Macquarie University, Sydney

Man Made:
Nationalism, Military Service & Masculinity in Istanbul & Tel Aviv

A written dissertation submitted as part of the requirements for the award of Ph.D.

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Summary:

Through the methodology of ethnographic film production, this thesis studies the relationship between nationalism, conscription and masculinity in the lives of young men in Istanbul and Tel Aviv.

As the creative component of this written dissertation, the film *Man Made* examines the symbols, culture and institutions of Turkish and Israeli nationalism, specifically focussing on the practise of mandatory military service. The film also analyses how conscription shapes masculine cultural expectations in both states, and how this phenomenon impacts the lives of a handful of young men. By means of filmed biographical ethnography, *Man Made* explores the vexed relationship between national identity, manhood and conscription in the lives of select male participants in two contrasting cities.

The qualitative research in *Man Made* suggests that in both field sites the relationship between the participants and their military service is cultivated by institutionalised state nationalism, which is detectable in the lives of the participants from their early childhood. In both nations, a consequence of this relationship is a homogeneous cultural mode of masculinity, which is enmeshed with the militarisation of society. This militarized masculinity positions conscription as a personal milestone for men, one of many ethno-nationalist attributes and gendered rites of passage that must be attained if they wish to experience full citizenship rights in their respective nation states.

This written dissertation is a companion to the film, further exploring the themes and historical context of military service in Turkey and Israel, the methodological and technical production of the film itself, as well as the ethnographic research conducted in the creation of *Man Made*.

This thesis is atypically structured, eschewing numbered chapters for a scene-by-scene deconstruction of the film. Mirroring the film's serialized structure, four episodes substitute for traditional chapters. Each episode comprises a written response, framed around events that occur within the specific vignette's duration. Alongside conventional footnotes, in text time-coded references guide the reader to specific moments in the film, which are then analysed.

This is to certify that:

i. This thesis comprises solely of original work by the principal investigator, in order to satisfy the criteria for a PhD in anthropology from Macquarie University. The work herein has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other university or institution.

ii. Due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used.

iii. The thesis is fewer than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of preliminary pages, footnotes and bibliography.

iv. Macquarie University's Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) granted this research project ethical approval on January 5th, 2015 (reference no: **5201400782**).

Mr. Max Dolphin Harwood (Principal Investigator)

Dr. Christopher Houston (Doctoral Supervisor)

Acknowledgements:

The participants and informants of this project have continually stunned me with their willingness, bravery and accommodation to my various requests and impositions over the years. It goes without saying that without their friendship, help and donated time, this project would not have been possible. While they cannot be named individually, let them be recognized here at the top of the bill.

This research project would also not have been conceivable without the support and funding from Macquarie University. I must also thank the Faculty of Arts and the Department of Anthropology, whose staff have been instrumental in my development as an academic and young man. Special thanks to Dr. Lisa Wynn (for introducing me to anthropology as a disciplinary major in 2009), Ms. Payel Ray (for answering my hysterical emails at all hours for what is now nearly a decade) and Dr. Eve Vincent (for her mentorship throughout 2018).

I am also grateful to Macquarie University's generous study abroad program, which allowed me to first visit Turkey and Boğaziçi University as an exchange student in 2010, the spark for this entire adventure.

To my supervisor, Dr. Christopher Houston, I cannot thank you enough. I still do not quite understand *why* – way back in 2011 – you took me under your wing. In taking a chance on a precocious undergraduate student, here we are seven years later. I am indebted to your patience, mentorship and humour throughout our working relationship. I look forward to continuing our work and friendship for many years to come.

To my parents, for believing in me.

To Carmela, for delicious food and unparalleled optimism.

To Geoff, for his tireless editorial assistance, vocabulary and expertise.

To U, who on a rainy March morning sat next to me on a bus to the *miniatürk* and gave me this thesis question.

To Lindsey Langford, Beth Woodward, Jane Watson and Andrew Hewitt, who took in a scruffy east coaster back in 2011 and made sure he was fed and well looked after. Your continued support and love are a constant source of comfort and was essential fuel in my tank from 2011 to 2017.

Turkish crew (in no order): Çağatay, Ian, Can, Cem, Özgür, Yahya, Stephen, Alex, Marco and Isabella – your friendship and kindness made six years in Istanbul life changing and unforgettable.

Australian crew (in no order): Jeff, Euan, Carl, Karl, Sam, Warwick and Tomas – who all subjected themselves to early drafts and cuts of this project, thank you for your support and friendship.

And of course, to Christina. At the beginning of this project, you were just a twinkling ship on the horizon of my wildest dreams. Suddenly, we are sharing our lives together, married happily ever after. Without you, my love, my anchor, I would still be adrift. I could not have done this without you.

Finally, this thesis is dedicated to the memory of Brenton Glenn Douglas, my dear friend and filmmaking mentor. On December 19, 2014, Brenton (quite rudely and against my advice) took matters into his own hands and abruptly exited this mortal coil. It is such a shame that he could not see this project completed, but I know in my heart that he would be proud of the result. It was a terrifying ordeal to lose him in the early stages of this mammoth task, but I clung on to hope, eulogizing before friends and family that "although you have left me in the workshop, I have inherited many tools."

This turned out to be true, both figuratively and literally – thanks for the 85mm lens, man.
I hope that you are in a better place now, where there is no pain.
I hope we meet again.

Notes:

Context and positioning to the film *Man Made*:

This thesis is intended to be read after having viewed the film *Man Made*. This is to account for the production timeline of my thesis and resultant structure of this written dissertation, which was completed in the months after *Man Made* had premiered at Macquarie University.

On quotations:

Verbatim quotations reflect transcribed, on-the-record dialog (either via video, field notes and/or recorded audio interviews) and are indicated with conventional quotation marks, i.e. "I remember in school." My recollection of conversations (usually written down after the event with short-hand notes) and deep-background interviews, are noted in italics without quotation marks, i.e. *Being in prison, it's better than doing push ups and getting shot at!*

On referencing:

Footnotes are used throughout this written dissertation. The multi-disciplinary style of this thesis (and the sheer number of non-bibliographical references cited throughout) rendered in-text citations (conventional to anthropology) both inappropriate and cumbersome. Footnotes are formatted as **author, year, page number** at the bottom of each page.[1] A final bibliography and reference list is provided at the end of this written dissertation. Footnotes are also occasionally used for brief clarifying remarks, hyperlinks to digital media, explication of slang/specialised terms (especially in film production), and suggestions for further reading not found in the final reference list.

On translation:

Turkish, Israeli and French words are *italicised,* with the English translation appended in parenthesis, ex. *çay* (tea), except when using proper nouns, ex. Boğaziçi University.

On the fair use of unlicensed commercial music and third-party commercial footage in *Man Made*:

Man Made's frequent use of commercial music and unlicensed third-party footage would normally bankrupt the average independent filmmaker. The legal inclusion of commercial music and video rights is notoriously expensive, with single use costing from hundreds to tens of thousands of dollars per screening. In the pre-production of *Man Made*, I made inquiries to the Australian Federal Register of Legislation, with questions about the "fair use" of commercial music and third-party video in an educationally produced ethnographic film as part of a PhD thesis. I was delighted to be informed that the Australian Copyright Act 1968 (ACA), revised under the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), contains precise statutes on the free use of unlicensed media for student and educational films produced in Australia, in a collegiate setting, including post-graduate research collections.

[1] e.g. Harwood, 2018, 7

Specifically, the ACA permits the free use of commercial music and video not originally created for a research project under the following rulings:

> ***<u>The Educational use clause (13.11) of the ACA (1968):</u>***
> ***Section 44:*** *"Permissible inclusion of short extracts from (c) material in a new collection".*[2]
>
> ***<u>Educational use clause 271 of the ACA (1968):</u>***
> ***SS135ZG, 1357MB:*** *"Permissible copying of insubstantial portions".* [3]
> ***S200:*** *"The use of works and broadcasts for educational purposes".*[4]

I was assured that my film's status as mixed media submission for the award of PhD qualified it for the above waivers of commercial license. Statute **S200** in particular ensures that *Man Made's* use of unlicensed commercial music and third-party footage is permissible in the context of its production as part of a PhD thesis. This waiver also extends to not for profit public/festival/conference screenings of the film while it remains the intellectual property of Macquarie University.

[2] See "Current Exceptions": https://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/13._educational_use.pdf
[3] See "Educational Fair Use": https://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/13._educational_use.pdf
[4] Ibid.

Definitions & Terms:

Conscription:

The compulsory enlistment of an individual for the purposes of military service.[5]

DSLR:

Digital single lens reflex camera. The primary camera used in the production of *Man Made* was a Nikon D750 DSLR.

Ethnicity:

Throughout this thesis, ethnicity is analysed alongside nationalism as a comparable ideological construct of cultural and social belonging, "distinguished by discrete linguistic, cultural, or national features".[6] Like nationalism, ethnicity is complicated by its shifting meaning, dependent on its disciplinary context. Morris (2012) offers a concise anthropological context to studied ethnicity, writing, "In anthropology, the modern study of ethnicity has turned on how meaningful it is to separate ethnic groups analytically, what membership of such a group means to those involved, and latterly on how ethnicity is used by modern states to mark difference, which can lead to conflict and a sense of discrimination."[7]

Film:

Unless otherwise noted, when referring the use of video cameras (digital or celluloid) to record the moving image, I have opted to use the generalised term "film", despite its skeuomorphic inference.

Hegemonic:

Another cross-disciplinary term that requires a precise classification when studying nationalism, conscription and masculinity in the lives of state citizens. I concur with Ben-Ari & Lomsky-Feder (1999), who outline their understanding of the term in relation to militarism in Israeli society thusly:

> *"The term hegemonic encompasses (at one and the same time) ideas about a socially legitimated and maintained hierarchy between alternative arrangements and the centrality of the state (and its myriad agents) in controlling not only material and state resources but also dominating the very conceptual categories through [citizens] think about the reality within which they live . . . By hegemonic, we suggest the dominance of certain groups not only in economic or political terms but also in ideological ones. Hegemony, following Williams* (1977)*, is a process rather than a state: as the system of domination and inequality becomes so lodged in cultural belief it comes to appear natural and inviolate. Along these lines the first section of this volume includes chapters on the main cultural sites within which hegemonic representations of war and the military are created and propagated as well as the dominant elites that bear and convey these governing ideas."*[8]

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[5] Bowyer, 2007, 57
[6] Morris, 2012, 84
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ben-Ari and Lomsky-Feder, 1999, 28

LGBTI:

Considering the ever-evolving initialisation of the non-heteronormative community, I have opted to settle on LGBTI, which reflects the current constitutional language of *Lambdaistanbul*, an organisation that was the nexus for my privileged research of Istanbul's LGBTI community.[9]

Masculinity:

Manhood, male identity and social roles that are seemingly attributed to be the dominion of the male sex. I subscribe to the work of noted male studies sociologist Michael Kimmel (2004), who carefully specifies masculinity as referring to "the social roles, behaviours, and meanings prescribed for men in any given society at any one time. As such, the term emphasises gender, not biological sex, and the diversity of identities among different groups of men."[10] This behavioural definition speaks to feminist anthropology of the 1980s, which introduced the study of engendered and engendering persons, the study of "men as men".[11] In this thesis, I define the complex abstraction of gender as a cultural, hierarchical and political concept that surpasses the structuralist, biological binaries of pre-feminist anthropology.

Militarism:

Morris (2012) broadly defines militarism as the social and political doctrine that a polity should have a formidable military to aggressively defend its interests. In the context of Turkish and Israeli militarism, I use Daniele Conversi's (2008) framing of the subject as an applied doctrine of modern state nationalism, which he situates in 19th century Western Europe. Conversi claims that militarism is a specific institutional mechanism of the nation state, usually disseminated through public education. Conversi contends that militarism's role extends beyond the practical utility of national defence, arguing that it also functions to propagate a cultural homogeneity that is advantageous to the ruling polity and the nationalist project.[12]

Nationalism:

For this dissertation, I have built my understanding of nations and nationalism on the sociological constructivist models, advanced by Gellner (1983), Anderson (2006) Smith (1986, 1998) and Hobsbawm (1992). Understanding nationalism through the works of these scholars, I regard the nation as an ideological social construct, born out of the specific conditions of 19th century Western Europe. I define the nation as constituted by the ethno- (or political) state, whose polity and media fabricates, performs and regulates nationalized bodies, sentiments, rituals, everyday practices and ideologies to legitimately function.

Situated as a 19th century phenomenon, the nation is an abstraction of industrialised cultural homogenisation – a "congruent" ethnic and political unit, resulting in a standardised "high culture" that serves an elite polity.[13] Nationalism denotes the reproduction of specific symbols, mythologies, rituals and traditions amongst the nation's population for the purposes of cultural homogenisation. These mass-produced nationalist totems draw on patriotic, ethnic and indigenous "imaginings"[14] of shared descent and interest among otherwise disparate groups of people.

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[9] See *Lambdaistanbul's* 2013 Intersex statement: https://lgbtinewsturkey.com/2013/10/03/intersex-statement/
[10] Kimmel, 2004, 503
[11] Morris, 2012, 160
[12] Conversi, 2008
[13] Gellner, 1983
[14] Anderson, 2006

Intimately connected to state institutions like public education and military service, these nationalist imaginings justify territorial sovereignty/independence, enforce political and cultural homogeneity within borders, denote and repress internal threats or non-nationals, and persuade the citizenry into institutional compliance and other state obligations. Furthermore, Hobsbawm's specific advice to qualitatively study the nation "from below"[15] informs the ethnographic research in *Man Made,* i.e. participant interviews with non-state/non-institutional representatives.

Shot:
A frame, scene or moment in a film.

The State:
I use Barfield's (1997) technical definition of the modern state as, "a regional polity, dynamically expanding through conquest. Within the polity, diverse hierarchies of offices are associated with specialized institutions that are financed by political economy."[16] Barfield goes on to outline how institutions of the state reflect the need to efficiently integrate the diverse citizenry that inhabit them – these include administrative bureaucracies, legal systems and military organisations. These various "sources of [state] power" differ from state to state.[17]

[15] Hobsbawm, 1992
[16] Barfield, 1997, 444-445
[17] Ibid.

Introductory Remarks to My Examiners:

The following dissertation is a written accompaniment to the ethnographic film *Man Made*, although it is more adequate to describe it as a composite text, as it includes a mixture of scholarly styles contained within a single written work (excluding this introduction and the bibliography). This dissertation seeks to bridge the significant experiential and methodological gap between the presentation of traditional ethnographic writing and the experience of viewing an ethnographic or documentary film. The distinct qualities of the two methodologies of ethnographic film production and ethnographic writing are identified by Hastrup (1992)[18] as "two separate modes" of anthropological practise that seek the same objective. I concur with Hastrup's view that although dissimilar mediums, both methodologies share the common goal of producing and presenting original anthropology-based research to the reader or viewer. A fusion of these two modes through new media technologies can greatly enrich the contemporary anthropologist's work.

If we take Hastrup's prompt and separately evaluate the individual merits of creating ethnographic knowledge through and in the visual and the textual, then the visual mode can offer "place, thin description, record, behaviour, happening, framing and mapping". Somewhat by contrast, the textual mode features "space, thick description, recollection, action, event, reframing and itinerary".[19] When brought together, using both the visual and textual mode to synthesise fieldwork data, they offer a rich ethnographic report, presenting a unique and multisensory arrangement of an anthropologist's research to their audience.

The use of visual elements to supplement the written text is not new to anthropology, nor the wider social sciences. The inclusion of still photographs, art and film-based research has been a feature of cultural studies and ethnography since image capture technology emerged alongside the practise of anthropology in the 19th century.[20] However, the presentation of a feature length documentary film project as a primary source for a doctoral thesis in anthropology is a more contemporary innovation,[21] which owes its emergence both to the evolution of accessible digital video technologies for students, and the growing reputation of digital ethnographic film as a competent research methodology within the field of visual anthropology.[22] Further, ethnographic film can enhance a traditional anthropological study. Pink (2001) writes of the "transformative potential of the visual" in relation to qualitative research, calling the visual medium a "[powerful] force that has a transformative potential for modern thought, culture and society . . . and social science itself".[23] The force of *Man Made* surely lies in its visual testimony of conscientious objectors and political dissidents from within the Turkish and Israeli state – a novel ethnographic approach that blends guerrilla filmmaking with traditional anthropological methods.

Alongside the film *Man Made*, this written dissertation presents a fusion of Hastrup's methodological partition, by modifying the traditional ethnographic film essay into a structurally analogous experience to viewing the very film that the text is addressing. This unusual approach was primarily influenced by Paul Henley's (1998) description of the unique processes and logistical frameworks around ethnographic film production[24] that mark it as so distinct from traditional ethnographic fieldwork.

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[18] Hastrup in Crawford and Turner, 1992, 8
[19] Ibid., 20-21
[20] Gaillard, 1997, 1
[21] Prosser, 1998
[22] Heider, 2006, 110-117
[23] Pink, 2001, 13
[24] Henley in Prosser, 1998, 43

Henley argues that the "series of decisions"[25] the scholarly filmmaker is charged with (ethnographic or otherwise) calls for a unique written response to sufficiently illuminate the ethnographic film that is the primary text of a research project. To reflect the episodic structure of *Man Made*, this written response is largely a shot-for-shot analysis of the film itself, offering a combination of historical framing, ethnographic writing and theoretical discussion that illuminates the footage, as opposed to being structured by traditional written chapters. Originally, I had intended to compose a more conventional written thesis, with – for example – a chapter on Turkey, a chapter on Israel, a long chapter on ethnographic film theory, and so on. But once *Man Made* was complete, it felt disingenuous to ignore what was now the primary text and structure of my PhD, and write separately about the themes and topics therein. The solution was to address *Man Made* "shot by shot", still covering the technical and theoretical ground that I had drafted in my initial outline, yet oriented towards the structural order of the final cut of the film.

Atypical writing styles aside, both Henley[26] and Heider (2006)[27] also question the role of traditional written material accompanying an ethnographic film in the first place. Should not the film stand as its own completed ethnographic work? Presumably if the film is competent, it should be so imbued with rich layers of thematic meaning that it does not require a written explanation. Henley analyses the unique tension between written and visual description in multimedia anthropology, reconciling that the ethnographic filmmaker who deliberately manipulates (edits) their raw visual data into a traditional documentary, can then call upon "their writerly skills to communicate their understandings"[28] in the fulfilment of a complete work of requisite anthropological significance.

My contribution to answering this question lies in this dissertation's emphasis on technical film production in the context of anthropological fieldwork – a largely ignored but fundamental element of ethnographic film analysis and pedagogy. While a good ethnographic film should not require an instruction manual for initial comprehension, by accompanying it with a written analysis, the anthropologist can clarify not only the film's backgrounded themes, topics and ideas, but also reveal crucial technical insights specific to the film's production. In writing about the myriad technical minutiae that occur behind the camera lens, the anthropologist can pass on critical methodological skills, a fusion of ethnographic and technical knowledge that is much richer than what is presented in the limited experience of the film itself. Indeed, it is hoped that this written accompaniment can illuminate and inspire the reader when considering their own future projects of mixed media anthropology – an ethnographic film school by osmosis, if you will.

[25] Ibid.
[26] Henley in Prosser, 1998, 42-56
[27] Heider, 2006, 116
[28] Henley in Prosser, 1998, 44

Akin to the illuminative quality of an auto-ethnographic chapter within a traditional monograph, writing about *Man Made* offers both a behind the scenes deconstruction of its production by the director, as well as a nuanced anthropological analysis of the film itself. A central contention of *Man Made*'s value for the discipline of ethnographic film is in its minimalist technical production, particularly the creation of the film by a single researcher. From personal ownership of all equipment used, to a mastery of simultaneous sound/cinematography and direction and final editing, *Man Made* was created entirely by one anthropologist with no personnel support in the field or in post-production – a technical feat that was largely impossible until just a few years ago. Heider emphatically argues that "while film can play an important role in ethnographic description, it cannot satisfy all ethnographic needs".[29] This written dissertation attempts to complete the ethnographic portrait offered in *Man Made* by offering a perspective from behind the camera, as well as into the anthropological theory and historical framing that informed its production.

Moreover, clarifying statements by the anthropologist on the technical aspects of camera-based fieldwork is a unique feature of ethnographic film writing. Aside from describing the practical challenges of making anthropology films in remote locations, both Heider[30] and Henley have spent time writing on the pitfalls and unique theoretical and ethical challenges of ethnographic film – issues such as veracity in videorecording ("the image as evidence" debate),[31] representation of the participant in the visual mode, the aspiration and loss of *Kino-Pravda* (film-truth)[32] and the conventions of *cinéma vérité* (truthful cinema)[33] in the use of editing and non-diegetic music, the nature of subjective interpretation, the inclusion of participant and observer reflexivity[34] and so on. Considering these technical and theoretical challenges, it is easy to concur with Henley's prescription for a unique written response to a completed ethnographic film. Without a detailed report to accompany an ethnographic film, these issues and many others would go unanswered after the rolling out of the film's credits.

The structure of this thesis intends to creatively reflect Henley's "series of decisions" and to complement the format of *Man Made*. After this introduction, this dissertation is segmented according to the four episodes of *Man Made*, using the time codes of the film within its 142-minute running time to both partition the writing into a digestible format and orient the reader. Analogous to an expository-laden director's commentary track, this dissertation is divided into the following sections:

Prologue: (The abattoir / opening monologue / "Generals and Majors" historical montage)
Episode 1: The Three Sabras
Episode 2: The Reluctant Sons
Episode 3: The Soldier & The Swede
Episode 4: The Pink Certificate
Epilogue and concluding remarks: (The abattoir)

[29] Heider, 2006, 116
[30] Ibid.
[31] Banks in Prosser, 1998, 15
[32] As innovated by Dziga Vertov in his pursuit of 'natural' representations in cinema.
[33] As both a cinematic genre and a methodological approach to ethnographic film production.
[34] Prosser, 1998, 1

Theoretical themes and hypothesis in *Man Made*: Each episode/chapter is cinematographically deconstructed and anthropologically contextualised, with theoretical and technical analyses presented in a series of written vignettes. The opening description of this format as a composite text accounts for the variety of forms that these digressive vignettes use, grounding the sometimes-abstract nature of the film is an ongoing literature review that continues through all sections of the dissertation. This serves to intellectually underpin the primary topics and themes that emerge in the film across its four key scenes. Principal focus is placed on the systems and theories of nationalism (both historical and contemporary), their relationship to ethnicity and militarism, and to the overall study of nationalism within anthropology.

Examiners may wish to note that in this written format, the four scenes are disproportionally sized. As *Man Made* comprises of two Turkish and two Israeli episodes each, the written analysis for the first Turkish and Israeli scenes (*The Three Sabras* and *The Reluctant Sons)* are significantly larger than the subsequent two (*The Soldier & The Swede* and *The Pink Certificate)*. This is to account for the inclusion of two extensive and standalone historical exegeses of Turkey and Israel, that are integrated into the prologue, *The Three Sabras* and *The Reluctant Sons*. These lengthier sections differ significantly from the anthropological and ethnographic writing that typifies most of this written thesis. Instead they function as historical literary surveys that contextualise nationalism and militarism in the context of *Man Made*, emphasising their role in shaping cultural modes of masculinity in Turkey and Israel through the practice of conscription. In short, examiners should not be alarmed when they see the disproportionate written length of *The Three Sabras* and *The Reluctant Sons,* both of which are longer than the comparatively concise ethnographic analyses of *The Soldier & The Swede* and *The Pink Certificate*.

While *Man Made's* four episodes are distinct entities set within two separate field sites, they are thematically linked by my hypothesis that the state institution of military service embodies ideological, or "imagined", nationalism in Turkey and Israel. Through the practice of mandatory military service, the state coerces the individual citizen into a homogeneous, nationalist ideal. A by-product of this process is the emergence of a state-defined masculinity, that in both field sites is directly linked to model citizenship and rigid heteronormative gender roles. This echoes the thesis statement delivered in the opening monologue; that even in the face of individual dissent and public allegations of discrimination and human rights abuse, the practice of conscription concretizes the abstract ideology of nationalism to justify and perpetuate its existence in both countries. The informants who appear in the film have inter-subjectively struggled with this embodied nationalism to varying degrees, and the focus of *Man Made* is on the participants' unique reactions and experiences that result from this contact.

My reading of military service as a tangible host for ideological nationalism is also influenced by Michel Foucault's (1977) concept of "docile bodies"[35], as well as Cavers (1994) specific modification of Gellner's (1983) theory of nationalism.[36] My inclusion of Foucault's punitive theories in *Man Made* contend that, when analysing the soldier as a disciplinary product of the state, Turkish and Israeli conscription are examples of Foucault's "technologies of power" that discipline the body through the "enclosure"[37] of military service. This reading is supported with a combination of the original ethnographic research produced in *Man Made*, the rich anthropological fieldwork and historical texts on Turkish and Israeli society, as well as selected literary staples of the social sciences that are pertinent to this hypothesis.[38]

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[35] Foucault, 1977, 167
[36] Cavers ,1994
[37] Foucault, 1977, 175-176
[38] See reference list.

Finally, throughout this written thesis there is an interweaving critical evaluation of ethnographic filmmaking and its production. Examining *Man Made* as a principle text of the genre, this thesis analyses how the film contributes to the wider sub-discipline by situating its position, value and purpose within the now enormous archive of ethnographic filmmaking. As a result, many ethnographic and documentary films are cited in context, as well as film production methodology and technique that ranges from academic works to commercial and independent cinema.

Brief review of current research on masculinity in Turkey & Israel: In preparation for this thesis, I have found the qualitative study of cultural masculinity and its relationship to military service in Turkey and Israel (in English) to be limited, particularly in the field of anthropology. While only a few scholars have published comparative studies on Turkish and Israeli nationalism, they usually emphasise the religious component of both states as the locus of research.[39] Moreover, it appears that there is no filmed comparative ethnographic work on the subject as of 2018. This is symptomatic of the well-noted research gap in gender studies of men in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In 2017, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) published their first comprehensive men and gender equality survey of the MENA, remarking that "there has been significant policy and civil society attention to the rights and conditions of women and girls in the MENA region in recent years. In contrast, there has been relatively limited research on men's attitudes and practices."[40]

An excellent case in point can be found in the reading list for the master's level course *Gender and Sexuality in the Middle East* at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). While the readings and supplements cover an array of comparative geographies, cultures and societies from Morocco to Iran, of the 29 readings listed only three contained material related specifically to the study of men and masculinity in the region.[41] In preparation for *Man Made,* I found the existing gender studies literature in both of my field sites disproportionally focussed on the experience of female Turks and Israelis, ranging from feminist ethnographies to specific deconstructions and analyses of gendered power dynamics in the region.

Outside of Turkey and Israel, the specific study of military service and its relationship to masculinity and men's lives has seen only a handful of works published in a variety of multi-national and cross-disciplinary contexts. Heather Streets' *Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-1914* (2004) studies the soldiers of Nepal, Bengal and Scotland in a racial reading of militarised masculinity in 19th century Britain. Similarly, Anders Ahlbäck's *Manhood and the Making of the Military: Conscription, Military Service and Masculinity in Finland, 1917-39* (2014) sheds light on the development of Finnish hegemonic masculinity and the influence of historical institutionalised conscription. A unique intersection of peace and conflict studies, anthropology and the study of masculinity is also found in Claire Duncanson's *Forces for Good? Military Masculinities and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan and Iraq* (2013), in which Duncanson qualitatively researches the combat experiences of British soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of a gendered analysis of contemporary military intervention.[42]

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[39] Cesari, 2018
[40] UN Women, 2017, 24 (report): http://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2017/images-mena-multi-country-report-en.pdf?la=en&vs=3602
[41] https://www.soas.ac.uk/courseunits/15PGNH012.html
[42] Duncanson, 2013

In contrast to the narrow selection of men's studies focussed on the MENA region, contemporary gender studies of men and masculinity within the Western world has now produced a far more comprehensive bibliography. Often intersecting queer theory, anthropology and sociology together, major Western works on male-oriented gender studies include the significant body of research by Michael Kimmel,[43] standalone works by George L. Mosse (1996) and David Gilmore (1990),[44] and the foundational post-structuralist criticism of Western sexuality by Michel Foucault.[45] Thus, while the more general field of European and American masculinity and men's studies is resource-rich, given its limited focus on Turkey and Israel it nevertheless is insufficient in addressing the concerns of *Man Made.*

However, the literature that does fall within the precise thematic crosshairs of *Man Made* – while scarce – has been exceptionally instructive in the development of this thesis. In Turkey, the most fitting analogue to *Man Made's* own research is Ayşe Gul Altınay's *The Myth of the Military Nation* (2004). Based on her own qualitative study of men and conscription in Turkey, Altınay writes a rich ethnography of nationalism, masculinity and militarism in Turkey and Europe. Likewise, social scientists Hanioğlu, Çağaptay, Uzer and White have written extensively on the Turkish nationalist project and its relationship to military service in their work, ranging from intellectual biographies of Atatürk, to critical evaluations of revisionist Turkish nationalism in the era of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.[46]

In Israel, sociologist Orna Sasson-Levy has dedicated much of her research to studying the relationship between masculinity and military service in the IDF. Coincidentally, midway through my own research (and much to my delight) she collaborated with Merav Perez on a significant qualitative study examining conscientious objection as a rejection of hegemonic masculinity in Israel.[47] Despite the precision of this standalone work, more general studies of masculinity in relation to the IDF and the Israeli nation state have been few and far between in the English language, although it has been peripherally analysed as part of wider gender studies of Israeli society and culture.

As Karin Yefet (2015) outlines, "Feminism has largely treated men as the undifferentiated dominant gender group, neglecting a discussion of men's own gender identity. As a result, the legal conceptualization of masculinity is still under-explored; a tapestry of legal doctrines renders inconsistent ideological messages about what it means to be a 'man', and especially what it means to be a father."[48] In Israel's case, Yefet argues for the "outing" of the hegemonic masculine archetype in Israel (as opposed to their default state as a control group) as a necessary step in approaching a practical reconciliation of gender inequality in the country – but this acts as merely an aside to her more specific research on male-female power dynamics in modern Israel.

[43] See Reference list
[44] Gilmore, 1990
[45] Foucault, The History of Sexuality (Vol 1-3), 1978-1986
[46] See reference list for Hanioğlu, Çağaptay, Uzer, White, etc.
[47] Sasson-Levy and Perez, 2015
[48] Yefet, 2015, 48-49

Israeli queer theory offers similar tangential studies of masculinity and military service in the country. In his re-evaluation of contemporary Israeli cinema, Raz Yosef (2004) dedicates a significant section of his book to the study of Israeli nationalism and its influence on their hegemonic masculinity. Through a comprehensive analysis of Israeli cinema from 1948 onward, Yosef argues that the Jewish nationalist project's well-documented reformation of the Diaspora Jew into a masculine warrior was largely transmitted through film and television in the 20th century, as well as reproduced in the institution of mandatory military service. With *Man Made,* I seek to offer an original contribution that addresses this research gap and encourages further study of men within Turkey and Israel from international researchers. While far from an original attempt at studying nationalism's effect upon masculinity within the state, *Man Made*'s is distinct in its comparative study of Turkish and Israeli young men, coupled with the unique methodology of ethnographic film production.

The ethics of research in *Man Made* in the context of Turkish and Israeli law: In his analysis of hostile environments for qualitative researchers, Nigel Fielding (2007) describes them as any place "where the research population is actively resistant to research. It isn't simply indifferent, uninformed, or susceptible to being upset by certain questions or poor technique. It does not want the research done, and if research nevertheless takes place, it seeks to control the research and the researcher."[49]

This encapsulates my time embedded in Istanbul and Tel Aviv, particularly my relationship with the central institutions related to my research in *Man Made*, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). Through the oral testimony of its participants, *Man Made* indirectly describes the inner workings of the Turkish and Israeli military, institutionally and culturally. Despite this, direct qualitative research and interviews involving enlisted military personnel or high-ranking Turkish and Israeli officials are notably lacking from the final cut of the film. Their absence is the result of several interlinked elements: the consequences of serious legal censorship (especially in Turkey); the upholding of my ethical obligations to ensure the personal safety of the informants and myself; as well as both military's policy of non-cooperation with outsiders, especially when faced with the critical gaze of researchers.

In the case of Turkey, censorship extends beyond military personnel with the Turkish Penal Code's infamous Article 301 stipulating the following:

1. *Any person who slanders the Turkish Nation, the State of the Turkish Republic or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the judicial institutions of the State shall be punishable by imprisonment from 6 months to 2 years.*

2. *Any person who publicly slanders the military and police organisations of the State will too receive the same punishment.*[50]

[49] Fielding in Seale, 2007, 237
[50] As translated by the author from https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5237.html

Evidently, every Turkish informant who appears in *Man Made* may be construed in some ways to contravene one or both of those subclauses across the film's duration**.** Further, the ambiguous language of Article 301 makes much academic research in Turkey potentially prosecutable, while any combination of the articles' directives may make non-citizen researchers vulnerable to deportation and black-listing. It is worth noting that Article 301 is still enforced as of 2018. In July 2018, 23-year-old Safiye İnci filmed herself on the steps of Atatürk's mausoleum, and in an online video declared her dislike for the founder of modern Turkey, comparing Atatürk unfavourably to the current president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. After her brief and crude video went viral, İnci was arrested and now faces up to three years in prison.[51]

When I arrived in Turkey in mid-2013, my own paranoia about Article 301 was paired with the fact that I was hauling a significant amount of audio-visual equipment into the country. This was just weeks following the Gezi park protests that summer, and there had been a violent crackdown on journalists, researchers and activists throughout Istanbul. Only holding a tourist visa, it was in this climate of hostility that I flew into Atatürk International Airport with an anxiously rehearsed cover story, in the event I was questioned by immigration police.

In my very own *Midnight Express* moment, I was detained at Turkish customs after clearing immigration – the sliding door to the arrival hall tantalisingly in sight – and had my luggage unpacked and searched by two humourless security officers as I was questioned by a third. In full view of my camera equipment, I was asked bluntly if I was a journalist or activist filmmaker. Hiding my conversational Turkish, I managed to convince them that I was a mere video enthusiast, making YouTube travel vlogs as a hobby, and that I intended to stay in Istanbul to be with my girlfriend, as well as teach English for a summer working holiday. Bemused, they eventually waved me on, and I was permitted entry into the country.

This experience acted as a cautionary tale, and in my subsequent application for approved study with the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) at Macquarie University, I was determined to take significant protective measures for myself, the participants in *Man Made* and the accumulated research data of the project. This included digital security protocols: from encrypted hard drives, to installing complex "usbkill"[52] remote wiping software on my laptop, as well as acts of civil subterfuge – I fudged the true nature of my research in Istanbul when questioned by Turkish police and other government officials at various points of my candidature. This included taking on a part-time private sector job when applying for my İkamet (residence permit), to minimise suspicions that I was freelancing as a journalist, writer or studying in the country without a valid visa.

[51] https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/07/erodgan-supporter-insults-ataturk-prosecuted.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter accessed July 2018

[52] *Usbkill* is an open source anti-espionage tool that 'bricks' a computer hard drive if a USB key is inserted into it when the operating system is locked – a common tactic of law enforcement I.T specialists who have seized personal devices they wish to decrypt. For more see: https://github.com/hephaest0s/usbkill

Having previously conducted research on the experiences of gay men in the Turkish military,[53] I was no stranger to the Turkish government and the TAF's hostility when it came to external researchers. Any journalist or academic scrutinising the internal workings of the TAF or the Turkish state quickly finds themselves in a vacuum of secrecy, denial of access and the recipient of curt warnings from officials. In the wake of the Gezi protests, the deportation of fellow expat journalists became increasingly common, and horror stories of friends being escorted to the airport without access to their belongings added to my anxiety. This of course paled in comparison to the plight of my domestic Turkish peers. Deportation looked infinitely preferable to the number of jailed Turkish journalists, academics and activists in the wake of the post-Gezi crackdowns. These colleagues faced indefinite imprisonment, show trials and physical abuse at the hands of the increasingly authoritarian Turkish state.

Despite this, over the course of my research I was in fact able to secure a handful of interviews with serving personnel of the TAF, but all were strictly off the record and limited to audio only recordings. These interviews served largely as background research and I was informed time and again that it would be impossible to get a serving officer, soldier or doctor of the TAF to appear on camera for any meaningful exchange. I was also careful to never reveal my own identity to these participants, as I was mindful of the TAF's own motivations when it came to shielding their rather poor international reputation vis-a-vis human rights. A trusted Turkish contact had conspiratorially warned me that the TAF solicit their own intelligence gathering via "plant" interviews, with a view to catch and deport *spies posing as journalists and students* who were seeking to criticize the institution's internal dynamics. I cannot verify whether any of my TAF interviews were of this nature, but I was nevertheless cautious and unable to meaningfully connect with any of these participants beyond superficial pleasantries – a sharp contrast to my deep personal engagement with the civilian participants of *Man Made.* Deeply unsettled, I resigned myself to focussing exclusively on a group of informants in Istanbul with whom I had already established years-long relations and rapport.

My experiences in Israel were far less dramatic, although similarly futile in gaining any on-the-record film access to serving personnel in the IDF. While there is not an Israeli equivalent of Article 301 barring all criticism of the Israeli state and military specifically, from the moment you land at Ben Gurion International Airport you are entering the hyper-sensitive security apparatus of the Israeli state. Entering Israel as a non-Jewish visitor feels like a tenuous privilege at best, where one needs to prove one's innocence in the face of assumed guilt. Indeed, the experience of negotiating my way through the immigration gates of Ben Gurion is emblematic of the wider Israeli "siege mentality" that is one prominent subject of this written dissertation.[54] My official status as an invited visitor, despite carrying a letter of introduction from Tel Aviv University as an international PhD researcher, meant that each time I presented myself to Israeli immigration, it was an exercise in semantic gymnastics. After presenting my papers, a typical encounter would resemble the following:

Immigration Agent (IA): *What brings you to Israel?*

Me: *I'm here to conduct PhD research at the Moshe Dayan Centre as a visiting scholar.*

IA: *What is your research on?*

[53] *Making Men in Turkey,* 2012 (Dir. Max Harwood)
[54] See Bar-Tal, 1992 and *The Three Sabras*

Me: *I'm looking at the history of the IDF and its role in Israeli society.*

IA: *Are you here to criticise Israel?*

Me: *Not at all, I love this country and Tel Aviv especially. As you can see, I have visited many times.*

IA: *Will you be travelling to the West Bank, and are you friends with anyone there?*

Me: *No sir, I'll be staying in Tel Aviv and working solely out of the library at the university.*

IA: *You have arrived from Turkey. Why?*

These encounters could go on for agonising minutes, as my status as an Istanbul-based, non-Jewish visiting scholar (who was apparently not in Israel to cause trouble) quickly complicated my passage of entry. Despite my professional introductions and Israeli friends and contacts willing to vouch for me, every time I entered Israel it felt like it could be the last. Travelling as a lone male in my twenties, I presumed I was also in the highest risk category for Israeli airport security, as my bags were often pried open and searched (a kind note apologising for snapping my luggage locks placed carefully in my toiletry bag). Unpleasantly, I was often given extra screenings, including a one-off, full body strip search (during which I uncomfortably made small talk in my underwear, hands on my head, as a surgical gloved security officer placed his palm between my buttocks).

While life inside Israel was comparatively carefree and, unlike in Turkey, criticism of the state technically bore no legal risks, access to the Israeli military was no different from that of the TAF. It was a foregone conclusion made within my first year of fieldwork that the IDF would have to be studied externally, only via trusted informants. That is not to say I did not attempt to recruit serving IDF personnel for my research. In 2014, I became acquainted with a serving IDF official, who loved the idea of *Man Made*, but laughed at my offer of taking part in it. *They'd kill me – are you kidding*? he would admonish. Openly gay, he sympathised with my focus on understanding Israeli masculinity in the context of conscription, but warned me, *you won't ever get a serving member of the IDF to talk to you on camera about "being a man" that will be authentic, meaningful or substantive*. Indeed, as he later clarified, it would have been relatively easy to get a public relations interview with the IDF, but this was at odds with my emphasis on intimate biographical ethnography in the film, and I did not want *Man Made* to consist of impersonal talking heads from the media relations unit of each institution. Despite his offers for a formal, "front of house" IDF interview, I declined in favour of more meaningful long-term research subjects.

To conclude, early in my research I decided to conduct ethnographic research on the Turkish and Israeli military externally, focussing on individuals outside of the army. This was out of necessity, as both militaries are near impossible to ethnographically penetrate with traditional, legal methods. I found support for my resolve in the work of Eric Hobsbawm (1992), who implored qualitative researchers of nationalism to focus on "the view from below",[55] i.e. on the perspective of the individual who is the subject of the nationalist project. Hobsbawm believed this was inherently more valuable to the study of nationalism than macro-analysis of an impersonal state apparatus, or from the testimony of state sponsored advocates. Furthermore, since their inception the TAF and IDF have spoken for themselves in the production of their substantial public image. The IDF in particular has cultivated a significant social media presence in the last decade. By contrast, *Man Made's* participant interviews offer viewers a subjective counterpoint to the carefully manicured TAF/IDF advertisements that are featured in the film.

As my research in Israel and Turkey began to include conscientious objectors and other activists working against the state, their status quo obstruction of my research began to resemble a microcosm of the lifelong struggles of the participants in *Man Made.* The feeling of exclusion, that of being unwelcome, and constantly being engaged in subterfuge in the face of authority became a shared experience between myself and many of my informants. True to Fielding's optimism about the unique qualities that arise from conducting research in hostile environments, the antagonism I experienced from the state and the potential illegality of my own research in Turkey gave me crucial common ground with my participants in both countries, contributing to the strong rapport and trust present in the film's participant interviews*. Fuck 'em,* one Turkish participant and close friend would often say as we hugged at the end of another interview together. It became a sort of catch phrase throughout my fieldwork.

There is a silver lining to be found in these unique field site challenges in Turkey and Israel. Fielding reminds us that being antagonised and restricted by our research subject, or the surrounding environment, can offer its own merits. "Obstruction, evasion, refusals and other troubles can in themselves be significant sources of data. Resistance is an important way to understand the culture being researched, and researchers can derive insight into belief systems and other facets of organizational culture [as a result]."[56]

Methods of concealment: Throughout *Man Made,* there are multiple tactics deployed to ensure varying degrees of privacy and anonymity for each participant. It is notable that some participants reveal their face, relative location and enough personal information to provide at least some pathways for easy doxing (the practise of actively searching for someone's identity on the internet with malicious intent), while others have their voices altered, or are not shown on camera at all. These varying levels of privacy reflect my practise of enforcing baseline anonymity with pseudonyms and offering increasing levels of concealment based on individual requests. Throughout my research, each participant's contribution to *Man Made* was always contractually underpinned by a guarantee that they would at least be given a pseudonym, and that they could increase their privacy or revoke their inclusion in the final cut at any time during the editing process. This was guaranteed verbally and contractually with a signed copy of my HREC participant consent form. Following the participants agreement with these baseline terms, I would then negotiate individual requests for privacy by offering bespoke opportunities for concealment.

[55] Hobsbawm, 1992, 10-11
[56] Fielding in Seale, 2007, 238

Nevertheless, despite the obvious dangers (particularly in Istanbul) many participants insisted on filmed interviews, with a few stipulating they would leave the project if their testimony was not *shown to the world* as part of a somewhat novel documentary film project.[57] Each participant's request for varying degrees of privacy reflects the relative danger imposed on them by agreeing to appear in the film. Indeed, the episodic structure of *Man Made* is ordered deliberately to suggest a descent into anonymity, as the dangers of revealing oneself notably increases as the film progresses. This was not intended to imply a formal conclusion that military service in either Turkey or Israel was decisively negative – rather, I wanted to present a broad spectrum of experiences with conscription by my participants – from the full-throated endorsements seen in *The Three Sabras* (in which only pseudonyms are used), to the completely hidden and agonising testimony in *The Pink Certificate* (in which participants are masked in a variety of ways, including the use of body doubles).[58]

Thus, the privacy features deployed in *Man Made* reflect the broader reality of speaking negatively about military service in Turkey and Israel in the given context of the individual's status and position in relation to the state and military. Looking solely through the interviews in *Man Made*, it is abundantly clear that in Turkey, there is a very real danger of arrest, harassment and even violence against individuals who choose to openly criticise the TAF or the state. In Israel, it is notable that the seemingly free talking dissent that in *The Three Sabras* come from the mouths of two participants who have since left the country permanently. Conversely, the highly decorated veteran who makes up half of *The Soldier & The Swede* remains in Tel Aviv and was adamant that I conceal his identity and not use any footage that could reveal his precise location in the city.[59]

The final step of ensuring my participants safety, privacy and comfort took place in the wake of my completing the final cut of the film in November 2017. Before its faculty premiere, I upheld a clause in my HREC contract and previewed the film privately for each participant (with a password protected streaming link that would erase upon completion), with a note reiterating their editorial control of their appearance in the film – no questions asked. Not surprisingly, a few participants had changes to their scenes requested, but thankfully none opted to remove themselves completely from the final cut.

On technology, the self as filmmaker, and the rise of the new visual anthropologist: In many contemporary works of anthropology, the role of the researcher and their relationship to the ethnography's informants is proactively acknowledged and often integrated extensively into the final monograph. A fine example of this can be found in Timothy Pachirat's acclaimed book *Every Twelve Seconds* (2013), in which the researcher is a principle actor in an abattoir that is both the field site and environmental subject of the ethnography. *Man Made* is distinctly suited for demonstrating this process visually, produced as it is by a single anthropologist/filmmaker, drawing from a well of participants, who were interviewed numerous times over the course of fieldwork – often from the perspective of the filmmaker himself. The camera in *Man Made* often composes a perspective just near the anthropologist's line of sight, giving the viewer a seat next to him, or in certain scenes, a first-person perspective using a camera shoulder mount. While aesthetically deliberate, the intimacy and style of *Man Made's* interviews and their first-person perspective is largely the result of the significant technological leap that filmmaking technology has undergone since DSLR camera's first integrated a video recording option in the mid-2000s.

[57] Quoted with permission from private messages.
[58] Discussed at length in *The Pink Certificate*.
[59] The testimony of 'Yonatan' was produced in a specific manner to meet his privacy needs.

Man Made is an example of the exceptional advancement in modern filmmaking technology, specifically in the reduction of the vast crew and production once required for the making of any substantive documentary film to a single (resourceful and likely stressed) individual. This has not only slashed film production budgets for filmmakers like myself worldwide, but – in tandem with the rise of free streaming/broadcasting services online – certain elements (but not all) of the global film industry have also been functionally democratised in the space of a decade. Visual anthropologists, ethnographic filmmakers and other image-based researchers are included in this revolution, and as I have discovered during my own research and fieldwork, living in an era where toddlers can deftly wield camera equipped smartphones[60] yields interesting results for the contemporary visual social scientist. The assertion that the classically trained anthropologist does not necessarily need to attend a technical film school, or spend more than a few thousand dollars to produce a satisfactory work of ethnographic/documentary film in 2017, is central to the executable thesis of *Man Made*.

The arrival of the single camera operator, brandishing the tools of cinematography, editing and distribution all within a large backpack, emerged like any other technologically innovative craftsman – using a combination of available tools of the era, and an improvisational mutation of the previous standard. This is an accurate, albeit simple, description of the rise of the modern ethnographic filmmaker in my own experience. *Man Made* was produced over three years, with no traditional financial backing, other than my own savings (and Macquarie University's generous PhD scholarship). I was also able to afford the unusual privilege of owning all the equipment used in the production of the film, and the total cost of my gear would not have exceeded $6,000 AUD[61] at the time of writing. I could safely estimate the entire film production budget of *Man Made* to not have exceeded $10,000 AUD, including equipment, travel costs, insurance, accommodation and personal expenses. Segmented evenly into the three years of my PhD program at roughly $3,300 AUD annually, this is preposterously low-budget ethnographic filmmaking, considering the technical difficulties, topical depth and sheer size of the final product.[62]

How did this come to pass? From the logistical horror stories relayed by pioneering ethnographic filmmakers like Rouch, Gardener and Heider, to the young ethnographic filmmaker in 2017: alone, hunched over their laptop, editing the day's footage in the field site itself, perhaps having used their smartphone as a B-cam (secondary camera), or even as a sound recorder. In this written companion, I elucidate my personal development as an ethnographic filmmaker, its interlinking with the production of *Man Made*, the state of ethnographic and documentary film today, and the anthropological thesis of this research project. The atypical structure of the writing will not only reflect the unique nature of making ethnographic cinema in 2017, but will also satisfactorily answer the many theoretical and technical questions raised in *Man Made*, across its four distinct episodes.

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[60] *17 months old baby uses iPhone like a pro!* YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jVm1qyUuXI0
[61] http://viewfrombelow.com.au/equipment.html
[62] The overall interview material shot for *Man Made* exceeded 60 hours of raw footage, not including set pieces, B-Roll and other footage.

Man Made – Shot by Shot:

An ethnographic film exegesis

"We must remember that one man is much the same as another…
and that he is best who is trained in the severest school."

- Thucydides (460-395BC)

Prologue

"Getting its history wrong is part of being a nation."
- Ernest Renan, 1882

Timecode: 0h:0m:00s – 0h:13m:20s
Location: *Sütlüce Küçük Mezbaha* (The Slaughterhouse at Sütlüce), Istanbul

Turkish National Consciousness Part I

The *Mezbaha* in Sütlüce: I decided I wanted to film the interior of an Istanbul slaughterhouse about two years into my fieldwork. It was my sixth year living in Turkey overall, and the first winter after the surreal coup attempt on July 15, 2016. The symbol of blood was everywhere. Huge red billboards with stark white text were erected throughout the city, a deliberate homage to the Turkish flag's colour scheme. They declared that the martyrs of July 15 "would never be forgotten", and that "the blood of the innocent was paid to maintain peace and order".[63] By mid-October, there were daily reports of Gülenists[64] being arrested, alongside an increasing number of other alleged co-conspirators within the police, military and public services. A nightly feature of Turkish news was footage of freshly apprehended putschists perp walked before state media. They were often shirtless, beaten and bloodied.[65] By mid-2017, over 160,000 Turkish citizens had been purged from the public sector, and over 60,000 had been arrested.[66]

The most potent evocation of blood was the Turkish flag itself – tens of thousands of them – which now adorned nearly every building, streetlight and mosque in the city. Deep crimson, with a white crescent moon and five pointed-star in the centre, it hung everywhere – a billowing reminder of the coup attempt and the government-sponsored nationalist fervour that followed it. As late-fall gave way to winter, familiar icy winds began to blow southwards down the Bosphorus, but Istanbul was already locked in a permanent state of nationalist rapture, frozen in the perpetual twilight of July 15 and its bloody consequences.

Any study of nationalist symbolism in modern Turkey quickly encounters the recurrent motif of blood and bloodletting (*kan, katliam*), often depicted as a necessary act of the citizen to contribute to the ongoing security and prosperity of the nation state. For example, in a comparative case study of Turkish and Greek Cyprus, Bryant (2002) regards blood as symbolically "governing relations of the imagined community" for Turkish Cypriots, specifically transcending the figurative notion of ethnic kinship into literal bloodlines of "the national family" that must be unpolluted.[67]

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[63] http://www.marmaragazetesi.com/akmye-dev-pankart-meydana-sehitler-panosu-90235h.htm
[64] Followers of Muhammed Fethullah Gülen, the influential cleric of *Hizmet*, a Turkish religious movement that was instrumental in the rise of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, but in recent years has been charged with actively undermining both in a "parallel state" conspiracy.
[65] http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/son-dakika-haberi-akin-ozturkun-ifadesi-40153062
[66] https://www.economist.com/europe/2017/06/15/turkeys-president-wants-to-purge-western-words-from-its-language
[67] Bryant, 2002, 510-512

The founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, regarded the earth of Anatolia as sacred, "because it is drenched in the blood of those who gave their lives for the country".[68] It was in 1923, in the wake of the Ottoman defeat during World War I, that Atatürk's fusion of ethno-centric Turkish nationalism along with European-inspired cultural and linguistic reforms resulted in the creation of the new Turkish Republic: a sovereign nation state, ideologically shaped by its leader and his namesake political and cultural schematic, Kemalism.

Fuelled by a contentious claim that the inheritance of Anatolia was the birthright of a singular ethnic ancestor – the Turk – Kemalism sought to homogenise the fractured cultural landscape of the vanquished Ottoman Empire under a singular ethnic banner.[69] Kemalism insisted that Anatolia ancestrally belonged to ancient Turkic warriors, who had conquered and continuously occupied the transcontinental landmass, following their westward descent from the mountains and steppes of Central Asia in antiquity.[70] Distinct from their Ottoman forebears, who pursued multi-ethnic and multi-cultural dynastic rule over a vast geographic empire, the Turks who seized power in the post-war vacuum reconciled a significantly reduced sovereign footprint in favour of a centralised, homogeneous ethno-state. In the republic's first years, Kemalism was chiefly deployed in the interest of political unification and post-war nation building, but this was dwarfed by the dramatic historical and cultural revisionism that slowly enabled the newly compiled, distinctly Turkish "History Thesis" and its patching over the multi-ethnic, multi-lingual landscape of the country with a singular, unified and wholly original new Turkish nationalism.

The bloody crimson of Turkey's flag is also a potent symbol of mandatory military service, and the flag's elegiac role in Turkish society and culture can be crudely described as a visual civic lubricant, smeared liberally inside the figurative engine of the nation state. This is dramatically evident in the Turkish presidential election advertisements that appear in *Man Made* (1h:12m:40s-1h:14m:30s). This engine gives locomotion to the Turkish nationalist project, which has been in perpetual operation since the country's founding in 1923. Nationalism as an applied concept, much like the nation state itself, is a relatively contemporary phenomenon, born out of specific historical conditions in late 18th and 19th century Western Europe. In Turkey's case, Kemalism was the name given to the original attempt at a coherent Turkish nationalist ideology, created by Atatürk and his political party, the CHP (Peoples Republic Party) in a bid to culturally depose the *yeni ülke* (new country's) historical predecessor, the Ottoman Empire.

[68] Atatürk quoted in Zürcher, 2010, 62
[69] Hanioğlu, 2011
[70] White, 2014, 26

Kemalism, nationalism and the Turkish History Thesis: As the Ottoman Empire faced increasing territorial challenges through the late 19th century, bureaucrat intellectual reformers sought to consolidate what remained of the sultanate with a centralised ethnic polity. Hoping to mirror the emergent nation states of Western Europe, the defence of "Ottomanism" was ironically designed in part to quell increasing ethnic tensions throughout the empire, with a view to impede breakaway territories that had begun to fray along the realm's Balkan borders.[71] The end of the 19th century saw a political and cultural reform movement, Tanzimat (Reorganisation), bubble to the surface of Ottoman public discourse, with the Tanzimat intellectuals seizing on growing discontent brought on by the territorial losses incurred by the Sunni Islamic caliphate.[72]

Hanioğlu (2011) describes that by the end of the reform era, "the Tanzimat statesmen had sought to overcome communitarian strife, ethnic separatism, and religious obscurantism by constructing a new, supranational Ottoman identity . . . but the deep religious and nationalist fractures of the empire simply would not heal".[73] Separatist nationalist tendencies had emerged scattershot throughout the Ottoman Balkans, and the Russo-Turkish war (1877-1878) only further galvanised the ethnic minorities of the Balkan Peninsula, expediting their various claims to territorial sovereignty from the sultanate.[74] Though ultimately a failure of implementation, Ottomanism as a unifying political ideology and practice was not without historical merit, despite the Tanzimat Era (1839-1876) becoming a period of ideological gestation for what would eventually be called Kemalism and modern Turkish nationalism.

Born in 1881, Mustafa Kemal was thrust into a world at historical crossroads, on the very precipice of its collapse. By his late twenties, the future statesmen's birthplace of Salonica (today Thessaloniki) became the centre of the Young Turk Revolution against the sultanate in July 1908.[75] By 1912, the city was overrun by the Greeks, another casualty of Ottoman fragmentation in the First Balkan War (1912-1913). Atatürk later gave insight into the trauma these losses had caused himself and his countrymen, recalling, "One day I heard that Salonica, the land of my father, had been ceded to the enemy, together with my mother, sister, and all my relatives… one day I heard that a bell had been installed in the minaret of the Hortacı Süleyman Mosque, and that the remains of my father there had been trampled upon by the filthy boots of the Greeks."[76] His racially charged animosity, preoccupation with ancestry, ethnically framed territorial entitlement and the attachment of religious denomination to ethnic identity would later become hallmarks of Turkish nationalism (*milliyetçilik*), a cultural pillar (*Ilke*) of Kemalism.[77]

The death spiral of the sultanate tormented the Ottoman military intelligentsia, who began to mull their own insurrection plans against the royal family as a final bid to right the sinking ship. The 1908 Young Turk Revolution demonstrated the first intellectual deployment and military execution of modern Turkish nationalism upon the sultanate. A breakaway faction of the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*), the Young Turks sought to overthrow the monarchy and supersede it with a new constitutional government.[78] While they failed to reverse the tide of Ottoman decline, the Young Turks refined the ideology and philosophy of Turkish exceptionalism in this tumultuous period, just prior to the outbreak of the Great War.

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[71] Hanioğlu, 2011, 26
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid., 26
[74] Ibid.
[75] Hanioğlu, 2001
[76] "Subay ve Kumandan ile Konuşmalar," in Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri, vol. 1, 1903– 1915 (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1998), 165.
[77] Hanioğlu, 2011, 28-29
[78] Zürcher, 2004, 93-95

Alongside its fundamental declaration that Turkish ethnicity was the sole heir of post-Ottoman Anatolia, it was in the early 1900s that Turkish nationalism absorbed a peculiar racial scientism, particularly from the 19th century German philosophy known as *Vulgärmaterialismus* and its proponent, Karl Vogt. A fusion of materialism, scientism, and armchair Darwinism, *Vulgärmaterialismus* separated the racial variants of Homo sapiens into a dubious genetic caste system, offering the nationalist a scientific rationale for the ethno-state and theories of racial superiority. The Young Turk intelligentsia enthusiastically shared Vogt's doctrine amongst each other.[79]

Typical of early 20th century European intellectuals, Atatürk was enamoured with pseudo-scientific literature that framed Turkish ethnic superiority through eugenics and phrenology. While not the sole injector of racially charged scientism into Turkish nationalism, it was nevertheless under Atatürk's guidance that Kemalism's cultural and historical revisionism was peppered with pseudo-scientific research, largely overseen by his own adopted daughter, the sociologist Afet İnan. İnan's modernist quantitative research on the ethnic Turk, which included a vast phrenological survey and included other race-based cultural theories,[80] is critical to understanding the near-mythological roots of contemporary Turkish nationalism and the notion of Turkic exceptionalism in Anatolia. This study of Turkology was what Ayşe Gül Altınay (2004) called the application of the Turkish History Thesis.[81] In her research, Gul Altınay reveals the symbiotic relationship between militarism, masculinity and Turkish nationalism – with emphasis on how these three totems are perpetuated and reified through the institution of public education, and the endurance of distinct gender roles in Turkish society and culture.

The Turkish History Thesis was first presented and ratified by a combination of Turkish intellectuals and foreign consultants at the First and Second Turkish History Conferences, in 1932 and 1937, respectively.[82] The central premise of the thesis rests on a spurious claim that the origins of humanity began exclusively in Central Asia, coincidentally the constant Turkish homeland since the dawn of man. It then asserts that it was from this mountainous Eden that all civilisations could trace their lineage. Whether it was the Chinese, Greco-Roman or African empires of antiquity, they all shared a common ancestor in the Turkish genetic basin.[83] İnan's fieldwork rendered this revisionist historical patchwork, and was theoretically informed by a combination of Darwinian social theory as well as diffusionist anthropological thought of the early 20th century.[84] She placed a curious emphasis on the racial superiority of Turks throughout antiquity, comparing them favourably to their prehistoric European counterparts.[85]

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[79] Hanioğlu, 2011, 48-49
[80] Altınay, 2004, 20-25
[81] Ibid.
[82] Kocatürk, 2017, weblink: http://www.atam.gov.tr/dergi/sayi-09/ataturks-thesis-concerning-central-asia-as-a-cradle-of-civilisations
[83] Hanioğlu, 2011, 164-165
[84] Ibid., 190
[85] Çağaptay, 2004, 88

The creation of this artificial ideological framework, which lacked professional consensus among historians, biologists, anthropologists and others, is crucial to understanding the experiences of participants in *Man Made*, their relationship to Turkish nationalism and the institutions that perpetuate it, such as mandatory military service. The link between a man's duty to serve his nation as a conscript and the mythology that justifies it is an explicit theme in *Man Made.* With Kemalism's roots in mythologised race biology, there is a unique discursive veneration of blood in the Turkish imagination as a result. Blood is a literal substance of the Turkish body – an essential quality that perpetuates the ethno-state. Simultaneously, blood is also a symbol of sacrificial donation that the Turk can let if necessary. I have identified a specific way these two meanings can collide in contemporary Turkish life and tradition: the act of ritual slaughter; a centrepiece of the prologue and epilogue of *Man Made* that will be discussed later. In her own fieldwork on Turkish nationalism, Jenny White (2014) observed that "Kemalist secularism has taken on aspects of the sacred… Turkish blood represents the nation and is surrounded by taboos."[86] Similarly, in her survey of Turkish conscription, Altınay identified the figurative "having" of blood as an attribute of the idyllic Turkish soldier.[87]

Mirroring this analysis, the informant Murat explicitly states in *The Reluctant Sons* (1h:23m) that Turks have a longstanding pre-occupation with blood, both as a nationalist symbol as well as its utility as a public service donation, directly related to the concept of martyrdom. Murat directed me to observe the phenomena of blood donations in Istanbul, something that he insisted was disproportionate in Turkish society generally. He argued that its connotation with Turkish nationalist mythology, as well as its highly functional role in emergencies and disaster response, has resulted in a fusion of both sacrificial nationalist ideals with a "direct action" from the individual Turk that causes pain and discomfort in exchange for a donation to the state. There are contemporary examples of blood's symbolic role in Turkish society. In 2016, for example, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan drew international condemnation when he challenged the ethnic patriotism of a German Turkish MP. "Some say he's a Turk. What a Turk! His blood should be sent for laboratory tests!" Erdoğan remarked.[88]

The symbolic utility of blood, bloodletting and sacrifice in Turkey compelled me to find a filmic example of this phenomenon to include in *Man Made* and will be returned to later. While the film extensively analyses Turkish and Israeli nationalism – *Man Made* lacks a broader examination of historical and ideological nationalism, which is essential to the specific context and Turkey and Israel. Through anthropological and historical literature, I have surveyed nationalism as a 19th century phenomenon and identified a shared ideological embryo that drove both Atatürk and Theodor Herzl in their respective establishment of modern ethno-states in the 20th century.

