I have been told that I have had my overseas trip. That

is just not fair. This was last year. ...UNTAC

The ultimate impact of this restrictive approach is that those with experience tend to

reconsider their service in the organisation, and ultimately for some, it is likely to be a

contributing factor toward electing to separate from the organisation. The perception that it is

ADF or Army policy is also considered in the second assumption, that once the individual has

been deployed overseas there is little left to achieve by remaining in the organisation, and

therefore they elect to separate from the organisation. This assumption is widely understood

as the "been there, done that" syndrome

The perception is that there is a higher discharge rate post-deployment, however, the

participants warn that the numbers may not be accurately represented or interpreted.

Consistently, participants made allowance for those soldiers who had fully intended to

separate from the organisation prior to the deployment, but who when the opportunity for

overseas deployment became available withdrew or delayed their separation.

We were relatively lucky in [X] Coy because we only had abut 6 discharges up

until November. But the support element that I took of 23 soldiers had about

10 discharges. So from the company group about 16 discharges. It was not a

high percentage compared to other groups who came back. The thing to

weigh up there is that 10 guys in support company were older were already

looking for something different, and were probably going to get out anyway.

The same with the guys from [X] Coy, I think 4 of them had withdrawn

discharge papers when the Rwandan mission came up. ...*UNAMIR*

My whole reason for [joining the Army was to be] *an infantry platoon*

commander and I did that. Then all I wanted to do is take them overseas, and

then I got to do that, now I am finding it a big challenge to go and find things

that I want to do in the Army. That is the big problem you face for anyone

who wants to go overseas. That is why there is higher discharge rates from

groups who have been overseas. In the platoon I took overseas there are now

about three guys in that platoon, and I would say that out of the 28 I took ten

would be out of the Army now. This is a point that I would like to bring out, I

do not believe that it is that high. You have guys who are going to get out

anyway. I know Somalia had the same problem we did, we had a whole bulk

of soldiers who were looking at getting out anyway and so they either pull

their discharge or prolong it. When they get back they put it in as they had

always intended, and people infer that it is a result of the actual deployment.

It can be a contributing factor, because they go overseas and see how they can

be employed, when they get back they decide that it is not for them. I do not

begrudge them that, because they have seen what they are going to do, and

they do not want to do it. I think that because they have done that they are

better for it. I know that for me, personality wise, it had been a lot better for

me, because I have become a lot more open and broad minded.   ...UNAMIR

The above comment raises an additional issue not considered by the researcher in the research design, or explored in any detail in the course of the research. It is raised here as a pointer to future research or consideration. Three of the participants in this study were relatively junior platoon commanders when they were deployed overseas. They recognised that they had been given the ultimate opportunity for infantry officers, to command a platoon on operations. All three expressing that this highlight very early in their military career had caused them some problems in redefining their career expectations. They could see little opportunity to match or exceed their experience, and this left them feeling "flat" about their future in the organisation.

It can be assumed that soldiers, particularly at the section commander level, would experience similar problems in career expectations, and this may be an additional individual consideration in the election to separate from the service.

Developing appropriate individual expectations of the adjustment period, and the problems that may be encountered by peacekeepers on their return to Australia, was seen by the participants as an appropriate solution to many of the problems raised here. The psychological debrief process in part provides this service, but the participants observations noted here suggest that organisational adjustment issues should be given increased prominence as part of that process. Also, as discussed above, the contingent hierarchy has a role to play in winding the contingent down towards return to Australia.

I think probably because it is such a satisfying trip because of all those things

we talked about earlier which you are encouraged to do. You come back into

an environment in which the restrictions are reimposed, and you say well this

is crazy and it does not mean a lot. And there has to be a process whereby it

is made clear to people that a UN or operational deployment is an aberration.

It is not the norm and never will be the norm, it is an aberration that may

come along. So do not think that everything is going to be different when you

come home. Peoples expectations have changed and they have also gone

through a self learning process where they say well I can do more than just

continue fill my role in the Army. There is nothing wrong with that because

they have broadened their horizons and seen other opportunities or potential

for themselves. For others it is just because they can not mentally adjust to

the fact that it was an aberration and they can not progress from there and

become a problem for the unit.   ...UNTAC

To be perfectly honest we need to grab people when they come back and tell

them about the downside. Explain that it is a natural thing. It is more a

personal thing and will allow them to cope better with re-integration with

Australian military society better than anything else.   ...UNTSO

The negative impact for the organisation of the issues discussed in this chapter is the

loss of corporate knowledge. Peace operations are seen as a opportunity for the ADF to gain

valuable operational experience without the risks associated without conventional conflict.

The gains are made in the opportunity to test plans and procedures, and the experience gained by individuals.

> [Discharge rates were] *enormously high. Nearly all the technicians are gone.*
> *All the comms operators are gone. We have lost a lot of the experience we*
> *notionally said they we would gain as a result of the deployment into this*
> *environment because we did not go the next step and attempt to capture it.*
> *...UNTAC*

The perception that the ADF fails to take the "next step" in capturing experience and incorporating it into corporate knowledge was a consistent feature that emerged from the data. As noted earlier (Chapter Eleven) it is closely related to issues of individual recognition, but it also has wider implications for the culture and climate of the organisation.

INFORMATION CAPTURE

Issues related to information capture were more often expressed as the perception that skills and experience gained from operational deployment were not effectively tested and integrated into general training and experience. Most participants expected, and indeed wanted, to contribute information toward the development of skills and knowledge on peace operations in the Army, or wider ADF.

I think that I am in a fortunate situation because most of the people here have been overseas, and so you are encouraged to talk about and reflect on your experiences. I was certainly upset that from corps, not because that x was not asked his opinion, but because it appears that we do not have a system for capturing information and storing it in corporate memory. So you can bet that next time we do something stuff will be picked up by the efforts of a particular individual, or by accident, not because of any formal system that brings that information forward at the appropriate time. That is what concerned me. ...UNAMIR

The only problem I had was that I don't think that any of the lessons that we brought back with us were not incorporated into the training. ...OP SOLACE

Examination of the perceptions of those who were involved in the process at an individual level compares favourably with the wider held beliefs of most participants. Those who serve with UNTSO are deployed individually, and consequently are required to complete post operational report individually. For larger contingents this process is completed by the contingent headquarters. The perceptions of the UNTSO participants in this study about information capture process, and the outcomes was representative of the general perceptions of most participants.

