

Cooperation and Image in the Climate Change Context:
Australia Frames China as an Environmental Actor

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December 2012

STATEMENT OF CANDIDATE

I certify that the work in this thesis entitled “Cooperation and Image in the Climate Change Context: Australia Frames China as an Environmental Actor” has not previously been submitted for a degree nor has it been submitted as part of requirements for a degree to any other university or institution other than Macquarie University.

I also certify that the thesis is an original piece of research and it has been written by me. Any help and assistance that I have received in my research work and the preparation of the thesis itself have been appropriately acknowledged.

In addition, I certify that all information sources and literature used are indicated in the thesis.

The research presented in this thesis was approved by Macquarie University Ethics Review Committee, reference number: 5201001399 (D) on 10 December 2010.

Li Ji (Student ID: 41550595)

December 2012

DEDICATION

To my parents

Xiaoxian Ji and Xiuxiang Yue

For their love, inspiration and encouragement

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Writing a doctoral thesis has been the most challenging, life-changing and unforgettable journey in my life. The completion of my thesis project could not have been achieved without the support and encouragement of numerous kind people and various institutions. I would like to gratefully acknowledge their support and contributions.

My utmost gratitude goes to my principal supervisor, Professor Naren Chitty, Foundation Chair in International Communication and Director of the Soft Power Advocacy and Research Centre at Macquarie University. His wisdom, knowledge and positive attitude have deeply enlightened me; his mentorship was paramount in providing me with a well-rounded experience, with patient supervision and the affording of practical opportunities consistent with my long-term career goals. I would also like to thank my associate supervisor, Dr Catherine Simpson, for her willingness to assume this responsibility and for her patient guidance.

My special thanks and respect extend to all the interviewees, who willingly accepted my interview request and generously shared their experiences and perspectives. The in-depth interviews with them yielded the precious ore, the findings of this thesis – that I have worked with in forging conclusions. Without their support, this thesis would not have been possible.

It is a great honour for me to express appreciation to all the scholars and experts that I met, particularly in the U.S. during my PGRF-sponsored research trip. They offered me such constructive comments and illuminating

perspectives, which have contributed to the diversity, breadth and depth of views that have been captured in my thesis. These scholars include Professor Gary Weaver (the American University), Professor Dwight Perkins (Harvard University), Professor Joseph Nye (Harvard University) and Professor Gary Rawnsley (University of Leeds). Other professional experts I consulted include Jill Crowther (World Bank), Daniel Shepard (United Nations) and Katy Lin (Australian Permanent Mission to the United Nations). My special thanks are extended to Professor Philip Seib for inviting me to attend an inspirational graduate class in Public Diplomacy, Professor Gary Kreps (George Mason University) for arranging my visit to George Mason University, Ramu Damodaran (United Nations) for his introduction to his colleagues in the UN and Shamali F. de Silva (World Bank) for her introduction to her colleagues in World Bank.

I owe my deepest gratitude to Glen Phillips, Associate Professor in Edith Cowan University. He is like a mentor as well as a father, always generously offers his support and understanding to me; and also, to a journalistic great couple, Jay Hauben and Ronda Hauben, who provided me with kind assistance when I was conducting research in New York.

I am indebted to many of my friends and colleagues for their friendship and support. The communication with them always gave me inspiration and courage to continue this long journey. I would like to show my thanks to Anika Struppert, Dianlin Huang, Hui Xue (Janet), Kuo Huang (Viola), Luc Lin, Juan Carlos Valencia, Prithi Nambiar, Shuqin Zhu (Judith), Tony McHugh, Wichian Lattipongpun, Xiaoguang Zhu (Zoe).

My family deserves the deepest gratitude and special acknowledgement. My parents Xiaoxian Ji, Xiuxiang Yue, and my brother Zhengkai Ji, have been always behind me and have supported me with their greatest love. No words can express how grateful I am for their love and support, and how much I love and appreciate them. I also extend my great gratitude to my boyfriend, Jesse Gebryel, for his love and company in this journey.

Last but not least, I take this opportunity to sincerely acknowledge my university – Macquarie University – that generously offered me this great opportunity and a Macquarie University Research Excellence Scholarship to financially support my pursuit in this life-changing journey, and my department – Media, Music, Communication and Cultural Studies – that furnished me with teaching opportunities to add to my pedagogic experience, knowledge and skills. I would also like to thank the organizations and institutions that helped me on my way, including the Library of Congress, UN Archives and Records Management Section, and Lamont Library at Harvard University.

ABSTRACT

Environmental issues, especially climate change, have increasingly gained salience on the agenda of national policy and in the theatre of world politics in the 21st century. China is one of the key players on this stage. In the contemporary international context, a new typology of national images needs to be established to incorporate relationships that go beyond the enemy-ally dichotomy. In the field of communication, most studies about China's national image follow a visibility-valence typology, but the results are no longer sufficient to serve the subtleties arising in the context of 21st century, particularly the implementation of soft power and public diplomacy.