[86] White, 2014, 6
[87] Altınay, 2004, 126
[88] For more: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/08/germany-summons-turkish-envoy-in-row-over-erdogan-comments/ 8

Defining nationalism in *Man Made* and "the view from below": Since the French Revolution, social scientists and philosophers have endeavoured to accurately define nationalism, to empirically observe its existence beyond the conceptual, and to locate its effect on global communities following the feudal period. In 1882, French philosopher and social theorist Ernest Renan branded the nation as artificially constructed; "a spiritual principle, resulting from the profound complications of history – a spiritual family – not a group determined by the configuration of the soil".[89] Renan heralded the 20th century constructivist view that nations and nationalism are socially engineered, inorganic constructs and a distinct phenomenon of the Enlightenment. Renan's view of the nation would carry through to the late 20th century, in a series of breakthrough academic takes on the subject.

The triad of constructivist works published by Ernest Gellner (1983), Benedict Anderson (1983/2006) and Eric Hobsbawm (1992) guide *Man Made's* epistemological framing of nations and nationalism in Turkey and Israel, i.e. the nation defined as a modern political and economic construct. Rather than interpret each scholar's work as successive challenges to the other, *Man Made* sees the collective oeuvre of Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm as individual works that all contribute to the ongoing study of nations and nationalism within anthropology and sociology.

Ernest Gellner's study of nationalism ranged across his life, from his earliest publications in the 1960s,[90] to posthumous works released after his death in 1995.[91] His landmark thesis *Nations and Nationalism* (1983) presented a modernist, constructivist lens on the qualities and mechanics of the nation state in the 20th century. Gellner argued that the conceptual nation state was a 19th century invention of the ruling class, a cynical effort to homogenise disparate working-class populations in the wake of collapsed feudalism and the rise of the Industrial Age.
Gellner defined the nation as a manufactured social construct, made up of "congruent" economic and political systems that were a distinct product of modernism, and the shift from agrarian to industrial society in the 19th century.[92] He rejected any notion of a hardwired primordial nationalist sentiment ever-present in the history of man, preferring a strict, structurally focussed interpretation of the successful nation state, a product of the distinct technological and philosophical eras that began in the late 18th century.

Prior to the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and industrialisation, the congruence of society and its peoples were achieved through divine right and monarchic hierarchy – a king or queen's land was filled with their subjects from frontier to frontier, and there was no space for independent cultural or ethnic thought in the fiefdom. This was most clearly demonstrated in the cradle of modern nationalism, late 18th century France. Following the deposition of King Louis XVI in 1792, the realm was suddenly rid of a pedigree authority that had been in power since 1180,[93] and thus the nation state emerged as a harmonizing structure to supersede the Ancien Régime and maintain the country as a sovereign political and economic entity made up of a compliant citizenry.

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[89] "Une nation est un principe spirituel, résultant des complications profondes de l'histoire, une famille spirituelle, non un groupe déterminé par la configuration du sol." Renan, 1882 (speech), p30 (1997)
[90] Thought and Change (1964)
[91] Nationalism (1997)
[92] Gellner, 1983, 1-7
[93] The first King of France (*Roi de France)* was Phillip II, coroneted the 1st November 1179.

Describing how this congruence takes shape amongst the citizenry, Gellner wrote:

> *"A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory, or speakers of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it. It is their recognition of each other as fellows of this kind which turns them into a nation, and not the other shared attributes, whatever they might be, which separate that category from non-members."*[94]

Gellner also recognised the state and the nation as separate entities – not symbiotic, but co-existent. The nation was simply the reflection of a dominant culture onto a society – what Gellner called the "high culture" of the polity dominating over the weaker "low cultures" of the middle and lower class, to create a single, homogeneous and hierarchical society of workers and the elite.[95] Whereas the nation was the label given to the dominant culture, Gellner quoted Max Weber by distinguishing the state as the apparatus, political group or agency that "possessed the monopoly of legitimate violence"[96] within a given society. Like Michel Foucault (1977), Gellner saw the state as defined by its leveraged power over the community, its ability to organise and govern society through a polity, as well as its establishment and maintenance of territorial sovereignty.

Gellner himself was of Czechoslovakian Jewish descent and was deeply affected by the anti-Semitic Communist take-over of the country in 1948. As a result, Gellner cautioned about the impermanence of the conceptual nation, warning that "in fact, nations, like states, are a contingency, and not a universal necessity. Neither nations nor states exist at all times and in all circumstances. Moreover, nations and states are not the same contingency."[97] Gellner was highlighting both the great strength and fundamental weakness of constructivist perspectives of nationalism – it is theoretical, abstract, and, as Anderson was to later to describe it, "imagined".[98] While this makes the nation a malleable, multi-functional concept, its survival depends on the governing state that wields it – this maintains the constant bond between the citizenry and the nationalist ideology.

To account for the post-feudal proliferation of modern nation states, Gellner dedicates an entire chapter of *Nations and Nationalism* to the role of industrialisation in driving culture homogeneity in vast nation states. The separation of traditionally small, interdependent communities into macro-states of disconnected working-class populations was part of Gellner's wider theory that cultural homogeneity or "social entropy" was first produced in the Industrial Age. To the benefit of the institutional and military focus of *Man Made,* Gellner's functionalist reading of cultural homogeneity in the industrial state has received significant criticism for lack of institutional focus, most notably from sociologist Daniele Conversi (2007), who argued that Gellner had ignored the state bodies of mass education, conscription as well as explicit militarism as modern vectors for cultural homogeneity in the nation state.[99]

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[94] Gellner, 1983, 7
[95] Ibid., 57
[96] Ibid., 3
[97] Gellner, 1983, 3-4
[98] Anderson, 2006
[99] Conversi, 2007, 377-380

Conversi suggests that the origins of applied cultural homogeneity amongst separate ethnic communities began well before the nationalist period following the French Revolution. Citing the spread of common languages as a military strategy in 16th century Scandinavia, Conversi demonstrates that pre-revolutionary examples of weaponised cultural dissemination indeed predate Gellner's benchmark of industrialisation by hundreds of years.[100] Conversi's revision of Gellner's work is particularly resonant in the context of *Man Made*. Both Israel and Turkey rely heavily on ethno-nationalist ideology and operate state institutions like public education and military service to generationally regulate their citizenry into fixed positions as men, soldiers and ethnic citizens of a sovereign territory.

While an invaluable theoretical contribution of its time, *Nations and Nationalism* was indeed a macro-view, lacking any qualitative study of the citizens that inhabit the nation itself. It was Gellner's contemporary, Eric Hobsbawm, who identified the lack of qualitative focus on the inhabitants of the nation state itself,[101] describing the distinction between broad studies of nationalism as "the view from above", and the qualitative research of individual citizens of the nation state as "the view from below". He wrote of Gellner's theory:

> *"That his [Gellner's] preferred perspective of modernization from above makes it difficult to pay adequate attention to the view from below. That view from below, i.e. the nation as seen not by governments and the spokesmen and activists of nationalist (or non-nationalist) movements, but by the ordinary persons who are the objects of their action and propaganda, is exceedingly difficult to discover."*[102]

In the spirit of Friedrich Engels' qualitative research in *The Condition of the Working Class in England*,[103] this proposal for a bottom-up analysis of the nation state was distinctly Marxist in ideological praxis – superficially at odds with Gellner's own advocacy for anti-communism and the liberation from socialist regimes.[104] Nevertheless, Hobsbawm shared Gellner's view that the concept of the nation was a constructed "high culture" myth, stating that "nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality."[105]

While Hobsbawm gleaned his constructivist framing from Gellner, his call to analyse the "view from below" was a specific response to Gellner's impersonal study of nationalism. He rationalised that the individual stories of those within – or "beneath" – nations offered crucial insights that supported the theory of its fabrication by the governing elite. He wrote, "Official ideologies of states and movements are not guides to what it is in the minds of even the most loyal citizens or supporters. Second, and more specifically, we cannot assume that for most people national identification – when it exists – excludes or is always or ever superior to, the remainder of the set of identifications which constitute the social being."[106] This precise articulation of the value of individual subjectivity in understanding the conceptual is the basis of the ethnographic inquiry in *Man Made*, in which participants reveal critical tensions between individualism and the often rigid national identifiers that constitute a legitimate social being.

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[100] Ibid., 378-379
[101] Hobsbawm, 1992, p 10
[102] Ibid.
[103] Engels, 1845 [1987]
[104] See Gellner, State and Society in Soviet Thought (1988)
[105] Hobsbawm, 1992, 10
[106] Ibid., 10-11

Nationalism in the life of the citizen: Following Gellner and Hobsbawm, the study of nationalism in the lives of individuals and the societies they inhabit saw keen adoption of the constructivist lens from anthropologists, sociologists and other qualitative researchers. In trying to describe the observable features of nationalism from the subjectivity of the citizen, the anthropologist Robert Foster (1991) used symbology to create a checklist of nationalist symbols that have persisted across modern history, since the concept emerged following the French Revolution. Building on Lofgren's "internationally approved ingredients" of nationalist symbols, Foster labelled the semiotic hallmarks of nationalism as including "flags and anthems . . . but also ideas about national history and landscape . . . and specific institutions such as national museums and educational systems".[107] This simple catalogue of how imagined nationalist mythology transcends discourse and takes physical form in society – whether it be through flags, songs or institutions within the state – is a potent indicator of how abstract nationalist mythology expresses itself tangibly to impact the individual within the state.

Benedict Anderson (2006) also addressed such cultural signs and signifiers deployed by the state in the interest of homogeneity and nationalist ideology. Anderson influenced Hobsbawm with his further development of constructivist nationalism theory, publishing *Imagined Communities* the same year as Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism.* Whereas Gellner dwelled on the political and economic infrastructure of nationalist theory, Anderson emphasised the role of culture and fabricated mythologies in perpetuating nation states, as well their reliance on modern political, economic and technological systems to properly function – a position later echoed in Hobsbawm's own research.[108]

Anderson's most renowned contribution to the study of nations was that, as social constructions, they must be "imagined" by the community to exist, "because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each, lives the image of their communion".[109] Anderson argued that, within a nation state, the reality of geographical divide and the varied distribution of the populace impeded the emergence of a supervised, continuous nationalist current in any society. Thus, "communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined." He determined that "communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined".[110]

Anderson also focussed on the Enlightenment's paradoxical birthing of the free, self-determined individual alongside the oft repressive, collectivist nation state. Anderson highlights how the 1789 *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* (Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen) also served to benefit the needs of the distinctly communalist nation, writing that "the idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogeneous, empty time is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which also is conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history."[111]

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[107] Foster, 1991, 252 (in Cavers), 1994, 22-23
[108] Anderson, 2006, 1-5
[109] Ibid., 5-7
[110] Ibid.
[111] Ibid., 26

Geertz (1973) distinguished ethnicity as a potential form of pre-modern nationalism – a "primordial sentiment" – the "longing not to belong to any other group" that is pervasive in the history of human experience.[112] In the context of Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm, ethnicity is understood as similarly imagined, in the sense that the individual must cognitively accept a combination of discursive cultural history and mythology that presumes shared descent with others.[113] As Barfield states in his anthropological definition of ethnicity, "The mechanism for establishing a shared descent among those who claim a common ethnic identity is not, as with kin groups, a genealogy that establishes links to a common ancestor. Rather, linkages to the ancestor or forbears of an ethnic group are established through narratives of origin, migration and especially the suffering of others."[114] The role of ethnicity in the imagining of nationalist identity was a hallmark of the 20th century ethno-state – both Atatürk's Turkish History Thesis and Israel's Law of Return[115] demand specific, partially imagined ethnic attributes of the individual in their justification for their legal belonging to the nation state through citizenship.

Thus, we can read both nationalism and ethnicity as characteristically similar in their imagined quality. Cavers (1994) cautions their separation by social scientists, criticising the "artificial differentiation"[116] cleaving the two in constructivist anthropology and sociology. "This differentiation is based on the assumption that there is something intrinsically unique in the nature of the phenomena labelled nations and nationalism, that excludes them from being studied in relation to ethnic groups and ethnicity,"[117] he writes, suggesting that the two separate studies are intimately related, often overlapping in their shared goal of "ideological, cultural and socio-political continuities".[118]

Cavers' points out that like ethnicity, "nations are not coterminous with state boundaries."[119] This echoes Anderson, Geertz and Barfield, who reason that – as subjective imaginings – nationalism and ethnicity can be readily observed in the individual who resides outside of the nation's borders. While *Man Made* uses the constructivist theory of nationalism found in Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm as an epistemological foundation, it also incorporates Cavers' argument that ethnicity need not be separated in our understanding of how nations and nationalism can be read in contemporary culture and the lives of individuals within the state. Cavers posits that the nationalist who holds feelings of shared descent and community is reflecting the "primordial sentiments" of Geertz, the "imagined communities" of Anderson and the "imagined life possibilities" of Hobsbawm.[120]

In the case of Israeli and Turkish nationalism, both nation states cite ancient ethnic mythologies as justification for their existence; nationalist imaginings presented as historical evidence. "Nations throughout the world rely on ethnically based symbols, heritage, ideals and social organisations in their nationalist causes,"[121] writes Cavers, and it is the production of these symbols that perpetuate static tradition, nationalist mythologies and constant civic pride in the citizenry.

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[112] Geertz, 1973, 261
[113] Barfield, 1997, 152
[114] Ibid.
[115] Which extends to converted Jews alongside designated ethnic Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jewish peoples.
[116] Cavers, 1994, 21
[117] Ibid., 22
[118] Ibid., 29
[119] Ibid., 22
[120] Ibid.
[121] Ibid., 29

Coda, *Turkish National Consciousness Part I*: How does the imagined nation manifest in the mind of the citizen? The state institutions of public education, government and military service all play key roles in the reproduction of nationalist symbols, rituals and traditions in society – but what of the effect on the individual? Gellner, Anderson and Hobsbawm's constructivist theories on nations and nationalism have guided the methodological approach to the participant interviews in *Man Made,* which seeks to reveal how nationalism, principally through mandatory military service, shapes men's lives in Turkey and Israel. To understand the subjective imaginings of the nation, ethnographic biographical interviews with participants from "below" the institutions, militaries and governments of Turkey and Israel make up the bulk of the film's research.

Preceding the film and underlying it are key questions: What is Turkish and Israeli nationalism? Where did it come from? Why is it seemingly connected to military service, as is constantly suggested by the participants and both military's propaganda? While the applied making of ethnographic film is logistical, technical and largely reliant on practical technologies, its theoretical approach is no different to a traditional ethnography. A qualitative research project that seeks to reveal the conceptual needs a clear theoretical framework with which to approach the subject of research and the participants involved. In *Man Made,* constructivist theories of nations and nationalism were the epistemological lens that then guided the ethnographic fieldwork, and it is through this lens that the results will be assessed.

Note: ***Turkish National Consciousness Part II*** *continues within the analysis of The Reluctant Sons.*

Filming the aftermath of an adak ceremony (Photo: Max Harwood)

Finding blood in Sütlüce: Walking amongst Istanbul's flags, billboards and memorials in the months after the coup attempt**,** blood and sacrifice were on my mind. I began to wonder if there was a space in contemporary Turkish life that combined the distinct nationalist reverence of blood, as well as the notions of sacrifice and martyrdom that often accompanied it. It was on an evening walk through Elmadağ that I noticed a commotion on a distant street corner. A group of men and children were huddled around an entranceway, bathed in the orange light of the street lamp above. As I walked closer, I noticed a sheep on a leash that had just had its throat cut. I asked what the occasion was, and one of the younger boys informed me that they were eating the animal to celebrate a family engagement. Looking down at the sheep, blood pulsed from its neck into the curb below, trickling down the sloping hill. I was struck by the image, and my photographer's eye noticed the billowing Turkish flags that lined the street above me. Taking it all in, the red of the flag was an artificial matte in contrast to the very real, wet crimson viscera that spilled out onto the curb below. In an instant, after living in Turkey for six years, I saw for the first time something more than a simple, red coloured flag.

Political scientist Timothy Pachirat spent five months working in an American Great Plains abattoir and meat packing facility for his acclaimed ethnography, *Every Twelve Seconds* (2013). For Pachirat, the industrial slaughterhouse "authorizes physical, linguistic, and social concealment to allow those who consume the products of this violence to remain blind to it".[122] Concealing the industrial slaughter of animals to morally absolve human consumption is central to Pachirat's thesis and his fieldwork reveals the deliberate architectural and linguistic partitions that physically and psychologically separate the slaughterhouse employees from their activities on the killing floor.

In his riveting narrative ethnography, Pachirat describes how slaughterhouse workers can obfuscate direct participation in the mass killing of animals. For example, they poke paddles through grill slits to urge lines of cattle along, their view of the slaughter literally obstructed by design.[123] This creates a moral absolution that begins with the killing floor worker and ends with the everyday consumer, who purchases a relatively formless, shrink-wrapped meat – what Pollan (2006) calls the "boneless abstraction" of industrially slaughtered animals when they are finally sold to the public.[124] What begins with a living animal fighting for its life is proactively hidden from public view throughout its journey, ending with a disassociated consumer product that is sold deceptively separate from its true source: the killing of an animal that did not want to die. As Pachirat writes, "The divisions of labor and space on the kill floor work to fragment sight, to fracture experience, and to neutralize the work of violence."[125]

While Pachirat's ethnography seeks to inform everyday meat eaters of what he views as the barbaric and unsustainable farming of animals in the 21st century, his analysis of institutional concealment of violence for the moral absolution of the civil majority illustrates my own view on military service in Turkey and Israel. In a wide-ranging 2012 interview on the theoretical impetus for his extraordinary fieldwork, Pachirat broadens his motivations beyond animal rights, and veers his research aims directly into my own:

> *"I wanted to understand how massive processes of violence become normalized in modern society, and I wanted to do so from the perspective of those who work in the slaughterhouse. My hunch was that close attention to how the work of industrialized killing is performed might illuminate not only how the realities of industrialized animal slaughter are made tolerable, but also the way distance and concealment operate in analogous social processes: war executed by volunteer armies; the subcontracting of organized terror to mercenaries; and the violence underlying the manufacturing of thousands of items and components we make contact with in our everyday lives. Like its more self-evidently political analogues--the prison, the hospital, the nursing home, the psychiatric ward, the refugee camp, the detention centre, the interrogation room, and the execution chamber--the modern industrialized slaughterhouse is 'zone of confinement,' a 'segregated and isolated territory,' in the words of sociologist Zygmunt Bauman."*[126]

[122] Pachirat, 2013, 146
[123] Ibid., 140-161
[124] Pollan, 2006, 114
[125] Pachirat, 2013, 159
[126] Pachirat in conversation with Ali Soloman, 2012: https://boingboing.net/2012/03/08/working-undercover-in-a-slaugh.html

In Pachirat's description of the elaborate lengths the slaughterhouse administrators go to dull the impact of the violent work on their employees, I saw distinct parallels with the way the Turkish and Israeli state venerate conscription as a sacred duty, and how both conceal the often-uncomfortable reality of military service for the individual with popular narratives of bonding, fraternity and glorified civic duty. Throughout *Man Made*, I deliberately contrasted the individual suffering endured as a direct result of forced conscription with a series of propaganda samples from the TAF and IDF. Both militaries present conscription as a crucial step in a young man's life, and one that is overwhelmingly positive for him. If the conscript is killed, the state honours the fallen as a martyr, and his family is comforted by their new-found status as contributors to the state's perpetuation.

I left the street corner in Elmadağ as the dead sheep was dragged inside, the wind flapping the Turkish flags above. In the coming months, I began researching the neighbourhood of Sütlüce – a historical district synonymous with animal slaughter across Istanbul's centuries of urban record. Wedged on the eastern banks of the Golden Horn, Sütlüce is home to the remains of Istanbul's biggest industrial abattoir. Opened in 1923, the first year of the republic, the slaughterhouse was a massive complex of warehouses, animal pavilions and ice production facilities. The first modern slaughterhouse of its kind in Turkey, the opening of the plant sought to centralise the distribution of meat in the city, making it safer for general consumption whilst boosting overall production with the latest technologies of the period.[127]

In operation until 1984, it was eventually closed due to the environmental hazard it posed to the waterways of central Istanbul. The slaughtering pavilions were deliberately designed to be adjacent to the water's edge, which quickly became the natural waste disposal canal beneath the enormous platforms of the abattoir.[128] By the 1980s, tons of industrial and animal waste mixed into the slaughterhouse's outflow, most of which ended up in the Golden Horn itself.[129] Today, what remains of the abattoir has been converted into a beautiful cultural centre (*Sütlüce Kültür Merkezi*), which includes an opera house, exhibition hall and conference centre. However, the effect of the abattoir's longstanding history in the city means that even today Sütlüce is still Istanbul's premier European side slaughterhouse neighbourhood – primarily in the form of unofficial mini-abattoirs (*kucuk mezbaha*) that are found in the district's backstreets.

Stepping off the bus close to the cultural centre itself, I noticed several speciality grilled meat restaurants (*ocakbaşı*), a giveaway that I had come to the right place. I ventured into the nearest one and gingerly asked the waiter if there were still small slaughterhouses operating in the area. He told me I could walk down any side street in Sütlüce and simply use my nose to find the mini-abattoirs, which had sprung up in the intervening years since the closure of the historical slaughterhouse. I was told that the mini-abattoirs were private enterprises and were technically illegal as they were not regulated by health and safety standards. Nevertheless, the regulations were not strictly enforced, as I quickly found a boarded-up shed on a street corner with a large industrial waste bin at its entrance. A distinct farmyard smell hung in the air. Looking inside the waste bin, I saw various bits and pieces of sheep feet, intestines and organs, freshly cut.

[127] Kucuk in Brebbia and Hernández, 2015, 241
[128] Ibid., 235
[129] Ibid.

Inside the main entrance was a small office, where three men sat around a desk listening to music and checking their phones. To the left was a long, tiled corridor with a central grill running along the centre as a catchment. The entire room was streaked with blood and long hooks hung from the roof. I introduced myself and explained to the boss (*mezbahaci)* that I wanted to observe the practise of traditional animal slaughter as part of my PhD research. The men were thrilled that a *yabancı öğrenci* (foreign student) had just walked in off the street to learn about meat butchering, and they excitedly told me that I could stay if I wished and had permission to film anything I wanted. Tea was poured, and they quickly ushered me into an improvised tour of the facility.

Having viewed the main office and slaughtering area, they led me into a third space in the back of the shed, which was the animal holding pen. You can see my walk through this cloister and into the pen at the climax of the film.[130] The grim confines of the shed contained dozens of sheep, mostly huddled together in the darkness, silent and unmoving. Each animal was marked with a painted number or symbol to categorise them. My tour complete, thus began an ongoing relationship with the *mezbahaci*, who invited me back on multiple occasions to observe and visually document the daily occurrences inside the *mezbaha*. The only condition for his time was that I provide him with any footage I acquired, so he could share it with friends and family.

As time went on, the *mezbahaci* would walk me through the facility and explain the reasons people came to him (as opposed to an ordinary supermarket or butcher). His busiest periods were the two major Sunni Muslim holidays: Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha *(Ramazan Bayramı, Kurban Bayramı).* However, he was always busy with clients buying sheep and having them killed on the spot, and I quickly understood that the *mezbahaci*'s year-round clientele came for one specific commodity: personal a*dak* (vow/sacrifice*)* slaughter ceremonies. The *adak* ritual operates in a similar manner to *Kurban Bayrami* (the sacrifice feast), in which a family traditionally will kill a goat or sheep to honour Ibrahim's (Abraham's) ritual sacrifice of his son as a test of his faith. As described in the Book of Genesis, Abraham was asked by God to kill his own son and only at the last second did the archangel Gabriel intervene, putting a ram in the son's place instead. Interestingly, Delaney (2000) reads Abraham's sacrifice as "symbolically masculine", emphasising the myth's stress on patriarchally administered violence as a means of imitating God himself.[131] *Kurban Bayrami* recreates this scene, with an animal slaughtered in accordance with Islamic law (*halal*). Afterwards, the animal is traditionally divided into three shares – one for the family, one for neighbours and the last share given to the poor as an act of *zakat* (charity).[132] As tradition dictates that all Muslim families who can afford to purchase an animal for sacrifice must do so,[133] *Kurban Bayrami* is easily the *mezbaha*'s busiest time of year.

[130] *Man Made,* 2h:19m
[131] Delaney, 2000, 17-20
[132] Armstrong, 2000
[133] Ibid.

The off-season *adak* ceremony is undertaken in a similar manner: a client purchases an animal from the *mezbahaci* to be sacrificed and distributed back to the community. As the *mezbahaci* explains in the opening minutes of *Man Made*, an *adak* sacrifice acts as a contextual good luck charm in the life of the pledger (client). In exchange for taking part in the ritual slaughter of the animal "for God's pleasure", the pledger can expect to be blessed themselves, or direct a blessing to contextual circumstances in their life. As an added service, the *mezbahaci* can expertly and humanely slaughter the animal on site, negating a messy clean-up at home. Upon the animal's ritual sacrifice in the abattoir, the meat is divided and placed into black plastic bags, then given back to the pledger who will distribute it to the poor and needy. Indeed, waiting just outside the slaughterhouse on every occasion I visited, *Domari* women and their children mingled close by, often peeking self-consciously into the waste bin at the entrance to the building as a means of gauging when the last kill took place.

I witnessed multiple *adak* ceremonies during my visits to the *kucuk mezbaha*. The pledgers' desire for a blessing on their lives ranged from celebrating newlyweds, to a nervous young man looking to do well on his final exams. My last visit to the slaughterhouse resulted in the footage in the opening scene of *Man Made*. The *adak* client on that afternoon was a father whose son was about to move away from home. He wanted to sacrifice two sheep for his safety, as well as for "his own happiness" when he settled in Adana. The footage I captured during this exchange documented the selection, purchase, slaughter and highly skilled dissection of the animals, serving both as an arresting opening set piece and as an ambiguous allegorical thesis statement for the rest of the documentary film.

The analogy of mandatory conscription with the ritual slaughter of animals is not meant to be a superficial visual metaphor, nor a cheap trick to force an emotional reaction. After all, most conscripts return safely to their families. More precisely, the opening scene sets up a possibility that is considered, qualified and reinterpreted by the film's later scenes and by their participants' thoughtful interviews. Nevertheless, scholarly work on contemporary political representations of martyrdom in Islamic contexts reveal that notions of sacrifice are not necessarily limited to death in militarised settings. Jean-Klein (2002) notes the evolution of conceptual martyrdom in Palestine, from the First Intifada onwards, noting its slow definitional shift from a general personal sacrifice for the wider community to militarised suicide bombings.[134] I contend that the inclusion of the *adak* ceremony presents a visual anthropological image on the wider metaphor of blood and bloodletting in Turkish society, as well as the way that generationally reproduced nationalist mythology conceals the reality of pain and suffering, as experienced by Turkish and Israeli individuals in *Man Made*.

The tone of resignation in the *mezbahaci*'s explanation that "this is how it is supposed to be, not every animal is blessed with being sacrificed" captures the state ideology that is mulled over by many participants in *Man Made*. The shocking nature of conscription's potentially lethal role in the everyday lives of young men is a seemingly inescapable feature of Turkish and Israeli citizenship. Like the *mezbahaci* dragging the pliant sheep by the ears, most of my informants in Istanbul and Tel Aviv fatalistically recognised conscription as an aspect of everyday life in the state, whether they were for or against it. Ultimately, the *mezbahaci* reflects a common response to conscription in both nations: he reconciles that if an animal is killed, it may be sad for us to watch in such proximity, but it has served a divine purpose for the greater good that will surely be rewarded in the afterlife.

[134] Jean-Klein, 2002, 1-7

Thus, the perfunctory, transactional tone with which the *mezbahaci* and his client barter over the price of the sheep foreshadows the violent banality of military service, as shown in the interviews of *Man Made*. By banality, I mean the largely bureaucratic nature of mandatory conscription that undermines its purported sacred quality. While the scene's inclusion at the beginning and end of the film break the geographic symmetry of Israel-Turkey-Israel-Turkey in the presentation of its four episodes, the slaughter takes place entirely indoors. This creates a dreamlike atmosphere of displacement for the viewer and situates the vignette in a convenient interzone between Turkey and Israel, which suits the film as it bookends the four scenes that take place in a fixed reality.

Allegations of orientalism and reactions from participants: I should not have been surprised that, of all the scenes in *Man Made*, the *adak* ceremony sequence would elicit the strongest reaction. Audiences were polarised over the scene's graphic violence and uncomfortable atmosphere. They either advocated its removal, or they insisted upon its inclusion, citing its power as a visual metaphor for the film's philosophical thesis. Following *Man Made's* closed premiere at Macquarie University, there was an informal Q&A session between myself and the audience. Aside from ethical concerns about conducting academic research in Israel and my position on the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, the strongest debate centred around the *adak* opening sequence. Most notably, a Turkish colleague later warned me that, despite my best intentions, the scene could be construed as orientalist – sensationalising perceived Muslim barbarity and contributing to the construction of the Muslim "other" by a secular Australian anthropologist.

Reflecting on this assertion, I asked myself a question: if I were a Turkish anthropologist, would the scene's inclusion still carry a viable charge of orientalism? In consultation with my participants and supervisor, I think not. After all, the *adak* ceremony is not an anomaly of everyday Turkish life, and the scene is directed in such a way as to place the compassion and humanity of the two *mezbahaci* at the forefront of the scene as well as their craftsmanship and dedication to the compassionate aspects of *Dhabihah* (Islamic ritual slaughter).

Nevertheless, after such a polarising response, I wrestled with the scene's inclusion for many months – feeling strongly about its symbolic importance in the context of the film's four episodes, but also fearing a negative reaction from examiners, who will only consider this discursive justification of the scene *after* having viewed the film. Ultimately, I resolved to leave the scene's fate in the hands of my participants. I wrote privately to each of them and described the polarising reaction of the sequence and how this bemused me, considering that I found much of the testimony in the film far more shocking and disturbing than the ritual slaughter of two sheep.

I anxiously awaited their reply, and the results were fascinating. Every Turkish participant I contacted insisted on the scene's inclusion. In fact, one participant emphatically wrote, "If you take [this scene] out, take my footage out too." I never inquired whether this was a serious threat (this particular informant was often prone to hyperbole), but I felt encouraged by such a resounding affirmation of the sequence. Another wrote, "Max, the [scene] is something I've never observed in documentary representations [*sic*] of my country. When watching it, I of course felt revolted and uncomfortable. But also, deeply introspective. This is something that happens in Turkey countless times a day, and we don't even notice it. I am not a vegetarian, but I think this scene is a good example of how our comfortable lives are underpinned by hidden violence and sacrifice. If, by seeing [the *adak* ceremony] I suddenly feel so disgusted and guilty – what else is happening [in Turkey] that we collectively ignore for the sake of ourselves? I then saw your meaning [*sic*] in how this was just like military service – a violence on the individual that we cover up, that we ignore."[135]

This reaction is particularly striking, as it highlights my initial rationale for the scene's inclusion without an explicit prompt from me. In harmony with Pachirat's deconstruction of institutional concealment of violence in commercial slaughterhouses, this participant was forced to experience the reality of animal sacrifice with the barriers of concealment lifted. Conversely, two of my Israeli participants cautioned against the scene's inclusion, citing similar concerns to those at the premiere. "Maybe Turks will be uncomfortable being seen this way," one wrote. "It sets up a bad look for Turkey from [the get-go]. I understand why it's in there, but it's just so graphic you might put people off your film within minutes of it starting." None of the dissenting Israeli participants mentioned the metaphor itself or reflected on the notion of hidden violence in their own society. However, one assenting Israeli participant – a committed vegetarian – wrote to me, "You are showing death first hand – this is what I get [*sic*] from this scene. Obviously, you can't show a conscript being shot – or an LGBT soldier being assaulted – instead, you found an analogy of suffering that we all take for granted if we choose to eat meat." Reflecting on this, I noted the parallels with Pachirat again, whose chapter on concealment is aptly titled, "Killing at Close Range".[136]

I have left the scene largely intact in the final cut of *Man Made*. Originally, the cutting of the sheep's throat was shown, but after the premiere, I removed approximately three seconds of footage (a cut to black) to minimise the graphic nature of the animal's death. Considering my Turkish participants unanimous demand to include the scene as an allegorical portrayal of hidden individual suffering for the greater good, I believe the sequence remains a crucial sequence of the final cut. While I understand the scene makes many uncomfortable (myself included), I hope that the viewer regards it as culturally sensitive and understands that it establishes a clear thematic precedent for the rest of the documentary.

[135] Transcribed from Facebook messages and personal emails.
[136] Pachirat, 2011, 140-161

"A Boring Part of Life"

Timecode: 0h:05m:40s – 0h:08m:30s

Establishing the filmmaking, style and tone of *Man Made*: Upon fading out on the *mezbaha*, an introductory monologue and accompanying visual montage begins. It opens with a series of cityscape panoramas of Istanbul. These shots were recorded specifically as B-roll footage – visual material that is not pertinent to ethnographic research as such, but is indispensable in its utility as aesthetic filler, giving both environmental context to the film as well as to artistically enhance the overall documentary. The act of cutting away to landscape and exterior detail shots, is an often-used device in most documentary films, and *Man Made* is no exception. *Man Made* consists primarily of three streams of visual material:

1) **Interview footage** with participants (the primary ethnographic research).

2) **B-roll footage**: Landscapes, cityscapes, interior details, exterior details, drone shots and the *mezbaha* sequence.

3) **Third-party and/or stock footage**: Gathered from a variety of online/digital visual archives and occasionally from participants themselves.

While the opening monologue introduces the audience to myself and the film's thesis statement, visually, the segment introduces the film's style, tone and format – most notably its extensive use of B-roll footage, and the significant overlaying of third-party visual material throughout most of the interviews and sequences in *Man Made*. This establishes the aesthetic principles of the film *before* the first episode (*The Three Sabras*) has begun, ensuring that by the end of the introduction, the viewer has been preconditioned to both the frequent use of cutaways and the overlaying of stock footage. Heider directs the anthropologist to "exploit the visual potential of film"[137] in the pursuit of engaging ethnographic cinema; to use the rich language and tools of the medium to enhance one's research. Heider's sentiment encourages a synthesis of the specific aesthetics of film with the data from the qualitative ethnographic fieldwork. Further, the film establishes the aural background within the opening monologue – low ambient music accompanies my voice – along with specific soundscapes I captured on the streets of Istanbul and Tel Aviv.

Man Made is classified throughout this thesis as an ethnographic film, but it owes much to the language and nature of documentary film as a mode of production – with "documentary" defined here as a standalone cinematic genre, distinct from the more specific genre of ethnographic film. Paul Henley (1998) identifies the historical separation between the two categories, resulting in distinct styles and methodologies. Henley pinpoints the birth of conventional documentary film to the 1950s, many decades after the earliest ethnographic films were made, most notably Robert Flaherty's 1922 film *Nanook of the North*. *Nanook* is widely considered to the be the first (albeit flawed) attempt at a feature length ethnographic film, whereas the news reel visual reportage of World War II is seen as the precursor of mainstream documentary cinema.[138]

[137] Heider, 2006, 113
[138] Henley in Prosser, 1998, 38-39

As technology broadened the technical possibilities for creating and manipulating images for both documentary and ethnographic filmmakers, the line between the genres increasingly blurred – most notably with the development of affordable, portable, synchronous sound in the 1960s. This enabled filmmakers like the anthropologist Jean Rouch to develop a meta-fictional style that incorporated aspects of both ethnographic and conventional documentary film, birthing the standalone genre dubbed *cinema vérité* (truth in film). Despite being decades apart, Flaherty and Rouch both experienced the plight of most documentary and ethnographic filmmakers: the genres' technical and budgetary limitations, and the subsequent negotiation of how the artist/filmmaker/anthropologist combats these challenges.

Whether it is their equipment (inferior, breaking down or a lack thereof), their subject matter (elusive, remote or inaccessible), or an inconsistent filming environment (light, weather, noise, privacy and permission), the documentary filmmaker is constantly juggling a series of potential catastrophes that could derail their production schedule. The common element of documentary and ethnographic film is their mutual existence outside the traditional systems, safeguards and controls of the wider commercial film industry. As a result, when one develops a film genre outside of a closed studio, he or she must (out of necessity) reflexively develop a set of tools, mechanisms and rules of thumb for creating a successful non-fiction narrative in unpredictable production environments.

Jean Rouch pioneered the embrace of this potential volatility, deliberately seeking out disruption, unplanned moments and self-aware reflexivity in his films. Rouch made a habit of breaking the fourth wall, first in *Chronique d'un été* (1961, Chronicle of a Summer), where he addresses his concerns, theories and opinions of the film itself as it is transpiring. This undermined the absolutist tone of Flahetry and later Robert Gardener (1963), who both spoke with the authoritative "voice of God" narrations and title cards in their films, leaving no room for self-examination, or an acknowledgement of the anthropologist's inherently limited subjectivity.

What we see in *Chronique d'un été* is in part a technical and aesthetic response to *Nanook of the North.* Rather than make a less interesting, honest ethnographic film, Flaherty was retrospectively criticised for staging much of *Nanook*'s key scenes, opting to dramatize events he had previously observed among the Inuit but had failed to capture in the moment.[139] In *Chronique d'un été* we see Rouch in command of the limits of his own control as a filmmaker. His qualitative interviewers literally chase Parisians down the street, frighten children, confuse the elderly – and all this stays in the final cut. The choice to include the failure of Rouch's interviewers, alongside their ethnographic success, set a new precedent for both ethnographic and documentary film – chiefly a confessional meta-narrative, a stylistic reflexivity from filmmaker to audience that has been a staple of non-fiction film ever since.

[139] Heider, 2006, 20-24

Rouch's innovation of reflexivity and *cinema vérité* was as pragmatic as it was ideological, a result of the technical, financial and manpower deficit that befell during the production of *Chronique d'un été*. *Man Made* owes much to Rouch's stylistic choices, as well as his embrace of the limited scope of an anthropological themed film. On a technical level, *Man Made* is Rouchian: a single camera operator film, made entirely on the shoulder and within the laptop of a sole ethnographic filmmaker, on a limited budget. Like Rouch putting a microphone in front of the unsuspecting Parisian and displaying the warts-and-all results with deliberately minimal editing, *Man Made* is both heavily improvisational and carefully curated as an ethnographic film. This paradox is in full view during the introductory monologue that follows the *mezbaha*, with an establishment of the film's visual and tonal style, a confessional point of view from the director, and an overarching thesis statement, all presented to the audience in succession to establish clearly and succinctly what the following two hours will contain.

Theoretical and technical points of view in *Man Made*: "A film without a point of view is inconceivable,"[140] writes Heider. Indeed, the point of view (POV) in documentary and ethnographic film is a most crucial stylistic choice, as it generally (out of efficiency) must be established before principal photography has commenced,[141] thus affecting the tone, style and presentation of the film from its creative inception. In documentary film production, it is possible to acquire and pursue cinematic points of view spontaneously during shooting; for example, realising one could attach a camera to a moving vehicle, or perhaps leave it with an interview subject overnight to record themselves.[142] However, it was in the pre-production of *Man Made* that I committed to the film's POV to guarantee consistency throughout its lengthy production, but leaving open the possibility of spontaneity. I achieved this by only using three lenses in the film's cinematography. This was an aesthetic choice in principle, as I regard the consistent use of lens as critical for a production timeline that would likely last years. By committing to only use three Nikon prime lenses[143] for the film across its three-year production, I guaranteed at least some consistency in the *look* of the cinematography and overall aesthetic of the film. The lenses used were as follows:

1) Nikon 35mm f/2 AF-D: A natural focal length prime lens that replicates the human eye's field of view.[144]

2) Nikon 50mm f/1.4 AF-D: An ultra-fast, low-light portrait lens used for night footage and darker interviews.

3) Nikon 85mm f/1.8 AF-D: As above, also used for cityscape B-roll shots with extra fine bokeh (background blur).

These prime lenses all offer significant low light capabilities for use in a variety of day/night conditions. Their collective focal length (35mm-85mm), light weight and pocket size allowed me to carry all three at once and quickly change lenses on the fly, depending on the scene and its conditions. At the height of my skills, I could change a prime lens with one hand while balancing my DSLR rig on a shoulder mount at the same time (see photo below). I prefer carrying prime lenses over expensive zooms, as the latter tend to have inferior aperture ranges, are rather bulky and offer no automatic zoom control for a DSLR filmmaker setup with a limited budget.

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[140] Heider, 2006, 60
[141] POV in any film is heavily reliant on the equipment used in principal photography – lenses, shooting styles, camera setups. This should generally be decided prior to filming in order to guarantee consistency.
[142] Heider, 2006, 45
[143] I used one additional speciality lens in some landscape shots: a 500mm astrophotography mirror lens.
[144] Primary lens used for most of the footage in *Man Made.*

The DSLR rig used throughout Man Made's production. (Photo: Max Harwood)
This setup packs down into a medium-sized backpack, offering portability and day-long battery life.
Note: the separate sound recorder/mic on top, and the follow focus to the side of the camera.

Committing to a lens set before conducting principal photography established *Man Made*'s POV in the film's pre-production. The focal range of the three prime lenses aspired to cinematically imitate the experience of qualitative research, and the methodology of ethnographic biography directly for the viewer – no reality distorting wide-angle lenses or unnatural focal lengths for any of the interviews. I wanted the film to feel as natural as possible during my conversations with informants. This essentially meant that I would be creating a series of sit-down interviews that would mimic the POV of the ethnographic encounter, as opposed to extracting voice-overs with accompanying footage, or constructing elaborate dramatisations, à la *The Act of Killing* (Oppenheimer, 2012) or *My Scientology Movie* (Theroux, 2015).

Of course, this POV was a logistical necessity as much as it was an artistic choice. I wonder if documentarian Joshua Oppenheimer had lacked the commercial budget for his remarkable film *The Act of Killing*, whether he would have opted for the extravagant dramatisations of his subjects that make his film so visually stunning. Knowing that *Man Made's* POV would be limited to myself as the camera operator, it was easy to conceptualise the film's format prior to principal photography, as the film was simplified by its budgetary circumstances. Like Rouch maximising the limits of his own resources, I stripped *Man Made* of conceptual set pieces, flourish and expensive aesthetic veneer even before I commenced filming it, instead envisioning it as a relatively simple film in format and style.

Practical cinematic methodology in *Man Made*: It is important to emphasise the multi-tasking that I undertook whenever I captured footage with this setup. If I was filming on location, i.e. not in a closed room for a sit-down interview, I would carry all my equipment in a nondescript, black backpack. When a participant and I decided to start rolling, I would quickly assemble my DSLR shoulder mount (see above), which included a robust follow focus (to "pull" focus fluidly without manually turning the barrel of the lens), a separate four-track sound recorder with a shotgun microphone attached via the DSLR's hotshoe, and finally the camera itself, which was locked onto the shoulder mount using a series of quick release plates.

When ready, I would focus and light the scene by manipulating the aperture ring on the barrel of the lens. A key innovation of DSLR video is their use of extraordinary low-light photography lenses, which negates the need for professional lighting in most circumstances. The lens set I employed were all fast in that they could shoot "wide open"[145] in extremely low light, and still capture a viable image that could be brightened in post-production. Throughout the filming of *Man Made*, I did not light a single shot beyond the use of natural available light, or lamps strategically placed within a room.

I would then begin recording video on the camera (using SD cards) as well as sound on the separate four track deck and microphone. I would then have my participant clap on camera, for sound synchronisation when editing.[146] Ensuring vision and sound were being recorded, I would then direct the scene, interview the participant, maintain focus and composition of the shot, monitor the sound recording through headphones, as well as keep an eye on battery life, clip length and aperture/white balance. Like a conscript who is timed while he disassembles, cleans and reassembles his rifle, I too spent many hours seeing how fast I could assemble my shoulder setup from my backpack, and similarly pack it back down. In the peak of *Man Made's* production, I could go from fully packed to recording a scene in less than two minutes.

Stripped to component parts, *Man Made* is a series of sit-down interviews with informants, edited in such a way to focus on conflicting points of view, whilst presenting intimate biographical portraits of individuals – a *Rashomon*[147] documentary style that presents various informants' perspectives on a limited number of specific topics. The camera's perspective mirrors my own POV as an ethnographer, placed to my side as I conduct lengthy biographical interviews, hiked on my shoulder when I was filming outside, or placed in my lap when riding in vehicles. In ethnographic film production, the placement of the camera alone presents a myriad of anthropological questions of veracity, representation and intention.

The POV of *Man Made* is established in the opening monologue, by showing my bus ride from Atatürk International Airport: my views of the Golden Horn, the Bosphorus, and the narrow streets of Beyoğlu. This is coupled with the brief monologue itself, a thesis statement on the central research topic, but also an exposition on how I came to make this film, my personal background as both filmmaker and anthropologist, as well an overview of the four episodes of *Man Made*. Pre-empting the film's extensive use of ethnographic biography, the prologue includes a self-revelation, to establish myself as the catalyst for the research, the subjective lens through which the film's world will be viewed and interpreted.

[145] Referring to the aperture range of the lens set used.
[146] This technical manoeuvre is demonstrated by Ben in *The Soldier & The Swede.*
[147] Akira Kurosawa (1950). 'The Rashomon Effect' denotes the use of multiple (often contradictory) points of view in a film to reveal a narrative.

The inception of *Man Made* and the comparative study of Istanbul and Tel Aviv: Choosing a POV and cinematic perspective in ethnographic film offers unique opportunities for the anthropologist to address questions of reflexivity through what McGee and Warms (2007) call the relatively nascent "self-revelation ethnograph[ic]"[148] style. This reflexive method is analogous to Rouch's confessions on camera and is mirrored in the establishment of my visual POV and personal backstory in the first minutes of the monologue. But how did both this POV and the "self" it revealed in the monologue come about?

My own justification for the comparative study of Istanbul and Tel Aviv is twofold: a personal series of events that brought me to Turkey and Israel in 2010, and the subsequent identification of a distinct research gap in the study of masculinity and nationalism in the region. While the beginning of the monologue places my own arrival to Istanbul and pre-existing interest in the research topic as the catalyst for *Man Made*, there is a deeper backstory to how I came to comparatively study informants in Istanbul and Tel Aviv around their experiences with conscription. As I summarise in the monologue, I originally came to Turkey in 2010 on an undergraduate exchange program at Boğaziçi University. It was from this point that I began my six years of living in Istanbul, including my honours degree research in 2011, which was followed by my PhD research that commenced in 2013. My first visit to Israel was in early 2012, during a particularly cold winter in the region that saw deep snow on the streets of Istanbul – fast tracking my plan to escape southward for Tel Aviv as soon as possible.

Aside from sightseeing in the Holy Land, my first visit to Israel was partly to see friends I had made a few years prior in Thailand. During a backpacking trip through Southeast Asia in 2009, I had become close with three Israeli men, most of whom had recently completed their military service, and who now found themselves relaxing on the salt white beaches of Ko Pha Ngan while they cycled out of their three years of conscription – and in one case, an extended service record that saw frontline duty in the 2006 Lebanon War. I was struck by the young men's intensity, as well as their close familiarity with violence, death and war. I felt psychologically alien in comparison. While I did not feel inferior, I was keenly aware that these were young men who – although my contemporaries – had been deeply shaped by their military service, something they had not chosen. At 22 years old, I had only been formatively shaped by high school and some international travel, which I had chosen.

What I saw in these three men was difficult to describe, call it a thousand-yard stare[149] of the soul. While we all got along well, they were nevertheless on a markedly different plane of reality that was distinct from mere cultural differences amongst backpackers in their early twenties. Despite a mutual desire to embrace the hedonistic lifestyle pervasive in the Gulf of Thailand, what separated these young men were their divergent encounters with the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). As I got to know them better (and as the budding anthropologist in me took over), I was struck by the diverse, competing attitudes they had toward mandatory military service in their country. There was Avi,[150] an Azerbaijani Israeli who had served on the front lines of the 2006 Lebanon War. He was very defensive of the Israeli nation state, the IDF and was vehemently Islamophobic, openly mocking my sympathy towards Palestinians as both ignorant and naïve, but at the same time he was clearly shell shocked by the combat he had experienced and was terrified at the prospect of *going to war again*, as he dully put it.

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[148] McGee and Warms, 2007, 534

[149] 'Battle Fatigue', the 'thousand-yard stare' first referenced in Life magazine, 1945: https://books.google.ca/books?id=_EkEAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PA61&dq=%22tom+lea%22&as_pt=MAGAZINES&pg=PA65&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=%22tom%20lea%22&f=false

[150] All names have been changed.

Then there was Sergey, a Russian Jew who had migrated to Israel with his family after the collapse of the Soviet Union. He had served in the Israel Air Force (IAF) and held a more pragmatic view of the occupation and what he called *the inevitability of war* embedded in the Israeli life experience. A man who truly lived in the moment, Sergey saw his personal existence as drastically finite, meant to be enjoyed and something which could end at the hands of your enemy, or just bad luck, at any given moment. While not dismissive of my views of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he conversed with me openly about his experiences in the IAF with an air of sympathy. For him, conscription and serving your country to guarantee its survival was something I could never understand and – as a non-Israeli – I never would.

The third young man was a Ukrainian-Israeli named Uri, darkly funny and a lover of heavy metal and cigarettes. The runt of the trio in both physical size and demeanour, we got along instantly, and Uri was largely responsible for my becoming close with all three of them in the first place. Uri's story was also the most unusual and was revealed to me almost by accident. One evening on the island, all three of us were eating dinner at a schnitzel restaurant, and the topic of military service had come up again. At a certain point, Uri made a disparaging remark about the IDF, and the other two Israelis rolled their eyes back dramatically and cursed at him in a combination of Russian and Hebrew. Bemused, I asked what had just transpired with such lightning speed. Sergey turned to me and hitched his thumb toward Uri, *He didn't do his service. He makes fun of it and laughs about our friends getting shot for him while he sits his ass in a pretend jail in Tel Aviv, he's being an asshole*. Uri then burst out laughing, looking at me to gauge my response.

Uri was the first conscientious objector I had ever met, although his reasoning arguably stretched the boundaries of what is typically meant by the term "conscientious". Since he could remember, he told me, he knew he would not serve in the army. Arriving in Israel as a little boy from Kiev, he didn't see any sense in defending a nation from which he felt detached. Bullied for his heavily accented Hebrew in Beer Sheba, punished for speaking Ukrainian, Uri became a rebellious teenager. When conscription loomed, he faced it head on with a staunch defiance. *Basically, it's like this,* he explained to me*. One day, I get some letters in the mail, they say, "Uri, you must come to army", I take them and place them in the trash. I then pack my bag and wait for them to collect me and take me to jail.* His matter-of-fact attitude fused beautifully with his deadpan Eastern European humour. Furthermore, his reasoning for avoiding enlistment was essentially apolitical, amoral and without any deep consideration for Israel, the occupation or the civic and philosophical questions around conscription.

Uri simply did not want to serve in the army. He saw it as fundamentally at odds with his right to live in society as a free citizen and relished the imprisonment that befell him as he routinely trashed his service papers. *The jail is a joke,* he told me. *It's basically like camping with friends. They [the army] come to collect you in a Jeep, they say, "Hello Uri, nice to see you again", and then you are in a room with other guys who also won't serve, and you sit around and talk all day. They feed you, you smoke a bunch of cigarettes and after a few weeks they send you home. It's much better than doing push-ups and getting shot at by a bunch of assholes.* This attitude infuriated Avi, who had served as a mine sweeper during the 2006 Lebanon War. *He's a coward, he makes fun of us for serving but ignores the security we've provided him,* Avi would later tell me. Despite this friction, they were still close friends by the time I arrived in Tel Aviv in 2012, and it was Uri who met me at Ben Gurion International Airport, driving all the way from Beer Sheba to welcome me to Israel for the first time.

Partying with "Uri" in Tel Aviv, on my first trip to Israel, 2012 (Photo: Max Harwood)

In the years prior to my arrival, Avi, Sergey and Uri had observed with increasing alarm my time in Turkey, and the subsequent trips to what they had dismissed as uniformly dangerous Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries. I posted photos of my travels to Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan on Facebook, much to their collective horror. I frequently received messages asking if I was okay – not from my parents in Australia, but from my three Israeli friends in Tel Aviv. They later told me that, amongst themselves, they perceived me as a clichéd, automatically prejudiced anti-Israeli Westerner, exercising his lazily acquired privilege to visit countries that were sworn enemies to Israel. They encouraged me to visit Tel Aviv, promising to pick me up from the airport and show me their country in a way that was both unique and, in their words, *not what you see of Israel on TV.* As Uri embraced me at the arrival hall of Ben Gurion, I took my first steps into the remarkable Israeli ethno-state: a country built on its security, its ethnicity and its fervent nationalism.

Discovering conscription and discrimination in Istanbul: My exposure to the reality of conscription in Turkey occurred in similarly auspicious circumstances. Living in Rumeli Hisarüstü during my 2010 university exchange program, just a short walk from the front gates of Boğaziçi University, I found myself in a flat-share with three Turkish men, all of whom were fellow undergraduates. They were in their final year of study and the topic of military service soon came up in our nightly dinners, which were often lengthy exchanges over *beyti sarma* and *çay*. It was during these meals, at the cluster of *ocakbaşı* (grilled meat restaurants) that line the perimeter of Boğaziçi University, that I became privy to the almost universal anxiety felt by my housemates and male peers at Boğaziçi. They were either terrified or extremely antagonised at the notion of being conscripted, and they described at length the various means of postponing enlistment or avoiding it altogether.

The young men's grievances included the inconvenience of conscription's length, its questionable utility, the apparently harsh conditions within the barracks, and the way university-educated privates were rumoured to be treated by their commanding officers. But compounding their negative views was a perception that freedom of religious expression was severely limited within barracks life, as the Turkish Army's (TAF) Kemalist and secularist ideology discouraged any religious observance in its soldiers. I was surprised to learn over the course of my first year in Turkey that some of my university friends were devout Muslims, despite coming from mostly secular Western (or *Beyaz Turk*)[151] backgrounds. I had inadvertently stumbled onto a born-again Turkish Muslim undergraduate network, who had become practising Muslims only *after* they had arrived at university in their late teens. They often hid their faith from their families, for fear of shame, alienation and potential excommunication, in much the same way a gay man may hide his sexuality from disapproving parents and friends in their provincial hometown. Alongside this phenomenon, I had also begun to attend meetings at Lambdaistanbul, the city's most visible LGBTI rights organisation.[152]

In my meetings and early discussions with new friends at Lambdaistanbul, I was educated in the Turkish military's extreme practise of discrimination against non-heterosexual Turkish men. I was shocked by the TAF's unofficial practise of requesting explicit photos and videos as evidence of homosexuality for exemption-seeking Turkish men. This visual evidence had to portray the subject in a "passive homosexual encounter" in which their face was clearly visible. Shocked and with no academic focus in mind, I quickly began researching the issue in an informal qualitative survey. Many of the people I met at Lambdaistanbul during this period later appeared in both my undergraduate honours film and *Man Made*, largely due to this early period of pre-fieldwork.

As 2010 ended along with my year at Boğaziçi, I had inadvertently identified two separate male subcultures in Istanbul, both of which appeared to suffer from similar grievances with the Turkish nation state. There were the new Muslim Boğaziçi friends, who suffered from a paradoxical dynamic of apparent religious discrimination from both the state (with conscription) and from their own secular families. And there were the activists at Lambdaistanbul, with their horror stories of appearing before military psychiatrists and forced to undergo a combination of physical and psychological humiliation to prove their homosexuality before a panel, and thus avoid conscription.

The comparative study of these two groups became the basis for my undergraduate honours research, which culminated in the film *Making Men in Turkey* (2012), my first attempt at a feature length ethnographic documentary. While technically crude, the themes and ideas that appeared throughout the film became the seeds for *Man Made*, and the task of self-producing ethnographic cinema was an invaluable experience, akin to my own private film school. Following my honours year, I felt strongly that I would like to explore the experience of conscription in Israel and began to conceptualise a research project in which I would comparatively research the relationship between cultural modes of masculinity and military service in Turkey and Israel.

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[151] *Beyaz Türkler* or "white Turk" is a term originally coined by Ufuk Güldemir in his description of the imagined socio-cultural divide between coastal "republican" and apparently secular Turkish citizens, and the pious, rural Anatolian Turks of the inner countryside. Colloquially deployed to describe the divide between urban middle/upper class and rural/working class Turks.
[152] See Lambdaistanbul manifesto: www.lambdaistanbul.org

The thesis statement of *Man Made*: The monologue's second half outlines the theoretical thesis of *Man Made*: the compulsory embodiment of ideological nationalism through the institution of mandatory military service and its impact on young men in Istanbul and Tel Aviv. As a naïve comparison, I relate my own experiences with nationalism in my native Australia, and how it was confined to theoretical discourse for the average citizen. Excluding oft-ignored war memorials, two public holidays and some basic education of the ANZAC legend in public schools, I could not feel any impactful way in which nationalist ideology was either tangibly imposed on the Australian public, or used to justify a mandatory contribution by the Australian citizen to the state as a pathway to citizenship.

In my view, nationalism in Australian seemed ethereal, rhetorically invoked in songs, stories and as part of the broad-spectrum and somewhat benign concept of "Aussie pride". Of course, being a white Australian, what would I know of the ugly side of Australian nationalism, and of its long history of assimilation, cultural distinction and racism? As Hobsbawm highlights, for ethnic minorities, the view of nationalism "from below" gives way to a distinct range of experiences and perceptions not shared by the "sovereign" ethnic subject of the nation.

Conversely, in Istanbul and Tel Aviv, I was struck by the impact conscription had on the lives of almost every man I met. The consequences ranged from mild inconvenience and loss of personal freedom, to imprisonment, alienation and *prima facie* evidence of human rights abuse, via institutionalised sexual discrimination.[153] Moreover, in both Turkey and Israel, recurring historical narratives and imagined military mythologies were the primary sources for their respective nationalist projects. This nationalism was weaponised to justify and perpetuate conscription, as well as create monolithic archetypes about "who and what a man was in their society".[154] In both of my field sites, it was clear that a soldier of the ethno-state – willing to sacrifice himself for the security and preservation of his people – was an essential attribute of model citizenship for the 21st century Turkish and Israeli man.

[153] See 2008 Human Rights Watch Report: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/turkey0508webwcover.pdf
[154] *Man Made,* 0h:5m:20s

"Generals and Majors" Musical Montage

"Generals and Majors (ah ah)
They're never too far
Away from men who made the grade"
- XTC

Timecode: 0h:9m:25s – 0h:13m:10s

Ethnographic film and the visual essay: In *Reframing Visual Social Science* (2015), Luc Pauwels advocates for the "visual presentation of knowledge"[155] in contemporary sociology and anthropology, fields that he regards as ripe for methodological innovation with the emergence of new digital media platforms. The "visual essay", which Pauwels broadly defines as any visual material that is presented either in a contained sequence or as part of a compilation, is a powerful medium that has existed since photo-chemical images first appeared in newspapers and magazines in the early 20th century. As image capture technology flourished, including visual material to enhance written articles and fiction rose steadily. Eventually, the publication of standalone visual non-fiction collections, or photo-essays, became a staple of journalism, art and commercial publications. The gradual inclusion of film in these visual collections gave an added dimension to the visual essay, and as documentary film became mainstream in the late 20th century, film-based visual essays became increasingly popular in the arts as well as the social sciences. It was in the latter field that Pauwels locates the birthplace of the "visual social scientific essay" – a distinct academic take on the artistic visual essay. For Pauwels, the visual social scientific essay is a medium where academia and the visual arts finally "meet"[156] in an innovative methodological approach to social science research.

Inclusive of still photography, documentary film and other forms of new digital media, Pauwels regards the visual social scientific essay as multi-modal in style, approach and production. In the case of film-based anthropology and sociology, Pauwels concludes that "the synergy of the distinct forms of expression that are combined – images, words, layout and design . . . add up to a scientifically informed statement",[157] leaving much room for a blend of styles, forms and modes within a single visual work. *Man Made* is an example of Pauwels' vision, being a multi-modal visual essay of anthropology, delivered through new media digital platforms and presented online as an ethnographic media collection.[158]

In the film itself, the collage of visual styles throughout its running time highlights the rich well of aesthetics and artistic choices that are available for image-based researchers, visual anthropologists and ethnographic filmmakers. In the final section of the introduction of *Man Made,* a historical montage set to music shows the modern history of Israel and Turkey from 1923 to 2017, with rapid historical footage "fast-cut"[159] to the beat of the XTC song "Generals and Majors" (1980). This complex sequence is made almost entirely of third-party footage, sourced from a variety of online and digital libraries. It also includes some original B-roll footage of Istanbul and Tel Aviv that is echoed in the film's four subsequent scenes.

[155] Pauwels, 2015, 139
[156] Ibid., 143
[157] Ibid., 163
[158] See http://viewfrombelow.com.au/phd.html
[159] Or "kinetic editing" popularised by Scorsese, Aronofsky et al.

My decision to create a high-energy visual montage that feverishly summarises a century of history in two countries was borne out my desire to establish an explicit historical context early (and quickly) in the film, without resorting to lengthy exposition, title cards or other traditional means of situating a documentary set in a specific time and place. Before I had begun my participant interviews, I was well-aware of the pedagogical handicap that any anthropologist who has spent years in a field site soon discovers: how does one succinctly reinterpret years of scholarly focus on a society, environment, culture or subject into a digestible and understandable ethnography for external assessment? Considering Turkey and Israel's complex and layered political and cultural history, there would likely be an assumed amount of backgrounded knowledge that is absent in a non-specialist audience (i.e. documentary film viewers). Coupled with my intention to keep the final cut of the film within feature length (ninety minutes to three hours), I needed to establish the complicated historical and cultural military context that precedes two hours of interviews with young men discussing nationalism, cultural masculinity and military service in the specific context of Turkey and Israel in the 21st century.

To remedy this, I have inserted an engaging visual historical primer in the early moments of the documentary, marking the key moments in the political history of Turkey and Israel, using the aftermath of World War I as a starting point. While the scene accomplishes its goal of quickly educating the viewer to the basic history of Israel and Turkey as they emerged as new nation states in the 20th century, the most important feature of the sequence is in the symbolic implication of the montages' interwoven editing. By presenting an entangled Israeli and Turkish modern history, the sequence lays a visual illustration before the viewer who may have been asking, "Why study Turkey and Israel comparatively?" The musical montage demonstrates that the two nation states are not as dissimilar as one may assume prior to viewing the film. From the two states' creation as a result of the 20th century World Wars, to their shared geo-political ancestry in the Ottoman Empire, as well as their distinct use of military service and nationalism in response to domestic and international challenges, the histories of the two countries are decisively linked through careful editing in the two-and-a-half-minute sequence.