I wrote a very lengthy POR on my return and I know what is done with them. I

am not naive enough to suggest that anyone actually read it. I know that, the

people I sent it to know that, it is like a big farce we play out.   ...UNTSO

We did not have any formal debriefing. You put your points into a

post-activity report and who knows what happens to that. I made a few

suggestions related to the medical side, self- paced learning packages for

Arabic ... I would have liked some feedback on the POR I sent in. Some

acknowledgment would have been appropriate. The contingent commander

read it, but because of the time of the year an the geographical separation it

was difficult to get any feedback.   ...UNTSO

The sentiment is that any report made of the deployment is generally perceived to be

.not read, or not acted on. For the UNTSO participants, completing and sending such report is

the equivalent to sending it into a 'blackhole', in that, they receive no acknowledgment of its

receipt, and their observations of subsequent deployments suggest that little change is made

preparation and training in the short or long term.

This is the impression of the formal side of the information capture process. As the

following comments suggest observations of the informal side of the process suggests that the

culture of the peacetime Army obstructs the acquisition, testing and development of skills and

knowledge gained on operational deployment.

I went to the school, and I think that because of the professional jealously they were not accepting of the lessons learned from Somali. The jealousy was personal from senior people who had been in a long time and not gone anywhere being confronted with a junior man who had been there, right through to unit jealousy. ... Techniques were developed but some could not be used because of the safety restrictions at home, but they should be stored somewhere for later use. A lot of that information has been lost already. A lot of people are not willing to share that information any more because of the social implications (for example, showing off) of talking about it.

...OP SOLACE

Nobody was really interested. Nobody wanted to know. I did not push it. I know a lot of people did and they got told to shut up quickly. Basically they were told that nobody was interested. Probably not in those words but in those terms. ...UNTAC

By contrast those who were posted to Army Reserve units after their deployment found that these units were very keen to hear about the individuals deployment experiences, and debate and test the skills that they had to offer. The participant who made the comment below felt that the Army Reserve unit he had been posted to had taken every opportunity to explore and utilise his knowledge. The sentiment that the Army Reserve did not have the professional 'jealousy' that existed in the Regular Army is supported by other participants in this study.

There was the perfect opportunities that were not taking it up. Working with a

the Army Reserve is completely different in that there is real interest, and no

jealousy. They are really keen to learn about the situation and the skills

involved.   ...OP SOLACE

The differences between the Regular Army and the Army Reserve suggest that within the former there are some significant cultural boundaries that prevent organisational learning, and in turn organisational capability.

The final comment on perception of information capture within the Army explores the contribution it makes to problems in adjustment and re-integration.

At the moment when you return nobody likes to acknowledge that you have

done something over there because most people consider that you have had a

'swan', you have not learnt anything because you have been on holiday for

twelve months, you have come back with a 'bad' or 'dodgy' attitude because

you are mopping around which are all pretty reasonable things from a human

perspective. The guy has just spent twelve months in a fascinating part of the

world and has seen the most amazing things and had dealings with people

which are simply astounding. Nobody is interested, nobody cares, they are his

ideas but nobody gives a rats about them, he is going through a lack of

purpose of sense of direction because nobody has ever told him that it is quite

acceptable, you start to consider that the problem does lie with me.

...UNTSO

OPERATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL DEBRIEFING

Official Army policy as contained in Army Office Staff Instruction (AOSI) 28/1994 titled, "Army Stress Management Policy" details possible stress reactions to operational deployments. It states:

> Operational deployments include the deployment of personnel on combat and non-combat operations. Examples of such deployments include active service, counter terrorist activities, services protective evacuation, and United Nations peacekeeping/peacemaking missions. Deployments for long periods of time (such as in the order of six months or more) or deployments to isolated areas may cause adverse stress in some individuals regardless of the threat assessment.

It also details the reactive aspects of stress reaction prevention, and the mandatory procedures to be followed. These are that:

    a.   Personnel receive psychological intervention, including stress debriefing, at an appropriate time toward the end of the deployments to reduce stress build-up or attend to post-critical incident stress, and assist re-integration to family, friends, work, unit and society; and

b.   Follow up personnel after return from deployment or following a critical

incident to assess the psychological health of a member, determine if further

psychological prevention is required, and to further psychological research.

That there is a policy and a process does not necessarily mean that it widely accepted

among personnel, nor that it is effective. It was not the original intention of this study to

conduct an evaluation of the operational psychological debriefing process. It was identified

early in the research design process that consideration of this topic could be a potential

problem because the participants were aware that the researcher was a member of the

organisation that conduct the debriefings, the Australian Army Psychology Corps, and

knowledge of that relationship had the potential to introduce participant or researcher bias.

Despite this, the topic was so frequently spontaneously raised by the participants in the

study, that a broad evaluation of the process was included in the terms of reference of the

study. As the following comments attest it would appear that the policy is considered both

worthwhile and effective.

...the psychological debriefings, which are truly critical ... you need to be able

to talk to your intimate section commanders or the shrinks. You can't talk to

your wife and your unit has moved on, so you need to find someone to talk to.

...UNSCOM

The psych debriefs are extremely important. You get an Intelligence debrief,

we should continue to get an emotional or psychological debrief as well.

...CMAC

FINDINGS

Overwhelmingly, the psychological debriefing process was seen as positive and to a point, a critical part of the process of readjusting to work and life in Australia. All participants expressed some level of support for the process, but were also quick to point out where they believed there was room for modification. Although some were initially sceptical of the process and reluctant to participate, their final assessment was positive in terms of the benefit for themselves and those who worked for them.

I went as a sceptic. But it was an opportunity to talk over the deployment and

I know that in one case it gave me a better understanding of her position,

whereas throughout the deployment we had not got along, from that time there

was a bond there.   ...UNOSOM

Very worthwhile because it was not forced on you but you were obliged to go.

