

The Final Agreement and Sustainable Peace between the FARC and the Colombian Government

Alicia Faehrmann

Bachelor of Arts (University of Sydney)

A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Masters of Research

Department of International Studies

Macquarie University

Contents

Synopsis	3
Statement of Authorship	4
Acknowledgements	5
Glossary of Abbreviations	6
Introduction	9
1. The History of the Colombian Conflict	22
2. Synopsis of the <i>Acuerdo final para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera</i>	46
3. Analysis of the <i>Acuerdo final</i> and the Prospects for Sustainable Peace	69
Conclusion	93
References	99

Synopsis

After four years of negotiations between the FARC and the Colombian Government, the *Acuerdo final para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera* (Final agreement for the termination of the conflict and the construction of a stable and lasting peace, ‘the final agreement’) was settled and the FARC ended their armed insurgency in favour of a political route. The final agreement proposes reforms and mechanisms for ending the conflict between the FARC and the Government and building sustainable peace in Colombia. Despite this promising future, it is uncertain how the peace process as a whole will impact Colombian politics, economics and society and achieve sustainable peace. Due to the history of violent political, social and economic exclusion of the FARC and the classes they represent, which lay at the origins and crux of the conflict, I argue that peace in Colombia will be sustainable once political, social and economic inclusion is achieved. The purpose of this investigation is to understand how the final agreement proposes to make peace sustainable in Colombia through political, social and economic inclusion and analyse whether the accords can achieve the goal of a stable and lasting peace. I conclude that without a rigorous implementation plan for achieving political, social and economic inclusion, the final agreement cannot achieve sustainable peace in Colombia.

Statement of Authorship

This thesis has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other university or institution.

This thesis is 22,018 (twenty-two thousand and eighteen) words in length.

Signed:

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Hachmann", written over a light blue dashed line.

Acknowledgements

To all the Colombians that have made an impact on me. Not one of you has been left untouched by the war some way.

To Juan Bravo, Sonia Gutiérrez and family, I now realise why you left Colombia. Thank you for all the lessons you taught me as my first employers.

To María Lucia Vela Mantilla, Alejandro de Francisco and family, thank you for your incredible and unceasing generosity towards me, even when I least deserve it!

To Colombia Vivas, María José Velasco and family, thank you for your friendship, support and treating me as part of the family. I adore and love you both dearly.

To Marcus León Quintero, I am so grateful to have a friend like you. Although we don't always see eye to eye, our conversations over the last two years, your point of view and most of all your experiences have been invaluable to me in this whole process. Thank you also to El Tigre, Eldy, Venus and Agatha for your generosity towards me.

To Jessica Perez Parada, gracias amiga por tu amistad y por siempre estar pendiente de mi!

To Miguel Ángel Zorrilla Puertas, for being the first to tell me the stories of Gaitán, *El Bogotazo*, *La Violencia* and *La Toma del Palacio de Justicia*. As we wandered through the places they occurred I didn't appreciate them then as much as I do now.

To the ladies of Diagonal, especially Lorena, thank you for your friendship, warmth and constant invitations to return.

To my family, Milly, Peter, Josephine, Sophie and Justin, thank you for loving me, putting up with me and for picking up the slack where I left it. Thanks Dad for being so interested in my research and for stirring my interest in history and war every night at dinner (even though mum would tell you to stop).

To my supervisor, Rodrigo Camilo Acuña, thank you for sharing so generously your immense knowledge, experience, time and wealth. I appreciate all you have done for me in the last two years and feel privileged to have worked on this project under your supervision and guidance.

Thank you to Perrin Walker, Emily Di Natale and Prajesh Shrestha for your comments on previous drafts. Thank you Daniel for your patience and encouragement.

Glossary of Abbreviations

AUC – *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia*, United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia

BACRIM – *bandas criminales*, criminal gangs

CELAC – *Comunidad de Estados Latinamericanos y Caribeños*, Community of Latin American and Caribbean States

CEVCNR – *Comisión para el Esclarecimiento de la Verdad, la Convivencia y la No Repetición*, Commission for the Clarification of the Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition

CFHBD – *Cese al Fuego y de Hostilidades Bilateral y Definitivo*, Ceasefire and Definitive Bilateral Cessation of Hostilities

CGSB – *Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar*, Simón Bolívar Guerrilla Coordination Body

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

CI-MM&V – *Componente Internacional*, International Component

CNR – *Consejo Nacional de la Reincorporación*, National Council for Reincorporation

CSIVI – *Comisión de Seguimiento, Impulso y Verificación a la Implemetación del Acuerdo Final*, Commission for Monitoring, Impetus and Verification for Implementation of the Final Agreement

DA – *Dejación de Armas*, Abandonment of Arms

DDR – demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration

ECOMÚN – *Economías Sociales del Común*, Communal Social Economy

ELN – *Ejército de Liberación Nacional*, National Liberation Army

EPL – *Ejército Popular de Liberación*, Popular Liberation Army

FARC – *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

FARC-EP – *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejercito del Pueblo*, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army

Fondo – *Fondo de Tierras*, Land Fund

ICMP – International Commission on Missing Persons

JEP – *Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz*, Special Jurisdiction for Peace

Law 1448 – *Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras, Ley 1448 de 2011*, Victims and Land Restitution Law of 2011, Law 1448 of 2011

Law 975 – *Ley de Justicia y Paz, Ley 975 de 2005*, Justice and Peace Law, Law 975 of 2005

Los Pepes – Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar, People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar

MAS – *Muerte A Secuestradores*, Death to Kidnappers

Misión – misión electoral especial, special electoral assignment

MM&V – *Mecanismo de Monitoreo y Verificación*, Mechanism of Monitoring and Verification

NMID – The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy

PDET – *Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial*, Development Programs with a Focus on the Land

PCC – *Partido Comunista Colombiano*, Colombian Communist Party

PISDA – *Planes Integrales Comunitarios y Municipales de Sustitución y Desarrollo Alternativo*, Communal and Municipal Substitution Program and Alternate Development

Plan Marco – Plan Marco para la Implementación de los Acuerdos, Plan for the Framework of Implementation of the Agreements

PNIS – *Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución y Desarrollo Alternativo*, National Substitution Program and Alternate Development

PSR – *Partido Socialista Revolucionario*, Socialist Revolutionary Party

PTN – *Puntos Transitorios de Normalización*, Transitional Normalisation Points

Sistema Integral – Sistema Integral de Seguridad para el Ejercicio de la Política, Integral Security System for the Exercise of Politics

SIVJRNR – *Sistema Integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y No Repetición*, Integrated System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition

The final agreement – *Acuerdo final para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera*, Final Agreement for the Conclusion of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace

UBPD – *Unidad Especial para la Búsqueda de Personas Dadas por Desaparecidas*, Special Unit for the Search of Disappeared Persons

UN – United Nations

UP – *Unión Patriótica*, Patriotic Union

ZVTN – *Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización*, Local Transitional Zones for Normalisation

The Final Agreement and Sustainable Peace between the FARC and the Colombian Government

Introduction

Civil war has been the ordinary state of affairs for generations of Colombians. The civil war is known as the Colombian Conflict and began in 1964. Its beginning corresponds to the formation of the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo* (Revolutionary Armed Force of Colombia – People’s Army), formerly an army of *guerrilla* better known by their acronym the FARC.¹ The FARC waged an insurgency against the Colombian State and entered into negotiations to settle the war in 2012. After four years of negotiations, the *Acuerdo final para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera* (Final agreement for the termination of the conflict and the construction of a stable and lasting peace, ‘the final agreement’) was settled and the armed insurgency ended in favour of a political route. The final agreement was signed by the President of the Republic, Juan Manuel Santos and the Commander in Chief of the FARC, ‘Timochenko’² on 23 November 2016 at the Christopher Columbus Theatre in Bogotá.

The final agreement proposes reforms and mechanisms for ending the conflict between the FARC and the Government, and building sustainable peace in Colombia. Its signing represents a promising gesture for the future of peace in the country. Despite these

¹ As of 15 August 2017, the FARC are no longer considered an armed group, and its members are now classified as civilians. All individual arms were handed over to the United Nations as they undergo the process of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration. ‘Día histórico: Las Farc dejaron de existir como grupo armado’, *La Nación*, 15 August 2017, <http://www.lanacion.com.co/2017/08/15/dia-historico-las-farc-dejaron-existir-grupo-armado/>, (accessed 30 August 2017); and G. Burnyeat, ‘Demobilisation in Llano Grande’, *LRB blog*, [web blog], 25 August 2017, <https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2017/08/25/gwen-burnyeat/demobilisation-in-llano-grande/>, (accessed 31 August 2017).

² Timochenko is the nickname for Rodrigo Londoño, also known by his nom de guerre Timoleón Jiménez. He assumed the role of Commander in Chief or Supreme Leader of the FARC in 2011 and is successor to Alfonso Cano (born Guillermo León Sáenz Vargas) and Manuel Marulanda Vélez (‘Tirofijo’ born Pedro Antonio Marín Marín).

developments, it is uncertain how the peace process as a whole will impact Colombian politics, economics and society and achieve sustainable peace. In this thesis I argue that peace in Colombia will be sustainable once political, social and economic inclusion of the FARC and the classes they represent is achieved. The purpose of this investigation is to understand how the final agreement proposes to make peace sustainable in Colombia through political, social and economic inclusion, and to analyse whether the accords can achieve the goal sustaining peace.

Theoretical Considerations

Theories of civil war settlement and the concept of peace define standards for achieving sustainable peace within a negotiated settlement of a civil war. There are a variety of civil war settlement theories for sustaining peace in a negotiated settlement, due to the uncertainty of achieving peace. Scholars agree that societies are likely to relapse into civil war when it is settled through negotiation rather than through an outright military victory.³ This certainly has been the case for previous peace processes between the Colombian Government and the FARC in the past. The concept of peace on the other hand is conveyed as a process of eradicating violence within the structures of a society.⁴ These standards are useful for considering how the final agreement proposes to create a sustainable peace in Colombia. Moreover, they correspond to the overarching themes in this investigation of political, social and economic inclusion. Standards for achieving sustainable peace relevant to this investigation will be outlined below and referenced throughout my analysis of the final agreement.

³ R. Licklider, 'The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993', *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 89, no. 3, 1995, p. 681; B. Walter, 'The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement', *International Organisation*, vol. 51, no. 3, 1997, p. 335 and M. Duffy Toft, 'Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?', *International Security*, vol. 34, no. 4, 2010, p. 7 & 27.

⁴ A. Themnér and T. Ohlson, 'Legitimate peace in post-civil war states: towards attaining the unattainable', *Conflict, Security & Development*, vol. 14, no.1, 2014, p. 68.

When it comes to negotiating the settlement of war, the factors prolonging the war must be addressed so that peace is sustainable. Hultquist has found that the military strength of insurgents varies throughout a civil war, and only when their military strength rivals that of the State are conditions favourable for a negotiated settlement to the war.⁵ Accordingly, insurgents are less likely to enter into negotiations if their military force is stronger than that of the government.⁶ Thus when it comes to sustaining peace in a negotiated settlement, the process of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) is essential for dismantling the military strength of insurgents. This process is also central to the political, social and economic inclusion to achieve sustainable peace. Likewise, Hegre suggests that a factor prolonging civil war is the sources of finance that insurgents rely on to fund their political and social cause.⁷ Hence, to sustain peace in a negotiated settlement, it is vital to dismantle these sources of finance. In the case of the Colombian Conflict, the illegal economy – namely the drug trade – has been a notable source of funding for the FARC.⁸ Thus to sustain peace in Colombia, insurgents and civilians alike must withdraw from their involvement in the drug trade and be reintegrated into the legal economy, to restrain this source of finance for insurgent groups.

Political inclusion of former combatants is an essential component in sustaining peace. Joshi, Melander and Quinn have found that implementing provisions for political inclusion of former combatants prior to the first elections after settling a peace agreement is vital for sustaining peace.⁹ Marshall and Ishiyama find that peace is sustainable when former

⁵ P. Hultquist, 'Power Parity and Peace? The Role of Relative Power in Civil War Settlement', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 50, no. 5, 2013, p. 623.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ H. Hegre, 'The Duration and Termination of Civil War', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 41, no. 3, 2004, p. 250.

⁸ J. Brittain, *Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia – The Origin and Direction of the FARC-EP*, New York, Pluto Press, 2010, p. 99.

⁹ M. Joshi, E. Melander and J. M. Quinn, 'Sequencing the Peace How the Order of Peace Agreement Implementation Can Reduce the Destabilizing Effects of Post-accord Elections', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2015, p. 20.

insurgents are included in specific areas of politics. Their findings indicate that conflicts recur or resume when insurgent groups are excluded from any part of the political sphere; particularly in the legislative and executive branches.¹⁰ Although civil-war is more likely to recur if insurgent group are excluded from politics, there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that political inclusion reduces the likelihood of recurrence.¹¹ The authors suggest that it is because they need to trust that the political system is conducive to their cause instead of armed struggle.¹² Hence political inclusion is also vital for social and economic inclusion to create sustainable peace.

In a negotiated settlement, Quinn, Mason and Gurses have found that peace is not sustainable when former combatants perceive that waging insurgency is more advantageous to them than the terms negotiated in a peace process. For this reason, economic development is a vital part of a peace process for preventing the recurrence of civil war. Thus peace is sustainable by improving the economic wellbeing and quality of life of both former combatants and the lower classes through economic development, as it means that they are less likely to risk their lives and economic wellbeing by waging an insurgency.¹³ Quinn, Mason and Gurses have also found that civil war is likely to recur when there is a perceived threat to the personal security and wellbeing of the former combatants by their enemies in the post-war period.¹⁴ This means that the human costs for the demobilised insurgents is perceived to be the same or higher than waging insurgency. To protect and guarantee the quality of life and security of former insurgents, Walter argues that the involvement of third

¹⁰ M. C. Marshall and J. Ishiyama, 'Does political inclusion of rebel parties promote peace after civil conflict?' *Democratization*, vol. 23, no. 6, p. 1020.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1018.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1011-1012.

¹³ J. M. Quinn, T. D. Mason, and M. Gurses, 'Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence', *International Interactions*, vol. 33, no. 2, 2007, p. 186.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

parties is vital.¹⁵ Their role as guarantors of the terms of a negotiated settlement ensures that the State follows through with the agreed provisions to insurgents.¹⁶ These points are important for analysing the final agreement in Colombia, as they address the issues of quality of life and security for the FARC in the post-war period and how that may impact the achievement of a sustainable peace through political, social and economic inclusion.

Walter complements the findings of Quinn, Mason and Gurses, and argues that peace is sustainable through improving the quality of life of civilians and political solutions for social and economic hardship.¹⁷ Walter states that when civilians find themselves in a state of abject poverty, which she calls “misery”,¹⁸ and unable to transform this situation and alleviate their misery through political means, they are likely to turn to violence as a solution and enlist in insurgent groups.¹⁹ She therefore suggests that peace cannot be sustained unless the State works to redress these two causes of civil war: low socio-economic status and lack of access to politics for its poorest citizens. These two issues lie at the origins of the Colombian Conflict, thus the way in which the peace agreement addresses the issues of poverty and access to politics is central to sustaining peace through political, social and economic inclusion.

The connection between peace and social change is further reinforced by the concepts of ‘negative peace’ and ‘positive peace’, which Bargent describes in reference to the peace process in Colombia.²⁰ He states that negative peace refers to a peace agreement which, once

¹⁵ B. F. Walter, *Committing to Peace: The successful settlement of civil wars*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 19.

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 5 & 19.

¹⁷ B. Walter, ‘Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War’, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 41, no. 3, 2004, p. 374.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ ‘Colombia’s FARC insurgency may be coming to an end. But can peace hold?’, *Global Dispatches*, [podcast] World Politics Review, 2012, <http://podbay.fm/show/593535863/e/1438808280?autostart=1>, (accessed 21 May 2016).

settled, does not include social reforms nor achieves social change.²¹ Positive peace however conveys the idea that a peace agreement should produce perceivable change to society.²² Such change in Colombian society is possible through political, social and economic inclusion, to ensure that peace is sustainable. Chinchilla on the other hand identifies the risks to sustainable peace through the concept of 'fragmented peace'.²³ As the Colombian Conflict involves multiple armed insurgent groups including the FARC, there must be peace processes with all armed groups to ensure that peace is complete and sustainable.²⁴ Chinchilla highlights the potential for recruitment to remaining armed groups as a threat to sustainable peace.²⁵ Thus he suggests that ex-combatants of the FARC must be deterred through the rigor of political, social and economic inclusion, in the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration process of the former combatants.

According to theories proposed by the scholars above, a sustainable peace is possible through political, social and economic inclusion of insurgents and the classes they represent. Standards for achieving peace in a negotiated settlement through inclusion define measures to prevent the recurrence of civil war, as well as outlining steps towards achieving peace through inclusion. First, through dismantling the military structure of insurgent armies, then by removing their source of funding for rebellion. Once military power is neutralised, political inclusion of insurgents through positions in the branches of politics is necessary, accompanied by mechanisms to improve the quality of life and economic wellbeing of former insurgents. Expansion of provisions for political participation, improved quality of life and

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ F. A. Chinchilla, *Inclusion, Exclusion, and 'Fragmented' Peace: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Processes in Colombia*, Vancouver, Canadian Consortium on Human Security Centre of International Relations, 2007, p. 4.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid, p. 6.

economic wellbeing of the lower classes is also necessary for preventing civilians from turning to violence to achieve social change. The presence of third parties is a necessary measure to ensure that the provisions negotiated in civil war settlement are accomplished. Finally, for a sustainable peace, the extension of political, social and economic inclusion for other parties involved in a civil conflict is necessary to avoid a 'fragmented peace', and extensive social change is necessary for achieving 'positive peace'.

Review of Current Literature

Relevant current literature regarding the peace process in Colombia and the final agreement overall does not focus on political, social and economic inclusion of the FARC as determinants for sustainable peace in Colombia. There are two categories of literature dealing with the topic of the peace process. The first takes an analytical approach to the terms of the final agreement or the peace process and focuses on examining the proposals made in the final agreement. The second category investigates the issues addressed in the final agreement and based on this research, makes recommendations for how this issue should be approached in the peace process.

Literature that takes an analytical approach focuses on drawing conclusions about the peace process and final agreement based on the issues dealt with in the peace process. Ospina, Marks and Ucko discuss the design of the peace agreement, focusing on the ceasefire, DDR process and political inclusion for the FARC. Drawing on examples of ceasefires, DDR and political participation defined in peace processes from Sri Lanka, Nepal and El Salvador, the authors suggest that these elements are not conducive to a sustainable peace in Colombia. They conclude that these elements could be used as FARC strategies to

continue the conflict.²⁶ While these authors do not discuss the other aspects of the final agreement and their potential for sustaining peace, they do emphasise the pitfalls of a settlement purely based on a ceasefire, DDR and political inclusion.

In their separate investigations, Josi and Jean-Baptiste analyse the final agreement to determine how it complies with international standards for punishing crimes against humanity and human rights violations in its treatment of victims and transitional justice. Josi found that while justice is complex in the context of the Colombian conflict, the proposed mechanisms for transitional justice in the final agreement do comply with international laws regarding human rights violations and amnesties.²⁷ Jean-Baptiste agrees with Josi, however focuses on whether amnesties provided in the final agreement are consistent with Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions.²⁸ Jean-Baptiste found that the amnesty outlined in the final agreement is consistent with international law.²⁹ She also states that amnesties are necessary for restoring the social fabric after civil conflict, highlighting the importance of amnesties to the political, social and economic inclusion of former combatants.³⁰ The focus of these analyses however is on transitional justice and human rights violations and whether they adequately meet international standards, rather than how they contribute to political, social and economic inclusion to achieve sustainable peace. Thus they leave room for my investigation into the role of transitional justice as a strategy for achieving sustainable peace through political, social and economic inclusion.

²⁶ Ospina, Marks and Ucko state: "As part of its [the FARC's] revised emphasis on the political aspects of the struggle, it conditionally accepted new peace talks but remained determined to obtain as much advantage as possible by exploiting the government's eagerness to seal a deal." Gen. C. A. Ospina, T. A. Marks and D. H. Ucko, 'Colombia and the War-to-Peace Transition: Cautionary Lessons from Other Cases', *Military Review*, vol. 96, no. 4, 2016, p. 40.

²⁷ C. Josi, 'Accountability in the Colombian Peace Agreement: Are the Proposed Sanctions Contrary to Colombia's International Obligations', *Southwestern Law Review*, no. 46, 2016, p. 420.

²⁸ M. Jean-Baptiste, 'Cracking the Toughest Nut: Colombia's Endeavour with Amnesty for Political Crimes under Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions', *Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law*, vol. 7, no. 2, 2017, p. 30.

²⁹ Ibid, p. 62.

³⁰ Ibid.

Bell argues that the peace agreement contributes to a standardised *lex pacificatoria* or ‘law of the peacemakers’.³¹ She suggests that the final agreement will achieve sustainable peace, as it treats issues not typically addressed in peace processes. These issues include organised crime, women, sexual orientation, and victims’ rights.³² Furthermore, Bell affirms that the final agreement raises issues overlooked in previous peace processes with the FARC, stating that the current agreement learns from these failures, and is thus a step on the path to a “fuller peace”.³³ Although not explicitly stated, Bell indicates that by incorporating these issues, peace as envisaged by the final agreement is sustainable through political, social and economic inclusion. She does so by asserting that peace requires state and non-state actors in the conflict to change their attitudes towards the issues discussed and the social groups which they affect.³⁴ However Bell proposes that peace will be achieved based on the content of the final agreement, rather the end goal of achieving inclusion. Unlike Bell, I argue that it is inclusion that will ultimately sustain peace, thus my investigation will build on her work. Ucrós complements Bell, stating that the strategies employed by negotiators have ensured its success and the sustainability of peace. These strategies include diplomacy, planning and preparation of the negotiations and the primacy of victims.³⁵ Ucrós however focuses on how these elements are instructive to other societies eager to negotiate peace, rather than the components of the final agreement itself and how they will achieve sustainable peace in Colombia.

³¹ Bell states: “the Colombian Peace Agreement and its eventual success or failure is of global significance to peace processes in the future, and even to new norm creation and application.” C. Bell, ‘Lex Pacificatoria Colombiana: Colombia’s Peace Accord in Comparative Perspective’, *American Journal of International Law*, no. 110, 2016, p. 166.

³² Ibid, p. 167-168.

³³ Ibid, p. 166-167.

³⁴ Ibid, p. 166.

³⁵ A. Ucrós Maldonado, ‘What is the Colombian Peace Process Teaching the World?’, *New England Journal of Public Policy*, vol. 29, no. 1, p. 2.

Another kind of literature relevant to the peace process in Colombia focuses on the topic of victims and victimhood, and makes recommendations for how mechanisms for victims should be implemented. Victims have become the subject of media reports and academic research due to their exclusion from previous peace processes and the failures of justice to victims of the conflict through impunity. Prieto suggests that the implementation of DDR and transitional justice programs by the Colombian Government at the local level constitutes a major challenge in achieving sustainable peace.³⁶ His study on communities consisting of ex-combatants, victims and non-victims found that the implementation of such programs was a source of tension between the groups.³⁷ He cites issues such as pension money and state attention each group is given as the main sources of tension.³⁸ Prieto does not analyse if or how the DDR and transitional justice programs foster political, social, and economic inclusion. However he does highlight the local impact of State policies and institutions in Colombia, and their role in achieving peace through political, social and economic inclusion. As he does not discuss the final agreement to determine the impact it will have, there is space for an investigation into the real-world change that the final agreement seeks in order to achieve peace.

On the other hand, an investigation by Nussio, Rettburg and Ugarrizza into the attitudes of victims and non-victims towards transitional justice and reconciliation has found little difference between the two groups and their opinions. Their findings question the adequacy of State-conducted transitional justice procedures that are exclusive to victims and thus do not include the whole of the society. They assert that the State treats victims and non-

³⁶ J. D. Prieto, 'Together after War While the War Goes On: Victims, Ex-Combatants and Communities in Three Colombian Cities', *International Journal of Transitional Justice*, vol. 6, no. 3, 2012, p. 526.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

victims as “fundamentally different social groups,” while their research suggests otherwise.³⁹ The marginal difference in opinion between the two groups on the issue of transitional justice and reconciliation suggests that they are not only relevant issue to victims, but to the whole of society. Moreover, that these are important strategies for achieving sustainable peace through social inclusion. Taylor, Nilsson and Amezcuita-Castro complement these findings by exploring the relationship between structural transformation and communal reconciliation. Their research addresses the political structures that enable continued violence in Colombia. Participants from the Caribbean coast of Colombia interviewed in this investigation agreed that the Justice and Peace Law of 2005 (Law 975) did not succeed in achieving justice or ending violence.⁴⁰ Nor did the Victims and Land Restitution Law of 2011 (Law 1448) succeed in serving justice to victims of human rights violations, or effectively restore land to victims.⁴¹ The research suggests that fear of retribution and a feeling of insecurity is created when perpetrators of violence in these areas in Colombia are not held accountable.⁴² The authors therefore conclude that there needs to be a framework in place that guarantees that victims can speak openly about harms done to them without fear of retaliation.⁴³ As they have not engaged with the frameworks for justice outlined in the final agreement and their importance to social inclusion, there is room to discuss this study in relation to the final agreement.

Methodology and Structure

I conducted my investigation through an analysis of the final agreement, to determine how it proposes to make peace sustainable in Colombia through political, social and economic

³⁹ E. Nussio, A. Rettberg and J. E. Ugarriza, ‘Victims, Nonvictims and Their Opinions on Transitional Justice: Findings from the Colombian Case’, *International journal of transitional justice*, vol. 9, no. 2, 2015, p. 18.