My supervisor and I had arrived on the up-tempo post-punk XTC track after trialling a few others, most notably Flock of Seagulls' 1982 synth-drenched hit "I Ran" (for no other reason than my personal love of the track). I wanted a song that was both juxtaposing, and culturally alien in a film about Turkey and Israel, to aurally represent the presence of myself, the outsider, in the film. Furthermore, an important aesthetic influence on the tone and style of *Man Made* is the work of visual essayist Adam Curtis, who frequently juxtaposes modern, avant-garde music against historical and political footage, creating a unique atmosphere and tonal style that is a remix of historical, political and documentary material. I wanted to pay homage to Curtis' oeuvre in *Man Made*, as well as further prepare the audience for the film's extensive use of third-party footage throughout its length. The use of "Generals and Majors" as a centrepiece of the film's introduction also kickstarts the film's eclectic soundtrack, as well as establishes the occasionally frenetic editing in the interviews that follow.

Episode 1: The Three Sabras

"I really hated coming here…"

- Eli

Timecode: 0h:13m:20s – 0h:47m:20s
Filming Locations: Re'ut, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv

Welcome to Re'ut: Early on in our relationship, Eli[160] told me that to understand why he had dedicated his life to conscientious objection, I should first see his hometown of Re'ut. In his early thirties, Eli stands over six feet tall, bespectacled, with long locks of curled greying hair tied back into a shaggy ponytail. He was easy to spot, leaning against his car when my train pulled into Mo'din Merkaz station one afternoon in the summer of 2016. "My Australian!" he bellowed as I hauled my camera gear over to him, bear hugging me, and oozing a warmth that I always found instantly infectious. Eli had behaved as if we were close friends from the moment we had met.

It was back in January 2012, on my first trip to Israel, that I was first put in touch with him, as he was a Couch Surfing ambassador and I was looking for tips and accommodation in Jerusalem and the West Bank. A mutual friend had stayed with him the year before, and Eli was keen to meet me, as he had backpacked through Australia. It was a forgone conclusion that we would have a lot in common, but what I didn't expect was an enduring friendship that would feel almost like family in a very short space of time. But that was Eli. He radiated positivity and had a sharpness about him that was instantly detectable.

What betrayed this easy-going façade was the profoundly difficult relationship that Eli had with his country. A quick Google search of his real name generates Israeli news articles from the early 2000s. During this time, Eli became somewhat of a poster boy for the conscientious objector's movement in Israel – a tumultuous period that culminated in a Supreme Court (the Israeli High Court of Justice – *Beit Mishpat Gavo'ah Le Tzedek)* challenge that was ultimately unsuccessful. After many years in stalled litigation, and almost constantly in front of the news media, the then teenaged Eli tried to amend the Israeli Security Service Law (ISSL), to include a provision for men who wished to avoid their military service on the grounds of conscience and pacifism.

[160] Name changed at participant's request.

The heart of Eli's case for exemption rested in the existence of such a provision for Israeli women, as outlined in Article 39, Section C of the ISSL:

> *39. Statutory Exemption From [Military] Service:*
>
> *(a) The following persons shall be exempt from the duty of defence service –*
>
> *(1) the mother of a child;*
>
> *(2) a pregnant woman.*
>
> *(b) A married woman shall be exempt from the duty of regular service.*
>
> ***(c) A female person of military age who has proved, in such manner and such authority as shall be prescribed by regulations, that reasons of conscience or reasons connected with her family's religious way of life prevent her from serving in defence service shall be exempt from the duty of that service.***
>
> *(d) A female person of military age who considers herself aggrieved by decision of an authority as referred to in subsection (c) may, on such conditions and in such manner as shall be prescribed by regulations, object thereto before an objection committee appointed by the Minister of Defence.*
>
> *(e) The objection committee shall not be bound by rules of procedure or rules of evidence but shall act as it deems most expedient for the clarification of the questions to be decided by it.*[161]

Eli's argument before the Supreme Court was simple: on what grounds did the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) conclude that "reasons of conscience" were the exclusive domain of the female gender in Israeli society? If the ISSL was able to justify an exemption from military service for women on the basis of conscientious objection, then surely they could amend it to include men, as well. Unfortunately, Eli's case was (by his own description) bureaucratically sabotaged from the beginning – delays, hearings abruptly postponed, judges mysteriously reassigned, as well as a consistent stream of interrogation requests, in which Eli would testify for hours before a military psychiatric panel about the nature of his pacifism. In the end, it took Eli longer to have his case thrown out of court than it would for him to have served the required three years in the IDF.

Unluckily, Eli's petition was just a few years short of an equitable, albeit informal ruling by the Israeli Supreme Court – but not the one he was hoping for. By 2005 the IDF was increasingly burdened with young women who circumvented conscription via the ISSL's statute on female conscience. Originally a narrow provision of exemption for religious girls, the exclusively female avenue was seeing an uptick in popularity amongst mainstream Israelis, and tensions boiled over in the mid-2000s.

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[161] See Knesset publication (English): http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfaarchive/1980_1989/Defence%20Service%20Law%20-Consolidated%20Version--%205746-1

Reacting to increased public scrutiny and an ever-present media covering individual cases, the IDF and its legal apparatus sought to definitively quash accusations of inequality, thereby reasserting itself as an institution that placed gender equitability as a feature of its ethos.[162] Jailing two women and admonishing them publicly, the IDF informally announced that – as of late 2005 – it was no longer treating non-religious women differently when they sought exemptions from conscription on the grounds of conscientious objection.[163]

Instead, they would be treated equitably, and be jailed alongside any man who chose to reject his duty of conscription on political or philosophical grounds. Although there is no evidence to suggest that Eli's challenge in the preceding years had any role in the IDF and the court's decision, the irony of it does not escape him. Eli relates his years' long David and Goliath challenge to the IDF in *The Three Sabras*. Despite the passage of time, or as he calls it "the great settling down", he is still visibly emotional about the years' long ordeal, and the experience ultimately led him to emigrate from Israel indefinitely in 2017.

Eli was one of my earliest informants in Israel, and framed much of my preliminary thinking around conscientious objection and its consequences in the country. He put me in touch with a variety of NGOs and other legal representative bodies that dealt primarily with anti-conscription and demilitarisation advocacy in and around Tel Aviv, most notably New Profile[164] and Breaking the Silence.[165] These organisations introduced me to the nature of Israeli conscientious objection at a critical moment in my early fieldwork – in 2012, I had only been studying patterns of resistance to Turkish military service for a year. My time with New Profile in particular was instrumental in the widening of my field site and the various contacts borne out of my attendance there. As well, Eli's personal contacts in the community of activists, objectors and pacifists were extremely valuable to my early education on the subject, but it was his personal story that stayed in my mind and eventually became the opening scene in *The Three Sabras*.

Eli presented a unique opportunity for an ethnographic film project on a sensitive subject: he was willing to appear on camera (his real name changed) and in our early planning for his inclusion in *Man Made,* he began to insist that where he grew up in Israel was essential to understanding his journey as a pacifist, and that I should film his hometown as a framing device for his story. My inner filmmaker quickly saw the cinematic value of Eli revisiting such a complicated period in his life, personified in the geography of his hometown. He encouraged the idea and even offered to chaperone myself and all of the camera equipment on a series of day trips. "It's not just about the occupation, the wars, the wider experience of living in Israel," he told me of his opposition to conscription and his visceral hatred of the IDF, "It's where I fuckin' grew up . . . that's what started this for me." He was describing the town of Re'ut.

[162] Rimalt, 2007, 99
[163] Dr. Noya Rimalt has written extensively on the evolving role of women in the conscientious objector movement in Israel. For more, see Rimalt in reference list.
[164] http://newprofile.org/english
[165] http://www.breakingthesilence.org.il

Sitting equidistant between the shores of the Mediterranean and the rising hills that precede the West Bank and Jerusalem, Re'ut is part of the incorporated city of Modi'in-Maccabim-Re'ut, a short drive from Tel Aviv. Like many of the Israeli municipalities that are wedged alongside the Occupied Territories, part of the city is technically an illegal West Bank settlement, with Maccabim sitting entirely within the internationally recognised No Man's Land of the 1949 Armistice Agreement.[166] South-east of Modi'in centre, Re'ut itself straddles the armistice line, with a few streets of its eastern fringes veering directly into it. Prior to their incorporation as a single city in 1990, the three neighbourhoods were detached towns, and most of the residents still refer to the individual names of the townships as distinct entities, exemplified in Eli's case when he directed me to *come to Re'ut*, despite it not appearing as a standalone entity on Google Maps.

Eli grew up in Re'ut, moving there with his parents during its construction in 1985. While neighbouring Maccabim was built in part by the philanthropic Jewish sports organisation *Maccabi,* Re'ut was a purpose-built housing and development project of the IDF, overseen by a committee of military officers until its completion in 1987. In Eli's words, Re'ut was a town "built by the army, for army people".[167] The construction of the adjacent Mitkan Adam Central Command army base necessitated the town's creation, with the facilities' personnel quickly filling Re'ut's residential plots with military families.[168] As Eli's father had a career in the IDF, he was offered a placement in the new development at the end of the 1980s. His young family in tow, Eli's father moved into a typical red shingle roof dwelling at a time when "the streets were still made of sand".[169]

The unique status of Re'ut as a purpose-built military town, precipitously straddling a flashpoint of the Arab-Israeli conflict, evokes the crystallisation of Zionist aspiration and ideology that had been nearly a century in the making. Foreshadowing Re'ut, the early Jewish agricultural pioneers, who arrived in Ottoman Palestine during the 19th century during the First and Second *Aliyahs* (ascensions),[170] also created purpose-built villages to assert their territorial permanence. Ignored by the Ottoman authorities and often proximate to increasingly hostile Arab communities and marauding Bedouins, the disparate settlements' minimal security proved insufficient to ensure their survival, compelling the early Jewish farmers to develop a culture of sophisticated, armed self-reliance. The historical growth, and subsequent internecine tensions that defined these scattershot Jewish agricultural settlements in 19th century Ottoman Palestine, led to the first overtures of Jewish paramilitary organisation, a critical step in the eventual establishment of the militarised Jewish nation state in 1948.

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[166] https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/european-union-parts-of-modi-in-do-not-belong-to-israel-1.458222
[167] *Man Made*, 0h:15m:05s
[168] Eli's oral history, as well as http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/background-and-history-of-israel-s-special-forces-units
[169] *Man Made*, 0h:16m:10s
[170] Historical Zionist migration waves of Jews to Palestine, 1880-1948.

1.1 Israeli National Consciousness

The Twin Histories of Jewish Agrarian Self-Defence and The Rise of Modern Political Zionism, 1881 – 1948

Note: *The following historical exegesis draws from a distinctly Israeli militarist perspective on the emerging proto-self-defence movements of 19th century Ottoman Palestine. In no way do I assign moral judgement to those who are described within this militarist focussed history of the Israeli nation state. Further, the use of terms like 'belligerents', 'fighters', etc. are strictly clinical in application, drawing from a war studies and international law framework.*

Writing from the Israeli military's own perspective further clarifies the historical framing of contemporary Israeli nationalism, which permeates throughout both of Man Made's Israeli episodes. As with Man Made's excursion into the military museum of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), this written dissertation must also wander through the halls of Zionist history, in order to understand the unique mindset of Israeli siege mentality, as well as the mid 20th century crafting of the militarised masculine archetype that is the Jewish Sabra soldier.



19th century map of Ottoman Palestine (credit: wikicommons)

The Return: At the height of its power, the Ottoman Empire stretched over two million square kilometres in three continents.[171] The classical Ottoman age (*Klasik Çağ)* or historical apogee of the sultanate, is generally agreed to have begun with the 1453 conquest of Constantinople, and concluded around a century later, with the death of Suleiman the Magnificent in 1566.[172] During this epoch of prosperity and expansion, in 1516, Sultan Selim I thundered into modern-day Syria, crushing the Egyptian Mamluk Empire. The battle of *Marj Dabiq* in northern Syria (now Aleppo) saw Selim's army push down the Levantine and into the Sinai desert, finally conquering what is now modern-day Egypt in 1517. The Mamluks vanquished, the Ottoman Empire was now in control of the Holy Land, a custodianship it would maintain until its defeat at the end of the World War I.

[171] Agoston, 2009, 545 and Azak, 2010
[172] Ibid.

After two centuries of Ottoman rule, it was circa 1700 that a trickle of Jewish migrants, mostly from Poland and Lithuania,[173] began to arrive in the Ottoman backwater of Palestine. Fleeing pogroms and discrimination, these early Jewish refugees fared terribly on the harsh journey from Eastern Europe, and many entered the Holy Land destitute, without any significant resources to establish the new lives they sought.[174] Relying on their meagre valuables and donations from international benefactors, the new arrivals sought to establish themselves alongside the existent Jewish and Arab communities that dotted the landscape. This was still a century before the French Revolution, and the notion of ethnic statehood and collective organisation was far from the minds of the newly arrived Jews in Ottoman Palestine.

In the mid 19th century, half a million people resided in the land of Palestine – the majority were Arabic speaking Muslims, with a Jewish population of around 20,000.[175] Since the Roman destruction of the Second Temple in 70 AD, the Jewish population in and around Jerusalem had fluctuated, but never returned to its pre-Roman zenith, and so there was no social or political template for a coordinated Jewish challenge to Ottoman sovereignty. Instead, between much of the 1st and 18th centuries, the Jews who remained in Palestine had been subjects to a revolving door of empires in their own homeland. The demographic balance only began to tip in the 19th century, as a combination of growing anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe and a looming monarchic upheaval in Russia brought waves of Jewish migrants back to the land that their ancestors had once ruled in antiquity.

In modern-day Israel, mandatory conscription has resulted in a significant overlap between the civilian and military sectors of Israeli society, with the country often described as a "nation in arms."[176] As of 2017, Israel's population was just over 8.5 million, with 3.6 million citizens theoretically ready for active military duty.[177] This extraordinary ratio of total population to military personnel available in a time of war illustrates the deep integration between the IDF and civilian Israeli life, with nearly half of the population supposedly available to defend Israel if necessary. While relatively brief, the history of Israel after its founding offers a reasonable justification for the pervasive militarisation of the country – with eight wars, countless border skirmishes and two *Intifadas* (Palestinian uprisings) occurring since the nation's establishment. While chronic encounters with Arab belligerents and Palestinian insurgents may account for the Israeli state's unique status as a highly militarised ethnically representative democracy,[178] it is in the pre-history of the Israeli nation that reveals the origin of Jewish militarisation.

Israeli political scholar Stuart Cohen (2008) writes that "measured by the long gauge of Jewish history, the intimacy of contemporary relationships between Israelis and their army is entirely novel. For many centuries, the nation now almost totally mobilized for war, possessed no martial traditions at all."[179] The following historical account describes how these martial traditions were formed, framed around the particular evolution of the 19th century Jewish community in Ottoman Palestine, as they shifted from disorganised farmers into a militarised proto-nation state on the cusp of sovereignty. Looming over this gradual transformation is the broader historical origins of nation states themselves, particularly their emergence as part of dramatic historical events that would define the "Long Nineteenth Century"[180] in Western Europe.

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[173] Gilbert, 2014, 5
[174] Ibid.
[175] Pappe, 14, 2013
[176] Ben-Eliezer, 1995, 265
[177] https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=israel
[178] Palestinians within the occupied territories do not participate in Israeli democratic processes.
[179] Cohen, 2008, 17
[180] As defined by Hobsbawm in The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789–1848 (1962)

Nationalism and conscription from 1792: From the ashes of the French Revolution came an infectious idea that rapidly spread throughout Europe. Its symptoms were observed in the 1792 battle of Valmy, where General François Kellermann declared dramatically in front of French volunteer soldiers, *Vive la nation*![181] and rushed head-on into Prussian regulars. If the history of modern nationalism was a pandemic, revolutionary France was patient zero, and the concept moved quickly across Europe like an airborne contagion. In the vacuum of traditional monarchic governance, the ethnically determined nation state rose to assume its place. Expedited in part by the ensuing Napoleonic Wars and culminating in the 1848 Revolutionary Wars in Europe, nationalism was one of the harbingers of Enlightenment governance in Western civilisation, imbuing the peasantry with the ideals of self-determination, indigenous collective pride, and a relatively fair negotiation of state power over the citizen through the symbiotic political philosophy of the social contract.[182]

Just a year after Kellerman summoned nationalist patriotism on the Valmy battlefront, the National Convention (or Second French Republic government) was experiencing catastrophic military losses, and it was estimated that at least 300,000 new men would be needed to maintain security and order in the vulnerable French republic. While mechanisms for voluntarily enlistment were already mobilised across France, they failed to garner anywhere near the manpower needed to replenish the National Convention's depleted army. Thus, in 1793, the Committee of Public Safety chairman, Bertrand Barère, penned *levée en masse* - a decree ruling that forms of national service, including military service, would be temporarily mandatory for all French citizens until "the enemies have been driven from the territory of the republic".[183]

As it was part of a provisional state of emergency, *levée en masse* was distinct from outright conscription, but its application roused French political consciousness with the notion of a permanent national military service scheme made up of citizen soldiers. While unpopular with the citizenry, *levée en masse* proved to be an enormous military success, with its implementation enabling a slew of revolutionary victories abroad, the halting of border incursions by foreign invaders, and the restoration of domestic security in the republic itself. As the 18th century concluded, a final step was taken to bring the success of *levée en masse* into a permanent codified law of mandatory conscription for all male citizens in France. In 1798, the decorated revolutionary general turned politician Jean-Baptiste Jourdan proposed a new edict that would maintain the revolutionary army in perpetuity, which came to be known as Jourdan's Law.

[181] Connelly, 2006, 29
[182] See Rousseau, 1762
[183] Rothenberg, 1977, 95-102

Jourdan's Law: While northern European peasants had experienced the concept of forced enlistment in the military in the early 1600s,[184] the codified link between valid citizenship and mandatory military service was first observed with Jourdan's Law. Alongside the American Revolutionary War's informal militia draft of the same period,[185] Jourdan's Law was a unprecedented institutionalized doctrine that filled the ranks of the nascent state's army with its own male citizens, who were legally obligated to serve as part of their civic requirements.[186] Jourdan's Law would stay in effect through the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, swelling the republic's military into its early 19th century pinnacle of roughly one and half a million conscripts.[187] France's *Grande Armée* (the great army) signalled the birth of the modern nation in arms and the concept of mandatory military service for the citizenry quickly spread throughout Western Europe and Imperial Russia, as competing emperors, kings and emergent nationalist polities harnessed the power of mass civilian conscription following the Napoleonic Wars.[188]

The spread of nationalism in Europe is closely linked to the rise of modern conscription, as both concepts were carried through the 19th century via a series of revolutions, institutional transformations, and a pronounced re-evaluation of what – in light of divine right's collapse – was required of a citizen. By the middle of the 19th century, the nationalist revolutionary wave that had first consumed France had metastasised, engulfing Western Europe in a series of political upheavals and outright conflicts.

The 1848 Revolutionary Wars later came to be known as the Spring of Nations (to denote the explosion of modern nation states that were forged in its wake). These conflicts were borne largely of multiple flashpoints of democratic and liberal revolutionary movements across the continent that were spirited by nationalist ideology.[189] From France's decisive abolition of the constitutional monarchy, to the toppling of serfdom in the Hapsburg Empire, to the Netherlands' adoption of an early form of representative democracy, popular liberal revolutions stripped the European kings and queens of compliant subjects. Instead, they called themselves citizens and coalesced around new mechanisms for collective governance, from secular autocracy with required civic service, to the novel concept of the national soldier.

The spark of *aliyah* in Imperial Russia and modern Zionism in Europe: In 1879, in the aftermath of the Spring of Nations, strands of ethno-nationalism and popular revolt coalesced in Tsarist Russia. St. Petersburg-based *Narodnaia Volia* was an ethno-socialist insurgency looking to depose the monarchy, replacing it with a nationalist-socialist government focussed upon the rights of the peasantry.[190] Embracing terrorism and violence to accomplish their goals, the crowning achievement of the revolutionary movement was the assassination of Tsar Alexander II. Although the assassination failed to topple the monarchy entirely, Russian civic life was sufficiently agitated as a result, and street violence soon erupted against the insurgents. Amid rumours of foreign agents within *Narodnaia Volia's* ranks, the counter-revolutionary purges rapidly mutated into anti-Semitic riots.

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[184] Mjoset & Van Holde, 2002, 9
[185] Perri, 2013
[186] Ibid.
[187] Rothenberg, 1977, 134
[188] Mjoset & Van Holde, 2002, 34-36
[189] Sperber, 1994
[190] Bushkovitch, 2012, 277-279

Principally carried out in Kiev and Warsaw, the centre of the Pale of Settlement,[191] the pogroms were used as revenge against the Jews, who were alleged to be sympathetic to the revolution and sheltering remnants of *Narodnaia Volia* in their communities.[192] Seeking stability and a return to order, the new Tsar Nicholas II actively encouraged the pogroms, calculating that an airing of grievances against an ethnic minority by the peasantry was preferable to further unrest against the royal family.[193] This exposed a predicament for the Jewish communities in post-feudal Russia – either assimilate into the new nation state or face alienation, expulsion or the violent chagrin of the often-agitated ethnic majority. For the immediate survival of the tsar, the tactic worked. The Jews fled during the purge of 1881-1884 and the ideological bulwark against the socialists continued to hold until the February Revolution in 1917. As the pogroms spread across Imperial Russia, a wave of Jewish refugees – approximately 25,000 in total[194] – fled southward from the Pale, mostly for the Ottoman *sanjaks* (districts) of Greater Syria and Palestine. This unprecedented collective movement of refugees came to be known as the First *Aliyah* – the first in a series of Jewish migration waves that triggered a chain of events that would eventually culminate in the creation of the Israeli nation state in 1948.

Simultaneously, another people's history was already being written in the Holy Land. The indigenous Palestinian Arabs had suffered neglect and a near total lack of political representation under the late Ottoman Empire. By the mid 18th century, anti-colonialist Palestinian fervour had manifested into fully fledged political autonomy in the region's north. Dhaher al-'Umar (1689-1775) emerged as a heroic figure of proto Palestinian nationalism, seizing control of the northern Palestinian city of Acre from the Ottomans in a series of mid 18th century skirmishes. Masalha (2018) regards al-'Umar's annexation of the city and its surroundings as "the closest Palestine got to early modern independent statehood".[195] At the height of his power, al-'Umar's domain was recognised as an independent emirate within the Ottoman Empire, ushering in a new era for Palestine and the wider region.[196]

For the Jews of the First *Aliyah*, their arrival in the Holy Land came a half century after al-Umar's death and the fall of the nascent Palestinian emirate. Their arrival occurred alongside the continued decline of the Ottoman Empire, with the future of indigenous Arabs more uncertain than ever.[197] As the First *Aliyah* arrived, they integrated with existing small Palestinian Jewish communities, which mostly consisted of Yemeni, Sephardic and Eastern European Jews. Distinguished as the New *Yishuv* (settlement), the Jews of the First *Aliyah* marked a distinct demographic shift from the pre-existing Jewish population, or Old *Yishuv*, of Ottoman Palestine.[198]

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[191] From 1791 to 1917, the permanent residence of Jews in Imperial Russia restricted to a specific western zone of the empire, known historically as The Pale of Settlement.
[192] Smith, 2010, 28
[193] Berk, 1985, 54-55
[194] Smith, 2010, 29
[195] Masalha, 2018, 227
[196] Ibid., 234
[197] Ibid., 242-245
[198] Shapira, 2012, 30

By 1882, an Ottoman census indicated that over 9,000 Jews lived in Jerusalem,[199] with the majority residing in and around the Old City. As outlying communities developed to cope with the growing population, the newly arrived *Yishuv* trickled down from the arid plains of Syria, or disembarked at the port of Jaffa, and moved to the north and west of the Jerusalem foothills. It was here, on the roughly 100-kilometre stretch of territory from the Temple Mount to Jaffa port, that an archipelago of Jewish villages and farms (*moshavot*) emerged between Jerusalem's Old City and the western shore of the Mediterranean.[200]

While the mountainous region of Jerusalem was the most densely populated area of Ottoman Palestine, the marsh-sodden, malaria-infested countryside and coastal plains saw Jewish agricultural expansion during the 19th century. The Ottoman's division of Palestine into separate *sanjaks* made the commercial hub of Jerusalem and the port city of Jaffa both relatively secure and prosperous, whereas the surrounding geography of Palestine was devoid of proper Ottoman administration – and this included a lack of adequate security. By the end of the 19th century, the interzone between the major towns of Palestine was a veritable wild west for those who dared to establish settlements and farms within it.[201] Despite Ottoman law forbidding the entry of Jews into Palestine,[202] those who managed to slip through paid bribes, avoided the authorities and began construction on *moshavots* in both the Jerusalem and Galilee basins. They did not know it at the time, but the *Yishuv* of the First *Aliyah* had triggered an ideological and pragmatic milestone on the road to Jewish statehood.

Theodor Herzl and modern Zionism: Historically parallel to the increased migration of Jews to Palestine was the emergence of Jewish nationalist thought in 19th century Europe. The founder of modern Zionism was the Austro-Hungarian intellectual Theodor Herzl, who articulated the movement's principles in a range of public lectures and written works, delivering Zionism's most famous pre-state proclamations into the mainstream via the World Zionist Organisation (WZO). While Herzl came to embody the ideological movement to resettle the world's Jews into an independent ethno-state, Avineri (2014) points out that "[Herzl] was preceded, most notably, by the socialist Moses Hess in his work *Rome and Jerusalem* (1862) and by the Russian intellectual and physician Leo Pinsker in his *Auto-Emancipation* (1882)." However, Avineri concedes that "Herzl's proactive motivation was crucial in creating the institutional and organizational structure which helped to bring the idea of a Jewish state to the attention of world leaders and international public opinion."[203] In particular, Hess reflected the emerging nationalist rationale, which Herzl would later adopt in his speeches and writing. Hess was pivotal in asserting that the Jewish people were equally deserving of statehood, likening the European absence of a Jewish nation in an era of proliferating ethno-states as "an orchestra that could not play in harmony as long as one instrument – the Jewish nation – was missing".[204]

[199] Kark and Oren-Nordheim, 2001, 28
[200] Smith, 2010, 19-23, Van Creveld, 2002, 7
[201] Shapira, 2012, 33-42
[202] Ibid., 36
[203] Avineri, 2014, xix
[204] Shapira, 2012, 14

Interestingly, the father of modern Zionism was relatively unaware of the wider Jewish independence movement prior to his late twenties. Smith (2010) relates that, for much of his youth, Herzl "was unfamiliar with the strands of Zionist thought and the activity current in Eastern Europe".[205] Born in 1860, just a decade after the Spring of Nations, Herzl was a product of the seismic cultural and political shifts that had transformed his birth country of Hungary into the dual monarchy of Austro-Hungary, following the 1867 Compromise Agreement. A journalist from an assimilated liberal Jewish family, Herzl was ideologically triggered into voicing demands for Jewish statehood in the wake of his reportage on rising European anti-Semitism, particularly in France where he spent years as a correspondent.[206]

Herzl quickly established himself as an intellectual foil to the real-world arrival of Jews in the First and Second *Aliyahs* in Ottoman Palestine, with his seminal 1896 publication *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State). The work amalgamated the discordant intellectual calls for radical alternatives to Jewish assimilation in Europe into a central, clear thesis statement that summarily advocated for Jewish statehood. A treatise of Herzl's Zionist vision, *Der Judenstaat* outlined the necessity for a Jewish state as a permanent solution to anti-Semitism as experienced by the Diaspora Jew, rationalized in part by the modernist notion that the Jews were indeed a distinct nationality, living as guests within other nation states and without a sovereign territory to inhabit and call their own.[207]

Herzl's role in the establishment of a clarified Jewish national project was pivotal and historically far-reaching. His formation of the First Zionist Congress in 1897 became the birthplace of the WZO, a lightning rod for Zionists and wealthy international benefactors who, along with Herzl, advocated for the Jewish colonisation of Ottoman Palestine: *Eretz Yisrael.*[208] The WZO's primary goal was explicit, demanding that "the creation of a home for the Jewish people in Palestine be secured by public law",[209] even in the face of almost certain Ottoman opposition and demographically minimal Jewish presence in Palestine. Herzl prioritised international advocacy and diplomacy over use of force in his attempt to realise a Jewish state, a position that would lead to tension with the New *Yishuv* in Palestine in the early 20th century.

Writing in his own Zionist weekly newspaper *Die Welt* in 1898, Herzl argued that deliberate Jewish migration to Ottoman Palestine was perfectly legitimate, likening it to the practise of colonial expansion by the British and German empires in the context of the 19th century. Herzl wrote, "Don't you know what a colonial age we are living in? . . . Many nations are endeavouring to found overseas colonies in order to channel the flow of emigration there." Herzl saw little distinction between an established national colony and an independent state. "What is a state? A big colony. What is a colony? A small state. Mankind seems never to have seen anything terrible in that," he wrote.[210] In this statement, Herzl preceded the modernist and constructivist notions of nationalism and statehood that would later be expressed in Gellner, seeing them not as ordained, naturally occurring phenomenon, but as manufactured expressions of independent self-governance by newly enlightened ethnic communities.

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[205] Smith, 2010, 30
[206] Ibid.
[207] Herzl translated by D'Avigdor, 1988, 6
[208] The traditional Jewish declaration of their homeland in Palestine. See Smith, 2010, 31-33
[209] Ibid.
[210] Herzl, *Zionist Writings: Essays and Addresses,* vol. 1 January 1896-June 1898, trans. Harry Zohn (New York 1973), 211-15

In 1898, Herzl along with a delegation of the WZO, made the gruelling journey to Ottoman Palestine from Vienna, connecting the key actors of political Zionist thought with the real-world experience of the First *Aliyah* for the first time. Disembarking from Jaffa port following passage from Alexandria, Herzl was overwhelmed on his arrival, and would later write in his diary:

> *"At night and in the morning the sea was wonderfully still and shimmered in its multi-coloured luminosity. When it grew light, we began to see the Jewish coast … We approached the land of our fathers with mixed feelings. Strange what emotions this desolate country stirs up in most people: in the old German pastor from South Africa, in the Russian muzhik in the foul-smelling steerage, in the Arabs who had been traveling with us from Constantinople, in us … [the] Zionists."*[211]

While he only stayed ten days in Ottoman Palestine, Herzl's journal reveals a turbulent emotional experience that exceeded his expectations that had been idealistically laid out in *Der Judenstaat.* From Jaffa, he visited the surrounding *moshavots*, where he was moved to tears after being welcomed in traditional Hebrew,[212] before making his way to Jerusalem. In surveying the first settlements of the new *Yishuv*, Herzl was astonished at the progress of Jewish agricultural development since the 1880s. The result was a distinctly cosmopolitan Jewish society and culture that had flourished within the openly hostile Ottoman Empire and the surrounding Arab communities in barely two decades.[213] So buoyed were his spirits during his expedition that his diary indicated a radical shift of thinking on the question of a Jewish state. For Herzl, his trip to Palestine moved *Der Judenstaat* from an aspirational political pamphlet to a practical inevitability – a historical event that he hoped he might see in his lifetime. "Such great results . . . with such meagre means," he later wrote. [214]

Herzl's relationship with the eventual militarisation of the Jewish population in Palestine was notably ambivalent. On the one hand, he prioritised diplomacy and political lobbying over any use of force. The strategy was partly practical, as the WZO solicited international funding from wealthy benefactors who were skittish at the notion of bankrolling an armed insurgency within an established empire.[215] Van Creveld hypothesises that Herzl probably envisioned a neutral Jewish state emerging in the style of modern Switzerland,[216] i.e. carved from negotiation and international relations, albeit a state that would eventually maintain a military of its own to ensure "internal and external order". On the other hand, Herzl publicly and privately fantasised about the creation of a Jewish military and the effect it would have on the pride and national character of the eventual Zionist state.[217]

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[211] Herzl in Avineri, 2014, 2
[212] Avineri, 2014, 15
[213] Ibid., 14-16
[214] Ibid., 16
[215] Baron Von Rothschild in particular was resistant to the efforts of the WZO, as he was uncomfortable with the optics of forced statehood in Palestine. For more, see Avineri (2014).
[216] Van Creveld, 2002, 11
[217] Ibid.

Herzl and the WZO delegation left Ottoman Palestine disappointed, as their audience with the Kaiser Wilhelm in Jerusalem had failed to negotiate a Jewish homeland within the existing Ottoman Empire.[218] On their return to Europe, they concluded that the Jewish state's creation would be expedited by expanding and financially securing the disparate agricultural Jewish settlements in and around Jerusalem, irrespective of the Ottoman status quo. However, not all the newly arrived *Yishuv* farmed the landscape. There were also those who would coalesce around Jaffa Port, where Sephardic Jews had been living alongside Palestinian Arabs since the early 18th century.[219] These urban communities would eventually grow and expand outward, founding their own outlying quarters to cope with the growing population. The first such neighbourhood was Neve Tzedek – founded by Aharon Chelouche in 1887 – which lay north of Jaffa Harbour. Neve Tzedek's sleepy, pastel lined streets would ultimately metastasise into the city of Tel Aviv, now Israel's skyscraper laden commercial capital and principal field site of *Man Made*.

The Bilu Movement and the first Jewish defence initiatives: Despite Herzl's enthusiasm, the period of increased Jewish migration and agricultural expansion that preceded his 1898 expedition was largely bleak and full of hardship.[220] The coastal plains and central Ottoman Palestine were a difficult and unforgiving environment, with bandits harassing the farmers, as well as frequent skirmishes occurring with neighbouring Arab communities as they fought to monopolise the wild landscape of their mutual ancestors. In the earliest years of *aliyah*, one of the New *Yishuv* was Russian migrant Vladimir Dubnow.

Having fled the pogroms of 1881, Dubnow arrived in Ottoman Palestine in July of 1882 as part of the Bilu Pioneers – an agricultural Zionist movement of the First *Aliyah*. Initially resting at the French-funded boarding village and farming school *Mikveh Israel* (Hope of Israel), Dubnow embodied the phenomenon of the proto-Zionist sentiment. Over a decade before *Der Judenstaat,* the Bilu movement envisioned a Jewish homeland in Palestine, a new ethno-religious state that would be founded on the back of agricultural prosperity that was the sole product of Jewish labour.

While stationed at *Mikveh Israel*, Dubnow wrote impassioned letters to his sceptical brother Simon Dubnow, who would later become an eminent philosopher, Jewish historian and ultimately a Holocaust victim. In a revealing exchange, Dubnow outlined to his ambivalent brother in St. Petersburg his sincere advocacy for the emergent *aliyah* movement. "Do you really think that my sole motivation in coming here is to better myself?" he wrote. "No. My aim, like that of many others . . . [is to] eventually gain control of Palestine, and to restore to the Jewish people the political independence of which it has been deprived for two thousand years."[221]

While this ethno-nationalist sentiment was nothing out of the ordinary for the Bilu movement and the later Jews of the First *Aliyah* and the WZO, it is a minor detail in Vladimir's letter that alludes to a missing ingredient that would later come to define the modern Jewish state, and the struggle for independence in the early 20th century: armament in order to guarantee survival. "In addition," Vladimir writes to Simon, "it is necessary to instruct young people and the future generation in the use of firearms . . . and then the Jews will proclaim . . . with arms in their hands, that they are the masters of their ancient homeland."[222]

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[218] Avineri, 2014, 24-25
[219] Smith, 2010, 15
[220] Ibid., 19-26
[221] Gilbert, 2014, 5-6
[222] Ibid.

The nascent militarisation of the Bilu pioneers was by no means an over-reaction – Dubnow had seen the anti-Semitic violence and pogroms that followed the assassination of the tsar in 1881. Vladimir eventually heeded the advice of his brother, and like many other Bilu pioneers and Jews of the First *Aliyah*, he would eventually abandon Ottoman Palestine and return to Russia.[223] Nevertheless, his call to arms for the Jewish community was a novel *Yishuv* reaction within the ranks of the early migrants. While Vladimir left his dream of a Jewish homeland in Ottoman Palestine, his sentiment was shared by the handful of determined Bilu settlers who remained and continued construction on the early *moshavots*, purchasing land through Ottoman bureaucratic loopholes and bribes[224] and rooting their budding community in Palestine. By the time Herzl arrived in Jaffa, they had proliferated throughout Palestine, but were still yet to arm themselves in any coordinated manner.

The Second Aliyah and Jewish militarisation in Ottoman Palestine: As fate would have it, Herzl would not live to see his vision for Jewish statehood become a reality. In 1904, just outside of Vienna, he died in his mid-forties of a fatal heart condition. Until he became bedridden, Herzl had continued to engage in diplomacy, Zionist advocacy and negotiation with a combination of the European powers, the Ottoman Empire and even the Vatican.[225] Although Herzl's mind was set on a Jewish state in Ottoman Palestine, by the turn of the century, the WZO had hedged its territorial bets by floating alternative sites in Argentina and Uganda. Despite their efforts, no real headway had been made on the path to Jewish statehood other than the establishment of Zionism's political legitimacy through publication, advocacy and political lobbying. Nevertheless, as the 20th century began, Europe and Russia continued to haemorrhage Jewish migrants – and of course, many set sail for Ottoman Palestine.

At the close of the 19th century, the *Yishuv* of the First *Aliyah* were planted firmly in the soil of the Holy Land, with over thirty established *moshavots* and an agrarian population of over 5,000.[226] In the lead up to World War I, the Second *Aliyah* would bring an additional 40,000 Jews to the farms, settlements and urban Jewish communities in Jerusalem, Jaffa and Tiberias.[227] The Second *Aliyah* (1904-1919) saw a marked shift in the evolution of the new *Yishuv* from that of a fleeing mass of ethnic peoples to an ancestral homeland, to a purposeful migration linked to a modern nationalist political movement.

As the *moshavots* expanded and the Jewish population of Palestine grew, tensions between the existing Arab communities and the new *Yishuv* continued to rise. As a result, the farmers of the First and Second *Aliyah* would evolve into the earliest organised Jewish defence groups, an event of such significance that it continues – in part – to influence the Jewish nationalist project today. As disputes over water, land and borders began to increase tensions amongst the Jewish farmers and their Palestinian Arab neighbours, it was in 1908 that a secret, armed Jewish vigilante group was formed. Named after Simon Bar Giora, who in 70 AD led the Jewish rebellion against the Romans, Bar-Giora consisted of a handful of *Poalei Zion* (Marxist Zionists) who touted themselves as literal guns for hire in the defence of Jewish farms and communities from banditry, as well as the mounting of needless assaults on Palestinian Arabs, often framed as tit-for-tat retribution.[228]

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[223] Shapira, 2012, 32
[224] Ibid., 36
[225] Avineri, 2014, 257-259
[226] Shapira, 2012, 42
[227] Gilbert, 2014, 21
[228] Van Creveld, 2002, 10-15

Cultish in initiation and ritualistic ceremonies, Bar-Giora's founding members were – like those of the Bilu movement who partially filled its ranks – direct products of the Russian pogroms, having experienced extreme violence and anti-Semitism against their community before they even arrived in Palestine during the First *Aliyah*.[229] Aside from their Jewish security doctrine, Bar-Giora ideologically sought to transform the gendered European stereotype of the Diaspora Jew.[230] Modelling themselves on hyper-masculine Circassian soldiers,[231] they were enamoured with the Jewish warriors of antiquity and saw the formation of Bar-Giora as a direct challenge to the 19th century image of the weak, parasitic and effeminate Diaspora Jew that was stereotypical in Europe and Russia.

Orna Sasson-Levy (2015), who has written extensively on the cultural and historical origins of Israeli masculinity and its connection to military service, writes that "the foundation of the relationship between the army and masculinity in Israel lies in the Zionist movement, which drew, from its inception, a strong connection between its national goals and masculine ideals. . . Zionist thought, which sought to rid itself of the weak, feminine figure of the Diaspora Jew, emphasised the view that the 'new Jew' must be physically strong, with a powerful masculine physique, ready to defend his honour in battle."[232] The origins of this critical masculine renaissance in Jewish nationalist thought is alluded to by multiple participants in *Man Made* and is focal point of *The Soldier and The Swede's* written analysis.

The interwar period, the Haganah and British Palestine: Although the Ottoman royal family formally surrendered on October 30, 1918, the sultan had lost Palestine to the Allied forces the year before. The success of the 1917 Sinai and Palestine Campaign saw British and French military planners carve up Greater Ottoman Syria into a series of administrative divisions – an interim plan called the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA). Alongside this, political Zionists scored a major victory with the 1917 Balfour Declaration, a publicly declared policy commitment from the British Empire to facilitate an eventual homeland for the Jews in Ottoman Palestine. As British forces occupied the territorial void left by the Ottomans, the bulk of modern day Israel and Palestine was designated as OETA South, and this in turn became the basis for British Mandate Palestine, an administration that would remain in effect from 1923 until the declaration of the state of Israel in 1948.

At the time of the British Mandate's ratification, there were over 34,000 Jews in Jerusalem.[233] The argument for independent statehood had accelerated after World War I, with the ever-increasing Jewish population in Palestine evolving its own culture and unique status as the epicentre of modern Zionism in the Holy Land. As Shapira notes, "In the thirty years between the First Aliyah and World War I, there appeared in Palestine not only the seed of modern Jewish settlement but also the embryo of a national culture. This culture was characterized by a secular Jewish identity, a shift to Hebrew as the spoken language, and a demand for independence from Diaspora cultures."[234] Alongside this, the nascent Jewish defence movement continued to grow, taking on an even more militarised posture in the first years of British control.

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[229] Ibid.
[230] See Mosse (1996), Yefet (2015) and Yosef (2004).
[231] Van Creveld, 2002, 11
[232] Sasson-Levy, 2015, 466
[233] Kark and Oren-Nordheim, 2001, 147
[234] Shapira, 2012, 54

The three-pronged paradigm shift of the Great War, the Ottoman collapse, and the 1917 Balfour Declaration energised Jewish nationalists both inside and outside of the British Mandate.[235] Meanwhile, *Bar-Giora* continued to evolve and expand, transforming into *Hashomer* (The Watchmen) in 1909. The *Haganah* (Defence) emerged in 1921 as a somewhat unified, sophisticated paramilitary response to increasing conflicts with Palestinian Arabs, as well as a response to lax Jewish security under the British occupation. A series of Arab attacks on Jewish settlements inspired the new *Yishuv* to form a coherent, singular security force that would represent the entire Jewish community within Palestine, as opposed to separate *moshavots*, villages and urban Jewish neighbourhoods.[236]

At the close of the 1920s, the *Haganah* consisted of over 3,000 active members, although only half of those were likely armed.[237] The Arab Revolt of 1929 was the first serious test of the *Haganah's* abilities. When riots against Jews erupted across the mandate from Jerusalem to Haifa and Tel Aviv, British security forces were overstretched in their efforts to maintain law and order. The result was successful defence and counter-attack where the *Haganah* positioned themselves throughout the mandate. Conversely, in places where the *Haganah* were absent, an inadequate British response resulted in dozens of Jewish deaths. The security failure of the administration in key Jewish communities contrasted sharply with the coordinated defence of the *Haganah*, launching their domestic and international reputation as a prepared, serious paramilitary that further revealed the mobilisation and self-determination of Jews chafing within an increasingly unstable British Palestine.[238]

Throughout the 1930s and the early 1940s, the militarisation of the Palestinian Jewish community continued to expand, evolve, and split on various lines of ideological difference and strategy. Further escalations of violence between Jews and Palestinian Arabs led to cyclical tit-for-tat confrontations, radicalising elements of the paramilitaries on both sides. The most prominent of these ruptures gave rise to the *Irgun*, a distinct offshoot of the *Haganah* that resorted to terrorism and the targeted killings of Arab civilians and British forces as a means of driving the Zionist colonial project toward forceful takeover via eventual British and Arab capitulation.

In the lead up to World War II, *Irgun* combatted the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 with heavy-handed revenge tactics, as well as coordinated a terrorist insurgency against their British benefactors for most of the inter-war period.[239] The distinct split of *Irgun* from the *Haganah* would have a dramatic impact on the eventual formation of the IDF, with offshoots of *Irgun* embracing even more extreme insurgency tactics throughout the 1940s, leading to massacres, bombings and targeted killings. As the prospect of statehood crept closer, the collective Jewish armed forces became increasingly synonymous with the political Zionist movement that had continued beyond Herzl's death in 1904. As their objectives began to overlap, it became harder to distinguish the various factions, offshoots and variances within the greater Jewish defence movement.

[235] Van Creveld, 2002, 19
[236] Ibid., 23
[237] Ibid., 24
[238] Ibid., 26-33
[239] Ibid.

During the Arab Revolt in particular, *Irgun* was emblematic of the ideological schism that had begun to appear within both political Zionism and the various Jewish militias operating within the mandate. The military arm of Revisionist Zionism, *Irgun* was a modification of both the WZO ideology and the diplomatically focussed plan for Jewish statehood as outlined in *Der Judenstaat* and propagated by the *Haganah.* Commanded by the Odessa-born intellectual Ze'ev Jabotinsky, *Irgun* was politically advocated by Jabotinsky's own *Beitar* movement, which sidestepped the WZO's wider international diplomacy efforts and engaged in direct negotiations with the British, amidst ongoing attacks by the Arab and Jewish populations of the mandate.[240]

Irgun's embrace of terrorism throughout the 1930s was the result of what Smith describes as the Revisionist Zionist perception that the British were unwilling partners with the Jewish nationalist movement,[241] and thus violent resistance in Palestine should be the driving force of expedited Jewish statehood. This ideology led the *Irgun* to carry out a series of attacks on both British security forces and Arab civilians in the mandate during the Arab Revolt. However, as World War II broke out, Jabotinsky de-escalated *Irgun's* campaign of violence and resolved instead to assist the British in the war effort against the Nazis.[242] Ironically, this spurred radical elements of *Irgun* to split from Jabotinsky and begin a violent insurgency against the British forces and Arab population. The new faction became *Lohamei Herut Israel* (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel - LEHI), also known as the Stern Gang, which rose to prominence in 1940 and became responsible for some of the worst atrocities against British forces and Arab civilians throughout World War II and beyond. Footage of attacks carried out by LEHI and *Irgun* are present in the musical montage in *Man Made*'s introduction.

As a result of the Balfour Declaration, the British administration in Palestine had laid out its policy for Jewish statehood even before the mandate's creation, and so they found themselves toeing an ever-narrowing line of mediation between the Jews and Palestinian Arabs as the years crept on. While the Balfour Declaration asserted the eventual creation of a Jewish nation in Palestine, the escalating violence and riots of the 1920s and 1930s led to significant revisions and postponements of any resolution, partition or British disengagement from the region. At the end of the 1930s, British resistance to the expedited establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine peaked with the policy statement known as the White Paper of 1939. Written as a containment strategy following the Arab Revolt, the white paper throttled Jewish immigration to Palestine for the first time since the mandate's establishment and delayed the Balfour Declaration's promise of an independent Jewish state for another decade. Furthermore, the paper froze the Jewish acquisition of Arab lands, enraging the New *Yishuv*.[243]

[240] Van Creveld, 2002, 53-54
[241] Smith, 2010, 117
[242] Ibid., 174
[243] Smith, 2010, 161-163

Aliyah Bet and the United Front of Revolt: Rather than contain the growing crisis that befell the British administration, the White Paper of 1939 emboldened Jewish resistance. World War II only further exacerbated tensions, especially as news of the systematic Jewish extermination at the hands of Nazi Germany began to leak out of Western Europe. As refugees fled the continent en masse, *Yishuv* leaders facilitated the illegal passage of over 100,000 European Jews between 1939 and 1944, well over the allocated 75,000-person five-year cap that had been established in the White Paper.[244] Known as *Aliyah Bet*, this extraordinary human smuggling operation was the last of the pre-state Jewish migration waves that had begun nearly 70 years prior with the expulsion of many Jews from Tsarist Russia in the early 1880s.

Orchestrated in part by the *Haganah, Irgun* and other defence groups, and in spite of the British security forces intercepting multiple refugee vessels and interning those they managed to capture, the surge of Jewish arrivals into the British Mandate throughout the war led to a dramatic acceleration of hostilities between Jews and Palestinian Arabs. As deaths at sea and the arrest of the refugees and smugglers mounted, Jewish resentment grew. Ultimately, terrorist activities conducted by the various *Haganah* offshoots, including the Stern Gang, would define the last years of the New *Yishuv's* relationship with the British administration as one of acrimony, suspicion and extreme violence. While *Irgun* and the *Haganah* initially directed their combined forces to reduce violence against the British and to coordinate with them during World War II, by the middle of 1945 the relationship between the Zionists and the administration had deteriorated significantly. The Holocaust now in full view and the war in its final stages, the continued British interception of Jewish refugees through 1945 incensed the Zionists,[245] and just two months after the Nazis surrendered, *Haganah*, *Irgun* and the Stern Gang coordinated to create the United Front of Revolt (UFR). The UFR rescinded all prior calls for de-escalation and kicked off a full-blown insurgency against the Arab and British forces in Palestine in the wake of World War II.[246]

The UFR's formation also saw a blurring between the likes of the more moderate *Haganah* and the extremist elements of *Irgun* and Stern Gang for the first time.[247] Van Creveld writes that "[the paramilitaries] worked so closely together as to be virtually indistinguishable . . . whatever *Haganah's* intentions, many of its operations resulted in British [and] Arab casualties."[248] These combined Jewish defence forces now worked under a unified banner, forming the structural precursor to the modern IDF in the final years of the British Mandate.

The *Haganah* and the first mass Jewish conscription: Nevertheless, the British would not capitulate without a fight, mounting a formidable counter-insurgency from 1945 to 1948. They declared a state of emergency in the region, initiating curfews, mass arrests and establishing checkpoints throughout Palestine in an effort to stop the flow of weapons, intelligence and manpower between the UFR forces.[249] By 1946, the sporadic insurgent skirmishes that characterised the last five years of conflict had intensified into a daily two-front war against both the British and Arab forces. Since its creation in 1921, the *Haganah's* manpower relied on steadily rising membership as more migrant Jews arrived, but it was during the height of the refugee crisis in the wake of World War II that the Zionists began to implement their earliest form of mass military conscription. As the British intercepted ships with Jewish refugees in the Mediterranean, the island of Cyprus was the main site of captivity for the tens of thousands that were detained.

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[244] See Section II. Immigration of 1939 White Paper. Yale Weblink: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/brwh1939.asp
[245] Smith, 2010, 186
[246] Van Creveld, 2002, 55-57
[247] Smith, 2010, 196
[248] Ibid.
[249] Van Creveld, 2002, 58-62

Within these internment camps, the refugees sat in limbo as they awaited processing, presenting an extraordinary opportunity for the *Haganah* to boost their manpower. Gilbert (2014) writes:

> *"There were 50,000 Jews being held behind barbed wire in the British detention camps in Cyprus. All of them had been caught while trying to enter Palestine by ship, and had been detained. Many of them were able-bodied; some had previous experience of fighting in the Second World War. The Haganah was desperate to train as many as possible for service in Palestine as soon as the British would let them leave. On March 20 the first course was started on the island for weapons instructors. Seventy mock rifles, made out of wood, and wooden grenades, were the principal weapons. The Hebrew language was taught as part of the weapons drill."* [250]

Archival newspapers of the period[251] and Van Creveld corroborate Gilbert's account, which describes initial attempts at an organised *Haganah* conscription toward the end of 1947, with a *Haganah* decree published on November 28 of that year demanding military registration of all available Jewish men and women in the mandate, resulting in nearly 50,000 enlistments on top of the approximately 7,000-10,000 refugee conscripts already processed in Cyprus.[252] The unusual practise of forcing basic military training on the interned Jewish refugees preceded the 1949 Law of Conscription in Israel by three years, priming the Zionist edict that the right to live in any future Jewish nation would require military service for all of its citizens, and that the armed forces of *Eretz Israel* would be intimately connected to civilian life. The military training in Cyprus is of particular significance as it included an explicit linguistic assimilation strategy.

Throughout the basic training of the new conscripts, all instructions were delivered in Hebrew – militarily homogenising the disparate refugees who came from all over the European continent. The revival of the Hebrew language and its implementation as the national language of Israel was an important feature of the early cultural development of the state, as it historically functioned as a communicative bridge between the old and new *Yishuv* in the decades prior to statehood.[253]

On November 30, 1947, the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine was adopted under General Assembly Resolution 181 (II). Almost immediately afterward, an outright civil war erupted, with Jewish and Arab communities openly attacking each other as the British tried to maintain control and security of the mandate. Amid escalating violence, in February 1948, the British finally capitulated by enacting a policy of restraint and conflict avoidance,[254] citing domestic pressure and war-weariness – effectively leaving the Jews and the Palestinian Arabs alone to fight in the increasingly destructive civil war.

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[250] Gilbert, 2014, 164-165
[251] Analysed firsthand at the Moshe Dayan Centre.
[252] Van Creveld, 2002, 66
[253] Berdichevsky, 2014
[254] Smith, 2010, 208

At the time of British disengagement, there were over 600,000 Jews living within in the mandate,[255] and by the end of 1948, the combined forces of the UFR (now the IDF) exceeded 200,000 personnel.[256] The sheer size and organisational tactics were devastating for the Arab population of Palestine throughout 1948, with Jaffa, Haifa, Tiberias and Safed all falling IDF forces as they advanced. The sight of fleeing Arab civilians from major towns and villages became a common scene on the main thoroughfares of Palestine, as the IDF secured territory after territory.[257]

The IDF rapidly took control of the Jewish share of the two-state 1947 United Nations Partition Plan (see below), with the Jewish state expanding north of Tel Aviv through the coastline of the Mediterranean, before veering east through Nazareth and onward to the Sea of Galilee. In the south, boxed in by the Arab-designated Gaza coast and the West Bank, Jewish territory narrowly extended through the Negev desert to Beer Sheba, before blossoming outward all the way to the Egyptian border and Red Sea in the south, and Transjordan and the Dead Sea to the east.

The concurrent birth of Israel & the IDF: On the day that the British Mandate was scheduled to expire, it was underneath an enormous portrait of Theodor Herzl on May 14, 1948 that acting president of the WZO, David Ben-Gurion, took the podium at Dizengoff House in Tel Aviv and declared the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel. Within days, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Iraq would declare war, and push into Jewish cross-country gains. The civil war had now widened into a multi-front international war and, two weeks later, the UFR was officially rebranded the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), and thus the Jewish state and its national military were born. Thrust immediately into an international conflict that the IDF would decisively win, the Palestinian Arabs would later call the IDF victory in the 1948 War of Independence the *Nakbah* (catastrophe).

Israel's ideological journey from an aspirational Zionist sentiment to its territorial reality in 1948 cannot be understood without two historical narratives: the formation of the New *Yishuv* in the late 19th century and its gradual evolution from agrarian Ottoman subjects to an armed nationalist movement under the British Mandate, and the development of modern political Zionism in Europe. The twin histories of Jewish self-defence in Palestine and the rise of political Zionism abroad were symbiotic and operated in tandem. In effect, theory and practice were evolving alongside one another.

The epicentre of these two distinct historical events was the Holy Land itself, which acted as an ideological magnet; the nationalist ideology of *Eretz Israel* inexorably brought the two together. The intertwining of Jewish self-defence in Palestine and political Zionism birthed the state of Israel, but not without significant consequences for the national consciousness and the character of the Jewish state. Cohen writes that the Jewish nation was "born into battle . . . Israel has ever since been almost continuously engaged in some form of violent military confrontation. War, indeed, has been central, as much to the formation of the collective identity of most Israelis as to their state's consolidation."[258]

[255] Rabinovich, 2008, 571-572
[256] Van Creveld, 2002, 66
[257] Image in Smith, 2010, 211
[258] Cohen, 2008, 8

The security of the Jewish people secured by the IDF became an essential component of nationalist consciousness, as well as a functional reflection of Israeli values and ethos. Cohen stresses that the paternal role the IDF has continued to play in Israeli society should not be underestimated, writing that:

> *"At the apex of the Israeli social structure, civilian and military elites over the years forged a close partnership . . . Still more extensively, a military ethos long pervaded other strata in the societal fabric. Quite apart from being invested with iconic status as the guardian of national survival, the IDF was widely projected as the corporate custodian of national values."*[259]

Addressing the *Knesset* (Israeli Parliament) in 1952, David Ben-Gurion alluded to the primary role of the IDF in the successful creation of a new Jewish nationalism: "I have been a Zionist all my life and I do not deny the existence of Israel, heaven forbid . . . but even the English nation was not always that nation . . . but was composed of different tribes. And only after a development of hundreds of years did they become one nation . . . We do not have hundreds of years, and without the instrument of the army . . . we will not soon be a nation . . . This requires a framework of duty . . . a framework of national discipline."[260] On July 5th, 1950, the *Knesset* signed the Law of Return – a statutory decree that permitted all Diaspora Jews of good character to enter Israel and be eligible for citizenship.[261] As a result, Jewish communities around the world had a priority pathway for citizenship. From its inception, most healthy non-orthodox adult beneficiaries of the Law of Return were required to enlist in the IDF as part of their citizenship requirements – serving alongside the New *Yishuv* citizens and *Sabras* who were descended from the First *Aliyah* in 1881.

Living history in Tel Aviv and Re'ut: The Israeli poet Nathan Alterman first arrived in Palestine in 1925. A teenager, he became a man during the worst of the violence between Palestinian Arabs and Jews in the British Mandate. In late 1947, on the very eve of Israeli statehood, the 37-year-old Alterman published a poem in the *Davar* newspaper: *Magásh Ha-késef* (The Silver Platter). In it, Alterman describes a young Jewish couple, dressed in combat fatigues, walking on a road amidst the ruins of the Jewish-Arab civil war, in the last months of British Mandate Palestine:

Dressed in battle gear, dirty, shoes heavy with grime, they ascend the path quietly
To change garb, to wipe their brow
They have not yet found time. Still bone weary from days and from nights in the field
Full of endless fatigue and unrested,

Yet the dew of their youth is still seen on their head
Thus, they stand at attention, giving no sign of life or death
Then a nation in tears and amazement
will ask: "Who are you?"

And they will answer quietly,
"We are the silver platter on which the Jewish state was given." [262]

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[259] Ibid., 14
[260] Knesset Protokol, August 19, 1952. Translated by Ben-Eliezer, 1995
[261] Smith, 2010, 225
[262] Alterman, 1978. Emphasis added.

Whenever I was in Tel Aviv, I felt a certain vertigo. The modern history of the country is as claustrophobic as the tiny nation itself. As a result, an inquisitive mind cannot help but feel affected by the proximity of such a tumultuous recent history on every street, town and city of the country. In Istanbul, it was different. There, history stretched back so many centuries that the past was like a perceptual horizon, always visible but at an enormous distance. The sight of the old Ottoman mosques, the decayed Roman walls that lined the Bosphorus, the millennia-old mosaics fading with quiet dignity in the *Hagia Sofia* – these were all reminders that Istanbul was built on veritable layers of human civilisation. Back in Tel Aviv, many of the streets I wandered at night had been uninhabited sand, swamp and dirt just a generation ago.

As a result, past and present often intertwined, and I often felt I was wandering in a museum of living history as opposed to a gallery of detached, long dead antiquity. My apartment was on the western end of Rothschild Boulevard, just three blocks from Dizengoff House, its bleached façade unchanged since David Ben-Gurion declared independence inside of it just 70 years ago, when my father was just 5 years old. The port of Jaffa, where I would stroll some evenings, still had remnants of the original docks on which Theodor Herzl disembarked during his sole visit to Palestine in 1898. The *Haganah* museum, built on the site of the paramilitary's secret headquarters, was also a short walk down Rothschild. The thoroughfares of Tel Aviv are often marked by historical plaques that rarely stretch further back than 1900.

Jogging on the promenade at Geula Beach, I once noticed a small sign on a non-descript wall. It stated in bleached lettering that it was here that *Irgun* troops gathered on the eve of their attack on Jaffa, during the civil war of 1948. I stood and imagined the scene, my mind wandering, while indifferent Israelis jogged past me. Even as a guest, as a gentile, the immediacy of history could seduce you, and as I drove through Re'ut with Eli in 2016, I could not help but imagine the sight of Bilu pioneers ascending the Jerusalem hills to the east, looking for clearings to establish new *moshavot* amongst the rocks and brush of Ottoman Palestine.

1.2 Masculinity and Military Service in Re'ut (Eli):

I viewed Re'ut through the prism of Israeli history, seeing it as emblematic of the interweaving narratives of Jewish self-defence and the establishment of independent Zionist statehood. Its troubled location on the frontlines of the Arab-Israeli conflict, its roads, houses and schools all developed as part of the continued militarisation project of *Eretz Israel.* Re'ut was a town that existed because of the IDF, which in turn existed because of the state of Israel – Ben Gurion's instrument creating a nation state in less than a generation. Re'ut also served as a potent reminder of the continued practise of Jewish settlements built on occupied land. Its design by the IDF also speaks to the unique Israeli intersection of civil society, urban planning and an integration of militarisation with everyday life. Re'ut encapsulated the distinct social and cultural growth of Israel since 1948: the Zionist quest for statehood was inherently buoyed by militancy and the occupation of disputed territories, and Re'ut was a contemporaneous example of these principles. As Eli grew up, Re'ut did, too. From streets "still made of sand"[263] in 1985, to the sprawling interconnected neighbourhoods that make up Maccabim-Re'ut municipality, Re'ut today is essentially a far-flung suburb of outer Tel Aviv. As we looked west towards the sunset from the hills of Re'ut, the suburbs seemed to stretch on and on, to the very edge of the Mediterranean Sea.

Eli was sensitive to Re'ut's unique origins and exclusive population from a young age. "There was this energy, I don't know how else to describe it," he told me. "Did you ever see *Dawn of the Dead*, the old Romero film? It was basically like that. People walking around in a daze, in their [IDF] uniforms, of course." Eli was alluding to his perception of extreme homogeneity in Re'ut's residential population, almost all of whom were from military backgrounds, giving the town a singular demographic composition. His perceptions ranged from the superficial, with the sight of a mostly uniformed neighbourhood vaguely unsettling, to more insidious observations that Eli saw as consequences of a purpose built military residential zone and its lifestyle. "I took a job in a video store, it was my first time working and earning money," he told me. "I was around 15 . . . it was a quiet job, like most of Re'ut it always felt sleepy – the only time people would come was the afternoons and early evenings . . . and it was almost always men . . . basically when they were coming off of the [military] base and going home to their wives, they'd swing by the video store." Eli recalled a particular instance while working in the rental shop that triggered his earliest first thoughts of conscientious objection. "I remember every Thursday night,[264] the officers would come into the store in uniform and rent two films each. They would always request the same thing, 'I want something violent for me and a romance for the wife.' This wouldn't have been a big deal if it didn't happen 100 times a week. I thought it was disgusting, and I started to count the times this would happen, to the point where I would have pairings of gory action films with light-hearted romance flicks ready at the front counter, so I wouldn't have to get up."