I was dubious to begin with but believe that I benefited from it.   ...UNAMIR

Generally, the role of the debrief was appropriately seen as preparing personnel for the re-integration into work and life in Australia, but as noted above it was also the first

opportunity for some to understand that other members of the contingent may have different

perceptions of the environment.

One perspective on the need for debriefing related it to Australian national character,

and as with UNSCOM comment above the opportunity to approach an independent third

party who is separate from the mission, and separate from their life in Australia, but still

readily accessible. However, the perspective has been shifted from the debriefing process as

an opportunity to express negative feelings and emotions, to one where it is equally an

opportunity to clarify or validate concepts of success and achievement, that might not be

normally available as part of Australian culture generally, and military culture specifically.

I think it is very important, and everybody in my group as I have spoken to

them has said it helps so much to talk to the psychs if for no other reason than

to get off your chest what you thought. And this is a uniquely Australian

problem in that we have a propensity not to brag about things and so as a

result, and there is this manly thing that you can't be seen to be crying is a

part of it, but the bragging thing is the largest part. If you have medal on

your chest, unless you are talking to someone who has similar ribbons or

similar experiences it is not kind to talk to someone who does not about that

sort of thing. If you don't have someone right next to you who is not able to

talk to about those sort of things then it all bottles up.   ...CMAC

The following comment from a person who was not debriefed in-country, or on his return home, offers some insight into other activities that can be of benefit in allowing people to clarify and express their feelings and emotions about their deployment, and offers the opportunity to compare these methods with the debrief.

I felt good when I did the briefing for the guys who recently left. All day I was relating how I felt about things, how you related to people and how you did things was such a relief, I felt like a weight had been taken off my chest. Now I was driving back into the city after that with one of my Sergeants who had had a psych interview, and I said that I felt relieved now, I felt happier with life and he said he felt exactly the same way about doing the psych interview. For him doing the briefing was an advantage but the psych interview was the best method. ...CMAC

This comment reinforces that successful unit re-integration can be facilitated by providing a forum, a structure, or an opportunity for those who have returned from a deployment through which they can express themselves. The personal benefit to the individual is noted above, the organisational benefit is drawn from a more effective individual, and the addition they make to wider corporate knowledge of the organisation.

When the debrief that is promised in predeployment preparation and official policy is not delivered, people express considerable disappointment, and it is quickly linked to dissatisfaction, in that the 'system' does not recognise or value their experience. Those who

reported that they had not been debriefed were generally from smaller, longer term operations

with low profiles, such as CMAC, MFO and UNTSO contingents.

At present, the debrief process follows a group debriefing model with the opportunity

for individual debriefing on request, or to a lesser extent as identified by the contingent. The

impression from this sample is that the individual interview is appreciated to be more effective

because it is a safer environment in which they can be open with feelings and emotions. The

group process produced a curious reaction in that it was often recognised as being good for

others in the group, but not for the participant. This is a curious observation that may well be

worth exploring in future research.

The following comments highlight the points that have been made above and provide

some insight into individual perceptions of the process, and in some cases suggestions for

improvement.

> *I have a concern about the methodology of the debrief. I asked for a separate*
>
> *debrief. I found the group debrief nearly useless. I think people tended to*
>
> *isolate information from themselves. A tendency to hide in the group. The*
>
> *group process was sabotaged. There was a lot of denial because your mind*
>
> *was on going home, and because you could relate a lot of what was said to*
>
> *other people. You thought that was good for him but not for me. I think that*
>
> *the individual approach was far more useful.   ...UNTAC*

They were keen. They were following a questionnaire or format and we

realised that our interpretation of the question probably did not reflect the

information they were after. I was left with the impression that it was a tick in

the box approach. That is more about how it was done rather than what it is.

But because we had a perception problem the shutters went down and it

probably was not as effective as it could have been. We did not think too

much of it at the time, but it was important to get the information out of

themselves. If it stimulates the process then it is worthwhile. These guys were

almost in the god-king complex as well in that they came from a position

where they had been in charge of their own show and thought they new it all.

...UNTAC

For me I did not get much benefit from it. From an OCs perspective I had a

few people in my group that I think did benefit from it a great deal. To that

end it was worthwhile.   ...UNOSOM

You need to be prepared for going home before you leave the country. You

need to be prepared for the impacts of separation. It is more than the

psychologists asking questions, because the soldiers will not tell them. The

psychologist must challenge them. For example, what are you going to do if

this situation takes place?   ...MINURSO

The final area of interest raised by participants takes up the issue raised in the last comment above, that is, whether the debrief should be conducted in-country, or on return to Australia. In the past, where possible, the debrief has been conducted in-country. On two occasions (UNAMIR and UNTAC) a psychologist has been deployed with larger contingents where individual debriefing and support was an ongoing activity. Smaller contingents, are rarely debriefed in-country. They are contacted on their return to Australia, but as has already been noted, from the participants perspective, there are some flaws in this system.

The majority of participants supported the need for in-country psychological debriefing. The reasoning in support of this centred around two issues, first, the psychologist must have some experience and understanding of the conditions under which the group has lived, and the issues within the group, that is, there must be a period of adjustment and understanding for the psychologist that ultimately leads to a more effective process. Second, logically the information educative and emotional aspects of the debrief are best dealt with before arriving home. Moreover, it should be delivered when the individual is focused on going home, not after the fact.