⁴⁰ L. K. Taylor, M. Nilsson and B. Amezcuita-Castro, ‘Reconstructing the social fabric amid ongoing violence: attitudes toward reconciliation and structural transformation in Colombia’, *Peacebuilding*, vol. 4, no. 1, 2016, p. 87.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p. 88.

⁴² *Ibid*, p. 95.

⁴³ *Ibid*.

inclusion. The analysis was performed through considering how the final agreement both engages with standards for sustainable peace as defined by civil war settlement theories, and responds to the history of conflict in the context of Colombia. I consider the analytical approach appropriate for this investigation and for interpreting the final agreement due to the limitations of an investigation of this size. It is also a suitable methodology for determining what is included and excluded and thus the real world implications of the terms of the final agreement. I chose an analytical methodology over a qualitative methodology due to physical distance, time constraints and word limits. A qualitative methodology would require extensive interviews, and a variety of political and ideological opinions, which would require more time, and is suited to a more in-depth investigation.

This approach involves contextualising the final agreement in relation to the political history of Colombia, the history of the conflict and the history of peace processes with the FARC, and understanding how these historical events inform or correlate with the standards for achieving peace based on the standards set by theories of civil war settlement. I consider the inclusion of the pre-conflict era important, as it was a time in which the political, social, and economic mechanisms that caused the conflict were established. It was also a time in which political violence became the norm for engagement between different ideological groups. The final agreement should address this legacy of violent engagement to show that it aims to achieve sustainable peace by acknowledging this history of violent political, social and economic exclusion through proposing strategies for political, social and economic inclusion of the FARC and the classes they represent. While I acknowledge the involvement of other armed insurgent groups in the Colombian Conflict, the discussion of the history of war and previous peace processes is limited to the FARC and their relationship to the Colombian State.

Considering the methodology used and purpose of this investigation, this thesis is organised into three chapters. Chapter 1 chronicles the history of unrest that led up to the conflict and discuss the complexities of the conflict and political, social and economic exclusion at the origin and crux of the conflict. Chapter 2 is a summary of the main points of the final agreement between the FARC and the Colombian Government. The final chapter, Chapter 3, offers an analysis of the final agreement and discusses how it aims to achieve sustainable peace in Colombia. Here I will examine whether it adequately responds to the history of political, social and economic exclusion to achieve a sustainable peace. Currently, the peace process is moving into the implementation stage, and despite positive developments in the process, a sustainable peace is yet to be achieved.

1. The History of the Colombian Conflict

Introduction

The final agreement between the FARC and the Colombian government faces a long history of entrenched political, social and economic exclusion, accomplished through violence. Consequently, the outcomes of the final agreement are not likely to be immediately felt or noticed. Its biggest challenge is making up for and redressing abuses to civil liberties and human rights originating in the foundation of the Republic of Colombia. Colombia consolidated its national boundaries and centralised State power amidst wars and disputes over territory. The Colombia that exists today became as such when the surrounding lands of Venezuela, Ecuador, parts of Peru and Brazil broke away from the ‘Liberator’ Simon Bolivar during the 19th Century.⁴⁴ Bolivar also lost territories through a series of revolts and coups.⁴⁵ The breakaway surrounding lands and emergence of neighbouring nations came as a response to the fluctuation of Conservative and Liberal administrations.⁴⁶

Fluctuation of Liberal and Conservative administrations came to define the Colombian political system in the 20th century and marked periods of increased political violence and social upheaval. Such wars and disputes highlight that political solutions to social and economic problems were accompanied by or enforced through violence. Moreover, those who claimed political legitimacy in the formation of the country met those who disagreed with them ideologically with hostility, violence, repression, displacement and intolerance. Hence excluded populations responded with violence as the means for achieving political, social and economic change. In the contemporary context, the final agreement

⁴⁴ H. Horna, *A People's History of Latin America*, Princeton, Markus Wiener Publishers, 2014, p. 153-160.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 162.

marks an important step towards achieving peace through political, social and economic inclusion.

To argue that peace is sustainable in Colombia through political, social and economic inclusion, the historical context of the final agreement must be taken into account. This chapter will set out the historical events preceding the Colombian Conflict, to illustrate the origins of political, social and economic exclusion which culminated in the conflict and the formation of the FARC. The events include the Thousand Days' War, the death of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán and the National Front Agreement. Factors which exemplify the continuation of exclusion and prolonged the conflict will also be discussed. These include the issue of land, evolution of the drug trade and the emergence of paramilitaries. Recent events in the Conflict are vital to understanding the circumstances surrounding the engagement in a negotiated settlement to the war. These include the failure of previous peace processes and the intervention of the United States (US) in Colombia. This chapter lays the foundations for my analysis of the final agreement and the prospects for sustainable peace in Colombia.

Liberal-Conservative Unrest and Foundations of the Conflict

Colombia entered the 20th Century locked in *La Guerra de Los Mil Días* (1899-1903) or the Thousand Days' War. The war transpired as Colombia was in the process of forging itself as a nation, both through its physical boundaries and political system. It was fought between Liberal and Conservative groups and according to Soifer, erupted due to Liberal defiance towards the state.⁴⁷ The Liberals opposed the development of a centralised authority by the Conservative administration, feeling that it excluded them from politics.⁴⁸ Palacios considers this war a precursor to the current conflict, and identifies the Liberals as FARC

⁴⁷ H. D. Soifer, *State Building in Latin America*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 54-55.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

predecessors.⁴⁹ He suggests that their prevalence in the eastern plains – particularly the Magdalena River and Tolima – as well as their use of *guerrilla* warfare, is the source of radicalism in those areas, which would eventually become FARC strongholds.⁵⁰ This too is another way The Thousand Days' War is a precursor to the current conflict in Colombia.

The Thousand Days' War ended with the first semblance of a peace process in Colombia during the 20th Century. Both Liberals and Conservatives disarmed or surrendered, civilian and military prisoners were released and the Liberals were included in politics.⁵¹ The Government subsequently granted a general pardon to all parties involved and immediately reduced the army to 50,000 troops.⁵² The army was later reduced further to 15,000 men.⁵³ Despite the resolution of Thousand Days' War, the war itself and its settlement fortified affiliations to Liberal and Conservative parties.⁵⁴ The period following the war was one of peace, however conflicting political ideals for how to achieve true democracy and progress became a source of tension during that time.⁵⁵

From 1903 to 1930 Colombia experienced a period of relative peace and stability. Bushnell states that it was a time when the country showed that it was capable of peaceful and inclusive debate and rivalry between Liberals and Conservatives.⁵⁶ Nonetheless, economic stability and growth came at a price for this budding capitalist economy. Workers were exploited in remote regions of Colombia, particularly areas where rubber and bananas were harvested.⁵⁷ The most noted case of exploitation was that of the United Fruit

⁴⁹ M. Palacios, *Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875-2002*, Durham, Duke University Press, 2006, p. 38.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 39.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 39-41.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ D. Bushnell, *The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself*, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1993, p. 155.

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 163.

Company.⁵⁸ Exploitation of workers for United Fruit culminated in a strike, organised with assistance from *Partido Socialista Revolucionario* (Socialist Revolutionary Party, PSR).⁵⁹ It ended with the Banana Massacre of 1928 in the town of Ciénaga.⁶⁰ The massacre was carried out by the military in response to the strike and sanctioned by the Conservative government of the time.⁶¹ Safford and Palacios suggest that the PSR connection meant that strikers were seen as disloyal to the State and therefore the State turned against its citizens in support of a foreign investor in the country.⁶² Ultimately, the massacre caused a decline in popular support for the Conservative party and the Liberals won the subsequent elections in 1930.

The Liberal party held power from 1930 to 1946. The transfer of ideology from Conservative to Liberal was marked by episodes of violence, which eventually subsided.⁶³ Divisions appeared within the Liberal government in the 1940s, due in part to the emergence of Liberal politician Jorge Eliécer Gaitán and his popular following.⁶⁴ Gaitán identified with the poor and lower classes, unlike other politicians who claimed from a distance to represent them.⁶⁵ He attacked Conservative government methods and was particularly outspoken on the Banana Massacre.⁶⁶ Although he was not elected to run for president in the 1946 elections, Gaitán continued to mobilise the masses by demanding the expansion of democratic rights and social and economic justice.⁶⁷ He subsequently increased popular participation in

⁵⁸ The United Fruit Company was a company from the United States that had a monopoly on the growth and export of fruit, particularly in the Caribbean areas of Central and South America in the early to mid-20th Century.

⁵⁹ Bushnell, *The Making of Modern Colombia*, p. 179.

⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 179.

⁶¹ F. Safford and M. Palacios, *Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 281-282.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Bushnell, *The Making of Modern Colombia*, p. 181-183.

⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 198.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 124.

⁶⁷ W. J. Green, "'Vibrations of the Collective': The Popular Ideology of Gaitanismo on Colombia's Atlantic Coast, 1944-1948", *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol. 76, no. 2, 1996, p. 284.

politics.⁶⁸ In his speeches, Gaitán referred to Liberals and Conservatives as forming the *oligarquía* (oligarchy); categorising them as one class rather than opposing political groups.⁶⁹ When describing those he represented as the *pueblo* (the common people), thus recasting political, social and economic exclusion as a class struggle.⁷⁰

Violence erupted once again in 1946 when the Conservatives were re-elected. However this time it did not subside, marking the beginning of the period known as *La Violencia* (The Violence).⁷¹ In 1948, followers of Gaitán gathered in the Plaza de Bolívar, Bogotá, to protest the violence they had been subjected to.⁷² Rioting that began when Gaitán was assassinated left Bogotá in ruins and thousands dead in the city and other towns.⁷³ Confrontations between Liberals and Conservatives continued until the mid-1960s as violent clashes were succeeded by counter-attacks on both sides.⁷⁴ Each side justified their actions: the Liberals refused to accept the Conservative administration as a legitimate government, while Conservatives, for their part, considered Liberals to be disloyal to the government and the country.⁷⁵ Most violent episodes occurred in rural areas, causing peasants to arm and defend themselves from death squads and military force.⁷⁶ By the end of *La Violencia*, between 200,000 and 300,000 people had been killed.⁷⁷

In 1958, in an effort to end the *La Violencia*, the Liberal and Conservative parties agreed to a truce known as *El Frente Nacional* (The National Front). Under the terms of the agreement, Liberals and Conservatives shared political office by alternating presidential

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 286 and L. Rehm, 'La construcción de *las subculturas políticas* en Colombia: los partidos tradicionales como antípodas políticas durante *La Violencia*, 1946-1964', *Historia y Sociedad*, no. 27, 2014, p. 20.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Bushnell, *The Making of Modern Colombia*, p. 201-204.

⁷² Safford and Palacios, *Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society*, p. 318-319.

⁷³ Palacios, *Between Legitimacy and Violence*, p. 142.

⁷⁴ Bushnell, *The Making of Modern Colombia*, p. 204-205.

⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 205.

⁷⁶ G. Simons, *Colombia: A Brutal History*, London, SAQI, 2004, p. 41.

⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 41-42.

terms. Also under this agreement, Liberals and Conservatives were given equal representation in legislative bodies.⁷⁸ However, power was shared solely between Liberals and Conservatives and continued to be centralised.⁷⁹ This two-party system aimed to achieve peaceful, inclusive political practice in Colombia by preventing either side from creating a one-party system. As a one-party system, Communism was consequentially considered a threat and outlawed.⁸⁰ This ban on Communism is crucial to the origins of the conflict, as the Government responded to any threat to itself with violent exclusion. *La Violencia* continued until 1964. Pécaut states that it is “invoked as a justification by those who continue to practise violence in the present,” suggesting that the memory of *La Violencia* persists in Colombia.⁸¹

The Issue of Land

Land disputes have a long and wide history in Colombia; 450 altercations over land occurred between peasants and landlords from 1875 to 1930.⁸² Disputes and confrontations over land are central to political, social and economic exclusion in Colombia, especially for the FARC and the classes they represent. The period of *La Violencia* was an opportunity for the upper classes to accumulate land and capital, and to exclude the lower classes.⁸³ During this period, owners were subjected to extortion and tenants forced to flee their lands, causing a surge in migration from the countryside to the city.⁸⁴

⁷⁸ Brittain, *Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia*, p. 6.

⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 7.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ D. Pécaut, ‘From the Banality of Fear to Real Terror: the Case of Colombia’, in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), *Societies of Fear: The Legacy of Civil War, Violence and Terror in Latin America*, London, New York, Zed Books, 1999, pp. 142.

⁸² C. Metelits, ‘From Jekyll to Hyde: The Transformation of the FARC’, in *Inside Insurgency: violence, civilians, and revolutionary group behaviour*, New York, New York University Press, 2010, p. 87; and O. Villar and D. Cottle, *Cocaine, Death Squads and the War on Terror: U.S. Imperialism and Class Struggle in Colombia*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 2011, p. 23.

⁸³ Villar and Cottle, *Cocaine, Death Squads and the War on Terror*, p. 24-25.

⁸⁴ Safford and Palacios, *Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society*, p. 352, 354.

Those years of economic growth in the 1920s and 1930s meant that the demand for agricultural products increased and agribusiness grew.⁸⁵ With the growth of agribusiness came land reforms, which privatised ownership of land, favouring the interests of large landowners over those of the peasantry.⁸⁶ Moreover, expansion of agribusiness demanded an increase of labour force; achieved through privatisation of land ownership.⁸⁷ By removing peasants from the land they tended, they could then be employed by landowners.⁸⁸ This led to monopolisation of the land by private landowners and land concentration in the hands of elites.⁸⁹ With the expansion of agribusiness, landowners gained political visibility and high representation in government, while those with opposing interests were outlawed and excluded.⁹⁰

According to Holmes and Gutiérrez de Piñares, the FARC have their roots in the land conflicts of the 1920s and 1930s.⁹¹ Furthermore, the insurgency is closely related to the ownership and control of land by the upper classes.⁹² The interests of the peasantry lay at the origins of the FARC and remain one of their key priorities.⁹³ These interests include land reforms that favour requests of the lower classes to occupy, own and cultivate land – to create higher numbers of smallholdings or *minifundistas* and for better working conditions for the peasants employed by large landowners on *latifundistas* (large estates).⁹⁴ The legacy of land disputes is apparent in contemporary Colombia. Villar and Cottle note that wealthy landlords account for 1.3 percent of the population that owns forty-eight percent of the land, while

⁸⁵ Metelits, 'From Jekyll to Hyde: The Transformation of the FARC', in *Inside Insurgency*, p. 85.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid, p. 86.

⁹⁰ Villar and Cottle, *Cocaine, Death Squads and the War on Terror*, p. 23-25.

⁹¹ J. S. Holmes and S.A. Gutiérrez de Piñares, 'Violence and the State: Lessons from Colombia', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, vol. 25, no. 2, 2014, p. 373.

⁹² Villar and Cottle, *Cocaine, Death Squads and the War on Terror*, p. 100.

⁹³ Safford and Palacios, *Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society*, p. 354.

⁹⁴ Ibid; and Villar and Cottle, *Cocaine, Death Squads and the War on Terror*, p. 23.

peasants own an estimated five percent of the land, and account for 68 percent of the population.⁹⁵

The Origins and Growth of the FARC

Before Communism was outlawed under *El Frente Nacional* in 1958, the *Partido Comunista Colombiano* (Colombian Communist Party, PCC) was an active organiser of peasant self-defence groups during *La Violencia*. They were active in the community of Marquetalia, a self-declared ‘independent republic’ located in the centre of Colombia, southwest of Bogotá.⁹⁶ It spanned the department of Tolima and reached into neighbouring departments of Cauca and Huila.⁹⁷ The borders of Marquetalia were protected throughout the 1950s and 1960s by *guerrilla* belonging to the community. By declaring itself an autonomous community, the Republic of Marquetalia rejected the central political authority of the Colombian state. As an ideologically Communist community, they refused allegiance to both the Liberal and Conservative parties.⁹⁸ On the other hand, supporters of the PCC were shunned by Liberals and considered a threat by Conservatives.⁹⁹

The ban on Communism under *El Frente Nacional* was accompanied by increasing ties between the US and Colombian governments during the Cold War period. In 1964, in an effort to confront the threat of Communism in Colombia through military action, the Conservative administration of Guillermo León launched an assault called *Operación Marquetalia*. The attack was permitted under the counter-terrorist policy Plan Lazo (1962). Brittain suggests that *Operación Marquetalia* was carried out with support from the US.¹⁰⁰ The community of Marquetalia anticipated the attack and their self-defence *guerrilla*

⁹⁵ Villar and Cottle, *Cocaine, Death Squads and the War on Terror*, p. 26-27.

⁹⁶ Brittain, *Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia*, p. 5.

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 8-9.

⁹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 5.

⁹⁹ *Ibid*.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, p. 12.

prepared by evacuating townspeople who could not fight.¹⁰¹ The *guerrilla* fighters were a group of 48 peasants,¹⁰² who retaliated under the instruction of Manuel Marulanda, a peasant and organiser for the PCC.¹⁰³ Having successfully defended the community, the *guerrilla* fled the zone only to return and retake Marquetalia within months.¹⁰⁴ *Operación Marquetalia* – an instance of political and social exclusion – thus forged the core of what would become the FARC.¹⁰⁵ In 1965, the *guerrilla* held their first conference and named themselves *Bloque Sur* (Southern Bloc).¹⁰⁶ During their second conference in 1966, they renamed themselves the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* and established a constitution and military structure later that year.¹⁰⁷

Marulanda assumed the position of commander in chief of the FARC, with a political division overseen by Marxist and PCC member Jacobo Arenas.¹⁰⁸ Throughout the 1970s, the FARC grew slowly and organised their internal structure. By their seventh conference in 1982, the FARC were confident to change their military strategy from defence to offence.¹⁰⁹ The change in strategy was accompanied by a change in name. From that point on, the FARC called themselves the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo*.¹¹⁰ They would no longer wait for their enemy to attack before retaliating, preferring to strike first.¹¹¹ Despite this change in military strategy, Arenas stressed the importance of

¹⁰¹ Ibid, p. 10.

¹⁰² G. Leech, *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency*, London, New York, Zed Books, 2011, p. 14.

¹⁰³ J. Bargent and J. McDermott, '50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution', *Insight Crime: Investigation and Analysis of Organised Crime*, 26 May 2014, <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017).

¹⁰⁴ Brittain, *Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia*, p. 14.

¹⁰⁵ Bargent and McDermott, '50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution', <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017).

¹⁰⁶ Leech, *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency*, p. 15.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, p. 16-17.

¹⁰⁸ Bargent and McDermott, '50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution', <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017).

¹⁰⁹ Leech, *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency*, p. 25.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

fighting the conflict on all fronts, reiterating the political goals of the FARC.¹¹² When the FARC first began, it was active in only four municipalities, but by the time Marulanda passed away in 2008, it had expanded and was active in 1,050 municipalities.¹¹³ The expansion of the FARC and its influence was enabled by a lack of State presence, coupled by their changes in military strategy and accumulation of wealth through extortion, kidnapping, and meddling in the drug trade.

The Conflict Endures: FARC involvement in the drug trade

The drug trade in Colombia flourished during the 1980s, spawning the Medellín and Cali cartels. While the mobilisation of the FARC predates the trafficking of cocaine,¹¹⁴ the booming illegal trade provided a source of funding in addition to kidnapping and extortion.¹¹⁵ Their official policy was to tax coca cultivation, rather than manufacture and transport cocaine.¹¹⁶ Drug related activity carried out by the FARC was not officially sanctioned by its central high command.¹¹⁷ Nonetheless, the FARC further developed its relationship with the drug trade after Arenas passed away in 1990.¹¹⁸ Arenas opposed any attachment to the drug trade, believing that connections to the trade compromised the morals of the FARC,¹¹⁹ perhaps by turning the revolutionary struggle into a “commercial endeavour”.¹²⁰ According to Brittain, the FARC not only became more involved with the drug trade as a result of the death of Arenas, but accepted coca cultivations as a peasant issue; changing their policy to reflect

¹¹² Ibid, p. 26.

¹¹³ Ibid, p. 16.

¹¹⁴ Brittain, *Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia*, p. 90.

¹¹⁵ C. Lee, ‘The FARC and the Colombian Left: Time for a Political Solution?’, *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 39, no. 1. 2012, p. 34

¹¹⁶ Villar and Cottle, *Cocaine, Death Squads and the War on Terror*, p. 93.

¹¹⁷ Bargent and McDermott, ‘50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution’, <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017).

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ A. Barrios et. Al., ‘Marketing as a Means to Transformative Social Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Transitions War Economies and the Colombian Coffee Marketing System’, *Journal of Public Policy & Marketing*, vol. 35, no. 2, 2016, p. 188-189.

their identification with the rural populations.¹²¹ Thus the FARC originally taxed peasants for growing coca leaves, and drug gangs and traffickers for producing, buying and transporting cocaine in the territories they controlled.¹²² For this reason, the FARC forcefully denied being a drug cartel, despite State branding as ‘narco-terrorists’.¹²³

Despite the FARC rebuking claims that they are a drug cartel, there are a few notable examples of FARC members who dealt more deeply in the drug trade. FARC documents that were seized by the Colombian military suggest that producing, processing and transporting cocaine was a tactic used by the FARC to raise funds.¹²⁴ This is particularly true for the 16th Front of the Eastern Bloc, which earnt US\$200 million for the FARC in 2012 using these methods.¹²⁵ The head of the front, Negro Acacio¹²⁶ collected cocaine produced in areas controlled by other FARC fronts¹²⁷ and traded with Brazilian Fernando Da Costa, a dealer from the *Comando Vermelho* (Red Command).¹²⁸ These deals made the Eastern Bloc the most dominant division within the FARC.¹²⁹ In 2004, a *guerrillera* from the 14th Front of the Southern Bloc, alias ‘Sonia’, was captured and extradited for the controlling the transport of

¹²¹ J. J. Brittain, ‘The FARC-EP and Consequential Marxism in Colombia’, in S. Feuchtwang and A. Shah (eds.), *Emancipatory Politics: A Critique*, Open Anthropology Cooperative Press, 2015, p. 108.

¹²² Bargent and McDermott, ‘50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution’, <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017); and Brittain, *Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia*, p. 89-91.

¹²³ Villar and Cottle, *Cocaine, Death Squads and the War on Terror*, p. 28, 46.

¹²⁴ Bargent and McDermott, ‘50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution’, <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017); and Brittain, *Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia*, p. 89-91.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ ‘Negro Acacio’ was the alias for Tomás Medina Caracas, who also went by the name of Tomás Molina Caracas.

¹²⁷ N. Nogueira, ‘Money, Drugs, Guerrillas – A case study on FARC’s relationship with coca and cocaine from 1978-1999,’ *Medium*, 1 January 2017, <https://medium.com/@NatalieNogueira/money-drugs-guerrillas-a-case-study-on-farcs-relationship-with-coca-and-cocaine-from-1978-1999-492a13e220dd>, (accessed 9 September 2017).

¹²⁸ Bargent and McDermott, ‘50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution’, <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017); and Nogueira, ‘Money, Drugs, Guerrillas’, <https://medium.com/@NatalieNogueira/money-drugs-guerrillas-a-case-study-on-farcs-relationship-with-coca-and-cocaine-from-1978-1999-492a13e220dd>, (accessed 9 September 2017).

¹²⁹ Bargent and McDermott, ‘50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution’, <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017).

drugs to the US via Panama.¹³⁰ According to Bargent and McDermott, the FARC were involved in moving drugs into Panama, Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil, and expanded into the trade of heroin and marijuana.¹³¹

While the involvement of the FARC in the drug trade was not sufficient for them to classify as a cartel, revenues from the trade did give rise to the rapid military growth and expansion for the FARC.¹³² It also meant that the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991) did not hamper the revolutionary objectives of the FARC.¹³³ During the 1990s the FARC grew to an estimated membership of 20,000, accompanied by an increase in fronts from nine in 1979 to sixty in 1995.¹³⁴ It was due to this rapid growth that at the end of the 1990s, the FARC threatened to “topple the state”.¹³⁵ FARC growth followed increases in social and economic inequality in rural regions due to neo-liberal economic policies which increased rural poverty.¹³⁶ This contributed to increased recruits to the FARC, which increased military strength, reinforcing the violent engagement between the FARC and the Colombian State.

Paramilitary Groups and their role in sustaining the Conflict

FARC involvement in the drug trade and subsequent expansion served to prolong the war and increase violence. So did subsequent persecution of the FARC by another type of armed group known as paramilitaries, which reinforced political, social and economic exclusion of

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Nogueira, ‘Money, Drugs, Guerrillas – A case study on FARC’s relationship with coca and cocaine from 1978-1999,’ <https://medium.com/@NatalieNogueira/money-drugs-guerrillas-a-case-study-on-farcs-relationship-with-coca-and-cocaine-from-1978-1999-492a13e220dd>, (accessed 9 September 2017).

¹³³ Brittain, *Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia*, p. 114; and Brittain, ‘The FARC-EP and Consequential Marxism in Colombia’, in *Emancipatory Politics: A Critique*, p. 107-110.

¹³⁴ Nogueira, ‘Money, Drugs, Guerrillas – A case study on FARC’s relationship with coca and cocaine from 1978-1999,’ <https://medium.com/@NatalieNogueira/money-drugs-guerrillas-a-case-study-on-farcs-relationship-with-coca-and-cocaine-from-1978-1999-492a13e220dd>, (accessed 9 September 2017).

¹³⁵ Bargent and McDermott, ‘50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution’, <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017).