Eli qualified repeatedly that while this memory was his first real engagement with the possibility that he would reject conscription, he felt disgusted and fearful of guns and violence in his early childhood. "Growing up in this country, it's a cliché to say you always feel attacked, right? Growing up in Re'ut magnified that. Everyone was a soldier, and so I figured out pretty quickly as a kid that if a war ever broke out in Israel, my town would be one of the first to be destroyed. I used to sit in bed at night terrified of what would happen to my parents, to my family." It was only as a teenager that Eli began to connect the militarisation of Re'ut with the clear, gendered stereotypes of men and women that he found so alienating. "I had nothing in common with them" was a common refrain when he described growing up in school, life in Re'ut, and even Israel more generally.

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[263] *Man Made,* 0h:16m:00s
[264] The end of the Israeli work week, which runs Sunday to Thursday.

Above all, Eli was most disturbed by the apparent fascination with violence, aggression and tribalism that seemed requisite characteristics of men of Re'ut. In his own words, Eli felt more like "a woman than a traditional Israeli man", shunning violence and its glorification, and instead feeling emotionally sensitive and unable to envision himself harming others as a soldier or as a civilian. Furthermore, his distaste for violence and conflict were equally matched with his sense of alienation from his peers. "I was never part of 'the group', even as a kid. I don't know if it's the same for you [in Australia], but in Israel, you're taught from a young age to be a cog in a machine. There's none of this 'you are all special and unique' positive reinforcement that you see in schools on American TV. This was a big problem – I rejected group tasks, group sports, I was always punished in the corner for not participating. My parents still mention this when they reflect on my [conscientious] objection – my resistance started so young!" By his late teens, Eli knew he would never be conscripted in the IDF, and therefore he would never be a real man. "You were only a man if you were a soldier. You got off on violence, you were macho and that's all there was to you."

In her study of men's resistance to military service and hegemonic masculinity in Israel, Sasson-Levy (2015) writes, "The first signs of opposition emerge in early adolescence, when the perception of self diverges from the conventional masculine mould. The emotionally charged encounter with the military deepens this resistance, which is then reinforced by the decision not to serve, and ultimately leads to the construction of the present nonconformist identity."[265] This accurately mirrors the experiences of teenage Eli, who went on to define himself as a conscientious objector in Israel from adolescence. Interestingly, his teenage assertion of pacifism was an articulation of a sentiment that began in his infancy. Like childhood sexuality, Eli's pacifism was eventually armed with adult vocabulary and means of expression – but he felt that it had "always been there" – dormant, but intuitive, from a very young age.

Sasson-Levy focusses on the particular encounters that take place between young Israeli men and the IDF, and how this will likely shape their sense of masculine selves throughout their developmental years and early adulthood. She argues that Israeli teenagers cross a unique threshold as they near the age of conscription, having to choose social conformity to the wider ethos of Israeli citizenship, or – if they experience feelings of discomfort and consider objection – possible alienation, humiliation and social castration. Relative to other nation states with conscription, the proximity of actual war and conflict in Israel makes the responsibility of military service even more burdensome for adolescents awaiting their induction papers.

In what may seem counter-intuitive to conscientious objection that included both men and women, my discussions with Eli were almost always framed around the gendered question and, in his opinion, the perceived masculine value of conscription in Israel. His recollections largely drew on feelings of masculine inadequacy and perceived femininity by others. Furthermore, at least in a town like Re'ut, Eli noted a marked correlation between virile heterosexuality and military culture. This is surprisingly analogous to the experiences of my participants in Turkey, where military service is restricted to heterosexual, able-bodied men. Indeed, almost all my Istanbul participants exhibited feelings of emasculation and gendered "incompleteness" because of avoiding their military service, irrespective of their sexuality. At the outset of my research, I naively assumed that this was due to Turkey's exclusive conscription of men, but I was fascinated to discover similar inferiority complexes and insecurities in the male conscientious objectors I met in Tel Aviv.

[265] Sasson-Levy and Perez, 2015, 462

This leads to the somewhat broad question of how modes of masculinity interrelate in contemporary Turkey and Israel, despite their significant social, historical and cultural differences. While much of *Man Made* analyses and compares the particular attributes and social attitudes surrounding contemporary masculinity for men in Istanbul and Tel Aviv, the film does not explore any specific link between Turkish and Israeli masculinity, historic or otherwise. In my analysis of the historical nationalism, conscription and militarism that preceded the establishment of Turkey and Israel, it became difficult to ignore certain ancestral links between the two, particularly in light of both nations emerging as a consequence of the 20th century World Wars. Before analysing *The Three Sabras* further, it is necessary to describe the historical and theoretical foundation for my understanding of masculinity in the context of Israeli and Turkish society and the participants of *Man Made.*

Linking Israeli and Turkish masculinity: In their national establishment, both Turkey and Israel readily emulated then ascendant European nation states, their governing models and institutions – most notably Italy and Imperial Germany for Turkey, both of which heavily influenced Kemalist nation building and militarism in the early formation of the Turkish republic.[266] Clearly, the significant institutional crossover for both the Turkish and Israeli states is their mutual use of mass conscription, one of many civic tools typical of European nation states of the early 20th century. Considering this shared inspiration, it can be reasoned that other cultural aspects of European civic life, nationalism and militarism may have informed the construction of a homogeneous Turkish and Israeli national identity, including the gender role of masculinity.

Through the works of Mosse (1996), Conversi (2008) and Smith (1994), I contend that alongside 19th century nationalism and militarism – ideological concepts that heavily influenced both Turkish and Israeli intellectuals in their respective nation building projects – there are shared fundamental masculine ideals in both societies, which suggests a mutual historical origin for militarised (by which I mean homogeneous) masculinity in Turkey and Israel. When analysing the features of masculinity through the participants in *Man Made*, fundamental gendered attributes that are present in both field sites clearly emerge. As is described throughout the film by the participants, this is most evident in the comparable heteronormative expectations of men in Turkish and Israeli society: a man's earning potential, prospective marriage to a woman, his "completeness"[267] and the eventual fathering of children are all masculine milestones that are explicitly underpinned by the fulfillment of military service in both countries.

Obviously, the features of Turkish and Israeli masculinity and its cultural enforcement vary considerably. As has been outlined, gender focussed scholarly work on both nation states from Gul Altınay to Sasson-Levy reveal aspects of Turkish and Israeli masculinity that show them to be distinct from one another. While I do not suggest that Israeli and Turkish masculinity are contemporarily alike, I do contend that both state's enforcement of conscription draw from similar ideals of ethnic homogeneity and heteronormativity, resulting in an observable ideological crossover between the two.

Through the works described above, I have identified the 19th century European conscript as the historical masculine construct that appears to inform the basis for homogeneous Turkish and Israeli masculinity in the context of military service. Born out the distinct social conditions of revolutionary nationalism, militarism and the Industrial Age, the ideal of the European national conscript would persist through to the 20th century, consequently influencing the formation of Turkish and Israeli masculinity in its wake.

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[266] Hanioğlu, 2011, 187-188 & Smith, 1994
[267] As later described by David.

A brief history of masculinity: "From its very beginning, masculinity was regarded as of one piece: body and soul. Outward appearance and inward virtue were supposed to form one harmonious whole, a perfect construct where every part was in its place,"[268] writes Mosse, offering a typical binary description of masculinity that pervades his thesis in *The Image of Man* (1996). He argues that masculinity in Western cultural consciousness is composed of both physical and psychological parts ("outward and inward") that should be viewed as distinct, but innately symbiotic. Like in nationalist studies, the analysis of gender within the social sciences stresses the separation of the empirical world from elaborate psychological "imaginings"[269] of the self and others.

This somewhat mirrors the distinction within gender studies of masculinity as a subjective abstraction, as opposed to the physical sex of the individual. According to Kimmel (2000), whereas physical sex is biologically determined, masculinity is psychologically constructed – with its meanings, behaviours and functions varying from culture to culture and transforming over time, in both the individual and wider community. Kimmel and Aronson (2004) describe the malleable quality of cultural masculinity, noting that "historians have explored how these definitions have shifted, in response to changes in levels of industrialization and urbanization, position in the larger world's geopolitical and economic context, and with the development of new technologies."[270] This interplay between physical sex and imagined gender suggest a dualistic state of mind that is simultaneously anchored by fixed biology and set adrift by subjective consciousness – much like Anderson's imagined community living in the mind of the nationalist, distinctly separate from empirical observations of kinship and community in the observable world.

In his wide-ranging study of the European masculine archetype and its relationship to militarism and cultural homogeneity within the state, Mosse traces the antecedent of contemporary Western masculinity to the neo-classical movement that began in the late Renaissance and the Age of Enlightenment. In the Napoleonic era, Mosse argues that the neo-classical model of idealised manhood evolved alongside the tumultuous revolutionary period, ultimately serving as a foundation for the model soldier of mass conscription and mobilisation in the latter half of the 19th century. This cultivation of a homogeneous male archetype that was congruent with the polity of the nation state in turn became the basis for the 20th century masculine stereotype that would underpin aspects of cultural masculinity in Turkey and Israel and the participants in *Man Made*.

[268] Mosse, 1996, 5
[269] Anderson, 2006
[270] Kimmel and Aronson, 2004, 503

The Industrial Age and the modular man: Gellner (1995) specifically identified the transformation of archetypal masculinity in 19th century Europe, classifying this *Homo Novus* as the "modular man" – a distinct sociological product of the Industrial Revolution.[271] According to Gellner, the monolithic social conditions of the agrarian period severely limited an individual's capacity for meaningful civic engagement, communal membership and dynamic political affiliation. Conversely, the Industrial Age produced unique conditions that granted the individual newfound ideological freedoms, including the capricious adoption of abstract cultural and political attributes. Gellner wrote that by the 19th century, the average citizen could easily join a political party ''without slaughtering a sheep'' and could leave it "without incurring the death penalty for apostasy.''[272] Ironically, the newfound social mobility and pliable mind of the proletariat inspired the ruling polities of the era to construct and reproduce a homogeneous, nationalist imagining of their ideal citizen. Using the technological innovations of the period, the industrially-powered nation state could now culturally regulate disparate populations across huge tracts of geography, enforcing social and political hegemony with relative ease.

Despite the technological advances of the 19th century, homogeneous models of culture and gender were not exclusive innovations of the Industrial Age. Rather, early modern Europe had its own archetypes – but they were not nearly as ethnically focussed, regulated or confined as the nation states that would emerge after the French Revolution. Rather, archetypes of status and gender in the medieval and Renaissance era were disseminated much like universal material and ideological aesthetics: bounding across empires and cultures with the same fluidity of fashion, architectural trends and art movements of the period. The intelligentsia of the late Renaissance drew particular inspiration from neo-classical masculine traditions in their vision of an idealised, streamlined manhood and its entwinement with a warrior ethos.

Building on these existent gender roles that had demarcated men and women throughout the Middle Ages, the 18th century soldier was marked by physical strength, religious observance and athleticism, all unified by the male sex.[273] Mosse regarded this homogeneous masculine totem of the Enlightenment as a direct precursor to latter nationalist reproductions of masculine homogeneity in modern conscription,[274] writing that "at a time when political imagery like the national flag became potent, the human body itself took on symbolic meaning. [As the eighteenth century closed], Western Europe was entering an ever more visually oriented age, exemplified not only by national symbols but also by the effect of sciences such as physiognomy and anthropology, with their classification of men according to standards of classical beauty."[275]

In just a few decades, the political and cultural status quo of late 18th century Europe would be upended by the seismic shifts of the revolutionary period. In its wake, the first nation states would appear, bringing with them mass conscription armies and a wealth of ethno-nationalist ideologies to propagate them. Mosse contends that with the arrival of the modern era, a fusion of this established neo-classical "image of man" with the social conditions of the Industrial Age would form the basis of the archetypal masculine conscript which would carry well into the 20th century.[276] Crucially, the emergence of the nation state and mass conscription in Europe also heralded the arrival of a new kind of homogeneous ideology: modern militarism.

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[271] Gellner, 1995, 186-189
[272] Ibid., 103
[273] Mosse, 1996, 49
[274] Ibid., 40-55
[275] Ibid., 5
[276] Ibid.

The national interest: Militarism is broadly categorised as the self-defence doctrine of a polity – the ideological desire of the state to wield a powerful defence force that guards, advances and polices the nation and its citizenry.[277] In the context of nationalism studies, Daniele Conversi (2008) regards modern militarism as a distinct feature of modern nation states. Conversi reads militarism as a cultural homogenisation tool, essential for any effective regulation of conscription and mass mobilisation of the citizenry, but also of cultural standards and social models within the state, such as ethnicity and gender.[278] Conversi contrasts his analysis against the propositions of Gellner, pointing out that militarism's use as a vehicle of cultural homogeneity was largely ignored in *Nations and Nationalism* (1983).

Instead, Gellner focussed on the social and technological conditions of industrialisation that gave rise to the "modular man", who was then transformed by the nationalist project into the compliant homogeneous citizen. For Gellner, nationalist cultural homogenisation was enforced through the separation of traditional communities into dystopian industrial sectors, reflecting the dominant "high culture", or elite polity of the industrial state, over the "low culture" of the proletariat working class.[279] Conversi instead argues that industrialisation and its effect on culture was not the only source of Gellner's "congruent" nation state. Rather, institutions of the elite polity, specifically the military and public schools, played a crucial role in the propagation and reproduction of early nationalist projects amongst the citizenry. The dissemination of militarism through public education programs and military service rapidly generated gendered nationalist archetypes – an institutional process of nationalism not addressed by Gellner.[280]

Conversi thus views militarism as an observable project of applied cultural homogeneity by the state. He sees it as not merely the ideological aspiration of national self-defence by the polity, but an artificial, homogeneous cultural framework specifically designed by the governing elite for the cultural policing of the citizenry and the defence of the nation state.[281] In line with the research of Sasson-Levy (2003, 2015) and Altınay (2004) on Israeli and Turkish military service respectively, Conversi contends that militarism is chiefly disseminated ideologically within the nation. Conversi, Sasson-Levy and Altınay highlight public (state) education programs as key vectors of militarism and nationalism's ideological deployment in civic life. It is within these state-supervised institutes – with their mandated syllabus, infused with a nationalist rhetoric or "high culture" that is taught compulsorily – that civilians absorb a normative model of citizenship from an early age.

[277] Morris, 2012, 84
[278] Conversi, 2008
[279] Gellner, 1983
[280] Conversi, 2008, 1287
[281] Ibid.

In the case of mass conscription, Conversi argues that militarism's distribution through state education allows for a culturally homogeneous masculine archetype to emerge. Citing Bond, Conversi writes that throughout the 19th century's Spring of Nations, "governments commonly saw conscription and militarisation 'as an instrument for developing social cohesion and political docility of the masses'".[282] As will be discussed later, the compulsory public school experiences of participants in *Man Made* often incorporates concepts and routines that are transplanted directly from military service basic training. Militarism can be viewed as a symptomatic ideology and function of nationalism in the post-revolutionary age. While it is not an innovation of the modern era, its relationship to modern cultural masculinity is made explicit when viewed in the context of mass conscription in the 19th century. Mosse offers a chronological history of masculine archetypes from the Middle Ages to the modern era, persuasively revealing the close relationship of the warrior ethos to masculinity, contending that the two have been inseparable since antiquity.

The revolutionary man: After the French Revolution and the stunning accomplishments of the *Grande Armée,* the age of revolution was truly underway in Western Europe. *Levée en masse* and the consequent institutionalisation of mass conscription were regarded as essential components of a thriving nation state. German military theorist Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz (1780-1831) reasoned that, in the context of the revolutionary period, victory for nation states would be dependent on "[those who] put the largest possible army into the field".[283] Thus, mass conscription was rapidly enacted as a matter of military pragmatism in the increasingly bellicose Spring of Nations.

The question remains how governing nationalist polities ideologically compelled their citizens into mandatory military service. This is where Conversi emphasises the role of institutional militarism on civil society. In 19th century France, Napoleon Bonaparte transformed public education by overhauling state educational policies in a manner that reflected *levée en masse* and imbuing ideological militarism into the classroom. Standardisation of curriculum, mandatory school uniforms and daily physical routines that mimicked military drills all contributed to the homogenisation of post-revolutionary French youth, who were indoctrinated with a combination of military discipline and nationalist ideology within state schools.[284]

Militarism's moulding of individual citizens into nationally homogenised soldiers inevitably regulated social roles, as well. Citing Lewis Mumford (1963), Conversi describes the "mutual relationship between militarisation and the mechanization of social roles", or the resulting social engineering of class, gender and other social roles in societies that featured national conscription and militarised state educational programs.[285] Consequently, gender roles were homogenised by post-revolutionary militarisation in a manner that would have significant consequences for the shaping of masculinity and its fusion with conscription and national defence in the 20th century.

[282] Conversi citing Bond (1998, 32), 2008, 1293
[283] Conversi citing Clausewitz, 2008, 1293
[284] Ibid., 1295
[285] Ibid.

At the close of the 19th century, a new kind of masculine archetype had been mass-produced within Western European nation states. Mechanised by industrial technology, mobilised by mass conscription and ideologically nationalised by state education programs, masculinity had been neatly tied to militarism and conscription in France, Tsarist Russia and Imperial Germany. However, beneath these modern layers of innovation and technology, masculinity at its core still resembled the neo-classical model of the Enlightenment. The conscript of the late Industrial Age was decidedly virile, pious and exemplified by his strength – all primary attributes of pre-revolutionary masculine purity, according to Mosse. But the homogeneous ideological conditions in which citizens were fitted resulted in the emergence of a novel masculine feature in the sovereign state: national identity and collective ethnic pride. Mosse writes that "the search for a 'national character' has occupied nations ever since the romantic age in the early nineteenth century, [taking] the creation of a virile manliness ready to defend the nation as one of its goals."[286]

Modern masculinity, militarisation and femininity: Whereas masculinity and femininity in the elite social circles of the 19th century differed radically from that of the civil majority (Arnold, Brady, 2011), Yuval-Davis (1997), Smith (1998) and Mosse highlight 19th century proletariat femininity, and how it complemented the construction of a homogeneous masculine archetype in the male conscript. For much of the Middle Ages, femininity was emphasised by motherhood as well as qualities of softness, physical frailty and sensuous beauty. These basic tenets would later be celebrated in artistic neo-classical representations of women that were disseminated throughout the Enlightenment. Contrasting to typical masculine categorisations of the period, femininity was positioned as a social and biological foil to men's physical strength, spiritual and bodily purity, intelligence and leadership.[287]

While this may read as a broad categorisation of Western European gender roles, often the lived experiences of the historical individual reveal a variety of subjective contradictions. It is nonetheless essential to understand the general outline of masculine and feminine expectations in the lead up to the 20th century, as these gender stereotypes would stubbornly persist – as evident in the testimony of participants in *Man Made.* Shaped by militarism, nationalism and the social conditions of industrialisation, the primary attributes of archetypal masculinity and femininity cast proletariat men as the backbone of the nation through conscription and the labour market. While women began to join men in the industrial workforce, they were biologically sidelined in their role as dependent mothers, wives and daughters of men, and were largely excluded from the frontlines of national defence.[288]

The historical categorisation of women as inherently inferior in labour and war is recognised by Smith, who points out that revolutionary nationalism had a "basic male character" and that female gender roles were rarely understood outside of the prism of the male gaze.[289] Counterintuitively, this dynamic continued well into the Industrial Age, despite technologies of mass production leading to an unprecedented equitability of the labour market, where working class men and women often worked alongside each other as they operated heavy machinery.[290]

[286] Mosse, 1996, 109
[287] Smith, 1998, 208-209
[288] Yuval-Davis, 1997
[289] Smith, 1998, 208
[290] Yuval-Davis, 1997, 131

Despite relative labour equality in the working class, the realm of national defence and conscription would largely remain the burden of men. Yuval-Davis contends that the ideological exclusion of women from military service during the 19th century is a historical basis for contemporary attitudes of masculinity and femininity in militarised societies today and – as I will discuss in the context of my Israeli participants – even those that conscript women alongside men.[291]

Seeking a rationale for this exclusion, Mosse suggests that while industrial era militarism disseminated nationalist ideology and cultural homogeneity, nationalist polities also compelled their male citizenry into military service by linking the attainment of manhood directly to the completion of conscription.[292] This correlation was predicated in part on the exclusivity of military service to men, with military service regarded as a citizenship milestone as well as one of masculine maturity.[293] As Altınay and Sasson-Levy further verify, the inference that a boy can only become a man through military service is exemplified by society's use of women as a bargaining chip, as they are often perceived as the reward for the successful Turkish and Israeli male conscript.[294] Indeed, Sasson-Levy encapsulates broad feminist criticism of gender roles in militarised societies, writing that "identifying citizenship with military service constructs citizenship according to men's life cycles, thereby creating a differential and hierarchical citizenship for men and women".[295] Therefore, in the militarised heteronormative nation state, a man can expect hierarchical and preferential social positioning as a result of his military service. As is explicitly described by both Israeli and Turkish participants in *Man Made,* appropriate sexual relations, marriage and the eventual fathering of children are all deeply valued masculine milestones that are only availed after completing one's military service. Conversely, deviation from conscription – via conscientious objection or otherwise – often results in a perception of *incomplete* masculinity.

By reading the history of homogeneous masculinity and militarism in the form of the 19th century European conscript, there is now sufficient grounding to analyse Israeli and Turkish masculinity and its relationship to military service in *Man Made*. So far, this thesis has offered key surveys of theoretical nationalism and the antecedent historical context of the Israeli and Turkish militarism. Bar a final historical framing of Turkish nationalism in the opening of *The Reluctant Sons,* the rest of this written dissertation will engage solely with the content of the film with reference to these standalone surveys, as well as the ongoing analysis of the film's technical production, and its wider contribution to ethnographic film studies.

[291] Ibid.
[292] Mosse, 1996, 98-102
[293] Ibid., 107-110
[294] Altınay, 2004, 61-87 and Sasson-Levy, 2003, 319-323
[295] Sasson-Levy, 2003, 322

Fear of emasculation and Eli's first encounter with conscription: Reflecting on his personal journey as an Israeli pacifist nearly 15 years after acquiring an exemption, when he cast his mind back to the early 2000s, Eli describes a keen sense of emasculation as the dominant emotional memory. This made sense, as the legal challenge Eli had mounted against the IDF asked for an inclusive male statute in the ISSL's guidelines for conscription exemption. "From day one of my challenge [to the Supreme Court], to them I was basically asking to be treated like a woman," he told me, reflecting the wording of section 39(c) of the ISSL's guidelines. Although the inequitable provision for women would ultimately be phased out in 2005, the years that Eli spent in and out of the Israeli legal system considerably warped his subjective understanding of his own masculinity, not helped by his perception that Israeli society classified him as an "incomplete" man for declaring himself a pacifist.

Although he ironically came from a military family, Eli claims that his first real encounter with conscription, the IDF and its inherent social and cultural value, occurred during his secondary education. "In school is where it starts, maybe if my parents were more nationalist, I'd have encountered the army at home – but no, even though my dad was a career officer, we didn't really talk about it." It is during high school, at 16 years old, that Israeli teenagers generally begin receiving their first draft notices from the IDF. A symbolic, albeit bureaucratic milestone, the draft notice heralds the beginning of a years-long process that will eventually see most able-bodied Jewish Israeli teenage boys completing two years and eight months of military service alongside their peers.

Sasson-Levy identifies the average Israeli teenager's first encounter with the IDF as a significant personal crossroads on the road to normalised citizenship and social participation – a "concrete reality" in which an individual is required to confront the Israeli national ethos with a limited, binary decision: either conform and begin the process of conscription, or reject military service and face legal consequences and social stigma.[296] For Eli, receiving his draft notice did not worry him too much. He told me that does not really remember the day it arrived, nor the feelings he had at the time – an absent memory he suspects was superseded by "everything that came later". Instead, Eli's personal crossroads took place during Re'ut High School's annual IDF recruitment drive.

One of the many locations Eli and I explored in Re'ut was his old childhood home. Standing outside the leafy front gate, he describes on camera how charismatic enrolment officers visited his class around the time they were to begin receiving their draft notices.[297] Ostensibly to solicit the attention and admiration of the impressionable students, the event is a careers fair for the various technical roles of the IDF, with an emphasis placed on the exciting and rewarding aspects offered by various branches of the IDF. It was during this event that Eli first experienced a previously dormant pacifism and saw his "gag reflex for violence" first emerge as a distinct reaction to the presentations given by the IDF's high school recruiters.

Eli recalls that they set up multiple presentations that reflected the different branches of the IDF – army, navy, air force and so on. In each seminar, a pair of recruiters – usually a man and a woman in military dress – would give a presentation on what their particular branch does for the IDF, operationally and otherwise. One particular presentation was accompanied by IDF combat footage, much like the overlaid examples intercut at various points in *The Three Sabras*. Teenaged Eli and his classmates were subject to what he describes as an unedited "snuff film" in which grainy night vision footage showed IDF tracer fire decapitating an unidentifiable enemy combatant. Watching this video with his classmates, as they cheered and burst out laughing at the man's head being "taken clean off", Eli felt sick to his stomach, and it is here that he knew he would never serve in the military.

[296] Sasson-Levy, 2015, 470
[297] *Man Made*, 00:27:10

Why would the IDF show such a film to a room full of teenagers? The screening could be read as an example of in-group bonding through the communal viewing of violent acts – an indoctrination technique identified by psychologist Clark McCauley (2004). McCauley researches the psychology of modern terrorist organisations, emphasising the significance of militarised in-group bonding through violence as a vital step to recruit individuals who will in turn commit violent acts.[298] While this may be a hyperbolic reading of a simple error of judgement and taste on behalf of the IDF recruiters, for Eli the damage was done.

He personally considered the experience as a test of the students' collective willingness to dehumanise the enemy combatants of Israel. "It's important [to them] that you're all on board," he would tell me. "By showing something so shocking, so horrible, the whole class is complicit. I think the laughter was a shock reflex – it wasn't that the rest of the class were monsters, and I was some sort of angel – I just felt sick by it . . . alone while they all cheered." Eli told me, "that was the point of no return". Sasson-Levy writes that "in a situation where the state and society's mechanisms of coercion demand of the individual more than he can bear, the individual decision not to serve in the army becomes an act with political significance, a form of resistance that, quietly but thoroughly, unravels the close connections between masculinity, militarism, and nationalism."[299]

The politicisation of Eli's pacifism was involuntary – his personal rejection of violence, and his assessment of his inability to function within the IDF's ranks, was "entirely personal . . . emotional . . . it was instinct, not politics – I was a kid!" Thus, using Sasson-Levy's model, how does Eli's case of personal exemption on the grounds of pacifism unravel these connections of masculinity, militarism and nationalism in Israel, and how does it result in the politicisation of his philosophy of non-violence?

Eli vs. the IDF: Throughout his appeal to the Supreme Court for an exemption from his military service, Eli was interrogated many times, often for hours, in front of a panel of military officers and medical specialists. On the predication that the IDF must analyse the mental state of potential conscription exemptions, as well as their personal rationale for requiring an exemption, Eli interpreted these panel interviews as primarily an intimidation tactic, a form of strategic humiliation in which a teenager would sit on a hard-backed chair, without water or legal aid, and be relentlessly analysed by career IDF personnel with a combination of animus and condescension.

Eli's lawyers were able to acquire partial transcripts of these interviews. Eli then provided me with a translated, annotated exchange of one such interrogation, which he also leaked to the Israeli media to highlight "the mentality of the assessors and their priority in making me feel like shit throughout the process". Walking me through the document, Eli points out, "You can see they're trying to shame me into serving. This isn't about my mental health or anything like that." As a researcher, within these conversations, I saw evidence of how Eli's individual choice to reject military service seemed to threaten the institutional homogeneity of Israeli militarism, nationalism and masculinity:

[298] McCauley in Stout, 2004, 33-37
[299] Sasson-Levy, 2015, 484

Committee member: Do you think the State of Israel is in a situation in which it can afford not to protect itself?

Eli: The State of Israel is not a good example.

Committee member: Let's take the State of Israel as an example. [David] Ben-Gurion didn't have intentions of causing anyone harm, but there was no choice, right?

Eli: This is a historic debate I prefer not to get into.

Committee member: Nazi Germany, which attacked countries, for instance.

Eli: You have to examine what led Germany to be such a country.

Committee member: And what about Poland, which it attacked?

Eli: There are situations in which [there are preventative steps to take] . . . I don't know what stopped them from doing it beforehand. There are some situations you simply can't do anything about.

Committee member: Let's move on. Suppose that this committee wants to help you out. What do you think it should do?

Eli: Give me an exemption as they do in other countries, and as they do with girls. I refuse to serve for reasons of conscience.

Committee member: And what if it does not let you?

Eli: I will explore other avenues. I would also go to prison, if I had to.

Committee member: You benefit from the State of Israel, you studied in its educational institutions and so on, and there are obligations in a state. . . . You are disregarding the idea of equality.

To reiterate, Eli was still a teenager when these interviews took place, and I find his responses remarkably articulate and measured considering the circumstances. He qualifies that while this excerpt shows him arguing quite effectively with the committee member, he was often exhausted and frightened throughout much of these exchanges. As evidenced above, the committee members would consistently refer to the Israeli state as a coherent whole – a singular entity from which Eli was essentially requesting to be separated. Eli as the individual was not conforming to the national whole; the very act of asking for special treatment was aberrant to the requirements of the homogeneous civil majority.

This attitude reflects the unique relationship between Israel's civil and military sectors, and how these spheres are bridged by historical Zionist ethos of self-defence and the ensuing nationalist narrative that emerged – largely the self-identifying description of the Israeli state as a "nation in arms". Uri Ben-Eliezer (1998) describes the particular overlap of the IDF and Israeli civil society, writing, "These permeable boundaries, some scholars believed, allowed the two sectors (and the two elites) to interact across a wide range of situations and to benefit from reciprocal influence after agreeing on the rules of the game. It made it possible, on the one hand, to conceive of expanding the army's role and intervention in building the nation, a phenomenon that Horowitz and Lissak termed the (partial) militarization of the civil sector."[300]

Eli evidently challenges the blurring of civil and military sectors in Israel by rejecting mandatory military service. Instead, he creates an ideological barrier between the two, marking himself as an Israeli citizen, but one who resists participation in the nation-in-arms nationalist project. Whether it is then possible for this type of citizen to exist in a militarised civil sector is at the heart of Eli's struggle in the wake of his exemption. At the time of his interrogations, the principal retort of the state (via the committee member in the transcript above) is to compel Eli into military service by reminding him of the nationalist principles that birthed Israeli statehood, i.e. the necessity of organised self-defence during the particular circumstances of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and the subsequence creation of the IDF by David Ben-Gurion.

Accounting for the Israeli link between state survival and military preparedness, Ben-Eliezer reminds us that the 1948 Arab-Israeli war was marked by ill preparation and a by-the-skin-of-their-teeth Israeli victory – this was converse to the later successes of the 1956 Sinai campaign, which saw a highly coordinated and meticulously organised IDF operation give way to dramatic victories for Israel over Egypt.[301] This strategic outcome transformed Israeli discourse on conscription to consistently allude to mass mobilisation and military preparedness as central tenets of Israel's very existence. Eli related to me that, throughout his interrogations, the contemporary status of Israeli national security was rarely, if ever permitted to be discussed. Instead, the past was invoked frequently as justification for the continued necessity of mandatory military service. At one point, Eli argued with committee members that *Israel has nukes, why do they need me?* In his recollection, the committee members ignored this statement, calling him *ridiculous* for drawing a comparison to Israeli nuclear deterrence and his desire to be exempt from conscription.

Stretching back beyond the early victories of the Israeli nation state, the committee members' reference to World War II suggest that Israeli militarism is ideologically predicated on the wider narrative of historical Jewish persecution, and that by seeking an exemption Eli is not only disrupting a pivotal nationalist discourse, but he is also disrespecting and dishonouring antecedent Jewish generations who were massacred in the 19th and 20th centuries by hostile polities. Alongside the spectre of the Holocaust, Eli was constantly reminded of historical events and grievances as *prima facie* evidence of his required participation in conscription, which in turn was presented by his IDF interrogators as the only firewall that stood between the continued prosperity of the Israeli nation state and its annihilation. This ethos is articulated at length by David, the second participant in *The Three Sabras*.

[300] Ben-Eliezer, 1995, 265
[301] Ibid., 283

Through his interactions with the IDF panel, Eli's conscientious objection challenges Israeli nationalism, militarism and homogeneous masculinity. By finally acquiring his exemption and narrowly escaping jail time, the result for Eli was ambivalent. On the one hand, he got what he wanted. But on the other, his status within Israeli is permanently marked. Put simply as Eli told me, "I'm not a real man . . . at least on paper." Citing feminist scholar Genevieve Lloyd, Sasson-Levy (2003) suggests a philosophical connection between the militarised nation states, homogeneity, and masculinity:

> *"War-making and citizenship are both connected to masculinity through the most central ideals of the Western philosophical tradition: individuality, selfhood, autonomy, the concern with 'universal' moral principles, and the transcending of 'private' interests. War is the ultimate antithesis to concern with self-interest, self-love, and love of one's own."* [302]

Eli's self-interest, it would appear, is critical to his apparent emasculation. In the end, Eli's effort to amend the ISSL with a Supreme Court challenge was ultimately unsuccessful, and he was finally granted an exemption on grounds of psychological unfitness after his case was thrown out of court.

The memorial: Eli's contribution to *Man Made* consists almost entirely of our time in Re'ut. This includes scenes of visiting his childhood home, the town square, a famous lookout where he spent evenings as a wayward teen, and a pivotal moment that begins and ends *The Three Sabras*: the grounds of his old high school. It was upon his suggestion that we would visit Maccabim Re'ut High together, and so we drove there as an afterthought. As we parked the car and walked together through the front gates, Eli began reminiscing out loud.

As the memories flooded back, he realised he hadn't set foot into the school itself since he graduated, over 15 years ago. The light of the day waning, I filmed Eli as he mutters to himself. "I really hated coming here . . . every day man," and I can hear a different tone in his voice – a distinct vulnerability that makes me uneasy. I begin to wonder whether or not I should be filming such an intimate moment – most of my interviews with participants were highly curated, taking place in closed environments. At Eli's insistence, this interview was very different. As we wandered the school quadrangle, something immediately catches his eye. Busy pulling focus and framing my subject, I cannot see what he has noticed at first. The camera, mounted on my shoulder, hovers behind him as we get closer. As we approach, the object comes into view. It is a sculpture made of stone, about 6 feet high, and the film abruptly cuts to black. In the final edit of *The Three Sabras,* Eli's encounter with the school's war memorial is a narrative bookend – beginning and ending the episode – in much the same way the *mezbaha* scene functions outside of the film's four episodes. As a thematic device, Eli's encounter neatly closes *The Three Sabras,* but in this written analysis I will engage with the scene in its entirety before moving onto the other two participants.

[302] Lloyd in Sasson-Levy, 2003, 322

The stone memorial is a burnt, earthy orange colour. It has plastic placards on it, each a name in Hebrew. Eli stood silently in front of it for a while, not saying anything to me as I held the camera on my shoulder. In silence, he gestures me to come nearer, and as I get closer, I notice the upturned soldier's helmet on the ground and I instantly understand what I'm seeing. Eli is stunned, and he tells me that this is a monument for soldiers who were killed in service, and who also attended this particular school in Re'ut. Five names in total, they are all men. To his horror, Eli recognises three of the five names, having graduated the same year as two of them. He methodically recites their names and tells me his relationship to them and – if he knows – how and when they were killed. A wave of survivor's guilt slowly washes over Eli, and his voice chokes as he relates what he was doing in his life at the time of their deaths.

Despite his experiences with conscientious objection, Eli considers himself rather lucky in comparison to his countrymen. After his Supreme Court case "went to shit", Eli left Israel on a long backpacking jaunt. He visited Europe, South East Asia, and eventually Australia. He felt free, unburdened and "unknown", as he travelled anonymously in countries that did not have mandatory military service. "It was a big part of my personal development, seeing people living in countries that weren't defined by conflict and violence – a place like Australia where you were judged for who you were, not who the state said you were supposed to be."

Around this time, the 2006 Lebanon War broke out, and he remembers "in the early days of the internet" getting sporadic news on the war when he was in Sydney and Melbourne. He remembers at the time hearing of a classmate being killed and reflecting on the easy-going holiday he'd been having the previous months. "I had told myself I was over it – I left Israel, felt like I'd finally proven my convictions, and that I was above most of Israeli society – but when I found out *[name removed]* was killed, I found myself crying uncontrollably in a shitty hostel in Australia." The guilt, he said, was irrational. He knew his exemption had nothing to do with the classmate's death, but he felt like he couldn't mourn publicly, or grieve with his other classmates and friends. "They all knew me as the guy who didn't serve. Before that, I was just a bit of a joke to them – now I was excluded completely – how could I possibly justify being emotional about [his death]." Although he knew it was almost certainly fine to reach out to classmates, he never did.

Eli's exemption, it seemed, left far greater trace on his consciousness than he could have ever imagined. Not even allowing himself to share the mourning of a dead friend, he harboured deep insecurities upon his return to Israel. "I wondered if it was marked on my citizenship, so that every time I came into the country, it would come up on the computer screen at immigration. I felt judged, silently judged . . . by everyone." His reaction to seeing the memorial is no surprise, give these experiences. He later told me that "[although] I was no doubt very worked up from talking nonstop about this period in my life [for your film], seeing the memorial really broke something inside of me. It reminded me of just how much I'll never be like everyone else here. And it's a decision I made, and one I can never escape."

In 2016, Eli and his partner were delighted to learn that they would be having a child. Not entirely unexpected or unplanned, there was still a veneer of first-time parent shock, and the pregnancy was confirmed close to the time we filmed our scene together in Re'ut High School. His child, which he knew would be a boy, was at the forefront of Eli's mind for much of that last summer we spent together. In preparation for the birth, the couple had decided to go ahead with a lifelong dream and leave Israel indefinitely. Eli had long confided in me that he yearned to live in a society that did not institutionalise violence or force its citizens into conscription. He was sick of the occupation and the cyclical nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, seemingly flaring up every few years like the Olympics. Instead, they would leave the country, and take advantage of his partner's dual British and Israeli citizenships.

As they finalised their relocation to the United Kingdom, I asked Eli why. This was at the end of our on-camera interviews for *Man Made*, and we knew would not see each other for some time, and certainly not on Israeli soil. Night had fallen on Re'ut, and our backs were to the east. The haze of nearly disappeared sunset illuminated one half of the sky, the other an inky black with stars beginning to show. The hilltop we stood on revealed the dramatic hills of the West Bank, and we sat quietly talking as we prepared to drive back to Tel Aviv. I asked him directly (in an interview that didn't make the final cut of the film) "Why leave Israel completely?" He paused and looked at the ground for some time. Looking back up, he simply replied, "My son".

1.3 The People's Army (David)

Locations: An undisclosed Tel Aviv interview space, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

An example of the artistic triptych: "The Garden of Earthly Delights" by Hieronymus Bosch (circa 1500).
(scan: wikicommons)

In the early minutes of *The Three Sabras,* the second interviewee, David, is introduced via intercuts with Eli. As his opening descriptions of the IDF and mandatory military service contrast and clash significantly with that of Eli, a *Rashomon* effect is quickly established in the scene. Following the introduction of the final informant, Tolik, the three-panel juxtaposition of *The Three Sabras* is established, presenting three separate perspectives on Israeli conscription, nationalism and masculinity.

Like many documentary filmmakers in the midst of location shooting, I tend to avoid forming concrete expectations of the final film's structure prior to editing. This is an important technical note, as I did not begin editing *Man Made* until after I concluded principal cinematography in late 2016. This is largely a pragmatic strategy, as visual non-fiction (and unscripted ethnographic film, in particular) can yield wildly unpredictable results, which often deviate significantly from a director's presumptions and expectations. While this is the case for any anthropologist engaging with human subjects, the stakes are somewhat higher with location-based ethnographic film production, as the methodology itself can both impede and transform pre-prepared fieldwork and participant interviews. Compounding this, time is often in short supply, reducing the likelihood of reshoots and multiple takes. The advantage of this occasionally chaotic fluidity is the almost limitless opportunities afforded to the filmmaker in the editing bay, once the material is "in the can".[303]

[303] Skeuomorphic film production slang for completed cinematography. "The can" refers to film stock canisters of the analogue production era.

The triptych: Bearing this in mind, I had some rough, but not concrete, sketches that the final form and style the documentary would take as I commenced principal cinematography (the primary fieldwork). I discarded most of these initial pre-fieldwork concepts, or "narrative prompts" as I dubbed them, either during fieldwork itself, or years later in the editing bay. However, one such structural concept survived and became the final organisational format for all but one of *Man Made*'s four episodes. Prior to principal cinematography, I had considered crafting the entire film as a visual triptych,[304] comprising of an ethnographic portrayal of three individuals in Istanbul and Tel Aviv across years of fieldwork research. In this context, the triptych is a three-portrait perspective on the varying experiences of the individual when it came to conscription, nationalism and masculinity. A common device in documentary cinema, the contrast and comparison of multiple individuals in a given narrative can offer the viewer a multifaceted perspective of a singular event or context.

An immediate comparison is the documentary film *One of Us* (2017), directed by Heidi Ewing and Rachel Grady. The film, which could easily be regarded as a product of ethnographic film methodology, closely follows the lives of three unrelated orthodox Jewish individuals living in Brooklyn's Hasidic community, as they independently make the decision to remove themselves from the strict confines of religious life, and instead make their way in the outside world. Filmed over many years, the film is a typical example of the documentary triptych, in that it flows freely between the three separate narrative panels inside the space of a feature length film, offering indirect comparison and contrast among the three separate individuals who share a mutual circumstance. The interwoven style is uncomplicated, relatively linear and offers an efficient means of representing the varied experiences of the individuals in the context of the documentary, and its master narrative of orthodox Jewish life in Borough Park, Brooklyn.

My earliest visions of *Man Made* were predicated on a similar structural approach, in which I would focus solely on three individuals over a period of years, capturing their experiences with military service in their respective cities. I quickly encountered the first fault in this approach: I had two field sites and three slots to fill with participants, automatically creating an uneven dispersion in any final edit. Most of all, I felt that, as an anthropologist, my film should more accurately reflect the number of informants I had spent time with over the research period, and that a more kaleidoscopic structure would better reflect the scope of my fieldwork. My primary reservation with an open-ended list of participants was that the final cut would lack focus and be overly long, so I was careful to balance out the right number of participants in the film whilst not narrowing the scope of the final cut.

Thus, as I began the editing process in late 2016, I resolved to instead structure *Man Made* episodically – drafting four distinct episodes (two for each field site) with an estimated duration of 30 minutes each. This tapered the film's potential running time to around 130 minutes (including its introduction and credit sequence), resolving a key question between myself and my supervisor of the film's appropriate length. We often cited Claude Lanzmann's nine-hour documentary *Shoah* (1985) as a guiding influence on what *not* to do when it came to parsing *Man Made*'s 60-odd hours of raw interview footage into a single feature length film. We agreed that I would populate the film's four episodes with a selective short-list of twelve or so participants, forcing my directorial hand, to synthesise a three-year archive of interview footage into four coherent and self-contained episodes that ran less than three hours total. In hindsight, this may have been the greatest editorial challenge of this research project. In the end, of the final four episodes in *Man Made*, three retained the triptych format, a homage to my initial conceptual structure of the film.

[304] Multi-panel artwork e.g. Hieronymus Bosch's *The Garden of Earthly Delights* (circa 1500).

In late 2016, I returned from a final trip to Istanbul and found myself in the editing bay[305] for the first time. Reviewing all of the interview footage, I spent weeks "auditioning" participants, taking copious notes and gradually sifting through the 450 GB of files. Following this gruelling marathon review, I saw a spectrum emerge across both field sites – one that reflected the different attitudes towards conscription, from outright condemnation to full-throated endorsement. In my effort to sort my participants into key areas, it became logical to classify my informants' experiences with military service into three distinct categories:

1) **The opposed:** Participants who advocated outright conscientious objection, resistance and legally sought exemption (as exemplified by Eli and the Turkish informants in both *The Reluctant Sons* and *The Pink Certificate*).

2) **The ambivalent:** The middle ground participants who exhibited pragmatic ambivalence and cautious deliberation toward military service (evident in *The Three Sabras* especially, and notably lacking amongst my Turkish participants).

3) **Those in favour:** Participants who offer a full-throated endorsement and justification for conscription as an essential institution and state practise (as represented explicitly by David in *The Three Sabras* and – in a less explicit manner – both participants in *The Soldier & The Swede*).

I envisioned a back-and-forth edit between these three individual categories that slowly revealed a range of responses to military service in Turkey and Israel by urban, university educated men in Istanbul and Tel Aviv. As I considered the structure of each individual episode, it became clear that the triptych format was most suited to my fieldwork and informants. Analysing David's contribution particularly compelled me to adopt this format. I immediately saw that he plugged an unusual gap in my participant pool: an experienced IDF soldier/reservist who was not an official spokesperson and who was willing to speak candidly and positively about the merits of conscription.

The bristling Sabra: Initially, an acquaintance referred David to me as a cold call, which makes him a rare participant in *Man Made*, as he is the only informant who appears in the film with whom I met specifically in the context of my PhD research (many informants in *Man Made* were introduced to me years prior, or as mutual acquaintances arising from years of living in both cities for prior fieldwork). Nevertheless, David ultimately became a friend who I was able to hold a series of discussions on a topic he initially suspected I would hold an inherently biased view.

Early on in our relationship, as we drove to his home in Jerusalem, he jokingly referred to my research as "your anti-IDF film to show the world how we are all monsters – don't worry, I'll say all the right things". This worried me somewhat, and I decided to postpone our on-camera interviews until a later date. It took some time to establish a degree of comfort in which David was able to provide insight that was not performative or condescending, and I was sceptical that our nascent friendship would be too superficial for an ethnographic contribution to *Man Made*. As a non-Jewish foreigner, coercing the average Israeli man into describing his experiences with conscription without them veering into IDF talking points or taking on a defensive tone was a complex affair. Over time, David slowly came around to the conclusion that I was not an "anti-war hippy liberal" or a "pro-Palestinian activist" but was in fact an

[305] By which I mean, my bedside desk – a humble corner of a small room in which all of *Man Made* was edited.

anthropologist looking to understand the individual perspectives of men living in a militarised society – and so, we began our on-camera discussions.

Despite our eventual rapport, it is important to note that in many ways David still fit the cliché of the bristling *Sabra*, chafing against external examination and perceived cultural criticism. Similar to my Israeli friends whom I met in Thailand, my first interactions with David brought out a state of pity on my behalf. He saw me as the innocent, naïve Australian who, in his quest to unpack the justifications for military service, will never truly understand what it is like to be ethnically vilified, and to be "encircled by nations who wish to wipe out your very existence". As a non-Jewish visitor to Israel, I can attest that this is a pervasive sentiment in the country. I recall one morning in Tel Aviv, I was breakfasting with my wife, when a common interaction unfolded between myself and our server. The sight of a light haired, blue eyed foreigner with a strange accent always attracts attention from Tel Aviv's gregarious hospitality workers, and the young Mizrahi waiter quickly asked where I was from. Answering him, the follow up from him was typical: *Oh, so you're here for aliyah,*[306] *right? No,* I would reply, *I'm not Jewish.* His eyes furrowed with confusion: *So, you're on vacation, travelling through the Middle East then?* Shaking my head, I would say *No, I live here, on Rothschild!* More confusion, and then the same blunt answer I had heard a dozen different ways: *I don't mean to be rude, but why do you choose to live in Israel? It's just like Australia - beautiful beaches, great lifestyle - but you're not surrounded by millions of people who want to kill you!*

More than a superficial anecdote, this exchange is a revealing insight into the oft-cited Israeli siege mentality – or Masada Syndrome (Bar-Tal and Antebi, 1992) – that has pervaded the national consciousness since the founding of the state, which occurred as both the civil war and Arab-Israeli War of 1948 raged.[307] In David, I found an embodiment of the particular siege mentality pervasive in Israeli consciousness. This phenomenon can be read as an influence on David's unequivocal conclusion that, despite its flaws, conscription is a "necessary bad thing" for the very survival of the Jewish state.

Masada Syndrome: Daniel Bar-Tal has written extensively on Israeli siege mentality and its influence on the militarisation of the nation after its founding. After his research began in the mid-1980s, Bar-Tal acknowledged that siege mentality was not a unique Israeli phenomenon,[308] initially dubbing the particular Israeli experience as Masada Syndrome,[309] in reference to the circa 73 AD siege that captured the imagination of Jews throughout history, and was later appropriated into Israeli nationalist mythos. According to the legend, during the 1st century Jewish rebellion in *Judea* (Roman Palestine), Roman soldiers surrounded retreating Jewish insurgents at the fortress of Masada – an ancient citadel set atop a desert mesa close to the Dead Sea. Primary historical source Flavius Josephus (37-100 AD) was later corroborated by contemporary excavations at the site in his description of the thousand-odd band of rebels fortified inside the castle, as Jews held off the Roman attack for many months in a heroic last stand.[310] As supplies dwindled, the rebels were eventually faced with certain defeat, but not before they were able to set the fortress alight and commit mass suicide, leaving the conquering Roman legions to discover the corpses of nearly a thousand men, women and children within the collapsing blaze.[311]

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[306] *Aliyah* is still the nomenclature for any Diaspora Jew arriving in Israel and seeking citizenship. Young Diaspora Jews typically visit Israel as teens on a state funded Birthright trip to encourage *aliyah*.
[307] Bar-Tal, 1992
[308] Bar-Tal, 1992, 252
[309] Ibid., 1992, 251
[310] Shapira, 2012, 261
[311] For more, see Start Classic's 2014 *Complete Works of Flavius Josephus* translated by William Whiston (The Wars of the Jews, Book 7, Chapter 9)

Despite recent academic and archaeological revisions that question the specifics of the Masada siege (particularly the dramatic element of mass suicide),[312] it nevertheless became a legendary allegory for Israeli national resolve as well as being emblematic of the historical scope of Jewish persecution – a proto-holocaust two millennia old, in which Jews are besieged and burned alive (albeit via self-immolation) with no survivors. By proto-holocaust, I mean the definition of the 20th century neologism: Holocaust being a portmanteau of the Latin *holokaustos* – *holo* (whole/consumed) and *kaustos* (sacrifice via incineration).

In conversation with *The Guardian* (2013), archaeologist and eminent Masada specialist at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem Guy Stiebel summarised the modern politicisation of Masada in Israel, remarking that "the left regard Masada as a symbol of the destructive potential of nationalism. The right regard the people of Masada as heroes of our nation . . . [and so] the myth evolved. All the ingredients were there. At the end of the day, it's an excellent story and setting, you can't ask for more." In rebuttal to criticism of its historical authenticity, author Yadin Roman framed Masada as a nationalist panacea for the depressed psyche of the post-Holocaust Israeli Jew, noting that "Masada became an Israeli myth [following the Holocaust] . . . The image of brave Jewish warriors standing up to the might of the Roman army was a much-needed antidote."[313]

Bar-Tal describes the Holocaust as the climax of anti-Semitism and historical Jewish suffering in the Diaspora,[314] and a crucial milestone in the development of Israeli siege mentality, with Jewish statehood expedited in part by the genocide perpetrated by Nazi Germany. In 1971, Jewish journalist and notable critic of the Israeli state Amos Elon wrote, "the Holocaust remains a basic trauma of Israeli society. It is impossible to exaggerate its effects on the process of nation building . . . there is a latent hysteria in Israeli life that stems directly from this source."[315] Bar-Tal and Elon's bounding of the relationship between the Holocaust and Israeli siege mentality is clearly demonstrated in my conversations with David, who frames much of his thinking around justifiable conscription, the militarisation of Israeli society, the permissibility of occupation and war around the spectre of the Holocaust, and the historical persecution of Jews generally. Significantly, David's interviews in *Man Made* verify a fundamental aspect of manifest nationalism in the individual: a perception of indivisibility of the self from the nationalist communal whole. David sees little separation between his personal experiences as an Israeli and the broader threats to Israeli national security and the survival of the international Jewish community – "they hate us" he says at various points in our discussions. This is the very essence of nationalist self-expression, as well as Israeli siege mentality.

[312] See Guy Stiebel's comments in: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/22/israel-masada-myth-doubts (accessed March 2018)
[313] Ibid., Yadin Roman's comments
[314] Bar-Tal, 1992, 253
[315] Elon, 1971, 198-199 in Bar-Tal, 2000, 108

In all but name only, David's description of Israel in *Man Made* resembles a state-sized Masada citadel: the Jewish people surrounded by enemies, cornered and alone in desolate geography, with militarised self-reliance their only recourse. As a result, David views conscription as a tragic inevitability, arguing that the mass mobilisation and militarising of civil society is merited when one is surrounded by hostile neighbours, many of whom have either been at war with Israel or have openly craved for its demise since its founding. As Bar-Tal points out, the 1960s Israeli song "The Whole World Is Against Us" is, "probably the most vivid and obvious expressions of Israeli siege mentality" and also as a nationalist appropriation of Diaspora Jewish wariness of anti-Semitism. The lyrics include the following verse*:*

> *"The whole world is against us. This is an ancient tale,*
> *Taught by our forefathers,*
> *To sing and dance to.*
> *If the whole world is against us, we don't give a damn,*
> *If the whole world is against us, let the whole world go to hell."* [316]

This stanza mirrors much of David's perspective of Israel's place in the world. He cites hostile neighbours, the historical precedent of Diaspora anti-Semitism and the compounding plight of Israel's "tiny, tiny" geography, which he sees as a crucial metric of the country's unique vulnerability. This is true – military strategists and historians often point out Israel's "narrow waist", which before 1967 was a mere 8 kilometres wide – a tenuous territorial boundary that leaves little room for error in any armed conflict.[317]

Geographical handicaps aside, Bar-Tal remains sceptical of any contemporary declaration that the state of Israel remains on the precipice of eradication. He asks, "How is it possible – one may ask that a nation, which is technologically [at this stage] so advanced and militarily so strong, worry so deeply about its security?"[318] While not specifically citing Israel's covert but widely acknowledged possession of nuclear weapons, David conceded to me that in the 21st century, a civilian army was probably unnecessary – but this didn't change the fact that "Israel is surrounded by [nations] that want us gone" and that mass conscription overall gave Israelis invaluable training in self-defence – both individually as well as a national whole. In our lengthy back and forth, David ultimately concluded that for Jews "it is the world itself that is inexorably insecure" and this sentiment raises a critical perspective on Israeli militarism and siege mentality.

[316] Bar-Tal quoting Yoram Tehar Lev, Ibid.
[317] A common citation most recently invoked by Major General Uzi Dayan in 2016: http://jcpa.org/defensible_borders_to_ensure_israels_future/
[318] Bar-Tal, 1992, 269

Siege mentality and Israeli militarism: Throughout my interviews with Israeli informants who were self-identifying nationalists, almost all discussions on the merits of conscription and the overt militarisation of Israeli society were generally argued through the prism of self-defence, specifically citing the nation's genuine brushes with catastrophe in the wars of 1948, 1967 and 1973. These events all contribute to what Bar-Tal describes as the persistent "[insecurity] of the Israeli psyche" that citizens such as David continue to exhibit into the 21st century.[319]

A functional state military generally features a range of defensive and offensive capabilities. The defensive capabilities include the state military's ability to protect the sovereignty and security of the national interest, as well as exert public displays of strength to deter belligerents. The aggressive mode typifies the state military's capacity to decisively attack and destroy enemy forces and invade foreign territory – whether that be via occupation, annexation or sustained targeted strikes on foreign soil from home.[320] Up until the 1956 Suez Crisis, the IDF had demonstrated its capacity for both defensive and offensive warfare. However, the Suez war cast the Israeli nation state as distinctly aggressive in its operations.[321] As a result, by the mid-1970s, the historical precedent and popular conception that the requisite militarisation of Israeli society was primarily a self-defence mechanism became significantly less persuasive, given the offensive nature of IDF operations from 1956 onward.

Van Creveld verifies this strategic shift, writing of a distinct malaise of militarism in Israel from the early 1980s onward. He describes a demoralisation within the IDF and Israeli civil society, which was in part due to the military's increasingly opportunistic excursions and offensive strategies, a significant departure from the parameters of noble self-defence that had largely defined the preceding decades.[322] Through the defensive/offensive dichotomy, one sees that since the genuine existential crises of 1948, 1967 and 1973, Israelis veered from a defensive state militarism into an outright offensive posturing. In the decades that followed, this offensive nature was exemplified by the continued occupation of the West Bank and its accompanying violations of international law (including illegal Israeli settlements), the blockade and bombardments of the Gaza Strip, as well as numerous long-range air strikes and targeted attacks on Palestinian, Lebanese, Syrian and Iranian military assets and key personnel abroad.

[319] Ibid., 269
[320] This basic model was developed as a result of many fruitful conversations about militarism, Israel and general military history with former Canadian defence attaché to Israel (2004-2008) Col. Richard Geoffrey St. John (ret).
[321] Shemesh and Troen, 1990, 2-12
[322] Van Creveld, 2002, 245-248

I do not contend that historical Israeli first strikes were unwarranted or reckless, but it is important to note the shift of strategy that took place as Israel settled its roots, following the tumultuous first decades of its existence. Operation Focus, the surprise air attack on Egyptian air forces that instigated the 1967 Six-Day War, is a unique example of an IDF response to a genuine existential threat that also featured a now common offensive military strategy that uses surprise attacks with somewhat dubious tactics. Popularly understood as an inevitable first strike by reticent IDF forces, Van Creveld writes that the Israeli government informed its civilians on the morning of the IAF's pre-emptive strike[323] that it was a retaliation to an Egyptian invasion of Israel – an outright fabrication presumably delivered to rally the militarised populace and engineer early support for the conflict.[324] While history has shown the relative intractability of Israel's decision to first strike looming Egyptian forces, the aggressive strategy of pre-emptive strikes on the unsuspecting enemy had, by 1967, become a strategic doctrine of the IDF that would reshape Israeli militarism into the 21st century.

By the 1980s, the IDF favoured first strikes on foreign targets even in conditions where an actual invasion of Israel by enemy forces was logistically impossible. 1981's Operation Opera was an IAF strike on Iraqi nuclear facilities after rhetorical threats from Saddam Hussein and his naked aspiration to acquire nuclear weapons. That same year, then Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin openly acknowledged the Israeli practise of preventive first strikes and its mission to prevent enemies of Israel from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.[325] Dubbed the Begin Doctrine, there was now a codified military strategy that invoked the Israeli siege mentality as a justification for preventive strikes on foreign soil and other offensive acts.[326] Fuelled in part by the very real existential crises of Israel's first decades, the Begin Doctrine remained *de rigueur* during the two wars in Lebanon (1982, 2006) , two Palestinian intifadas (1987, 2000), and a handful of periodic clashes in the Gaza Strip (2008, 2012, 2014) – none of which posed any serious threat to the Israeli nation state's fundamental existence.

While Bar-Tal is careful to qualify that, in the individual, "the centrality of siege mentality beliefs [are] not stable and may fluctuate over time", it appears to be centred on two historical events – the diasporic experience of anti-Semitism (climaxing with the Holocaust) and the early wars and tribulations of the nascent Israeli state up to 1973.[327] Therefore, the Israeli siege mentality exemplified by David's emphatic defence of militarisation and conscription is arguably an imagining of the national Israeli psyche – an ideological construct that lacks any credible evidence of an existential threat to Israel and the Jewish people's existence in the modern context. The benefit of perpetuating Israeli siege mentality is that it discursively permits all aspects of defensive and offensive Israeli militarism – including mass conscription – rendering Israeli militarism as essential to the very existence of the nation state.

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[323] International law defines a pre-emptive attack as "one that is launched based on the expectation that the adversary is about to attack, and that striking first will be better than being attacked" (RAND, 2006, 6). This is distinct from a preventive attack, which the United States Department of Defense defines as "[a] war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risks" (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004, p. 419). For more, see Mueller, Castillo *et al* in reference List (reports).
[324] Van Creveld, 2002, 183
[325] Shlaim, 2001, 387
[326] Smith, 2010.
[327] Ibid.

This packages Israeli siege mentality neatly into the broader Israeli nationalist project, whose attributes include the militarisation of the citizenry through homogeneous conscription. While the nationalist mythology of Israel and Jewish siege mentality portray the country as an ethno-sanctuary state constantly besieged by external enemies, this does not accurately reflect the reality of Israeli national security in the 21st century. This is understandable – the history of the Jewish people is one of exodus, diasporic displacement and eventually attempted annihilation. This last part, the systematic genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of Nazi Germany, is impossible to ignore in any analysis of Israeli siege mentality nationalism and militarism. David is the first participant to name it in *Man Made* and, alongside his personal journey with the IDF, the Holocaust loomed large in our discussions.

"A necessary bad thing": David is a unique case for a self-described "right-wing Israeli"– remarkably candid and non-confrontational, he offered me a deeply personal insight into the process of conscription in Israel, as well as a broader critique of its value as an institution that did not shy away from uncomfortable truths. Alongside the common talking points of Israeli siege mentality, his impassioned defence of mandatory military service stems from a combination of personal pressure points: his particular transformation from a somewhat frightened pre-conscripted youth into a grateful veteran of the IDF's intelligence branch, as well as his family's tragic history with the Holocaust and his inherent fear of its replication.

While acknowledging a desire to live in a demilitarised nation state such as Australia, these factors combined result in David's pragmatic assessment that Israel's security is not guaranteed, and therefore military service is a "necessary bad thing", despite its physical risk and psychological demand. Although he never clarified it on camera, I often wondered if his negative perception of conscription was limited to the various effects military service could have on the individual who resisted it, or whether he saw it as potentially harmful for Israeli society as a whole. I suspect it was a little of both, given the circumstances that he went on to describe.

David offers merits for military service in Israel as a social good based on his own successful transition from a self-described "weak, frightened boy" into a self-sufficient confident man. According to David, this metamorphosis from child to adult was fuelled primarily by institutional conscription, which imbued him with the necessary skills and experiences to "make him a man". David pegs much of his teenage reluctance and fear of military service as a natural and understandable weakness, a fear that is common amongst young Israeli boys and girls as they veer closer to the age of enlistment. This is notably converse to the experience of Eli, who argues that his inability to conform to the citizen soldier model in Israel was a direct result of his fear and revulsion of military service. David insisted that breaking through this barrier of fear and discomfort is essential to becoming a man in Israeli society, and that this paradoxically applied to both men and women.