I thought it was a 'jolly' for the psychs, but when I think about the problem I

can see that it is important for them to see the conditions to understand the

perspective of contingent. I think it should be done in-country. It is part of the

recognition from Australia as well. Recognition that you have been living

under harsh conditions. The information that is given should be delivered in

country, there is little point in telling people about the potential problems

when they are already at home.   ...UNOSOM

*The psychological debrief. I think that it is a good idea to have teams to go across. Mine was done two or three months after I came home. There is a huge transition in your mind from being on operations and then getting on an aircraft and flying back to Australia. It could be quite tough on individuals. It is important for the people to spend a few days in-country getting the feel for the place before they start talking to the people they are debriefing. They need to be able judge the feeling of the group, and be aware of the environment they have come out of. Otherwise it is like having someone asking you seemingly inane questions about the things that you have seen, and how did that make you feel. It seemed to me to be a bit ridiculous dealing with it three months after the event. It also seemed inappropriate asking those questions in a totally different environment by people who had no appreciation of the situation. If it had happened in-country I would have benefited and I would have felt like the Army actually cared a bit more. It allows you pick up any early problems and there has to be a follow up.
...UNOSOM*

But one of my blokes had a very emotional hangover from there, which we jokingly referred to as 'toxic sperm build up', but he certainly had a bad time. I believe it would have been reduced or negated if he had the opportunity to have a two hour session with someone and be able to get his thoughts off his

chest. It would not have helped for any of our group to do it because we all

new what he was going through, we all knew what he was talking about, and

he would not be able to express himself.   ...CMAC

The final comment in this set highlights the role of the small group in facilitating the

process of ventilation, but shows that this process has social boundaries that prevent full

benefit for the individuals. Many times members of formed units noted that they felt they were

better placed to deal with the emotions associated with a peace operation on the basis that

their understanding and trust in each other was already established prior to leaving Australia.

Composite units, like CMAC, must pass through the process of group formation in the course

of the deployment, and therefore the group processes are not mature and are of less benefit to

the individual. Two points come out of this, first, predeployment training has an active role to

play in the group formation process, and second, small groups are also in need of in-country

debriefing.

The benefits of in-country debriefing are further reinforced when the following

comment of the difficulty some people experience in seeking help is considered. The comment

made below indicates that the demands of work, family, and the perception of stigma

associated with seeking help all act to prevent people from making best use of the services

available at home. For this participant, support was available in the Townsville region, but he

felt more comfortable speaking to those psychologists who had established a bond with his

unit and his mission through involvement in the initial predeployment briefing and post-

deployment debriefing. That is, those who understood his circumstances. He suggests that

effective follow-up is best conducted by that unit, rather than by those with limited experience or understanding of his situation. There are a number of practical resource problems associated with this suggestion, but all suggestions that aim to improve the effectiveness of this type of support should be considered carefully.

The only thing that I will say is that it is absolutely essential that the psych counselling be maintained. I do not want to be critical about what happened after we got back but it became difficult for some people, myself included, to take that step to talk to someone. Maybe it was because the people that we were suppose to go and talk to were the people were those down in Sydney and it became a little bit awkward. If someone had been there in the area to whom I could go to, and talk through some of these things in Townsville. Doing a sort of road show type thing. ... In hindsight it might have been easier. I actually made contact with 1 Psych Unit. At one stage, I intimated that I was keen to talk to someone but with a busy schedule and that sort of thing. The problem is that if you are on that borderline that you think you need to speak to someone and there are other pressures it is difficult to make that step. ... Yes, [there is] a little bit of stigma. At my level I can deal with that stigma, but at another level these other soldiers might not be able to. So that you do not want too many people to know, therefore I will not rock the boat, therefore I will not go and see anyone.   ...UNAMIR

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter was to further delineate the differences between the ADF in peacetime and on operational deployment. If the features of organisational architecture that were seen to contribute to the development of individual capability were accurate then the process of re-integration would be relatively seamless. It was anticipated that the participant would discuss re-integration in terms of personal rather than organisational issues.

The findings did reveal new insights into the personal issues associated with re-integration. Return to unit issues highlighted that peacekeepers return to Australia in a state of 'exhaustion' that can take up to twelve months to recover from. Some participants noted that they had not been aware of the problem until they have passed through the recovery phase, and had the opportunity to reflect on their performance.

Returning to work in Australia involves a significant drop in intensity and realism; consequently work seems mundane and trivial. Participants report a period of "motivational crisis" that for some involves reconsidering their military career. It is suggested that during the recovery period peacekeepers must pass through a process of re-building their ties with the peacetime organisation that involves placing the deployment into appropriate perspective, and re-establishing their military career goals. The findings suggest that it is the latter that is the source of greatest difficulty.

In parallel, but distinct from this issue, are the difficulties peacekeepers experience in moving into a more restrictive organisational climate. When first deployed, they must overcome a period of 'cultural hesitancy' to accept that in an operational environment they have increased autonomy and responsibility that stems from an appropriate application of the fundamentals of Directive Control. As described in Figure 10.1, this transition is associated with a growth in personal and professional confidence that produces a permanent change in the individual. Movement back into a peacetime organisation that is characterised by reduced individual responsibility and autonomy, that is seen to be unable to: cater for; make use of; or reward the change that has taken place in these individuals is a significant source of re-adjustment difficulties. The issues raised by the participants concerning their perceptions of restrictive nature of ADF and Army human resource polices, and the scepticism associated with the development of corporate knowledge further highlight that there are organisational issues that prolong the readjustment period, and likely contribute to the high separation from service rates experienced in the post-deployment period.

When the processes that could support peacekeeper re-adjustment were considered they reflected the personal rather than the organisational issues. They suggest that on the return home there needs to be a graduated reduction in work intensity where the individual is provided with some challenge at work, or better still takes on new responsibilities or a different position. Informal support networks appear to form naturally as peacekeepers seek support from those who understand their situation and experiences. There may be some scope for the organisation to provide additional mechanisms to support the development of these networks. Finally, participants saw a role for creating appropriate expectations for the return

home prior to departure form the host country. The psychological debrief already partly meets this need, but the sense here is that there is also a role for contingent leadership. That is, they have a responsibility to begin the process of re-integration early.

The psychological debrief is widely accepted as a valuable and appropriate mechanism that makes a significant contribution to individual re-integration. In-country individual debriefings are particularly valued. Given the issues raised above their may be a need to raise the profile of organisational issues as part of this process.

From a capability perspective, the peace operations environment has again been defined as one that provides conventionally trained military personnel with unfamiliar problems in an unfamiliar context. The issues discussed in this chapter pick-up and reinforce the theme that while the transition from the conditions prevailing in Position Y to Position Z is relatively simple for ADF personnel, the movement back is more difficult. It is interesting to note that the organisational architecture that contributes significantly to their ability to make the initial transition, but once the foundations of their ability have been confirmed in practice they find it difficult to return to the environment that provided the foundations. The impression is that the peacetime organisational architecture is an appropriate training ground for producing capable individuals, but it is less appropriate for retaining or utilising those who have confirmed their capability.