¹³⁶ Brittain, *Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia*, p. 109.

the FARC and the classes they represent. Paramilitaries have emerged throughout the history of violence in Colombia. These irregular or civilian armies have their origins in *La Violencia* and developed over time as ‘self-defence groups’ for drug cartels.¹³⁷ These self-defence groups were legalised through *Decreto 3398 de 1965* (Decree 3398 of 1965) and *Ley 48 de 1968* (Law 48 of 1968),¹³⁸ under the counterinsurgency program Plan Lazo.¹³⁹ They were subsequently made illegal in 1989.¹⁴⁰ Despite a connection to State counterinsurgency, they lack political or social agenda and ideology.¹⁴¹ In recent years they are better known for protecting the interests of business elites and covert involvement with the Colombian military. Paramilitary involvement sustained the conflict by maintaining the stasis of violent engagement between the FARC and Colombian State.

During the 1980s, the assassinations of members of the FARC political party *Unión Patriótica* (Patriotic Union, UP) were attributed to the paramilitaries. This subsequently prolonged the war, by causing the FARC to turn away from politics after engaging in peace talks in 1984 and drafting the *Acuerdos de la Uribe* (Uribe Accords).¹⁴² Increased involvement of the FARC in the drug trade during the 1980s was also considered a threat to drug trade profit, thus paramilitaries defended the interests of cartels and corrupt State officials.¹⁴³ Specifically, paramilitaries acted in retaliation to the expanding *guerrilla*, who

¹³⁷ Metelits, ‘From Jekyll to Hyde: The Transformation of the FARC’, in *Inside Insurgency*, p. 105; and Villar and Cottle, *Cocaine, Death Squads and the War on Terror*, p. 24.

¹³⁸ Metelits, ‘From Jekyll to Hyde: The Transformation of the FARC’, in *Inside Insurgency*, p. 105; and D. Raby, ‘Colombia as the linchpin of US hegemony in Latin America’, in F. Dominguez, G. Lievesley and S. Ludlam (eds.), *Right-Wing Politics in the New Latin America*, London, New York, Zed Books, 2011, p. 82-83.

¹³⁹ Holmes and Gutiérrez de Piñares, ‘Violence and the State: Lessons from Colombia’, p. 374; and J. Hristov, ‘Self-Defense Forces, Warlords, or Criminal Gangs? Towards a New Conceptualization of Paramilitarism in Colombia’, *Labour, Capital and Society*, vol. 43, no. 2, 2010, p. 18-19.

¹⁴⁰ P. D. Scott, ‘Forward’, in *Cocaine, Death Squads, and the War on Terror: U.S. Imperialism and Class Struggle in Colombia*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 2011, p. 11-12.

¹⁴¹ Metelits, ‘From Jekyll to Hyde: The Transformation of the FARC’, in *Inside Insurgency*, p. 105.

¹⁴² S. Dudley, *Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia*, London, Routledge, 2004, p. 141; Safford and Palacios, *Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society*, p. 357; and Villar and Cottle, *Cocaine, Death Squads and the War on Terror*, p. 17, 98, 124.

¹⁴³ Metelits, ‘From Jekyll to Hyde: The Transformation of the FARC’, in *Inside Insurgency*, p. 103.

targeted drug cartels for extortion¹⁴⁴ and landowners for “war taxes”.¹⁴⁵ This is exemplified by the emergence of the paramilitary group *Muerte A Secuestradores* (Death to Kidnappers, MAS), which was established by the Medellín Cartel in retaliation for the kidnapping of its members by the FARC.¹⁴⁶ These private armies preserved the interests of their employers, the drug cartels and landowners.¹⁴⁷ Paramilitaries were also established for self-defence between drug cartels; *Los Pepes* or *Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar* (People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar) was formed by the Cali to defend itself against Pablo Escobar of the Medellín cartel.¹⁴⁸ Tactics used to eradicate the FARC included acquiring land by purchase or force.¹⁴⁹ Although paramilitaries were financially independent from the government, they are known to collaborate with the Colombian military and to have received training from foreign countries such as the US and Israel.¹⁵⁰

After the demise of the drug trade in the 1990s, the fragmented paramilitary groups became the *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia, AUC) in 1997.¹⁵¹ Despite the decline of the drug trade from its peak in the 1980s, the AUC increased in number. According to Metelits, the AUC increased from 2,000 in 1996 to 11,200 in 2000.¹⁵² Furthermore, former *guerrilla* members of insurgent groups besides the FARC that demobilised in the 1980s and 1990s joined the paramilitaries, adding to the military strength of the paramilitaries.¹⁵³ At its peak the AUC numbered 15,000 fighters.¹⁵⁴ The

¹⁴⁴ O. Dube and S. Naidu, ‘Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of US Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia’, *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 77, no.1, 2015, p. 251-252.

¹⁴⁵ Simons, *Colombia: A Brutal History*, p. 55.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Dube and Naidu, ‘Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of US Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia’, p. 254.

¹⁴⁸ Villar and Cottle, *Cocaine, Death Squads and the War on Terror*, p. 78.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 59, 68.

¹⁵⁰ Metelits, ‘From Jekyll to Hyde: The Transformation of the FARC’, in *Inside Insurgency*, p. 104.

¹⁵¹ Dube and Naidu, ‘Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of US Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia’, p. 252.

¹⁵² Metelits, ‘From Jekyll to Hyde: The Transformation of the FARC’, in *Inside Insurgency*, p. 105.

¹⁵³ Safford and Palacios, *Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society*, p. 360.

increased presence of paramilitaries in areas controlled by the FARC often led to increased massacres and violations of human rights, and ultimately sustained and prolonged the war.¹⁵⁵

While the paramilitaries have a strong link to the drug trade,¹⁵⁶ their attitude towards the FARC as counterinsurgency forces is that of “*cortarle el mal por su raíz*”¹⁵⁷. A similar attitude was adopted by the Uribe administration under the counter-narcotics policy Plan Colombia. Under Plan Colombia, the AUC were given increased military support, although they were never officially recognised as government agents.¹⁵⁸ They did however receive off-the-record support from the military and police force.¹⁵⁹ This added support made them more lethal than the army as they employed more brutal methods.¹⁶⁰ In a peace process with the Uribe administration, the AUC demobilised between 2003 and 2006.¹⁶¹ During the process, paramilitaries were tried under the *Ley de Justicia y Paz*, *Ley 975 de 2005* (Justice and Peace Law, Law 975 of 2005), which became synonymous with reduced sentences and impunity.¹⁶² While the demobilisation of the AUC did improve security in Colombia, a minimalistic approach to the peace process meant that not all weapons were surrendered. Nor was the internal structure of the paramilitaries dismantled, which ultimately produced *bandas criminales* (criminal gangs) known as BACRIM.¹⁶³ The way the peace process with the AUC

¹⁵⁴ Dube and Naidu, ‘Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of US Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia’, p. 252.

¹⁵⁵ Metelits, ‘From Jekyll to Hyde: The Transformation of the FARC’, in *Inside Insurgency*, p. 108-117

¹⁵⁶ M. C. Ramírez Lemus, K. Stanton, and J. Walsh, ‘Colombia: A Vicious Cycle of Drugs and War’, in C. Youngers and E. Rosin (eds.), *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy*, Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005, p. 103.

¹⁵⁷ “cutting out evil from its root”; Rehm, ‘La construcción de *las subculturas políticas* en Colombia: los partidos tradicionales como antípodas políticas durante *La Violencia*, 1946-1964’, p. 42.

¹⁵⁸ Dube, and Naidu, ‘Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of US Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia’, p. 254.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 252.

¹⁶⁰ Bargent and McDermott, ‘50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution’, <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017).

¹⁶¹ E. Nussio, ‘Learning from Shortcomings: the demobilisation of paramilitaries in Colombia’, *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, vol. 6, no. 2, 2011, p. 88.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid, 88, 89, 91.

was carried out raised concerns over the implementation of the current-day peace process with the FARC, particularly regarding the DDR of ex-combatants.

US Intervention in Colombia

The US has a history of interfering in military, political and economic affairs in Colombia to achieve its own ends as a nation. This history with Colombia served to increase popular mistrust for Colombian governments, exclude politically, socially and economically and fortify the ideological position of the FARC towards the State. The earliest intervention of the US government in Colombia was their role in the separation of Panama from Colombia in 1903. Under the Thompson-Urratia Treaty 1921, the US paid Colombia US\$25 million for Colombia to recognise Panama as an independent nation.¹⁶⁴ The most notable incident of the Colombian State pandering to the interests of the US was the Banana Massacre of 1928.¹⁶⁵ Support for the US only grew throughout the 1930s and during World War II, where the problem of concern turned to security.¹⁶⁶ During this period the US sought to expand their security and military objectives in Latin America, deploying a US attaché to Colombia in 1939 to direct the Colombian War Department Administration Division.¹⁶⁷ In 1942, Colombia received US\$8.3 million worth of arms from the US as part of a 'Lend-Lease' program for military resource sharing.¹⁶⁸ WWII also marked the origins of US interest in combating organised crime in Colombia, where it confronted the illicit trade of platinum.¹⁶⁹ US interest in Colombia was reciprocated when Colombia supported the US in the Korean War during the 1950s.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁴ Bushnell, *The Making of Modern Colombia*, p. 164.

¹⁶⁵ Safford and Palacios, *Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society*, p. 274.

¹⁶⁶ B. L. Coleman, *Colombia and the United States: The Making of an Inter-American Alliance, 1939-1960*, Kent, The Kent State University Press, 2008, p. 9.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 18.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 29.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 36.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 28.

By 1964 and *Operación Marquetalia*, the enemy changed from the Axis powers to Communism under *El Frente Nacional* and Plan Lazo, a counter-insurgency program instigated by the US. Under Plan Lazo, the US provided military training, financial aid worth US\$60 million and military equipment worth US\$100 million between 1961 and 1967.¹⁷¹ Plan Lazo was accompanied by the US Alliance for Progress 1961 which offered support for economic and social development; viewed by its opponents in Colombia as another example of US imperialism.¹⁷² According to Brittain, the US devoted \$17 million to ensure the success of *Operación Marquetalia*, which stands as proof of its importance to both Colombia and the US in their fight against Communism.¹⁷³ However, the military attack only fortified the ideological position of the community against the State and spawned the FARC.

Throughout the following forty years, US intervention was consistent with their ‘War on Drugs’, and focused mainly on stifling the drug trade throughout Latin America. In Colombia, the War on Drugs intensified in 1999 with the implementation of Plan Colombia, an agreement between President Pastrana and President Clinton to receive aid from the US.¹⁷⁴ Until around 2002, the increased militarisation and adoption of neo-liberal policies under the conditions of Plan Colombia intensified and prolonged the conflict.¹⁷⁵ In total, the US has invested nearly US\$8 billion in Plan Colombia.¹⁷⁶ Plan Colombia was accompanied by military expansion and development under Plan 10,000, an initiative to professionalise the

¹⁷¹ Simons, *Colombia: A Brutal History*, p. 42.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Brittain, *Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia*, p. 12

¹⁷⁴ M. Shifter, ‘Plan Colombia; A Retrospective’, *Americas Quarterly*, vol. 6, no. 3, 2012, <http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3787>, (accessed 16 May 2017).

¹⁷⁵ L. Carasik, ‘Washington should avoid repeating Plan Colombia’s failures’, *Aljazeera America*, 9 February 2016, <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2016/2/washington-should-avoid-repeating-plan-colombias-failures.html>, (accessed 16 May 2017); and D. Stokes, *America’s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia*, London, New York, Zed Books, 2005, p. 84-86.

¹⁷⁶ Shifter, ‘Plan Colombia; A Retrospective’, *Americas Quarterly*, <http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3787>, (accessed 16 May 2017).

army; shifting from conscription to voluntary recruitment.¹⁷⁷ Plan Colombia expanded under changes to the administrations of both the US and Colombia. Under the Bush administration and presidency of Álvaro Uribe the rhetoric changed from the 'War of Drugs' to the 'War on Terror'.¹⁷⁸ This change was used to justify targeting the FARC under the principles of Plan Colombia. Uribe succeeded in reducing kidnappings and the size of the FARC due to improved intelligence and security forces.¹⁷⁹

Under Uribe, Plan Colombia succeeded in driving the FARC to the border regions of the country through clandestine collaboration with the AUC and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).¹⁸⁰ These operations succeeded in fragmenting and 'decapitating' the FARC, executing two dozen FARC commanders.¹⁸¹ For the first time, US intervention hindered FARC participation in the conflict. The most notable were the assassinations of Negro Acacio in September 2007¹⁸², and member of the FARC central high command Raúl Reyes in March 2008.¹⁸³ The FARC were dealt several blows in 2008, losing a further two members of its central high command in March. Iván Ríos, commander of the Central Bloc and negotiator in previous peace talks with the Colombian government, was killed by his secretary 'Rojas'.¹⁸⁴ After learning that Ríos planned to dispose of Rojas, Rojas acted first and killed Ríos in his

¹⁷⁷ Bargent and McDermott, '50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution', <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017).

¹⁷⁸ Simons, *Colombia: A Brutal History*, p. 304.

¹⁷⁹ Shifter, 'Plan Colombia; A Retrospective', <http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3787>, (accessed 16 May 2017).

¹⁸⁰ Bargent and McDermott, '50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution', <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017); and D. Priest, 'Covert Action in Colombia', *The Washington Post*, 21 December 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2013/12/21/covert-action-in-colombia/?utm_term=.f8cf6a268e28, (accessed 16 May 2017).

¹⁸¹ Bargent and McDermott, '50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution', <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017).

¹⁸² Priest, 'Covert Action in Colombia', http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2013/12/21/covert-action-in-colombia/?utm_term=.f8cf6a268e28, (accessed 16 May 2017).

¹⁸³ Bargent and McDermott, '50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution', <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017).

¹⁸⁴ 'Las confesiones de 'Rojas', el guerrillero que asesinó a 'Iván Ríos' *El Tiempo*, 1 July 2015, <http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-16028597>, (accessed 16 May 2017).

sleep.¹⁸⁵ Rojas then delivered the severed right hand and a computer belonging to Ríos to the Colombian army, hoping to recover a reward of US\$5 million under the Narcotics Rewards Program.¹⁸⁶ Later the same month, it was announced that the commander in chief of the FARC, Manuel Marulanda had died from natural causes. Later in 2008, in a joint effort from France and the US, former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt was rescued after spending six years in FARC captivity.

In the following years, US intervention continued to assist the targeted assassinations of FARC commanders. In 2010, Mono Jojoy, commander of the Eastern Bloc and second in command to the commander in chief, was killed during an airstrike.¹⁸⁷ The military located Jojoy through a microchip supplied by the US that was inserted into a new pair of boots before they were delivered to him.¹⁸⁸ In 2011, the second commander in chief and successor of Marulanda met his demise: Alfonso Cano was killed in an airstrike.¹⁸⁹ According to Pinzón, the “FARC lost 54 of its most important leaders,” including two chief commanders.¹⁹⁰ The loss of FARC commanders was accompanied by high rates of desertion; the FARC numbers were reduced to between 6,000-8,000 after demobilisations in 2001 and 2002.¹⁹¹ While Plan Colombia did not depose of the drug trade, it did upset the stable growth the FARC enjoyed for over 40 years, and showed signs of bringing the conflict to an end through military victories.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Bargent and McDermott, ‘50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution’, <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017).

¹⁸⁸ J. L. Anderson, ‘Colombia’s Guerrillas Come Out of the Jungle’, *The New Yorker*, 1 May 2017, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/01/colombias-guerrillas-come-out-of-the-jungle>, (accessed 16 May 2017).

¹⁸⁹ Bargent and McDermott, ‘50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution’, <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017).

¹⁹⁰ J. C. Pinzón ‘Colombia Back from the Brink: From Failed State to Exporter of Security’, *Prism*, vol. 5, no. 4, 2015, p. 7.

¹⁹¹ Bargent and McDermott, ‘50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution’, <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017); and Lee, ‘The FARC and the Colombian Left: Time for a Political Solution?’, p. 38.

Negotiated Settlements with the FARC: A History of Failed Peace Processes

The Colombian government first attempted a peace process with the FARC almost 20 years after the conflict commenced. The decision to engage the FARC in a negotiated settlement coincided with their change of strategy from self-defence to offence in 1982. In 1984, the first peace agreement was settled between the FARC and the Betancur administration, and was known as the Uribe Accords.¹⁹² The terms of the agreement included a ceasefire and granted amnesty to the FARC.¹⁹³ They were also granted political power and established a political party called the UP.¹⁹⁴ The UP was organised by Alfonso Cano and Jacobo Arenas with support from the PCC, the original organisers of the FARC.¹⁹⁵ Cano and Arenas however refused to demobilise as they did not trust the government; thus the internal military structure of the FARC remained intact.¹⁹⁶ In the 1986 elections, the UP won 14 seats in congress and 351 seats in local councils, gaining political legitimacy and posing a challenge to Conservatives and upper classes.¹⁹⁷ Due to this perceived threat and the failure of the government to provide security for the FARC, 4,000 members of the UP were killed by the paramilitary.¹⁹⁸ Among the dead were two presidential candidates, eight congressmen, 13 state deputies, 70 councillors and 11 mayors.¹⁹⁹ The mistrust felt by Cano and Arenas was justified and the FARC became sceptical of the efficacy of their political struggle, turning once more to focus on building military strength.²⁰⁰

¹⁹² Leech, *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency*, p. 26.

¹⁹³ Ibid, p. 26.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 27.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 26.

¹⁹⁷ Bargent and JMcDermott, '50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution', <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017).

¹⁹⁸ Metelits, 'From Jekyll to Hyde: The Transformation of the FARC', in *Inside Insurgency*, p. 99.

¹⁹⁹ Bargent and McDermott, '50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution', <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017).

²⁰⁰ Ibid; and C. González Posso, 'Negotiations with the FARC: 1982-2002', *Accord*, vol. 14, 2004, p. 46-48.

From 1991 to 1992, President César Gaviria engaged in peace talks with the *Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar* (Simón Bolívar Guerrilla Coordination Body, CGSB) in Caracas, Venezuela and Tlaxcala, Mexico. The CGSB was a cooperative of the FARC and two other *guerrilla* groups, the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (National Liberation Army, ELN) and *Ejército Popular de Liberación* (Popular Liberation Army, EPL).²⁰¹ The talks ultimately broke down after an assassination attempt was made on Senator Aurelio Iragorri Hormaza, and Liberal minister Argelino Durán Quintero was kidnapped and later died in captivity.²⁰² As the talks began to deteriorate, the FARC assassinated their own representative, Daniel García.²⁰³ Attempts to resuscitate the talks failed and Gaviria declared *guerra integral* (integrated war) against the *guerrilla*.²⁰⁴

President Andrés Pastrana engaged the FARC in another peace process in 1999. Pastrana agreed to meet the preconditions of the FARC to engage in peace talks after their public display of might in late 1998, when they held the town of Mitu hostage for three days.²⁰⁵ The FARC were granted dominion over a demilitarised zone as an experiment of what peace would be like in this *laboratorio de paz* (laboratory of peace). Dubbed ‘Farclandia’, the zone was 42,000km² and had a population of 80,000 and was the location of the peace talks.²⁰⁶ The agenda for peace talks was quite sophisticated and covered issues such as human rights, agrarian policy, natural resources, a revision of economic and social development policies, reforms for the justice system and the state and the redefinition of armed forces for their peace-time role.²⁰⁷ Trust developed between the government and the

²⁰¹ Ibid, p. 48.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ González Posso, ‘Negotiations with the FARC: 1982-2002’, p. 48; and ‘Las FARC asesinaron a Daniel García: Policía’ *El Tiempo*, 27 February 1992, <http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-47196>, (accessed 16 May 2017).

²⁰⁴ González Posso, ‘Negotiations with the FARC: 1982-2002’, p. 48.

²⁰⁵ Bargent and McDermott, ‘50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution’, <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017).

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ González Posso, ‘Negotiations with the FARC: 1982-2002’, p. 48-49.

FARC and a ceasefire was declared for Christmas 1999.²⁰⁸ An agreement to continue the peace process was signed in 2001 and is known as the *Acuerdo de Los Pozos* (Los Pozos Accord).²⁰⁹

Tensions arose and support for the peace talks from large business and traditional power holders waned due to a lack of a ceasefire between the FARC and the government.²¹⁰ In 2000 Pastrana discontinued the peace talks after a string of assassinations. It began with the public execution of Elvira Cortes by a necklace bomb. Cortes was a peasant who refused to pay extortion money to the FARC.²¹¹ The same year, Liberal politician Diego Turbay was killed by the FARC with six others while travelling to the town of Puerto Rico.²¹² In 2001 former minister Consuelo Araujo Noguera was killed. The deal-breaker however was the kidnap of Senator Jorge Gechem Turbay after his plane was hijacked by the FARC in early 2002.²¹³ The FARC had also used their control of the demilitarised zone to build strength and revenue; planting coca crops and detaining hostages.²¹⁴ In February 2002, Pastrana finally gave the order for the military to enter Farclandia. The FARC however exited the peace talks with a military force of 20,000,²¹⁵ indicating that they were still strong enough militarily to pose a threat to the Colombian State, a condition incompatible with a negotiated settlement to war.²¹⁶

²⁰⁸ Ibid, p. 49.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ T. Johnson, 'Woman's bomb death stirs rage in Colombia', *The Miami Herald*, 17 May 2000, <http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/farc/elvia.htm>, (accessed 16 May 2017).

²¹² González Posso, 'Negotiations with the FARC: 1982-2002', p. 50.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Bargent and McDermott, '50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution', <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017).

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Holmes and Gutiérrez de Piñares, 'Violence and the State: Lessons from Colombia', p. 623.

Conclusion

The current peace process between the FARC and President Juan Manuel Santos began in 2012, after the current commander in chief, Timochenko, announced that the FARC would no longer seek revenue through kidnapping.²¹⁷ Prior to engaging in peace talks, President Santos displayed a change in attitude towards the FARC as counter-insurgency strategies under *Espada de Honor* (Sword of Honour) aimed to weaken the FARC by targeting its wealthiest and well-armed fronts rather than its leaders.²¹⁸ The negotiation phase of the current peace process came to a close with the signing of the final agreement and has progressed to the implementation phase. Nonetheless, the terms of the final agreement must contend with a history of civil war, political violence and persecution based on political ideology; ultimately a history of continuous political, social and economic exclusion. It must also show that there are mechanisms towards making peace sustainable through political, social and economic inclusion.

The challenge that the final agreement faces is the history of political, social and economic exclusion carried out through violent means. This history dates back to the Thousand Days' War, where both sides of the political spectrum – Liberals and Conservatives – fought for self-preservation and inclusion by violently excluding the other. This pattern repeated itself in such events as the Banana Massacre, and throughout the period of *La Violencia*. Acts of exclusion were not limited to massacres and killings but were also articulated through conflict over land and land ownership. Aside from the fight against the political exclusion of Communism under the *Frente Nacional*, the FARC also have their

²¹⁷ Bargent and McDermott, '50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution', <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017).

²¹⁸ G. Ramsey, 'Is Colombia's New Military Strategy a Herald of Peace?', *InSight Crime: Investigation and Analysis of Organised Crime*, 27 March 2012, <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/is-colombias-new-military-strategy-a-herald-of-peace>, (accessed 16 May 2017).

origins in conflicts over land. After all, *Operación Marquetalia* was an effort to destroy the community by purging the land of them; excluding them socially and economically as well as politically. The actions of the FARC to expand through extortion and organised crime were as much their fight for inclusion as the paramilitary action and US-backed military operations fought to exclude them. The next chapter will summarise main points of the final agreement and how it proposes reforms in favour of political, social and economic inclusion.

2. Synopsis of the *Acuerdo final para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera*

Introduction

The *Acuerdo final para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera* (Final Agreement for the Conclusion of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace; ‘the final agreement’) was signed on 24 November 2016 after the original peace agreement was rejected in a referendum on 2 October 2016. It represents four years of negotiations between the Colombian Government and the FARC-EP and the agreements that they settled to end the civil war; or rather the role that each party has played in the war. This chapter will outline the final agreement, focusing on the mechanisms for political, social and economic inclusion. The final agreement starts with a preamble, outlining the issues and considerations taken into account during the negotiations.²¹⁹ The introduction then outlines the topics it dealt with and their proposed solutions. These topics include rural reform, political participation, the end of the conflict, drug trafficking and consumption, the rights of victims, and lastly how the final agreement is to be implemented.²²⁰ The main body of the peace agreement is divided into these issues. Although they constitute separate agreements in their own right, they are fundamental areas to address in the broader context of resolving the conflict making peace sustainable through political, social and economic inclusion.

In a similar manner, the main body of this chapter will describe each point discussed in the final agreement. The first point is *Reforma Rural Integral* (Integral Rural Reform),

²¹⁹ Alto Comisionado para la Paz, ‘Acuerdo Final para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera’, *Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz*, 24 November 2016, <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y-conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf>, (accessed 23 April 2017), p. 1-5.

²²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 6-9.

which deals with land ownership and cultivation as an essential part of the political, social and economic spheres in Colombia.²²¹ The second point, *Participación Política* (Political Participation), focuses on political inclusion through access to politics, increased political and electoral participation and new avenues for diverse political ideologies, whilst guaranteeing security for those who hold different political views.²²² The third point is *Fin del Conflicto* (Ending the Conflict), which focuses on social and economic inclusion of the armed members of the FARC through the process of DDR.²²³ The fourth point discusses the *Solución al Problema de las Drogas Ilícitas* (Solution to the Problem of Illicit Drugs) which outlines plans to combat the cultivation of crops used by the drug trade, trafficking of drugs, organised crime, and the consumption of drugs with a focus on social and economic inclusion.²²⁴ The fifth point is the *Acuerdo sobre las Víctimas del Conflicto* (Agreement Concerning the Victims of the Conflict), which details the proposed mechanisms to recognise victims, and satisfy their rights to truth, justice, reparation and reconciliation and to prevent the repetition of violence and promote coexistence.²²⁵ This is an important part of sustaining peace through inclusion. The final point, *Implementación y Verificación* (Implementation and Verification) outlines how the agreements will be implemented.²²⁶ The agreement concludes with a series of annexures, which specify the logistics and security guarantees for the demobilisation of the FARC and the administration of justice and amnesty laws.²²⁷

²²¹ Ibid, p. 10-34.