Responding to the inadequacies in the literature, this project has developed a new typology of national images as well as a framing approach for national image analysis in the Chinese national image context. In order to fill the research gap, this project examined the Australian social discourse (media discourse and intermediate experts' discourse) constructing China's national image in relation to environment. It did so by conducting framing analysis on two leading Australian broadsheets and in-depth interviews with scholars and policy-makers (13 in total).

The findings demonstrate that there are four common generic frames in the media discourse and intermediate experts' individual minds. These frames, on the one hand, show the significant presence of a 'cooperative image' in the climate change context. On the other hand they reveal a new category of

image, environmental image, to the ones normally discussed in international communication. They are incorporated in a new framework for evaluating environmental image in other international contexts. Furthermore, the findings disclose the images of China in the Australian social discourse and China's dominant discourse about soft power do not match each other. Thus, the findings may provide some insights for China's practice of soft power and public diplomacy in the western democracies.

ABBREVIATIONS

ABC	Australian Broadcasting Corporation
ACBC	Australia-China Business Council
ALP	Australian Labor Party
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CCTV	China's Central Television or Chinese Central Television
CMEA	China Management Enterprise Association
COP15	Fifteenth session of the Conference of the Parties
COP17	Seventh session of the Conference of the Parties
CUC	Communication University of China
DCA	Deductive Content Analysis
DCI	Derived Categories from Inductive Process
DCL	Derived Categories from Literature
DFAT	Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
EC	Environmental Communication
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
GMEs	Global Media Events
IC	International Communication
IFA	Inductive Framing Analysis
IGO	International Government Organisation
IPCC	International Panel on Climate Change
IR	International Relations
N	Number
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NYT	New York Times
P	Percentage

PA	Public Affairs
PD	Public Diplomacy
RGCT	Realist Group Conflict Theory
PRC	People's Republic of China
SFA	Strategic Frame Analysis
SMH	Sydney Morning Herald
TICC	Tsinghua [University] International Communication Centre
UN	United Nations
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework on Climate Change
USIA	United States Information Agency
VOA	Voice of America

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

“When states perceive, in part they try to determine what the other side intended. When states try to project a desired image, they must estimate how the other side will see them and interpret what they are doing.”

--- Robert Jervis

The Logic of Images in International Relations

1.1 Background and Justification

1.1.1 Environmental Steps in World Politics

Industrialisation has had a devastating effect on the environment. Since the late nineteenth century, human awareness of and concern about environmental problems have been discernible in the public sphere. Entering the 20th century, the domestic environmental movement in the western countries – including European ones, the U.S. and Australia – flourished. The environmental movements in civil society vociferously urged governments to reform their environmental policies.¹

¹ The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established by the U.S. Federal Government in 1970, and the legislation on environmental protection in the U.S. was enacted in the form of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (1970). April 22 1970 was designated as the World Environmental Day. In Australia, the manufacture and mining industries were extremely prosperous since the 1960s, but economic prosperity was achieved at the cost of environmental devastation. Facing a serious environmental crisis, the NSW government passed Green Bans under the pressure of the Builders Labourers Federation (BLF) and other citizens. The Australian citizens too began to engage more in environmental protection.

With environmental deterioration and the upsurge of the environmental movement in developed countries, the time was ripe for an international dialogue on environmental protection to emerge. Against this background, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (also known as Stockholm Conference) was held in Stockholm in 1972.² This was the first time that the states came to a consensus on environmental problems and actions at an international level. The Stockholm Conference marked a turning point in the development of international environmental politics and paved a way for future understanding and actions on climate change and environmental mitigation.³

At the end of the twentieth century, with there being a scientific consensus on climate change, a new appeal for environmental protection and economic development arose. The United Nations (UN) regularly hold international conferences on environmental protection and climate change mitigation, as well as gathering states to negotiate and ratify the international agreements. Several influential UN conferences and agreements in relation to environment and climate change that preceded the Copenhagen Conference in 2009 include the following:

1) The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) (also known as Earth Summit).⁴ This conference proposed a new global partnership plan for states to meet the challenges of environment and development. Climate change was placed at the top of the conference agenda. A great achievement of the conference was the signing of an

² The conference was held from 5 June to 16 June 1972. The conference highlighted the pollution problem, agreed upon a Declaration containing 26 principles and an Action plan with 109 recommendations and a Resolution. The conference also provided recommendations on various aspects of environmental issues including educational, informational, social and cultural aspects.

³ Green politics in developed countries were stimulated progressively in its wake. The major countries founded environmental departments corresponding to the Stockholm Conference recommendations. The European Community (later the European Union) created the Environmental and Consumer Protection Directorate and composed the Environmental Action Program. In Australia, the Franklin River Campaign, the most influential environmental campaign in the Australian environmental protection history was launched in 1976. The Australian Greens Party was founded by the campaign leader Bob Brown during the campaign; the party holds an important position in Parliament nowadays.