The findings in this chapter suggest that the answer is in the middle ground. The principles and organisational architecture employed by the ADF contribute significantly to the

development of capable individuals, and the appropriate application of these principles in a

peace operations environment results in capable individual and organisational performance.

However, application of the organisational architecture in Australia is less complete as the

environmental conditions allow the negative aspects of a large bureaucracy to prosper,

specifically increased individual control, the retention of power and responsibility further up

the hierarchy, an authority system based on status, and the vigorous application of complex

rules, regulations and procedures.

The majority of participants in this study were drawn from the level of senior soldier to

middle level officers, it was ideally acknowledged that the restrictions of the peacetime

environment were less of a problem for this level than it was for solders, as they had some

control over their environment by virtue of their status. For soldiers, this is not the case.

Further research is required to determine the impact the transition from Position Z to Position

Y has on these individuals in terms of their continued service or performance, and for those

who stay, what processes they use to adjust and adapt.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION

In Chapter One the stated aim of this study was to improve the human resource policies and practices relevant to preparing Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel for peace operations. The purpose of the study was threefold:

a.   to determine those organisational factors that contribute to the development of individual capability, using the Australian Army on peace operations as a case study, and thereby contribute to the conceptual development of Organisational Capability;

b.   to evaluate the preparation, training and education of ADF personnel deployed on peace operations by completing a qualitative and quantitative analysis of ADF involvement in peace operations, highlighting the contribution of these activities to ADF strengths and deficiencies in performance; and

c.   to lay the framework for the development of a comprehensive "Peace Operations Task Analysis Survey" that can be employed to determine exactly what tasks are performed by ADF personnel on peace operations.

The conceptual foundation for achieving these goals was laid by reviewing the peace operations literature to clearly define the environment in which the operations are conducted and the issues associated with preparing individuals and units for that environment (Chapters Two and Three). The environmental conditions and the task demands were then linked together to evaluate the factors that contributed to success and failure of individuals or units on peace operations (Chapter Four). In Chapter Five, the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical basis for training in the ADF was evaluated in terms of it's relevance to existing peace operations predeployment preparation policy and practice. To overcome the perceived weaknesses of the current approach the relevance of the Capability Model (Stephenson, 1992) of education in coping with the apparently divergent tasks of training for war and deploying to peace operations was explored. Further, an expanded model of capability was proposed that considered the role organisational architecture plays in the development of individual capability. The utility of this model was then explored using the ADF on peace operations as a case study.

The importance of the study is drawn primarily from its relevance to the three sponsors. For the ADFPKC, the information provided here will be used as a reference to the further development of ADF peace operations doctrine. It will also be incorporated into the education of middle and senior ranking officers who will be involved in the deployment of future ADF contingents. For LHQ Australia, this information will contribute to developing policies and practices that improve the conduct and management of deployed contingents. For

preparation of future overseas deployments. Finally, the study will contribute to the

development of a theoretical framework that can be used to underpin efforts to understand the

issues in the design, development and conduct of peace operations education and training

worldwide.

The findings of the study can best be understood when centred around the following

two statements:

a.   peace operations demand more of military personnel than conventional training

provides; and

b.   peace operations preparation must provide more than conventional military

competence.

The underlying theme to both statements is that the current policies and practices have

identified and focused on those skills, knowledge and attitudes that are the foundations of

effective performance in modern peace operations, but have not recognised that provision of

the foundation alone is not enough. Conventional military training provides military personnel

with the professional skills that are the foundation of performance, but does not provide them

with, for example, the cross-cultural contact skills identified in this study as a factor in

successful performance in a modern peace operations environment. Similarly, competence in

professional military skills, or cross-cultural skills is not enough without providing the

conceptual basis that individuals can use to guide action and behaviour in an environment that

continually presents unfamiliar problems in an unfamiliar context.

The focus of this study is not to deride or destroy existing policy and practice, but rather to recognise and validate its strengths, and propose solutions and models that incorporate and build upon those strengths. So, conventional military training remains the cornerstone of peace operations preparation, but this study highlights that there are knowledge and skills that should be developed to augment that foundation. Similarly, competence is the foundation of skills development, but capability provides a method for understanding and incorporating features of performance and behaviour that cannot be adequately catered for in the competency model, but are nonetheless critical to performance in a peace operations environment.

It is around these themes that the main conclusions that can be drawn from this study will be identified and detailed. Other issues related to broader human resource policy and practice in the ADF and Army are identified in a separate section. Finally, the future research directions are discussed.

PEACE OPERATIONS: MORE THAN CONVENTIONAL MILITARY TRAINING

Much of the peace operations literature tends to portray the orientation or attitudes required by peacekeepers as an either/or choice between combat and non-combat. This simplistic approach does not adequately capture the complexities of the environment nor does it do justice to the existing skills and abilities of conventionally trained military personnel.

This study highlights that peacekeepers need to be able to adopt both attitudes depending on the situation, or alternatively, that a background in combat skills and attitudes provides a sound foundation for effective performance in a non-combat environment.

Peace operations are war zones, and peacekeepers are potential targets. In this environment military instinct and skills are the foundation of survival. However, the role of the force, contingent and individual is representative of strategic goal of third party mediation. In this context, peacekeepers must exhibit skills and attitudes appropriate to that role. Both combat and non-combat orientations are appropriate, because the context in which peacekeepers perform their tasks are ambiguous and complex enough to demand that they must be able to readily make the transition between the two.

In terms of preparation and training for deployment, the current practice is to consolidate military skills and knowledge, and is augmented by fact-based information designed to support a non-combat orientation. A consistent theme in the findings of this study is that while this approach is adequate, more is required. Consistently, experienced peacekeepers either referred to, or described their experiences and understandings in terms of, a need for greater conceptual understanding of the deployment. Conceptual understanding was seen to provide the framework within which information relevant to peace operations can be understood and interpreted. Further, once deployed it provides guidance on the appropriate adaptation of existing skills and knowledge, or the base from which new skills can be developed to meet novel demands.