²²² Ibid, p. 35-56.

²²³ Ibid, p. 57-97.

²²⁴ Ibid, p. 98-123.

²²⁵ Ibid, p. 124-192.

²²⁶ Ibid, p. 193-218.

²²⁷ Ibid, p. 219-309.

Point 1: Integral Rural Reform

The agreement on rural reform deals with the issue of land and its connection to the conflict.²²⁸ The issue of land ownership and cultivation is an important driver of the conflict, as it determines social and economic wellbeing and political visibility of individuals in rural areas in Colombia.²²⁹ For this reason, the final agreement proposes to transform the countryside; changing the conditions that have caused violence to endure in rural areas.²³⁰ This includes improving the quality of life and wellbeing of peasants and rural populations and bridging the gap between the rural and urban populations.²³¹ The two main issues addressed in the proposal are land ownership, poverty and rural quality of life, which are recognised as root causes of the conflict.²³²

The final agreement proposes to increase use of and access to land for the purposes of ownership and cultivation by establishing a *Fondo de Tierras* (Land Fund), to be instituted by the Government.²³³ The land available in the *Fondo* consists of 3 million hectares of lands that have not been exploited or were recovered by, abandoned, ceded and donated to the Government.²³⁴ The lands will be distributed for free in the first twelve years of the creation of the *Fondo*.²³⁵ The Government will also offer subsidies and special credits to agricultural workers, so they can afford to buy land if they are without it or if they have insufficient land

²²⁸ J. Orlando Melo, 'Resumen del Acuerdo de Paz', *Revista de Economía Institucional*, vol. 18, no. 35, 2016, p. 324.

²²⁹ J. Faguet, F. Sánchez and M. Villaveces-Niño, *The Paradox of Land Reform, Inequality and Development in Colombia*, London, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2017, p. 13-14.

²³⁰ Acuerdo Final, p. 10.

²³¹ Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, *Acuerdo Política de desarrollo agrario integral* [website], <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/politica-de-desarrollo-agrario-integral.html>, (accessed 27 June 2017).

²³² Acuerdo Final, p. 10-11.

²³³ Ibid, 1.1.1., p. 14.

²³⁴ Ibid; see also Y. P. Franco, et al., 'Acuerdos entre las FARC-EP y el Gobierno de Colombia: Política de Desarrollo Agrario Integral-Reforma Rural Integral (RRI)', *Revista Kavilando*, vol. 8, no. 2, 2016, p. 187.

²³⁵ Ibid.

for cultivation.²³⁶ In addition to the *Fondo*, the final agreement outlines plans to formalise the ownership of a separate 7 million hectares of land; particularly of smallholdings,²³⁷ so that ownership is standardised and regulated.²³⁸ It also ensures that landowners who acquired land legally are protected.²³⁹ This includes the formation of a *catastro rural* (rural cadastre); a public register of real estate, to be established and updated through a *Sistema General de Información Catastral* (General Scheme of Cadastral Information).²⁴⁰ The cadastre will promote use of the land according to its capacity, as set out by guidelines for the use of the land.²⁴¹ It also lays the foundation for a rural tax system,²⁴² to tax rural cultivation at a more progressive rate than current taxes.²⁴³ Disputes over land will be referred to the existing *Jurisdicción Agraria* (agricultural jurisdiction), as established under *Decreto 2303 de 1989* (Decree 2303, 1989).²⁴⁴

The agreement proposes plans for rural development called *Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial* (Development Programs with a Focus on the Land; PDET). The final agreement states that poverty can be overcome through the PDET, which aim to eradicate

²³⁶ Ibid, 1.1.2. & 1.1.3., p. 15.

²³⁷ Franco, et al., 'Acuerdos entre las FARC-EP y el Gobierno de Colombia: Política de Desarrollo Agrario Integral-Reforma Rural Integral (RRI)', p. 187.

²³⁸ Acuerdo Final, 1.1.5., p. 16; and *Acuerdo Política de desarrollo agrario integral* [website], <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/politica-de-desarrollo-agrario-integral.html>.

²³⁹ G. Burnyeat, 'Peace in Colombia?' *London Review of Books*, 1 December 2016, <https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2016/12/01/gwen-burnyeat/peace-in-colombia/>, (accessed 31 August 2017); and International Crisis Group, 'In the Shadow of "No": Peace after Colombia's Plebiscite', *Latin America Report*, no. 60, 31 January 2017, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/060-shadow-no-peace-after-colombia-s-plebiscite> (accessed 21 February 2017).

²⁴⁰ Acuerdo Final, 1.1.9., p. 18- 19; and *Acuerdo Política de desarrollo agrario integral* [website], <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/politica-de-desarrollo-agrario-integral.html>.

²⁴¹ Franco, et al., 'Acuerdos entre las FARC-EP y el Gobierno de Colombia: Política de Desarrollo Agrario Integral-Reforma Rural Integral (RRI)', p. 188.

²⁴² 'In the Shadow of "No": Peace after Colombia's Plebiscite', <https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/060-shadow-no-peace-after-colombia-s-plebiscite> (accessed 21 February 2017).

²⁴³ Orlando Melo, 'Resumen del Acuerdo de Paz', p. 325.

²⁴⁴ *Acuerdo Política de desarrollo agrario integral* [website], <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/politica-de-desarrollo-agrario-integral.html>.

extreme poverty and rural poverty by fifty percent over a period of fifteen years.²⁴⁵ PDET are the proposed mechanisms to implement a series of national plans and achieve structural transformation of the Colombian countryside, and ultimately political, social and economic inclusion of rural populations.²⁴⁶ As well as improving economic and social conditions, the series of national plans will also fortify State presence in the countryside.²⁴⁷ They will be achieved through schemes to reduce social inequality and poverty by increasing access to food, water, housing, electricity, education, healthcare, technical assistance and mobility by developing infrastructure and roads.²⁴⁸ The plans include strategies to support the rural economy by providing subsidies and stimulus packages to aid the generation of income, as well as guaranteeing adequate conditions for marketing of agricultural products.²⁴⁹ According to Orlando Melo, these plans reiterate the rhetoric of rural development programs for Colombia since 1958, and overall work towards creating new conditions to be able to apply the rule of law in the countryside once governed by the conflict.²⁵⁰ The focus of this point is to sustain peace through political, social and economic inclusion of the peasantry and poor rural populations.

Point 2: Political Participation

The agreement on political participation is designed to increase political inclusion through electoral and political participation and by promoting political pluralism.²⁵¹ Moreover, it acknowledges the impact of the conflict and particularly issues of security for those ideologically in opposition to the State, in weakening democracy in Colombia by including

²⁴⁵ Ibid; and Acuerdo Final, 1.3., p. 24.

²⁴⁶ Ibid; and Acuerdo Final, 1.2., p. 21.

²⁴⁷ A. M. Ibáñez, 'El proceso de paz con las Farc: ¿Una oportunidad para reducir la pobreza rural y aumentar la productividad agropecuaria?' *Revista de Ingeniería*, no. 44, 2016, p. 8.

²⁴⁸ Acuerdo Final, 1.3., p. 23-29; and *Acuerdo Política de desarrollo agrario integral* [website], <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/politica-de-desarrollo-agrario-integral.html>.

²⁴⁹ Ibid, 1.3.3., p. 30.

²⁵⁰ Orlando Melo, 'Resumen del Acuerdo de Paz', p. 326

²⁵¹ Acuerdo Final, p. 35-36.

some and violently excluding others.²⁵² Nonetheless it does not specifically mention the role of paramilitary groups and their historical links to the State. The main issues addressed in the agreement on political participation are access to information on politics, political and electoral participation and representation and the issue of security for those with opposing political perspectives. The ultimate goal is to break the link between politics and bearing arms.²⁵³

The agreement outlines the rights and guarantees for the exercise of political opposition, citing Article 112 of the *Constitución Política de Colombia de 1991* (Colombian Constitution, 1991) as its foundation. It states that there will be a commission to define guidelines for a statute of guarantees for those who declare themselves to be in opposition.²⁵⁴ The *Marcha Patriótica* (Patriotic March), *Congreso de los Pueblos* (People's Congress), and two experts appointed by the FARC-EP, as those 'in opposition' will attend the commission.²⁵⁵ Based on the guidelines defined by the commission, the Government will develop a bill to present to Congress.²⁵⁶

The agreement proposes plans to guarantee security for groups who oppose the status quo, and for political parties that will emerge in future, particularly those linked to the FARC. Security guarantees will be provided specifically for leaders of social movements and human rights defenders.²⁵⁷ In addition to guaranteeing security, the agreement aims to create a "culture of coexistence"²⁵⁸ through the *Sistema Integral de Seguridad para el Ejercicio de la*

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Ibid; see also J. Acosta, '¡Es el tiempo de tomarse en serio la política sin armas!', *El Espectador*, 11 May 2017, <http://colombia2020.elespectador.com/opinion/es-el-tiempo-de-tomarse-en-serio-la-politica-sin-armas>, (accessed 23 August 2017).

²⁵⁴ Ibid, 2.1.1.1., p. 37.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 38.

²⁵⁷ Ibid, 2.1.2.2., p. 41-42.

²⁵⁸ Ibid, 2.1.2., p. 38.

Política (Integral Security System for the Exercise of Politics).²⁵⁹ The *Sistema Integral* will revise current regulatory frameworks regarding security and political participation, and improve monitoring and protection for those vulnerable to political violence. It proposes to prevent political violence through the *Sistema de Alertas Tempranas* (Early Warning System) and increase penalties for crimes against those who are in opposition.²⁶⁰

The agreement describes mechanisms to increase civilian participation and social movements in politics.²⁶¹ This includes guarantees for the right to non-violent protest, which aims to destigmatise certain groups and respect their entitlement to make demands of the government.²⁶² The agreement plans to increase access to politics and the visibility of social and political movements through different media channels.²⁶³ Media platforms will be made available to social and political movements for dispersing information.²⁶⁴ As a part of these plans, the *Consejo Nacional para la Reconciliación y la Convivencia* (National Council for Reconciliation and Coexistence) will be formed to ensure that all of these goals for peace are achieved.²⁶⁵

Other plans to increase political and electoral participation and create equal opportunities for all people to participate politically include increased access to resources by providing funding for political movements and representation in Congress.²⁶⁶ These plans aim to promote transparency in electoral processes and reform government administration and electoral organisation. The *Consejo Nacional Electoral* (National Electoral Council) is

²⁵⁹ Ibid; and Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, *Acuerdo Participación Política* [website], <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/participacion-politica.html>, (accessed 27 June 2017).

²⁶⁰ Acuerdo Final, 2.1.2.1., p. 39.

²⁶¹ Ibid, p. 43.

²⁶² Ibid, p. 2.2.4., p. 46-47; and *Acuerdo Participación Política* [website], <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/participacion-politica.html>, (accessed 27 June 2017).

²⁶³ Ibid, 2.3.1.2., p. 51.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 47.

²⁶⁶ Ibid, 2.3.1.2., p. 51.

the proposed body to enforce the plans by creating a *misión electoral especial* (special electoral assignment).²⁶⁷ The *misión* will be composed of a representative from the *Misión de Observación Electoral* (Electoral Observation Mission), and six experts from the Carter Center, The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) and The Department of Political Science from both the *Universidad Nacional de Colombia* (National University of Colombia) and the *Universidad de los Andes* (University of the Andes).²⁶⁸ The *misión* will work towards defining guidelines, based on national and international standards, for good practice in the electoral system. They will then be presented to the Government after four months. The Government will then make the administrative and institutional changes that are necessary.²⁶⁹ Ultimately, these proposed mechanisms aim to make peace sustainable through fostering political inclusion of all citizens.

Point 3: Ending the Conflict

The agreement on ending the conflict consists of the guidelines and course of action that will take place once the agreement is signed. This includes the terms of the *Cese al Fuego y de Hostilidades Bilateral y Definitivo* (Ceasefire and Definitive Bilateral Cessation of Hostilities; CFHBD) and *Dejación de Armas* (Abandonment of Arms; DA). Other terms settled in this agreement include the reincorporation of the FARC-EP into civilian life and politics, the obligations of former FARC combatants, and guarantees of security for former combatants. The focus is making peace sustainable through the political, social and economic inclusion specific to FARC combatants. CFHBD and DA are discussed together and

²⁶⁷ Ibid, 2.3.4., p. 53.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

considered necessary for creating conditions favourable to implementing the final agreement and sustaining peace.²⁷⁰

CFHBD is described as the conclusion of offensive actions between the *Fuerza Pública* (Public Force) and the FARC-EP,²⁷¹ where the FARC-EP will discontinue hostilities against civilians and the State.²⁷² DA is the procedure carried out by the United Nations (UN) to receive artillery from FARC-EP combatant. In due course the weapons received will be used to construct monuments in New York, Havana and Bogotá.²⁷³ To complement the implementation process, a *Mecanismo de Monitoreo y Verificación* (Mechanism of Monitoring and Verification; MM&V) will be established. The MM&V will guarantee security, monitor the CFHBD and DA, and identify factors that may endanger their completion on the national, regional and local levels.²⁷⁴ It is composed of the *Fuerza Pública*, the FARC-EP and a *Componente Internacional* (International Component; CI-MM&V).²⁷⁵ The *Componente Internacional* consists of unarmed supervisors from the UN and from countries associated with the *Comunidad de Estados Latinamericanos y Caribeños* (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States; CELAC).²⁷⁶

To accomplish CFHBD and DA, FARC-EP members will move into demilitarised zones called *Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización* (Local Transitional Zones for Normalisation; ZVTN). Twenty ZVTN will be prepared, accompanied by seven *Puntos*

²⁷⁰ Ibid, 3.1.1.2., p. 58.

²⁷¹ Ibid, 3.1.1.1., p. 58.

²⁷² Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, *Acuerdo Fin del Conflicto*, <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/fin-del-conflicto.html>, (accessed 27 June 2017).

²⁷³ Acuerdo Final, 3.1.1.1., p. 58; and *Acuerdo Fin del Conflicto*, <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/fin-del-conflicto.html>, (accessed 27 June 2017).

²⁷⁴ Ibid, 3.1.3., p. 60.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 61.

Transitorios de Normalización (Transitional Normalisation Points, PTN).²⁷⁷ The MM&V will secure each ZVTN, and establish *Equipos de Monitoreo Local* (Local Monitoring Groups).²⁷⁸ A perimeter of one kilometre around each ZVTN will serve as a *Zona de Seguridad* (Security Zone).²⁷⁹ Once the former FARC-EP combatants reach the zone, they will undergo a process of identification and follow a schedule of arms abandonment, to be completed within 180 days.²⁸⁰ Medical attention and treatment will also be available to them.²⁸¹ Certain members of the FARC-EP will be exempt from staying in the ZVTN to perform tasks related to the fulfilment of the final agreement.²⁸² Sixty FARC members will be responsible for tasks at the national level and ten FARC members per ZVTN at the municipal and departmental level.²⁸³

The DA will take place within the ZVTN and involves registering and identifying the arms and in whose possession they were, followed by the relocation, storage and disposal of the arms.²⁸⁴ Each ZVTN will be attended by members of the CI-MM&V, who will complete the DA process and retain weaponry. The schedule for DA is the most detailed in the whole document. From Day 1 after the final agreement is signed, members of the FARC-EP will move into the ZVTN with their individual arms.²⁸⁵ From Day 7 to Day 30 the FARC-EP armament, including weaponry; grenades and munition, will be transported to the ZVTN.²⁸⁶ Registration, identification and storage will then take place. Between Day 10 and Day 60, arms containing hazardous materials will be destroyed.²⁸⁷ Individual arms belonging to combatants of the FARC-EP will be collected in three phases. The first phase will transpire

²⁷⁷ Ibid, 3.1.4., p. 61.

²⁷⁸ Ibid, 3.1.4.1., p. 62.

²⁷⁹ Ibid, 3.1.4.2., p. 64.

²⁸⁰ *Acuerdo Fin del Conflicto*, <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/fin-del-conflicto.html>, (accessed 27 June 2017).

²⁸¹ Ibid, p. 63.

²⁸² Ibid, 3.1.4.1., p. 62.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Ibid, 3.1.7., p. 66.

²⁸⁵ Ibid, 3.1.7.1., p. 67.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 68.

from Day 90, where 30% of arms will be collected and stored, the second phase at Day 120, where another 30% will be collected and stored and the third phase at Day 150 where the remaining 40% will be collected and stored.²⁸⁸ Between Days 150 and 180, all artillery will be taken away by the UN. Day 180 will mark the end of residence in the ZVTN.²⁸⁹

After leaving the ZVTN, former FARC-EP combatants will be reincorporated into civilian life; politically, socially and economically. To promote political participation and achieve political incorporation, the FARC-EP are granted concessions to create a new political movement or political party.²⁹⁰ The new party must fulfil relevant criteria to achieve legal status and conform to the Constitution and the law, as is expected of all other political parties.²⁹¹ However from their date of registration until 19 July 2026, they are exempt from registering a certain number of members, presenting at electoral competitions and obtaining a voting threshold.²⁹² Until 2026 they will receive funding and have access to resources just as any other political party.²⁹³ They are allowed to participate in forthcoming presidential and senatorial elections, provided their candidates satisfy legal requirements.²⁹⁴ They are guaranteed access to the media and security.²⁹⁵ From 18 July 2018 onwards, the FARC are guaranteed five seats in the Senate and five seats in the House of Representatives.²⁹⁶ Three spokespeople from each chamber will be appointed by the FARC-EP to participate in legal and constitutional reforms and appoint another delegate to the *Consejo Nacional Electoral*.²⁹⁷

The organisation *Economías Sociales del Común* (Communal Social Economy; ECOMÚN) will facilitate the social and economic reincorporation of the FARC-EP through

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Acuerdo Final, 3.2.1.1., p.69.

²⁹¹ Ibid, p. 70.

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ Ibid; and Orlando Melo, 'Resumen del Acuerdo de Paz', p. 321.

²⁹⁴ Ibid; and Orlando Melo, 'Resumen del Acuerdo de Paz', p. 321

²⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 71; and Orlando Melo, 'Resumen del Acuerdo de Paz', p. 321.

²⁹⁶ Acuerdo Final, 3.2.1.2., p. 71.

²⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 71-72.

education and training courses to help former combatants to establish businesses.²⁹⁸ The *Consejo Nacional de la Reincorporación* (National Council for Reincorporation; CNR) will carry out the process of reincorporation. The CNR will compile a socioeconomic census of the members of the FARC-EP while they reside in the ZVTN and use this information to address the needs of each individual.²⁹⁹ The agreement also offers former FARC-EP combatants economic support. Former combatants are entitled to a once-off payment of COP\$8 million, to be spent on an individual or collective project³⁰⁰, and upon leaving the ZVTN, will receive COP\$2 million.³⁰¹ For a two year period thereafter, former combatants are entitled to a monthly pension equivalent to 90% of the minimum wage in Colombia if they are to find themselves unemployed.³⁰² The CNR will also provide educational programs for human and professional development.³⁰³ On the other hand, former combatants have a responsibility to participate in the reintegration process and ensure its success so that peace is sustained.³⁰⁴

Lastly, the agreement proposes plans to guarantee security and finally references the issue of paramilitarism. In addition to the *Sistema Integral de Seguridad*, the agreement proposes to establish the *Comisión Nacional de Garantías de Seguridad* (National Commission of Security Guarantees).³⁰⁵ The *Comisión Nacional de Garantías de Seguridad* will combat and dismantle paramilitary groups and their successor groups, support networks, and political corruption. It will be composed of government officials and human rights

²⁹⁸ 'Así funcionarán los negocios lícitos de las Farc' *Semana*, 30 June 2017, <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/ecomun-cooperativa-de-las-farc-en-la-vida-legal-su-nueva-economia/530424>, (accessed 13 September 2017).

²⁹⁹ Acuerdo Final, 3.2.2.6., p. 74-75.

³⁰⁰ COP\$8,000,000 is worth approximately USD\$2,735. Ibid., p. 75.

³⁰¹ COP\$2,000,000 is worth approximately USD\$685. Ibid., 3.2.2.7., p. 76

³⁰² Ibid, p. 75.

³⁰³ Ibid, p. 76.

³⁰⁴ Ibid, 3.3., p. 77.

³⁰⁵ Ibid, 3.4.3., p. 80.

workers that will meet on a monthly basis.³⁰⁶ Additionally, the *Unidad Especial de Investigación* (Special Investigation Unit) will be formed as part of the *Comisión Nacional de Garantías de Seguridad*.³⁰⁷ The *Unidad* will be accompanied by additional security personnel to implement a *Plan Estratégico de Seguridad y Protección* (Strategic Plan of Security and Protection), through the creation of the *Cuerpo Élite* (Elite Body) division of the National Police³⁰⁸ and the *Mesa Técnica de Seguridad y Protección* (Technical Group of Security and Protection).³⁰⁹ These mechanisms provide security and protection, through monitoring, rapid response and early warning procedures to prevent security breaches, which could cause violence and a possible return to war.³¹⁰ Security guarantees are also vital to ensure that peace is sustained by combating political, social and economic exclusion caused by violence.

Point 4: The Solution to the Problem of Illicit Drugs

The final agreement addresses the issue of drugs and acknowledges the drug trade as a source of funding for the FARC and its impact on prolonging the conflict.³¹¹ This section however addresses the broader drug problem in Colombia and focuses on three main issues. These include the supply of drugs through the cultivation of crops used in drug production, the demand for drugs by addicts and users as a public health issue, and the role of organised crime in the traffic of drugs. This point reinforces the primacy of the legal economy, and proposes plans to achieve peace through social and economic inclusion of persons on the supply and demand sides of the drug trade.

³⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 81.

³⁰⁷ Ibid, 3.4.4., p. 82.

³⁰⁸ Ibid, 3.4.5., p. 86.

³⁰⁹ Ibid, 3.4.7.4.2., p. 89.

³¹⁰ Ibid, p. 94.

³¹¹ Ibid, p. 98.

On the issue of cultivation of crops used in drug production, the agreement proposes crop substitution programs to be included in plans for rural reform as set out in the PDET.³¹² The *Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución y Desarrollo Alternativo* (National Substitution Program and Alternate Development; PNIS), will allow peasants who grow coca to be incorporated into the legal economy through the production of legal crops.³¹³ Essential to the PNIS is participation from communities affected by coca cultivation. This includes agreements between the Government and coca-growing communities as well as the voluntary decision of coca farmers to substitute their crops.³¹⁴ Communities have one year to come to a consensus and notify the Government of their decision to abandon coca cultivation.³¹⁵ Crop substitution will be undertaken by farmers through manual eradication.³¹⁶ In the case where individual farmers have not articulated their decision to substitute their crops, despite an agreement between the Government and the community to do so, the Government will proceed to remove the illicit crops.³¹⁷ Similarly, if a community and the Government have not settled an agreement to substitute crops, the Government will proceed to extract the illicit crops nonetheless.³¹⁸ The PNIS is accompanied by *Planes Integrales Comunitarios y Municipales de Sustitución y Desarrollo Alternativo* (Communal and Municipal Substitution Program and Alternate Development, PISDA).³¹⁹ The PISDA includes a *Plan de Atención Inmediata* (Plan for Immediate Attention), a guarantee of economic and food security for former coca farmers while the transition from illicit to legal crops.³²⁰

³¹² Ibid, 4.1.1., p. 102.

³¹³ Ibid, 4.1., p. 102.

³¹⁴ Ibid, p. 103.

³¹⁵ Ibid, 4.1.3.4., p. 108.

³¹⁶ Ibid, 4.1.3.2., p. 107.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ Ibid, 4.1.3.5., p. 109.

³²⁰ Ibid, p. 112.

The agreement proposes programs to prevent drug consumption with a focus on public health through the *Programa Nacional de Intervención Integral Frente al Consumo de Drogas Ilícitas* (National Program of Integral Intervention to Confront the Consumption of Illicit Drugs).³²¹ This proposed program will revise and adapt policies addressing drug consumption, and promote public health, focusing its attention on consumers and their potential treatment or rehabilitation needs.³²² To achieve this objective, the Government will establish a *Sistema Nacional de Atención a las Personas Consumidoras de Drogas Ilícitas* (National System of Attention to Consumers of Illicit Drugs).³²³ This system will be designed to respond to the needs and conditions of communities, engage the youth, and prioritise vulnerable populations.³²⁴

Lastly, the issue of drug trafficking and production is addressed through Government objectives to combat organised crime and structures that preserve the problem of drug production.³²⁵ The agreement states that organised crime of all kinds will be addressed, including money laundering, political corruption and paramilitarism. To combat organised crime, the agreement proposes to intensify the fight against organised crime through deeper investigations and convictions of groups associated with organised crime and the production of drugs.³²⁶ This includes confiscating lands and tougher regulations for supplies of chemicals used in the production of drugs.³²⁷

Point 5: The Agreement Concerning the Victims of the Conflict

The agreement on treatment of the victims of the conflict is by far the most detailed and complex point in the final agreement. It proposes a sustainable peace through a project of

³²¹ Ibid, 4.2., p. 116.

³²² Ibid, 4.2.1.2., p. 117.

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Ibid, 4.2.1.4., p. 118.

³²⁵ Ibid, 4.3., p 120.

³²⁶ Ibid, 4.3.1., p. 120.