⁴ The Earth Summit (UNCED) was held in Brazil from 3 June to 14 June in 1992, aimed to negotiate a plan for what was termed *Sustainable Development* in the 21st century. The Earth Summit resulted in five documents, two being legally binding agreements.

international environmental treaty – The United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – encouraging industrialised countries to stabilise greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which was produced at the conference, and in turn led to the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.

2) The Kyoto Protocol.⁵ The Kyoto Protocol, as an international agreement linked to the UNFCCC, set binding targets for 37 industrialised countries and the European community for reducing GHG emissions. The significance of the Kyoto Protocol is identified by UNFCCC when it characterises it as “an important first step towards a truly global emission reduction regime that will stabilise GHG emissions, and provide the essential architecture for any future international agreement on climate change.”⁶

3) Bali Road Map.⁷ The Bali Road Map was taken on by the participating nations as a two-year process that would lead to finalising a binding agreement in 2009 in Copenhagen in order to renew the Kyoto Protocol.

The emergence of international organisations about climate change (e.g., IPCC⁸, UNFCCC) and the international conferences and agreements organised by them facilitated climate change being seen as a core issue in the environmental dimension and increasingly entered the world political agenda from the scientific world in the 21st century. Environmental negotiation has been unprecedentedly comprehensive particularly at the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in 2009 (also called Copenhagen Summit, or COP15), and environmental cooperation is now being widely promoted by major countries. In the domestic context, climate change has

⁵ The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in Kyoto on 11 December 1997. The Protocol was enforced from February 2005. It is notable that the U.S. and Australia did not sign the Kyoto Protocol at that time. The Rudd Government endorsed the agreement in 2007.

⁶ UNFCCC (1997). Retrieved April 18, 2011 from http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.

⁷ The validity of the Kyoto Protocol will expire in 2012, so a new international framework needs to be negotiated and ratified. The United Nations Climate Change Conference was held on the island Bali in Indonesia in December 2007.

⁸ IPCC, International Panel on Climate Change, was created by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1988, in the recognition of “the potential problem of climate change” (IPCC, 2007b). IPCC spurred governments to create the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Most scientists confirm IPCC as the world’s most reliable source of scientific information on climate change (Lever-Tracy & Pittock, 2010).

been increasingly “integrated into the discussion of an ever-wider range of social and political themes”(Loi, 2010, p. 219). One of the most notable examples is the discussion about carbon tax. In Australia, the carbon emission tax had been heatedly debated as a crucial new policy and has generated an Act that was eventually passed by the parliament in 2011.

The perception of environment/climate change issues as important continues to increase in world public opinion according to polls.⁹ Australia is well-known for its beautiful natural environment in many parts and the efforts made to protect that environment in many quarters. Since the 1970s, the Australian public has expressed a great concern about environmental protection and has achieved great success in the environmental movement by international comparison. Several national polls conducted by authoritative organisations¹⁰ all show that climate change is one of the top concerns for the Australian public and that the majority of people believe climate change should be listed as a very important foreign policy goal.¹¹ The latest Garnaut Climate Change Review¹² released in 2011 concludes that most Australians believe the climate is changing and Australia should take action on climate change without waiting for global consensus.

Since China was assessed as the largest emitter of carbon dioxide, overtaking the U.S., by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency in 2007, China has been exposed to the global spotlight in relation to its environmental situation and its contribution to the world environment, COP15 in particular. The proliferation of media reportage has been focused on the China’s rapid economic growth, its severe environmental

⁹ Several distinguished public opinion polls on climate change conducted by international public opinion organisations include 2007 BBC’s 21-country Poll Study, the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Projects on 47 countries, National Geographic and GlobeScan’s 14-country cross-culture study in 2008 and the 21-country WorldPublicOpinion.Org. study in 2008.

¹⁰ These organisations or reports about the poll in relation to climate change include the Lowy Institute Poll, the Climate Institute, Newspoll, CPI Strategic, the American studies Center in University of Sydney (USSC)’s (survey 2009), Garnaut Climate Change Review.

¹¹ The Lowy Institute Poll 2010 shows that the majority of the Australian public considers that tackling climate change is a very important foreign goal (2007:75%; 2008: 66%; 2009: 56%; 2010: 53% respectively). Fergus Hanson, Australia and the world: Public opinion and foreign policy. Retrieved June 26, 2012 from http://lowyinstitute.cachefly.net/files/pubfiles/LowyPoll_2010_LR_Final.pdf.