Strategically, this understanding and guidance is represented by doctrine. The findings reported here may reflect the absence of appropriate ADF peace operations doctrine until recent times. However, it suggests that the further development of doctrine must provide a clear conceptual understanding of the peace operations environment and conditions that can be readily interpreted and translated into guidance for the behaviour and actions of ADF contingents overseas. It is this guidance on which preparation and training should be based. It is this guidance that individuals should be able to recall to interpret the appropriate response to the novel conditions often found on peace operations.

The issues raised by participants in this study suggest that the tactical principles of consent developed by the British Army (1994) are a valid and reliable starting point from which to further develop an ADF approach to peace operations. The utility of the British principles is that they provide simple conceptual understanding of the environment while also providing the basis for skills definition and development. It is this type of connection between conceptual understanding and skills development that was found to be lacking in the ADF approach to preparation and training for peace operations.

Defining an appropriate conceptual framework for the ADF is beyond the domain of this study, as it involves military considerations beyond issues in preparation, training and education examined here. However, it does offer some guidance to those whose role it is to prepare such doctrine, by providing an insight into the peacekeepers perceptions of environmental conditions and task demands common to peace operation deployment.

Participants in this study identified that the peace operations environment was characterised by the demonstration of advanced interpersonal skills, both within the force and contingent, and between the force and the host population. The common theme here was that successful individual performance on a multi-national peace operations requires the demonstration of effective skills in cross-cultural awareness and communication. The interpretation of cross-cultural interaction in a peace operations deployment was expanded in this study to be seen as a series of cultural immersions each of which has different features, but all of which ultimately impact negatively on individual performance if not managed appropriately (Figure 8.1).

In this context, the interpersonal skills associated with effective cross-cultural performance are those that should be developed within the ADF. It is not realistic that these skills will be developed to an appropriate level within the time constraints often associated with peace operations deployment; these are complex skills and attitudes that take time and experience to develop. Moreover, they are not confined to peace operations, but rather apply equally to peacetime military operation. They compare well to the 'soft skills' identified as a deficiency in Australian civilian management (Karpin, 1995), and it may be that if the ADF is to continue to participate in peace operations at any level, then the development of these skills should be considered as equally important and complimentary to the development of warfighting skills in modern military personnel.

A more specific skill that highlights the importance of these issues is the need to develop some understanding of 'tactical negotiation'. This concept captures the application of 'soft skills' in a cross-cultural setting, and provides it with a military context. The definition of 'negotiation' at the tactical level of peace operations requires further definition. It is readily identified by participants as an appropriate skill that requires development, but the terms of the definition, and thus the skill requirement remain unclear. It appears to be a hybrid between what might be traditionally termed negotiation, and the military interpretation of the term liaison. There is no doubt that advanced interpersonal and cross-cultural skills are at the core of this concept, but further, more specific research is required to define it's boundaries.

The approach to predeployment preparation that flows from a predominantly fact-based approach to the non-combat role of peacekeepers is the assumption that all levels of the force require the same information to the same level. Consequently, predeployment preparation is homogenous. Again, the time between notification to deploy, predeployment preparation and deployment is often short, and this supports the efficiency that is inherent to an homogenous approach. However, this study identified two areas in which greater consideration should be given in the preparation of ADF contingents.

The first area suggests that small contingents require more detailed information and different skills to large contingents. Even this distinction is not clear enough, as some large contingent deployments were seen to operate as hybrids with large numbers of personnel operating in small geographic areas, while the remainder of the contingent operated in small groups in geographically dispersed and isolated areas, resulting in the need for different

preparation requirements for personnel nominally within the same deployment. Figure 8.2, shows that with an increasing level of interaction with, and dependence on, the host population the greater is the preparation requirement. Members of small contingents are more likely to be required to demonstrate cross-cultural capability than members of large groups. In large groups there is less cross-cultural demand made of personnel, or there is more opportunity to structure the environment such that the impact of the demand is negated. The members of small contingents require more detailed knowledge and understanding of their environment, as they rely more on that information. An homogenous approach to predeployment preparation operates on the assumption that the provision of base level information is appropriate for all, the findings from this study suggest that consideration should be given to developing a more sophisticated approach to predeployment preparation that seeks to tailor information and skills to the role of the contingent, the operation of the contingent, and its size.

The second area for consideration in the delivery of information is the distinction between what is relevant to officers and soldiers. The current approach delivers information that is common to both groups, that is, information that is generic to the mission. However, this study showed that there is a difference between the groups in terms of the pitch and delivery of the 'additional' information. Officers consistently identified a need for a greater understanding of the political issues in these operations, possibly reflecting the compression of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of command in modern peace operations. Soldiers were seen as requiring more concrete information on the relationships between themselves and the other groups that might be encountered in-country. The 'additional' information identified

here highlights the different levels of conceptual understanding required by the two groups as they form a mental framework for their role in the deployment. The role of predeployment preparation in defining the framework and providing the appropriate level of information is important to performance in-country.

That peace operations demand more of military personnel than catered for in conventional training is the persistent theme. The participants passed through a period of psychological adaptation on arrival in the new environment that in some skill, knowledge and teamwork areas could last up to six weeks. For officers, leadership in small groups provides a good example. Officers who had commanded small contingents in remote locations noted that the skills and processes of leadership in this context were different from that provided in their conventional training. They found that they were required to adjust and adapt existing skills, and develop new skills to meet these challenges. At the team level, adjustment and adaptation that occur within composite contingents before they reach a period of effective team performance was seen as reducing effective performance in-country at a time when the deployment was at its most intense and demanding period (Figure 8.3).

The period of adaptation and associated reduced levels of performance can be overcome by providing appropriate knowledge and skills development, targeted to the likely demands of these type of operations and the particular deployment. Contribution of skills and knowledge developed in both general training and predeployment preparation needs to be considered. This preparation should compliment conventional military preparation, but importantly should be based on a simple framework that is designed to offer conceptual

understanding of the operation from which existing skills and knowledge can be adapted, and

new skills can be developed.