David references Israeli masculinity at various points in our discussions, but notably he articulates idealised masculinity as seemingly transcendent of biological gender. Rather, Israeli masculinity was an aspirational quality, almost a mindset. This was proven, he told me "because in Israel the [archetypal] masculine soldier is anyone who steps up . . . especially those who serve in combat units. Otherwise, you'll be a man by definition . . . but less of a [proper] man."[328] For David, Israeli masculinity was deeply connected to combat roles in the IDF and that, in this hierarchy, those who served in elite units (such as the famed *Golani* brigade, or Yonatan's *Shayetet* 13)[329] were at the apex of Israeli masculinity. Women in the IDF make up only 3% of its total combat units,[330] so it would appear that David's idealised Israeli masculinity is less gender equitable than he would profess. Despite this contradiction, David qualified at numerous points in our discussions that this was his personal experience and should be not be considered a sweeping generalisation for all conscripts – *this was how I saw the IDF* he told me off-camera. *Israeli masculinity isn't about gender – it's about strength, one's capacity to serve in the most stressful and dangerous scenarios for your country – this is what I think the ideal soldier is in Israel.*

Coda - *the dream machine*: There is one final anecdote about David that was not present in the final cut of *Man Made.* As we were driving together one evening, David was kind enough to chaperone me to the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He had heard me complain about schlepping my camera equipment around the Old City in my pursuit of B-roll footage (landscapes, vistas, small urban details that make up most of *Man Made*'s cutaways) and so he suggested we take a drive to HUJ's main campus and see what we could find. As we wandered the elaborate campus grounds, which offer stunning views of the city from its perch on Mount Scopus, David related to me his passion for neuroscience, and its relationship to the scientific understanding of dreams in particular. Still sporting his lapel microphone from our earlier interview, I captured our exchange as I took various landscape shots of the Dome of the Rock and the Old City of Jerusalem.

"There's so much locked away in our heads," he told me. "I wonder, with all the studies of DNA and genetic memory, if there aren't deep-seated memories of our ancestors that are burnt into the recesses of our unconscious mind." David studies neuroscience in his spare time and shared with me the most contemporary scientific evidence for ancestral traumatic memories being carried genetically onto successive generations. "A few years ago, there was a research study in Mount Sinai [hospital] in New York. Basically, they proved that if you experience something horrific, such as the Holocaust, your genetic structure changes . . . it takes on the pain. This structure is then passed on to your children . . . in a process called epigenetic inheritance." As I packed down my camera equipment, I asked him why he brought this up. "Well, I was thinking about all our conversations about the Holocaust. How I take it so personally. I dream about it often… why? I wasn't there. Now this could just be that I'm traumatised by my parents' stories, by my father's work – it's like a horror movie that I can't shake. But I wonder if we built a machine that could extract my dreams, whether or not in fact these are the memories of my ancestors who saw the Holocaust with their own eyes."[331]

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[328] *Man Made* 1h:52m
[329] See episode The Soldier & The Swede.
[330] IDF press release, 2011: https://www.idf.il/1086-14000-EN/Dover.aspx
[331] For more, see: https://www.biologicalpsychiatryjournal.com/article/S0006-3223(15)00652-6/abstract

1.4 "I started paying attention" (Tolik)

Location: Mount Bental (Golan Heights) & an undisclosed interview space in Tel Aviv

Tin soldier cut-out on Mount Bental, facing Israel's border with Syria (Still: *Man Made*).

I introduce the third and final participant of *The Three Sabras* via a musical segue at 0h:22m. As Kanye West's *Run Away* slowly builds in volume over David's opening summary of military service in Israel, a sudden smash cut reveals the interior of a car. The perspective is akin to a dash cam; the car winds along a mountain road in the middle of the day, through the Golan Heights in north-eastern Israel. I am sitting in the passenger seat of Tolik's[332] hatchback and we are driving to the peak of Mount Bental, a dormant volcano that straddles the border between Israel and Syria. A generous, sloping incline means that we can get all the way to the top of the 1,171-metre high summit, which offers stunning views of southern Syria, the surrounding Golan Heights and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains to the north.

Because of its extraordinary vista, the top of Mount Bental is a popular tourist destination in Israel. Sign posts are in English and there is a gift shop and café all within reach of a well-maintained parking lot. As we amble up to the summit proper, I immediately notice the historical significance of the mountain. Rusted barbed wire, crumbling trenches, chipped concrete foundations for long-gone artillery emplacements and abandoned bunkers riddle the hillside. These are the remnants of the IDF citadel on Mount Bental, a military observation post that made this peak the centre of one of the greatest tank battles in modern history.[333]

At the outbreak of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, 1,400 tanks and multiple Syrian infantry divisions confronted a lone IDF brigade in the Golan.[334] The meagre IDF forces dug into the high ground and defended Mount Bental and the surrounding valley. Supported by the Israel Air Force, the brigade and its 177 tanks repelled the Syrian invasion, destroying over 500 vehicles in four days.[335] A modern day antithesis for the siege of Masada, the aftermath of the Israeli victory saw the valley beneath Mount Bental littered with hundreds of destroyed Syrian vehicles, and it was later dubbed "the valley of the tears" as a result. The battle has since entered popular Israeli consciousness as a modern example of Zionist resolve in the face of overwhelming enemy forces seeking to destroy the state of Israel and the Jewish people.

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[332] Name changed.

[333] For a fascinating memoir on the Valley of the Tears campaign, Brigadier-General Avigdor Kahalani's *The Heights of Courage* (1992) is an authoritative, first-hand account.

[334] Rabinovich, 1999, 142

[335] Van Creveld, 2002, 230-232 and Rabinovich, 1999, 143

Standing on top of Bental with Tolik, we looked at what remained of the fortifications. Black metal cut-outs of IDF soldiers, their guns pointed toward the Syrian and Lebanese horizons, were placed haphazardly throughout the structure, a simple artistic representation to role play the peak's military history. Some of these cut-outs stood at attention, others were poised on one knee, reloading their rifles in a freeze frame (see image above). Other than these two-dimensional models, there wasn't much left of Mount Bental's former glory. Looking toward Syria below, we heard distant concussions and saw insect-like helicopters buzzing in the distance. From here, Damascus was only 60 kilometres away, and a pair of United Nations peacekeepers now occupied Bental's north-eastern observation deck, scanning the Syrian Civil War with long range binoculars. We stood near them and quietly watched as the sun set over the Syrian frontier, the lights of outer Damascus twinkling through the smog.

"If we take it from the very top," Tolik begins, "my first memory of war, was the Gulf War."[336] At the time of filming his contribution to *Man Made*, Tolik and I had known each other for a number of years. We were introduced by my wife, and fast became friends with our mutual interests in music, film and eclectic literature. A keen amateur astronomer, Tolik once took my wife and I far into the Negev desert in southern Israel, where on a particularly clear night we looked at Jupiter through a powerful telescope. A highly sensitive and soft-spoken young man, Tolik initially struck me as a decidedly peaceful individual, but like Eli, this relaxed demeanour hid deeper trauma that he carried as a result of his participation in multiple Israeli wars – over a decade's military service in total, including reserve duty. Over many hours talking on the record, as well as years of friendship, I slowly came to understand his unique status as a veteran of the IDF who also declared himself a non-violent pacifist. Like David, during his four years of conscription, Tolik was an intelligence officer – but following the completion of his mandatory military service, he deliberately volunteered for reserve duty during times of war and conflict.

Undergoing reserve duty is not unusual for the average Israeli. Successful completion of military service rarely ends the relationship one has with the IDF, particularly if one is talented and maintains a personal connection with their unit. What set Tolik apart was his adoption of a distinct non-violent philosophy that drew from he called, "a long considered academic . . . by which I mean, *detached* study of the conflict", fused with his interest in Buddhism, historical pacifism and other spiritual movement's that promoted universal, interconnected consciousness – particularly the writings and lectures of Alan Watts. Like many veterans, Tolik had also emerged from his experiences in the 2006 Lebanon War and the 2008 Israeli-Gaza War with a degree of trauma. I first became aware of Tolik's mild PTSD early on in our friendship. My wife was talking to me about her lunch break that day (she and Tolik briefly worked together in Tel Aviv) and she recalled that as they were waiting at a busy pedestrian crossing on their way to a restaurant, a car exhaust suddenly backfired. While it was startling and unexpected, my wife was shocked to see Tolik wincing, his eyes shut tight, grimacing with his body frozen as he stood on the corner. After a few seconds, he slowly opened his eyes, embarrassed and a little shaky. *I'm sorry,* he said, *loud noises… they can really take me back.* My wife understood, and they crossed the street in silence.

[336] *Man Made*, 00h:21m:03s

As his interviews in *Man Made* reveal, Tolik's relationship with conscription and the IDF is one of complex ambivalence – a considered negotiation of practical reality with personal ideals. Throughout our on-camera discussions (the last of which make up the bulk of his on-screen contribution to *Man Made*), Tolik slowly revealed to me a process of change that he began to experience in the years following his military service. I came with Tolik to the Golan Heights as part of a mutual desire to see the war in Syria from close range, but I also used the opportunity to have long a conversation with him about his life in Israel, and his experiences with war, the IDF and his imminent departure from the country of his birth. After a painstaking reflection on his future, in early 2016, Tolik applied for foreign citizenship by descent and was accepted into a prestigious master's program in the United Kingdom. His decision riddled him with guilt, but not only because he was leaving his family and friends. Rather, I observed Tolik struggle with a unique aspect of living within the "nation in arms"– he viewed Israeli society as one in deep crisis – and his sense of responsibility as a citizen soldier of Israel elicited painful feelings of selfishness and moral abdication.

Filming Tolik for Man Made (Photo: Max Harwood)

"I started paying attention": Between David's staunch advocacy of state militarism, to Eli's outright rejection of military service and the IDF through conscientious objection, Tolik sits somewhat equidistant between these two extremes. This is a deliberate facet of *The Three Sabras* triptych. At times, Tolik echoes both David and Eli's positions, but rather than take a hard line on the merits or flaws of conscription and Israeli militarism, Tolik speaks instead about his personal journey of serving in the IDF and how it has shaped his sense of self in the country, both as a man and as a citizen. Specifically, Tolik argues that a consequence of militarisation has been the gradual desensitisation of Israeli civil society to permit acts of extreme violence and racism – particularly towards ethnic and cultural minorities within the state who do not fit the strict rubric of Israeli national identity.

While he points to the drawn out, multi-generational Arab-Israeli conflict as central to the dehumanisation of the ethnic other within and outside Israel, it was Tolik's experiences with anti-immigrant rallies that make up the focus of his analysis in *Man Made*. The actions and behaviour of right-wing nationalists at these rallies are, for Tolik, clear evidence that a country founded in the wake of ethnic persecution and genocide is now paradoxically experiencing the worst aspects of nationalism, fascism and racism on the streets of its most cosmopolitan city. Coupled with a broader drift of the Israeli electorate to right wing ethno-nationalist politics, the last decade had been a turning point for Tolik in which he began to question what – and who – he was defending as a veteran of the IDF.

In *The Founding Myths of Israel* (1997) Zeev Sternhell analyses Israeli nationalism in the writing of Aaron David Gordon, the prominent Zionist philosopher of the Second *Aliyah*. Gordon's early classification of the Jewish nation describes it as "one great family . . . an organic body from which the individual draws not only his culture but his very existence". Sternhell writes that for Gordon, "a nation . . . unlike a society, is not a mechanical conglomeration of individuals from the general pool of humanity. Unlike a society, which is a mere artificial conglomeration, devoid of the spirit of life, a nation is bound up with nature. Its living connection with nature is its creative force, which makes it a living entity."[337] Tolik echoes this description of Zionist nationalism, articulating his belief that Israeli society was like a family he could never detach from; an inescapable genomic reality that drew opposing feelings of pride and shame throughout his life. Gordon's description of the "living entity" of Israeli society is also appropriate in understanding Tolik's mindset. He views Israeli society as a collective organism that he is both intrinsically attached to but from which he feels personally alienated. Complicating matters, while both Eli and Tolik identify as pacifists, Tolik willingly completed his mandatory conscription and has since served as a voluntary reservist, proactively seeking out opportunities to work in the intelligence branch of the IDF when war breaks out.

Tolik does not see this as hypocritical, reasoning that "in Israel, there is always going to be another war. I understand conscientious objectors. I've worked alongside them; I'm close with a few. It's a powerful means of resistance and the fact they go to prison and [are] publicly humiliated makes them far more resilient than me. The way I see it . . . I'm a very good intelligence officer. I'm a natural. When I was in the army [during conscription] and when I take on reserve duty, my priority was to preserve human life on both sides. That's very important. I do everything I can to minimise danger for everyone. That's my job, as I see it. If I wasn't there to do that . . . someone would be in my exact role and potentially do the complete opposite . . . and that's why I can't say no when they call me up." Tolik spent much of his twenties pondering the role of violence in Israeli society, considering that his country had experienced an almost constant state of war and conflict since its founding. Like Van Creveld, Tolik views the ideological trajectory of the Israeli nation state in the 21st century as gradually veering away from the founding principles of mid 20th century Zionism (which prioritised Jewish self-determination underpinned by democratic processes). Instead, Tolik sees Israel as increasingly resembling a morally dubious ethno-state, which internally incites violence upon ethnic minorities and externally subjugates Palestinians in the continued occupation of the West Bank and blockade of the Gaza Strip.

[337] Sternhell, 1997, 53

Analysing the collective memory of militarised societies that experience sustained violence over generations, Bar-Tal (2003) writes that "a culture of violence develops in response to the experiences of physical violence accumulated over time during intergroup conflicts, and is based on the subsequent evolved collective memory that preserves those experiences and their meanings . . . these powerful experiences touch society members emotionally, involve them, and permeate societal products, institutions and channels of communication, which then serve to maintain them as collective memory."[338] Essentially a vicious cycle, the society that experiences sustained violence – whether it be through war or inter-social conflict – is likely to spawn more acts of violence in a repeating pattern. This is also linked to siege mentality wherein perceived victimisation of the collective social or ethnic group is weaponised as a justification for violent acts against others, both internally and externally.[339]

Aside from the strategic and legal consequences of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Tolik alleges that the history of intermittent war, and Israel's subsequent militarisation of civil society, has cultivated an inherently violent public sphere within the country. Citing the popular anti-war slogan *ha'kibush mash'chit* (הכיבוש משחית – "the occupation corrupts"), this philosophical statement encapsulates the negative aspects of Israeli siege mentality, especially its relationship to militarisation and the role of cyclical violence that has permeated in the country since. When I asked him how he would define siege mentality in Israel, Tolik remarked that "it's basically the mindset that everyone is against you, and you can't trust anyone except your own people, so you need to be completely self-reliant. Danger is lurking in every corner . . . it's clear where [siege mentality in Israel] comes from . . . I can't judge it . . . [but] the question remains: what are you losing, what do you become blind to, when you believe that fully? . . . what does it make you do?"

The answer is presented midway through Tolik's interview in *Man Made*, in which he recalls attending a Tel Aviv immigrant rights rally in 2011 and the spasm of violence that saw counter-protestors viciously assault fellow Israelis, as well as anyone they perceived to be an illegal immigrant. The rank hypocrisy of the counter-protestors and their rioting in immigrant neighbourhoods draws obvious comparison to the *Kristallnacht* pogrom of 1938, and this was the moment that Tolik began "rethinking about the moral consequences of living [In Israel]". "The chickens came home to roost that night," he told me. "I saw my people behaving like Nazis . . . it looked like the victim imitating the abuser, and I knew we had come full circle as a society."

Tolik uses the example of Israeli ultra-nationalists viciously attacking immigrants and their own citizens as evidence of the deep-seeded violence that underpins Israeli consciousness. In *Man Made*, he asks, "How are we so easily incited to do these things?"[340] He adds, "Thinking that just the concept of being an occupier is corrupting to society . . . once you see it you can't un-see it . . . it's in how people drive, it's in how they act . . . everybody is a master, everybody is used to living in a macho society, dominated by violence and hierarchy, trying to be one step up on the ladder."[341] This sentiment is reminiscent of Eli's previous assertion that, counter-intuitively, the IDF does not teach teamwork. Instead, Tolik sees Israeli siege mentality operating on the individual level as well as a wider social phenomenon. He even sees it in himself, telling me that being in the anti-war movement created its own kind of siege mentality within Israel itself, freely admitting that, "I had all the symptoms . . . thinking everyone was out to get me and that the only solution was to be hostile and defensive. Obviously, this was limited to public discourse, but you can see the parallel."

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[338] Bar-Tal, 2003, 84
[339] Ibid., 86
[340] *Man Made*, 0h:39m:03s
[341] Ibid., 0h:30m:21s

After watching *Man Made*, I asked Tolik what he thought of his contribution to the final cut, and if he had any particular insight or had evolved his views in the intervening years. "I think I've finally figured out the relationship between Israel's history of war and the culture of violence than I talk about it in [*Man Made*] . . . violence is almost always an automated product of fear . . . organised violence, which war basically is, it's just an attempt to manage that fear, rather than overcome it . . . only when the wars stop happening, only then will Israeli society return to some sort of normalcy." For now, the situation was untenable – cyclical war and conflict was at the heart of Tolik's discomfort with continuing to live in Israel. Throughout the film, he asks repeatedly of himself how he could continue to reside in a country that he had broadly assessed as both unsustainable and inherently violent to itself and others. In late 2016, he moved to the United Kingdom, and is currently based in the United States with no plans to return to his country of birth.

Episode 2: The Reluctant Sons

"It's not even talked about…'
- Murat

Time in film: 0h:47m – 1h:18m
Filming Locations: Istanbul Askerî Müze, Beyoğlu, Kadıköy, Bebek, Yenikapı.

2.1 Istanbul and the Outsider's Gaze

As *The Three Sabras* fades to black, a long silence extends the intermission between the first and second episode of *Man Made*. After Eli's monologue in front of the war memorial, I wanted the viewer to contemplate the preceding moment, and sit in the emotional weight of the scene before beginning the next episode. In fact, this intermission is the longest in *Man Made*. Suddenly, a smash cut[342] and up-tempo traditional music reveals historic tourist footage of Istanbul in 1963. In a notable shift of tone, orientation and pace, this is the first demonstration of *Man Made's* episodic format, as well as the self-containment of each episode as a standalone vignette. Like *The Three Sabras* before it, *The Reluctant Sons* crucially serves as the viewer's formal introduction to one of two field sites (while the opening monologue contains cutaways of both cities, glimpses are abstract and fleeting). My awareness of this significant visual reveal led me to playfully begin the scene with an ironic juxtaposition: the fairy-tale Constantinople of Western popular imagination contrasted with the gritty, urban and thoroughly modern reality of a city that I called home for six years.

Ethnographic film and accurate representation of place: Like much of the Middle East, popular cinematic depictions of Istanbul and Turkey are somewhat sensationalised beyond any recognisable reality of the every-day. Whether it be documentary films, a new Hollywood blockbuster or a reality television series, cinematic portrayals of Istanbul tend to follow a persistent formula: the hustle bustle of urban congestion in the traditional Middle Eastern world, with lingering emphasis on customary visual elements of Ottoman and Islamic symbolism. From Joseph Pevney's *Istanbul* (1957), to Jules Dassin's *Topkapi* (1964) and climaxing spectacularly with Alan Parker's *Midnight Express* (1978) – popular visual representations of Istanbul are remarkably consistent in their superficial gaze and emphasis on orientalist cliché.

Through the lens of the Western gaze, these cinematic "visions of the East" (Bernstein, Studlar 1997) often evoke an exotic T.E. Lawrence-esque fantasyland: men standing in markets clad in fez and traditional dress – shouting as they brandish fistfuls of multi-coloured spices – women in black veils moving serpentine through labyrinthine alleyways, as the call to prayer echoes loudly across the dusty Ottoman cityscape. My self-awareness as a long-term foreign resident of Istanbul (and avid cinephile), led to considered aesthetic choices in my visual depiction of both field sites in *Man Made*. In preparation for my PhD fieldwork, my supervisor and I concurred that my cinematography should not devolve into a series of clichéd cinematic representations of Istanbul and Tel Aviv, but visually emphasise the everyday lived experience of my own life there – the places *I* visited, *my* jogging routes, and the various street corners nearby the homes of my informants. Moreover, we wanted to accurately represent the social strata and general demographic of my participants, i.e. the middle to upper-middle class, distinctly urban *İstanbullu* and *Sabras* of inner-city Istanbul and Tel Aviv.

[342] Film editing technical term for a sudden, unexpected change of the visual scene.

The eminent visual anthropologist David MacDougall (1992) regards the accurate representation of place and the "cultural style" of the field site a critical facet of qualified ethnographic film production.[343] "Films attempt to create a trajectory of understanding, beginning with images which make certain claims upon us", he writes in his essay *Complicities of Style,* a broader critique of ethnographic film's aesthetic artifice. MacDougall is himself an accomplished ethnographic filmmaker, and he encourages fellow anthropologists to come to terms with the various manipulations and deceptions that are requisite in the methodology of film production – including the selective lens with which the visual anthropologist captures the world. This subjectivity is unavoidable for MacDougall, who regards "the repertoire of shooting and editing techniques" of the anthropologist filmmaker as a tool of deliberate "exaggeration" – a manipulation of reality that places selective emphasis on what anthropologists view as important for their audience.[344]

I often think about my own "trajectory of understanding" when wielding the camera. While this was not my first ethnographic documentary based on Turkish subjects, I was nevertheless directorially sensitive to my portrayal of both field sites, aspiring for a visual representation of both cities that was accurate, detailed and reflective of the specific circumstances in which I had lived. I strived for the visual gaze of the film to reflect my own wandering eye – the landscapes I found personally beautiful, the secret balconies and panoramas that only a long-term resident could find. Superseding my desire for a "lived in" visual aesthetic, was an attempt to cinematically reflect my participant's gaze – most of whom had lived in Istanbul and Tel Aviv for much of their lives. As an informant who was born in Istanbul so aptly put it: *Max, make sure you show them how the city really looks to me, man! Make sure you show the garbage, the filth, the fucking traffic. If I see one shot of dervishes, baklava, or hear a line about how Istanbul "straddles two continents" in your movie, I'm going to fucking kill you.*

Indeed, throughout *Man Made* it is clear that the film's informants wield significant intellectual and theoretical influence over its trajectory. As a result, many of *Man Made*'s participants transcend the usual boundaries of the studied ethnographic subject and become influential co-theorists in the production of the final cut. Still, I felt self-conscious as the director of yet another *yabanci* (foreigner) film in Turkey, and that my outsider's gaze was condemned to misconstrue the true "cultural style" of both field sites. I aimed to resolve this tension by imbuing the film with various instances of directorial self-awareness. Drawing attention to the artifice of anthropological filmmaking in *Man Made* is expressed at various points in the film, most often through humour and cinematic reflexivity. The opening of *The Reluctant Sons* typifies this: a visual juxtaposition of mid-century, oriental Istanbul colliding wildly with "my" Istanbul of 2016 – grimy, commercial and just as I saw it. The traditional music is jettisoned for an informant's favourite club song from 2015 – the up-tempo EDM[345] track *Allahu Akbar* – featuring remixed Islamic declarations against a catchy drum and bass rhythm. While the scene is funny, it also feels authentic, lived in.

[343] MacDougall in Crawford, 1992, 91
[344] Ibid., 93-95
[345] Electronic Dance Music

This self-awareness as an outsider, coupled with my discomfort of the persistent "oriental tale"[346] that pervades cinematic representations of Istanbul, led me to mock the trope in this opening visual salvo. A fast-moving daytime supercut of Istanbul in all of its exaggerated exoticism is quickly discarded for a typical evening drive from Yenikapı to Beşiktaş. The historical footage demonstrates most cinematic clichés of Istanbul: the men are clad in traditional clothing, polishing melons and haggling, veiled women scurry just out of sight, mosques dominate the skyline as horse and buggies carry mysterious goods towards the local bazaar. This footage, shot by British Pathé as part of a 1963 travel series, is typical in its superficial pretence. A voiceover later actually promises that "these are Turkey's authentic back streets", whereas it was clearly shot in and around Sultanahmet, the infamous tourist trap of the city where a picture of genuine *İstanbullu* life is far from reach. With careful editing, precisely cut to the final beat of traditional music, the sun literally sets on this tired formula, giving way to the night-time reality of Istanbul in 2016. We speed through the city, the stereo blasting as we get bogged down in traffic.

This high energy introduction serves a secondary function to revealing Istanbul; it also introduces the first of three informants in *The Reluctant Sons*, as well as offering a rare glimpse of myself as director and anthropologist. The camera is briefly turned, showing both Yusuf[347] and I in his car, as we wait for a green light. The inclusion of this moment draws from the methodology of cinéma vérité – a genre that shares a kinship with ethnographic film production in its pursuit of everyday spontaneity that is not fabricated by the presence of the camera.[348] These in-between moments of *Man Made's* rigid sit-down interview format serve as a reminder to the viewer of my proximity to the informants, as well as the constant presence of the bulky camera.

Heider advocates for the anthropologist's presence in competent ethnographic film production, writing, "The very presence of outsiders, be they ethnographers carrying out their research or filmmakers making films, inevitably have a myriad of influences on the subjects' behaviour . . . the ethnographic presence is, after all, part of the behaviour being filmed, and so by including some of this in the film, we can see that part of the behaviour and form some idea of how it affected the rest."[349] This technique is obviously anathema to any narrative fiction film, but many ethnographic and documentary films strive to excise the presence of the director, camera operator and interviewer as well.

In *Man Made*, I have included several instances of traditionally excised behind the scenes footage that reveal my presence behind the camera, usually as I set up and fumble with my equipment. Pointing to the editorial manipulation of Robert Flaherty's *Nanook of the North* (1922), Heider emphasises anthropological sensitivity to "reconstruction and the ethnographic present".[350] In *Man Made,* reflections of myself are visible throughout the film, and in the car with Yusuf, I deliberately turn the camera onto both of us as he gauges my reaction to a song while we sit at a red light. These self-referential moments echo both MacDougall and Heider's philosophy on embracing the artifice of filmmaking and the reality of the ethnographic present. In scenes like this, there is acknowledgement that the camera is secondary to the anthropologist: it is demystified, a mere tool, akin to the pen and paper we use to scribble fieldnotes and nothing more.

[346] Said, 1979
[347] Name changed.
[348] De Brigard in Hockings, 1995, 36
[349] Heider, 2006, 67-69
[350] Heider, 2006, 22

In highlighting the pretence of ethnographic film production, Timothy Asch (1995) would regard the introduction of *The Reluctant Sons* as a mechanic of directorial selectivity. "It is the filmmaker and sound person who introduce selectivity: angling the camera, choosing the frame, focus, time, placement of microphone, and so on. What the camera describes is in large measure determined by the filmmaker – but not entirely. One can film things one did not intend to film, particularly when filming spontaneously occurring social interaction," he writes.[351] This inclusion of the ethnographic present is contrasted with the highly curated sequence that follows. In dramatic slow motion, Yusuf blows *nargile* (water pipe) smoke into the camera, and we both laugh as the scene fades to black. A moment of levity after the seriousness of *The Three Sabras*. The scene then smash cuts again, revealing the back of a red Ottoman military band leader. As he calls out to the rest of the musicians, *The Reluctant Sons* begins.

Kettle drums and fake moustaches (the military museum): In Harbiye, on the ceiling of the main performance hall of Istanbul's *Askerî Müze* (military museum), written in prominent capital letters is the phrase *TARİHİNİ BİLMEYEN BİR MİLLET, YOK OLMAYA MAHKUMDUR!* ('Those who forget their nation's history, are destined to die out!') This epigraph is attributed to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish republic, who ruled the country from its establishment in 1923 until his death in 1938. In the performance space just beneath the inscription, every day of the week (except Monday), a model *mehteran* (Ottoman ceremonial military band) appears from behind a tall red curtain, playing traditional marching, conquest and war songs. The band consists of a few dozen men, clothed in various ill-fitting uniforms and donning fake handlebar moustaches. After marching solemnly onto the stage, carrying banners in dramatic silence, they settle in a crescent moon formation, as the bandleader in the centre of the room conducts the musicians through a routine set list of historical classics. Rippling with aggressive, masculine energy, the men furrow their brows, smash their cymbals together and pound their kettle drums as screeching oboes and horns reverberate around the wood panelled auditorium.

The school children who visit the *Askerî Müze* are generally delighted, and the *mehteran* always stay behind after the performance to pose for selfies and handshakes. I have visited the *Askerî Müze* at least a dozen times in six years, and I try to never miss the *mehter takımı* (military band platoon) show. An open expression of Ottoman nostalgia in a militaristic setting, I have come to view the afternoon *mehteran* performance as a striking example of how Turkish militarism presents itself in childhood education through song, performance and pageantry. Throughout the recital, I frequently catch the faces of the school children, many of them mouthing the words soundlessly between laughs and smiles. Many refrains of the *mehteran* songs are common Islamic exhortations, which for children (and *yabancı* like me) are familiar and easy to remember. *Ya Allah bismillah Allahu akbar* (In the name of God, God is great) rings out as they bang their drums and scowl.

Upon admission to the museum, an attendant informs us that we will be taking a journey through time itself. Beginning in the Central Asian steppe of antiquity, the designated path of the museum winds through old passageways and grand exhibition halls, displaying huge dioramas of early Turkic conquests on the Silk Road, their triumphs in Mesopotamia and eventually culminating in their westward tribal migration to Anatolia and the establishment of the Ottoman Empire. Reflecting the Turkish History Thesis as refined by Atatürk and integrated into Turkish academia during the early 1930s,[352] the museum portrays the Turkish race as distinct from Anglo, Arab, and Asiatic civilisations, and insists on the Turkish race's superior warfare, culture and technology. This journey of the Turkish people, from disparate tribal warriors of the prairie land to an established Islamic empire that spanned Europe and Asia, is richly depicted and solemnly observed.

[351] Asch in Hockings, 1995, 338
[352] Altınay, 2004, 21

An overarching theme is one of constant progress for the Turks, as they bound effortlessly through history. The 1453 fall of Constantinople to Ottoman forces is emphasised, with multiple exhibition rooms filled with elaborate dioramas and huge works of art depicting Byzantine ruin as Ottoman catapults and cavalry lay siege. The consequent centuries of Ottoman rule and expansion bridge fluidly to modernity, with scant reference to the gradual decline of the sultanate. Instead, the unsubtle and ill-attended "Hall of the Armenian question" precedes a large World War I exhibit, which frames the Great War as a collective multi-national tragedy, exemplified by the Dardanelles Campaign (known as the Battle of Gallipoli in the Anglosphere), which pairs nicely with the rise of one Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the creation of modern Turkey.

The final wing preceding the *mehteran* show is dedicated to Operation Atilla, the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the only modern example of a sustained Turkish military offensive abroad. There are no references to the various coup d'états of 1960, 1971 and 1980, nor the significant counterinsurgency campaign waged against the Kurdish separatists in eastern Turkey, the longest military engagement in the history of the Turkish Armed Forces (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri* or TSK, anglicised as TAF).[353] Before one can exit through the gift shop, the daily *mehter takımı* show awaits. Placed at the end of this voyage through Turkish military history, I have often wondered about the curious positioning of the re-enactment of Ottoman marching songs in such a chronologically focussed museum.

It suggests that the apex of Turkish national pride supersedes the course of history itself. It is not the 21st century Turkish army that concludes the museum tour, but rather an expression of Ottoman military pageantry, performed underneath an explicit veneration of the past by Atatürk himself. This is a curious foregrounding of the militarised Turkish mindset – a celebration of the Ottoman Empire that is justified through the teachings and philosophy of Atatürk – a firm bridging of old-world nostalgia fused with modern Turkish militarism, and the nationalist ideology of Kemalism.

The *mehteran* performance and its place in the *Askeri Müze* also reveal a unique aspect of contemporary Turkish military culture: that even in the 21st century, the military still reveres the aesthetics and symbolism of the Ottoman Empire. It is generally understood that the founding Kemalists reviled the sultanate, characterising the family as a corrupt monarchy of antiquity that – through economic and social paralysis – was the bumbling architect of its own demise. Çağaptay (2016) writes how early Republican Turks viewed "the [Ottomans] as all about religious, anti-Western darkness – almost a Turkish version of the Salafists. Kemalism . . . was all about progressive secularism . . . after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, sweeping cultural reforms sought to permanently erase the style, aesthetic and even language of the new Turkey's imperial past."[354]

[353] Since 1984, over 30,000 have been killed in the broader Turkish-Kurdish conflict. For more, see Houston (2001, 2008), Lust (2013) and International Crisis Group (2017).
[354] Çağaptay, 2016, weblink: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/where-does-Erdoğan-want-to-take-turkey

The *Askeri Müze* suggests a substantial departure from this perspective. Indeed, Turkish nationalism and the state's militarist ideology frequently draw from the diverse and often opposing camps of Kemalist, Ottoman and Islamic symbolism and history. This patchwork of inspiration is highlighted following *The Reluctant Sons* introduction to Istanbul. After the brief monologue outlining my prior research on militarism and masculinity in the country, three eras of Turkish history are overlapped in quick succession:

1) The Ottoman *mehteran* performance, in all of its tired grandeur, representing the immediate pre-history of the Turkish republic.

2) A dramatisation of Atatürk himself, as he articulates key aspects of secular modernisation in the early 1920s, much to the chagrin of his confidants.

3) A recent firebrand speech from Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who, in his rise to power, has emerged as Turkey's most consequential leader since Atatürk himself. Erdoğan's bridging of the country's Islamic cultural identity with Turkish nationalism and nostalgia has been described by recent scholars as neo-Ottomanism.[355] Embodying the Kemalist notion of the *devlet baba,*[356] Erdoğan mirrors Atatürk in his broad cult of personality and totalitarian grip on the Turkish state.

The *mehteran* show begins this three-cut sequence. The performance is unenthusiastic, lethargic, and without precise context, somewhat surreal. This is contrasted with the high production value of *Veda* (2010), Zülfü Livaneli's slick biographical film of Atatürk's life, in which a young and handsome Mustafa Kemal confidently outlines the key features of the nation state that will replace the sultanate. For Atatürk, Westernisation and modernity were synonymous, with the adoption of a Latin alphabet and the forcible removal of Ottoman clothing in favour of European dress serving as critical aspects of Kemalist social reform. He speaks over the *mehteran* band, drowning their kettledrums out, with his measured and confident voice articulating the principles (*ilke*) of Kemalism, tracing the outline of the future national ideal.

Closing the sequence, Erdoğan stands atop a building, bellowing before an immense crowd. "In our homeland, no one can mess with us!" he exclaims. As the masses wave Turkish and Islamic flags, he lists the nation state's enemies. Inside, outside, real, imagined; enemies of the state are seemingly all around. As his voice cracks, he finishes with a scream of "*Topunuz gelin*!" (bring it on) and the crowd chants the same Islamic refrain as the *mehteran* band. Both chants overlap, and the scene circles back to the *Askeri Müze*, where the *mehteran* band now poses for selfies with tourists and small children.

[355] White, 2014, 50
[356] Literally "state as the father", as cited by White, 2010, 229

White (2010) has written about Turkey's dependence on what she calls "a homogenization of the rhetoric of fear"[357] in the maintenance of its national identity. In Turkey, times of crisis, panic and war are often a rich source of nationalist energy, with patriotic demonstrations, songs and ceremony a common means of expression. In Turkey, "nationalism implies control—of the body, of national boundaries, and of boundaries of the body", says White.[358] In the three intercut scenes at the beginning of *The Reluctant Sons,* the viewer is privy to this persistent sense of crisis (real or imagined), that has preoccupied Turkey since its founding. A tireless "fear and loathing of the national imagination"[359] has perpetuated a militarised national identity, from the *mehteran* songs celebrating Ottoman conquest and Islamic pride, to Erdoğan's blistering depiction of a country under siege.

This bifurcated nationalist past has usually seen Atatürk and the Kemalists at its forefront, but White has observed a change in the 21st century. She notes, "In their search for an authentic identity, [Turkish] people are turning to the pre-republican past for discourses on which to model the self within the nation."[360] As a result, Ottoman culture in Turkey has seen a political revival in recent decades, with nostalgia for the period emerging as a counter-Islamic nationalism of sorts, increasingly wielded by religious conservatives to combat the orthodoxy of secular Kemalism. Tracing the development of this "Muslim nationalism" in modern Turkey, White describes how:

> *"The AKP [Justice and Development Party] and its pious supporters, have developed and implemented an unorthodox alternative definition of Turkishness and the nation that imagines Turkey not as a nation embattled within its present political borders but as a flexibly bounded Turkey that is the self-confident successor to the Ottomans in a rediscovered (and reinvented) past. The new Turkish identity, which I call Muslim nationalism, is that of a pious Muslim Turk whose subjectivity and vision for the future is shaped by an imperial Ottoman past overlaid onto a republican state framework but divorced from the Kemalist state project."* [361]

The complication of resurgent Ottomanism as a new Turkish nationalism with an Islamic twist is one facet of Turkey's constantly evolving nationalist identity. Since its intellectual establishment in the early 1900s, the complex nature of "Turkishness" has been shaped by turbulent politics, international and domestic conflicts, and a seesawing power struggle between the state military and the government's attempts at legitimate, multi-party democracy. Even after the nation state and its ideology were consolidated in 1923, the hegemony of Kemalism was challenged immediately, from early Kurdish independence movements (Houston, 2001), to radical Marxist-Leninist insurgents (Landau, 1997) to factional Islamic revivalism (Karasipahi, 2009, White, 2013).

[357] White, 2010, 215
[358] Ibid., 233
[359] Ibid.
[360] Ibid., 226
[361] White, 2014, 9

While these overt political challenges to Kemalist orthodoxy have been analysed comprehensively by scholars, *The Reluctant Sons* instead offers three ethnographic portraits of male resistance to Turkish nationalism and conscription that is somewhat apolitical. As a preamble to my analysis of their interviews, I will first survey the foundation of Turkish national identity, focussing specifically on Atatürk's cultural reforms and his namesake philosophy, Kemalism. I contend that whilst Kemalism was a semi-successful reformist ideology that cultivated a secular, militarised ethno-state for the Turkish people, it also birthed a hegemonic mono-culture that has long stifled minority rights and individual self-expression in the country. A century on, I have observed in my Turkish participants a perceptible discontent with this nationalist mono-culture and its associative demand of mandatory military service as a pathway to manhood and citizenship.

2.2 Turkish National Consciousness Part II

The education of Atatürk, the making of Kemalism and the rise of modern Turkishness: 1881 – 1938.

At its outset, the social reforms and ideology of Kemalism were chiefly disseminated through two key institutional channels: the modernised, centralised public education system of the new republic (*Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı*) and the state military – both examples of Foucault's (1977) theory of state disciplinary dissemination, "the art of distributions".[362] Ethnic and religious minorities, alternative political discourse and even homosexuality were all suppressed as a result of gradual Kemalist cultural homogenisation and its nationalist, militarist discourse.[363] Alongside the crushing of minority independence movements in the country, any individualist self-expression that deviated from Turkish national hegemony was demonised and punished. Over successive generations, Atatürk's Kemalist ideology transfused slowly from the political intelligentsia of the early republic, and into the veins of Turkish society and culture.

In its wake, the Turkish national identity was solidified, and conscription emerged as a central tenant of masculinity and a requirement of full citizenship in the lifecycle of the healthy Turkish man. In the manner of Foucault's description of the 18th century soldiers of the industrial era, Turkish military service rendered its male citizens as "something that can be made; out of a formless clay, an inapt body, the machine required can be constructed; posture is gradually corrected; a calculated constraint runs slowly through each part of the body, mastering it, making it pliable, ready at all times, turning silently into the automatism of habit; in short, one has 'got rid of the peasant' and given him 'the air of a soldier'".[364]

By the time of Atatürk's untimely death in 1938, there was a clear outline of who, and what, the ideal man was in Turkish society. In my years of fieldwork in Istanbul, I regard this standardised Turkish man as largely unchanged from those first decades: he is a secular, ethnically Turkish, heterosexual, nominally Sunni Muslim trained soldier of the state. As the participants of *The Reluctant Sons* and *The Pink Certificate* show, this fixed hegemony of the ideal Turkish man is not only still enforced, but also easily destabilised by acts of individualism and self-expression. Whether it be one's discomfort with Turkish ethno-nationalism, resistance to mandatory military service, non-heterosexuality, or simply being born as an ethnic minority in the country – aberration from the national ideal in Turkey can have dire consequences for the individual male. As a participant summarised in my previous film *Making Men in Turkey:* "Being anything in Turkey is difficult, you know?"[365]

From the ashes of empire: On October 29, 1933, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ascended the dais of the Ankara hippodrome and gave the last great speech of his lifetime. In front of a cluster of microphones, the face of the Turkish republic orated in celebration of his nation's ten-year anniversary. While his remarks were brief, much of Atatürk's 10 *Yıl Nutku* speech would be memorialised and celebrated for the next century. His voice rising in emotion, but with an unmistakable fatigue in its delivery, the father of modern Turkey opined, "We have accomplished many and great tasks in a short time. The greatest of these is the Turkish republic, the basis of which is Turkish heroism and the great Turkish culture . . . we owe this achievement to the cooperative progress of the Turkish nation and its valuable army."[366]

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[362] Foucault 1977, 173
[363] Aksin, 2007, 206-224
[364] Foucault, 1977, 167
[365] *Man Made*, 0h:51m:25s
[366] Translated from original speech: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UqoRYNU1_JA

Atatürk's reasoning that the establishment of the Turkish republic was synonymous with the state military was not without merit. Founded in the wake of a war of independence fought mainly against Greek irregulars, Atatürk and his army restored Turkish military dominance on the western coastline, occupying Izmir by 1922. In ten years, they consolidated the final borders of Turkish Anatolia and received international recognition in 1923 with the decisive Treaty of Lausanne. After declaring national sovereignty for the ethnicity of the Turkish people, Atatürk and his government set to work.

In bridging the historical founding of the Turkish republic with my ethnographic fieldwork of young men and their experiences with military service in Istanbul, I have found Ayşe Altınay's *The Myth of the Military Nation* (2004) and Jenny White's *Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks* (2013) particularly instructive. Additionally, Erik-Jan Zürcher's *The Young Turk Legacy* (2010), M. Şükrü Hanioğlu's *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography* (2011) and Jacob M. Landau's *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation* (1995) were foundational texts in my research on the ideological origins of Kemalism, its founder, and the early 20th century construction of Turkish nationalism. Despite the graceful linear history depicted in the *Askeri Müze*'s exhibition halls, the modern republic and its revolutionary Kemalist ideology did not begin with one man, or in 1923. Rather, the secular Republic of Turkey (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*) was an idea first seeded in the late 19th century. First during Atatürk's upbringing in Salonica (now Thessaloniki) and later during his military education in Constantinople (now Istanbul), whispers of a post-Ottoman state in Anatolia and the very concept of Turkishness emerged in the final decades of the Ottoman Empire.

The Turkish nation in arms and the education of young Mustafa Kemal: While the radical Kemalist reforms of the Turkish republic (1923-1938) came to epitomise Atatürk's inclination for sweeping social and cultural engineering in the name of modernisation, nationalism and Turkish pride, it is essential to appreciate the early education and military training that shaped his thinking. Enrolling in the *Manastır Askerî İdadisi* (Monastir Military High School) when he was 15 years old, the young Mustafa Kemal was ensconced within the ideals – and subsequent suppression – of the Tanzimat reform era brought on by the repressive sultanate. As Kinross (1964) notes, "Kemal had been born into an age in which tyrannical reaction had arrested a process of liberal advancement. Since the French Revolution . . . the Ottoman Empire had been pursuing a chequered but continuous course from a medieval theocracy towards some form of modern constitutional state."[367]

Just a few years after Mustafa Kemal was born, the spirit of the Tanzimat (reorganisation) era had reached the Ottoman military, and its ideological reformation began. Hanioğlu (2011) relates how in 1883–84, "the celebrated German theorist Colmar Von der Goltz led a restructuring of the Ottoman Royal Military Academy on the model of his home institution, the *Kriegsakademie* of Berlin". Goltz was brought to Constantinople primarily as an advisor, but his militarised social Darwinist philosophy would have a profound influence on the officer class he presided over, in turn influencing the future architects of Kemalism. The author of *Das Volk in Waffen* (The Nation in Arms, 1883), Goltz argued that "since war in the modern age meant a struggle between entire nations, not merely their armies, it was incumbent upon the military elite to go beyond its traditional role in society and help guide the ship of state. Military commanders . . . ought to be more than loyal servants of the state; in fact, a 'superior position in the state' was 'of necessity the natural due of officers as a class'."[368]

[367] Kinross, 1964, 41
[368] Hanioğlu, 2011, 34

Despite his invitation to Constantinople by the Sultan himself, Goltz was openly hostile to his rule, writing that "as long as Sultan Abdulhamid and the present ruling classes remain at the rudder, one may not speak of the rescue of Turkey".[369] Goltz achieved renown amongst his Ottoman military pupils over the twelve years he spent amongst them, and his protégés came to be known as the "Goltz generation".[370] Revered by his students and subordinates, Goltz imprinted his ethos onto the Ottoman military intelligentsia, who by the 20th century's dawn regarded themselves as an elite bastion uniquely capable of ensuring the state's survival. During his own studies, Mustafa Kemal was not immune and "caught the prevailing infection of popular ideas"[371] in the barracks. It was here that the seeds of state secularism, ethnic pride and nationalism were planted in his mind.

Studying in the grand halls of the Harbiye military college, Mustafa Kemal encountered ideological reciprocity in the highly agitated officer class. At the turn of the 19th century, the Ottoman military elite were collectively poised against the monarchy and had begun forming secret societies, with murmurs of outright mutiny in the air.[372] This discontent would eventually culminate in the Young Turk revolution of 1908, forcing the monarchy into a second constitutional era, allowing the previously underground Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) to emerge as one of the country's first openly ultranationalist political movements.

Hanioğlu describes the curious tension of Atatürk's contrasting influences of the Tanzimat movement and the radical European ethno-militarist philosophies of Goltz, which had penetrated the Ottoman officer class. "Although the Tanzimat reforms of the mid-nineteenth century sought to promote equality among Ottoman subjects of various religions, and to reduce the chasm between the ruling class and the masses, the creation of a new Western-style army drove a wedge between the new military elite and the rest of society."[373] Mustafa Kemal was sensitive to this divide, and it is worth noting that while he respected the philosophy of elitist military theories of Goltz and Le Bon, "he believed that the crude intervention of the military in politics, through routine coup d'états and the extreme politicization of the military, would prove detrimental to the army as an institution, preventing it from focussing on its genuine military and social roles."[374]

The intellectual architecture of Turkish nationalism: Alongside the fermenting revolutionary discourse within the officer class, key figures would emerge out of the Young Turk revolution that would influence Mustafa Kemal and his contemporaries. The sociologist Mehmed Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924) principally worked on articulating Turkish exceptionalism within the Ottoman Empire through the "culture, language and common ideals" of ethnic nationalism, and his writing drew Mustafa Kemal in as both a keen pupil and political confidant.[375] Though they would later disagree on Islam's place in the future Turkish state, Gökalp intellectually drafted what would eventually become Atatürk's carefully curated Turkish History Thesis.

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[369] Goltz, translated in Nezir-Akmese, 2005, 23
[370] Ibid.
[371] Kinross, 1964, 44
[372] Ibid., 41
[373] Hanioğlu, 2011, 35
[374] Ibid., 45
[375] Karasipahi, 2009, 13

Alongside Gökalp, another disaffected Ottoman intellectual would deliver a seminal political vision of the post-sultanate polity. In 1904, proto-Turkish nationalist Yusuf Akçura (1878-1935) outlined what he regarded as the three most viable models of a new state to emerge out of the failing Ottoman Empire. Publishing his essay *Uc Tarzı Siyaset* (Three Policies) from Cairo, Akçura listed three doctrines – or possible futures – which could transition the Sultanate into a modern nation state. Akçura argued that the only avenues for continued sovereignty were either a heavily modified post-monarchic Ottoman state, an outright Islamic theocracy, or the creation of an altogether new ethno-state that prioritised the Turkish race. While the first two strived to modify the existing Ottoman Empire based on its multicultural demography, it was the third future – a nation state crafted strictly upon the Turkish ethnicity – that radically narrowed the scope and inclusivity of a post-Ottoman state, reflecting the growing ethno-nationalist sentiment amongst Turkish intellectuals and military intelligentsia of the early 20th century.

Akçura concluded that the adoption of Turkism was the only real "opportunity for union" for the people of Anatolia in a future nation state. Landau describes this shift in strategy, noting that by 1904, "a national union of all Turkic groups as a 'closed circle' with Turkey as its centre . . . was the coherent alternative to Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism . . . due to its feasibility and its usefulness for the Empire's survival."[376] By the end of World War I, Ottomanism was thoroughly condemned, large swathes of extant territory were either lost or seceded, and the population of non-Muslims had declined significantly. In short, Anatolia was ripe for the emergence of a distinctly Turkish nation state in the wake of the Great War, and in almost the exact conditions as outlined by Akçura nearly two decades prior. Soner Çağaptay writes, "Although the Ottoman state disappeared, it left behind an important legacy. First, a politically active Turkish-Muslim community had been consolidated in Anatolia. Second, Turkish nationalism had emerged as a force to be reckoned with. Third, the population of Turkey had been transformed dramatically, with a sharp drop in the number of Christians. In the interim, large groups of non-Turkish Muslims had been dispersed among ethnic Turks, where they could be assimilated. Finally, Anatolia was less Christian and more Turkish now than before."[377]

The first years of the republic & the birth of Kemalism: In the spring of 1919, the May tulips would have just begun to bloom in Smyrna (now Izmir), when proto-Turkish nationalist Hasan Tahsin raised his gun and shot at invading Greek forces. For historians, Tahsin's gunshot marked the beginning of the Greco-Turkish war.[378] As the Allies only occupied Constantinople and the Bosphorus Strait, they would become increasingly uneasy with their occupational prospects for wider Anatolia, as the Turkish National Movement (*Türk Ulusal Hareketi*, acronymized as TNM in English) and its militia gained momentum. Driving French and Greek forces back to the Aegean, the TNM were buoyed by victory, further evolving their ideological ethno-nationalism in the process. By 1923, the Allies would abandon Anatolia all together, in a withdrawal evocative of the later British evacuation of Palestine. The Allied capitulation had cemented Turkish national sovereignty, as well as the ascendancy of one Mustafa Kemal. Though the Grand National Assembly would not formally style him as the "father of all Turks" (Atatürk) until 1934,[379] he was the intellectual and political centre of the country from its outset, and would remain so long after his death.

[376] Landau, 1994, 14
[377] Çağaptay, 2006, 10
[378] Aksin, 2007, 125
[379] Mango, 1999, 10

In the end, it took only half a decade to violently conclude seven centuries of Ottoman rule. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne would formally recognize the Turkish state's independence along with its new borders. In the same year, the last sultanate of the Ottoman Empire was officially dissolved, and the Turkish Grand National Assembly replaced the monarchy with single party rule under Atatürk's own Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*). The threat of a balkanisation into colonial statelets loomed large in the minds of the national assembly. As Landau writes, "The defeat and break-up of the Ottoman Empire discredited the main political ideologies which had been prevalent during its later years. Ottomanism had lost its very *raison d'être*; and neither Pan-Islamism nor Pan-Turkism had succeeded in saving [it]."[380]

Ottomanism was jettisoned from any future state plan in Anatolia, with Turkism and rapid social modernisation remaining the priority of the nascent Kemalist government. Here a critical aspect of Turkish national hegemony emerges. As it was intellectually forged in the elite military academies and social circles of late 19th century Constantinople, Turkish nationalism was not widely known or understood outside of the urban intelligentsia of Western Anatolia. Instead, Kemalism and Turkism reflected a narrow world view that the elite would imminently impose onto a former empire of disparate multicultural populations. Alaranta describes how the Kemalists assumed intellectual and moral superiority over the greater population, seeing themselves as an elite authoritative class that would remake Ottoman society and culture.

This sense of superiority drove the Kemalists to radically remodel the people of Anatolia in their idealised image. The result is amongst the most remarkable and explicit projects of modern social engineering and cultural revolution as deployed by Atatürk and his first government of Kemalist architects. The rapid "Turkification" of the state first involved immediate historical revisionism, as well as the deployment of key social reforms throughout the nation. For example, Altınay points out that the War of Independence was initially framed as a struggle for "the Anatolian and Rumeli Muslim people'', and not solely for the Turkish ethnicity or its aspirational statehood.[381] She continues, "By the early 1930s, not only had the war been re-conceived as a Turkish War of Independence, but the existence of all other 'Muslim elements' as distinct ethnic groups . . . had become silenced."[382] This inconsistency highlights the dissonance between the initial goal of the TNM (i.e. the liberation of Anatolia from foreign invaders) and the creeping ethno-nationalism that would, from 1923 onward, rewrite the immediate past and deem large segments of the post-Ottoman citizenry as unassimilated strangers.

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the state project of historical and cultural revisionism would climax. Ideologically codified first in 1931, the publication of the six "arrows" (*ilke*, principles) of Kemalism were as follows:

Republicanism (*Cumhuriyetçilik*)
Populism (*Halkçılık*)
Nationalism (*Milliyetçilik*)
Secularism (*Laiklik*)
Statism (*Devletçilik*)
Reformism (*Devrimcilik*)[383]

[380] Landau, 1994, 74
[381] Altınay, 2004, 19
[382] Ibid.
[383] Ahmad, 2003, 88 and Zürcher, 2004, 181

Atatürk's government did not lay out these doctrines clearly in advance of the republic's formation, or through much of the 1920s as various social reforms were enacted. Nevertheless, the critical faculties of Kemalism were intellectually seeded decades prior. This was reflected throughout the independence war, as Atatürk's oratories refined his demands for Turkish ethnic and political sovereignty, rapid modernisation and secularism in the public domain. Landau describes, "As early as 1921, Mustafa Kemal declared 'Neither Islamic Union nor Turanism may constitute a doctrine of logical policy for us . . . henceforth the government policy of the new Turkey is to consist in living independently, relying on Turkey's own sovereignty within her national frontier.'"[384] By shunning existing cultural traditions and religious beliefs in Anatolia, Atatürk focussed instead on carving out an independent Turkish state that would prioritise Turkish hegemony and modernisation above all else.

Laiklik and cultural revolution in Anatolia: The Kemalist project of state secularism (*laiklik*) bore great consequences for the cultural and political makeup of Turkish society – particularly its interior population, which consisted of disparate religious and ethnic minorities. Laiklik had begun as an ideological goal of the Young Turk Revolution, but at the time it was deemed unfeasible given the deeply entrenched religious traditions of the Ottoman citizenry. Under Kemalism, however, state secularism became an institutional authority in the country, and in 1924 the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*, Diyanet or DRA) was inaugurated. The DRA set about radically streamlining the religious lives of citizens within the nation's borders, orienting them in favour of Turkish ethno-nationalist hegemony, including the gradual diminishing of Islam in public and private life. However, as Karasipahi notes, large swathes of the country exhibited little desire for secular modernisation, and lacked the fervour of Turkish nationalism that had gripped Western Anatolia and its urban populations during the post-war period.[385]

Houston (2001) styles the imposition of secularism on the wider Turkish population as part of the Kemalist "Turkish enlightenment"[386] noting, "In its bid to create civilization, and in its corresponding attack on religion and the memory of religious constructions of identity, the state took upon itself the task of liberating the people from tradition."[387] Houston is alluding not only to *laiklik*, but also to the broader Kemalist social reforms that aimed to taper ethnic expression and multiculturalism in Anatolia. However, as Karasipahi and Azak (2010) write, the Kemalist secularisation of Anatolia often stumbled and occasionally failed completely. Rather than simply banning religious observance or Islam outright, Azak writes how "the Kemalist regime incorporated Islam in its secularist discourse and promoted a national, *vernacular* Islam. That discourse was articulated in a state-secular project of controlling and steering religious practice, thus fostering 'good Muslims' praying in Turkish and understanding the 'rational' essence of Islam."

[384] Landau, 1994, 74
[385] Karasipahi, 2009, 30-39
[386] Houston, 2001, 88-90
[387] Ibid., 88

This curious rationalisation that eschewed centuries of Islamic belief in favour of a newly interpreted, Turkish oriented "vernacular" Islam, was typified in the Kemalist reconfiguration of the *ezan* (*adhan* in Arabic, Islamic call to prayer) in 1932. Preceding the establishment of the modern Turkish alphabet and language in the early 1930s, it was as early as 1924 that the Kemalists experimented with translating the Koran into a simplified, unauthorised Turkish version for recitation in the country.[388] A remarkable shunning of fundamental Islamic doctrine which emphasises the Prophet Muhammad's native Arabic as the authoritative word of God,[389] this was an early example of the Kemalist weaponisation of linguistics for the purposes of cultural and ethnic hegemony.

It was ironically within the mosque that the DRA communicated Kemalist policies, including aspects of ideological secularism. The DRA achieved this by taking over the traditional *hutbe* (Friday sermon within the mosque). The *hutbe* is a traditional Islamic oratory that preludes Friday ritual prayers – the DRA used *hutbe* as a means of broadcasting state policies and Kemalist ideology in mosques throughout the country.[390] Cleaving the *hutbe* into two sections, Azak writes:

> *"While the first part of the sermon, mentioning the Prophet, his companions and the caliphs, continued to be in Arabic, the second part in Turkish dealt with issues that related to daily activities and included subjects such as the 'exultation of the new government, the Grand National Assembly, and the principle of the integral sovereignty of the nation.'"* [391]

What is apparent here is the unscrupulous means with which Kemalism and the republic commandeered Islamic ceremony and ritual to further state secularism and Turkish hegemony. While traditional aspects of Islam are popularly understood as anathema to Atatürk and the state polity, the Kemalists in fact came to inhabit various aspects of Islamic ritual tradition in the early years of the republic, harnessing the discursive power of organised religion as a means of furthering their policies and ideology. This effort climaxed in 1932 when Atatürk directly ordered the daily *ezan*, or Islamic call to prayer, to be chanted compulsorily in modern Turkish.[392] A feature of Atatürk's ambitious language reform project, his orders to extend modern Turkish directly to the minaret marked the first time any state or government in the Muslim world had ever enforced a translation of the prayer's traditional Arabic.[393]

The results were disastrous. The new, modern Turkish translation of a fundamental feature of Islamic worship went so far as to exclude the traditional Islamic name of God (Allah), instead restricting the *muezzin* to recite, with a state composed melody,[394] *tanrı uludur* (God is great), a neologism of its time that still makes little sense to native Turkish speakers today.[395] This explicit disconnect from the broader *Ümmet* reflected how the ideology of Ziya Gökalp continued to inform Atatürk and the Kemalists – an incremental suppression of Islam from Turkish public life as opposed to an outright, sweeping ban of its practise. Indeed, it was Gökalp who coined the phrase *Dini Türkçülük* (Turkish nationalism in religion) to reflect his vision of a diminished, ceremonial Islam in the Turkish nation state.[396]

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[388] Azak, 2010, 49
[389] Leaman, 2006, 50
[390] Kedourie, 2005, 66
[391] Azak, 2010, 49
[392] Ibid., 54
[393] Vanderlippe, 2012, 191-192
[394] Zürcher, 2004, 193
[395] McPherson, 2011, 6
[396] Azak, 2010, 47-48

Ultimately, the Turkish *ezan's* recitation was short-lived, with the DRA underestimating the collective outrage that emerged in its wake. Resistance quickly spread to multiple cities across the country, with mosques reverting back to the traditional Arabic recitation, whilst calling for freedom of religious expression and snap protests against the state.[397] Whereas *laïcité* emphasised the clear separation of church and state, the Kemalists selectively inhabited various aspects of traditional Islamic life in Turkey, a compromise that broadcasted nationalist ideology as well as curtailed the competitive cultural identity of Islam in the country.

The result is visually evidenced in *The Reluctant Sons*, where Islam and *laiklik* continue to be strange bedfellows in contemporary Turkish militarism and national identity. Islamic prayers occur at military funerals and religious imagery often features in nationalist television advertisements. Unsuccessful in truly assimilating the rural, traditionally religious and multi-cultural swathes of Anatolia, Kemalist social reforms instead cultivated a hybrid state secularism with a "vernacular" Islam, culturally policing the Muslim population from the first years of the republic. Alongside the linguistic hegemony of the Turkish language reform, mandatory institutional programs of education and conscription, the state sought to generate a complex – and at times paradoxical – ideal Turkish citizen.

Individual and collective resistance to Turkish national hegemony first dogged the Kemalists, and continued well beyond the one party period. In particular, the forced project of state Turkish-Islam antagonised millions of Anatolians (including the Kurds), setting a precedent for civil agitation and ethnic cultural assertion that has persisted throughout the nation's history. From early Kurdish revolts, to the urban activism that sought to change the country in the 1970s, right through to the handful of individuals that appear in *Man Made,* various avenues of individual and collective resistance to the Turkish nationalist project have materialised since the state's founding.

[397] Ibid.

Atatürk leads Anatolia to its own "Lady Liberty". Note the book *Türk Tarihi* (Turkish History) held aloft in front. *İnkılap Yolunda, (On the Way to the Revolution) by Zeki Faik İzer, 1933* (Scan: isteaturk.com)

The elusive Turkish military in *Man Made*: In 2011, I was in the final months of production for my undergraduate honours thesis film *Making Men in Turkey* (2012). Roaming the streets of Beyoğlu and Kadıköy between participant interviews, I came to befriend a taxi driver who I will call Turgay. Turgay was typical of Istanbul's famous warmth and hospitality toward foreigners. We chatted every other day as I walked past his cab rank on the way to the metro station, and we gradually became friends. I would linger by his usual bench for longer stretches of time, sharing a quick cup of tea before going on my way. Turgay had a high school-level education, was born and raised in Istanbul, and had recently completed his military service. While he described to me in great detail the negative aspects of daily life during his service – the boredom, the monotonous routines, missing certain foods and home comforts – Turgay also spoke affectionately about the friends he made there, and the sense of accomplishment that came with its successful completion.

He still wore his dog tags around his neck and would open his flip phone, showing me videos and photos from his military service, one of which is included in the final cut of *Man Made* (his face obscured as he goofs around with a rifle).[398] Turgay described with relish his family's pride and his girlfriend's admiration when he finally returned home. "Now I can get married – I just need to save up some extra cash!" he would joke to me. Turgay spoke little English, and our relationship was firmly built on the symbiotic value of language exchange, and our mutually gregarious personalities. As we often met on my way to formal ethnographic encounters, Turgay contrasted significantly with my scheduled participant interviews.

[398] *Man Made,* 1h:06m:39s.

Cast against my intense sit downs with conscientious objectors, LGBTI rights activists and radical leftists, talking to Turgay and his comparatively benign experience with conscription struck me, and I began to question the focus of my own fieldwork. At the conclusion of this particular fieldwork stint, and after much cajoling, I compelled Turgay to appear on camera and outline why he thought conscription was a valuable experience for the average Turk. He eagerly agreed – but asked that his face be blurred in the final cut.