¹² Leviston et al.(2011). Australian’s views of climate change, Social & Economic Sciences Program, CSIRO Ecosystem Sciences. Retrieved June 26, 2012 from <http://www.garnautreview.org.au/update-2011/commissioned-work/australians-view-of-climate-change.pdf>.

degradation, as well as its global role in climate change mitigation. World public opinion on China's environmental situation is being formed in a negative light. The Lowy Institute China Poll 2009 shows that 76% of the Australian public considers environmental issues like climate change are possible threats to China's security over the next ten years.¹³ The Chinese government raised its anxiety and awareness of the deteriorating environmental situation. It has made environmental protection a national plan, ratified a series of environmental policies and been active in the international climate change negotiations. Chinese diplomacy transformed into being more multilateral and issue-oriented rather than country-oriented. The issues that the government focuses on, cover counterterrorism, nuclear nonproliferation, environmental protection, energy security, food safety, and post-disaster reconstruction (Jisi Wang, 2011). China took on a green mantle, branding the Beijing Olympics as the 'Green Olympics' in 2008 and attending the COP15 as the leader of the developing camp in its negotiations with the developed camp led by the U.S. China obtained a great deal of attention from the global media and the Australian media was no exception, as China is its largest trade partner.

1.1.2 Sweet and Sour Australia-China Relations

Sino-Australian folk interaction has taken place over a century, whilst the intergovernmental relationship is 30 years old. Bilateral relations between the two countries have gone through a few episodes over time, varying from fear to friendship, from enemy to partner and have fluctuated around a few key issues (Mackerras, 2004). The bilateral dialogue covers all aspects such as economics, politics, culture, military and the environment. Each aspect displays different characteristics: economic dependency, cultural attraction, political divergence, military alertness and environmental mutuality, all of which contribute to the complexity of the Sino-Australian relationship.

¹³ Fergus Hanson and Andrew Shearer (2009). China and the world: Public opinion and foreign policy. Retrieved June 26, 2012 from http://lowyinstitute.cachefly.net/files/pubfiles/Lowy_China_Poll_2009_Web.pdf.

Concerning the overall Sino-Australian relationship, there are a few significant episodes in the bilateral relations. According to the identification by the Australian international relations scholars (e.g., Mackerras, 2004; McDougall, 2009), the years of 1949, 1972 and 1996 are watersheds in the Australia-China relations.

Before the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), while there was seldom any contact of a diplomatic nature between Australia and China, there was a massive swarming of Chinese immigrants swarmed into Australia in the nineteenth century. China was perceived as a ferocious dragon, threatening Australia's security and society (Mackerras, 1997), which resulted in the White Australia Policy.

After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power on the mainland in 1949, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) government of Ben Chifley refused to recognise the new CCP government. Hence, the Sino-Australian relationship went through a dark period during which diplomatic and people-to-people contacts were few and far between. There were a few times when the Australian governments showed their intention to recognise the legitimacy of the PRC, but the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the recognition to the Republic of China refroze the Sino-Australian relationship into hostility.¹⁴ In the international context of the Cold War, Australia emotionally perceived China as the Red China of communism and had a great fear of it.

Ever since Australia set up diplomatic ties with the PRC in 1972, the Sino-Australian relationship has been on the track of a nation-to-nation intercourse.¹⁵ Initially, the Australian public was enthusiastic about

¹⁴ The Menzies Government (1949-1966) once showed its intention to recognise the legitimacy of the PRC in line with Britain's diplomacy towards China, but the Korean War, which broke out in 1950, impeded the initiative and the engagement in the Korean battlefield froze the Sino-Australian relationship into hostility. The Sino-Australian relationship was exacerbated by the eruption of the Vietnam War at the end of the Menzies era (in April 1965) and deteriorated again when the Hold administration shifted formal diplomatic recognition to the Republic of China in Taiwan. Mackerras, C. (1997). *Australia and China*. In F. A. Mediansky (Ed.), *Australian foreign policy into the new millennium*. South Melbourne Macmillan Education Australia PTY LTD.

¹⁵ Gough Whitlam's (ALP, 1972-1975) government recognised the PRC and ruptured the diplomatic relationship with Taiwan, opening a new page of the Sino-Australian era.

building up a new relationship with China (Mackerras, 2004). In the 17 years from 1972 to 1989, the Sino-Australian relationship grew rapidly in various fields under three administrations including both ALP and Liberal Party ones. During the Fraser (Liberal Party, 1975-1983) administration, Fraser adopted a very 'pro-China policy' (Mackerras, 2004, p. 18) since China regarded Soviet hegemony as the main threat to the world. During the Hawke (1983-1991) administration, Australia-China relations reached a peak. Mackerras (2004, p. 19) argues that it was from 1983 to mid-1989 that Australia-China relations came closest to being a 'partnership'. In particular it is bilateral economic relations that have expanded and diversified substantially since the Australia-China Business Council (ACBC) and China Management Enterprise Association (CMEA) began their cooperative endeavours in 1984 (Evans, 1991). Nevertheless, the relationship suddenly broke down in connection with the controversy around how the student movement was dealt with in June 1989, sinking heavily to the bottom.¹⁶ Since then, the human rights issue of China has always been of great worldwide concern from both the diplomatic level and public diplomacy perspectives. The CCP has subsequently been marked with the image of the abuse of human rights. As White (2010, p. 17) claims that, "Tiananmen enshrines an image of a party set in ruthless and implacable opposition to the welfare and aspirations of its people". The Sino-Australian relationship did not improve during the Keating administration (ALP, 1991-1996). Australian foreign policy under Keating administration was guided by a wish to break away from the British monarchy and shift diplomatic attention towards Asia, but the government showed less interest in China than in Indonesia.