PEACE OPERATIONS PREPARATION AND TRAINING:

MORE THAN COMPETENCY

The Capability Model (Stephenson, 1992) (Figure 5.2) proved useful throughout the

analysis as a tool for understanding and interpreting the performance of conventionally trained

military personnel on peace operations. Moreover, the features of the individual model were

expanded in this thesis to include the concepts of Administrative Capability (Position X) and

Cognitive Capability (Position W) (Figure 5.5). These additions expanded the utility of the

model to support further refinements in developing the boundaries of capable performance. In

this study of peace operations, some situations were seen to require a purely administrative

adjustment of previously learned skills, while others required a cognitive adaptation to meet

the demands of unfamiliar problems in a familiar context.

The training, education and professional development system employed by the

Australian Army potentially produces capable individuals in the way that it establishes

competence as a base requirement, and then through a combination of scenario, workbased

training, and career progression, exposes personnel to situations that challenge the

administrative and cognitive boundaries of their basic competence. The product of this

approach is a professionally and personally confident individual, who is able to develop new

models for problem solving in response to situations where there is a limited or incomplete

reference to prior environmental or procedural experience.

In this case study of peace operations, Australian Army personnel are shown to be adept at making administrative adjustments (Position X) in response to novel environments, but are not so skilled in making cognitive adjustments in their attitude or approach. While the approach to military training and education described above is valid, the reality is that in application there may be a tendency or bias toward supporting and reinforcing responses that in capability terms are administrative. When confronted with a problem that requires a cognitive adaptation of knowledge and skills (Position W) that is, one in which the response to a situation where established procedures fail and performance is referenced in prior contextual experience (for example leadership in small groups described above), ADF personnel have difficulties. The preliminary finding is that in response to this situation ADF personnel tend to redefine the environment such that the problem can be re-interpreted as requiring an administrative adjustment. In a cross-cultural setting, this was shown to be a response that potentially limits the effectiveness of the individual and group.

The Capability Model as it has been employed in this study offers an alternate, and yet inclusive, approach to CBET by examining and understanding task requirements and the environmental conditions under which they are performed. It offers the advantage of the personal and professional requirements of performance without being prescriptive about how those requirements should be met. In this study the utility of the model of individual capability has been expanded and applied to the examination of ADF personnel on peace operations.

One purpose of this study was to determine the organisational features that contribute to the development of individual capability. From the literature these were determined to be organisational culture, climate and structure. The features of these three constructs were defined for the ADF, and their application in the peace operations environment was examined. Ultimately, organisational culture and climate do appear to contribute to capable performance. Organisational culture was seen to be an inward guide to attitude and behaviour, in that it was defined by those values and beliefs that are supported and rewarded by the organisation, whereas organisational climate, in the context described in this thesis, appears to be externally orientated, in that it defines the relationships between the organisation and elements external to the organisation, and the boundaries of individual action and behaviour. The role of organisational structure was not as clear. This term may have been too closely related to the concepts of culture and climate, and therefore the examination proved to be less distinct.

The features highlighted in this work are specific to the deployment of ADF personnel on peace operations, but further investigation across different organisations may reveal generic organisational architecture in support of the concept of organisational capability.

The final issue in developing the capability concept is the relationship between individual capability and organisational architecture. Deployment on peace operations is seen to be associated with the realisation of individual capability in ADF personnel. As a result of the deployment who are personally and professionally more confident, and more aware of their capabilities. In terms of the Capability Model, they have validated their experience and moved from Position Y to Position Z, and this movement is associated with fundamental personal and

professional growth. We have seen in a number of circumstances that this transition has been relatively simple, with the transition delayed by 'cultural hesitancy' as the individual recognises and adjusts to the organisational architecture in the new context. However, we have also seen that the move back into a more restrictive organisational context (operational deployment to peacetime Army), or a move from the conditions that support independent capability (Position Z) to those that support dependent capability (Position Y) is significantly more difficult.

It was noted that the organisational architecture contributes significantly to the individuals ability to make the initial transition (Position Y to Position Z), but once the foundations of their ability have been confirmed in practice they find it difficult to return to the environment that provided the foundations. The impression is that the peacetime organisational architecture is an appropriate training ground for producing capable individuals, but it is less appropriate for retaining or utilising those who have confirmed their capability. Professional validation was a significant source of personal satisfaction for those who had participated in a peace operation, this findings of this study suggests that this process also involves fundamental growth in personal development for these personnel. At present, the organisational architecture and operation of a peacetime Army is perceived to be unable to recognise the change, and provides limited opportunities to further develop the individuals capabilities. It is these issues that further research may reveal contribute to the high rate of individual dissatisfaction (82 percent) among ADF personnel noted in the pilot Cohesion, Morale and Satisfaction Survey in this study.

In theory, the transition from one environment to the other should be relatively seamless. That this is not the case suggests two things: first, that the operational performance and effectiveness of individuals in-country could be improved through the better application of Directive Control at home, and second, that improved comparability between command and control philosophy employed in the two environments would improve the reverse transition (operations to home).

OTHER ISSUES IN HUMAN RESOURCE POLICY AND PRACTICE

This study has touched upon a range of human resource issues that are not effectively captured by the themes outlined above. These are issues that were raised spontaneously by the participants and not anticipated by the researcher.

Volunteer Status and Selection

Volunteer status is one of these topics. The participant's responses negated the original intention of the topic area, however, their comments offered some interesting insights in the perceptions of volunteer status of ADF personnel deployed on peace operations. The main issue is that, given the limited opportunities for operational deployment in the ADF there is significant personal and professional pressure to participate. Under these pressures, individuals whose family, personal circumstances, or individual motivations would ordinarily preclude them from other types of exercise deployment may be deployed on peace operations.

Participants in this study drew a clear link between inappropriate motivation, and/or welfare problems, and subsequent poor performance in-country. Further research is required to clarify the issues in volunteer status, and consider these in terms of developing appropriate selection procedures.

The second issue in volunteer status, closely related to the first, is that the motivation to deploy to an operational environment for the first time is driven primarily by career and professional development issues. This was termed the 'selfish deployment' in this study. Subsequent deployment motivation appears to stem from issues surrounding the family and the nature of the deployment. This information may be of use to career managers and commanders involved in selecting and managing personnel on peace operations.