³²⁷ Ibid, 4.3.2., 4.3.3, p. 121-122.

social inclusion based on the administration of justice and recognition for 8 million victims of the war.³²⁸ It seeks to satisfy the rights of the victims to truth, justice, reparation and reconciliation, as well as security guarantees to prevent repeat victimisation.³²⁹ The agreement will establish a *Sistema Integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y No Repetición* (Integrated System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition; SIVJNR).³³⁰ The SIVJNR was informed by victim testimonies provided to the Government and the FARC-EP during the course of the peace negotiations.³³¹ It is composed of the several mechanisms, including the *Comisión para el Esclarecimiento de la Verdad, la Convivencia y la No Repetición* (Commission for the Clarification of the Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition, CEVCNR), the *Unidad Especial para la Búsqueda de Personas Dadas por Desaparecidas* (Special Unit for the Search of Disappeared Persons; UBPD), and the *Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz* (Special Jurisdiction for Peace; JEP).³³² The SIVJNR will include plans for reparations and peacebuilding, and guarantees for non-repetition.³³³

The CEVCNR aims satisfy the rights of victims to know the truth about what has occurred. It will also contribute to constructing and preserving historical memory,³³⁴ clarify events that took place, acknowledge victims and recognise the responsibility of the

³²⁸ C. F. Torres, 'In Colombia, The Forest Of Peace Honors 8 Million Lives Lost In Civil War', *Huffington Post*, 25 August 2017, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carlos-f-torres/in-colombia-the-forest-of b 11655470.html>, (accessed 14 September 2017).

³²⁹ Acuerdo Final, p. 124- 125.

³³⁰ Ibid, 5.1., p. 127.

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Ibid, p. 129.

³³³ Ibid. It should also be noted that "guarantees for non-repetition" is a term taken directly from the 'Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Laws and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law – General Assembly resolution 60/147. See United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 'Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Laws and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law', 16 December 2005, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RemedyAndReparation.aspx>, (accessed 4 October 2017).

³³⁴ Ibid, 5.1.1., p. 130.

perpetrators.³³⁵ In particular, it concedes that all actors in the conflict are subject to blame, thus the State, the Government, political powers, the FARC-EP, paramilitaries and any other group or organisation that has contributed to the conflict has a responsibility to victims.³³⁶ It also aims to foster peace through social inclusion by promoting coexistence among all groups in society.³³⁷ It is not a mechanism to administer justice, but is independent of the judicial system and will treat all individuals who participate in it with impartiality.³³⁸ The CEVCNR will be composed of eleven commissioners.³³⁹ It will operate for three years, after which the CEVCNR will prepare a written report within six months.³⁴⁰

The UBDP aims to satisfy the rights of victims to know the truth about what happened to their relatives who have disappeared as a result of the conflict, and their right to recognition for the damage done to them.³⁴¹ It will collaborate with the families of disappeared persons to investigate their whereabouts and collect information.³⁴² It will proceed to search for, identify, locate and respectfully deliver the remains of disappeared persons to their families.³⁴³ Each family will be provided with an official report of all information regarding their disappeared relative.³⁴⁴ The UBDP will present this report to the CEVCNR and collaborate with the CEVCNR and other human rights group throughout each search process.³⁴⁵ Every six months the UBDP will produce and release a public report on this process and create a national register of common graves, illegal cemeteries and burial

³³⁵ Ibid, p. 131.

³³⁶ Ibid, 5.1.1.1.2., p. 134.

³³⁷ Ibid, 5.1.1., p. 130.

³³⁸ Ibid, and Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, *Acuerdo sobre las Víctimas del conflicto* [website], <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/victimas.html>, (accessed 27 June 2017).

³³⁹ Ibid, 5.1.1.1.5., p. 137.

³⁴⁰ Ibid, 5.1.1.1.6., p. 138.

³⁴¹ Ibid, 5.1.1.2., p.139.

³⁴² Ibid, p. 140.

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 141.

³⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 140.

grounds.³⁴⁶ A single director appointed to the UBPD will carry out their work informed by the recommendations of the *Comisión Nacional de Búsqueda de Personas Desaparecidas* (National Search Commission for Disappeared Persons), the Red Cross, and the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP).³⁴⁷

The JEP provides the legal and penal mechanism of the SIVJRNR, and is designed to combat impunity and satisfy victims' rights to justice, recognition and reparation.³⁴⁸ The agreement declares that the State is entitled to create special judicial systems under the UN letter regarding national sovereignty and self-determination, and the codes established under international human rights, international human rights law and international criminal law.³⁴⁹ It will be attended by a number of Colombian judges and magistrates.³⁵⁰ The JEP will be accompanied by a *Sala Incidental* (Incidental Court) composed of three magistrates from the *Consejo Superior de la Judicatura* (Superior Council of the Judiciary)³⁵¹ and three magistrates from the JEP courts, to resolve any judgement by the JEP that might conflict with another jurisdiction.³⁵² Cases presented to the JEP will be judged based on the evidence gathered by *La Unidad de Investigación y Acusación* (The Investigation and Prosecution Unit), however the final authority to decide on judgements is the *Tribunal para la Paz* (Peace Tribunal).³⁵³ Judgements can take two possible routes, depending on the nature of the crime

³⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 141.

³⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 142.

³⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 5.1.2., p. 143.

³⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 144.

³⁵⁰ Burnyeat, 'Peace in Colombia?' <https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2016/12/01/gwen-burnyeat/peace-in-colombia/>, (accessed 31 August 2017).

³⁵¹ The *Consejo Superior de la Judicatura* is the highest court of appeal in Colombia.

³⁵² Ibid, p. 145.

³⁵³ Ibid, p. 153.

and recognition for having committed the crime. Crimes are defined as either *no amnistiable* (not granted amnesty) or *amnistiable* (granted amnesty).³⁵⁴

Crimes that are not granted amnesty include crimes against humanity, genocide, hostage taking and deprivation of freedom, torture, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearance, forced displacement and sexual violence.³⁵⁵ When each case is brought before the JEP, there are two possible outcomes for the perpetrators, depending on acknowledgement of responsibility for their crimes. Those who recognise responsibility will be offered the best treatment; their punishment will include 5 to 8 years of *restricción efectiva de la libertad* (effective restriction of freedom).³⁵⁶ It is unclear what kind of detention this will be, however Orlando Melo suggests that punishment will consist of temporary restriction of movement, and the accused will be made and carry out acts of community service.³⁵⁷ These deeds of reparation will support the objectives of the peace process and include such tasks as removing land mines and crop substitution, and are outlined in the agreement under the *Listado de Sanciones* (list of sanctions).³⁵⁸ Alternatively, those who do not recognise their responsibility will be subject to investigation and the *Tribunal para la Paz* will decide whether a person is or is not responsible.³⁵⁹ If they are found to be responsible, they will be subject 15 to 20 years in prison.³⁶⁰ If they are found to be

³⁵⁴ *Acuerdo sobre las Víctimas del conflicto* [website], <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/victimas.html>, (accessed 27 June 2017).

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ Orlando Melo, 'Resumen del Acuerdo de Paz', p. 323.

³⁵⁸ Ibid; and Acuerdo Final, p. 171-175.

³⁵⁹ Acuerdo Final, number 54, p. 162.

³⁶⁰ Ibid, number 60, p. 166; and *Acuerdo sobre las Víctimas del conflicto* [website], <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/victimas.html>, (accessed 27 June 2017).

responsible and acknowledge their responsibility after sentencing, they will be held in mandatory custody for 5 to 8 years.³⁶¹

Crimes that are granted amnesty include the crime of rebellion, politically motivated crimes and crimes which were carried out in support of those crimes.³⁶² These crimes will be initially presented before *La Sala de Amnistias o Indultos* (court of amnesty or pardon) to determine if a crime is to be granted amnesty or pardoned.³⁶³ Jean-Baptiste finds that the amnesties offered under the JEP are consistent with Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions,³⁶⁴ which indicates that individuals who are granted amnesty do not pose a threat to the victims of the conflict or to the general population. Amnesties therefore are a necessary step towards social inclusion for former FARC combatants and victims alike.³⁶⁵ However the scope for granting amnesties for political crimes – and what will ensue after amnesty is granted – is unclear. If it is decided that a crime is not pardonable or not to be granted amnesty, it will be presented before *La Sala de definición de situación* (court for the definition of a situation) and will be treated with the appropriate legal and judicial action by the JEP.³⁶⁶

Lastly, the agreement proposes plans under the SVJNR to carry out reparations for victims, peacebuilding, and guarantees of non-repetition. These plans include acts of recognition of collective responsibility carried out by the Government, the FARC-EP and

³⁶¹ Ibid; and *Acuerdo sobre las Víctimas del conflicto* [website], <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/victimas.html>, (accessed 27 June 2017).

³⁶² *Acuerdo sobre las Víctimas del conflicto* [website], <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/victimas.html>, (accessed 27 June 2017).

³⁶³ Acuerdo Final, number 49, p. 157; and *Acuerdo sobre las Víctimas del conflicto* [website], <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/victimas.html>, (accessed 27 June 2017).

³⁶⁴ Jean-Baptiste, 'Cracking the Toughest Nut', p. 30.

³⁶⁵ Ibid, 62.

³⁶⁶ Ibid, number 50, p. 158-159; and *Acuerdo sobre las Víctimas del conflicto* [website], <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/victimas.html>, (accessed 27 June 2017).

other groups that have participated in the conflict.³⁶⁷ These acts also include the rehabilitation of victims,³⁶⁸ the return of displaced people to their lands,³⁶⁹ restitution of land to victims,³⁷⁰ and compensation for victims.³⁷¹ To guarantee non-repetition of violence, the agreement proposes to promote human rights,³⁷² strengthen mechanisms for the protection of human rights defenders.³⁷³

Point 6: Implementation and Verification

The last point of the final agreement outlines the process of authorisation and implementation once it is signed. This involves the participation of the State, the FARC and international third parties. The final agreement will undergo a process of implementation and verification through *Plan Marco para la Implementación de los Acuerdos* (Plan for the Framework of Implementation of the Agreements).³⁷⁴ The *Plan Marco* is valid for ten years and will be composed of a number of smaller plans to guarantee the implementation of the final agreement.³⁷⁵ *Plan Marco* will establish the *Comisión de Seguimiento, Impulso y Verificación a la Implemetación del Acuerdo Final* (Commission for Monitoring, Impetus and Verification for Implementation of the Final Agreement; CSIVI).³⁷⁶ The CSIVI will be composed of three delegates from the Government, and three delegates from the FARC-EP and a delegate from each of the *países garantes* (guarantor countries), Cuba and Norway and the *países acompañantes* (accompanying countries) Chile and Venezuela.³⁷⁷ The

³⁶⁷ Acuerdo Final, 5.1.3., p.178.

³⁶⁸ Ibid, 5.1.3.4., p. 181.

³⁶⁹ Ibid, 5.1.3.5., p. 182.

³⁷⁰ Ibid, 5.1.3.5., p. 184

³⁷¹ Ibid, 5.1.4., p. 186.

³⁷² Ibid, 5.2., p. 188.

³⁷³ Ibid, p. 190-191.

³⁷⁴ Ibid, 6.1.1., p. 196-197

³⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 197.

³⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 196.

³⁷⁷ Ibid, 6.1.7., p. 201.

implementation of the final agreement will count on the participation of local ethnic communities in Colombia as well as accompaniment from the international community.³⁷⁸

Conclusion

The final agreement intends to make peace stable through political, social and economic inclusion by breaking down the main causes and drivers of the conflict into six core points.

The first is rural reform, which acknowledges that disputes over land have been a central issue in the conflict, particularly because of its relationship to social and economic wellbeing, or lack thereof. The second point considers the impact of the conflict on political participation, acknowledging that the Colombian democratic system needs to be strengthened to resolve the conflict. The final agreement proposes to strengthen the democratic system by opening a space for inclusion of diverse political perspectives and ideologies and guaranteeing that political movements will not be subject to violence due to political ideology. The third point details the practical measures taken by the Government and the FARC-EP to end the conflict. This includes details of demobilisation, disarmament and reincorporation into civilian life and politics.

The fourth point deals with the issue of drugs and organised crime as an enabler of the conflict, and proposes plans to combat drug trafficking by suppressing the production of drugs through the substitution of coca crops, and discouraging drug consumption. It also proposes plans to combat organised crime and political corruption. The fifth point addresses the post-conflict treatment of victims, and outlines mechanisms for satisfying their rights to truth, justice, recognition, reparation and reconciliation. It also outlines both the judicial and extrajudicial mechanisms to ensure that perpetrators do not receive impunity. Finally, the sixth point details the implementation of the final agreement, which will rely on the

³⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 206-218.

participation of both the local and international communities. The following chapter will analyse the potential for achieving a sustainable peace as outlined through political, social and economic inclusion in the final agreement.

4. Analysis of the *Acuerdo final* and the Prospects for Sustainable Peace

Introduction

As outlined in the previous chapter, the final agreement proposes reforms and mechanisms for ending the conflict between the FARC and the Colombian Government. This chapter will contextualise the points in the final agreement and analyse whether they are likely to achieve sustainable peace. Thus far, I have shown that Colombia has a history of political, social and economic exclusion and that, in response to this history, the final agreement proposes projects for political, social and economic inclusion, to make peace sustainable. Through this analysis, I argue that peace in Colombia will be sustainable once inclusion of the FARC and the classes they represent is achieved. The final agreement also adheres to standards for sustaining peace as defined by civil war settlement theories outlined in the introduction of this thesis. This analysis will also discuss how the final agreement engages with these theories to include the FARC and the classes they represent, and thus achieve sustainable peace. These theories define the criteria for settling civil war through negotiation, and to prevent civil war from recurring in future.

In this chapter I argue that by corresponding to criteria for a negotiated settlement of a civil war and provisions for political, social and economic inclusion, sustainable peace is possible. The proposals outlined in the final agreement do engage with these criteria and provisions. However, some points covered in the agreement are more rigorous or detailed than others, which could destabilise the possibility of sustaining peace in Colombia. The agreement lacks detail particularly on the implementation of reforms to change political and social conditions in rural Colombia. Current developments in Colombia since the implementation of the final agreement only serve to reinforce this point. Thus far, the implementation has had some success for inclusion on some points, while falling short of

inclusion on others. To examine the prospects of a sustainable peace in Colombia as outlined in the final agreement, this chapter will discuss the incentives for the FARC to abandon armed insurgency, the proposed structural changes to address underlying causes of the conflict, land as the central issue for inclusion, how the final agreement recasts relationships in Colombian society, and lastly the importance of third parties as guarantors for achieving sustainable peace through inclusion.

Incentives for the FARC to Abandon Armed Struggle

Civil war settlement theory suggests that sustainable peace is possible once an insurgent group dismantles its military structure, and is offered incentives to prevent them from retaking arms. The final agreement between the FARC and the Colombian State does engage with these criteria through Point 2, Point 3 and Point 5. Point 2 is only relevant as a prerequisite for the FARC to agree to dismantle their internal structure and disarm. This is because it intends to broaden and diversify politics in Colombia through inclusion, while offering security for the FARC in the *Sistema Integral*, and thus lays the foundation for the inclusion of the FARC into politics.³⁷⁹ Point 3 describes the timeline for DDR of the FARC, and outlines their entitlements as they transition into politics,³⁸⁰ while Point 5 offers amnesties for FARC members accused of political crimes and rebellion so that they too might undergo DDR.³⁸¹

Point 3 demonstrates the importance of securing inclusion for the FARC through the final agreement. It does so through the meticulous detail in which it outlines the movement of combatants into ZVTN, the processes of CFHBD and DA within the ZVTN and the political, social and economic reintegration of the FARC after leaving the ZVTN. It also sets

³⁷⁹ Acuerdo Final, 2.1.1.1., p. 37.

³⁸⁰ Ibid, 3.1.1.1., p. 58.

³⁸¹ Ibid, number 38, p. 150.

milestones for weapons abandonment and removal of arms from ZVTN. Due to the rigour of this point, the collection process of arms from ZVTN is already complete, as of the 16 August 2017.³⁸² Monetary entitlements for the FARC as they enter into politics and society are also described. Economic security in the reintegration process itself is not the main reason the FARC decided to demobilise. Many individuals who joined the FARC did so to escape a situation of poverty and to improve their lives and those of their families.³⁸³ Herein lays another incentive for the *guerrilla* to undergo DDR, which will also achieve sustainable peace: education and skills training opportunities, just as joining the FARC once provided.³⁸⁴ Moreover, the opportunity for former combatants to develop new skills and businesses to therefore improve their social and economic wellbeing is available through ECOMÚN, an association managed by the FARC.³⁸⁵ This is consistent with and strengthens the concern of the FARC for social change. The language used to describe the disarmament process also conveys that the FARC have renounced violence but have not abandoned their cause. The disarmament process is called *dejación de armas*, meaning ‘leaving weapons behind’ which has a more positive connotation for the FARC, as it does not convey a surrender to the State.³⁸⁶

The FARC are able to continue their struggle, reframing it as a political cause based on provisions for political participation in Point 3, made possible through the foundations laid out in Point 2. This point addresses the persistent threat of annihilation for those who differ in

³⁸² ‘UN observers conclude FARC-EP arms removal process in Colombia, *UN News Centre*, 16 August 2017, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=57366#.WcpCfqjTTIV>, (accessed 26 September 2017).

³⁸³ O. Kaplan and E. Nussio, ‘Explaining Recidivism of Ex-combatants in Colombia’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2016, p. 24.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ J. M. Hernández Bonilla, ‘Cooperativas de las Farc, una alternativa para el posconflicto’, *El Espectador*, 14 August 2017, <http://colombia2020.elespectador.com/territorio/cooperativas-de-las-farc-una-alternativa-para-el-posconflicto>, (accessed 22 August 2017); see also ‘Las Farc inician la conformación de la cooperativa ECOMUN’, *El Tiempo*, 29 June 2017, <http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/conformacion-de-la-cooperativa-ecomun-104078>, (accessed 26 September 2017).

³⁸⁶ E. Álvarez Vanegas, ‘Post-conflict in Colombia (1). A farewell to arms’, *Democracia Abierta*, 16 December 2015, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/eduardo-lvarez-vanegas/post-conflict-in-colombia-1-farewell-to-arms>, (accessed 26 September 2017).

political ideology, which lies at the origin and crux of the war, and caused the FARC to strengthen itself militarily and continue the war after the UP assassinations in the 1980s and 1990s. Acknowledgement of active exclusion of the FARC from politics and plans to implement changes in favour of political inclusion are vital for achieving sustainable peace.³⁸⁷ Under the conditions outlined in the final agreement, the FARC are guaranteed funding, as well as a number of exemptions throughout the next two terms of office – until July 2026 – to support their transition into a political party.³⁸⁸ These provisions were made effective on the date the final agreement was signed, and the FARC successfully launched their political party on 1 September 2017.³⁸⁹ Retaining the acronym of ‘FARC’, which has become a part of their identity, their political party is called *Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común* (The Common Revolutionary Alternative Force).³⁹⁰

The FARC will be granted ten seats in Congress as of July 2018.³⁹¹ As Congress has powers to make decisions for the country as well as judicial powers, ten seats could seem too

³⁸⁷ President Santos acknowledged the responsibility of the State in permitting the exclusion of the FARC and the classes they represent through the assassinations and forced disappearance of UP members and their supporters. See ‘Exterminio de la UP fue un genocidio político’, *Verdad Abierta*, 15 September 2016, <http://www.verdadabierta.com/component/content/article/42-asesinatos-selectivos/4390-extermio-de-la-up-si-fue-un-genocidio-politico>, (accessed 3 October 2017).

³⁸⁸ Acuerdo Final, 3.2.1.1., p. 69-70.

³⁸⁹ “‘No queremos una sola gota más de sangre por razones políticas’: Timochenko’, *Semana*, 1 September 2017, <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/el-discurso-de-timochenko-en-la-plaza-de-bolivar/538460>, (accessed 26 September 2017).

³⁹⁰ ‘Las Farc cambian nombre pero no de siglas en su paso a la política’, *RT*, 1 September 2017, <https://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/248666-farc-cambian-nombre-siglas-partido>, (accessed 22 September 2017).

³⁹¹ These seats are divided into five seats in the House of Representatives and five seats in the Senate. Acuerdo Final 3.2.1.2., p. 71.

generous.³⁹² However, in the lead up to the 1986 elections, when the UP was established as the political party of the FARC, the UP won 14 seats in Congress and 351 seats in local councils.³⁹³ When considered in historical perspective, the political inclusion that the final agreement offers does not seem so extreme. Moreover, the final agreement breaks from civil war settlement theory, which suggests that peace is more sustainable when disarmed insurgents are included in all branches of politics, particularly the legislative and executive branches over the judiciary branch of politics.³⁹⁴ This is because it does not automatically grant political inclusion for former insurgents in the executive and legislative branches of government. Their inclusion in these branches will depend on the vote of the Colombian people and participation in these elections will depend on whether their candidates satisfy legal obligations.³⁹⁵ This is unlikely to destabilise the possibility of peace, however, as provisions for ‘rebel-to-party’ transitions are not always included in peace agreements.³⁹⁶ Furthermore, it is more likely that an armed group will become a political party if its leadership is united in its decision to abandon arms.³⁹⁷ Thus provisions for political inclusion of the FARC – irrespective of their nature – are necessary for achieving sustainable peace in

³⁹² Menges and Fleischman state that “The FARC also demanded a number of guaranteed seats in Congress. It is not clear how far the Government wants to go but what makes more sense than anything else is that once the FARC establishes itself as a political party, they should run for office as any other party. Their seats should be given by the people not by government decision. To give them power without having earned it via vote is like giving them representation and a voice they do not have... Therefore, we see no reason to reward a criminally culpable guerrilla group such as the FARC with special privileges without them proving themselves first.” N. Menges, and L. Fleischman, ‘Agreement with the FARC should reflect a victorious Colombian State, not equal partnership’, *The Americas Report*, 13 July 2017, <http://www.theamericasreport.com/2016/07/13/agreement-with-the-farc-should-reflect-a-victorious-colombian-state-not-equal-partnership/>, (accessed 20 August 2017).

³⁹³ Bargent and McDermott, ‘50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution’, http://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/50_Yearsof_the_FARC.pdf, (accessed 28 June 2017).

³⁹⁴ Marshall and Ishiyama, ‘Does political inclusion of rebel parties promote peace after civil conflict?’, p. 1020.

³⁹⁵ Acuerdo Final, 3.2.1.1., p. 69-70.

³⁹⁶ M. Söderberg Kovacs and S. Hatz, ‘Rebel-to-party transformations in civil war peace processes 1975-2011’, *Democratization*, vol. 23, no. 6, p. 1003.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 992.

response to the nature of the war as a political conflict,³⁹⁸ as well as provide an incentive for FARC leadership to unite in their decision to disarm.³⁹⁹

Protection and support for the FARC political activities by the State is essential to achieving sustainable peace in Colombia, and provides another incentive to disarm. However, security provisions for demobilised FARC members have become more pertinent now that the FARC have abandoned arms. Unlike the DRR and political reintegration process, the guarantees and mechanisms for security proposed in the final agreement do not follow a strict timetable for implementation. While the DDR process follows proposals outlined in the final agreement, guarantees for security, which lack a detailed plan for implementation, are falling behind. The impact on the FARC has already been felt. According to reports, twelve former FARC combatants have been assassinated since the implementation process of the agreements began.⁴⁰⁰ Amongst the dead are three former FARC combatants who were released from prison under amnesties offered to aid the social inclusion in Point 5 of the final agreement.⁴⁰¹ While these former combatants were released from prison, they were not placed in ZVTN, and therefore did not benefit from the DDR process or security guarantees offered to other former combatants. Moreover, the final agreement does not outline security measures specific to FARC members released from prison under amnesties and it is

³⁹⁸ “‘No queremos una sola gota más de sangre por razones políticas’: Timochenko”, <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/el-discurso-de-timochenko-en-la-plaza-de-bolivar/538460>, (accessed 26 September 2017).

³⁹⁹ L. Carvajal and F. Badia I Dalmases, ‘Failing to transform good intentions into actions is the biggest challenge of the Colombian Peace Agreement’, *Open Democracy*, 11 August 2017, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/lucas-carvajal-francsc-badia-i-dalmases/in-colombia-failing-to-transform-good-inte>, (accessed 20 August 2017).

⁴⁰⁰ ‘¿Plan de exterminio contra los milicianos de las Farc?’, *Verdad Abierta*, 18 August 2017, http://www.verdadabierta.com/procesos-de-paz/farc/6726-plan-de-exterminio-contra-los-milicianos-de-las-farc?utm_source=TW&utm_campaign=proceso-paz-18082017&utm_medium=articulo, (accessed 22 August 2017).

⁴⁰¹ ‘Colombia: Another FARC Member killed in Sombre Sign for Peace’, *Telesur*, 20 June 2017, <http://wp.telesurtv.net/english/news/Colombia-Another-FARC-Member-Killed-in-Sombre-Sign-for-Peace-20170620-0020.html>, (accessed 22 August 2017).

presumed that the murders were carried out by paramilitaries.⁴⁰² Nor does the final agreement include or mention DDR options for FARC militia; thus it is uncertain whether they too can benefit from social and economic reintegration and security guarantees.⁴⁰³ There are fears that they will also be targeted by paramilitaries or illegal groups.⁴⁰⁴ While these incidents of violence – in some way permitted by the lack of detail in the final agreement – are unlikely to destabilise peace on a large scale, they are acts of social exclusion of the FARC, which deter disarmament for those members and impede the achievement of sustainable peace.

Structural Changes to address underlying causes of the War

Point 2 of the final agreement proposes important structural changes to Colombian politics to broaden political participation and inclusion, not only for the FARC, but for other political groups that differ from the status quo or that declare themselves ‘in opposition’.⁴⁰⁵ The final agreement aims to increase civic participation in politics by offering security guarantees for these groups, and the right to protest and peacefully make demands on the government.⁴⁰⁶ It also proposes to increase civic participation in elections through electoral reforms.⁴⁰⁷ This is consistent with criteria for a negotiated settlement to a civil war, which suggests that by broadening political participation, civilians who are experiencing extreme poverty or poor quality of life can transform their situation through political means rather than through an

⁴⁰² E. Álvarez Vanegas, and D. Pardo Calderón, ‘Disidencias de las Farc: ¿simples bandidos?’, *El Espectador*, 16 May 2017, <http://colombia2020.elespectador.com/pais/disidencias-de-las-farc-simples-bandidos>, (accessed 22 August 2017).