His contribution was remarkable in its banality. As soon as the camera was recording, Turgay stated quite rigidly a series of familiar talking points about conscription in Turkey. "It is good for the country, for the nation. It is a long tradition that Turks are warriors, and I am glad to have served," he would say, slowly and carefully and with a look on his face like he was in a hostage video. I will not recite all of our conversation, but it was impersonal, uninteresting and distinctly un-ethnographic. It felt rehearsed and undermined our months long relationship, despite my attempt at firm lines of questioning. *But how did it make you feel, Turgay, to go through your military service? You have told me at various points how you felt your time served was very boring, very pointless. Do you think conscription is still valuable in 2011?* These admittedly leading questions would only elicit a pained look on Turgay's face, and he would stay silent. "I can't say how I really feel, Max," he would later tell me. "What if they [the TAF] saw me? Even with my face blurred, they have ways of finding you. I'm sorry I can't be more honest – it's not just me – you won't find anyone in Turkey who will criticise it openly… I don't want to go to jail, man." I cut the recording and told him not to worry.

While *The Reluctant Sons* shares the triptych format of its predecessor, it notably lacks a balancing participant like Turgay who could potentially offer a nuanced, positive description of conscription in Turkey. Despite conducting interviews with Turkish military representatives, a retired TAF *yarbay* (lieutenant colonel) as well as the son of a high ranking TAF official, these interviews lacked the ethnographic depth that is consistent with the rest of the film. The valuable conversations I had were either off the record, given on deep background,[399] or audio only. This was extremely disappointing, as I had initially hoped that a pro-TAF informant would feature prominently in the final cut of *Man Made.* Learning from my misadventure with Turgay (who declined to take part in *Man Made* with any new interview material), I felt I was better prepared to seek out and work with an informant who could offer an insider's perspective on the TAF, and a positive rationalisation for military service in Turkey.

Unfortunately, despite three years of attempted cultivation, a frank and personal contribution from such an informant never materialised, although at times I came very close. The *yarbay* I interviewed insisted that we speak over the phone and on deep background, acquiescing that while I could record our conversation's audio, he reserved the right to review any included material that was drawn from our interviews. We discussed the nature of anthropology and the methodology of ethnographic fieldwork, which he came to appreciate and understand as distinct from investigative journalism (an occupation I was often mistaken for having). *You will be very unlikely to ever have this "in depth [ethnographic] encounter" . . . with a serving officer of the TSK, or anyone close to it,* he told me in our third taped conversation. *Not only is it strictly against the rules and regulations of the TSK, but it is also very unsafe for you to be asking these questions – I would recommend against it for your own sake.*[400]

[399] Associated Press sourcing method: "The information can be used but without attribution. The source does not want to be identified in any way, even on condition of anonymity." Weblink: https://www.ap.org/about/news-values-and-principles/telling-the-story/anonymous-sources
[400] I have editorialised these remarks upon request of the participant.

Encounters such as these indicated that by 2015, it was clear where the strength of my research in Istanbul lay, and so I decided to focus the final edit of *Man Made* on those informants who spoke exclusively against military service. In the end, I resolved the pronounced absence of the TAF in *Man Made* with the same technique deployed in the film's Israeli episodes, which also lacks an official perspective from within the IDF. After viewing years of both militaries' significant public relations and multimedia archives, it dawned on me that many of these advertisements, social media updates and other short films produced by the IDF and TAF spoke to the nature and ideals of each institution quite clearly. By including them, I could comfortably eschew my glib IDF and TAF public relations interviews in *Man Made,* and devote more screen time to comprehensive informants.

The final cut of *The Reluctant Sons* contains multiple inserts of TAF multimedia, which are deliberately contrasted against my interviews with three participants who have actively resisted military service in uniquely separate circumstances. Cumulatively, these participants represent different avenues of ideological and pragmatic resistance to conscription in Turkey. Notably absent is the subject of homosexuality and military service exemption on psychological grounds; this topic is saved for the final Turkish episode of *Man Made,* where it is examined as a standalone phenomenon.

The military nation: A self-described "military nation"[401] since its founding in 1923, Turkey has forged much of its national identity on two key principles: the ethnic pride and attached mythology of Turkish exceptionalism, and a reliance on a highly visible state militarism.[402] Alongside nationalism and state secularism, a crucial institutional mechanism of the French republican model was mandatory military service for civilians of the state, with national defence assured as long as there was a highly militarised citizenry. Conscription in Turkey preceded the Kemalists, with institutional reforms of the Tanzimat period (1839-1876) adopting mass conscription in the Ottoman Empire in 1844,[403] resulting in a unified army for the sultanate that was based on Western models. With Atatürk's pedigree as a distinguished veteran of the Ottoman military elite, it was not a surprise when the Turkish National Movement (*Türk Ulusal Hareketi*) formally modernised Ottoman military service by enacting the Turkish law of conscription in 1919. The law required all healthy men aged 21 to 46 to enlist in the military for a minimum of 18 months of service. While the fixed duration as well as the mechanisms for exemption have varied in Turkey over time, the law itself has remained in place ever since.[404]

A century later, what began as an institutional tool requisite for any self-reliant nation state of the late 19th century had evolved instead into a highly symbolic and deeply valued rite of passage in Turkey. My research interprets Turkish conscription as a highly ritualised and thoroughly venerated phenomenon, transcending mere bureaucratic process and civil service, and instead taking on elements of the divine. Burrowed deeply into the collective Turkish psyche, reverence around military service suggests spiritual as well as nationalist importance. "*Her Türk asker doğar*" (Every Turk is born a soldier) is a common maxim in the country, implying a deterministic relationship between ethnicity and conscription. However, I concur with Ayşe Gül Altınay, who regards this as an oversimplification and part of an artificial narrative of the early Kemalist polity, or what she calls "the myth of the military nation" in Turkey.

[401] Altınay, 2004
[402] See prior excerpts of Atatürk's 10-year speech.
[403] Zürcher, 2010, 247
[404] Ibid.

It is clear from my fieldwork that the Turkish state defines a man at least in part by his military service, whether he serves or not. The unanimous view from my participants is that those who do not serve are deemed aberrant, as both citizens and as healthy men. Those who acquire an official medical exemption are bureaucratically marked for life, categorised in public records as either invalids of the state or as psychologically disturbed. This judgement has a wide range of consequences, most notably for prospective employment opportunities, as well as one's capacity to successfully court and marry a woman in Turkish society. Those men who reject conscription without acquiring a formal exemption are deemed fugitives. Their movement in the country is severely restricted and they cannot travel internationally for fear of arrest. With conscription regarded so paramount in Turkish civic life, it is not surprising that since its implementation it has taken on elements of the sacred, from ritual tradition to elaborate integration with wider Turkish mythology and its ethnic history.

Rituals, ceremonies and militarism in the Turkish public sphere: Altınay highlights conscription's consecrated status in Turkish society, writing that "eighty years after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, military service has become a 'sacred' institution central to the 'national order of things' (Malkki 1995) and that military-nationhood is an authoritative discourse . . . and together, they contribute to a unique form of 'civilian militarism' in Turkey."[405] This "civilian militarism" can manifest itself in a variety of ways. In my research, I have witnessed the blurring of Turkish civil society and state militarism in the form of ritual celebrations of conscription at the central bus station of Istanbul (*Esenler Otogarı*). Throughout the calendar year, the TAF has a rolling recruitment schedule for new male conscripts, which helps to manage the enormous numbers of yearly recruits and disperses them evenly across Anatolia to their assigned barracks. When these periodic rosters are announced, young conscripts pour into local TAF processing offices and are then sent on a bus to their allocated garrison.

Istanbul's European-side bus station is chaotic at the best of times, but evenings where young *askerlerin* (soldiers) are shipped off and farewelled by their friends and family bring a festive and vibrant energy to the dull, featureless parking lots that surround the terminal. It is considered a longstanding tradition for families to see off a new recruit with songs, dancing and celebration at the foot of the bus that he will imminently board. The party usually begins at home, where the conscript is chaperoned with a fleet of vehicles. The windows down, music blaring and the car horns honking in discordant unison, they speed toward the terminal whistling and cheering from all corners of the city.

This soundscape was a staple of my evenings in Beyoğlu. They would happen a few times of the year and I would take them as my cue to grab my camera equipment and ride the Istanbul metro to the bus terminal, in the hope of acquiring some footage of the festivities. What struck me as most symbolic of these impromptu celebrations was the flash mob transformation of a public space into a nationalist ceremony, and the ease with which this occurred. Something so deeply personal – a close-knit family gathering to farewell their son – contrasted with the public display of nationalist pride and celebration. It is testament to the integration of Turkish nationalism into everyday civilian life that a group of friends and family can so quickly perform the rhetoric and symbolism of Turkish militarism with just a handful of flags, some Bluetooth speakers and a few select anthems and military songs. White (2010) writes, "Militarism in Turkey is concerned with fears of weakness and boundary penetration. These fears are kept at bay through purity rituals and taboos . . . on the purification of space through the placement of images (for instance, busts of Atatürk or oversized Turkish flags), or in rehearsal of in-group/out-group membership in festivals and national holiday displays."[406]

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[405] Altınay, 2004, 33
[406] White, 2010, 230

Yavuz (2003) notes that these bus stop celebrations have evolved politically over time. For example, as the PKK insurgency intensified in the late 20th century, the ceremonies increasingly took on anti-Kurdish sentiments as part of the celebration. The flexibility with which these ceremonies could change based on domestic politics and nationalist animus was striking. It demonstrated both the role of nationalist fear in these ceremonies, as well as state militarism's capacity to render everyday families and their children into racially charged anti-Kurdish orators one decade, and back to traditional nationalists the next.[407] The footage of my experiences at the bus station ceremonies was less racially charged, despite renewed hostilities in the south-eastern provinces of the country in mid-2015. Throughout my fieldwork period, the principal anxiety of new conscripts in Turkey was the rolling crisis of the Syrian Civil War, in which Turkey became increasingly entangled. As a result, there was a heightened sense of danger, real or imagined, that accompanied the send-offs I attended from 2014 to 2016.

Scenes of *askerlerin* send-offs and their celebrating families are included in *The Reluctant Sons* at various points, contrasting jubilant pride with the bittersweet sadness of a boy leaving home, often for the first time. It is worth noting that, despite my travelling to the bus station on six separate occasions with all of my camera equipment, it was only my incidental attendance as a transiting passenger that I was able to use my camera phone to capture some of the celebrations. This is a typical example of how unpredictable ethnographic film production can be – I did not want to reconstruct the ceremonies in any way, instead trying to capture them with my professional equipment naturally as they were occurring. Unfortunately, fate dictated that I would only attend *askerlerin* send-offs when I had my trusty iPhone, which nevertheless was able to capture the event in crisp high-definition digital video.

This informal qualitative research became a regular fixture of my extended fieldwork with my participants in Istanbul. A few times a year, I would find myself in front of flash mob *askerlerin* celebration. I would sidle up to the gatherings of friends and family before asking to shake the hand of the young conscript. Almost always, I was thrust forward to middle of the group and I would often find myself boogieing and clapping with strangers, as songs like *İleri Marşı* played and nationalist chants were enthusiastically recited.

I regard these *askerlerin* revelries as a highly visible example of Altınay's noted "civilian militarism" in the Turkey, a function of the military's broader project of ensuring national order being perpetrated in both public and private life. This blurring of public and private spheres is striking, particularly the symbolic value of a family showing off a flag draped conscript in a public space, as both an intimate family member and as a vessel for Turkish militarism. At one such celebration, a male relative said to me in broken English, *he now goes from his home, to the country – he will return a man.* This is one of many cultural traditions that reinforce a sense of ambiguity between the individual in Turkey and the national whole. Most importantly, the *askerlerin* ritual is one step in a series of gendered milestones that denote a Turkish boy's passage to manhood and full citizenship. From circumcision rites as a child, to nationalist recitals and marches learned in public schools, and finally the act of conscription itself – military service in Turkey is ubiquitous in the creation of men's lives in the country.

[407] Yavuz, 2003, 252

Those who choose to resist conscription do not simply reject an institutional norm, they reject a fundamental aspect of Turkish society itself and the very nature of what it means to be a citizen – and a man – in the country. This is epitomised in the three informants who appear in *The Reluctant Sons*, an episode titled as a wry nod to the traditional children's song *Atatürk Cocuklari* (The Children of Atatürk). Usually recited in primary schools as an early genuflection of nationalist values and Turkish pride, it is featured in *The Reluctant Sons* as Cem – the first informant – struggles to remember the Kemalist songs of his early childhood.

2.3 It Started with a Bus Ride (Cem)



Cem gets good news (still: *Man Made)*

Cem's first appearance on camera is in my Beyoğlu apartment, his back to the viewer as I film him *chiaroscuro.*[408] Huddled over his laptop in excitement, he scrolls through alternate tabs on his internet browser: a secret Facebook group, Twitter lists and his personal email. On a quiet afternoon in the last month of the year, December 2, 2014 was a big day for Cem and hundreds of thousands of other Turkish men. Just after 3 p.m., then-Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu announced before the Turkish Parliament that the government would offer paid amnesty for the 700,000-odd men in the country, who were over 27 years old and were still yet to complete their mandatory military service.[409] As Cem and I lived together, it was fortuitous that I was in my room when he suddenly screamed from the kitchen, *Max get in here – and bring your camera!* Quickly mounting my DSLR on a tripod and attaching a lavaliere microphone to his shirt, I began recording Cem as he hunched over his computer. Scrolling through his news feed and various chat groups with other Turkish draft dodgers, he explained to me that if he paid 18,000 Turkish lira[410] during the brief window of exemption, he could finally legally avoid military service.

A means of shoring up additional government funding, as well as decongesting the growing number of military service deserters (*asker kaçakçılığı*)[411] in Turkey, Davutoğlu reassured Turkish citizens that "the money we will collect from this exemption will directly be transferred to our Defense Industry Fund to be used as part of our efforts to adopt a technology-intensive army."[412] Prior to having the opportunity to pay his way out, Cem had lived as an outlaw of the Turkish state for five years, a near fugitive who was perpetually terrorised by the prospect of being arrested and thrown into prison before being carted off in handcuffs to complete his military service against his will.

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[408] Italian, literally meaning "light-dark". Technique in visual arts that contrasts extremes of light and shadow.
[409] http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-govt-revisits-exempted-military-service-before-2015-polls-75106
[410] About $4,000 USD at the time of filming.
[411] UNHCR status report on military service in Turkey, July 2001: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/467010bd2.pdf accessed September 2016
[412] As quoted in The Hurriyet Daily: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-govt-revisits-exempted-military-service-before-2015-polls-75106

Cem and I have been close friends since I first arrived in Turkey in 2010. He was my roommate during my exchange program at Boğaziçi University, and we continued to live together throughout my PhD research. I count him among my closest friends, and it is to Cem's credit that a chance conversation about Turkish military service eventually culminated in the production of *Making Men in Turkey* and subsequently this PhD thesis. On a cold February morning in early 2010, we both found ourselves on a fieldtrip to the Eyüp Cemetery. Sitting together on the bus, we chatted over coffee. We had only known each other a month or so, and I was full of rudimentary questions about life in my new home from the perspective of a local close to my own age. I knew very little about mandatory military service, but with a cursory awareness of its importance in the country, I asked Cem if he had been conscripted yet. He told me that he had not and that, in fact, as long as he was able to, he would resist it.

Short of describing himself as a conscientious objector, like most young Turkish men attending university Cem was dreading the prospect of graduating and then immediately spending six months on a far-flung military base, "bored out of my mind" in uncomfortable conditions. Despite its apparent reverence in wider Turkish society, conscription was a tremendous inconvenience for Cem that he resented deeply and refused to take seriously. He did not respect conscription as a crucial rite of passage, he dismissed the legacy of Atatürk and Turkish nationalism, and he hated the current government. Most importantly, at that stage in his life Cem was an observant Muslim, a faith he had only come to practise in university.

Raised in a middle-class household in south-west Turkey's liberal and relatively secular provinces, Cem had begun attending religious courses at Bogazici University, and frequented the local mosque (*cami*) just outside the college gates. Within the community of friends that he made there, he had heard many stories about religious discrimination in the conscript TAF barracks around the country. Complicating his Islamic faith, he had also hidden his religious awakening from his family for fear of ridicule and potential estrangement. It appeared that Cem was inhabiting a cultural no man's land in contemporary Turkish society. Unable to express his spirituality to friends and family back home, he also dreaded religious discrimination from the state in the form of military service. So began my introduction to the convoluted anxieties that many tertiary-educated Turkish men had around military service, personal religious faith, and the wider paradox of living within a secular nation state that was teeming with religious culture and tradition.

Peppering Cem with questions about all of this, it was during a laundry list of alleged discriminatory practises that Cem casually informed me of the TAF's longstanding policy of refusing homosexuals within its ranks, and the shocking tactics they employed to humiliate and shame gay men into serving without a seeking an exemption. I mention this here because it was Cem who first educated me on the relationship between non-heteronormative men and the Turkish military, which eventually led to the fieldwork and informants that comprise the final episode of the film, *The Pink Certificate*.

What was curious about Cem's opposition to conscription was that it was neither distinctly political nor ideologically motivated. The closest he came to any overtly political stance was his then-observance of Islam, which he had heard was mocked and discouraged within the barracks of conscripted infantry. Even in the 21st century, *laiklik* persists as a bedrock ideological framework for the Turkish military. This is despite the explicit positioning of nominal Islam as the homogeneous religious status of every soldier within the Turkish army. Altınay notes that when a Turkish soldier is not Muslim, it is noted on their dog tags in order to arrange for an appropriate religious burial. "Non-Muslim soldiers in the military bear the mark GM (which stands for the first letters of *gayri-Muslim*, or non-Muslim)", implying a rare acknowledgement from the TAF of the homogeneous status quo of observant Muslims in the country.[413]

Despite this, Cem was convinced (along with all his friends at the Rumeli Hisarüstü mosque – many of whom I interviewed for my honours thesis) that the army regularly punished observant Muslims, beating them and humiliating them in front of their peers. In 2011, one recently returned informant told me that during his military service he was privy to a hazing ritual on a religiously observant conscript. He recalled how the fellow private had been "praying when he found the chance" and that when their commanding officer found out, he was made to stand in the centre of the infantry barracks, holding a Koran, while a group of officers berated and humiliated him. During my fieldwork for *Making Men in Turkey*, these stories abounded amongst the Muslim university students I interviewed, but they were always unverifiable.

As a result of these anecdotes, Cem had resolved well before his graduation that he would postpone his military service for as long as possible. It was also during this time that he fell away from strict religious observance, settling into a more liberal, secular lifestyle. I asked him how he transitioned out of daily prayers to enjoying the occasional beer with me. In an interview from late 2011, Cem outlined his shifting religious views. "I went on a journey with Islam. My whole life I was taught that to be religious was to be stupid, backward, that it was for peasants. I think that it was only natural when I began experimenting with Islamic life in college, that I would take it as seriously as I could. I wanted to experience firsthand what my society had been pressuring me to reject. So, for a few years, I was pretty hardcore in my beliefs. I see now that it's possible to make your own mind up, and so I have a religious belief system that is entirely my own. I still pray every now and again, but like being a Turk, it doesn't define who I am overall."

Despite his evolving religious beliefs, his attitude towards military service remained the same. Following his master's degree graduation in 2013, Cem lapsed on his military summons and was designated a fugitive of the state. "Once you pass the limit of your graduate postponement," he told me, "you're in the system, essentially as a fugitive." In Turkey, every citizen carries a national identification card (*Kimlik Kartı*), and it is mandatory to carry it in public and be able to present it to the authorities on demand. A primary form of identification, akin to a driver's licence in Australia, the national Turkish identification card could also flag a citizen for arrest on outstanding warrants, or communicate any notices from the state when it was cross-referenced against the national database.

[413] Altınay, 2004, 73

This extended beyond police stations and government facilities. Checking into a registered hotel in Turkey requires submitting one's *Kimlik Kartı*, where it may be scanned into the country's digital records. Once Cem had lapsed on his summons to begin his military service in 2012, his *Kimlik Kartı* likely marked him as wanted for conscription. This meant that any time he travelled intercity, stayed in hotels or interacted with the police, he was likely to be detained and charged with desertion. In the years that I lived with Cem, this happened to him on a number of occasions. He travelled frequently for work, and had devised a workaround by habitually bribing the front desk operators of hotels when he would check in – although this would not guarantee that they would not report him anyway. Travelling abroad was entirely out of the question for fear of being arrested at the airport, and he recalled multiple instances where his ID was checked at roadside police checkpoints, as he would wait with bated breath to see if they examined it against the national database. In five years, Cem was detained eight times as a result of his desertion.

Luckily, with his graduate education and access to legal advice, Cem asserted himself confidently in front of the police, armed with a lawyer who specialised in conscientious objectors and other resisters to military service in Turkey. Despite threats, verbal abuse and hours spent in detention at various police stations around the country, Cem was able to leave the following morning. The obvious stress and fear of such experiences aside, he would also miss employment deadlines and scheduled meetings as a result of his periodic detention. I asked him why he continued to live his life this way, suggesting that he should just get his military service over with. Cem was emphatic; "No way, man. They can't make me, and so I'll just wait until they change the law or let me pay my way out. Either way, I'm never going to serve." Cem was particularly lucky because he was a freelancer, meaning that he was never refused employment on the basis of his incomplete conscription. "If I had a tracked career like most people, I'd never have a job at all. They'd take one look at my record and hire the next guy . . . who wants to hire someone who hasn't taken their military service? It's not worth it for them on a practical level; you're going to lose them in a few months for a huge stretch of time. And there is the stigma of defying the army, imagine hiring someone you know is wanted by the state!"

Turkish nationalism for the *çocuklar*: Like Eli in *The Three Sabras,* Cem identifies his early education as the first point of contact between the Turkish citizen and the military, corroborating Altınay's view that the militarised nation states prioritise public education as a primary vector of ideological dissemination and indoctrination.[414] This is also congruent with broader histories of modern nationalism, which identify the Napoleonic innovation of injecting disciplinary and aesthetic elements of nationalism and militarism into state education.[415] Thinking back to his school years, Cem paints a fairly typical picture of how the Turkish military ingratiates itself into the consciousness of small children. "They start with songs, poems and other chants when you're very little. We learn about Atatürk, what it means to a proud Turkish citizen – and most importantly, that Turks are better than everyone else in the world."

Growing older, Cem remembers using the internet for the first time, albeit mostly to practise his English. "Being online really ruined any chance I had of being a good Turkish citizen," he told me. "I remember googling 'military service' in other countries and learning how rare it was. This confirmed my suspicions that it wasn't that important in life, that it being worshipped was stupid." Youthful rebellion can take many different forms in different cultural contexts. Cem regards his childhood rejection of military service and Turkish nationalism as disobedient as well as his finding religious faith in his late teens. "I come from a secular, western Anatolian family – not even my grandfather believed in God. When I started practising Islam, if I'm honest, it came from a place of rebellion against my parents and the expectations of the society I grew up in . . . the fact I wasn't allowed to be religious was attractive to me."

[414] Altınay, 2004, 119-141
[415] Conversi, 2008, 1287

Cem's rejection of military service, as well as his forays into practising Islam, put him at odds with multiple homogeneous cultural norms that comprise the typical Turkish citizen. When I pressed another informant to describe to me what these norms comprised of, he said, "a Turkish citizen is, in this order: an ethnically Turkish, Sunni Muslim – but not a practising Muslim – man. The Islamic part is important; don't be a foolish believer . . . but be mindful of your heritage. You have to be secular, but respectful of Islamic tradition." Cem later echoed the Kemalist aspiration for a "vernacular" Islam that is ceremonial, stripped of spiritual gravitas and religious belief. "In Turkey, being a Muslim means you're a good person, a good citizen – that's it. If anything, it's kind of a morality . . . don't steal, don't murder, the basic commandments. Where I'm from, if you actually pray five times a day, most people I know would think you were crazy. It's seen as backward and superstitious."

The most disgusting thing: Finally, Cem articulates what he sees as the greatest support of Turkish militarisation and nationalism: the emergence of a highly aggressive "state mentality" in Turkish society, and the hostility he has encountered when resisting it. Citing his repeated interrogations as an example, Cem notes a parallel in the aggressive demeanour, discourse and behaviour of the police interviewers and that of Turkish military officers.

In the handful of times he was detained for draft dodging, Cem found himself not only being verbally abused and threatened with jail, but he also observed an inability of the militarised Turkish citizen to conceptualise notions of individual freedom, personal need and self-expression. As the police would attempt to coerce Cem into signing a statement confirming his acceptance of military service, he told me, "I would try and explain to them nicely: I'm not going to sign this document. I would remain calm, and they would go crazy . . . yelling and scream at you . . . I get the sense that these guys cannot even begin to understand how someone can choose to reject military service."

In another instance, Cem remembers a young police officer bringing him a cup of tea while he waited in an overnight cell. The officer asked, *Why do you think you can't serve in the army? Why are you special, do you think you're better than everyone else?* Genuinely puzzled, Cem explained carefully to the young man that he chose not to, and that as human beings, we all have free will. The officer paused, ruminating on Cem's philosophical stance. Finally, the officer conceded. *Ok, maybe we are all free, but not when it comes to the army!*

This is what Cem describes on camera as "that mentality . . . that we're all subjects of the state, and that we have to do what they tell us". As Cem related this anecdote in *Man Made*, an advertisement for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's 2014 presidential campaign overlays his interview. The commercial, which attracted the attention of international media for its bizarre imagery,[416] emphasises several aspects of the Turkish national project. First, a shadowy figure cuts the metal line of an enormous Turkish flag pole, felling the giant red and white shroud to earth. As it falls, the flag's shadow casts over the entire country, alerting the citizens of Anatolia to its plight. The black gloved saboteur could represent any number of the Turkish state's enemies – a physical embodiment of the Turkish state's "rhetoric of fear" around foreign penetration and insurgent destabilisation.[417]

[416] https://www.businessinsider.com/video-turkey-doesnt-want-you-to-see-akp-ad-2014-3
[417] White, 2010, 215

The rest of the advertisement unfolds with representative cultural corners of Anatolia binding together, dropping what they are doing and rushing to aid the rapidly falling flag. There are traditional villagers, cosmopolitan teenagers, working class men and pious, veiled women. They all run toward the flagpole, becoming an indistinguishable swarm of humanity, which piles up against it, a hivemind propelled skyward. Like ants harnessing collective energy and centralised will, at the very peak of the flag pole, a single young man grabs the flailing strap of the broken line. Thrusting himself forward to certain death, the human pyramid cheers as he leaps from the safety of the throng, sacrificing himself in order to raise the Turkish flag back upward again.

Here we see a visual representation of the national hegemon, with cultural differences across Anatolia eschewed in favour of a single unifying banner. According to this advertisement, the only legitimate means of standing out from the national whole is via martyrdom, or self-sacrifice for the state. Although the advertisement does not feature any elements of the TAF or allusions to Turkish militarism, Cem regarded the entire sequence as a metaphor for idealised conscription. *This is the way you become a man in the Turkish army, this is how you stand out: dying for them . . . dying for the flag . . . look at that guy's smile as he kills himself for the nation . . . look at how everyone around him cheers . . . you can't do much better than that.*

2.4 "It's in the Blood" (Murat)

In central Istanbul, one of life's great pleasures is jogging along the Bosphorus at dusk. As the sun sets over the Golden Horn with families, fisherman and tourists taking in the view, I would often find myself darting and weaving between two milestones of Turkish life that are often celebrated here. Wedding photography is extremely popular on the shoreline, and couples often traipse along the iconic Galata bridge, donning elaborate wedding attire, holding each other as a nearby photographer crouches to get the perfect shot. Further along, usually between the ferry boats of Eminönü and the long avenue of Kennedy Caddesi, another tradition of Turkish life is to be found. Small boys, dressed in Liberace-esque gowns (including a crown and sceptre), are hoisted on their relatives' shoulders and paraded along the waterfront in front of onlookers. These boys, usually between six and eight, are about to experience the first of many gendered milestones on the road to Turkish manhood: ritual circumcision.

Popularly rooted in Semitic tradition, the true historical depth of male circumcision is still not fully known. Writing at the turn of the last century, physician P.C. Remondino (1900) published an early historical analysis of the practise, lamenting that "misty antiquity" had left the medical historian with only scant references to ritual circumcision in ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs and archaeology, resulting in an overreliance on relatively recent Abrahamic religious texts as primary sources of his analysis.[418] A century later, David Gollaher (2000) still called circumcision "the oldest enigma in the history of surgery" and noted that despite a lack of scientific consensus on its definitive origin, its prevalence amongst Australian aboriginals of the Western Desert – who have continuously inhabited the region for 60,000 years – suggested that the ritual was a feature of the earliest societies of man.[419] Accounting for its pervasiveness across multiple continents and disparate ancient civilisations, Gollaher writes that for social scientists, "one of the fascinating problems in the history of anthropology is how disconnected people in different parts of the world assigned meaning to genital cutting."[420]

In Turkey, the meaning of male genital cutting (*sünnet*) is culturally bifurcated. Prior to the 15th century, circumcision was a nondescript everyday practise throughout the *ummah* (greater Islamic community) that lacked heritage that was particular to the sultanate. However, as Şahin (2018) describes, the early Ottomans purposely transformed circumcision's social and political value in the empire, creating new ceremonies and rituals that fashioned it as a uniquely Ottoman tradition. In doing so, Şahin writes, "The [Ottomans] elevat[ed] male circumcision, a fundamental ritual in all Muslim societies, to the status of a central political, cultural, and diplomatic event that appealed to the entire Ottoman polity . . . [ritual circumcision] served as an operatic event whose multiple components created an overarching narrative about the past and present of the Ottoman polity."[421]

Ritual circumcision continued throughout the Ottoman Empire and was an established cultural norm throughout Anatolia as the sultanate fell away and governance transitioned into the secular Turkish republic. Today, circumcision is an ongoing ritual tradition, a gendered milestone as well as an initiation ritual of male Turkish life – one that presages certain aspects of military service, and the particularities of Turkish masculinity. I have come to regard circumcision as symbolically representative of hegemonic masculinity in Turkey, although it was not an initial focus of my research prior to my fieldwork. However, when prompted to outline the principle features of the ideal Turkish man, every Turkish participant interviewed would invariably mention circumcision off the top of their heads.

[418] Remondino, 1900, 21
[419] Tonkinson, 1991
[420] Gollaher, 2000, 11-12
[421] Şahin, 2018, 464

As time went on, I increasingly prioritised including an anthropological understanding of *sünnet* in the wider context of Turkish masculinity. Therefore, I was thrilled when one Turkish informant requested that I frame much of his collaboration with me on the subject of *sünnet*, and its various roles in contemporary Turkish society.

"They take a part of you": The second participant of *The Reluctant Sons* is Murat – a bespectacled and soft-spoken young man, with whom I have been acquainted for many years. Fresh out of university, he was born in the mid-1990s and has only truly known Turkey in the 21st century. Considering the modern history of the country, he told me, "I can't remember much before 2000 at all, really. For me, it's always been AKP . . . the war on terror . . . that's about it!" Indeed, Murat is the youngest participant in *Man Made*. While his interview in the film is the shortest of the episode, our friendship offscreen resulted in close collaboration on various aspects of my Turkish fieldwork. It was Murat who encouraged me to conduct qualitative research on ritual *sünnet* in Turkey, primarily to enhance my understanding of masculine identity in the country. This culminated in my meeting with a local *sünnetçi* (practitioner of circumcision) in central Istanbul in 2015.

Declining to appear on camera, but more than happy to field questions on the record, the *sünnetçi* explained to me that in Turkey, "circumcision of a boy is the first step [to becoming a man]. Prior to that, they are just a child – sexless – but through becoming aware of what his father went through, he starts to learn about his place in society." Asking the *sünnetçi* to elaborate on how *sünnet* distinguished itself in Turkish society, as opposed to its practise in another part of the world, he told me, "A man in Turkey has certain responsibilities that are special for here [*sic*]. He has to be a good Muslim, and this starts with circumcision. It's a tradition going back to the Prophet – he circumcised his children . . . but . . . it is also an opportunity for the child to learn about his nation's history and to be proud of it, as well as celebrate his coming life as a man with his family."

The *sünnetçi*'s allusion to the ritual's ethnic tradition is analogous to its justified practise in contemporary Judaism. However, while the ritual is prevalent in all of the Abrahamic faiths, Turkish *sünnet* differs significantly from the Jewish Israeli *brit milah* in one respect. In Turkey, circumcision takes place at a distinctly older age – anywhere between three and eight years old. This results in one crucial difference in the Turkish *sünnet* ritual: unlike Christian and Jewish babies, the Turkish child is likely to remember the ordeal. Before continuing, I should note that while all of my informants had their *sünnet* within the age range of toddler to pre-pubescent, I have been anecdotally informed that, in the last twenty years, it has become increasingly common in Turkey to circumcise boys shortly after they are born, as is customary in contemporary Judaism and Christianity. I posed this cultural shift to the *sünnetçi*, and he disagreed with this modern trend, emphasising the boy's age as a critical function of the ritual. "It is important that the child learns *why* they are being circumcised, and that they understand the celebration [and consequent] pride of going through the ordeal – it is a lesson for the boy as well as a celebration for the parents!" he told me emphatically.

A few days later, Murat listened intently to my conversation with the *sünnetçi*, which I had recorded with his permission. He listened intently, alternating laughing at the absurdity of my research ("I can't believe you're getting paid to talk to this guy!") and smiling with nostalgia and affirmation at what he was hearing. As he later says of ritual *sünnet* on camera, "It's not even talked about," and prior to his participant in *Man Made,* he had not considered circumcision to be such a unique aspect of growing up as a man in Turkish society. "I'd never thought about the age being significant until now. I had just accepted it as one of the many fucked-up things religion does to you in this country. But when you first asked me to be part of your research, I began to think about what makes a man in Turkey. Obviously, the most obvious things are marriage, military service and… wow, circumcision!"

Murat continued to probe his own experience with *sünnet*, relaying his thoughts to me on the shoreline of the Bosphorus. "I think I've figured out why we have to be so old . . . I remember being so afraid, but also excited. My dad reassured me it wouldn't hurt too much, that it would be like a needle from the doctor. But my uncles teased me, saying it was like a knife cutting off your dick completely, that blood went everywhere . . . I remember them laughing as I cried . . . I realise now that I was being hazed, as I later told the same scary stories to my nephew when I was a teenager. What a fucked-up cycle!"

Although most of my Turkish participants alluded to the experience of *sünnet* at various points, it was Murat who suggested a causal link between the painful event itself and the later expectations of military service in Turkey:

> "I've been thinking about it a lot – they cut you, it draws blood – and you should feel proud because you joined the tribe, you know? I remember after having done it [circumcision] the praise and attention I got from my family, particularly my mum, was like a dopamine [*sic*]. If I'm honest, my emotional memory of the whole thing is in two places – before and after. Before, I was terrified, scared and anxious about the pain I was going to experience. Also, helplessness at having no choice but to go through with it. My dad . . . all my uncles . . . all men had [*sic*]. Who was I to refuse this? Then there was the 'after' – relief, joy, pride . . . and all the love and affection I received from my family. These two emotional reactions are so different, but so strong on my mind – great fear and then great joy."

Murat claimed that *sünnet* had a secondary, insidious function to its ritual tradition in Turkish society. He believes that it inadvertently prepares the Turkish male for the reality of living in a militarised citizenry. Asking what this reality, or "big truth" as he called it, Murat quickly replied, "*Sünnet* teaches you from a young age that in Turkey, you don't own your body, and what happens to it is out of your control. Don't like getting your dick cut? Well, too bad! Don't like military service? No choice! . . . It's all there for kids, man." Michel Foucault writes extensively on state control of the human body in *Discipline and Punish* (1977), and many of his contentions are applicable when analysing the relationship between the Turkish male and his gendered milestones to citizenship, including *sünnet*. The Turkish male body could be read as one "that is manipulated, shaped, trained, which obeys, responds, becomes skilful and increases its [capacity for] force".[422] It is first manipulated and shaped by *sünnet*, taught to obey and trained in the "enclosure" of public education, as Cem describes it, and is finally made skilful and a tool of "force" in the secondary "enclosure" of the military barracks.[423] Moreover, both public education and the compulsorily attended military base reflect Foucault's "art of distribution" which specifies the institutional vectors of the state which house and disseminate disciplinary ideology onto the citizenry.

Murat alludes to this understanding in *Man Made,* wryly noting that in *sünnet* "they take a small part of you . . . it hurts . . . and you learn what's coming next". In a separate interview, he even went so far as to compare circumcision to a survivable form of military martyrdom. Being killed in uniform is obviously one of the greatest tragedies that can befall a soldier and his family, and it unsurprisingly carries significant social value as one of the most respected outcomes in a soldier's life.

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[422] Foucault, 1977, 130
[423] Ibid., 135

In Turkey, this is especially apparent. To become a *şehit* (martyr) while serving in the TAF will immediately trigger complex and widespread reactions from society, both proximate to the immediate family and on the national scale as the death is transmitted via mainstream media. A military funeral in Turkey is another curious example of how Islamic ritual tradition finds itself surprisingly integrated into the staunchly secular world of the Turkish military. The coffin will usually be draped in a Turkish flag as it is presided over by an Islamic cleric, who will then lead traditional prayers in front of family, friends and TAF officers. One such funeral is shown in *The Reluctant Sons,* where senior ranking TAF officials are seen standing in Islamic prayer alongside the bereaved, indifferent to Kemalist doctrine.[424]

This had bothered me for some time and in my limited phone interviews with the serving *yarbay* of the TAF, I asked him about the inconsistent nature of Islamic ritual ceremony at military funerals. "This is one situation where we cannot ignore the reality of our population – almost all are Muslim, and [are] observant. When a soldier is killed, we have burdened their family forever. Who are we to deny them comfort of the afterlife and a proper Islamic burial? It would be very cruel to demand that a veiled mother from the village [*sic*] take off her headscarf just for my sensibilities." This admission of pragmatism highlights the veneer of Kemalist hegemon that acquiesces (when convenient) to the demographic reality of the Turkish citizenry. At the same time, the *yarbay's* comments echo the conclusions of Karasipahi and Zurcher, who both regard Kemalism's attempt at transforming interior Anatolia and the rural masses a near total failure. "It is hard to argue that the secularist and cultural modernization policies of the Kemalist ideology transformed the countryside as much as it affected the intellectual elites in the large cities and towns . . . the vast majority of people remained traditional and retained their religious beliefs,"[425] writes Karasipahi.

The way a military funeral can rally the national population is also a remarkable example of theoretical nationalism becoming perceptible in the everyday, what Anderson calls the deliberate crafting of nationalist "cultural products". Anderson writes that "it is useful to remind ourselves that nations inspire love, and often profoundly self-sacrificing love."[426] Turkish military funerals inspire a great deal of self-sacrificing love and admiration, encouraging an "imagined linkage" to emerge, bonding disparate citizens through collective grief and patriotic solidarity. [427] Heads of state will lead by example and often attend such funerals, openly mourning an individual they do not know. Television cameras then capture the event and broadcast it across the country, where solidarity and patriotic reverence for the *şehit* often follow.

"I just want to live my life": Like Cem, Murat exudes an extremely individualistic nature that is uncomplicated by his aesthetic uniformity with Turkish society. Both are heterosexual, highly educated ethnically Turkish men who are fairly typical in their social lives and outward appearance. This leads Murat to believe that he "blends in" to Turkish society very well, despite his strong feelings against the state, conscription and homogeneous masculinity. "I suspect that I am of an increasingly growing [demographic] trend in the country. Being middle-class, I learnt English and got good [at it]. This opened me up to the outside world, and it was like growing out of being religious, the way I shook off nationalist pride and the expectations of the majority and the state . . . of course I never wanted to do military service. I can't even remember when I first decided I wouldn't go."

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[424] While the funeral is heavily edited in its brief appearance in *Man Made,* the full clip is available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Co-HU3fRRGs
[425] Karasipahi, 2009, 31
[426] Anderson, 2006, 141
[427] Ibid., 33

I spent much time with Murat and his friends, a combination of university students, bartenders and musicians. We would sit around cafés in Kadıköy, and I ingratiated myself into their tight circle. We would often conduct roundtable discussions of my research, and the consistency of their responses to military service was remarkable to me. Here was an interesting cross-section of young urban Turkish men. Some were from the more conservative interior provinces, others from coastal Western Anatolia, and yet they all shared animus and disregard for conscription and Turkish nationalism in general. One friend even came from a prominent military family – growing up on a series of army bases as a child. I interviewed him and his father for *Man Made*; his face hidden upon request, his father speaking to me only over the phone.

In the end, both rescinded participation in the final cut of the film, but allowed me to include references in this written thesis. The son told me, "I grew up in the Turkish army – my father is high ranking and my mother was a military physician before she retired – but even they raised me to believe that conscription was a waste of time, a stupid tradition that no longer has a function." I pressed him on why they thought this, and he looked at me like I was stupid. "Because it serves no purpose other than one more reminder that they [the military] owns your ass." His father had similar views, "It's a tremendous burden on us [the TAF] – no one looks forward to babysitting new recruits . . . I still hope for a specialised, smaller army for Turkey, one that rescinds conscription in favour of some kind of civil service for all citizens, including women."

Murat would later hear these interviews as I reviewed them on my computer, and he nudged me hard in the side – "See, I'm not just some pacifist, selfish asshole . . . [*name redacted*] and his dad both told you the same thing, so now what?" I asked him why he thought he was incapable of ideologically buying into the notion of military service, cultural traditions and other particulars of Turkishness national identity. "I don't know, man. I was born at the wrong time in Turkish history. It's only going to get worse – every generation of men is going to drift further away from nationalism and the love of military service. How can they expect us to swallow it when we have the internet, television and international news?"

Murat is now in the process of leaving Turkey for the United States, where his American fiancée is waiting for him. As of 2017, his plan is to leave Turkey and return once conscription is discontinued. Like tens of thousands of others, if Murat were to return once his summons has lapsed, he is liable to be arrested upon arrival in the country. This does not bother him as much as I expected. "My mum is happy for me – she's going to come and visit as much as she can, and maybe she'll even get residency once I'm a U.S citizen," he told me hopefully.

I asked him if he would miss living in Turkey. "Sure, in as much as anyone misses their childhood home. But this 'home' sucks . . . I've walked on eggshells my entire life, and it's time for me to be like other guys my age in the free world . . . like you Max . . . I just want to live my life, pay some taxes, get a job I like, raise a family and be left alone. You know, some older people in my life still tell me that I need to do military service in order to be a real man, to grow up . . . well I look at guys like you, and you seem to be doing ok . . . what a load of shit."

2.5 "I Don't Belong Anywhere" (Yusuf)

"What's it like growing up Kurdish in Turkey?" I ask Yusuf, as we speed through Fatih one summer evening. "I'd say it's the worst thing in the whole world," he laughs. Raised between Mardin and Şırnak in Turkey's restive Kurdish provinces, Yusuf is visibly eastern Anatolian. Charming, handsome and gregarious, he often jokes that when he travels through airport security in Europe that he is confused for either a terrorist or a male model (depending on the sexual orientation of the immigration officer, of course).

In the years I have known him since attending university together, Yusuf and I have shared many adventures. From travelling to the annual camel wrestling festival in Selçuk, to attending his brother's wedding as a quasi-guest of honour, ours is a friendship of constant laughter and warmth. As we grew older (and away from our adjacent apartments in Rumeli Hisarüstü), it became difficult to see each other so often. As he now lived in Yenikapı, at least once a month I would walk down from the hills of Cihangir, to the water's edge in Karakoy, and wait on the side of the road. Yusuf would then pick me up in his car, and we would *go find the night* as he would say, which usually meant speeding through Istanbul after dusk, blasting Turkish club music with the windows down, eventually finding a *narghile* (shisha) bar where we would talk for hours, often past midnight.

Despite his light-hearted demeanour, Yusuf and his family have endured firsthand the decades long Kurdish-Turkish conflict, a civil war that has killed over 30,000 people since 1984.[428] According to Yusuf, it was in the late 1980s that his father was told by a local leader of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) to shelter local insurgents on his vast rural property. Uninvolved in the wider conflict and wanting to protect his young family, Yusuf's father refused, fearing reprisal from the Turkish state authorities. Enraged, the local leader took a pistol and shot him through the hand, warning that he would next week shoot him in the head if he did not comply with his orders. Over the coming days, Yusuf's father packed their belongings and, through their extended family's connections in Germany, paid smugglers to take them to Munich overland. Yusuf remembers much of the arduous trek through Anatolia that would later become well worn by the Syrians fleeing their country's civil war. "I've never felt so car sick in my life," he told me. "Sometimes when I am in the back of a *dolmuş* (share taxi van in Istanbul) it comes flooding back – being cramped with other refugees for days on end, looking sideways out the window, the nausea coming in waves. It was a horrible time."

Yusuf and his family made it to Germany a few weeks later, and like tens of thousands of Kurdish-Turkish refugees of the period, were granted temporary protection visas that allowed them to reside there while the conflict played out. Yusuf lived in Germany until he was 14 years old, complicating his already layered sense of cultural and national identity. "Do you know what it's like never to belong anywhere, Max?" he asks me on camera. "Try being born in the middle of a war zone, as the ethnicity that the majority hates, designated as terrorists by default. Then try being a refugee – a brown guy – in a Western country that resents hosting you in the first place. Then imagine going back to your home country as a teenager and living in a city where no one speaks your language . . . I had to learn Turkish properly for the first time . . . I may as well have been a *yabanci* like you."

[428] International Crisis Group collective assessment as of August 2018: https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkey/turkey-s-pkk-conflict-death-toll

Yusuf was describing the experience of moving to Istanbul when his family finally returned to Turkey. Unfortunately, their native village, and much of the Turkey's south-east, was still not safe by the late 1990s. "It really broke my father's heart, not being able to go home, even today I can see that it still pains him to live in Istanbul . . . after nearly twenty years, he still doesn't feel like he belongs here." Yusuf's father was always very warm to me, and when I asked him (with Yusuf as interpreter) how he felt about living in Istanbul, he looked mournful, his eyes never moving from the television to meet my gaze. He ruminated for a while, and then said quietly, *it's never going to be my home. I have to speak a different language when I go down the street, what can I do? It must be how you feel – you lived here in Turkey for years – do you feel at home as an Australian?*

Growing up in Germany, it was from abroad that Yusuf first learnt about the troubled history between his country of birth and the Kurdish ethnic minority. "I first became aware of what a Kurdish person and a Turkish person was, and it really shocked me. I remember knowing I was Kurdish, but I still understood myself as Turkish as well – but there was a light bulb moment in high school when I realised just how stuck in the middle I was, and always had been." Kurdish national identity was distinct from the rest of Anatolia long before the formation of the republic. Kinross notes that Kurdish independence movements had given "periodic trouble to a succession of Ottoman sultans" in the centuries leading up to the modern era.[429]

In the years following Ottoman capitulation, civil war and rising Turkish independence, advocates for Kurdish minority rights became increasingly vocal upon encouragement from the brief Allied occupants of Western Anatolia.[430] A late 1920s census listed over a million native Kurdish speakers in the country's then total population of 13.5 million, making them the largest non-Turkish minority in Anatolia.[431] Houston notes the distinct existential threat that Kurdish national identity posed to the congruence of early Kemalist ideology, writing of the Turkish History Thesis that "if the Turks have existed as a proto-nation since the dawn of time (as Turkish nationalist discourse insists) then the possibility is also raised that so have the Kurds."[432] Two years after the founding of the Turkish republic, a full blown Kurdish insurgency manifested itself in the country's new south-eastern frontier, formally marking the commencement of hostilities between the new Turkish republic and its substantial Kurdish minority.

Ironically, it was the Kurdish insurgency of 1925 that would set a familiar precedent for the Turkish state: overreliance on intermittent martial law and snap suspensions of democratic process and constitutional law in times of crisis. Lewis (1961) writes that following the outbreak of the rebellion, "On [March 4, 1925], a drastic 'Law for the Maintenance of Order' was rushed through the [National] Assembly, giving extraordinary and, in effect, dictatorial powers to the government for two years . . . they were renewed again in 1927 and did not finally expire until March 1929."[433] This first Kurdish insurgency was also distinct in its religious zeal. Led by Naksibendi sheikhs, the ethnically Kurdish insurgents sought to declare autonomy and restore the caliphate of the Ottoman Empire.

[429] Kinross, 1964, 601
[430] Lewis, 1961, 262
[431] Çağaptay, 2006, 19
[432] Houston, 2001, 99
[433] Lewis, 1961, 266

Lewis notes that Atatürk's reaction to the rebellion had far-reaching consequences for the Kurdish minority within Turkey as well as fuelling the state's increasing animus toward long standing Islamic cultural communities. "[Atatürk] reacted against the dervishes, closing their convents, disbanding their associations, and banning their meetings, ceremonies, and special garb . . . in this context, [Atatürk] made the first of his great symbolic revolutions: those dramatic changes of outward forms which expressed, in a manner at once vivid and profound, the forcible transference of a whole nation from one civilization to another."[434]

Kurdish national identity and the Kemalist reform era: In the same manner that the Kemalists encroached upon critical aspects of Islamic ritual to further state secularism, Atatürk used the crushing of the Kurdish rebellion as an opportunity to formally ban traditional and Islamic dress in Turkish public life. A dismantling of Ottoman aesthetics on the very body of the Turkish citizen, Atatürk's banning of the fez and headscarf policed the public appearance of the Turk, furthering the Kemalist bent toward Western modernism. This early example of Kemalist homogenisation highlights the lengths Atatürk went to "secularize the public sphere and adopt Western civilization"[435] in the country, but also of the Kemalist priority to replace the established cultural norms of the Ottoman Empire with an entirely new set of national attributes, especially ones which reflected intellectual modernisation and mirrored modernist European aesthetics. Alongside the specific ban of traditional Kurdish dress, cultural expression and political representation, institutionalised state education dealt a heavy blow to Kurdish linguistic independence. Atatürk was explicit in his view of language as a critical function of state nationalism, stating in Adana in 1931, "One of the most obvious characteristics of a nation is language. A person who says that he belongs to the Turkish nation, should, primarily and absolutely, speak Turkish. If a man who does not speak Turkish claims his loyalty to the Turkish culture and community, it will not be correct to believe him."[436]

Aspirations for a new language to supersede Ottoman Turkish had been codified as early as 1918, when the Renewal Party (*Teceddüt Fırkası*) published a detailed Turkish social reorganisation programme, which included specific articles calling for national language reform (*Dil Devrimi*).[437] In 1925, the Ministry of Education officially banned the use of ethnically referential terms such as *Kürt* (Kurd) and *Kürdistan* (homeland of the Kurdish people) among many others. By 1927, the sole party of Turkey's Grand National Assembly, the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*), affirmed the mandatory expansion and continued development of a new Turkish language and culture throughout Anatolia, citing that "among compatriots . . . [the] unity of language, of feelings, and thoughts form the strongest tie".[438] The following year, Arabic script was formally replaced by a new Latin-based Turkish alphabet, and by the early 1930s, the modern Turkish language was the administrative and educational lingua franca of the country.[439]

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[434] Ibid.
[435] Azak, 2010, 11
[436] Atatürk quotes in Bali, ed. Kaiser, 2006, 44
[437] Zürcher, 2010, 199
[438] Ibid., 232
[439] Arslan, 2015, 31

A key advantage for the Kemalists' spread of linguistic hegemony was widespread illiteracy throughout Anatolia. Mid-1920s census data estimated that 90% of the country could not read or write, gifting the Kemalists a clean linguistic slate with which to reform the population in their own image.[440] The effect on Turkey's minorities was gradual, with ethnic identity and non-Turkish cultural traditions supressed, as successive generations of Anatolian children were state-educated in modern Turkish, and illiterate adults were given language training in coordinated national re-education campaigns.[441] From the 1930s onward, the tandem institutional forces of mandatory state education and military service regulated Kemalist cultural hegemony throughout the country, and the government's ban on the Kurdish language would remain in effect until a partial repeal in 1991.[442] Foucault's "art of distribution" theory is again clearly visible in the praxis of Kemalist language reform and the enforcement of mandatory public education programs. First, state institutions absorb and "enclose" multi-cultural Anatolians en masse. Upon release from these institutions and state education programs, the reformed ethnic minority ideally emerges as homogeneous, literate Turkish citizens.[443]

Yusuf in *Man Made:* Born sixty-odd years after the first Kurdish insurgency in 1925, Yusuf carries the burden of Kemalist cultural hegemony and the domination of Turkish national identity in the country. "I don't feel that I belong anywhere," he insists in *Man Made,*[444] feeling that he instead inhabits a cultural interzone – not fully Turkish, nor an overt Kurdish nationalist. Instead, Yusuf's closest affinity to any cultural group is the global *ummah.* As a practising Sunni Muslim, he also explicitly rejects Turkish political Islam in favour of a liberal pan-Islamic identity that includes Muslims from all over the world. He articulates his disgust with the politicisation of Islam in contemporary Turkish life, describing in *Man Made* how all political parties in the country use the imagery of Islamic ritual tradition in order to attract voters. As religious rituals embedded in AKP advertisements play over his interview, Yusuf describes the role of Islam in Turkish politics as something "which is invisible, something holy, something magical" that aligns voters into a homogeneous nationalist bloc.[445]

When it came to conscription, Yusuf was ambivalent. "I know I can't serve in the army, that much is clear. How can I be expected to submit myself to an institution that has caused so much death and destruction to my people, to my family! This isn't some silly nationalism that I express, Max . . . people in my family have been persecuted by the very military that I am now expected to fight for voluntarily . . . are you crazy?" At the same time, he acknowledged his Turkish citizenship, which he did regard as important to recognise. "I have to face reality – I'm a Kurdish man living as a Turkish citizen, like millions of others, I'm not special. It's difficult, but I can manage it in my day-to-day life. But there is something deep inside of me that forbids me from ever participating in their military. I pay my taxes, which then pay for the tanks and tear gas that are used in the south-east. Isn't that enough of a contradiction already?"

[440] Arslan, 2015, 26
[441] Heper, 2007, 130-131
[442] Houston, 2001, 99
[443] Foucault, 1977
[444] *Man Made,* 1h:00m:50s
[445] Ibid., 1h:09m:02s

Yusuf was particularly receptive to my parallel fieldwork in Israel. Upon learning of the IDF policy barring most Arab-Israeli citizens from undertaking military service, he marvelled at the prospect. "Now that I understand such a rule exists, I don't know how I feel about it . . . I know it's seen as a negative quality of the IDF . . . but here in Turkey it could solve a lot of problems. A state ban on Kurdish military service would be very honest. But in a perfect world, it should be optional for everyone. All this comes back to how divisive mandatory military service can be for anyone with a conflicting view [in the country]," he told me.

Filming with Yusuf was always an interesting affair. He insisted that we not conduct our interviews in private quarters – despite my suggestion that he could speak more freely if it were in a controlled environment as with my other participants. Instead, he made a point of always meeting in public, speaking loudly and often checking over his shoulder before he said anything particularly controversial. I would often try and seat us toward the back of public spaces, or away from crowds of people, and he would loudly shame me. *Oh Max, you want it to be private, so you can censor me? I want people to hear what I have to say to you about being Kurdish. They should hear it!*
I later regarded Yusuf's insistence on such public encounters a part of his protest to the situation in which he found himself. Not one for self-pity, he instead wanted to participate in the film "to show others just how difficult it can be in this country, and to show the difference between those who choose to avoid military service, and people like myself who really don't have a choice".

Yusuf still does not know how he will avoid military service in Turkey. As of 2018, his summons is just over a year away. "I don't know, man, maybe I'll just have to serve," he told me in a recent meeting. "Both of my brothers moved back to Germany, so they will just stay there until they can afford the paid exemption . . . as for me, money is tight, and I can't afford to leave the country, leave my job, or my girlfriend." I asked him what he would do if he enlisted in a year's time. "I will try and make a case for my post-graduate skills, and plead mercy on the processing officer for an office posting in major city. It's the only reality I can imagine where I would not lose my mind . . . I have considered asking for a psychological exemption, but if I claim that I'll go crazy because I'm Kurdish . . . something else might happen to me, I could go on a [terrorist] list, my family could be in danger . . . who knows?"

Episode 3: The Soldier & the Swede

"Strong memories…"

- Yonatan

Time in film: 1h:18m:00s – 1h:52:m:0s
Filming Locations: Tel Aviv

3.1 Loner Ethnographic Filmmaking

> *"We shot the entire film with a single camera, which meant we were forced to work rather crudely during production; it added to the authenticity and spirit of the film. There was none of the glossy multi-camera sophistication you find in expensive Hollywood productions . . . It's such a basic film; you really can't strip it down any more than it already is . . . The camera I used was actually stolen from the Munich Film School."*
>
> - Werner Herzog, in conversation with Paul Cronin. [446]

The rhythm of fieldwork: By late 2015, principal cinematography for *Man Made* was at cruising altitude. Skipping back and forth between Istanbul and Tel Aviv regularly, I had developed a production routine that I have retrospectively viewed as the most industrious and productive period of my PhD fieldwork. This contrasted with the first 18 months of my candidature, which was confined to various stages of preparation, reading and logistics. These early months alternated between the daily grind of settling myself in both field sites, offset by literary digestion; days where I would absorb the relevant literature on the major themes and topics of my research. I would then reward myself with what may be the hardest part for most anthropologists: the act of leaving the house and hitting the pavement, as part of the long-term cultivation of ethnographic research participants.

This all changed once my Human Research Ethics Clearance (HREC) was granted and principal cinematography commenced. Every morning, my black DSLR backpack would be waiting by the door, camera batteries charged, and my SD cards formatted. Weighing in at 14 kilograms, the bag was packed with my DSLR and shoulder mount, three prime lenses, a sound recorder, a broadcast quality shotgun microphone and a carbon fibre cine-tripod. Werner Herzog, perhaps the greatest unofficial ethnographic filmmaker, emphasises the physical athleticism often required in documentary film production. In his signature Bavarian deadpan, Herzog declares, "Cinema doesn't come from abstract academic thinking; it comes from the knees and thighs, from being prepared to work twenty-hour days. Anyone who has ever made a film knows this. I have always appreciated a physical connection to my tools . . . What a relief to feel this weight, this substance, then let the heaviness drop away. It's the final stage of the physical act of filmmaking . . . Let me offer a metaphor: all my films have been made on foot."[447]

[446] Herzog in Cronin, 2014, 149-150
[447] Ibid., 154

In this respect, *Man Made's* production would have made Herzog proud. I walked everywhere, shunning public transport where possible.[448] Lugging my gear around both cities, I often left my apartment in the early morning only to return well after dark. One memorable day's filming in Tel Aviv had me walk over 10 kilometres from Jaffa Port all the way back to Tel Aviv University, capturing three interviews over a 12-hour period. Despite the relentless Israeli summer heat, I loved the physical challenge of hauling my equipment, and the corporeal effort of trekking through busy urban environments. Having said that, I looked borderline destitute at the end of most days. See below:

The end of a hard day's filming in Tel Aviv with Ben. Note my grimy feet. (Photo: Max Harwood)

[448] This was not preferential – public transport in Istanbul and Tel Aviv is often gated with metal detectors and routine bag searches. Operating as a filmmaker without a permit in both countries led me to prioritise travel on foot, or in personal vehicles, so as to avoid awkward encounters with the authorities.

Loner ethnographic film production: The unique technical aspect of *Man Made's* production is that it was produced entirely by one filmmaker, an example of the emergent one-person crew documentary film genre.[449] Largely enabled by the mid-2000s arrival of increasingly affordable audio/visual equipment, the pros and cons of the one-person crew generally revolve around the exceptional freedom and obvious limitations of creating a film with just one body. Many of the advantages have already been discussed in this thesis – extremely low-budgets, unprecedented freedom of movement and the natural intimacy that results in the crew-less participant interview. If *Man Made* is primarily a visual ethnographic account of young men, military service and nationalism in Istanbul and Tel Aviv, it also reflects a technical crossover point for documentary film production and showcases the merits of the one-person crew methodology for anthropologists.

Since the arrival of DSLR HD video recording in 2008,[450] notable technological innovations have included the arrival of affordable, broadcast quality lapel microphones that plugged into any smartphone, as well as lightweight follow-focus rigs that attached to DSLR lenses, ensuring silky-smooth adjustments to the camera's focus when shooting. I had been slowly adding to my equipment, experimenting here and there with new products. Working as a visual anthropologist in a Perth-based Indigenous Native Title organisation full-time from 2011 to 2013, I honed my craft as a cinematographer and multimedia content creator. In my capacity as the company's only in-house visual anthropologist, I increasingly relied upon the one-man crew methodology, frequently accompanying archaeologists and heritage anthropologists on remote excursions to the Central Desert of Western Australia, from its northern fringes in the Kimberley to the goldrush plains of Kalgoorlie.

The DSLR backpack that hauled all of Man Made's equipment across three countries (Photo: Max Harwood)

[449] Articles on the genre abound, take this 2017 IndieWire feature for example: https://www.indiewire.com/2017/03/shooting-documentary-by-yourself-city-of-ghosts-quest-hooligan-sparrow-1201797506/
[450] The Nikon D90

It was on these extended field trips that I facilitated multi-day film shoots without access to electricity, lighting or controlled indoor interview spaces. Carrying half a dozen lithium-ion camera batteries, I would strategically film a fieldtrip over a number of days, uploading the raw footage to my laptop in the evening. As each camera battery allowed me to film around 4-6 hours, I would pack light and plan specific instances in which I would record participants, with any leftover battery power dedicated to capturing incidental moments of travel, the surrounding environment and so on. Flying in on small planes and travelling by four-wheel drive on dirt roads, it was out in the desert that I mastered self-reliance and what I call loner ethnographic film production. Relying on a minimalist visual approach, I created a series of ethnographic films from 2011 to 2016 that slowly refined the methodology that is in *Man Made:* the anthropologist wielding a single camera, with the final cut edited between shoulder-mounted tracking shots of participant activity, tripod-stabilised sit-down interviews and atmospheric environmental cutaways.
These films were completed with the same equipment and methodological practise as *Man Made,* bearing a striking aesthetic resemblance as a result:

"On Ngururrpa Country" (2016), created with the same equipment and production methodology as Man Made.
(Stills: Max Harwood, with permission from Central Desert Native Title Services)

Daily routine of the one-man crew in *Man Made*: It was with the methodological practise of the one-man crew and the unique experience of remote ethnographic filmmaking that I commenced principal cinematography of *Man Made.* Despite adequate access to electricity and other amenities of a modern city, I nevertheless approached the production of the film in a similar manner to my work in the Western Desert. Packing light, setting out on foot and spending long days away from the comfort of my apartment, I settled into a daily routine that reflected the unique qualities of loner ethnographic film production.

In both cities, most days would begin the same way. Managing a shortlist of available participants for that week, I would schedule interviews at least a day prior, remaining flexible to the frequent cancellations and postponements that riddle participant-based fieldwork. Over breakfast, I would plan the day's scheduled meetings and interviews, confirming them as early in the morning as possible. I would keep a close eye on the light of the day, monitoring the sunset as well as cloud cover and potential rain. On days where I lacked an interview or a research-related meeting, I would dedicate a few hours of the day to roaming around and filming environmental B-roll footage. With interview cancellations frequent, many mornings and afternoons were spent this way. However, I looked forward to these sessions as a form of Zen-like down time from the arduous drain of participant observation.