Foreign policy of all successive governments since the Howard Government (Liberal Party, 1996-2006) took power (including the ALP's Rudd and Gillard Governments), has been characterized as a paradox lingering between the U.S. and China with the balance in favour of the U.S. Alliance

¹⁶ At that time, the Tiananmen Square event also promoted a change in Australian immigration policy towards Chinese temporary residences and cancellation of high level of official visits.

in security relations and on China in relation to trade. On one hand, Australia is the oldest friend of the U.S. and its loyal ally in the Asia-Pacific region, with the U.S. considered as the Australia's 'ultimate protector' (H. White, 2010, p. 1); on the other hand, China has been rising as a superpower and its rise is reckoned as a disruption of the Asian order (ibid) and a threat to the peace of the world due to its very difference political structure and culture. Nevertheless, the growing role of China in Australia's economic development and the fact that China has become the largest trading partner of Australia gives China a prominent place in Canberra's schema. How to position Australia vis-à-vis U.S. and China relations, how to balance the security and prosperity in relation to Australia's national interest, and to conduct containment or cooperation with China, have become a conundrum in Australian foreign policy.

When Howard took office in March 1996, his government expressed a strong desire to reinvigorate Australia's alliance with the U.S., with the intention of gaining more security aid from the U.S. However, Howard's overly pro-American stance and his neglect to develop, at the outset, an Asian foreign policy, led to a diplomatic dilemma at one time.¹⁷ With regard to China, the Howard government's involvement in the Taiwan Strait Crisis¹⁸ in March 1996 undermined the Australia-China relationship, as well as precipitating a diplomatic crisis. Soon after that, a series of diplomatic crises relating to Taiwan aggravated and even ruptured Australia-China relations.¹⁹ This

¹⁷ Howard's intervention against the Indonesian President's criticism of the American bombing of Afghanistan resulted in the growth of anti-Australian sentiment in Indonesia and Malaysia. Howard and Downer claimed that Australia had a legal right to act against terrorist bases in regional countries. This claim triggered angry editorials in Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, and Malaysia and Philippines threatened to end bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation with Australia. See Michael Wesley (2007). *The Howard paradox: Australian diplomacy in Asia from 1996-2006*, Sydney: ABC Books, p.17.

¹⁸ It is called the third Taiwan Strait Crisis. Lee Teng-hui visited the U.S. in 1995, advocating the first presidential election and independence of Taiwan. PRC warned Li with missile tests in the waters surrounding Taiwan Straits in 1995 and 1996 respectively. The U.S. dispatched aircraft carrier groups including USS Nimitz into Taiwan Strait in March 1996. Australia backed up the U.S. naval force and attempted to mediate between China and Taiwan at the upcoming APEC Summit, but received a frosty response from PRC. The Howard Government's unequivocal and unambiguous declaration of support for the U.S. forces deployed in the region irritated China.

¹⁹ A series of diplomatic issues include the following: In April, 1996, the Australia government discarded the Development Import Finance Facility (DIEF) invoking further protest by China; In July, Chen Shui-ban, the Mayor of Taipei City, attended the inaugural Asia-Pacific Cities Summit to protests by the Chinese government, the direct reaction of which was abstention by the Mayors of

episode was a lesson for Australia not to go too far away from China in balancing U.S.-China relations.

After the crisis, Howard promptly took diplomatic action to restore the damaged Sino-Australian relationship. Howard paid a visit to Beijing in 1997, which broke the deadlock of Australia-China relations formed in 1996. Since then, the Sino-Australian relationship has recovered and warmed up due to the closer economic ties with China that loomed ahead. The Howard government's foreign policy orientation towards China varied from considering the relationship with China as an economic opportunity and strategic challenge in the late 1990s²⁰ to a 'strategic economic partnership'²¹ in 2003, then to 'strategic partnership'²² in 2004. The relationship went beyond economic interests and extended in different areas during the Howard administration.

The ALP headed by Kevin Rudd (2007-2010) – with his Mandarin-speaking skills – came back to power in 2007. In contrast with the shape of the conservative Liberal Party's policy, the Rudd Government implemented a proactive foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region and showed its eagerness to position itself as a middle power on the international stage particularly alongside the U.S. and China. Since China emerged as the largest trade partner of Australia in 2007,²³ the Rudd Government supported a 'constructive bilateral relationship', enhancing a comprehensive

Beijing and Shenzhen. Other international issues include the Howard Government's strong condemnation of China's nuclear test in June 1996. Followed hard on its heels by the inaugural Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations in Sydney from 25-27 July, the 'Sydney Declaration' reaffirmed the spirit of ANZUS Treaty, heading into the twenty-first century. The Howard Government intended to conduct negotiations with Taiwan to sell uranium and met the spiritual leader of Tibet, Dalai Lama, both of which actions aroused strong opposition from China.