⁴⁰³ ‘¿Plan de exterminio contra los milicianos de las Farc?’, http://www.verdadabierta.com/procesos-de-paz/farc/6726-plan-de-exterminio-contra-los-milicianos-de-las-farc?utm_source=TW&utm_campaign=proceso-paz-18082017&utm_medium=articulo, (accessed 22 August 2017).

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid; see also ‘Las Farc aún no resuelven sus discusiones políticas internas’, *Verdad Abierta*, 2 August 2017, <http://www.verdadabierta.com/procesos-de-paz/farc/6715-las-farc-aun-no-resuelven-sus-discusiones-politicas-internas?t=1&cn=ZmxleGlibGVfcmVjc18y&refsrc=email&iid=4bf78d4ad2e1410ca675dd7bfcce1890&uid=790313251489796097&nid=244+276893704>, (accessed 9 August 2017).

⁴⁰⁵ Acuerdo Final, 2.1.2., p. 38.

⁴⁰⁶ This goal for sustainable peace through political inclusion will be carried out under the proposed *Consejo Nacional para la Reconciliación y la Convivencia*, Acuerdo Final, 2.3.1.2., p. 47.

⁴⁰⁷ To be carried out under the *Consejo Nacional Electoral*, Acuerdo Final, 2.3.4., p. 53.

armed struggle.⁴⁰⁸ While Point 2 proposes necessary structural reforms to readdress political exclusion as an underlying cause of the war, this point lacks a detailed implementation plan for reforms and security, which has allowed the continuation of political exclusion of these groups.

Political exclusion has continued through acts of violence toward those ‘in opposition’, and so far, the final agreement has failed to protect those who differ ideologically from the status quo and punish those who persecute them. This includes social leaders and human rights activists who align themselves politically or ideologically with the FARC, or who are simply accused of being FARC sympathisers. Colombia is considered the “most dangerous place to organise”, according to reports stating that 3,000 trade union organisers were assassinated between 1977 and 2013.⁴⁰⁹ The need to enforce proposed security guarantees for these individuals has become pertinent in the last year. A report from the office of the ombudsman, Defensoría Del Pueblo, states that between January 2016 and March 2017, 156 politically motivated assassinations of social leaders and human rights defenders have occurred.⁴¹⁰ The rate of assassinations since the implementation of the

⁴⁰⁸ Walter, ‘Does Conflict Beget Conflict?’ Explaining Recurring Civil War’, p. 374.

⁴⁰⁹ O. León, and B. Sanchez Espitia, ‘A New Generation of Paramilitary Groups is Killing Social Activists in Colombia’, *The Real News*, 2 August 2017, http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=19673, (accessed 19 September 2017).

⁴¹⁰ ‘156 líderes sociales y defensores de derechos humanos han sido asesinados en los últimos 14 meses: Defensoría’, *Defensoría del Pueblo*, 31 March 2017, <http://www.defensoria.gov.co/es/nube/noticias/6236/156-líderes-sociales-y-defensores-de-derechos-humanos-han-sido-asesinados-en-los-últimos-14-meses-Defensoría-Defensoría-del-Pueblo-líderes-sociales-Defensor-del-Pueblo-Colombia-líderes-sociales.htm> (accessed 22 August 2017); see also ‘Colombia: Another FARC Member killed in Sombre Sign for Peace’, *Telesur*, 20 June 2017, <http://wp.telesurtv.net/english/news/Colombia-Another-FARC-Member-Killed-in-Sombre-Sign-for-Peace-20170620-0020.html>, (accessed 22 August 2017).

agreement has increased, with 42 assassinations occurring in the first four months of 2017.⁴¹¹ By early June the death toll increased to 57.⁴¹² The continuation of political exclusion through violence towards those ‘in opposition’ has been allowed in part by the lack of a precise implementation plan for security mechanisms in the final agreement. The urgency of the need to implement these measures has grown more important still, as violence towards leaders of social movements, human rights workers and their families continues or increases. Despite continued violence towards social leaders, there have been no reports of the FARC or their supporters seeking revenge for the assassinations.⁴¹³ Nonetheless, persistent acts of violence hinder the achievement of sustainable peace.

Political exclusion has also continued by the hands of the State, which undermines proposals to protect civilian rights to non-violent protest and their entitlement to make demands of the government.⁴¹⁴ From 16 May to early June of 2017, strikes and peaceful protest were carried out by the civilians of Buenaventura.⁴¹⁵ Buenaventura is a port-city inhabited by Afro-Colombians, where 60% of residents are unemployed and 64% are affected by poverty.⁴¹⁶ Their demands on the State concerned potable water, healthcare, education and

⁴¹¹ G. Wilpert and M. Murillo, ‘Assassination of 41 Activists in Colombia Threatens Peace Process’, *The Real News*, 10 May 2017, http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=19032, (accessed 24 September 2017); see also ‘Asesinatos de líderes sociales se agravan con implemetación de acuerdo de paz’, *Verdad Abierta*, 17 August 2017, http://www.verdadabierta.com/victimas-seccion/los-resistentes/6724-asesinatos-de-lideres-sociales-se-agravan-con-implementacion-de-acuerdo-de-paz?utm_source=TW&utm_campaign=victimas-17082017&utm_medium=articulo, (accessed 22 August 2017).

⁴¹² León, and Sanchez Espitia, ‘A New Generation of Paramilitary Groups is Killing Social Activists in Colombia’, http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=19673, (accessed 19 September 2017).

⁴¹³ Wilpert and Murillo, ‘Assassination of 41 Activists in Colombia Threatens Peace Process’, http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=19032, (accessed 24 September 2017).

⁴¹⁴ To be implemented through the *Consejo Nacional para la Reconciliación y la Convivencia* in Acuerdo Final 2.3.1.2., p. 47.

⁴¹⁵ ‘Colombia: violence against protesters in Buenaventura Civic Strike must stop’, *Amnesty International*, 1 June 2017, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/colombia-hechos-violentos-en-el-marco-del-paro-civico-de-buenaventura-deben-parar/>, (accessed 28 September 2017).

⁴¹⁶ D. Kovalik, ‘Peaceful Protest in Buenaventura, Colombia Met With Terror’ *Huffington Post*, 6 June 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/peaceful-protest-in-buenaventura-colombia-met-with_us_5936c161e4b0cca4f42d9d8c?ncid=engmodushpmg00000004, (accessed 22 September 2017).

economic, social and cultural rights.⁴¹⁷ State forces responded to the protests with hostility; silencing protestors with teargas, firearms and death threats.⁴¹⁸ The lack of an implementation plan in the final agreement – to reform political structures and guarantee the political rights of citizens – has meant that political exclusion of marginalised populations continues. Although it is yet to be implemented, the Government finally respected the demands of the people of Buenaventura by settling an agreement with the Civic Strike Committee of Buenaventura.⁴¹⁹ The eventual agreement with the Civic Strike Committee indicates the need for further action and negotiation, which are necessary to carry out the goals of political inclusion proposed in the final agreement. Without a precise implementation plan within the final agreement, political exclusion continues in Colombia.

Lack of a detailed implementation plan and detailed reforms for political inclusion in the final agreement has also led to a failure to increase electoral participation. Although the final agreement proposes to establish the *Consejo Nacional Electoral* for good practice and transparency in the electoral system, it does not detail a plan of action to increase voter attendance in elections for a fairer outcome in elections. In the plebiscite for the final agreement on 2 October 2016, of the 34.9 million registered voters in Colombia, only 13 million participated.⁴²⁰ Of that 13 million, 170,000 cast an invalid vote and a further 86,000 cast a blank vote.⁴²¹ The ‘no’ vote won with a slim majority of 50.21%, compared to the

⁴¹⁷ ‘Colombia: violence against protesters in Buenaventura Civic Strike must stop’, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/colombia-hechos-violentos-en-el-marco-del-paro-civico-de-buenaventura-deben-parar/>, (accessed 28 September 2017).

⁴¹⁸ Ibid; see also Kovalik, ‘Peaceful Protest in Buenaventura, Colombia Met With Terror’ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/peaceful-protest-in-buenaventura-colombia-met-with-us_5936c161e4b0cca4f42d9d8c?ncid=engmodushpimg00000004, (accessed 22 September 2017).

⁴¹⁹ F. Galvis-Delgado, ‘El próximo acuerdo colombiano: Buenaventura’, *Council on Hemispheric Affairs*, 18 August 2017, <http://www.coha.org/el-proximo-acuerdo-colombiano-buenaventura/>, (accessed 22 September 2017); see also ‘Con \$1,5 billiones se puso fin a paro en el puerto’, *El Tiempo*, 6 June 2017, <http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/cali/acuerdos-que-se-lograron-por-el-paro-civico-en-buenaventura-96006?hootPostID=00003dfcd81a070d0422b2f1962d5e36>, (accessed 12 June 2017).

⁴²⁰ J. M. Tejedor Estupiñán, ‘Editorial: towards a post-conflict economy’, *Revista Finanzas y Política Económica*, vol. 9, no. 1, 2017, p. 15.

⁴²¹ Ibid.

49.78% of yes voters.⁴²² For a vote to be valid in Colombia, attendance of 25% of registered voters is required.⁴²³ The plebiscite had an attendance of 37%, therefore the vote is considered legitimate.⁴²⁴ A minimum of 25% attendance of registered voters represents a very small percentage of the Colombian population. It means in reality that the decisions of a minimum of 8.7 million voters are considered representative of the total population of 49 million. This only highlights the need to increase the minimum required percentage of attendance at elections and enact a clear plan to broaden electoral participation, which the final agreement lacks.

Moreover, Colombia has a history of voter abstention, and it is a symptom of political exclusion in Colombia. According to Raby, in the 2010 presidential election in which Juan Manuel Santos was elected to office, 50% of voters failed to attend or cast an invalid vote in the first round, a figure which increased to 56% in the second round of voting.⁴²⁵ Abstention was at approximately 60% in the elections for congress in the same year.⁴²⁶ Raby links voter abstention, particularly in rural areas, to intimidation and coercion frequently carried out by paramilitary groups,⁴²⁷ which only highlights the need for a strong implementation plan for security guarantees to ensure increase political participation. Dube and Naidu have also found that during election years there is an increase in politically motivated homicides carried out by paramilitary groups against left-wing groups.⁴²⁸ Voter abstention also reinforces the importance of giving FARC members seats in Congress, as a part of the final agreement, as it is less likely that their supporters will attend elections. Increased electoral participation is a

⁴²² Ibid.

⁴²³ R. E. Carlin, J. L. Meloy, J. Subotic, 'Legitimacy Deficits in Colombia's Peace Talks: Elites, Trust and Support for Transitional Justice', *USAID Research and Innovation Grants Working Paper Series*, 8 February 2016, p. 8.

⁴²⁴ Tejedor Estupiñán, 'Editorial: towards a post-conflict economy', p. 15.

⁴²⁵ Raby, 'Colombia as the linchpin of US hegemony in Latin America', in *Right-Wing Politics in the New Latin America*, p. 92.

⁴²⁶ Ibid.

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

⁴²⁸ Dube and Naidu, 'Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of US Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia', p. 264.

vital part of political inclusion to achieve sustainable peace. The small percentage of the population making decisions for the entire population, and the violent exclusion of a large percentage of the population, only perpetuates the use of violence for political change and impedes the achievement of sustainable peace.

Land as the centre of political, social and economic inclusion

Issues around territory and land ownership are addressed in Point 1, Point 4 and Point 5 of the final agreement. Land is a central point in the final agreement, as the setting in which the political struggle of the FARC took place, which began with the fight for the Republic of Marquetalia. The final agreement proposes mechanisms for political, social and economic inclusion through land reforms, land restitution and agricultural development, including crop substitution programs. These plans also address the underlying social conditions that caused the war, which is consistent with civil war settlement theory⁴²⁹ and the concept of ‘positive peace’.⁴³⁰ These conditions include poverty and poor quality of life and the inadequacy of political structures to solve this problem. Without access the politics for these populations, arms and territorial control became a means for social and economic change. These are important issues to achieve sustainable peace, and to ensure that violence is no longer used for social and political change in Colombia. However the realities of rural Colombia are overlooked in the final agreement.

Point 1 of the final agreement proposes land and agrarian reforms that offer land and money to peasants, and proposes the reduction of poverty and rural development through national programs known as PDET.⁴³¹ These reforms aim to provide peasants with the means of building their own agribusiness by increasing smallholdings and achieve social and

⁴²⁹ Walter, ‘Does Conflict Beget Conflict?’ Explaining Recurring Civil War’, p. 374.

⁴³⁰ ‘Colombia’s FARC insurgency may be coming to an end. But can peace hold?’ <http://podbay.fm/show/593535863/e/1438808280?autostart=1>, (accessed 21 May 2016).

⁴³¹ Acuerdo Final, 1.2., p. 21.

economic inclusion for these marginalised populations, and improve the underlying conditions which caused the war. Albertus and Kaplan have found that land reforms tend to resolve peasant grievances over land and thus reduce insurgent activity.⁴³² However due to poor implementation of land reforms in Colombia, these policies are more frequently linked to increased *guerrilla* activity.⁴³³ This is problematic for peace while there are still insurgent groups active in Colombia,⁴³⁴ as peasants who do not own property are more likely to support insurgent activity as a means of addressing their grievances.⁴³⁵

Other sources that analyse land reforms in the final agreement suggest that Point 1 reiterates the same provisions as previous land and agrarian reform programs which failed to achieve their goals in practice.⁴³⁶ However these sources only analyse the efficacy of land reform policies alone; whereas the final agreement combines it with the DDR process. Thus land reforms could be effective in fostering State presence and social and economic inclusion once implemented. This will also grant political visibility and access to politics for peasants and rural populations, according to Faguet et al.⁴³⁷ Point 1 of the final agreement however fails to acknowledge the presence of transnational corporations in rural Colombia and address their role in land-grabs and perpetuating rural poverty.⁴³⁸ Moreover, although the establishment of PDET aims to reduce poverty by half within 15 years, there is no precise

⁴³² M. Albertus and O. Kaplan, 'Land Reform as a Counterinsurgency Policy: Evidence from Colombia', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 57, no. 2, 2012, p. 227.

⁴³³ Ibid, p. 199, 227.

⁴³⁴ The *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (National Liberation Army, ELN) is still an active participant in the Colombian conflict. However as of 1 October 2017 observe a ceasefire with the Colombian Government until 12 January 2018. See 'Colombian government and ELN rebels agree ceasefire', *BBC News*, 4 September 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-41147416>, (accessed 29 September 2017).

⁴³⁵ Albertus and Kaplan, 'Land Reform as a Counterinsurgency Policy: Evidence from Colombia', p. 201.

⁴³⁶ B. Congate Ochoa and J. A. Caro, 'El uso minifundista de la tierra como eje central del preacuerdo agrario entre el gobierno de Colombia y las FARC. Factibilidad preliminar teórica y práctica', *I+D Revista De Investigaciones*, vol. 8, no. 2. 2017, p. 32; and Faguet, Sánchez and Villaveces-Niño, *The Paradox of Land Reform, Inequality and Development in Colombia*, p. 31.

⁴³⁷ Faguet, Sánchez and Villaveces-Niño, *The Paradox of Land Reform, Inequality and Development in Colombia*, p. 14.

⁴³⁸ León, and Sanchez Espitia, 'A New Generation of Paramilitary Groups is Killing Social Activists in Colombia', http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=19673, (accessed 19 September 2017).

timeline of milestones towards achieving this goal on the local level.⁴³⁹ The final agreement suggests that there will be an increased State presence and observance of rule of law through development programs and therefore better access to politics for peasants and poorer populations. The goal is to close that gap between the city and the countryside.⁴⁴⁰ However these plans do not specify strategies for preventing armed insurgent or illegal groups from occupying FARC territories after they leave.⁴⁴¹ This has caused violence to increase in those areas, particularly the departments on the Pacific Coast, such as Chocó⁴⁴² and Nariño.⁴⁴³

Point 4 draws on existing coca eradication and crop substitution programs in Colombia, and outlines two programs specific to crop substitution that included in the PDET called the PNIS and PISDA.⁴⁴⁴ As well as including coca farmers in the legal economy, plans for crop substitution prevent the supply of coca to illegal or insurgent groups for the production and trade of illicit drugs. The effect of this is cutting off the source of finance for insurgent groups, which is consistent with civil war settlement theory. Although it is unclear what the extracted coca crops will be replaced with, when considered alongside Point 1, it is probable that the land will be assessed for what crops are suitable for the terrain.⁴⁴⁵ This will likely form part of further agreements between the Government and communities that register

⁴³⁹ Acuerdo Final, 1.3., p. 24

⁴⁴⁰ *Acuerdo Política de desarrollo agrario integral* [website], <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/politica-de-desarrollo-agrario-integral.html>, (accessed 27 June 2017).

⁴⁴¹ Menges, and Fleischman, 'Agreement with the FARC should reflect a victorious Colombian State, not equal partnership', <http://www.theamericasreport.com/2016/07/13/agreement-with-the-farc-should-reflect-a-victorious-colombian-state-not-equal-partnership/>, (accessed 20 August 2017).

⁴⁴² 'El Chocó pone a prueba la paz colombiana', *El Pílon*, 3 May 2017, <http://elpilon.com.co/choco-pone-prueba-la-paz-colombiana/>, (accessed 22 August 2017).

⁴⁴³ N. Coso, "'Mi mama se orinó del miedo, los niños lloraban, todos llorábamos': el Pacífico sur, la region de Colombia donde la Guerra apenas comienza", *BBC Mundo*, 14 June 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-40230236>, (accessed 22 August 2017). See also J. Tweedie, 'Police Kill Nine Coca Leaf Growers During Protest, Say Farmers' *Morning Star*, 7 October 2017, <http://www.morningstaronline.co.uk/a-cf20-Police-kill-nine-coca-leaf-growers-during-protest-say-farmers#.WdiNpYNPnIU>, (accessed 7 October 2017).

⁴⁴⁴ Acuerdo Final, 4.1., p. 102 and 4.1.3.5., p. 109.

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 1.1.9., p. 18-19; see also M. Jelsma and C. A. Youngers, 'Coca and the Colombian Peace Accords: A Commentary on the Pilot Substitution Program in Briceño', *WOLA*, 10 August 2017, <https://www.wola.org/analysis/coca-colombian-peace-accords-commentary-pilot-substitution-project-briceno/>, (accessed 22 August 2017).

for crop substitution programs.⁴⁴⁶ Although the first three months of 2017 saw 58,000 families of coca growers register for crop substitution programs, some communities have declined to participate.⁴⁴⁷ They fear there will be insufficient funds for the Government to execute the promises outlined in the final agreement.⁴⁴⁸ Moreover, funding for crop substitution is not outlined in the final agreement, therefore it is uncertain how much money is dedicated to coca eradication. Security is also lacking for these coca farmers exposed to paramilitaries and organised crime groups that threaten with death anyone supporting crop substitution programs.⁴⁴⁹ This was the case for Nidio Davila, an assassinated leader of the *Marcha Patriótica*, who also belonged to the *Asociación de Trabajadores Campesinos de Nariño* (Association of Campesino Workers of Nariño).⁴⁵⁰

Land restitution proposed in Point 5 is a means of achieving social and economic inclusion through justice, reparations and reconciliation, by returning stolen lands to those from whom it was taken during the conflict, and returning displaced peoples to their lands.⁴⁵¹ However, the success of land restitution in achieving goals for justice and peace is dubious.⁴⁵² In 2014, the total number of victims of the conflict exceeded 6 million, and of that total, displaced persons accounted for approximately 5,368,138.⁴⁵³ Although displaced persons constitute a majority of victims in the conflict, the final agreement dedicates very little

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁷ 'Coca-growing in Colombia is at an all-time high', *The Economist*, 23 March 2017, <https://www.economist.com/news/americas/21719468-government-hopes-former-farc-guerrillas-will-persuade-villagers-switch>, (accessed 22 September 2017).

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid; see also N. Casey, 'Los campesinos de la coca en Colombia temen por su subsistencia en tiempos de paz', *The New York Times*, 18 July 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/es/2017/07/18/colombia-sustitucion-cultivos-paz-farc/>, (accessed 3 October 2017).

⁴⁴⁹ Jelsma and Youngers, 'Coca and the Colombian Peace Accords: A Commentary on the Pilot Substitution Program in Briceño', <https://www.wola.org/analysis/coca-colombian-peace-accords-commentary-pilot-substitution-project-briceno/>, (accessed 22 August 2017).

⁴⁵⁰ 'Colombian Campesino Leader Murdered, Paramilitaries Implicated', *Telesur*, 9 August 2017, <https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Colombian-Campesino-Leader-Murdered-Paramilitaries-Implicated-20170809-0011.html>, (accessed 24 September 2017).

⁴⁵¹ Acuerdo Final, 5.1.3.5., p. 182 & 184.

⁴⁵² M. Nilsson and L. K. Taylor, 'Applying the security-development nexus on the ground: land restitution in Colombia', *Conflict, Security & Development*, 2016, p. 7.

⁴⁵³ D. Paley, *Drug War Capitalism*, Edinburgh, AK Press, 2014, p. 63.

attention to land restitution. This could be due to the existing law on land restitution, *Ley 1448 de 2011* (Law 1448 of 2011). Nevertheless, the implementation of land restitution is slow, and few claims for land have been granted.⁴⁵⁴ In studies on the effectiveness of land restitution under Law 1448,⁴⁵⁵ Nilsson and Taylor indicate that while the law is rigorous on the judicial and administrative process of land restitution, it lacks a precise implementation plan.⁴⁵⁶ The final agreement also lacks a precise implementation plan for restoring lands. Moreover, Nilsson and Taylor conclude that for land restitution to be successful in achieving sustainable peace there must be a focus on security and rural development.⁴⁵⁷ While there are development programs proposed under Point 1, security guarantees related to land restitution are lacking. The final agreement offers security to protect political rights under Point 2 and 3, however it lacks security guarantees related to political organising specific to land rights. This has become more pertinent in recent times as social leaders who are being killed for politically motivated reasons by paramilitary groups are land rights activists.⁴⁵⁸ Moreover, the final agreement fails to acknowledge the connection of paramilitary groups and successor groups working for big businesses or organised crime groups that do not want to give up illegally acquired lands in their possession.⁴⁵⁹ Land restitution is necessary for achieving sustainable peace through social and economic inclusion of displaced peoples, however the

⁴⁵⁴ Nilsson and Taylor state that: “Despite a legal and procedural framework structure that seems clear on paper, the Colombian land restitution process is limping behind: fewer claims than expected were actually issued and after three – of a total of 10 – years assigned to the process, only two per cent of the land was returned by the end of 2014.” Nilsson and Taylor, ‘Applying the security-development nexus on the ground: land restitution in Colombia’, p. 7.

⁴⁵⁵ This law is also called *Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras* of the Law of Victims and Land Restitution.

⁴⁵⁶ Nilsson and Taylor, ‘Applying the security-development nexus on the ground: land restitution in Colombia’, p. 8.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 11.

⁴⁵⁸ Wilpert and Murillo, ‘Assassination of 41 Activists in Colombia Threatens Peace Process’, http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=19032, (accessed 24 September 2017); see also O. León, and B. Sanchez Espitia, ‘A New Generation of Paramilitary Groups is Killing Social Activists in Colombia (pt. 2/2)’, *The Real News*, 7 August 2017, http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=19714, (accessed 22 September 2017).; and N. Sánchez, ‘No somos invasores: José Ángel Palomeque’, *El Espectador*, 27 August 2017, <http://colombia2020.elespectador.com/territorio/no-somos-invasores-jose-angel-palomeque>, (accessed 22 September 2017).

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid.

lack of a precise implementation plan and security guarantees hinder the achievement of sustainable peace.

Peace through recasting and regulating inter-group relations

The final agreement recasts and regulates inter-group relations in Point 5 through justice, reparation and reconciliation. This part of the final agreement is a departure from theories of negotiated settlement of civil war, as it deals primarily with the effects of violence rather than its cause. Nonetheless, it represents an important step towards social inclusion for victims and the FARC and thus for sustaining peace. This is important because among the 220,000 deaths resulting from the war, civilians account for 81.5%, while combatants account for 18.5%.⁴⁶⁰ While the administration of justice is crucial for peace, it is not as urgent as the cessation of hostilities and politically motivated killings, nor should the judicial process be rushed. The final agreement proposes the JEP, the mechanism to administer justice to victims of the war, and is designed to examine all cases of violence carried out by all actors in the war.

The topic of justice for victims of the conflict has been the most criticised aspect of the JEP, due to the failure of previous laws, such as *Ley 975 de 2005* (Law 975 of 2005)⁴⁶¹ and Law 1448.⁴⁶² Moreover, punishments outlined in the JEP were considered too lenient; aimed to compel the FARC to demobilise without fear of imprisonment. However, in an analysis of the agreement, Bosch Alvarado suggests that it faces the challenge of ensuring that the FARC are held accountable for their crimes and that other armed actors are held responsible for their crimes against humanity.⁴⁶³ While she has singled the FARC, she acknowledges that the FARC have not been the sole perpetrators of violence in the war. In an

⁴⁶⁰ Grupo de Memoria Histórica, *¡Basta ya! Colombia: Memorias de guerra y dignidad*, Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2013, p. 32.