Walking for hours, I would scout and capture urban landscapes, sweeping panoramas and the stunning architecture of Istanbul and Tel Aviv that caught my eye. I found beauty in stained concrete, gridlocked traffic and garish neon. I photographed both cities as if they were willing ethnographic participants, sharing their stories with me in inanimate silent repose. Many of these shots appear in *Man Made,* operating as both environmental cutaways and establishing shots of specific urban exteriors. I approached the filming of individual participants with a pattern of slow escalation. First, I would conduct a series of off-camera interviews and social engagements. This informal preamble was especially important if I did not know the participant well, with casual meetings serving to build rapport and establish potential interview topics for when/if the camera was brought in. For those participants who were old friends of mine, I found that scheduling pre-interview research meetings also functioned as a means of distinguishing the social engagement from formal ethnographic research. Ethically, in both cases, this also gave the participant adequate time to consider their participation and for all avenues of inquiry to be explored before they committed to appearing in the film.

While this formula worked, it often meant that I would engage with a participant anywhere from 5 to 15 hours before recording them on camera. A laborious process, I invested in many of *Man Made*'s participants for months, only to have them omitted from the final cut of the film. There were many other participants who did not consent to appearing on camera at all, but still contributed significantly to my research through deep background and off-the-record interviews. Finally, I engaged with some participants for the duration of my fieldwork, but I only filmed them towards the end of our time together in Istanbul and Tel Aviv. This methodology is particularly evident in *The Soldier & The Swede*, in which months of preparation and ethnographic immersion paid off with a handful of on-camera interviews, with only two participants appearing in the final cut of the episode.

Narrative ethnography in anthropological film: Surveying the ubiquitous use of narrative storytelling in contemporary anthropological research, Gubrium and Holstein (2008) write that "countless ethnographic case studies of social worlds [are] depicted in participants' 'own words' and 'own stories.'"[451] The universal human tradition of oral storytelling accounts for ethnographic researchers' enduring reliance on spoken testimony, usually in the context of a close discussion between the anthropologist and the participant. Indeed, Gubrium and Holsten note the power of storytelling in ethnographic research, writing:

> *"Stories are considered for their internal features, for their particular contents, and for the structural differences between individual accounts. Whether it is the function of a witch or a dragon, the true-to-life representation of a social world, or the construction of a form of experience by those differentially positioned in it, the internal features of stories have generalizable characteristics that move us beyond the idiosyncrasies of individual accounts."* [452]

Man Made studies nationalism and militarism's role in the lives of men in Istanbul and Tel Aviv, specifically through the practise of mandatory military service and its relationship to masculinity. These are broad, meta-social themes and sociological concepts that, in and of themselves, are not able to be ethnographically interrogated or materially observed by an anthropologist specialising in participant observation. Instead, male citizens living within the context of the militarised social world of Istanbul and Tel Aviv are interviewed and their stories relayed to the anthropologist in their own words through biographical storytelling.

In this context, Gubrium and Holstein identify "narrative ethnography" as a distinct anthropological practise that uses ethnographic methodology to encourage personal, subjective storytelling from the participant. Narrative ethnography "is a method of procedure and analysis aimed at close scrutiny of social situations, their actors, and actions in relation to narratives. This involves direct, intensive observation of the field of study – in this case, the multifaceted field of narrative practice," they write.[453]

This results in a subjective, deeply personal ethnographic story that can be presented as evidence of abstract theoretical concepts like nationalism, militarism and cultural masculinity existing in the material world – a successful invocation of Hobsbawm's call for the study of theoretical nationalism "from below" or within the lives of citizens.[454] *Man Made* largely consists of these true-to-life personal stories, yielding crucial insights into the structure, culture and application of abstract concepts that cannot speak – like nationalism, militarism and masculinity – within the specific urban spaces of Istanbul and Tel Aviv.

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[451] Gubrium and Holstein, 2008, 244
[452] Ibid., 245
[453] Ibid., 250
[454] Hobsbawm, 1992

The second and final Israeli vignette of *Man Made* rests heavily on a narrative ethnographic structure, or "narrative practise" as Gubrium and Holstein call it.[455] While the first two episodes of *Man Made* bore the expositive burden of having to outline the foundational history and context of the research alongside participant interviews, the second half of the film is liberated to explore deeper themes and aspects of men's lives in the context of the research. The two participants who comprise the episode are Ben and Yonatan.[456] While both reside in Tel Aviv, they come from radically different social and cultural worlds and have completely different stories to tell. This is a deliberate contrast achieved with careful editing – neither participant knew the other – nor were they aware of how their interviews would be paired in the final cut of *Man Made*.[457]

Hewn out and placed alongside each other, their disassociated biographies reflect the complexity of Israeli citizenship, cultural masculinity and the changing value of mandatory military service in the country. I spent months with both participants, as one navigated the lead up to his voluntary conscription after emigrating from Sweden, and the other recovered from what he called the "hard landing" of re-entry into civilian life after spending years in an elite combat unit of the IDF.

Both interviews were significant in my overall ethnographic research. The luck of finding Ben, a recently emigrated Swedish Jew, who was in the process of voluntarily undertaking military service and acquiring Israeli citizenship, was beyond fortuitous. Having him then allow me to ethnographically track his assimilation into Israeli society for over a year was invaluable. Alongside this long-term encounter, I had also met Yonatan. A former special forces soldier, he was the partner of a friend who introduced us shortly after they began dating. Over many months, I worked with both Ben and Yonatan to extract two rich, narrative ethnographies. Offering granular biographical detail, both Ben and Yonatan paint a detailed portrait of how nationalism, citizenship, masculinity and conscription have shaped their lives in Israel. Their stories told parallel to each other*;* they are *The Soldier & The Swede*.

[455] Gubrium and Holstein, 2008, 247-249
[456] Names changed for *Man Made.*
[457] Both participants approved of the final cut of *Man Made* and their contrasting biographies in the episode.

3.2 The Soldier (Yonatan)

Yonatan lights up (Still: *Man Made*)

Yoni was burnt out. As he flung open the door of his small studio apartment in Florentine,[458] I could tell he had just woken up. This would have been fine, had it not been 6 p.m. in the middle of the Israeli work week. *Come in, come in*, he gestured as I slipped off my backpack. Walking into his one bedroom flat, I was reminded of my unruly teenage bedroom. Clothes strewn across the living room, stacks of papers, empty bottles, DJ equipment and lighting gear were stacked high on the few available surfaces around the room. Outside, the noisy evening commute of central Tel Aviv came muted through thick, tinted windows.

Yoni's fifth floor walk-up had me sweating profusely, but like everyone else in the middle of the Israeli summer, it didn't really matter. *You wanna smoke a joint?* he asked me, sitting cross-legged as he rolled a long, Bob Marley-sized spliff. Cannabis is widespread in Tel Aviv, casually enjoyed in public spaces despite its technical illegality. I declined, reminding Yoni that I had another interview after this one. *So busy, man, busy-busy-busy guy… OK, where do you want to start?* After months of planning, I unpacked my camera gear and set up for the first of three interviews that would make up the bulk of Yonatan's appearance in *Man Made.*

[458] Tel Aviv's answer to Williamsburg in Brooklyn, NY. Florentine is an artistic, cosmopolitan suburb just north-east of Jaffa.

Born in 1991 in the southern Israeli city of Arad, Yonatan is a Mizrahi *Sabra*, with half of his family descended from Morocco's Jewish community (*Yehudim Maroka'im*).[459] Raised first in Arad and then in a working-class neighbourhood in outer Tel Aviv, Yonatan's darker complexion and imperfect English make him notably shy in Tel Aviv's cosmopolitan hipster circle where we first met. Tall, good looking and brooding, he embodies the cliché of the self-identifying *Sabra* Israeli: so-named to those born in Israel for their resemblance to the native spiked fruit of the country, which is prickly and defensive on the outside, soft and warm-hearted within.[460] When we first met, I never imagined Yoni and I would get along. He was a local DJ, he smoked a lot of weed, and he seemed extremely disinterested in most people around him.

Over time, we got to know each other better, and I slowly learned of his experiences in the IDF. In central Tel Aviv, it seems as if everyone in the city eats out most nights of the work week. Strolling up and down Rothschild Boulevard on my way home, restaurants and cafés were often packed until late in the evening, the hum of dense conversation competing with the traffic. Throughout my years of visiting the city, I have duly noted the lack of kitchenware in most of my friends' apartments, leading me to anecdotally conclude that Israelis in Tel Aviv eat out more than any other city I have lived in. I once asked a local about this observation, and they offered a typically sardonic rationale. *It's two things,* he told me. *One: it's so hot, that being outside for dinner is often a way to enjoy the coolest part of the day. You can be outside having a drink, while your house cools down before you go to bed. The second reason is simple: life's too short to cook for yourself in Tel Aviv. Why save up money and slave over a meal every night, when we could all get killed next week? May as well have a glass of wine and a beautiful meal with my friends before I get blown up!*

I met Yoni on one such mid-week dinner, finding myself across from him as our other halves chatted.
Asking me about my research, he casually told me that he had recently completed his military service, and that he would be happy to tell me his story on camera. Assuming he was just being polite, I waited a few days before calling him to see if he was still interested. To my surprise, he not only remembered our conversation, but was offended I had not followed up sooner – *I was waiting for your call, man, what took you so long?!* he admonished. We ended up talking for over an hour. In our conversation, Yonatan related to me his remarkable military service as an IDF navy special forces soldier. Serving an additional eighteen months over the customary two and half odd years, Yonatan was now "retired", and in his own estimation, "not coping too well" with life after conscription, despite enrolment in university and an active social life.

Like other participants, Yonatan and I prepared for months ahead of filming, meeting informally and gradually narrowing in on his personal story and how it related to my research questions. Once he felt sufficiently comfortable, we arranged a series of filmed interviews, all taking place in his apartment over a few weeks. Although he was not as concerned about his appearance in the film, he stressed that he did not want to appear on camera outside, or anywhere near his place of work or study. Over four sessions, I met with Yonatan in his apartment and conducted an irregular interview over a few weeks. As we were limited to a single interview space, I employed an old film production tactic for continuity: photographing Yoni on my smartphone, we would then reference back to this master image for clothes, hair and lighting continuity. A photographer himself, Yoni marked the position of his desk chair with chalk, and we committed to replicate the look of the interview across multiple sessions until it was finished.

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[459] Sasson-Levy (2003) summarises the general context and class dynamic of Mizrahi in wider Israeli society: "The Mizrachim are Jews from Muslim and Arab countries, most of whom arrived in Israel during the 'massive immigration' of the 1950s. They occupy primarily the lower echelons of Israeli Jewish society, in terms of both their class position and social status." (Sasson-Levy, 2003, 321)
[460] Attwell, 2015, 81

Reforming Jewish masculinity in Israel: "It was in the late nineteenth century, under the pressure of what Boyarin calls 'the rise of heterosexuality,' that the reconstruction of the Jewish gender by modern Jewish thought began,"[461] writes Israeli queer theorist Raz Yosef. The remaking of Jewish masculinity in Israel has seen much analysis from sociologists, anthropologists and historians, ranging from surveys of early Zionism and Jewish regeneration (Presner, 2003), to aesthetic deconstructions of heterosexual and LGBTI masculinity in Israeli cinema (Yosef, 2004) to reading "unstable masculinities" in the ancient Hebrew Prophets (Graybill, 2016), to the study of contemporary Jewish "hyper-masculinity" (Yefet, 2015) and its relationship to militarism and nationalism. A deliberate social engineering project of early Zionism, the advent of Muscular Judaism[462] was a critical ideological precursor in the lead up to Jewish statehood.

As persecution increased within the Russian Pale of Settlement and anti-Semitism rose in Western Europe in the late 1800s, the already fraught existence of the Diaspora Jew was accompanied by a derogatory gendered stereotype. Derision for the "exilic" or "Ghetto Jew" of late 19th century Europe led to the characterisation of Jewish men as "effeminate, dependent, and homosexual" according to Yefet in her analysis of Jewish masculinity and its renaissance as "hyper-masculinity" in contemporary Israel.[463] Noted Israeli historian Daniel Boyarin went so far as to describe the Diaspora Jewish man as the inhabitant of a "third sex", with circumcision cited as "a hallmark of a feminizing Jewish practice, both because it was a cause of bleeding (evoking female menstruation) and because it damaged the penis and distorted one's masculinity . . . [it was] an act that 'cripples a male by turning him into a Jew.'"[464]

Mosse also writes of an ominous eugenic undertone that characterised the emasculation of the Diaspora Jew in the early Zionist period, citing early 20th century records which decreed, "Jews, in order to become true men, must become reacquainted with nature . . . young Jews were told to marry German peasant women in order to freshen up the tired old blood."[465] Rosenberg (2010) writes of 19th century Diaspora Jews deemed unfit for military service, "due to imagine[d] 'physical and characterological [*sic*] defects'".[466] In 1882, Sir Benjamin Ward Richardson published *Diseases of Modern Life* – a British compendium of known 19th century ailments – specifically linking race and ethnicity to physiological health and resistance to disease. In Chapter Four, "Induced Disease from Physical Strain," Richardson describes the inherent limitations of Jewish "physical capacity":

> *"Since they were conquered, they have never from choice borne arms, nor sought distinction in military prowess . . . the fact remains, that as a people they have never exhibited what is considered a high physical standard. To be plain, during their most severe persecutions nothing told so strongly against them as their apparent feebleness of body."* [467]

[461] Yosef, 2004, 18
[462] As coined by Max Nordau. For more see Presner (2003).
[463] Yefet, 2015, 56
[464] Boyarin in Yefet, 2015, 57
[465] Mosse, 1996, 152
[466] Rosenberg, 2010, 19
[467] Richardson, 1882, 98 (scan of original)

Early political Zionism firmly rejected the scientific characterisation of Jewish physical inferiority, with prominent Zionist orator and noted European physician Max Nordau giving a landmark speech on the image of the Jew at the Second Zionist Congress in Basel in 1898. Calling for a deliberate cultural reinvention of Jewish masculinity within the Diaspora, Nordau forwarded his notion of Muscular Judaism (*Muskeljudenthum*) for the first time. In a specific study of Jewish regeneration and the theory of the "muscle Jew", Presner (2003) depicts Nordau arguing before the Congress that reformed masculinity should be a priority of the Zionist project in Europe, and that "the necessity of creating a new type of Jew – corporeally strong, sexually potent, and morally fit – [was a] precondition for realizing the national goals of Zionism."[468]

As the 20th century began, political Zionism increasingly alluded to the project of Jewish regeneration – linking aspirational statehood, cultural self-determination and the physical transformation of the Jewish body as part of a singular narrative of Jewish independence and national sovereignty. Most importantly, in the age of the masculine soldier archetype (Mosse, 1996), reformed Jewish masculinity was linked firmly to a battle-ready ethos that emphasised physical domination over one's enemies and valorised violent self-defence. Indeed, "the goal of the muscle Jew discourse was not simply the rejuvenation of the individual body but rather the creation of a modern body politic through the aesthetics of corporeal regeneracy [*sic*],"[469] writes Presner.

Over a century later, a muscular Jew sits across from me in downtown Tel Aviv. Directly referencing classical representations of the Diaspora Jew in his interview with me, Yonatan described with enthusiasm the "typical, whiny, feeble Jew" of pre-Zionism, and how this stereotype has been replaced by a strong, masculine ethnic warrior in the time since Israel's creation.[470] I began our interview with a question I had now asked a dozen times. "What is your earliest memory of being aware of your nationality?" This always takes a moment for participants to process, and the answer is always interesting. Taking his time, Yonatan stared into space before he answered. As a child, he told me slowly, stretching his mind back, he remembered two things: the 1995 assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the fact that he was a chubby, awkward kid. Born during the First Palestinian Intifada (1987-1993), which first erupted in the Gaza Strip and quickly spread to the West Bank,[471] it was the murder of Rabin by a fundamentalist right-wing Israeli that left a deep impression on then four-year-old Yoni, instilling him with the first conscious sense of his national identity and its relationship to war, violence and fear.

Remembering the tumultuous fall-out after the assassination, Yonatan articulated that, even as small child, he had a distinct sense of dread and foreboding – that "it felt like we were going down" – and that this might be the end for the country. *Even the teachers couldn't explain it properly, I remember that very clearly. It's really scary when the adults are as scared as you are,* he later told me. A few years later, Yonatan became a teenager during the "peak of the buses exploding" or the Second Palestinian Intifada (2000-2005). While the First Intifada was largely confined to the Occupied Territories, the second Palestinian uprising brought a surge of terror attacks to the very heart of Tel Aviv. Harrowing images of suicide-bombed public buses in the middle of the city were a memetic touchstone for many participants in *Man Made*, with the phenomenon alluded to directly in *The Three Sabras* as a critical aspect of growing up in early 21st century Israel.

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[468] Presner, 2003, 169-170
[469] Ibid., 292
[470] *Man Made,* 1h:43m:00s
[471] Smith, 2010, 674

Entering high school in a distinct climate of fear and collective fury, Yonatan remembers early on that there was a discrete pressure amongst his classmates to "be a warrior" in response to the deteriorating security of the country. "Even though we were just kids, all we could talk about in the playground was how tough we were, it was like sports teams." It was in this early adolescent bravado that Yonatan felt distinctly emasculated, seeing himself as physically weak compared to his more developed classmates. "This is where my insecurities really took hold . . . and as you'll learn when I tell you my whole story, so much of my drive and motivation for military service was because of being a fat kid who hated his body in high school," he told me.

Teenage Yonatan started telling friends and family that he would "get strong" and serve in an elite combat unit of the IDF, to "prove to himself, his family and his nation, that he was a soldier for Israel and the Jews". Articulating the potent role of revenge in Israeli siege mentality (St. John, 2013), Yonatan also told me bluntly "I wanted to kill fucking terrorists as well, as many as I could" following the events of the early 2000s in Israel.[472] Increasingly bullied over his diminutive physicality, Yonatan began lifting weights and "training on [his] own" from 14 years old. "The other kids called me fat, called me a faggot, things like this. The only way to prove them wrong was to get strong, get serious and be able to beat the shit out of them when they picked on me . . . and of course, join the army."

Yonatan's journey from childhood emasculation to masculine reinvention in the extreme environment of an IDF combat role embodies the 19th century Zionist anxiety that reformed Jewish masculinity. The transformation of the Diaspora Jew into a battle-ready hyper-masculine soldier relied heavily upon militarisation of both the body and the mind. It was hoped that by militarising Jewish masculinity, perceptions of their physical inferiority would be corrected – pity would give way to fear and respect – and the same was true for Yonatan. Quoting Mosse in his later work *Fallen Soldiers* (1991), Yosef stresses the relationship between masculinity and war in Israel, writing:

> *"In the [Israeli] national myth, war was displayed as an education in masculinity. The ideal of manliness was represented as a symbol of personal and national regeneration. As Mosse suggests, 'Manhood was cast in the warrior image, symbolizing youth grown to maturity without losing its attributes of youthfulness.... Youth and death were closely linked in that myth: youth as symbolic of manhood, virility, and energy, and death as not death at all but sacrifice and resurrection.'"* [473]

This reflected the education of Yonatan, who told me that by the age of 15 "[he] was hardened to hate and wanted to kill" both for his nation and to ensure his own clear passage to manhood. His maturation from adolescence to adulthood seemed entirely dependent on his military service and becoming a soldier. He described how growing up in a nation rocked by political assassination, intermittent war and terrorist insurgency meant that "even as a child, you're already involved . . . it's not war propaganda". Alongside his growing physical strength as a result of his obsessive training, Yonatan's high school transformation from "scared little kid" to a "warrior" evokes Foucault's description of the "docile body" of the citizen being moulded and disciplined by nationalist discourse and ideology.[474] As Mosse writes, "The high road to the construction of modern masculinity ran through the sculpting of the male body."[475]

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[472] St. John, 2013, 16-17
[473] Yosef, 2004, 50
[474] Foucault, 1977
[475] Mosse, 1996, 53

But there were a few problems in realising this transformation. Up until 2014, Israeli parents bearing a single child had the right to refuse combat duty for their progeny.[476] Deeply protective and raising Yonatan single-handedly, his mother told him that he would not serve in the IDF in any combat role, and instead forced him to enlist as a *jobnik*, a non-combatant/desk job employee of the army. Yonatan was devastated. "I kicked and screamed for days, I just remember crying, like really, really crying . . . I remember thinking, well *I am* a faggot, just like the other kids said. I am just a fat, little boy. I didn't have what it took . . . I would just be a pussy forever. I felt so ashamed."

However, fate would cruelly grant Yonatan's wish. Near his 17th birthday, his mother's health had begun deteriorating. Initially she hid it from Yonatan, palming off her hospital visits as routine check-ups. I will not recount the finer details of this extremely sad chapter in Yonatan's biography, as his grief in *Man Made* speaks for itself. It was on the day that Yonatan passed his driving test that he was called to the hospital. His mother finally died from an aggressive cancer, just weeks before he was enlisted into the IDF. This changed Yonatan's life in several key respects. He was now a *hayal boded* (lone soldier) in Israel, a special IDF designation for those who serve in the army without immediate family to support them. Lone soldiers are offered slightly higher wages, food and housing assistance, as well as other privileges that enhance their quality of life during conscription.

Most importantly, as a lone soldier, Yonatan was now free to enlist without his mother's consent, and in the wake of his mother's passing, he felt like he had nothing to lose. Initially enrolling in *jobnik* training modules, the grieving Yonatan became increasingly obsessed with trying out for the Israeli special forces. "After my mum passed . . . all I could think about was the flotilla,[477] . . . it became the only way I could find any motivation in life. I now realise that I was grieving heavily still . . . it's interesting to me that I wanted to throw myself into the most extreme and dangerous role I could . . . on hindsight, I think I was looking for the biggest distraction." At the first opportunity, Yonatan transferred from his *jobnik* training and enrolled in the arduous summer try-outs for *Shayetet* (Flotilla) 13, a special forces unit of the IDF Navy. For much of his included interview in *Man Made,* Yonatan describes the "hell week" of the unit's demanding preselection course for prospective recruits.

Over four days of physical exertion, hazing and psychological punishment, Yonatan was "broken in half – mentally and bodily" and "remade . . . exactly how they wanted me [to be]". From timed challenges that were impossible to complete, to carrying the full body weight of collapsed trainees for kilometres, Yonatan harnessed grief and personal rage to push himself to the very limit of his abilities. In the end, he was shortlisted for selection into the unit, barely scraping through in his own retelling of the hell week. His subsequent enlistment cannot be discussed in this written thesis or on camera, but I can confirm with his consent that Yonatan's wish was granted: he saw active combat, and in his own words "many people have died in front of me" throughout his military service.

[476] The IDF changed this policy following Operation Protective Edge in 2014. For more: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-parents-of-only-children-can-t-void-combat-duty-consent-1.5389089

[477] *Shayetet* 13, the Israel Navy's special forces unit.

I asked him if, by the end of his tenure in the IDF, he felt satisfied with what he had accomplished. He jittered in his chair, his leg compulsively shaking. "More than anything, it's what came after [military service] that I did not expect [*sic*] . . . I left the army, and it's like a break-up, the door closes, and that's it . . . it's hard to explain, but in special forces, everything is so concealed and hidden. When you finish there's not much of a community to fall back on." I noted that my other Israeli participants all spoke highly of the friends they made during their military service, and how this contributed heavily to their positive memories of conscription. At the same time, I remembered Eli wryly telling me that "the army doesn't teach teamwork" and described the IDF as anti-social despite its reputation otherwise. I asked Yonatan if he felt like the IDF gave him the stability he wanted so badly after his mother's death. "When she passed, I felt like I had nothing. All I could think to do with myself was to throw my body into the IDF and hope for the best."

I asked Yonatan if this mindset was also influenced by his self-described poverty growing up. "Of course! I'm the first person in my family to even go to college. No one ever achieved much in my neighbourhood. My mum dying just made everything that much more extreme." Sasson-Levy (2003) has specifically studied the experiences of working class and Mizrahi men in the IDF, noting that conscription can allow men from ethnic minorities and the poorer classes to secure a higher social standing in the country, particularly if they serve in combat roles. "Mandatory conscription enables these men to challenge their exclusion from full participation in society . . . as it defines them as 'men enough' to be equal citizens and allows them to take part in the central institution of the state. [Military] service endows them with the status of 'normative Israeli men' and the benefits of army veterans," she writes.[478]

After our interview, Yonatan dug out a photo of himself in the middle of his military service. His hair is cut short, he is in peak physical condition, his eyebrows furrowed as he handles a rifle. Nowadays, Yoni has longer hair, and he has lost a lot of weight. He is now enrolled in a university program on an international scholarship program for lone soldiers in Israel. In *Man Made,* he hints that he felt abandoned by the army after finishing his service, noting the irony of receiving international donor support, not any domestic initiative. "On hindsight, I was so perfect for the army . . . an empty guy, ready to do whatever anyone in charge told him. More than anything, I wanted to become a man, for my mum, for my uncles . . . I wanted to have something I could take back to my shitty life in Tel Aviv and say, 'See! I did something!' . . . in Israel, serving in combat is the highest honour . . . so I knew if I'd ever be anything in my society, I had to go to the frontline."

I thought of David in Jerusalem, and his emphasis that "to be a man in Israel . . . is to be a soldier who fights, a proper warrior". Throughout his career as an intelligence officer in the IDF, he told me that he deeply admired anyone who fought in combat, suggesting a hierarchy of masculinity within militarism and the IDF structure. Sasson-Levy notes that "the hegemonic masculinity in Israel is that of the combat soldier, the man who was trained to fight, kill, and be killed in the battlefield. Soldiers who do not go through the ultimate experience of the battlefield (women soldiers, for example) often express admiration of and identification with the combat soldier and adopt his daily practices."[479]

[478] Sasson-Levy, 2003, 304
[479] Ibid., 338

At the end of our last interview session, I asked Yonatan to reflect on the history of Jewish masculinity. We talked at length about the notion of the muscular Jew, from the early speeches of Nordau and the more comical depictions of the Diaspora Jew in 20th century cinema and art. One such depiction is crosscut during Yoni's commentary on historical anti-Semitic depictions of Jewish men. As Yonatan describes the Diaspora stereotype, Sir Alec Guinness appears on screen as Fagin in David Lean's 1948 adaptation of *Oliver Twist*. Heavy makeup renders Guinness a cartoonish emblem of anti-Semitic tropes: lecherous, hook nosed and filthy, Fagin exploits children and hoards stolen jewellery under his black cassock. Yonatan laughed off these depictions, telling me that it was a pleasant pastime with friends to "get high and watch racist YouTube videos of Jews through history".

When it came to his place in Jewish history, Yoni was more cynical. I asked him if he considered himself an embodiment of what Nordau and Herzl were calling for over a century ago. "I don't know about that," he laughed, "but in talking about my life with you, I've been thinking a lot about how I transformed *for* the army . . . physically, I mean." I asked him what he meant. "Well, as I told you many times, I was a kind of effeminate kid. Didn't like sports, didn't like fighting. If I didn't grow up in a country where your leader is shot in the street, where bombs blow up buses and maim your fellow citizens . . . if I didn't grow up in this environment – would I have stayed that way?"

Yonatan found his first year out of the army revealing. "Look at me – you saw the photos from when I was in the army. Huge, strong guy. The warrior. Now, I'm [65 kilos]. I'm shy. All I want to do is make art and play music. I'm an effeminate Jew again! Back to the fat kid from before." Yonatan theorised that it was Israeli cultural militarisation that principally transformed him into a soldier. "The biggest thought in my mind now that I'm out [of the army] is how that wasn't really me." Once he had left the army, he had reverted into a more natural self, which he felt he was now exploring in an effort to find his true identity. "I'm not a soldier, I'm not an Israeli, I'm just a guy," he told me.

As we finished one interview, Yonatan began to tell me about a particular sculpture in The Israel Museum. "Nimrod", by the Israeli artist Yitzhak Danziger, was completed in 1939. It depicts the biblical Hebrew warrior, naked and uncircumcised, his back straight and his head upright, the sculpture cut from red sandstone. Yonatan related to me that, for Israelis, this statue represented the Jewish male's transition from its weak diaspora stereotype into its strong, hyper-masculine successor. He had recently studied it, and immediately thought of my research, and our ongoing conversations. What made the statue powerful for Yoni was its depiction of the Jewish man as a North African, a Mizrahi Jew like him. With distinct Nubian features, the sculpture indeed is a far cry from the Ashkenazi Jews of Europe and Russia. For Yonatan, "Nimrod" was the symbol of "my people's time", meaning the Mizrahi communities that are often overlooked in the common normative Israeli national identity.[480] "Our nation has been persecuted for the past thousand years . . . but the Zionists had enough . . . fuck you all . . . now we're strong, now we're big," he boasts on camera, a hint of a smirk on his face.

[480] Ibid.

Nimrod (1939) by Yitzhak Danziger (Photo: The Israel Museum, Jerusalem Collection)

3.3 The Swede (Ben)

It must be a common experience amongst embedded anthropologists who, at one point during their fieldwork, take a moment and reflect on the bizarre situation they find themselves in and question internally, "Wait, what does this have to do with my research?" As I felt my legs twist into a corkscrew of pain, and distinctly heard my favourite pair of mauve summer shorts tear across one knee, such a question arose in my mind. I was thoroughly pinned underneath a broad-shouldered Israeli judo enthusiast, as he easily trapped me beneath his body weight in a vice-like smothering. Squirming and trying fruitlessly to counter attack, I slapped the blue mat with an open palm repeatedly, tapping out to applause and laughter.

I do not like judo, but Ben did. We had now been hanging out for a while, and I tried my best to tag along to a variety of his extracurricular activities in Tel Aviv. Having arrived in Israel from Sweden earlier in the summer, Ben had been slowly building a new life for himself as a Swedish immigrant to Israel. Exercising his right to live in the country with Israel's Law of Return, Ben had completed his master's degree in the United Kingdom the year before, and now wanted to live in Tel Aviv permanently.

Footage of Ben in Judo training cut from Man Made (still: *Man Made*)

My wife had studied alongside Ben, and we were introduced when he visited Istanbul in 2014 on an extended layover between Israel and the United Kingdom. We instantly hit it off, and he was intrigued by my comparative study of Turkish and Israeli military service. As our friendship developed over the following months, Ben told me that he should probably be part of my research since he planned to emigrate to Israel and enlist in the IDF for a stint of at least six months. As he was granted Israeli citizenship at 25 years old, rules at the time of his draft stipulated that Ben would serve a reduced military service from the standard two and a half years for new recruits. Recently arrived migrants to Israel who are eligible for military service are afforded a one-year acclimatisation gap, but Ben had deliberately expedited his drafting. "I wanted to get it over and done with as soon as possible – I figured I wasn't getting any younger, and it would only be more physically demanding as time went on . . . also, I was honestly really looking forward it," he told me.

Far from an Israeli nationalist or political hard-liner, Ben is a highly educated liberal Scandinavian, who profoundly disagrees with the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Golan Heights and the blockade of the Gaza Strip. Extremely self-aware of this paradox in view of his enthusiasm for military service, it was over many months that Ben elucidated to me his uniquely transactional perspective on Israeli conscription and why he deemed it necessary. Ben is an interesting modern case study of an international Jew migrating to Israel via the Law of Return. Passed by the Knesset on July 5, 1950, the law dictates that any Jewish person has the right to migrate and settle within the nation's borders as *oleh* (Jewish immigrant to Israel, plural *olim*).[481] Once the *oleh* arrives on Israeli soil, he is given three months to decide whether or not to pursue full Israeli citizenship. Ben had visited Israel many times in his youth, but it was in 2014 that he decided to make *aliyah* as an *oleh* and commence the process of becoming an Israeli citizen. While Ben was legally required to undertake military service when he first arrived in early 2015, by the middle of that year the recruitment guidelines changed, designating *olim* over 22 years old as exempt from conscription entirely.[482] Despite this last-minute change, Ben was still resolute in undertaking his mandatory six months as soon as possible.

As the law of conscription changed right in the middle of his draft, the IDF processing team offered Ben an exemption. "I declined immediately, I didn't even entertain the possibility of getting out of it," he told me. I asked him why the IDF would even offer an exemption to a healthy young man – wasn't this the very purpose of military service in Israel? "In their eyes [the IDF], I really think they see six months of service as a waste of their time. If I'm a product, then I'm not worth it to them. The cost-benefit of absorbing some Swedish guy who doesn't speak fluent Hebrew, and then losing him after six months – why invest in that? I completely understood where they were coming from." In a sense Ben's military service was voluntary, and it is described as such in his introduction in *Man Made.*

In light of an easy exemption, I asked Ben why he still felt compelled to serve in the IDF, as opposed to simply moving to Tel Aviv, getting a job and settling down as in any other country. Indeed, despite his enthusiasm, Ben made quite the case for how ineffective he predicted his initial military service would be. Again, citing his lack of fluent Hebrew negating any immediate eligibility to the more elite sections of the IDF (such as the intelligence and communications branches), Ben was also aware that he was likely to be mentored by officers a few years young than him. Ben freely admitted that his military service would be far from consequential in the scheme of things and that by his own estimation, in light of his graduate level education, he was "probably more useful to [Israeli] society as a working taxpayer".

Nevertheless, Ben justified his desire to voluntary undertake military service in Israel for two reasons:

1. The strategic value of having completed conscription for future employment opportunities in Israel, especially the job network potential of serving in specific branches of the IDF, particularly as an intelligence officer. Additionally, *olim* are offered intensive Hebrew immersion courses as part of their military service, and Ben regarded this experience as invaluable to his personal investment to living in Israel permanently.

2. A personal sense of satisfactory assimilation into a society that demanded military service for most of its native-born citizens.

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[481] Official Knesset English translation: https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/return.htm
[482] Sourced originally from an oral interview with IDF recruitment and from Ben's own understanding of the law as related to me. English translation available here: http://www.jewishagency.org/first-steps/program/5146

In this written analysis, I will address these two motivations in sequence. The first will be combined with a framing of theoretical "materialist militarism" (Levy, Lomsky-Feder and Hare, 2010) in Israel and Ben's perceived transactional value of military service in Israeli society. In addressing Ben's desire for proper assimilation into Israeli society, I have linked his narrative ethnography in *Man Made* to an anthropological study of transnationalism in the lives of newly arrived Jews to Israel (Remennick, 2002).

Materialist militarism and the IDF: Upon his request, it is important to emphasise Ben's ethical perspective on his decision. In Ben's view, serving in the IDF as a conscript would have no bearing or tangible influence on either the occupation or Israeli foreign policy. One night, as he walked his bike with me through Rabin Square, he told me, "I'm a drop in the ocean. The occupation will continue whether or not I serve in the IDF. And besides, new recruits with only six months service won't be assigned any tasks or responsibilities that really impact anyone's lives [*sic*], Palestinian or otherwise . . . in fact, I expect to be thoroughly bored and underused for most of my service." Ben's ambivalence toward the IDF was tangible throughout the months leading up to his draft, and I could sense that he wrestled with the ethical consequences of serving, no matter how minor his role in the military would be. At one point, he raised a similar point made by Tolik, my participant from *The Three Sabras*. "I think that there's something to be said for my participation in the IDF as a force for good. Even though I'll likely be given no real power to change anything, my presence as an ethical, liberal-minded humanist would be better than my boots being filled by someone who embodies all of the negative stereotypes for the army. The best I can hope is that my direct impact on those around me is positive."

What serving in the IDF would impact on, however, was Ben's job prospects in Israel. "Serving in the IDF is like a business card," he would tell me, freely acknowledging the transactional value of military service when it came to certain careers, particularly in international relations, academia and the hi-tech industry. "It'll look great on my resumé, and the people you meet inside the IDF often have connections to the private sector once you get out." This perspective is widely held in Israel, with all of my *Sabra* informants who served in the IDF both as conscripts and reservists confirming to me that a major perk of military service – particularly in the more technological branches of the IDF – was preferential selection in business intelligence companies, tech start-ups and specialised public sector jobs with the Israeli government. Furthermore, the international appeal of having served in the IDF was well known amongst my informants, who often cited their military service as catnip for international graduate programs and job interviews in Europe and North America.

This made military service a personal investment for Ben's prospective career opportunities, drifting far from the ideological rationale that the IDF was a community-driven people's army in which personal sacrifice, the security of the Jewish nation and national patriotism were at the forefront of a soldier's mind. I thought again of my conversations with Eli in Re'ut, with his constant ribbing of the IDF as an institution that encouraged selfishness, discouraged teamwork and instilled a dog-eat-dog mindset in the soldiers that it produced. I wondered if Ben's transactional approach to military service spoke to Eli's critical assessment of the institution.

Analysing Israeli sentiment towards military service in the late 20th century, Levy, Lomsky-Feder and Hare (2010) mapped a gradual "erosion of the hegemonic military ethos" in the country, by which they mean a perceptible wane of enthusiasm toward "obligatory militarism", or the compulsory individual contribution of military service intended to benefit Israeli society. From the mid-1980s, Levy et al. traced a steady decline in motivation for military service in Israel, particularly amongst secular youth:

> *"This trend has been expressed in various ways: a clear, slow, and yet continual decline in the general desire to be recruited; a weakened readiness to be recruited into combat units; fewer volunteers for command courses; a rise in the number of youngsters changing their medical profile so as to avoid combat roles; an escalation in the number of soldiers requesting to serve in rear roles; and a significant increase in the number of people dropping out before or during their service for mental health reasons."*[483]

Disinterest in military service peaked following the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, with then Chief of the General Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak publicly declaring a "motivation crisis" amongst Israeli youth when it came to conscription.[484] By the late 1990s, Levy et al. describe the emergence of a new "contractual militarism" that replaced traditional notions of obligatory collectivist contribution (the notion of the people's army), with a transaction occurring between the recruit and the IDF. In this exchange, military service was "conditional on its meeting the individual's ambitions and interests".

To restore enthusiasm for conscription in Israel, recruits were increasingly incentivised to complete military service in light of its social value and veneration in the public sphere. This resulted in a re-evaluation of the IDF's function, symbolism and purpose, an "erosion of the canonical military ethos,"[485] recast as a public service employer that embraced liberal economic principles to incentivise conscription. Levy et al. contend that a culture of material transaction had surfaced as a means of making Israeli conscription palatable to the general population. For successful recruits – particularly those who served in elite units – there was an assumed quid pro quo that pledged material success and social elevation in Israeli civil society following one's conscription. Dubbed "materialist militarism", this social framework is defined by Levy et al. as "the exchange [that occurs] between social groups to acquire power within, and owing to, military service—that can be [then] converted into valuable social positions in the civilian sphere."[486]

I have seen the phenomenon of materialist militarism in the lucrative world of private sector Israeli business intelligence. The military intelligence body of the IDF (Agaf Ha Modi'in, AMAN), including the prestigious signals intelligence (SIGINT) Unit 8200, takes on new recruits as young as 18 years old. Conscription in Israel occurs at the traditional age of college education in non-militarised nation states, running as long as the average undergraduate degree program. As a result, many Israelis I spoke to never attended university, and regarded their military service as an alternative tertiary education of sorts, often tying their social networking and skills acquisition in the IDF with their post-conscription civilian employment. This was particularly evident with one participant, who was a veteran of Unit 8200 and was now employed in Israel's hi-tech industry.

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[483] Levy, Lomsky-Feder and Hare, in Sheffer and Barak, 2010, 145
[484] Ibid., 146
[485] Ibid., 162
[486] Ibid., 160

Declining to appear on camera for *Man Made,* but happily contributing to deep background interviews for my research, this young man regarded his three years with Unit 8200 as the sole reason he was employed with a decent salary in Tel Aviv. *I always have employment because of 8200. It's an instant verification of my skills and talent, and so I had no trouble getting work in computer science right out of the army.* He later confided that he only worked 40 hours a month, mostly from home, and earned a wage that was extremely generous, despite only holding a high school-level education. Alongside this participant, many other Israelis corroborated the strategic value that military service had for one's career in Israel and abroad. Both David and Tolik, the intelligence veterans from *The Three Sabras*, were employed on the basis of their military service and the connections they established during their conscription. Tolik in particular spent years working in a noted business intelligence company in Israel.

This private sector company (which I will not name) was founded and comprised mostly of seasoned intelligence service veterans of the IDF. This was not a hidden feature of the organisation; in fact, its public relations and client solicitation explicitly touted the unique skill sets and experience of their employees in the army. "It makes perfect sense," Tolik explained to me. "In the army, you learn to trust your team, those above and below you . . . so, it's logical when you're looking to hire people in a private company – imagine knowing everything about someone before they even apply for the job . . . their strengths, their weaknesses, how they work within a group." Most importantly, Tolik informed me, "The power dynamic of commander to subordinate stays in place after you both leave the army in Israel. Take for example, my old boss at [*company name*] . . . even though we don't work together anymore, he's still my boss. His nickname is actually *el hefe* [Spanish for 'the boss']! The structure of the workplace was the same as the army. The formula carries over cleanly from the IDF and into the office."

At least among participants who completed military service in Israel, it was clear that there were a certain materialist and careerist value to service in the IDF's *jobnik* placements, particularly the intelligence and communications branches. Ben arrived in Israel as an *oleh* with this understanding, aspiring to complete his six months service with immersive Hebrew language courses included. Upon completing his term, he was open to taking on a longer contract with the IDF, especially if it could potentially lead to better employment opportunities in the private sector. He noted to me that throughout his service, he expected to be "hustling", rubbing shoulders and mingling with potential post-army career contacts.

Ben's expectation of increased social standing and employability following his military service reflect Levy et al.'s analysis of Israeli high school preparatory courses for life in the IDF. Within these courses, students are oriented to regard their looming conscription as an exchange of services between the successful conscript and the IDF. "[A] central value that has been codified into the new soldier ethos is personal ambition, focussed on the individual and not the collective," they write.[487] Furthermore, these courses imitate the distinct social capital that certain *jobnik* and specialised combat roles carry within the IDF itself:

[487] Levy, Lomsky-Feder and Hare in Sheffer and Barak, 2010, 159

> *"This social capital ensures efficient use of social ties and information as the pupils strive to realize their goals . . . Moreover, a community of graduates develop around the course. The development of such a community is important . . . because it creates a social network of informal relationships, which helps in meeting the course's main aim — admittance to select units. Participation in the course, therefore, becomes social capital that increases its graduates' chances of being admitted to the units in which they want to serve."* [488]

Ben's perspective on the purpose of military service in Israel raises new questions on the contemporary role of militarism in the country, as well as the value of traditional, masculine combat roles in the IDF, such as Yonatan's experience in the special forces. It would appear that Levy et al. are correct in their assessment that "the shift from obligatory to contractual militarism represents a retreat" from the IDF's traditional values, although as an institution military service still looms large in Israeli public life. What is clear is that newly arrived citizens like Ben – despite an active interest in Israeli history and political Zionism – regard Israeli militarism and its value very differently from that of the nation's first generations. "The militaristic state is not as total as it once was," Levy et al. conclude.[489]

Nevertheless, Ben also viewed military service as an essential experience on his path to proper assimilation in Israeli society. Philosophically, he viewed conscription as a social equaliser – a means of homogenising disparate individuals into a congruent national whole. In undertaking conscription as a foreigner, Ben saw this as a necessary means of fitting in to mainstream Israeli society. As he later states rather existentially in *The Soldier & the Swede,* "I'm not going to feel properly Israeli . . . until I've done it."[490] His insistence on military service suggests that, in Ben's mind, Israeli citizenship and socialisation are intrinsically linked to the militarisation of the individual.

Basic training in particular appealed to Ben in the months leading up to his draft, and he looked forward to the hardship he would endure. For years, he had heard about the boredom and the pain that typify military service in Israel. *Shavuz* (literally "broken penis" in Hebrew) is an IDF slang expression that describes the unique depression experienced in IDF military service. *Shavuz* is both a melancholic noun as well as a collective nostalgic commiseration. Ben described Israeli friends that would sit around and wistfully trade stories on their worst bouts of *shavuz* during their military service. "I remember as a kid feeling jealous of their shitty experiences. Now, I'm not so silly as to covet their shitty time in the army, but it's a great example of the unifying experience of military service. Everyone's done it. Everyone's been 'dick broken', sitting around in their uniform, sick of the food, missing their family, bored out of their mind. I know it's stupid, but I want that experience, too."

This is consistent with Ben-Ari and Lomsky-Feder's sociological research (1999), who contend that in Israel "both warfare and armed service represent intensive meeting points between the individual and the collective".[491] Ben felt compelled to undertake a rite of passage that he felt was essential to fitting into Israeli society, and that the personal inconvenience of military service was an essential part of the experience. Not serving in the army would have been easy, Ben told me, but he explained that getting an exemption was akin to not paying income tax while the rest of society is forced to contribute. In short, Ben felt that the act of not serving in the IDF would set him apart from the rest of Israeli society for the rest of his life there.

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[488] Ibid., 159-160
[489] Ibid., 164
[490] *Man Made*, 1h:41m:05s
[491] Ben-Ari and Lomsky-Feder, 1999, 9

Transnationalism, militarism and fitting in: Describing contemporary experiences of transnationalism, Remennick (2002) writes that in the 21st century:

> *"Full-time loyalty to one country and one culture is no longer self-evident: people may actually divide their physical pastime, effort and identity between several societies. Citizenship and political participation are also becoming bi-focal or even multi-focal, since some sending countries allow their expatriates to remain citizens, vote in national elections and establish political movements."* [492]

Growing up in Stockholm, Ben told me that he felt like an outsider from his early childhood, with his Jewish heritage emphasised by his family, although they were not particularly religious. Educated in secular Jewish schools as a little boy, it was not until he was 10 years old that he took dance classes in central Stockholm and noted for the first time that he had been culturally and ethnically segregated up until that point. "It felt alien, I immediately knew I was different from the other kids – the way they talked, the way they looked . . . it was my first exposure to mainstream Swedish society, which is *not* Jewish." The friendships he made at the dance school led him into the homes of other children, and he was struck by how different the interior lives of his classmates were. "Going into their houses was a big deal… I still remember it to this day, that it was extremely jarring, kind of like a warning shot… 'you're not one of these people, get used to it', that kind of thing."

A self-described introvert, Ben found it difficult interacting with people growing up, but his anxiety was magnified by the cultural difference he encountered in Stockholm. Manifesting into a bifocal national identity from an early age, despite looking like a "regular Swedish kid", Ben carried an acute awareness of a second cultural and ethnic identity. This was not necessarily a bad thing, but he felt that the early establishment of this difference lay the groundwork for what eventually led to his emigration to Israel. "I never felt particularly Swedish or particularly Israeli, but I was definitely Jewish. I know that sounds crazy, but the terms Swedish and Israeli seemed ill-fitting . . . although I felt more at home in Israel, being surrounded by Jews and all . . . but I still didn't fit in there completely either. My looks alone single me out in Tel Aviv as an outsider, just like you!"

I asked him directly what these terms meant to him. "Swedish . . . to me… feels arbitrary. I was born there, so what? It's like you being Australian. You didn't have a choice, and even the name of the country is artificial to a degree. It's modern, it doesn't have any personal weight . . . being Jewish is like… this immense personal and communal history. You're a part of something that goes back millennia, an ethnic minority. Even as a secular Jew, the very idea to live in a time when the Jews have their own nation is extremely powerful." This echoes David's articulation of Israeli national pride in *The Three Sabras*, almost verbatim. This sentiment also played directly into Ben's decision to serve in the IDF. For him, it brought the idea of the Jewish ethnic community out of abstraction and made it concrete – a tangible means of inhabiting the figurative Israeli nation state. "It's not about being a soldier," he told me with a serious tone. "Not at all. I'm almost certainly going to be a *jobnik*… it's about participating in an experience that all Jews have here. That's very important to me, the way it equalises everyone." From the baker down the street to the movie star driving a Lamborghini to the beach, "they have all worn the same shitty outfit, gone through the same shitty routines, and it's important that I also go through that".

[492] Remennick, 2002, 3-4

The history of Jewish nationalism had also touched Ben's own family history. As waves of *aliyah* Jews continued to arrive in Ottoman Palestine from Europe in the early 20th century, Sweden's Jewish community felt increasingly torn between integrating into wider Swedish society and joining the blossoming political Zionism in Europe and Ottoman Palestine. The Swedish Christian majority publicly articulated scepticism of both political Zionism and the World Zionist Organisation (WZO) in the early 1900s, and publications of the period called for Swedish Jews to firmly reject both. Narrowe (1981) describes these tensions, highlighting the ideological schism of Sweden's Jewish community as they navigated political Zionism and assimilation. In the lead up to World War II, sections of Sweden's Jewish community openly identified as proto-Israeli state nationalists, renewing tensions in the country. Narrowe writes, "Concern for 'the Jewish People' was fundamental for Swedish Zionists. And no wonder: they, themselves, were almost exclusively immigrants. Some had succeeded in becoming members of the Swedish Jewish Communities — membership was reserved for Swedish citizens — but most were not. In fact, the denigrating term 'Zionist' among the community elite, was another way of saying 'foreign Jew'".[493]

Ben's grandfather was born and raised in Germany. The night of *Kristallnacht* (Night of Broken Glass) in 1938, he awoke in his Berlin Jewish boarding school to the smell of fire. Following the events of the pogrom, Ben's grandfather was sent to Sweden by his mother in an effort to spare her children's lives from the looming Holocaust. Growing up in Sweden alongside Israel's declaration of statehood and its turbulent early decades, Ben's grandfather was heavily involved in the Scandinavian Zionist movement, which first supported Jews in Ottoman Palestine from abroad and, after the state of Israel was founded, the nation itself. [494]

Ben notes that while his grandfather was an ardent and influential financial supporter of Israel, his enthusiasm for Zionism had little bearing on religious belief or observance. Seeing himself and his family as ethnically Jewish before Swedish, Ben told me that his grandfather had a defining role in his upbringing. "In my family, being Jewish is paramount, and that doesn't mean believing in God. It's an ethnicity, a community, 'the tribe', whatever you want to call it . . . and so my grandfather gave a lot of money to the country . . . it's not an accident that my parents have an apartment in Tel Aviv . . . and so growing up, before I even visited the country, I felt deeply connected to this idea of Israel, this idea of a nation filled with my people."

Lost in the echoes: Late in the summer of 2015, I sat with Ben on the roof of his parents' Tel Aviv apartment. The sun set lazily over the horizon, the tall shadows of beach front skyscrapers cast long toward the east. Up on the roof, it was nice and quiet. The traffic below was muted as I watched as Ben cut up eggplants and drizzle them with olive oil. In a week or so, we would be parting ways. He would soon be packing a bag and submitting himself to a local IDF processing centre, beginning one month of boot camp. In a few days, I had to return to Istanbul, and so we knew that the next time we would meet his experience in the army would likely be over. Ben never struck me as particularly afraid or apprehensive about his looming military service, but as he worked by the barbecue, I sensed a nervousness for the first time. Over a long conversation which concludes *The Soldier & the Swede*, Ben became introspective, existential and reflective about what we would soon embark upon. Prompting him, I asked him to consider history – a passion of his – and how he imagined he might fit into the narrative of Israeli nationalism. He declined such lofty self-examination, fearing delusions of grandeur when considering one's place in a given historical narrative. He cautioned that thinking too deeply on such matters would result in "getting lost in the echoes" of history itself.

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[493] Narrowe, 1981, 13

[494] Sourced from Ben's grandfather's personal memoir, kindly provided to me and translated by his family. It will not be referenced due to privacy.

In the months and years that passed after his voluntary military service, much had changed in Ben's life. He had ended a long-term relationship, travelled to different countries, but had continued to live in Tel Aviv, firmly committed to his new life as an Israeli citizen. Throughout his military service, I had followed along on social media, seeing him post photos of his new buzz cut, a rifle by his side as he stood in front of his barracks. The uniform suited him, and I noted his resemblance to many of the early IDF fighters who were photographed in the major conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s. He really did *fit in*, at least superficially.

In the end, Ben's military service fulfilled his expectations. The intensive Hebrew course that followed basic training improved his language skills, serving him well in the years following his draft. The final three months of his conscription played out almost exactly as he had hoped: Ben had "hustled" during the language course and found himself employed as a research assistant in the IDF's operations directorate, a true *jobnik* academic role that put him in touch with key personnel for his prospective career as a civilian. Just as he imagined in 2015, Ben is now working a hi-tech role that was acquired in part due to the aggressive networking he undertook in the IDF.

What did not work out as expected was Ben's sense of fitting into the country. Speaking in 2018, he told me bluntly, "I see now that I'll never be properly Israeli, in much the same way I never felt truly Swedish . . . But that's ok, it just took a few years for me to realise that you don't just fit in overnight. Living in Tel Aviv for a few years now, I see how different I still am to most people here and, as I'm unwilling to change certain aspects of myself, I don't see how that situation is going to improve." He told me this jovially, and I sensed he had genuinely settled in the years following his conscription. Ben still regarded his experience of military service as entirely personal and practical. It advanced his career, enhanced his assimilation through language training and scratched a kind of nationalist itch that left him feeling proud to have served, if only for a short while. I asked him about the strategic value of a *jobnik* IDF placement and how this clashed with the traditional perspectives on IDF combat roles, which carried significant social value but minimal earning potential following one's military service.

"It's definitely changed from the old days," Ben told me. "Combat roles are obviously still highly regarded, but even amongst the *olim* I bunked with in basic training, everyone talked about getting into the more technological jobs of the IDF. Intelligence, comms . . . everyone was aware that if you land one of those positions, you're going to be set when you get out on the other side . . . those who wanted to pursue combat roles only considered the elite units . . . these had a kind of prestige, but I wondered why anyone would want to subject themselves to that."

Ben during IDF basic training (Photo: informant).

Episode 4: The Pink Certificate

"It is against…brotherhood"
- 'Selin'

Time in film: 1h:52m:0s – 2h:19m:0s
Filming Locations: Istanbul

4.1 The Epicentre, Awash with Blood

In 1921, Ottoman poet and veteran of the Independence War Mehmet Akif Ersoy composed *İstiklâl Marşı* (Independence March), a long patriotic elegy that eventually became the Turkish national anthem. Although 41 lines long, only the first two verses are recited during official ceremonies. The final stanza of the performed anthem imagines a Turkish flag hung vertically, with the white crescent moon ceremoniously downward, anthropomorphised by Ersoy into a frowning human mouth:

Çatma, kurban olayım çehreni ey nazlı hilâl!
Kahraman ırkıma bir gül! Ne bu şiddet bu celâl?
Sana olmaz dökülen kanlarımız sonra helâl,
Hakkıdır, Hakk'a tapan milletimin istiklâl!

(Frown not, I implore you, oh coy crescent!
Smile upon my heroic nation! Why the anger, the rage?
Our blood, which we shed for you, will not be worthy otherwise;
For freedom is the absolute right of my God-worshipping
nation!)[495]

In the centre of Taksim Square – a public space in Istanbul metaphorically stained in spilt blood and political rage – the frowning Turkish flag flies enormous. In June 2012, at the base of the Taksim flag pole, I arranged to meet an informant just before Istanbul's annual LGBTI pride parade was scheduled to begin.

Living in Beyoğlu for a number of years, one develops a mind map of the labyrinthian alleyways and side streets that make up the urban nervous system of central Istanbul. Without thinking, it is easy to navigate the hive-like residential clusters of Çukurcuma and Cihangir, and with a few strategic turns down claustrophobic lanes, stairways and narrow *pasaji*, you will emerge suddenly onto one of the city's main thoroughfares. Looking on a map, the arterial boulevards of İstiklâl, Sıraselviler, Cumhuriyet and Taşkışla streets cross-cut European-side Istanbul, shooting off in different directions of the compass but all converging at the same nexus point. Geographically and historically, this node is the centre of modern Istanbul: hemmed in by luxury hotels, shopping malls and Gezi Park, this sparse urban plateau is the infamous Taksim Square.

[495] Translated by author.

Situated high on the undulating Istanbul peninsula, on a clear day in Taksim one can look south through the cracks of buildings and briefly glimpse the Bosphorus Strait. A wide expanse of concrete, the square is demarcated by architectural symbols of modern Turkish history. For decades, Taksim's eastern edge was bordered by the modernist Atatürk cultural centre (*Kültür Merkezi*), a 1960s opera house and secular icon. A bygone venue of music, art and international performance, it is now demolished. On the opposite side of the square rests the imposing Republic Monument (*Cumhuriyet Anıtı*), a two-panel bronze sculpture housed in an Ottoman-style archway. Built by Italian sculptor Pietro Canonica and unveiled in 1928, it features opposing bronze statues of Atatürk in contrasting iconic periods. The north façade depicts him in his Independence War battle dress, right hand is on his pistol as he leans forward, flanked by soldiers, Kemalist confidants and the traditional peoples of Anatolia. The south façade depicts Atatürk the statesman, leader of the Turkish republic. Here he is dressed formally with his back straight, his face relaxed and smiling, his right hand open in diplomatic invitation.

When I first arrived in 2010, Taksim was a chaotic bus station: a ring road of taxis, traffic and trash. Today, the asphalt has been swapped for slate-grey pavers, the traffic and buses have been replaced with tacky night markets and dozens of police in riot gear standing idly near their signature TOMA vehicles,[496] ready to crack skulls and shoot tear gas at a moment's notice. But this was nothing new. Since the republic's founding, Taksim square has been a focal point of Istanbul's modern history, "the symbolic epicentre of both state patriotism and anti-government protest."[497] On February 16, 1969, thousands of leftist protestors marched toward Taksim from Sultanahmet, demanding that recently stationed American naval forces evacuate the city. The anti-imperialist demonstrators were met by "conservative, nationalist and Islamist groups" and the police attacked all sides when they finally reached the square. Two were killed and hundreds injured, the day later commemorated as Istanbul's very own "Bloody Sunday" (*Kanlı Pazar*).[498]

Istanbul's "Bloody Sunday" protestors march toward Taksim, February 16, 1969. (Scan: Serap Güngör)[499]

[496] Toplumsal Olaylara Müdahale Aracı, water cannon-equipped anti-riot vehicles.
[497] White, 2014, 197
[498] Yıldız in Karakatsanis and Papadogiannis, 2017, 142-143
[499] https://www.weloveist.com/the-bloody-sunday-of-istanbul

On May 1, 1977, trade unions gathered in Taksim for their annual Labour Day celebrations. An official holiday in the Turkish republic, Labour and Solidarity Day (*Emek ve Dayanışma Günü*) was first observed in the final decades of the Ottoman Empire. However, as part of the wider government purges and the first Kurdish insurgency of 1925, Atatürk's Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) sporadically prohibited Labour Day marches from 1928 onward.[500] It was only in 1976 that the 1st of May celebrations were officially reinstated and – as thousands of attendees packed Taksim Square on May 1, 1977 – gunfire rang out across the wide concourse and into the masses. While the 1977 Taksim Square massacre *(Kanlı 1 Mayıs*) began with unidentified sharpshooters, it was the panic-induced stampede that killed 34 people and injured hundreds more.[501] That particular Labour Day was themed "against the rising tide of fascism", and so the shooters were suspected to have been far right extremists or shadowy government agitators. Like many perpetrators of Istanbul's political violence movement that part-defined the late 1970s, the Taksim Square massacre shooters were never identified or brought to justice.[502]

Crowds of Labour Day attendees cower under sniper fire in Taksim Square, May 1, 1977 (Photo: unknown)

[500] Hale, 1993, 72-77 and http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1-mayis-nedir-ilk-ne-zaman-gundem-2052551/
[501] Ahmad, 1993, 143
[502] Zürcher, 2004, 263

The last peaceful pride march: On June 30, 2012, I stood beneath Taksim's flagpole, in front of the fading Atatürk Cultural Centre, waiting patiently for Selin[503] to arrive. One of my oldest research participants, we have been friends since early 2011, when we were mutually introduced at a Lambdaistanbul[504] meeting in Kadıköy. Selin identifies as transgender. In her own words, "Sometimes I feel like a woman, sometimes like a man, sometimes neither . . . I don't really know what these terms mean." Born biologically male, Selin has oscillated between binary gender roles since she was a small child. We were introduced through a friend when I was conducting ethnographic research for my previous film, *Making Men in Turkey,* in which Selin featured prominently. An academic, LGBTI activist and visual artist rolled into one, Selin is well known in Istanbul's queer community. Vouching for me and supportive of my research in both my honours thesis and PhD, Selin has provided me with extraordinary access to an understandably guarded and insular subculture in Istanbul.

In the summer of 2012, we met in Taksim Square to attend Istanbul Pride together – partly to celebrate the end of my honours fieldwork, but also for work. Freelancing when I could during my degree, I was on photo assignment with Rolling Stone for the event, tasked with photographing the atmosphere of what would be a record crowd of over 20,000 people.[505] Selin and I did not know it at the time, but Istanbul Pride 2012 would be Turkey's last authorised and largely peaceful LGBTI march. While the 2013 pride march was enormous, it took place in the wake of the Gezi Park protests, with riot police and TOMA vehicles lining Taksim square as the crowd swelled inside of it.[506] After the attempted coup d'état of 2016, Istanbul Pride was completely prohibited, and it has now indefinitely vanished from the city's calendar of events.[507]

Back in 2012, there was no tear gas or water cannons. By later afternoon, the crowds in Taksim Square had swelled to tens of thousands, dancing and chanting jubilantly despite the sweltering humidity. People were dressed in vibrant colours, many with musical instruments, flags and streamers. The carnival atmosphere was infectious, as the march officially began near the old Republic Monument, on Taksim's western boundary. I looked up, and noticed someone had climbed the bronze statue, placing a rainbow flag in the crook of Atatürk's arm. The front of the parade featured parents of queer children, holding white signs declaring *benim çocuğum eşcinsel* (my child is gay), as they began marching slowly down İstiklâl. In the middle of the parade, an enormous rainbow flag was held aloft by dozens of people. Crawling underneath it, I pointed my camera upward to capture the surreal view from below. Hundreds of legs walked out of sync and the material of the flag flapped loudly as I raced beneath it. A friend followed me, laughing hysterically as we emerged on the other side, where a circus troupe banged drums and shouted *alışın heryerdeyız!* (we are everywhere!).