²⁰ The Howard Government depicted China as an economic opportunity and strategic challenge, and the government recognised China's economic rise as the most important strategic phenomenon in the region. Particularly during the Asian financial crisis, China's positive steps in stabilising the region's economy strengthened Australia's confidence about cooperating with the Chinese in the area of trade.

²¹ DFAT, 2003, *Advancing the National Interest*, p.79. Retrieved June 10, 2011 from http://www.australianpolitics.com/foreign/elements/2003_whitepaper.pdf.

²² Downer, 'Media Conference', 17 August, 2004.

²³ China became the largest trade partner of Australia with two-way trade in goods and services approaching \$58 billion in 2007, a year-on-year increase of 15 percent. Annual Report of DFAT, 2007-2008, p.30. Retrieved from February 8, 2011

http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/annual_reports/07_08/downloads/s2A.pdf.

link with China.²⁴ At one level, Rudd was productive in accommodating with China through presenting himself as a *cognoscente* about China; at another level, Rudd was disclosed as ‘a brutal realist on China’ during his meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton by Wikileaks.²⁵ This reveals Rudd’s uncompromising attitude and containment policy towards China in the security dimension. The current Gillard government generally maintains the approach and strategies in relation to China of her predecessors. Gillard paid her maiden visits to the U.S. first and then China after she took office, which may very well be a signal that the current ALP Government tilts towards the U.S. in its overall foreign policy, but is eager to pursue a ‘comprehensive, constructive and cooperative relationship with China as it continues to emerge as a major global player’.²⁶

Concerning climate change, this issue had silently grown to be part of the Sino-Australian agenda since the Howard administration. Chinese President Hu Jintao participated in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Sydney and signed a Joint Statement on Climate Change and Energy in 2007, which is considered as one of the meeting’s most significant bilateral initiatives by Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).²⁷ The Rudd Government was particularly keen on climate change issues in both domestic and international spheres. Differing from his predecessors, Rudd presented an ambitious climate change policy in the international stage and ambitiously sought an influential position in climate change negotiations and attempted to push for a new world order under a new environmental reality.²⁸ Rudd was very active in international negotiations on climate change and

²⁴ Annual report of DFAT. 2008-2009. Retrieved February 9, 2011 from http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/annual_reports/08_09/performance/1/1.1.1.html.

²⁵ During Rudd’s meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Washington on March 2009, Rudd clearly expressed his attitude towards China that China should be integrated into the international community but the U.S. and Australia should be prepared ‘to deploy force if everything goes wrong’. US embassy cables.

²⁶ Annual Report of DFAT. 2010-2011. Retrieved June 6, 2012 from http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/annual_reports/10_11/downloads/DFAT-AR1011.pdf.

²⁷ See the DFAT Annual Report 2007-2008. Retrieved February 8, 2011 from http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/annual_reports/07_08/downloads/s2A.pdf.

²⁸ Rudd’s active action in the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen 2009 was a good example.

promoting cooperation with China in the climate change affairs. During his visit to Beijing in 2008, one of the major outcomes was recognized as “the agreement to strengthen cooperation on environment and climate change issues, including a new ministerial-level dialogue on climate change, and agreement to reinvigorate bilateral FTA negotiations.”²⁹ The Gillard government’s foreign policy in relation to climate change remains unchanged, but the carbon emission tax was passed during her administration.

1.1.3 Justification

A review of the emergence of environmental issues with particular reference to climate change in the world politics and the history of Australia-China relations, demonstrates the significance of and the indispensable need to explore the construction process of China’s environmental issues in the Australian social discourse. The Australian government’s environmental policy/foreign policy, when mediated, projects the environmental image of China externally – as well as internally in the social discourse discernible by the Australian public. China’s national image within the Sino-Australian relationship structural pattern in the climate change context, and its exercise of soft power and public diplomacy practice in the Australian context, need also to be uncovered.

Environmental protection has been brought to prominence in diplomatic affairs on global agenda. Economic development on the national level and international trade are placed in the context of climate change mitigation and sustainable development. Intergovernmental dialogue concentrates on environmental amelioration, while international trade is limited to some criteria in terms of international agreements on climate change mitigation. As may be seen, environmental issues, particularly the issue of climate change, are ascending to the top of international economic and political agendas. Moreover, international negotiations on environmental protection

²⁹ DFAT Annual Report. 2007-2008, p.29. Retrieved February 9, 2011 from http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/annual_reports/07_08/downloads/full-report.pdf.

show binary opposite traits of conflict and cooperation, which contribute to the complexity of international relations. Nevertheless, as the environment is the common concern for human beings, cooperation is intrinsically required by nations, as well as negotiation if cooperation to be progressed in the reallocation of benefits in all areas. In this new international relations context, it is essential to assess the weight of cooperation with other countries in the social discourse of the country.