⁴⁶¹ Also known as *Ley de Justicia y Paz* (the Justice and Peace Law). Taylor, Nilsson and Amezcua-Castro, 'Reconstructing the social fabric amid ongoing violence', p. 87-88.

⁴⁶² Ibid.

⁴⁶³ D. V. Bosch Alvarado, 'The Failure of Peace: Transitional Justice's Inefficacy in Upholding Victims' Rights in the Colombian Peace Process', *Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship*, vol. 2, no. 6, 2017, p. 13.

investigation carried out by the *Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica* (National Centre of Historical Memory), *guerrilla* groups, not exclusively the FARC, were found to have caused the majority of kidnappings and destruction to public property.⁴⁶⁴ Between 1970 and 2010, of 27,023 reported cases of kidnapping, the *guerrilla* were accountable for 24,482 kidnappings (90.6%) while the paramilitary were responsible for 2,541 kidnappings (9.4%). Between 1988 to 2012, of a reported 5,137 incidents of damage to public property, the *guerrilla* were responsible for 4,322 incidents (84.1%), the paramilitary for 270 incidents (5.2%) and the military for 182 incidents (3.5%).⁴⁶⁵

On the other hand, the paramilitary groups were over-represented across various categories of violent crimes: massacres, selected documented killings and forced disappearances.⁴⁶⁶ The National Centre of Historical Memory found that of the reported 1,982 massacres between 1980 and 2012, the paramilitary were responsible for 58.9%, the *guerrilla* for 17.3%, unidentified armed groups for 14.8% and State forces for 7.9%. Between 1981 and 2012, of a reported 16,346 documented killings which victimised 23,161 civilians, the paramilitary were responsible for 38.4%, unidentified armed groups for 27.7%, the *guerrilla* for 10.1% and State forces for 6.5%. Of the 5,016 documented cases of forced disappearances, there are only 689 cases where the perpetrators have been identified. Of these 689 cases, the military are responsible for 42.1%, the paramilitary for 35.7%, unidentified armed groups for 19.9% and the *guerrilla* for 2.3%.⁴⁶⁷ Moreover, while the FARC were often scapegoats for violence in the past, now that they have disarmed and violence continues, the complex reality of the various perpetrators of violence is surfacing.⁴⁶⁸ Thus to accomplish

⁴⁶⁴ Grupo de Memoria Histórica, *¡Basta ya! Colombia*, p. 35, 37.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 36-37.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁸ L. M. Jaramillo, 'Colombia: how strong is the commitment to peace?', *Insight on Conflict*, 15 August 2017, <https://www.insightonconflict.org/blog/2017/08/colombia-how-strong-commitment-peace/> (accessed 20 August 2017).

social inclusion for both the FARC and for victims, the truth about perpetrators of violence is as important as the truth about victims of violence.

The importance of administering justice is not only a necessary duty to victims, but also important to break cycles of violence that might affect responsible perpetrators of violence. In his investigation into the relationship between demobilised combatants and victims of the war in Colombia, Prieto argues that periods of violence can emerge from legacies of hatred and prejudice between the groups.⁴⁶⁹ Similarly, if it is perceived that the crimes are not adequately punished, the administration of ‘private justice’ could give rise to new cycles of violence and destabilise peace.⁴⁷⁰ This is further complicated by the vagueness of the final agreement on the kinds of cases of crimes that qualify for the JEP, which could delay the administration of justice for such crimes as the infamous *falsos positivos*, carried out by the military.⁴⁷¹ On this point, the final agreement once again presents a complex judicial and administrative structure that lacks a precise implementation plan, however, it is unlikely to obstruct the achievement of sustainable peace.

The Role of Third Parties as Guarantors of Sustainable Peace

Point 2, Point 3 and Point 6 of the final agreement outline the role of international third parties as guarantors for peace and to ensure that the provisions of the final agreement are implemented. The third parties include the Carter Centre and the NIMD, both of which are

⁴⁶⁹ Prieto, ‘Together after the War While the War Goes On’, p. 526.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁷¹ *Falsos Positivos* or False Positives is the term to describe the series of murders of poor or mentally impaired people who were presented to authorities as *guerrilla* soldiers in order to claim financial rewards or career progression. See S. Eskauriatza, ‘Colombia struggles to deliver justice in army ‘cash-for-kills’ scandal’, *The Conversation*, 18 September 2017, https://theconversation.com/colombia-struggles-to-deliver-justice-in-army-cash-for-kills-scandal-82350?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Latest+from+The+Conversation+for+September+18+2017+-+83436836&utm_content=Latest+from+The+Conversation+for+September+18+2017+-+83436836+CID_4f5f37279f14f24fd0db3d056ba66c3b&utm_source=campaign_monitor_global&utm_term=Colombia+struggles+to+deliver+justice+in+army+cash-for-kills+scandal, (accessed 21 September 2017); and ‘El ‘toque’ de los militares a la Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz’, *Verdad Abierta*, 30 January 2017, <http://www.verdadabierta.com/procesos-de-paz/farc/6532-el-toque-de-los-militares-a-la-jurisdiccion-especial-para-la-paz>, (accessed 23 September 2017).

committed to reforms to the political system.⁴⁷² The UN and CELAC are committed to authorisation and implementation of the agreements.⁴⁷³ Accompanying countries Cuba, Norway, Chile and Venezuela are committed to overseeing implementation. They also ensure international legitimacy of the peace process⁴⁷⁴ and compel the FARC and the Colombian Government to commit to fulfilling the terms of the final agreement.⁴⁷⁵ In these points, the final agreement is consistent with civil war settlement theory, which suggests that the involvement of third parties as guarantors is more likely to sustain peace. This is because they ensure that both parties in the negotiated settlement – in this case the FARC and the Colombian Government – are held accountable for carrying out the terms of settlement in the agreements.⁴⁷⁶ This is the case for the final agreement, as third parties have shown themselves to be committed to unbiased and transparent monitoring of the implementation of the final agreement, and to reinforcing the commitment of both sides to sustainable peace. The final agreement however lacks vital financial support from these third parties to carry out implementation.

Each third party has demonstrated their commitment to the implementation of the final agreement according to their individual capacity. The NIMD launched an office in Colombia and had a solid relationship with the Colombian Government before offering support to the FARC in the negotiation process between the two.⁴⁷⁷ The UN has thus far achieved the disarmament process of the FARC, and remains committed to an active role in

⁴⁷² Acuerdo Final, 2.3.4., p. 53.

⁴⁷³ Ibid, 3.1.1., p. 58, and 6.1.7., p. 201.

⁴⁷⁴ Ucrós Maldonado, 'What is the Colombian Peace Process Teaching the World?', p. 2-4.

⁴⁷⁵ Johnson asserts that it is the responsibility of international actors is to "apply subtle pressure, mainly in private but on occasion in public, so that the agreement is fully carried out," K. Johnson, 'The Uncertainty of Peace in Colombia', *International Crisis Group*, February 1, 2017, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/uncertainty-peace-colombia>, (accessed 25 August 2017).

⁴⁷⁶ Walter, *Committing to Peace*, p. 19.

⁴⁷⁷ 'NIMD and the Colombia Peace Agreement: towards a more equal and inclusive society', *Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy*, 31 August 2017, <http://nimd.org/nimd-and-the-colombian-peace-agreement-towards-a-more-equal-and-inclusive-society/>, (accessed 29 September 2017).

the implementation of the final agreement.⁴⁷⁸ Cuba played an active role as host to delegates from the FARC and the Colombian Government during the negotiation process. Their commitment to peace continues; for the next five years they will offer scholarships to study medicine for young Colombians affected by the conflict.⁴⁷⁹ Their support aims to improve the quality of life of these young people through education, among whom are victims of the conflict, former combatants and inhabitants of rural Colombia.⁴⁸⁰ In a display of commitment to supporting peace in Colombia, Chilean President Michelle Bachelet attended the signing of the agreement on 23 June 2016 in Havana.⁴⁸¹ Members of the Chilean armed forces have also been deployed to Colombia to support the UN mission in Colombia, after the Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that Chile was “prepared to provide anything they consider to be of use” in the peace process.⁴⁸² Thus, while a precise implementation plan is lacking on some points of the final agreement, the robust and active commitment of neutral third parties is a positive step to ensuring that sustainable peace in Colombia will eventuate.

In spite of commitment from various countries and international organisations to guarantee that the final agreement is implemented, not one has offered financial support essential to its implementation. Surprisingly, absent from third parties in the final agreement is financial and diplomatic support from the US. Before the end of the negotiation phase of the peace process, former President Obama pledged to be a “partner in waging peace” and

⁴⁷⁸ ‘The UN verification mission in Colombia initiates its mandate’, *UN Missions*, 26 September 2017, <https://colombia.unmissions.org/en/un-verification-mission-colombia-initiates-its-mandate>, (accessed 3 October 2017).

⁴⁷⁹ ‘Llegan a Cuba 200 jóvenes colombianos para estudiar medicina’, *Telesur*, 26 August 2017, <https://www.telesurtv.net/news/Llegan-a-Cuba-200-jovenes-colombianos-para-estudiar-medicina-20170826-0043.html>, (accessed 29 August 2017).

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁸¹ G. Ávila Gómez, ‘Chile remains committed to Colombian peace process’, *Granma*, 23 June 2016, <http://en.granma.cu/cuba/2016-06-23/chile-remains-committed-to-colombian-peace-process>, (accessed 28 September 2017).

⁴⁸² C. Contreras, ‘Chilean Armed Forces Support Peace in Colombia’, *DIÁLOGO*, 15 September 2017, <https://dialogo-americas.com/en/articles/chilean-armed-forces-support-peace-colombia>, (accessed 28 September 2017).

requested that US Congress approve US\$450 million to go towards the peace process.⁴⁸³

Although these funds were approved by US Congress, no further action has been taken by President Trump.⁴⁸⁴ President Trump has shown no apparent support for the peace process,

and held a clandestine meeting with former presidents Andrés Pastrana and Álvaro Uribe, leaders of the far-right, who led campaigns opposing the terms of the final agreement.⁴⁸⁵

Moreover, he has withdrawn US funding from various international organisations, including funds for peacekeeping missions carried out by the UN.⁴⁸⁶ While third parties are included in the final agreement, the lack of financial support outlined within the agreement could interrupt its implementation, and delay reforms for achieving political, social and economic inclusion and thus sustainable peace.

Conclusion

The final agreement between the FARC and the Colombian Government follows the criteria recommended in scholarly literature for ending a civil war through a negotiated settlement to sustain peace, or avoid a return to war. The final agreement also aims to achieve sustainable peace through political, social and economic inclusion of the FARC and the classes they represent. The level of detail in each point of final agreement – particularly specifics on

⁴⁸³ Ironically, director of the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (National Centre for Historical Memory), Gonzalo Sánchez, stated at the time that the US were “giving the most for peace” after previously being “the same ones who gave the most for war”. S. Brodzinsky and J. Watts, ‘Colombia and Farc rebels sign historic ceasefire deal to end 50-year conflict’, *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/23/colombia-farc-rebel-ceasefire-agreement-havana>, (accessed 17 October 2016); see also R. Rampton, ‘Obama pledges more than \$450 million aid to help Colombia peace plan’, *Reuters*, 5 February 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-colombia/obama-pledges-more-than-450-million-aid-to-help-colombia-peace-plan-idUSKCN0VD2XM>, (accessed 5 October 2017).

⁴⁸⁴ L. Sharkey, ‘USD\$450 million approved for Peace Colombia’, *The Bogota Post*, 12 May 2017, <https://thebogotapost.com/2017/05/12/usd450-million-approved-for-peace-colombia/>, (accessed 7 October 2017).

⁴⁸⁵ ‘Trump Holds Secret Meeting With Right-Wing Colombian Leaders’, *Telesur*, 21 April 2017, <https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Trump-Holds-Secret-Meeting-With-Right-Wing-Colombian-Leaders-20170421-0029.html>, (accessed 5 October 2017).

⁴⁸⁶ M. Nichols, ‘Trump budget cut bid would make it ‘impossible’ for U.N.: spokesman’, *Reuters*, 24 May 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-budget-un/trump-budget-cut-bid-would-make-it-impossible-for-u-n-spokesman-idUSKBN18K1V2?il=0>, (accessed 5 October 2017).

implementing each point – will affect the time taken to achieve a sustainable peace. In the first twelve months after the ‘no’ vote won in the plebiscite for the final agreement, only 18% of the final agreement had been implemented.⁴⁸⁷ The components implemented thus far tend to belong to parts of the agreement that have a more precise implementation plan. The most detailed section of the final agreement pertains to the demobilisation and disarmament of the FARC.

Thus far, the FARC have completed the process of weapons abandonment and have established a political party, due to the rigorous timetable set out in the final agreement. Thus for the FARC, political inclusion is becoming a reality, and steps towards social and economic inclusion are being carried out. On the other hand, the lack of a detailed implementation plan for a more inclusive political system, particularly for security guarantees, has meant that politically motivated assassinations continue, and have increased since the implementation of the final agreement. This is problematic for both the FARC and the classes they represent, as it means that they will continue to be subjected to violent political, social and economic exclusion. Thus it presents a risk to achieving sustainable peace.

Projects outlined in the final agreement for social and economic inclusion aim to sustain peace by addressing the underlying causes of the war and the human cost and consequences of the war. The underlying causes of the war are addressed through land reforms, poverty alleviation, crop substitution and land restitution, to achieve social and economic inclusion for rural populations. Crop substitution also aims to stifle a source of finance for insurgent activity. The final agreement is vague on the details of implementation

⁴⁸⁷ ‘El precario balance de la implementación del Acuerdo de Paz, *El Espectador*, 2 October 2017, <https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/el-precario-balance-de-la-implementacion-del-acuerdo-de-paz-articulo-716104>, (accessed 3 October 2017). See also L. Arboleda Zárate and G. Gómez Polo, ‘El Acuerdo de Paz, a paso lento,’ *El Espectador*, 27 August 2017, <http://colombia2020.elespectador.com/politica/el-acuerdo-de-paz-paso-lento>, (accessed 22 September 2017).

for these proposed reforms, which has historically prevented social and economic change in rural Colombia. Ultimately these plans will take time to produce change, provided they are not abandoned, and that there is collaboration with communities. In the meantime the achievement of sustainable peace will take time and further agreements with communities will be made. The human cost and consequences of the war are addressed through the proposed mechanism of the JEP, which fosters inclusion through justice, reparation and reconciliation for all perpetrators and victims of the war. While the JEP has not yet been implemented, when it does begin, the focus should be on subjecting all perpetrators to justice. Justice will recast inter-group relationships through non-violent engagement to prevent new cycles of violence that could destabilise peace.

The involvement of neutral third parties complies with civil war settlement theory, as peace is more likely to be sustained when there are impartial guarantors to ensure that the terms of the negotiated settlement are carried out by all parties. Thus while the final agreement lacks detail on a precise implementation plan for important issues such as land reforms, crop substitution and security guarantees, it has strong support and monitoring by third parties. On the other hand, absence of economic support from third parties outlined in the final agreement could destabilise peace, as the peace process lacks the resources to implement the mechanisms proposed. Hence the final agreement is very much the starting point for achieving sustainable peace in Colombia; it has clear objectives for political, social and economic inclusion and complies with criteria for sustaining peace in a negotiated settlement to civil war. Nonetheless, it falls short on precisely how and with what resources it will achieve them.

Conclusion

In this thesis, I endeavoured to explore what will make peace sustainable in Colombia according to the terms of the final agreement, which propose reforms and mechanisms for ending the conflict between the FARC and the Colombian Government. I have found that it aims to achieve sustainable peace in Colombia by cohering to criteria defined by theories for negotiated settlements to civil war by responding to the underlying factors that caused and sustained the war. The final agreement also goes beyond these criteria to address the human cost of the war and administer justice. In the same way, by corresponding to and surpassing criteria for sustaining peace in a negotiated settlement, the final agreement also attempts to address the legacy of political, social and economic exclusion, by proposing systematic changes to foster political, social and economic inclusion of the FARC and the classes they represent. Within the first year of implementation, the peace process has progressed from the negotiation phase, and irreversible advances have been made. These developments correspond to crucial points in the final agreement which defined a rigorous implementation plan, and have set in motion mechanisms for achieving peace through the inclusion of the FARC. On the other hand, the lack of a precise implementation plan and resources for other crucial proposals has meant that political, social and economic exclusion continues in Colombia.

The findings of my investigation can be considered one among many perspectives on the shortcomings of the final agreement and the outcomes for peace in Colombia. I have focused on the binary of exclusion and inclusion and identified exclusion as the historic problem the final agreement attempts to resolve through inclusion. I found that while exclusion through violence persists, peace cannot be sustained in Colombia as it does not prevent new cycles of violence from emerging. On paper, the final agreement responds to the

pandemic of violence in Colombia throughout the 20th and early 21st Centuries. Colombia entered the 20th Century locked in the civil war known as the Thousand Days' War; a war fought against a centralised authority and for political inclusion. Ultimately, inclusion was achieved through an agreement between Liberals and Conservatives, after which Colombia experienced a period of relative peace, stability and healthy political rivalry. This period however was marred by the exploitation of the rural populations, epitomised by the Banana Massacre of 1928, and politically motivated episodes of violence, exemplified by the murder of Gaitán; an influential political leader in mobilising the poor and lower classes and increasing civic participation in politics and elections. His death was the catalyst for *La Violencia*, a more brutal and drawn out period of political violence. The period of exclusion through violence and oppression that followed the settlement of the Thousand Days' War and culminated in *La Violencia* is a cautionary tale for the current peace process, and highlights the urgency of implementing security guarantees. Although the final agreement does propose security guarantees to solve the problem of political exclusion at the origins and crux of the war in Point 3 and Point 4, the lack of a clear implementation plan hinders the achievement of a sustainable peace by allowing politically motivated violence to continue.

Political exclusion in the history of Colombia has also been articulated through the social and economic exclusion of the rural populations and the poorer classes through land ownership. Land concentration in the hands of the upper classes was a consequence of *La Violencia* and continued as a means of marginalising lower classes and left-wing groups throughout the conflict. Land ownership in Colombia also granted upper classes political visibility and representation, which further excluded the concerns of lower classes who did not own land. Political exclusion through expulsion or confiscation was exemplified by the attempted elimination of the Communist community residing in the Republic of Marquetalia from their autonomous territory. This trend continued throughout the war as a strategy used

by paramilitary groups against the FARC to increase their influence and eliminate the *guerrilla*. Taking land and expelling the owners or occupants, as a strategy employed by all actors in the conflict has caused the displacement of a large portion of Colombians. Thus land reforms and restitution form part of the solution to the war proposed in Point 1 and Point 5 of the final agreement. However, without a clear implantation strategy, and security guarantees for social leaders and activists that advocate land rights and restitution, the likelihood of land reforms succeeding as a solution to the conflict is dubious.

The findings of this investigation suggest that the final agreement addresses the role of the drug trade in the conflict as a source of economic support for armed groups in Point 4. Strategies to deal with the problem of drug use and the drug trade not only propose to dismantle drug cartels, but also prevent trading in their illegal economy, thus removing it as a source of funding for the FARC. The main strategy for dealing with the problem of drugs is to prevent the supply of coca to cartels for the production of drugs through substitution of coca crops. It also proposes security measures to combat paramilitarism and organised crime networks. This point however lacks a precise implementation plan, and simply proposes to settle further agreements with each community of coca farmers and increase policing of organised crime. The vagueness of this point, particularly crop substitution schemes, raises further questions about national policies for dealing with the complexity and diversity of each local community of coca growers, and how to encourage the confidence of coca farmers in State crop substitution programs. This point in the final agreement does not acknowledge the complex and diverse needs of each coca growing community, nor assert deferential treatment for each community. Uncertainty surrounding crop substitution programs and the lack of an implementation plan for policing organised crime and security guarantees for each community will ultimately slow inclusion into the legal economy and thus impede the achievement of sustainable peace.

My investigation have found that mechanisms and schemes to include the FARC politically, socially and economically in Point 3 are consistent with criteria for a negotiated settlement to a civil war. They also recognise that to adequately include former combatants of the FARC, it is essential to dismantle their military structure and undergo the DDR process. This addresses the problem of their withdrawal from society and the origins of the FARC as an armed group, and their growth into a military force, while still allowing them to continue the objectives of their original armed struggle. The DDR process consists of skills training and personal development programs to foster social and economic inclusion, improves the quality of life of former combatants, and addresses individual motives for former combatants to join the armed struggle. These terms in the final agreement also present incentives for the combatants to demobilise. These incentives were not addressed in previous failed peace processes, thus the current process observes and compensates for previous oversight. Incentives are also offered through provisions for political inclusion, and are consistent with the nature of the war as a political struggle. The foundations for political inclusion are outlined in Point 2, which proposes to broaden the ideological scope of politics in Colombia by granting wider access to, and resources for, political movements. Point 3 also provides specific concessions to nurture the political movement that arises from the FARC. Due to the precise implementation plan and the rigour with which Point 3 describes the political, social and economic integration and inclusion of the FARC, the DDR process is complete and the FARC have established their political party in time for the 2018 elections.

Nonetheless, the findings of my investigation question the prospects for achieving sustainable peace, as pardoned former FARC combatants, social leaders and human rights activists are being assassinated. The experience of the FARC in previous peace processes and attempts to enter politics through the UP should not be underestimated. This example of political exclusion through violence had a profound impact on the FARC and their

subsequent willingness to re-enter into negotiations. Whether these murders are carried out by paramilitaries or civilians who execute ‘private justice’, sustainable peace cannot be achieved as long as cycles of violence continue or new cycles arise. Additionally, as long as civic participation in politics is minimal, and efforts of civilians to make demands of the Government continue to be met with violence from State forces, the achievement of sustainable peace will remain an uncertain and protracted process. The consequences for former FARC combatants and the classes they represent in both cases are exclusion from both politics and society. If this is the case, the merits of the final agreement – the treatment of issues not considered in previous peace processes and issues surrounding causes and enablers of the war – could prove futile, and sustainable peace unattainable. While the current peace process learns from previous failed peace processes, without a precise plan for implementing security guarantees for civilians and new political movements, it risks the recurrence of political genocide comparable to that of the UP in the 1980s and 1990s.

My investigation also finds that unlike previous peace processes between the FARC and the Colombian Government, Point 5 of the final agreement acknowledges the victims of the conflict. It proposes an extensive project of social inclusion through justice, reparations and reconciliation. From this perspective, the inclusion of the wider community affected by the conflict reflects an understanding that sustainable peace through inclusion depends on the participation of the whole society. This point does not respond directly to statistics which convey the culpability of each armed group in the conflict, nor the complexity of victimhood and victimiser. Rather, it focuses on fostering justice through social inclusion, both by giving victims a voice, and through amnesties for former FARC combatants. As the administration of justice is crucial to achieving sustainable peace, Point 5 defines a complex judicial and administrative structure in the JEP, while again lacking an implementation plan. In this

instance, the pace of implementation will most likely not impede the achievement of peace, as the process of justice should not be rushed.

Lastly, the findings of my investigation suggest that the final agreement between the FARC and the Colombian Government sets clear goals which it aims to achieve through the peace process. As it lacks a precise implementation plan for most of the points it defines, the prospects for achieving sustainable peace through political, social and economic inclusion are uncertain. The question remains not if, but when these points will be implemented, and if they will achieve in reality what they set out to in theory. Timeliness is crucial to preventing the continuation of exclusion through violence and new cycles of violence that may occur if political, social and economic exclusion continues. The commitment to the peace process shown by third parties according to Point 6 is a positive, as their support helps to guarantee that the FARC and the Government fulfil their responsibilities and carry out provisions agreed on to settle the war. However, lack of financial support and resources from third parties threatens the implementation of mechanisms and reforms proposed to achieve peace. Nonetheless, sustainable peace may be eventually achieved, provided that both the FARC and the Colombian Government remain committed to the final agreement, and carry out implementation as soon as possible. As long as the implementation of the final agreement remains an uncertain and lengthy process, the continuation of political violence in Colombia may give rise to renewed cycles of violence, and peace will remain unsustainable.

References

‘156 líderes sociales y defensores de derechos humanos han sido asesinados en los últimos 14 meses: Defensoría’, *Defensoría del Pueblo*, 31 March 2017, <http://www.defensoria.gov.co/es/nube/noticias/6236/156-líderes-sociales-y-defensores-de-derechos-humanos-han-sido-asesinados-en-los-últimos-14-meses-Defensoría-Defensoría-del-Pueblo-líderes-sociales-Defensor-del-Pueblo-Colombia-líderes-sociales.htm> (accessed 22 August 2017).

Acosta, J. ‘¡Es el tiempo de tomarse en serio la política sin armas!’, *El Espectador*, 11 May 2017, <http://colombia2020.elespectador.com/opinion/es-el-tiempo-de-tomarse-en-serio-la-politica-sin-armas>, (accessed 23 August 2017).

Albertus, M. and O. Kaplan, ‘Land Reform as a Counterinsurgency Policy: Evidence from Colombia’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 57, no. 2, 2012, pp. 198-231.

Alto Comisionado para la Paz, ‘Acuerdo Final para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera’, *Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz*, 24 November 2016, <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y-conversaciones/Documentos%20compartidos/24-11-2016NuevoAcuerdoFinal.pdf>, (accessed 23 April 2017).

Álvarez Vanegas, E., ‘Post-conflict in Colombia (1). A farewell to arms’, *Democracia Abierta*, 16 December 2015, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/eduardo-lvarez-vanegas/post-conflict-in-colombia-1-farewell-to-arms>, (accessed 26 September 2017).

Álvarez Vanegas, E and D. Pardo Calderón, ‘Disidencias de las Farc: ¿simples bandidos?’, *El Espectador*, 16 May 2017, <http://colombia2020.elespectador.com/pais/disidencias-de-las-farc-simples-bandidos>, (accessed 22 August 2017).