Selection was a significant issue for small contingents. The findings of this study suggest that it may be appropriate to consider developing a more sophisticated approach to selecting personnel for small contingents. This study offers some broad guidelines on the behaviours and character traits considered positive and negative by experienced peacekeepers, suggesting that consideration should be given to ability, stability, compatibility and cultural awareness. Additionally, there is some scope to include the predeployment preparation and training activities as a feature of the selection process. This study has provided a base point from which further research can be conducted to define the issues in selection for peace operations.

Return to Unit

The individuals return to unit is a cómplex issue some elements of which have already been discussed. In human resource terms there is a need to acknowledge that personnel returning from these types of operations are often mentally and physically exhausted by the nature of the deployment. Participants in this study conceded that they were unable to recognise the problem until after they had passed through a recovery period that commonly lasted from six to twelve months. The issue for the organisation is what procedures and policies can be developed to support personnel during this time.

This was a side issue in this study, but the participants did provide the following insights. They suggest that on the return home there needs to be a graduated reduction in work intensity where the individual is provided with some challenge at work or, better still, takes on new responsibilities or a different position. Informal support networks appear to form naturally as peacekeepers seek support from those who understand their situation and experiences. There may be some scope for the organisation to provide additional mechanisms to support the development of these networks. Finally, participants saw a role for creating appropriate expectations for the return home prior to departure from the host country. The psychological debrief already partly meets this need, but the sense here is that there is also a role for the contingent leadership. That is, they have a responsibility to begin the process of re-integration early.

This study has broadly identified the problem, and some possible solutions, further research is need to better clarify the issues on which appropriate policy can be developed.

Psychological Debriefing

Psychological debriefing was spontaneously raised by the participants as an important issue in returning to home and work. This study is the first evaluation of the operational psychological debriefing conducted in the ADF. Participants offered comments on the utility of the process, the conduct of the debrief, and it's effectiveness in comparison to other activities.

The debrief was widely accepted as a valuable activity that made a significant contribution to effective individual re-integration back into family and work life. Individual debriefs were particularly well regarded, with a strong preference for them to be conducted in-country.

The findings support a continuation of current policy, with increased emphasis on in-country debriefing for all contingents, and deployment of a psychologist in large contingents. There is some scope for considering changes to the debrief process that may improve the overall efficiency, effectiveness and benefit to the individual. Finally, there is a need to consider developing appropriate follow-up procedures and practices on return to Australia.

THE FUTURE

The final purpose of this study was to lay the groundwork for the development of a comprehensive "Peace Operations Task Analysis Survey" that could be employed to determine exactly what tasks are performed by ADF personnel on peace operations. The findings presented here highlight that there is broad commonality between the issues faced by peacekeepers from the worlds professional military forces. Many of the issues raised by the participants in this study reflect the findings of other studies and reviews of Canadian (Pinch, 1994a; Shorey, 1994), Irish, Swedish (Haberl-Zemljic et al, 1996) and U.S. (D.P. Eyre, 1994; Inspector General, 1994) peacekeepers. This study offers the insights of ADF personnel, and provides a model through which the organisational and educational requirements of peacekeepers can be effectively interpreted and developed.

However, the next phase hinges on the need to gather a comprehensive understanding of the tasks performed by peacekeepers. The issues in 'tactical negotiation' offer an example of the need for this type of information. The application of the skill by peacekeepers appears to have much in common with what is generally understood to be negotiation, but it also has a distinctly military flavour specific to the peace operations context. Clearer identification of the elements of the skill, and the context in which it is employed will result in more effective and targeted skill development in predeployment preparation. The commonality between the experiences of different national contingents suggests that there is some scope for international collaboration between the members of the international defence community to produce an appropriate model and effective instrument to gather this type of information. The expanded

model of individual capability developed in this thesis offers an appropriate conceptual model

from which such collaboration could advance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This section offers some guidance on the direction this study could take operational,

educational, policy and research planners. The intention is to highlight those aspects of the

theory, practice and findings of this study that could be implemented or further developed.

For Practice

It is recommended that individual and organisational capability be developed as a key

consideration in the development of ADF personnel. Competency based training does not

equip personnel for environments in which they are continually presented with unfamiliar

problems in an unfamiliar context. Capability is an inclusive educational and organisational

model that can be employed to overcome the shortfalls of competency.

It is recommended that the capability analysis of context, environment and task

employed in this study be included as a key consideration in the description, analysis and

development of the tasks faced by military personnel.

It is recommended that an appropriate conceptual basis for performance on peace

operations be developed that emphasises a set of principles that will guide action in this

environment by reinforcing appropriate orientation and attitude, and the moral and ethical standards of the organisation.

It is recommended that the 'soft skills' identified as a shortfall in current individual training and development be considered as a core set of skills for inclusion in broader military training and education.

Further Research

It is recommended that a systematic task analysis be conducted to gain an accurate insight into the skills, knowledge and attitudes required by ADF personnel deployed to peace operations.

It is recommended that further development of parameters of individual and organisational capability be undertaken employing the research questions detailed in Table 5.1.

It is recommended that further research be conducted into the methods and models that could be used to facilitate the implementation of capability in the ADF.

It is recommended that the pilot Cohesion, morale and Satisfaction Survey employed in this study be developed as a tool for providing ongoing assessment of the attitudes and orientations of military personnel to peace operations.

Research Strategy

It is recommended that other researchers consider the qualitative research model employed in this study to further develop issues in peace operations. This model showed that an appropriately controlled qualitative study that remained cognisant of the quality standards of objectivity, reliability, internal and external validity and utilisation can be effectively employed to test theory and develop practical solutions to problems.

It is recommended that an international research effort be made into peace operations training and education based on the commonality between findings of this study and others conducted on peacekeepers in Canada (Pinch, 1994a), Ireland and Sweden (Haberl-Zemljic et al, 1996) and the U.S. (D.P. Eyre, 1994).

It is recommended that further studies of individual or organisational capability consider the issue in terms of cross-cultural contexts as they provide an ideal model for examining attitude and behaviour in response to unfamiliar problems and unfamiliar contexts.