Australia and China have many differences in terms of their political systems, ideologies, cultures, religions and the like. As well, they share common interests including bilateral trade and environmental protection. These contradictions and commonalities contribute to the complexity of the Sino-Australian relationship. Moreover, these two countries are respectively labelled as ‘developed country’ and ‘developing country’, but Australia is identified as a middle power whereas China is a great power or superpower. The Sino-Australian relationship represents an unconventional international relations pattern – neither ally nor enemy. They are friends but are confined to be on the basis of economic relationship. The two governments aim to promote bilateral cooperation, but significant strategic cooperation is largely excluded by them. Australia carefully positions itself in the America-China relationship, struggling with the predicament of the selection between security and prosperity. The Sino-Australian relationship pattern is a special case in international relations. It would be a new dimension in discovering a new image type based on the structural relationship pattern. To China, the research results will provide empirical evidence for the assessment of its practice of soft power and public diplomacy in this framework including the climate change context and Sino-Australian relationship pattern.

1.2 Proposed Plan of Research

1.2.1 Statement of Purpose

In the previous background section, I briefly examined the environmental situation in the world politics, the Sino-Australian relationship and Australian foreign policy towards China. In this project, broadly speaking, I focus on Habermas' public sphere, attempting an investigation of the dynamic construction process of Australian China policy in relation to environmental issues in the Australian social discourse, as well as the public's perception on China's environment. There are several specific purposes or objectives in this research as follows:

Firstly, the project aims to investigate the construction of China's environmental issues in the Australian social discourse, mainly focusing on the media construction (media projected image) and the perception by Australian civil society of China in relation to environment (public perceived image).

Secondly, the project aims to explore a new typology of national images – cooperation in the Australia-China relationship pattern and in the climate change context by undertaking the investigation of the portrayal of China's national image in relation to environment in the Australian social discourse. The results will indicate the weight of cooperation with China in the environmental dimension in the Australian social discourse.

Thirdly, on this ground, the project attempts to abstract China's environmental image types projected by the Australian media through examining a few distinct cases and a long-term coverage and the frames of China's environmental images in the public's individual minds (mainly focusing on intermediate experts' minds).

Fourthly, the project aims to further explore a conceptual framework for the evaluation of the environmental image in other international context, as well as to test whether the Chinese dominant discourse of soft power and

public diplomacy matches the discourse in the western democracies. This result will provide some insights for the Chinese policy community.

1.2.2 Proposition and Research Questions

As has been reviewed, Australian policy towards China currently follows a ‘comprehensive, conductive and cooperative’ direction; and environmental cooperation is now being widely promoted by major players in the climate change context. In this context, I advance an overall proposition and set out an overall research question along with several sub-research questions in order to achieve the research objectives in this project.

Proposition:

Cooperation rather than conflict is the dominant theme of Australian public discourse and public perception in relation to environmental cooperation with China.

Research Questions:

Overall Research Question:

What is the dominant theme of Australian public discourse and public perception in relation to environmental cooperation with China?

Sub-research Questions:

From the statement of purpose, it can be seen that the objectives of this research primarily refer to media framing, individual frames and image types in relation to environment. Based on these elements, the sub-research questions are designed as follows:

1. How do Australian media portray China’s image in relation to environment?
2. What are the environmental images portrayed by the Australian media?
3. What are the environmental images perceived by the Australian public especially by the intermediate experts?

-
4. What are the indications of the images in the Australian social discourse about the exercise of China's soft power and public diplomacy in relation to environment?

The first three sub-research questions seek to unpack the news discourse and individual cognition in relation to environment, to investigate the frames in the news and frames in the individual minds and further to develop the framework to evaluate these images. The fourth sub-research question refers to the analysis of these frames existing in the social discourse in order to investigate whether the Chinese practice of soft power and public diplomacy is covered in this framework.

1.2.3 Literature to be Reviewed

From the statement above, it can be seen that the framework of the research contains international relationship structure, national image and frames. The project is concerned with the social construction and subjective interpretation of the other country's environmental issues in the foreign policy formation process. This project attempts to detect the images represented from the media discourse and images perceived by the public through finding out the frames in the news and individual minds. Furthermore, the project attempts to discover a new typology of image in this particular international relationship structural pattern and climate change context and to assess the public diplomacy in the other country based on the framework of images.

According to the research objectives and research questions, this project relates to three fields of international relations (IR), international communication (IC) and environmental communication (EC). The literature to be reviewed should cover constructivism (international relations, IR), image theory, soft power and public diplomacy and framing theory.

I will firstly clarify the concept of image and review image theory in both the fields of IR and IC. The image study in the field of IR has been mainly

focused on the effects of images in the decision-making process and relationship of the image types, international relationship structure and potential international behaviour. Thus, the review helps to prove that the image can influence the foreign policy-making process and find out the image types existing in the literature.