Anderson, J. L., ‘Colombia’s Guerrillas Come Out of the Jungle’, *The New Yorker*, 1 May 2017, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/01/colombias-guerrillas-come-out-of-the-jungle>, (accessed 16 May 2017).

Arboleda Zárate, L. and G. Gómez Polo, ‘El Acuerdo de Paz, a paso lento,’ *El Espectador*, 27 August 2017, <http://colombia2020.elespectador.com/politica/el-acuerdo-de-paz-paso-lento>, (accessed 22 September 2017).

‘Así funcionarán los negocios lícitos de las Farc’ *Semana*, 30 June 2017, <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/ecomun-cooperativa-de-las-farc-en-la-vida-legal-su-nueva-economia/530424>, (accessed 13 September 2017).

Ávila Gómez, G. 'Chile remains committed to Colombian peace process', *Granma*, 23 June 2016, <http://en.granma.cu/cuba/2016-06-23/chile-remains-committed-to-colombian-peace-process>, (accessed 28 September 2017).

Bargent, J. and J. McDermott, '50 Years of the FARC: War, Drugs and Revolution', *Insight Crime: Investigation and Analysis of Organised Crime*, 26 May 2014, <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-50-years>, (accessed 28 June 2017).

Barrios, A. et al., 'Marketing as a Means to Transformative Social Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Transitioning War Economies and the Colombian Coffee Marketing System', *Journal of Public Policy & Marketing*, vol. 35, no. 2, 2016, pp. 185-197.

Bell, C., 'Lex Pacificatoria Colombiana: Colombia's Peace Accord in Comparative Perspective', *American Journal of International Law*, no. 110, 2016, pp. 165-171.

Bosch Alvarado, D. V., 'The Failure of Peace: Transitional Justice's Inefficacy in Upholding Victims' Rights in the Colombian Peace Process', *Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship*, vol. 2, no. 6, 2017, pp. 1-17.

Brittain, J., *Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia – The Origin and Direction of the FARC-EP*, New York, Pluto Press, 2010.

Brittain, J. J., 'The FARC-EP and Consequential Marxism in Colombia', in S. Feuchtwang and A. Shah (eds.), *Emancipatory Politics: A Critique*, Open Anthropology Cooperative Press, 2015, pp. 95-132.

Brodzinsky, S. and J. Watts, 'Colombia and Farc rebels sign historic ceasefire deal to end 50-year conflict', *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/23/colombia-farc-rebel-ceasefire-agreement-havana>, (accessed 17 October 2016).

Burnyeat, G., 'Peace in Colombia?' *London Review of Books*, 1 December 2016, <https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2016/12/01/gwen-burnyeat/peace-in-colombia/>, (accessed 31 August 2017).

Burnyeat, G., 'Demobilisation in Llano Grande', *LRB blog*, [web blog], 25 August 2017, <https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2017/08/25/gwen-burnyeat/demobilisation-in-llano-grande/>, (accessed 31 August 2017).

Bushnell, D., *The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself*, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1993.

Carasik, L., 'Washington should avoid repeating Plan Colombia's failures', *Aljazeera America*, 9 February 2016, <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2016/2/washington-should-avoid-repeating-plan-colombias-failures.html>, (accessed 16 May 2017).

Carlin, R. E., J. L. Meloy and J. Subotic, 'Legitimacy Deficits in Colombia's Peace Talks: Elites, Trust and Support for Transitional Justice', *USAID Research and Innovation Grants Working Paper Series*, 8 February 2016, pp. 1-27.

Carvajal, L. and F. Badia I Dalmases, 'Failing to transform good intentions into actions is the biggest challenge of the Colombian Peace Agreement', *Open Democracy*, 11 August 2017, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/lucas-carvajal-francsc-badia-i-dalmases/in-colombia-failing-to-transform-good-inte>, (accessed 20 August 2017).

Casey, N., 'Los campesinos de la coca en Colombia temen por su subsistencia en tiempos de paz', *The New York Times*, 18 July 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/es/2017/07/18/colombia-sustitucion-cultivos-paz-farc/>, (accessed 3 October 2017).

Chinchilla, F. A., *Inclusion, Exclusion, and 'Fragmented' Peace: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Processes in Colombia*, Vancouver, Canadian Consortium on Human Security Centre of International Relations, 2007.

'Coca-growing in Colombia is at an all-time high', *The Economist*, 23 March 2017, <https://www.economist.com/news/americas/21719468-government-hopes-former-farc-guerrillas-will-persuade-villagers-switch>, (accessed 22 September 2017).

Coleman, B. L., *Colombia and the United States: The Making of an Inter-American Alliance, 1939-1960*, Kent, The Kent State University Press, 2008.

'Colombia: Another FARC Member killed in Sombre Sign for Peace', *teleSUR*, 20 June 2017, <http://wp.telesurtv.net/english/news/Colombia-Another-FARC-Member-Killed-in-Sombre-Sign-for-Peace-20170620-0020.html>, (accessed 22 August 2017).

'Colombian Campesino Leader Murdered, Paramilitaries Implicated', *Telesur*, 9 August 2017, <https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Colombian-Campesino-Leader-Murdered-Paramilitaries-Implicated-20170809-0011.html>, (accessed 24 September 2017).

'Colombian government and ELN rebels agree ceasefire', *BBC News*, 4 September 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-41147416>, (accessed 29 September 2017).

'Colombia's FARC insurgency may be coming to an end. But can peace hold?', *Global Dispatches*, [podcast] World Politics Review, 2012, <http://podbay.fm/show/593535863/e/1438808280?autostart=1>, (accessed 21 May 2016).

'Con \$1,5 billiones se puso fin a paro en el puerto', *El Tiempo*, 6 June 2017, <http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/cali/acuerdos-que-se-lograron-por-el-paro-civico-en-buenaventura-96006?hootPostID=00003dfcd81a070d0422b2f1962d5e36>, (accessed 12 June 2017).

Congate Ochoa, B. and J. A. Caro, 'El uso minifundista de la tierra como eje central del preacuerdo agrario entre el gobierno de Colombia y las FARC. Factibilidad preliminar teórica y práctica', *I+D Revista De Investigaciones*, vol. 8, no. 2. 2017, pp. 25-34.

Contreras, C. 'Chilean Armed Forces Support Peace in Colombia', *DIÁLOGO*, 15 September 2017, <https://dialogo-americas.com/en/articles/chilean-armed-forces-support-peace-colombia>, (accessed 28 September 2017).

Coso, N., "'Mi mama se orinó del miedo, los niños lloraban, todos llorábamos': el Pacífico sur, la region de Colombia donde la Guerra apenas comienza", *BBC Mundo*, 14 June 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-40230236>, (accessed 22 August 2017).

'Día histórico: Las Farc dejaron de existir como grupo armado', *La Nación*, 15 August 2017, <http://www.lanacion.com.co/2017/08/15/dia-historico-las-farc-dejaron-existir-grupo-armado/>, (accessed 30 August 2017).

Dube, O. and S. Naidu, 'Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of US Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia', *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 77, no.1, 2015, pp. 249-267.

Dudley, S., *Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia*, London, Routledge, 2004.

Duffy Toft, M., 'Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?', *International Security*, vol. 34, no. 4, 2010, pp. 7-36.

'El Chocó pone a prueba la paz colombiana', *El Pílon*, 3 May 2017, <http://elpilon.com.co/choco-pone-prueba-la-paz-colombiana/>, (accessed 22 August 2017).

'El precario balance de la implementación del Acuerdo de Paz', *El Espectador*, 2 October 2017, <https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/el-precario-balance-de-la-implementacion-del-acuerdo-de-paz-articulo-716104>, (accessed 3 October 2017)

'El 'toque' de los militares a la Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz', *Verdad Abierta*, 30 January 2017, <http://www.verdadabierta.com/procesos-de-paz/farc/6532-el-toque-de-los-militares-a-la-jurisdiccion-especial-para-la-paz>, (accessed 23 September 2017).

Eskauriatza, S., 'Colombia struggles to deliver justice in army 'cash-for-kills' scandal', *The Conversation*, 18 September 2017, https://theconversation.com/colombia-struggles-to-deliver-justice-in-army-cash-for-kills-scandal-82350?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Latest+from+The+Conversation+for+September+18+2017+-+83436836&utm_content=Latest+from+The+Conversation+for+September+18+2017+-+83436836+CID_4f5f37279f14f24fd0db3d056ba66c3b&utm_source=campaign_monitor_global&utm_term=Colombia+struggles+to+deliver+justice+in+army+cash-for-kills+scandal, (accessed 21 September 2017).

'Exterminio de la UP fue un genocidio político', *Verdad Abierta*, 15 September 2016, <http://www.verdadabierta.com/component/content/article/42-asesinatos-selectivos/4390-exterminio-de-la-up-si-fue-un-genocidio-politico>, (accessed 3 October 2017).

Faguet, J., F. Sánchez and M. Villaveces-Niño, *The Paradox of Land Reform, Inequality and Development in Colombia*, London, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2016.

Franco, Y. P. et al., 'Acuerdos entre las FARC-EP y el Gobierno de Colombia: Política de Desarrollo Agrario Integral-Reforma Rural Integral (RRI)', *Revista Kavilando*, vol. 8, no. 2, 2016, pp. 184-195.

Galvis-Delgado, F., 'El próximo acuerdo colombiano: Buenaventura', *Council on Hemispheric Affairs*, 18 August 2017, <http://www.coha.org/el-proximo-acuerdo-colombiano-buenaventura/>, (accessed 22 September 2017).

González Posso, C., 'Negotiations with the FARC: 1982-2002', *Accord*, vol. 14, 2004, pp. 46-51.

Green, W. J., "'Vibrations of the Collective": The Popular Ideology of Gaitanismo on Colombia's Atlantic Coast, 1944-1948', *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol. 76, no. 2, 1996, pp. 283-311.

Grupo de Memoria Histórica, *¡Basta ya! Colombia: Memorias de guerra y dignidad*, Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2013, p. 32.

Hegre, H., 'The Duration and Termination of Civil War', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 41, no. 3, 2004, pp. 243-252.

Hernández Bonilla, J. M., 'Cooperativas de las Farc, una alternativa para el posconflicto', *El Espectador*, 14 August 2017, <http://colombia2020.elespectador.com/territorio/cooperativas-de-las-farc-una-alternativa-para-el-posconflicto>, (accessed 22 August 2017).

- Holmes, J. S. and S. A. Gutiérrez de Piñares, 'Violence and the State: Lessons from Colombia', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, vol. 25, no. 2, 2014, pp. 372-403.
- Horna, H., *A People's History of Latin America*, Princeton, Markus Wiener Publishers, 2014.
- Hristov, J., 'Self-Defense Forces, Warlords, or Criminal Gangs? Towards a New Conceptualization of Paramilitarism in Colombia', *Labour, Capital and Society*, vol. 43, no. 2, 2010, pp. 13-56.
- Hultquist, P., 'Power Parity and Peace? The Role of Relative Power in Civil War Settlement', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 50, no. 5, 2013, pp. 623-634.
- Ibáñez, A. M., 'El proceso de paz con las Farc: ¿Una oportunidad para reducir la pobreza rural y aumentar la productividad agropecuaria?' *Revista de Ingeniería*, no. 44, 2016, pp. 8-13.
- Jaramillo, L. M., 'Colombia: how strong is the commitment to peace?', *Insight on Conflict*, 15 August 2017, <https://www.insightonconflict.org/blog/2017/08/colombia-how-strong-commitment-peace/>, (accessed 20 August 2017).
- Jean-Baptiste, M. 'Cracking the Toughest Nut: Colombia's Endeavour with Amnesty for Political Crimes under Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions', *Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law*, vol. 7, no. 1, 2017, pp. 28-63.
- Jelsma, M. and C. A. Youngers, 'Coca and the Colombian Peace Accords: A Commentary on the Pilot Substitution Program in Briceño', *WOLA*, 10 August 2017, <https://www.wola.org/analysis/coca-colombian-peace-accords-commentary-pilot-substitution-project-briceno/>, (accessed 22 August 2017).
- Johnson, K., 'The Uncertainty of Peace in Colombia', *International Crisis Group*, February 1, 2017, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/uncertainty-peace-colombia>, (accessed 25 August 2017).
- Johnson, T., 'Woman's bomb death stirs rage in Colombia', *The Miami Herald*, 17 May 2000, <http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/farc/elvia.htm>, (accessed 16 May 2017).
- Joshi, M., E. Melander and J. M. Quinn, 'Sequencing the Peace: How the Order of Peace Agreement Implementation Can Reduce the Destabilizing Effects of Post-agreement Elections', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2015, pp. 1-25.
- Josi, C., 'Accountability in the Colombian Peace Agreement: Are the Proposed Sanctions Contrary to Colombia's International Obligations', *Southwestern Law Review*, no. 46, 2016, pp. 401-421.

Kaplan, O. and E. Nussio, 'Explaining Recidivism of Ex-combatants in Colombia', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2016, pp. 1-30.

Kovalik, D., 'Peaceful Protest in Buenaventura, Colombia Met With Terror' *Huffington Post*, 6 June 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/peaceful-protest-in-buenaventura-colombia-met-with_us_5936c161e4b0cca4f42d9d8c?ncid=engmodushpimg00000004, (accessed 22 September 2017).

'Las confesiones de 'Rojas', el guerrillero que asesinó a 'Iván Ríos'' *El Tiempo*, 1 July 2015, <http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-16028597>, (accessed 16 May 2017).

'Las FARC asesinaron a Daniel García: Policía' *El Tiempo*, 27 February 1992, <http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-47196>, (accessed 16 May 2017).

'Las Farc aún no resuelven sus discusiones políticas internas', *Verdad Abierta*, 2 August 2017, <http://www.verdadabierta.com/procesos-de-paz/farc/6715-las-farc-aun-no-resuelven-sus-discusiones-politicas-internas?t=1&cn=ZmxleGlibGVfcmVjc18y&refsrc=email&iid=4bf78d4ad2e1410ca675dd7bfcce1890&uid=790313251489796097&nid=244+276893704>, (accessed 9 August 2017).

'Las Farc cambian nombre pero no de siglas en su paso a la política', *RT*, 1 September 2017, <https://actualidad.rt.com/actualidad/248666-farc-cambian-nombre-siglas-partido>, (accessed 22 September).

'Las Farc inician la conformación de la cooperativa ECOMUN', *El Tiempo*, 29 June 2017, <http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/conformacion-de-la-cooperativa-ecomun-104078>, (accessed 26 September 2017).

Lee, C. 'The FARC and the Colombian Left: Time for a Political Solution?', *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 39, no. 1, 2012, pp. 28-42.

Leech, G. *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency*, London, New York, Zed Books, 2011.

León, O. and B. Sanchez Espitia, 'A New Generation of Paramilitary Groups is Killing Social Activists in Colombia', *The Real News*, 2 August 2017, http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=19673, (accessed 19 September 2017).

León, O. and B. Sanchez Espitia, 'A New Generation of Paramilitary Groups is Killing Social Activists in Colombia (pt. 2/2)', *The Real News*, 7 August 2017, http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=19714, (accessed 22 September 2017).

Licklider, R., 'The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993', *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 89, no. 3, 1995, pp. 681-690.

'Llegan a Cuba 200 jóvenes colombianos para estudiar medicina', *Telesur*, 26 August 2017, <https://www.telesurtv.net/news/Llegan-a-Cuba-200-jovenes-colombianos-para-estudiar-medicina-20170826-0043.html>, (accessed 29 August 2017).

Marshall, M. C. and J. Ishiyama, 'Does political inclusion of rebel parties promote peace after civil conflict?', *Democratization*, vol. 23, no. 6, 2016, pp. 1009-1025.

Menges, N. and Luis Fleischman, 'Agreement with the FARC should reflect a victorious Colombian State, not equal partnership', *The Americas Report*, 13 July 2017, <http://www.theamericasreport.com/2016/07/13/agreement-with-the-farc-should-reflect-a-victorious-colombian-state-not-equal-partnership/>, (accessed 20 August 2017).

Metelits, C., 'From Jekyll to Hyde: The Transformation of the FARC', in *Inside Insurgency: violence, civilians, and revolutionary group behaviour*, New York, New York University Press, 2010, pp. 79-120.

Nichols, M., 'Trump budget cut bid would make it 'impossible' for U.N.: spokesman', *Reuters*, 24 May 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-budget-un/trump-budget-cut-bid-would-make-it-impossible-for-u-n-spokesman-idUSKBN18K1V2?il=0>, (accessed 5 October 2017).

Nilsson, M. and L. K. Taylor, 'Applying the security-development nexus on the ground: land restitution in Colombia', *Conflict, Security & Development*, 2016, pp. 1-17.

'NIMD and the Colombia Peace Agreement: towards a more equal and inclusive society', *Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy*, 31 August 2017, <http://nimd.org/nimd-and-the-colombian-peace-agreement-towards-a-more-equal-and-inclusive-society/>, (accessed 29 September 2017).

Nogueira, N. 'Money, Drugs, Guerrillas – A case study on FARC's relationship with coca and cocaine from 1978-1999,' *Medium*, 1 January 2017, <https://medium.com/@NatalieNogueira/money-drugs-guerrillas-a-case-study-on-farcs-relationship-with-coca-and-cocaine-from-1978-1999-492a13e220dd>, (accessed 9 September 2017).

"'No queremos una sola gota más de sangre por razones políticas': Timochenko", *Semana*, 1 September 2017, <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/el-discurso-de-timochenko-en-la-plaza-de-bolivar/538460>, (accessed 26 September 2017).

Nussio, E., 'Learning from Shortcomings: the demobilisation of paramilitaries in Colombia', *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, vol. 6, no. 2, 2011, pp. 88-92.

Nussio, E., A. Rettberg and J. E. Ugarriza, 'Victims, Nonvictims and Their Opinions on Transitional Justice: Findings from the Colombian Case', *International journal of transitional justice*, vol. 9, no. 2, 2015, pp. 1-19.

Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, *Acuerdo Fin del Conflicto*, <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/fin-del-conflicto.html>, (accessed 27 June 2017).

Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, *Acuerdo Participación Política* [website], <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/participacion-politica.html>, (accessed 27 June 2017).

Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, *Acuerdo Política de desarrollo agrario integral* [website], <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/politica-de-desarrollo-agrario-integral.html>, (accessed 27 June 2017).

Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, *Acuerdo Solución al problema de las drogas ilícitas* [website], <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/solucion-al-problema-de-las-drogas-ilicitas.html>, (accessed 27 June 2017).

Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, *Acuerdo sobre las Víctimas del conflicto* [website], <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/victimas.html>, (accessed 27 June 2017).

Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, *Implementación, verificación y refrendación* [website], <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/informes-especiales/abc-del-proceso-de-paz/implementacion-refrendacion-verificacion-acuerdo-final.html>, (accessed 27 June 2017).

Orlando Melo, J., 'Resumen del Acuerdo de Paz', *Revista de Economía Institucional*, vol. 18, no. 35, 2016, pp. 319-337.

Ospina, Gen. C. A., T. A. Marks and D. H. Ucko, 'Colombia and the War-to-Peace Transition: Cautionary Lessons from Other Cases', *Military Review*, vol. 96, no. 4, 2016, pp. 41-52.

Palacios, M., *Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875-2002*, Durham, Duke University Press, 2006.

Paley, D., *Drug War Capitalism*, Edinburgh, AK Press, 2014.

Pécaut, D., 'From the Banality of Fear to Real Terror: the Case of Colombia', in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), *Societies of Fear: The Legacy of Civil War, Violence and Terror in Latin America*, London, New York, Zed Books, 1999, pp. 141-167.

Pinzón J. C., 'Colombia Back from the Brink: From Failed State to Exporter of Security', *Prism*, vol. 5, no. 4, 2015, pp. 3-9.

'¿Plan de exterminio contra los milicianos de las Farc?', *Verdad Abierta*, 18 August 2017, http://www.verdadabierta.com/procesos-de-paz/farc/6726-plan-de-exterminio-contra-los-milicianos-de-las-farc?utm_source=TW&utm_campaign=proceso-paz-18082017&utm_medium=articulo, (accessed 22 August 2017).

Priest, D., 'Covert Action in Colombia', *The Washington Post*, 21 December 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2013/12/21/covert-action-in-colombia/?utm_term=.f8cf6a268e28, (accessed 16 May 2017).

Prieto, J. D., 'Together after the War While the War Goes On: Victims, Ex-combatants and Communities in Three Colombian Cities', *International Journal of Transitional Justice*, vol. 6, no. 3, 2012, pp. 525-546.

Quinn, J. M., T. D. Mason, and M. Gurses, 'Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence', *International Interactions*, vol. 33, no. 2, 2007, pp. 167-193.

Raby, D., 'Colombia as the linchpin of US hegemony in Latin America', in F. Dominguez, G. Lievesley and S. Ludlam (eds.), *Right-Wing Politics in the New Latin America*, London, New York, Zed Books, 2011, pp. 78-95.

Ramírez Lemus, M. C., K. Stanton, and J. Walsh, 'Colombia: A Vicious Cycle of Drugs and War', in C. Youngers and E. Rosin (eds.), *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy*, Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005, pp. 99-141.

Rampton, R., 'Obama pledges more than \$450 million aid to help Colombia peace plan', *Reuters*, 5 February 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-colombia/obama-pledges-more-than-450-million-aid-to-help-colombia-peace-plan-idUSKCN0VD2XM>, (accessed 5 October 2017).

Ramsey, G., 'Is Colombia's New Military Strategy a Herald of Peace?', *InSight Crime: Investigation and Analysis of Organised Crime*, 27 March 2012, <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/is-colombias-new-military-strategy-a-herald-of-peace>, (accessed 16 May 2017).

Rehm, L., 'La construcción de las subculturas políticas en Colombia: los partidos tradicionales como antípodas políticas durante *La Violencia*, 1946-1964', *Historia y Sociedad*, no. 27, 2014, pp. 17-48.

Safford, F. and M. Palacios, *Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002.

Sánchez, N., 'No somos invasores: José Ángel Palomeque', *El Espectador*, 27 August 2017, <http://colombia2020.elespectador.com/territorio/no-somos-invasores-jose-angel-palomeque>, (accessed 22 September 2017).

Scott, P. D., 'Forward', in *Cocaine, Death Squads, and the War on Terror: U.S. Imperialism and Class Struggle in Colombia*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 2011, pp. 9-16.

Sharkey, L. 'USD\$450 million approved for Peace Colombia', *The Bogota Post*, 12 May 2017, <https://thebogotapost.com/2017/05/12/usd450-million-approved-for-peace-colombia/>, (accessed 7 October 2017).

Shifter, M., 'Plan Colombia; A Retrospective', *Americas Quarterly*, vol. 6, no. 3, 2012, <http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3787>, (accessed 16 May 2017).

Simons, G., *Colombia: A Brutal History*, London, SAQI, 2004.

Söderberg Kovacs, M. and S. Hatz, 'Rebel-to-party transformations in civil war peace processes 1975-2011', *Democratization*, vol. 23, no. 6, p. 1003.

Soifer, H. D., *State Building in Latin America*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Stokes, D., *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia*, London, New York, Zed Books, 2005.

Taylor, L. K., M. Nilsson and B. Amezcuita-Castro, 'Reconstructing the social fabric amid ongoing violence: attitudes toward reconciliation and structural transformation in Colombia', *Peacebuilding*, vol. 4, no. 1, 2016, pp. 83-98.

Tejedor Estupiñán, J. M., 'Editorial: towards a post-conflict economy', *Revista Finanzas y Política Económica*, vol. 9, no. 1, 2017, p. 15.

Themnér A. and T. Ohlson, 'Legitimate peace in post-civil war states: towards attaining the unattainable', *Conflict, Security & Development*, vol. 14, no. 1, 2014, pp.61-87.

'The UN verification mission in Colombia initiates its mandate', *UN Missions*, 26 September 2017, <https://colombia.unmissions.org/en/un-verification-mission-colombia-initiates-its-mandate>, (accessed 3 October 2017).

Torres, C. F., 'In Colombia, The Forest Of Peace Honors 8 Million Lives Lost In Civil War', *Huffington Post*, 25 August 2017, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carlos-f-torres/in-colombia-the-forest-of-b-11655470.html>, (accessed 14 September 2017).

'Trump Holds Secret Meeting With Right-Wing Colombian Leaders', *Telesur*, 21 April 2017, <https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Trump-Holds-Secret-Meeting-With-Right-Wing-Colombian-Leaders-20170421-0029.html>, (accessed 5 October 2017).

Tweedie, J. 'Police Kill Nine Coca Leaf Growers During Protest, Say Farmers' *Morning Star*, 7 October 2017, <http://www.morningstaronline.co.uk/a-cf20-Police-kill-nine-coca-leaf-growers-during-protest,-say-farmers#.WdiNpYNPnIU>, (accessed 7 October 2017).

Ucrós Maldonado, A., 'What is the Colombian Peace Process Teaching the World?', *New England Journal of Public Policy*, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 1-7.

United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 'Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Laws and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law', 16 December 2005, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RemedyAndReparation.aspx>, (accessed 4 October 2017).

'UN observers conclude FARC-EP arms removal process in Colombia, *UN News Centre*, 16 August 2017, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=57366#.WcpCfqjTTIV>, (accessed 26 September 2017).

Villar, O. and D. Cottle, *Cocaine, Death Squads and the War on Terror: U.S. Imperialism and Class Struggle in Colombia*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 2011.

Walter, B., 'The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement', *International Organisation*, vol. 51, no. 3, 1997, pp. 335-364.

Walter, B. F., *Committing to Peace: The successful settlement of civil wars*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002.

Walter, B., 'Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 41, no. 3, 2004, pp. 371-388.

Wilpert, G. and M. Murillo, 'Assassination of 41 Activists in Colombia Threatens Peace Process', *The Real News*, 10 May 2017, http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=19032, (accessed 24 September 2017).