Arriving hours later at the foot of Galata Tower, I reflected on the horror and humiliation that befell Turkey's queer community. For me, this was exemplified in how they were treated by the Turkish military, from the drawn-out psychological examinations, to the physical procedures that verged on torture. This contrasted with the sight before me. Such solidarity, celebration and happiness were evident in the tens of thousands that marched that afternoon. Turning to Selin, I asked her how such a parade was possible in light of what my research had taught me. *This is just one day, Max,* she told me. *Tomorrow it will be back to normal.*

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[503] Name changed.
[504] NGO founded in 1993, "Istanbul's largest queer liberation organisation": http://www.lambdaistanbul.org/s/
[505] Lambdaistanbul estimate, recorded at debrief meeting, 02/07/2012.
[506] Pearce in Fisher-Onar et al, 2014, 160-176
[507] Human Rights Watch, July 2018: "Turkey Has No Excuse to Ban Istanbul Pride March": https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/28/turkey-has-no-excuse-ban-istanbul-pride-march

The footage I shot that day is super-sampled[508] and included in the introduction to *The Pink Certificate*. It captures the energy, the positivity and the happiness on people's faces – it was a truly jubilant day. This is offset by cell phone footage shot on an İstiklâl side street in June 2016, where a few nervous LGBTI activists gathered to chant and wave rainbow flags. At this stage in Turkey's civil rights decline, like many other videographers I was far too nervous to attend and film such events. In the footage, the police quickly arrive to break up the dozen or so kids, shooting tear gas and rubber bullets directly into their bodies. One police officer runs ahead of the pack, lobbing a flash bang grenade into the crowd as the scene cuts to black.[509]

Istanbul Pride 2012 (Photo: Max Harwood for Rolling Stone)

[508] Upscaled from 720p to 1080p resolution.
[509] This footage was provided with permission by an unnamed participant. It appears in *Made Made* at 1h:55m:00s.

A history of broken behaviour: The historical origin of the Turkish military's unique LGBTI discrimination policy lies neither in ancient Anatolian socio-cultural attitudes, nor religious conservatism. Rather, the practise of banning gay men from mandatory military service is somewhat rooted in Kemalist modernisation, militarisation and the wider Turkish nationalist project. Hale (1993) recounts the historical perception in Turkish society that the military functioned both as an institution of national defence, as well as a cultural finishing school in which hegemonic societal norms were crafted and imposed upon the male citizenry. TAF literature of the 1930s describes military service as a "school of the nation" in which literacy programs, national identity education and disciplinary physical routines endowed Turkish conscripts with essential life skills and a right to full citizenship in the country.[510] As Hale notes, the TAF's role as a "vehicle for mass-education and political acculturation" was primarily a government initiative to transform the culturally disparate and illiterate rural Anatolian populations into a homogeneous national whole.[511]

Alongside the refinement and subsequent circulation of the Turkish History Thesis (*Türk Tarih Tezi*) and the state-wide implementation of language reform, Turkish military service enforced a set of specific cultural attributes that defined modern "Turkishness" in the new republic. Despite the passage of time, these attributes have remained remarkably consistent through to the 21st century. Throughout my research, my participants have consistently identified the ethnically Turkish, nominally Sunni Muslim and uncompromisingly heterosexual Turk as the standardised hegemonic citizen in the country. This rigidity of ideal Turkishness is maintained in part by the continued discriminatory practises of the TAF, which includes the prohibition of LGBTI men from its ranks, and the medicalisation of homosexuality as a severe mental illness.

In the case of military service exemptions, the TAF has strict guidelines for ineligible recruits who exhibit physical and mental disabilities and other debilitating diseases. The TAF mental health rules are outlined in an extensive Health Regulation Manual (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Sağlık Yeteneği Yönetmeliği*), which, as of 2017, is freely available online.[512] It is under the sub-section, "mental health and disorders" (*Ruh Sağlığı ve Hastalıkları*) that homosexuality is first listed as a mental illness. Articles (*madde*) 15 through 18 list a bevy of psychological disorders that, if diagnosable in the conscript, render him ineligible for military service. From paranoid schizophrenia, narcissistic personality disorder and OCD, it is under the heading, "anti-social personalities" (*Antisosyal kişilik*) that "sexual identity and behaviour disorders" (*Cinsel kimlik ve davranış bozuklukları*) is listed. The translation of the latter is revealing: *davranış bozuklukları* reads literally as "broken behaviour".[513]

The *madde* advises that "in the case of visible advanced sexual disorder [in the conscript], an exemption/discharge is recommended." This small paragraph in a more than 100-page-long health regulation manual is the impetus for the last episode of *Man Made*: *The Pink Certificate.* The legislative origin of the Turkish military's animosity towards homosexuals in particular is unclear. Despite significant efforts, I have been unsuccessful in locating the first decree or statute that initially prohibited gay men from Turkish conscription. In the words of a participant, "We don't have any clear answers about the military's policy [toward homosexuals] because they don't answer to anyone."[514]

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[510] Hale, 1993, 328
[511] Ibid., 328-329
[512] Article (*Madde*) 17.4 was amended in 2013 with slightly ambiguous language: https://www.tsk.tr/Content/pdf/insan_kaynaklari/TSK-Saglik-Yetenegi-Yonetmeligi.pdf
[513] Ibid., 62-64
[514] As stated by "Mr. X" in *The Pink Certificate.*

In 2007, however, an authorised representative of the TAF clarified the long unacknowledged practise of discrimination, stating on the record to the Human Rights Association of Turkey (*İnsan Hakları Derneği*), "In order to establish the sexual orientation of a recruit, the Turkish Army follows the guidelines established in the second revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-II) published by the American Psychiatric Organization in 1968."[515] This confirmed decades of prior assertions from researchers that the TAF rigidly adhered to the DSM-II Article 302 definition of homosexuality as a "psychosexual disorder".[516]

In her comparative research on military service and gender across modern nation states, Segal (2004) offers a possible explanation for LGBTI discrimination, writing that "cross-national comparisons have shown that there is a relationship between policies on homosexuals in the military and policies concerning women's participation . . . [a result of] the culture of hypermasculinity in the military."[517] In Turkey, women are not conscripted, rendering the practise inherently masculine and a dominion of the male sex in Turkish society, despite high profile female nationalists like Halide Edib Adıvar (1884-1964) and others serving in active support roles during the Turkish War of Independence.[518]

White (2003) analyses the scholarly assessment of the early Turkish republic as a "feminist state", or "a male-dominated state that made women's equality in the public sphere a national policy".[519] However, like much of Kemalist ideology, the equality of women in the country was culturally narrow in scope. Kemalist feminism prioritised a feminist homogeneity based upon the lives and social status of urban middle- and upper-class Turkish women, a state defined femininity that rarely reflected the values and behaviours of the civil majority. White writes, "The ideal Republican woman was a 'citizen woman,' urban and urbane, socially progressive, but also uncomplaining and dutiful at home. Modernity, as defined by the Turkish state, included marriage and children as a national duty for women."[520]

The propagation of an ideal Turkish femininity that emphasised both publicly progressive feminism as well as traditional, subservient homemaking reflected Kemalist ideological tension when it came to defining women's roles in the militarised nation state. Atatürk's own adopted daughter, Sabiha Gökçen (1913-2001), was a highly decorated fighter pilot who advocated for the inclusion of women into the armed forces, but the first conscription law of the new republic prohibited female enlistment. Altınay (2004) describes how the enactment of the Turkish republic's first conscription law in 1927 was pivotal in reinforcing narrow Kemalist gender roles across the country and its diverse citizenry. In the new republic, conscription would culturally dictate that all men would be required to serve the nation as soldiers, whereas women – while urbane and modernised in the public sphere – would be privately confined to their homes in traditional support roles as wives and mothers. To accommodate the odd instance of female participation in the armed services and nationalist politics, Altınay contends that there was the concept of "daughters of the nation", a specialist designation for the select women like Adıvar and Gökçen who would serve as iconic female combatants.[521]

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[515] 2007 Report, Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: http://www.refworld.org/docid/469cd696c.html
[516] Basaran, 2014, 562-563
[517] Segal in Callaghan and Kernic, 2004, 218
[518] Altınay, 2004, 49
[519] White, 2003, 145
[520] Ibid., 146
[521] Altınay, 2004, 50-51

In short, the Kemalist articulation of military service as a cultural feature of Turkish civilisation cemented hegemonic masculinity in the national consciousness, establishing rigid heteronormative gender roles for men and women in the militarised Turkish state. Despite women's participation in the Independence War and Atatürk's own progressive attitude toward potential female enlistment, the consensus view among TAF intelligentsia was that, in peacetime, military service should be restricted to healthy young men only. "When it is only men who become soldiers, military service inevitably defines male citizenship and masculinity in an opposition to female citizenship and femininity," Altınay writes.[522]

As Tolik states earlier in *The Three Sabras*, living in a militarised society is characterised by clearly articulated hierarchies of power and discipline between citizens. In his words, these hierarchies are not only more apparent in militarised nation states, but they are also enforced with threats of disciplinary violence. "It's everywhere," Tolik says, "it's in how people drive, in how they act."[523] In Turkey, the positioning of conscription as a historic masculine tradition has resulted in a unique hierarchy of hegemonic masculinity in the country, delineating men and women as separately tasked in respect to their contributions to the state and public life. Throughout their lives, men are crafted through a series of masculine rituals and traditions. Beginning with circumcision, the boy's transition to unconsummated manhood peaks with his expedition out of civil society and into the barracks.

How then to explain the apparent disruption posed by gay men when they come of age for enlistment in Turkey? This question has dogged my research, and I posed it to almost every interviewee I had spoken with in Istanbul. The *yarbay* (lieutenant colonel), with whom I spoke extensively on deep background, gave a stock answer that I had heard a hundred variations of, but is revealing in its candour. *You can't have gay men in the army,* he told me. *It fucks everything up. The other soldiers don't work with the guy, because they're uncomfortable around him. He will be alienated and made fun of by the whole barracks. Turkey is a conservative country, and for a lot of men in the army, they probably have never met a gay man.*

The Pink Certificate introduces a few.

[522] Altınay, 2004, 47-48
[523] Tolik in *The Three Sabras*, *Man Made*, 0h:30m:36s

4.2 "It Was Like a Performance for Me" (Selin)

Selin in her sünnet costume, circa late 1980s. (Photo: informant)

Walking to Selin's apartment for the last time in 2016, I felt guilty. I had been speaking to her for ethnographic research for over six years now. As self-conscious anthropologists often reflect, we can be a tremendous imposition on our participants. Always questioning, probing and "othering" (and in my case with a camera in tow), I felt particularly taxing on Selin considering her situation. Hers was a life that begged to be ethnographically examined, so much so that her own master's thesis was (in part) an auto-ethnography on the individual transgender experience in Istanbul. After six years of on-camera conversations, off-the-record interviews, tag-alongs to LGBTI NGO meetings and countless introductions to other activists, I asked her for a series of final interviews for *Man Made*. Viewing her participation as a joint research project of sorts, we often took notes after filming, referred each other to literature and attended university conferences together.

When I was first introduced to her, a news article was shared with me in advance of our meeting. Despite the risk, Selin gave an interview in early 2010 about her coming out and living as a transgender university student in Istanbul. The article features photographs of Selin wearing a skirt, tights and a long purple wig, obscuring her face and identity for the camera. When we eventually met at Lambdaistanbul, she was au naturel in jeans and a t-shirt. Registering my surprise, she laughed and told me that she dressed like a man or a woman based upon how she was feeling that day. *I'm transgender I guess . . . but it changes quite a bit. I think it's silly that gender should be fixed. I have a feminine side and a masculine side, and I like to express myself based upon which is stronger that day.*

Arriving at her quiet apartment in central Istanbul, Selin greeted me with a hug and led me to her living room. Here, she had two articles of clothing hung up on a steel rack. Gesturing toward them, she told me, "These are the two most important symbols, just as you asked." A few days before, I had asked her to consider bringing some props to our next filmed interview. For so much of Selin's story, her clothing was highly totemic – capable of reflecting her inner self or "gendered appearance" (Hines, 2007) – as well as marking key moments in her life and sexual identity in Turkey. Two garments hung on the rack before me: one from her childhood, the other from her early twenties. The first was traditionally masculine, the second distinctly feminine – a lifelong transition bookended by two simple pieces of clothing. In analysing both outfits that Selin presents at the beginning of *The Pink Certificate*, her biography as a conscientious objector and transgender woman in Turkey can be properly contextualised and understood.

The *sünnet* costume: Growing up just outside of Istanbul, like many Turkish men Selin recalls her circumcision ceremony very well. "I remember the excitement, the expectation . . . all the attention put on me was really nice. When I finally tried on the [*sünnet*] clothes, it was the strangest thing… I suddenly felt like a beautiful little girl. It was a white, shimmering outfit, like a party costume with a long-feathered cape . . . I imagined myself as a princess when I first put it on, in my child's mind . . . I somewhat fantasised that everyone saw me as a girl, I guess for the first time." When she holds the outfit in *The Pink Certificate*, it is easy to see feminine qualities of the garment. Faux-diamond encrusted, white feathers on the collar and a silky sheen all betray the inherently masculine ritual that *sünnet* symbolises in a Turkish boy's life. "It's ironic isn't it," Selin told me as she studied the costume, "[that] circumcision is such an important symbol of masculinity . . . but for me, it was the beginning of my femininity."

Thus began Selin's journey through childhood and adolescence, "living a life beyond and between gender dichotomy", attracted to the same sex as a biological man, but increasingly comfortable in a feminine public persona. "Of course, I couldn't act upon my urges as a teenager," she told me. "For years, I was just a boy who was gay. I did not even know about the possibilities of living a life as transgender or intersex that was compatible with mainstream society." Selin is referring to the simplified social status of the transgender community in Turkish society, which has historically existed on the periphery of the mainstream. Transgender women in Turkey are generally stigmatised as drifters, sex workers and social outcasts.[524] As of 2017, Turkey has the highest murder rate for transgender individuals in Europe, with transgender women in particularly vulnerable to abuse, human trafficking and exploitation.[525]

[524] Significant literature on trans-lives in Turkey include Muedini (2018) and Özbay (2017).
[525] September 2016 data from Transgender Europe (TGEU) statistical analysis. For more see: https://transrespect.org/en/map/trans-murder-monitoring/#
and BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-38147249/100-women-2016-fighting-for-transgender-rights-in-turkey

Internalising her emerging sexual identity as a child and teenager, "I hid my true self very well in the beginning," Selin told me. "Even though my parents were very progressive and loving, I instinctively knew that I should supress my femininity from an early age – my desires to appear in society as a woman – anything could happen to me if I came out as a kid." In school, like all of *Man Made's* Turkish participants, Selin encountered the looming prospect of military service, but it was not her sexual identity that initially gave her pause about conscription. Instead, Selin found herself entertaining thoughts of conscientious objection almost immediately and it was only years later that she realised her sexuality was also at odds with the TAF's induction process. "From high school, I knew I would refuse to serve in the military. The idea of holding a weapon, being taught how to kill for the state, it was non-negotiable for me almost from the beginning." As conscientious objection is not legally recognised in Turkey (Çinar 2017), Selin knew that at a certain point she would have to confront the TAF in person – either going to prison as a surrendered pacifist, or living in the country as a deserter.

By the time she was a university student, Selin had come out as intersex to friends and family, but still maintained a public persona of a heteronormative Turkish man. Heavily involved in the LGBTI activist movement, Selin was exposed to the horror stories of gay men who went before the TAF's health panels, and she personally worked with many gay men who underwent humiliating physical and psychological testing in their pursuit of an exemption from conscription before military psychologists. "As I worked with my brothers and sisters [at the organisations] I was filled with anger. It got worse throughout my years at university. My military service was a confrontation that was coming, a day when I would finally meet these abusers . . . it was around this time that I decided not to run or become a deserter. Instead, I would make it a huge performance. I would go to the military as a woman and dare them to try and intimidate me into serving."

The blue dress: "I wore this to my first interview for the army," Selin says, as she holds a summery blue dress, carefully folded and pressed. "It was so important that I go to the army as a woman. They make so many lives hell, as an activist and as a student, I almost wanted to see what they were so afraid of." I still marvel at the portrait Selin paints of that morning. She tells me that she waxed her legs, applied makeup and wore the blue dress and her signature purple wig to the interview centre. "It began even before I entered the building," she says of the stares. "Some of the guards at the facility actually had their mouths open, it was very funny." Walking confidently to the examination centre, she began the infamous process of acquiring an exemption from military service on medical grounds, an ineligibility certificate, usually printed un-ironically on garish pink paper. These "pink certificates" (*pembe teskere*) mark unfitness for military service in Turkey.

Basarin (2014) has studied the TAF's specific medical examinations for exemption-seeking LGBTI Turkish men, writing that the process "may involve psychological tests (the Minnesota Multi Personality Inventory [MMPI], the House Tree Person [HTP] test, and the Bier Incomplete Sentence Blank test) as well as interviews and physical (rectal) examinations".[526] As evidenced by the testimony of both Selin and the masked "Mr. X", the TAF uses a combination of these investigatory measures on the participants who appear in *Man Made*. First, Selin was ordered to strip naked and stand in front of a panel of doctors. Here they made her do exercises; prolonged movements and other exaggerated physical poses for unspecified analysis.

[526] Basaran, 2014, 563

"They say it's to check my health, but it wasn't that simple," she told me. "They made me take off my dress. I remember one doctor saying we want to see if you have breasts or not . . . it was clearly to humiliate me. I was of course a pre-operative transsexual, and I had told them I had no intention of seeking [sexual re-assignment] surgery. But they insisted, 'Take off your clothes, Selin, we need to see if your body is feminine.'" Standing naked before the panel, they asked her to turn around, raise her hands and stand in a Vitruvian Man-like pose for over a minute. Without further instructions, they eventually told her to get dressed and sit back down. *You have a problem,* was their blunt, preliminary diagnosis. *A big problem*. She agreed, and was sent home pending further examination.

What Selin experienced in her initial medical examination could be read as a crude, superficial and somewhat literal take on Foucauldian biopower, specifically the manipulation and discipline of the body by the state (1978). Although Foucault was clear in his assertion that biopower operates through "microlevels of everyday life",[527] state manipulation of the body is central to modern disciplinary power over the individual, with biopower encompassing "the numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations" within the nation state.[528] Foucault reasoned that sex and sexual identity's inherent individualism were anathema to citizen uniformity, and were therefore particularly vulnerable to state disciplinary power in the pursuit of hegemony:

> *"On the one hand it [sex] was tied to the disciplines of the body: the harnessing, intensification, and distribution of forces, the adjustment and economy of energies. On the other hand, it was applied to the regulation of populations, through all the far-reaching effects of its activity . . . giving rise to infinitesimal surveillances, permanent controls, extremely meticulous orderings of space, indeterminate medical or psychological examinations, to an entire micro-power concerned with the body."* [529]

Speaking to medical professionals years later, Selin's suspicions of mistreatment were confirmed. Her physical examinations went far beyond routine procedure, especially given their duration and their insistence that she pose in stress positions for minutes at a time. "I think they were letting me know that I don't control my body, that it is theirs to do what they want [*sic*]," she told me. This was only the beginning of Selin's interrogation by the TAF, which included lengthy psychological examinations over many months, often involving Selin taking the same test multiple times without explanation. Selin undertook the House Tree Person test three times, with her illustrative answers deemed inconclusive after lengthy analysis and interviews by military psychologists, in which she was coerced into interpreting her own drawings as evidence of childhood sexual abuse and severe mental illness.

A form of art therapy, HTP is usually administered by mental health professionals to detect "schizo-effective disorders, delusional disorders . . . and paranoid schizophrenics", but it is considered "at best a rough and non-specific measure of psychopathology".[530] Selin recounted to me that during her failed HTP tests, "I was told that because the house didn't have a chimney, that this meant I was convinced I had no penis, and that I was delusional," she told me. Arguing with the military psychologist, she retorted that houses do not have chimneys anymore, and she wasn't familiar with them in Istanbul. "Every answer I gave was checked for evidence of extreme mental illness, psychopathy, whatever they could think of . . . it was all negative, to prove that I was insane."

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[527] Pylypa, 1998, 21
[528] Foucault, 1977, 140
[529] Ibid., 145-146
[530] Le Corff et al in Handler and Thomas, 2014, 145

Throughout her examination, she was told that if she brought a family member or two – particularly her mother and father – then her assessment would be expedited, and she would not have to endure any more physical examinations or psychological testing. "They said if I bring my parents . . . and they testified that I was insane, or had a serious delusion about my sexuality, then I would be given an exemption immediately." Like many LGBTI persons, Selin found the prospect of bringing her parents to the examinations impossible. "My parents were very understanding – my father even offered to come. But when I explained that he would have to tell the army that I was sick, [he] of course refused." Selin was unique in this regard; the majority of Turkish LGBTI persons I spoke with were closeted from their families and immediate communities.

Turkish law lacks specific prohibition against hate crimes targeting LGBTI individuals and severely restricts legal recourse for discrimination, abuse and violence against the Turkish transgender community, in general.[531] This results in pronounced closeting and secretive behaviour by the Turkish LGBTI community, which in Istanbul can resemble a secret society of sorts. From social gatekeeping to layered anonymity, LGBTI culture in Istanbul was recently ethnographically documented in Cenk Özbay's marvellous *Queering Sexualities in Turkey: Gay Men, Male Prostitutes and the City* (2017), which highlights the methodical subterfuge that protects Turkish gay men from being outed to their family and community. Needless to say, Selin was particularly lucky in finding support from her parents, but she regarded the TAF's offer of a fast-tracked exemption with family involvement yet another intimidation tactic, designed to threaten LGBTI Turkish citizens with public outings.

As the months of testing wore on, Selin was increasingly convinced that she was being deliberately exhausted by the TAF, who offered no guarantees on when and if the testing would end. Finally, after five months of physical and psychological analysis, Selin was brought before the panel. Wearing her blue dress as always, she was told bluntly that she would likely receive an exemption from military service pending a 6-12-month final review – but in their estimation, she was severely mentally ill and delusional about her physical gender. This initial report exempted Selin from military service pending the final report's completion and it diagnosed her as suffering from a *Cinsel kimlik ve davranış bozuklukları* (a sexual identity and behavioural disorder). Selin remembers thanking them and blowing the panel a cheeky kiss goodbye. Her final report was delivered nine months later, and she was officially free of conscription for the rest of her life.

A few years after her exemption from military service, Selin has come to cynically regard the TAF's prohibition of gay conscripts as a circumstantial blessing of sorts. "In a way, I was lucky – I could never have served in the army, and so I exploited their homophobia to receive an exemption . . . obviously, many men suffer in other ways, and I feel very grateful for this." She remains convinced that the Turkish military continues to reject homosexuality because of the perceived threat LGBTI men pose to nationalist cultural hegemony. As she says at the outset of her appearance in *The Pink Certificate*, "They [the army] are defining masculinity . . . and femininity, in a way. They think the job of homosexuals is not to fight . . . they only know how to be fucked." Selin sees this simplification as evidence of the Turkish state's discomfort with non-heteronormative gender roles. In her outline of the key aspects of Turkish masculinity for example, she lists "circumcision, military service and being married." *Obviously, I have a problem with all three*, she later laughed when revisiting this statement.

[531] Danish Human Rights Institute report for the COE, 2011, available here: https://www.coe.int/t/Commissioner/Source/LGBT/TurkeyLegal_E.pdf

As we walked down İstiklâl during the pride march of 2012, I noted that the event felt like just as much a protest as a celebration. Selin jumped on my observation: *Max, you finally understand! Being gay in Turkey is a protest*![532] In Selin's encounter with the TAF, it would appear that the individual who deviates from heteronormative Turkish gender roles also deviates from the state itself. For Selin, this protest was involuntary. Mirroring the experience of Yusuf, who could not conscionably participate in military service as a Kurdish Turkish citizen, Selin felt that the Turkish state gave her a choice: either masquerade as hegemonic or resist and suffer the consequences. Selin's resolve at the end of *The Pink Certificate* encapsulates her attitude. "I'd rather die than go," she says, as the scene cuts to black.

[532] Emphasis added.

4.3 "Getting It Up the Ass for the Military" (Mr. X)



'Mr. X' as he appears in The Pink Certificate (still: *Man Made)*

> *"[In Istanbul] masculinity is ardently treasured, and machismo is very strong. At the same time, strict gender-based understandings of sexuality are very prominent. Therefore, homosexuality is considered a sort of feminization—a loss of manhood, a failure in one's masculinity. Similarly, a man can retain his masculinity as long as he remains solely the penetrative partner. Therefore, the active-passive distinction in homosexuality is very prevalent, with one partner irreversibly assuming the feminine role, and the other, the masculine."*
>
> - Mr. X, in an essay on LGBTI Turkey[533]

Filming the forbidden: As outlined in my introductory remarks, the illusory point of view (POV) that ethnographic film provides can both enhance the subjective quality of participant interviews, as well as attract a non-specialist audience to esoteric academic works of anthropology. While *Man Made* makes frequent use of identity masking techniques throughout the film's four episodes, the on-camera presence of participants is an essential feature of *Man Made's* aesthetic up until its concluding episode *The Pink Certificate.* The episode's second participant requested complete anonymity, specifying that he not appear on camera and that he be identified only as "Mr. X" in this written dissertation.

In his interview, Mr. X is obscured entirely, presented as a shrouded figure who speaks to the camera in a dimly lit, deliberately out of focus scene. The individual who appears on camera is, in fact, me. After finalising our interviews for *Man Made,* I edited in Mr. X's appearance with anonymous placeholder footage. When it came to editing the scene for the final cut, I set up my camera in a dark room with a backlit curtain. Hitting the "record" button and wearing a hooded sweater, I then gestured loosely for five minutes in an imitation of the natural head and body movements that occur in conversation. Reviewing the raw footage, I then further darkened the image and blurred it in post-production.

[533] To preserve the participant's anonymity, I have left this citation unattributed.

It was then easy to carefully synchronise my body language to the lengthy deposition of the participant. Mr. X is a well-known Turkish LGBTI activist with whom I have worked closely since 2011. Similar to Eli in *The Three Sabras*, he is somewhat of a poster boy for resistance to military service in both Turkish and international mainstream media. A quick Google search of his real name brings up interviews with the BBC, CNN and the New York Times. In all of these articles, Mr. X describes the nature of his military service exemption in Turkey, and how (along with the psychological and physical testing experienced by Selin) he was additionally coerced into providing explicit photographs of himself in a "passive sexual encounter" as proof of his homosexuality.

At the time of my PhD research, Mr. X had grown exhausted of media interviews, academic analysis and other appearances he had made on behalf of the activist movement in Istanbul and Turkey. *It's been 15 years, Max. I can't do this anymore,* he told me abruptly in 2014. We had remained friends throughout my time in Turkey, but when I moved back to Istanbul in 2013, something had changed. "I'm afraid my time in the country is running out," he texted me one day in late September. That summer, the Gezi Park protests had erupted and Mr. X had been engaging in the uprising throughout its duration, both as an LGBTI activist and as a civil protester. Well-known to the authorities because of his public record, Mr. X was packing away his belongings when I visited him in the fall of 2013. *I'm worried that I'm going to wake up one day and have the police kicking down the door,* he told me with absolute seriousness. Mr. X was used to harassment and discrimination, having previously been run out of an Istanbul neighbourhood when his apartment was trashed, his mattress set on fire and thrown into the street for all to see. Older than many of my participants, he sought a military service exemption in the early 2000s, at a time when prejudice against the gay community in Istanbul was markedly higher than in the years I had lived in the city. "Back in the early days there was no pride – no marches, no celebrations of any kind," he told me.

Mr. X came to Istanbul in the late 1990s. "In those days, it [gay culture] was so far underground in both cities [Ankara and Istanbul]. I still can't believe the contrast between the meetings then and now – it's like night and day. In those first years, we organised everything with paranoia, we shifted the venue to throw off outsiders and we vetted everybody in attendance." Lambdaistanbul was founded in 1993 as *Gökkuşağı* (Rainbow), and when Mr. X arrived in Istanbul toward the end of that decade, he started working with the organisation. Throughout his time with Lambdaistanbul and other Istanbul LGBTI activists, his focus was twofold: highlighting the plight of LGBTI Turkish citizens for the international media and banding together the disparate activist organisations around the country in an effort to amend Article 10 of the Turkish constitution. In the mid-2000s, the amalgamated Constitution LGBT Commission (*Anayasa LGBT Komisyonu,* ALK) was finally formed, demanding specific language that would protect LGBTI Turkish citizens in Article 10, which at the time only prohibited discrimination based on "language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect".

At first, the ALK's lobbying looked promising. In 2004, the Turkish Justice Commission (within the Ministry of Justice, or *Adalet Bakanlığı*) voted to include new language specifying "sexual orientation" as a protected status. But when it came to the final legal hurdles, the revision was ultimately dropped in favour of Article 10's existing language.[534] As of 2018, Article 10 still only lists gender (*cinsiyet*), without any specific language protecting LGBTI citizens of the Turkish republic from discrimination.[535] Despite the AKP's failure, the new political visibility of LGBTI rights as a result of their campaign was unprecedented. "All of a sudden, we were being talked about in public spaces. Whether it was in the back-pages of newspapers and 'zines, amongst university students and political groups – it was a start. Gay rights were finally out of the closet in Turkey." This coincided with the first pride rallies in the country, which were organised by Lambdaistanbul and debuted in the summer of 2003.[536] Starting out with just a few hundred participants, the pride march swelled to its 2010s peak of tens of thousands, gridlocking central Istanbul and turning Taksim Square into an enormous dance floor.

This highly energised political and social atmosphere of Istanbul's LGBTI organisations was what greeted me when I arrived in 2010. I was invited to my first Lambdaistanbul meeting that year, and the only requirement was that I come with a previously vetted member. The meeting took place in a local Kadıköy bar, which was open to the public. This was the context in which I met Mr. X, and we quickly got along. His sharp wit and morbid world view were charming. He loved films and video games, so we always had plenty to talk about. We would frequent bars and socialise together, with many mutual friends between us encouraging natural rapport and a building mutual trust that resulted in his advisory role in my research and participant interview for *The Pink Certificate.*

Agreeing to appear in the film and tell his story, Mr. X had two provisos. The first was that he not appear on camera and that I excise select identifiable aspects of his life from the final cut of the film and this written dissertation. The second requirement was that I include specific visual evidence of his exemption from the Turkish military. Other media outlets and interviewers had been reluctant to feature the graphic photography that he had submitted as part of his exemption requirement, and this had frustrated him over the years. "I don't want anyone to know it's me in your film . . . but I damn sure want people to see what I had to do in order to satisfy these fascists," he told me with contempt. His requirements fulfilled, the centrepiece of his participation in *The Pink Certificate* is not a tour of his hometown or his personal biography. Instead, Mr. X handed me two black and white photographs with which to frame his story with the TAF, and how it relates to nationalism, discrimination and masculinity in the Turkish republic.

[534] Human Rights Watch, 2008, 3-4
[535] Turkish government PDF of the constitution available here: https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa_2018.pdf
[536] Pearce, 2014

Two photographs: It was in his Istanbul apartment one hot summer afternoon that Mr. X rummaged through a box of mementos. *Ah!* he exclaimed, pulling out a small book of photos. Inside were two of the photographs he submitted to the TAF for the purposes of proving his homosexuality. Unlike Selin, Mr. X had his preliminary report approved within "seven to eight days",[537] a remarkably short time-frame that he attributes to his providing of photographic evidence. Appearing on screen in *The Pink Certificate* at 2h:01m:30s, the inclusion of the two photos in the film are significant in their filmed composition (which deliberately hides both Mr. X and his partner's face) as well as their sequential order. "I took two photos from the roll we shot – they were designed to satisfy the criteria of the health board, but I also wanted to send them a big 'fuck you' as well. So, it was important that the ones I submitted be presented in a specific order."

This is reflected in *The Pink Certificate*, which shows both photos of Mr. X engaging in so-called passive sexual intercourse with another man; in other words, receiving anal sex. As he describes in his interview, his assigned psychologist would not accept traditional couple's photos of Mr. X and an ex-boyfriend kissing, hugging or on vacation together. Instead, the psychologist insisted that he provide photos of himself having sexual intercourse with a man, with both their faces unobstructed. "This was the exact language they used. They wanted two things: me in a passive homosexual position and it clearly show my face [*sic*] . . . I thought OK, let's see what I can do to turn this on them."

Initially, Mr. X assumed that a photo of him giving oral sex would be more than acceptable. However, upon querying this to his assigned psychologist, he was told that this would not be sufficient in proving his homosexuality before the health board. "That's when I knew what they really wanted – a photo of me getting fucked in the ass for the military. To them, it was the ultimate humiliation . . . it was like a game of chicken. They expect lots of gay men to give in, and just do their military service. It's a deterrent to would-be exemption seekers . . . a tool of humiliation they [the army] use to break you, push you into conscription and make you submissive to the state." Undeterred, Mr. X quickly found a foreigner in Istanbul who was willing to have sex on camera. Looking down at the photos together, he laughed loudly, *Fuck them . . . they have no idea how much I enjoyed the entire process*.

The first photo offers a shrewd compositional contrast: Mr. X is lying underneath his partner. Both their faces as well as full penetration are clearly shown as he assumes what he calls, "a classic submissive and feminine sexual position – exactly what they see as the only thing gay man can do . . . [that is], get fucked by a man as they pretend to be a woman". This echoes the assertions of other participants in *The Pink Certificate*, who invariably identified homosexuality as a perceived third sex in Turkish society. As the third participant Ali later summarises, "There is no gay man in Turkish society – you're either a man, or 'a gay.'"[538] This refers to a common confused perspective of gay men in Turkey, who are perceived to internalise femininity while retaining their masculine form. While this first photograph seemingly satisfies the TAF's definition of a homosexual man in Turkish society, Mr. X was careful to frame the encounter with a dashing portrait of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who looks on with quiet authority in the background of the scene.

[537] *Man Made,* 1h:58m:10s
[538] Ibid., 2h:02m:40s

Mr. X's first photo submitted to the military health board (Still: *Man Made*)

Portraits of Atatürk are ubiquitous in the Turkish public sphere, from town squares, to public parks to state facilities like post offices and police stations. By including the portrait in a graphic sex scene, Mr. X was highlighting what he regarded as the hypocrisy of the TAF's self-identification as an institutional vanguard of Kemalism's modernist, secularist ideology. "I went out and bought the portrait, and hung it very deliberately in front of the bed. It sends a message to the army: is this what the founder of the Turkish republic had in mind when he tasked you with his legacy? Is 21st century Kemalism a bunch of military hacks watching a gay man getting fucked by a *yabanci*?"

Mr. X was the first of my participants to introduce me to this paradox of Kemalist modernism and Turkish nationalism. Back in 2011, we conducted one of our first interviews together in a Tepebaşı café. "You have to understand that, in this country, nothing is as it seems. Left is right, up is down, conservative is progressive – all the usual signs and signifiers of the Western political geography are either inverted or contradictory. For example, here it is the secularists – in the guise of the army – who institutionalised homophobia within the state. Not the religious conservatives, as it is perceived in the United States." This was counter-intuitive to the self-image of Turkish secularism and Kemalism, a political and cultural ideology that never explicitly criminalised homosexuality and gave women the right to vote as early as 1934.[539]

Instead, Mr. X regards the TAF's prohibition of homosexual conscripts as an explicit reflection of the Turkish nationalist project. "Military service is where the state transforms you into the ideal 'Turk'– if you haven't become that already . . . by this I mean a straight nationalist . . . maybe a little religious – certainly not any other ethnicity [than Turkish] . . . any type of individual, or aberrant lifestyle of behaviour, is beaten out of you in the army. So of course, being gay is in their crosshairs . . . it is incompatible with their needs." Mr. X is clearly well educated and speaks about conscription in Turkey in scholastic terms, having been academically published for his insights into Turkish gender studies.[540] "The state has a strict measure of what a man is in Turkey. It's a heterosexual, Sunni Muslim who is subservient to the nation . . . by this, I mean willing to die for his country. Now obviously, Turkey is filled with multicultural groups and citizens, but military service is the meat grinder where this is all erased. Individuals go in, uniform Turkish men come out. I don't know how else to describe it."

[539] Zürcher, 2004, 177
[540] See previous uncited excerpt.

The second photo is where Mr. X saw the opportunity to send a more personal message. The black and white image is quite artistic, reminiscent of the intimate bedroom portraits of 20th century erotic photographer Robert Mapplethorpe. Mr. X is now on top of his partner, holding him down as they have sex, looking straight into the camera, again with full penetration and their faces visible. "For this second one, I wanted to project a kind of masculinity… and I'm sure, make them [the health board] as uncomfortable as possible. I worked at looking angry in the mirror, dominant and in charge of the situation . . . This wasn't going to be me doing something against my will. I'm confident . . . proud to be with another man. I still fantasise the reaction this photo must have received."

The rest of Mr. X's application for exemption mirrors much of what Selin went through, but in a far shorter time-frame: psychological examination, coercion into bringing family members and constantly shifting goal posts on what would be satisfactory to the health board. In the end, as he relates on camera, Mr. X was granted an exemption via a preliminary report, as well as a lengthy psychological evaluation which was mailed to his parents' address months later. Footage of Mr. X reading his own pink certificate is included in the episode at 2h:12m:20s. I have blurred his details as well as his passport photo, but the certificate is there for all to see. Nowadays, it sits in the box of mementos along with the photographs he provided.

In 2015, Mr. X left Istanbul for good. He flew to a city in Canada and, upon arrival, applied for political asylum. In 2016, he and his partner were granted asylum in Canada, where they remain to this day. Nowadays, he keeps a low profile. "No more interviews, no more activism . . . the fascists have won in Turkey, Max. Get over it," he told me in recent text messages. Reviewing his appearance in *Man Made*, he was surprisingly satisfied with the result. "That'll show 'em. I like how you took your time with my photographs." I asked him if he has any intention of returning to Turkey. "I'm not even sure if I can, ever since the OHAL.[541] Let me turn the tables . . . do you have any plans to go back? I don't think they'll appreciate your film very much." "You've got me there," I replied, and Mr. X logged out.

[541] The years-long state of emergency implemented in the wake of 2016's coup attempt.

4.4 The Biggest Violence (Ali)

Zeki Müren, singing 'Ah Bu Şarkıların Gözü Kör Olsun' (Still: YouTube).[542]

Analysing the suppression of homosexuality in the secular Turkish republic, Gorkemli (2012) finds an explanation in the early years of Atatürk's one-party rule and the cultural reforms of Kemalism. Gorkemli writes that the first decades of the republic emphasised "heteronormalcy . . . in its efforts to create a loyal and uniform (i.e., exclusively "Turkish") citizenry, de-emphasizing differences, including linguistic and sexual".[543] As Kemalist modernisation peaked in the 1930s, Gorkemli identifies the reform of the Turkish language as a deliberate act of linguistic sabotage on the collective memory of Anatolian sexual identity. The Ottomans not only accommodated same-sex practises and alternative sexual identities throughout its history, but they also celebrated homosexuality, documenting it in official Sultanate records, literature and poetry.[544] The implementation of a new state language severed citizens of the new republic from their Ottoman cultural past, suppressing an apparently undesirable cultural heritage with a "purified" Latin Turkish alphabet. As a result, proto-LGBTI Ottoman cultural heritage was generationally eliminated from public literary discourse and state education throughout the reform period, replaced instead with the Kemalist heteronormative model of who, and what, the ideal Turkish citizen should be.

Gorkemli notes that the rise of television in the second half of the 20th century saw LGBTI discourse brought back into the Turkish public domain, with LGBTI singers like Zeki Müren and the transgender Bülent Ersoy appearing on television screens throughout the nation and connecting a new generation of Turks with public displays of alternative sexuality for the first time since the Ottoman Empire. As an avid listener of 1970s golden-age Turkish pop music, I was a fan of Zeki Müren, and an early cut of *The Pink Certificate* ended with a famous televised performance in which he sings mournfully of keeping one's true feelings hidden (*Ah! Bu Şarkıların Gözü Kör Olsun*). The performance is moving, the lyrics perfectly apt for the episode's theme, however I worried that the importance of the song would be lost on a non-Turkish speaking audience.

[542] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oCXfMJnGWaA
[543] Gorkemli, 2012, 69
[544] Ibid.

In 1993, the same year that Lambdaistanbul was founded, the internet was made available for personal use in Turkey. As Gorkemli notes, this had an enormous impact on emergent gay culture in the country, paving the way for the specific social context in which *Man Made* takes place. She writes:

> *"While the printing press led to the diminishment of sexual discourses and television brought these discourses back to life under the gender regime of the new republic, the Internet built on the sexuality-related legacy of traditional media by enabling something altogether new: It provided the means by which otherwise isolated individuals with nonmainstream gender identities and/or sexual orientations could connect with each other to form communities."*[545]

This observation is particularly important for the third participant of *The Pink Certificate*, whom I will call Ali. The oldest informant in *Man Made*, Ali grew up in the shadow of Turkey's 1980 military coup d'état (*12 Eylül Darbesi*), a bloody capstone over a decade of political activism in the country. In the three years that followed the *darbe* (coup), the TAF took control of the country and implemented a state of emergency and martial law. Footage of the period is shown in the opening musical montage of *Man Made* – tanks line the streets of Ankara and Istanbul, with major highways empty of traffic in the middle of the day.[546]

From an early age, Ali knew that he was attracted to men. "It was extremely clear to me who I was I attracted to, but it was simultaneously extremely unclear what *I was* as a result of my sexuality," he told me. Ali explained to me that, growing up in 1990s Istanbul, it was difficult to conceptualise himself as a man who was attracted to the same sex. As he describes on camera, "There is no real concept of being a gay man in Turkish society . . . you're either 'a gay' or a man . . . I don't think there is much distinction between being transgender and being gay . . . 'a gay' means, essentially, someone is supposed to be a man, but isn't." This echoes Gorkemli's contention that the Kemalist formation of the uniform national citizen was predicated on heteronormative terms, and that this mould persisted through the 20th century, long after Atatürk's reign and the arrival of multi-party democracy in 1950. "In my opinion, it hasn't changed since the beginning of the last century, the start of the republic," Ali told me plainly. For him, the arrival of internet access in the early 1990s introduced him to the concept of homosexuality. "As a teenager, I spent years utterly terrified for my future. Where I grew up, there was a red-light district. It was filled with transgender sex workers, and it was the only place for them. If you were a gay man, you had to have surgery to become trans. That was the deal until I was 26 . . . and went online for the first time."

Prior to his discovery of parallel LGBTI worlds on the internet, there was the matter of Ali's conscription. "I figured I should just do it. I'd been closeted my whole life anyway, what harm would it be to just pretend for a while longer." It can be assumed that innumerable LGBTI men go ahead with their military service despite their ineligibility. An earlier cut of the first Turkish episode *The Reluctant Sons* included a fourth participant in this category. This informant, while a close, off-the-record collaborator for *Man Made*, was very frightened about appearing on camera. Despite this, he still insisted on talking about his experiences with military service for the film, albeit with his voice digitally altered and his face blurred. Ultimately, he was excised from the final cut of the film due to my discomfort with his apprehension, but his story was a vital, further articulation of Ali's, i.e., a gay man who chose conscription out of a pronounced fear of the consequences should he seek an exemption.

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[545] Gorkemli, 2012, 73
[546] *Man Made,* 0h:11m:45s

This participant suspected that most gay men hide their sexual orientation and go ahead with military service in Turkey. "The alternative is too frightening to even consider . . . for years, I dreaded what I would do. Even though I am mentally tough, because I knew my very identity… the way in which I love . . . was considered disgusting and illegal. It felt like I was carrying drugs in an airport, you know?" Ali's experience was similar, but he requested that his time in the army be limited to this written dissertation. While in the barracks, Ali was terrified of being outed. "I speak softly, I'm an emotional guy – I'm aware that I'm quite feminine. Like so many gay men in the world, for those years I just buried my true self deep, deep down. Every day was stressful, and when I finally finished my service, I felt like I had gotten away with a crime."

I asked Ali if he had ever considered getting an exemption. "I actually didn't know it was possible!" he exclaimed. "I was naïve – very sheltered as a kid. At the time, the late 1990s, all I knew was that if the army found out you were gay, you'd be outed to your family and community. I couldn't let that happen; I might have ended up committing suicide. I was just too vulnerable at that age to protest." Part of the legacy of Lambdaistanbul and other LGBTI organisations in Turkey has been the increased visibility of military service exemptions. Prior to their existence, Ali suspected that most conscripts were just like him – unaware that there were even mechanisms for voluntary medical discharge. "I'm very proud of how much the information is out there now. I mean, look at you, you're proof of it. How did you first hear about exemptions from conscription as a *yabancı*?" This was an excellent point.

"It doesn't have to be physical": Ali is particularly interested in the psychological damage being done to Turkey's LGBTI citizens. "Obviously, physical violence against gay, lesbian, transgender citizens is very high in Turkey, this has been well documented over the years . . . it's not a big secret," he told me. A 2008 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report on LGBTI Turkey revealed that 37% of surveyed participants reported physical violence due to their sexuality, with a further 28% identifying as victims of rape and sexual assault. Furthermore, a staggering 89% of Turkish transgender participants reported physical violence to HRW, and over half had experienced rape and sexual violence.[547]

The psychological toll on Turkish LGBTI citizens is comparatively difficult to quantify. This is where Ali is keenly interested – both for himself and the wider LGBTI community in Turkey. He described to me that – while he has been a victim of physical assault as a result of his sexuality – upon reflection he considers the psychological trauma of suppressing his sexual identity far more damaging in the long term. In *The Pink Certificate,* he describes this experience as "the biggest violence" inflicted upon him, but he is also careful not to seem flippant about instances of sexual violence and physical assault that arise from LGBTI discrimination. "For me, I have had to work through a lot of pain to get to where I am. As I told you, the internet was my refuge. I lived in the closet until I was 26 – and this wasn't because I was in denial! . . . I simply could not fathom a life where I was acting on my urges and existing sustainably in Turkish society."

As with other Turkish participants, I had been interviewing Ali on and off since 2011. In the years leading up to my PhD research, social and political progress for LGBTI Turkish citizens had changed significantly. In particular, the fallout from the Gezi Park suppression and the creeping totalitarian rule of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had shifted my discussions with Ali. Before 2013, we spoke about the TAF and Turkey's post-1980 coup authoritarianism as a feature of the past; a bygone socio-political context that defined Ali's upbringing, his sexual closeting and gradual emergence as an LGBTI activist in the 21st century.

[547] Human Rights Watch, 2008, 5

In those conversations, Ali explicitly blamed Turkish nationalism and the state's enforcement of it via military service as an active policy of LGBTI discrimination in Turkish public life. Nowadays, Ali also has to factor in the political reality of life under Erdoğan, as an openly gay man. "It's so strange nowadays . . . I'm often asked where homophobia comes from in Turkish society. It used to be an easy answer. Historically, the *imam* was not in charge in Turkey, it has been the secular state, beginning with the Kemalists. They were openly hostile to homosexuality and made it a working policy of the state . . . open and shut case, right? Nowadays, it's all the more confusing – the army isn't what it used to be, but now we have this Islamo-Fascist government which bans gay pride and shoots protestors who don't want a city park destroyed."

For Ali, it appears that the Turkish state, while ideologically transformed from a dominant secularist Kemalism, still prioritises the marginalisation of LGBTI Turkish citizens, but this time in the guise of Islamic social conservatism. Speaking to me at the end of 2016, Ali concluded, "Being gay in Turkey is arguably much easier than it was under the military occupation following the [1980] coup – even the last fifty, maybe eighty years . . . but for the first time in my life, homophobia is now openly discussed as a conservative social policy . . . the whole situation is exhausting." At the end of that year, following our final interview on camera, Ali told me that he had serious health problems, and was likely to withdraw from public activism for the foreseeable future. *Time to pass the torch, Max*. *I'm getting too old,* he quipped, with shortened, raspy breath. Throughout our last interview, his breath was irregular; suddenly quickening and then falling. We took many breaks to accommodate his respiration, but nevertheless, he insisted on talking to me one last time before I returned to Australia.

Coda – *The Pink Certificate*: In September 2010, a long-awaited constitutional referendum took place in Turkey. Aimed squarely at revising the TAF-drafted constitution, the 26 proposed amendments included new restrictions on the TAF's capacity to meddle with the multi-party system, as well as a bevy of other liberal improvements that mirrored the constitutions of EU member states. Passing with a healthy majority, the amendments included an abolition of immunity for the 1980 coup plotters, as well as an unprecedented disaggregation of the military from the judicial and political branches of the state.[548] This historic referendum took place during my academic exchange in Istanbul – my first year in the country – and the vote's passage was an impersonal crash-course on Turkish politics, as well as the military's tyrannical reputation. I remember my Boğaziçi professor – a noted academic whom I still correspond with – walking into our small lecture theatre, triumphantly banging his hand on the lectern and declaring victory. *This is a great day for Turkey; a great day for those who remember our history!*

A few years later, that same professor has left Turkey in disgust. He now resides in Western Europe in self-imposed exile and speaks out frequently against the AKP. The glimmer of hope that was present during the 2010 referendum turned into a digression from what was coming. In 2013, Gezi Park was scheduled for demolition, and civil unrest exploded in Istanbul, Ankara and many other parts of the country. This was followed by a brutal government crackdown, which killed 22 people and injured over 8,000.[549] That same year ended with a massive corruption scandal that implicated the highest levels of the AKP leadership, including Erdoğan himself and his immediate family.[550]

In 2014, the ever-widening Syrian Civil War finally spilled over into Turkey's south-east, reigniting the Kurdish-Turkish conflict to levels of violence not seen since the 1980s. Between 2015 and 2016, 33 Islamic State attacks and suicide bombings rocked Ankara and Istanbul, cumulatively killing over 500 people.[551] One afternoon in 2015, I was walking along Meclis-i Mebusan Caddessi, on my way to Kabataş ferry terminal. Suddenly, explosions and automatic gunfire rang out to the north. Running into a nearby café, it was just as I neared the back counter that a deeper, louder explosion rattled the windows that faced the street. Everyone inside hit the floor. I will never forget the sound of young girls shrieking in panic, as cars – trapped in afternoon gridlock – mounted the pavement outside the café and sped erratically in all directions. We waited on our bellies. A few more gunshots, further away now, then nothing but sirens and yelling. I checked Twitter on my phone. It would eventually inform me that men with guns had thrown grenades and attacked police outside Dolmabahçe Palace, the final seaside residence of Atatürk.[552]

The climax to all of this chaos was the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016. Over 300 were killed that night, with the subsequent state of emergency and sweeping government crackdowns resulting in the arrest of over 77,000 people and "purging" over 150,000 civil servants.[553] As autumn fell in Istanbul, the tourists had long vanished, and the hipster *yabancı* expats of Cihangir had nearly disappeared. As one Turkish friend said to me that winter, *the party is over, man*.

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[548] Çağaptay, 2017, 119-120
[549] Amnesty International Report, October 2013: https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/eur440222013en.pdf
[550] Çağaptay, 2017, 171
[551] Ibid., 19
[552] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/11811995/Gunfire-and-explosion-heard-outside-Dolmabahce-palace-in-Istanbul.html
[553] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-turkey-security/turkey-arrests-german-for-spreading-kurdish-propaganda-anadolu-idUSKBN1KF2ZX

Through these turbulent events, LGBTI Turkish citizens face increasing discrimination, threats of violence as well as a continued lack of political recognition. There has been some good news: following the TAF's constitutional defanging in 2010, sporadic reports indicate that the army has stopped some of its more extreme requirements for homosexual exemption.[554] However, in November 2017, Erdoğan publicly denounced LGBTI Turkish citizens, arguing that their political recognition was "against the values of our nation".[555] It would appear that although there has been an institutional softening of LGBTI discrimination when it comes to conscription, those who live a lifestyle that is aberrant from the national mainstream are still marginalised and discouraged from any excursion off the beaten path of Turkish cultural homogeneity.

In late 2016, I asked Selin if, following the coup and the government's denouncement of the TAF, she was more afraid than before. "In a way, it's worse now. The night of the coup, Erdoğan called the people onto the street to kill all who betrayed the Turkish people . . . you must have seen the news footage." Of all the horrific events that took place the night of July 15, the image of civilians mercilessly beating disarmed TAF soldiers on the now renamed Bosphorus Bridge (Boğaziçi Köprüsü) was amongst the most disturbing. "These men – they came out of nowhere, in the middle of the night. They murdered people; everyone talks about it. They came into the street, with guns, bats and knives and they did what they wanted, without any restrictions . . . in a way, it was safer when these people were afraid of the army . . . I could handle that institution . . . this is much more dangerous." With Erdoğan publicly antagonising Turkey's LGBTI community, Selin and Ali remain pessimistic. "Who knows if we're next," Selin told me on our last interview.

When I came to her apartment in late 2016, I noticed she looked different from the six years I'd known her. Greeting me at her apartment door on sunset, her hair was longer. Her face was unshaved, her clothes were baggy and decidedly masculine. *Come inside quickly,* she gestured, *who knows who's watching.*

[554] https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ru/originals/2015/11/turkey-military-gay-rights-homosexual-picture.html
[555] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/23/its-just-the-start-lgbt-community-in-turkey-fears-government-crackdown

July 16, 2016, the morning after the coup attempt.

A man, draped in a Turkish flag, whips surrendered TAF soldiers in full view of the police and media. (Photo: Getty)

Epilogue & Concluding Remarks

"Unruly boys
Who will not grow up
Must be taken in hand."
- The Smiths

Time in film: 2h:18m:45s – 2h:34m:42s
Location: *Sütlüce Küçük Mezbaha* (The Slaughterhouse at Sütlüce), Istanbul

"I'd rather die than go…" Selin quietly concludes, speaking the last line of dialogue in *The Pink Certificate* that marks the conclusion to *Man Made*. Before the final credits roll, we return once more to the *mezbaha* in Sütlüce, where the same two sheep are led to their deaths. Unlike the film's prologue, we now see additional details of the ritual slaughter's aftermath. The darkened pen full of quiet animals is contrasted with the bright, empty killing room after the deed; guts and viscera pile up against the wall, blood pools and drains down the centre grill. As the camera lingers over the tiled flooring, the *mezbahaci's* voice speaks softly over the melancholic music. With perfunctory resignation, he remarks, "You can't help but feel sorry for them, but what can you do? . . . Not every animal is blessed with being sacrificed."

From its outset, *Man Made* theorises that in militarised nation states, nationalism transcends theoretical discourse and instead exists perceptibly, within and around citizens of the military nation. In Turkey and Israel, this perceptible nationalism materialises in domineering state institutions, specifically public education and mandatory military service. Both of these institutions resemble Foucauldian "enclosures" that, through disciplinary force and scholastic indoctrination, homogenise the incongruent masses into militarised citizens of the nation state.

In Turkey, nationalism is *milliyetçilik*, a central tenant of Kemalism. As a result of nationalism's ubiquity in the design of the republic, Turkey was bound to a rigid ethno-nationalist foundation from its outset. In the face of Ottoman Anatolia's kaleidoscopic cultural diversity, the Kemalists established the boundaries of Turkish citizenship on ethnic lines, deploying institutional military service and a curated state education program to enforce ethno-nationalist hegemony. As a result of aggressive Kemalist acculturation, a uniform Turkish citizen emerged in public discourse, with gendered expectations prescribed to men and women within the nation. Alongside secularist dress codes and linguistic standardisation, the idealised Turkish man was moulded in the image of the Kemalist polity: nominally Sunni Muslim, ideologically secular, rigidly heterosexual and above all, ethnically Turkish.

In Israel, nationalism is Zionism, an ethno-political movement woven into the very fabric of the state's existence. Indivisible from the Jewish state itself, Zionism was ideologically crafted in 19th century Western Europe as a political solution to the besieged Diaspora. In the same historical moment, Jewish migrants flocked to Ottoman Palestine, establishing a stalwart community that rapidly self-organised and eventually militarised. When the state of Israel was finally declared in 1948, the symbiotic relationship between militarism and nationalism was distilled into the now popular IDF axiom: "A nation builds an army; an army builds a nation."[556]

[556] Stern, 2012, 164-166

In October 2018, political scientist John Mearsheimer was in conversation with the Brookings Institution. In a wide-ranging discussion on the future of liberal democracy, he offered a salient and universal description of the individual living within the nation state:

> *"When you think about human beings, you have to decide whether you think they're social animals . . . who carve out [a] space for individualism, or you think of them as individuals who carve out social contracts . . . nationalism assumes we are tribal from the get-go. We're born into nations, we're born into social groups, we're born into tribes, and [in it] we carve out a space for our individualism."*[557]

Across *Man Made's* urban field sites, the mutual circumstance of many participants is their struggle for individualism within the confines of homogeneous state nationalism. While some participants embrace the nationalist pathway to militarised citizenship and idealised masculinity, others resist it. Exemplified in personal confrontations with conscription, those participants who reject the nationalist pathway to idealised masculinity and citizenship tend to do so on grounds of civil liberty, political self-determination and freedom of conscience. However, resistance to military service in Israel and Turkey is fraught with peril, from the mild inconvenience of draft postponement, to incarceration for conscientious objection and the torturous humiliation of those who seek medical exemption.

Despite the significant risks, a near century on from the establishment of both nation states, men continue to resist conscription and the nationalist archetype. This is because – as the participants in *Man Made* point out time and again – their resistance is an involuntary act: Selin would rather die than go the army, Eli felt physically incapable of holding a rifle, Ali could not deny his sexuality, and Yusuf felt that conscription would betray himself, his family and the entire Kurdish community.

Despite evidence of collective and individual resistance, the traditions, signs and symbols of nationalism and militarism persist in both Turkey and Israel. Although globalisation, social modernisation and ever shifting cultural mores have changed both nations dramatically, ritual traditions of militarism and masculinity continue largely unaffected, seemingly fixed in the era of their inception. In Turkey, the pathway to militarised masculinity commences with ritual circumcision, and peaks with *askerlerin* bus station ceremonies: here teenagers are sent away to the barracks, expectant to return as men, now eligible for marriage, employment and fatherhood. In Israel, masculine expectations continue to be informed by muscular Judaism, an early 20th century Zionist gender reform project that links the militarisation of Israeli society with the physical strength of the Jewish male body.

Although *Man Made* is limited to two field sites, it is clear that evasion of conscription in Istanbul and Tel Aviv are likely not isolated or contemporary phenomena. Rather, parallel to the state-sanctioned histories of both nations, there exists a pervasive counterculture of resistance to nationalism and its derivative institutions. From conscientious objectors to LGBTI activists, individual and collective resistance to nationalist hegemony is an oft-neglected chapter in the history of both nations. Consequently, there is limited qualitative study on the history of individual resistance to state nationalism in both Turkey and Israel, and *Man Made* is likely the first comparative ethnographic research of the two. This is in part attributable to the Turkish and Israeli governments' significant efforts to suppress the visibility of this counterculture, and it is this anthropologist's opinion that the subject deserves further ethnographic research and scholarly inquiry from social scientists.

[557] https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-john-mearsheimer-great-delusion

In dissatisfaction with the study of nations and nationalism, Eric Hobsbawm (1992) identified a lack of qualitative research on the subject, calling for a "view from below" from social scientists.[558] In studying the lives of everyday urban citizens, *Man Made* attempts a "view from below" of Turkish and Israeli nationalism and militarism, despite institutional hostility and state opposition to external research in both field sites. Achieved through the creative medium of ethnographic film, *Man Made* is both a qualitative study of nationalism and militarism in the lives of young men in Istanbul and Tel Aviv, as well as a distinct methodological proof of concept for the recent advances in digital ethnographic film production.

I end this written dissertation in the hope that *Man Made* is not only an original contribution to the discipline of anthropology, but that it also demonstrates the methodological and scholarly potential of its medium, especially to fellow colleagues considering their own creative and intellectual potential in the constantly evolving field of visual anthropology and ethnographic film.

Max Harwood
Perth, Istanbul, Tel Aviv, Ottawa, Sydney
12/2013 – 12/2018

[558] Hobsbawm, 1992, 10-11

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Note: *The following reference list is divided into subsections: bibliography, scholarly journal articles, published reports and online articles and web links. Each subsection is listed in alphabetical order.*

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Farina, S, Farina J, Farina. A. "Sleepwalk." *Santo & Johnny,* Canadian American Records Ltd., 1959.

Morrissey and Marr, J. "Barbarism Begins at Home." *Meat Is Murder*, Rough Trade, 1985.

Moulding, C. "Generals and Majors." *Black Sea*, Virgin, 1980.

Reznor, T and Ross, A. "Less Likely." *The Vietnam War (Original Score),* The Null Corporation, 2017.

Sloan, P.F (original), McGuire, B. "Eve of Destruction." *Eve of Destruction,* Dunhill, 1965.

West, K. "Runaway." *My Beautiful Dark Twisted Fantasy,* Roc-A-Fella, Def Jam, 2010.

Special thanks to the artist Ioscil for the generous free use of the album *Monument Builders* (2016), which serves as an atmospheric incidental score throughout the film.

Office of the Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Research)

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5 January 2015

Dr Chris Houston
Department of Anthropology
Faculty of Arts
Macquarie University
NSW 2109

Dear Dr Houston

Reference No: 5201400782

Title: Military Service and Civil Society in Istanbul and Tel Aviv

Thank you for submitting the above application for ethical and scientific review. Your application was considered by the Macquarie University Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC (Human Sciences & Humanities)) at its meeting on 29 August 2014 at which further information was requested to be reviewed by the HREC (Human Sciences and Humanities) Executive.

The requested information was received with correspondence on 19 October 2014.

The HREC (Human Sciences and Humanities) Executive considered your responses at its meeting held on 28 November 2014.

I am pleased to advise that ethical and scientific approval has been granted for this project to be conducted at:

- Macquarie University

This research meets the requirements set out in the *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research* (2007 – Updated March 2014) (the *National Statement*).

Details of this approval are as follows:

Approval Date: 5 January 2015

The following documentation has been reviewed and approved by the HREC (Human Sciences & Humanities):

Documents reviewed	Version no.	Date
Macquarie University Ethics Application Form & Appendix B: Research to be Undertaken Outside Australia	2.3	July 2013
Correspondence from Mr Max Harwood responding to the issues raised by the HREC (Human Sciences and Humanities)		Received 19/10/2014

This letter constitutes ethical and scientific approval only.

Standard Conditions of Approval:

1. Continuing compliance with the requirements of the *National Statement,* which is available at the following website:

http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/book/national-statement-ethical-conduct-human-research

2. This approval is valid for five (5) years, subject to the submission of annual reports. Please submit your reports on the anniversary of the approval for this protocol.

3. All adverse events, including events which might affect the continued ethical and scientific acceptability of the project, must be reported to the HREC within 72 hours.

4. Proposed changes to the protocol must be submitted to the Committee for approval before implementation.

It is the responsibility of the Chief investigator to retain a copy of all documentation related to this project and to forward a copy of this approval letter to all personnel listed on the project.

Should you have any queries regarding your project, please contact the Ethics Secretariat on 9850 4194 or by email ethics.secretariat@mq.edu.au

The HREC (Human Sciences and Humanities) Terms of Reference and Standard Operating Procedures are available from the Research Office website at:

http://www.research.mq.edu.au/for/researchers/how_to_obtain_ethics_approval/human_research_ethics

The HREC (Human Sciences and Humanities) wishes you every success in your research.

Yours sincerely

Dr Karolyn White
Director, Research Ethics & Integrity,
Chair, Human Research Ethics Committee (Human Sciences and Humanities)

This HREC is constituted and operates in accordance with the National Health and Medical Research Council's (NHMRC) *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research* (2007) and the *CPMP/ICH Note for Guidance on Good Clinical Practice*.