National image study has been very prevalent in the field of international communication, primarily focusing on media portrayal of national image, and its effects on public opinion and foreign policy preferences as well as the assessment of soft power and public diplomacy. I will review the literature about the national image in the field of IC. Meanwhile, I will review China's national image study and the literature about China's soft power and public diplomacy in relation to national image cultivation.

Last but not least, I will review the literature about the media and communication research on environment in the field of EC, in order to find out the media frames of environmental issues.

Concerning the theoretical framework, I will select theories of constructivism (IR), international image cultivation and framing theory to construct a sandwich-like framework in this project. I attempt to use constructivism (IR) to structure the outer layer of the framework and to use framing theory to construct the inner layer of the framework, whilst employing the international image cultivation to fill the intermediate space for the assessment of the framed images and possible change in the construction process.

1.2.4 Research Methods

Since the point of penetration of the research relates to frames and the primary objective is to find out images, the selection of research methods for this project should be able to uncover frames in both the news and individual minds. Based on this principle, the proper research methods for

this project are identified as framing analysis, content analysis and in-depth interviews.

I will use framing analysis to resolve the first and second research questions through analysing three cases in the project, namely Beijing Olympic Games 2008, Copenhagen Climate Change Conference 2009, Durban Climate Change Conference 2011. I will identify the framing devices based on the framing literature. I will use content analysis as a supplementary research method to the framing analysis to deal with a long-term coverage. I will adapt in-depth interviews with intermediate experts to uncover the individual frames in people's minds to address the third research question. Concerning the in-depth interviewing data analysis, I will use content analysis.

1.2.5 Outline of Chapters

Chapter One, as the opening chapter, provides the background and justification to the research, as well as delineating a proposed plan of the research. Based on the background to the problem, the chapter offers the statement of purpose and comes out with possible research questions and propositions. The chapter discusses the literature to be reviewed and the research methods to be adapted in order to resolve the research questions and address the propositions. An outline of the chapter is offered at the end.

Chapter Two reviews the literature in relation to image study in the fields of international relations (IR) and international communication (IC) and environmental communication (EC). I firstly define the concepts of image in a social-psychological perspective and classify the two typologies of image. Concerning the concept of national image, I review the concepts of nation and state to support the argument that the normal usage of national image in IC perhaps relates to nation-state image. After identifying the concepts, I review the existing literature about national image study in the fields of IR and IC, in order to trim the research threads running through these two fields and detect the research gap in existence by mutually referencing each

other's research tradition. Since the project attempts to discover a new typology of national image in the climate change context, I examine the literature of environmental communication, primarily in relation to media and research on environment, the reference of media framing domestic environmental issues/affairs, which could contribute to the empirical research in this project. During the examination of the literature, I reveal the inadequacies in the existing literature of national image study (China's national image study included), study of China's soft power and public diplomacy, and study of media and communication on environment, as well as propose propositions in order to fill the gap of the literature. At the end of the chapter, I come up with detailed research questions to go with the propositions.

Chapter Three addresses the theoretical framework of the project. The theoretical framework is constituted by theories of international relations (IR) constructivism, international image cultivation through public diplomacy and the use of soft power and framing. I review symbolic interactionism to begin with as the epistemological foundation for the other theories (international image theory and framing theory). In the examination of IR constructivism, I discuss the main debates among realists, liberalists and constructivists by the comparison of the three most popular international relations theories and interpret Wendt (1992)'s model of the codetermination of institutions and process to clarify the position of the project in the process. In the discussion of international image cultivation, I firstly focus on the international relations structural pattern (international structures, international image and potential international behaviour), and then review the Realistic Group Conflict Theory to support the premise that cooperative relationship may generate cooperative image. I discuss the concepts of public diplomacy and soft power as well associated strategies and resources. Concerning framing theory, I review the framing research as well as the definition and typology of frames, further to develop a framing process model in the international context. After reviewing these three theories, I develop a theoretical framework to serve the research.

Chapter Four devises an appropriate methodological model and designs specific research procedures for fieldwork research and data analysis. This chapter starts with the elaboration of research questions, followed by a discussion of social scientific approaches both at ontological and epistemological levels in order to locate the project in a proper methodological tradition, then further discuss the proper methods in this project. The methodological model consists of framing analysis, qualitative content analysis and in-depth interviews, with the combination of both inductive and deductive approaches. After the identification of research methods, I design the explicit research procedures including samplings, framing and reasoning devices identification, the application of inductive and deductive approaches, in-depth interviews design as well as codes and coding of news texts and interviewees. A methodological framework of this project is created to indicate the research methods and design corresponding to each research question. I explain how to collect the media text and to conduct the in-depth interviews. In the end, I interpret the limitation of the research.

Chapter Five represents findings of China's environmental image portrayed by selected Australian newspapers. There are two sections in this chapter. The first section displays the findings of three case studies through the method of framing analysis, following the sequences of framing package and framing matrix (Van Gorp, 2010). This presentation follows the principle of showing categories, examples and series of figures. The second section of this chapter contains the findings of coverage about China's environment from 2000 to 2008 in relation to thematic structures through the method of content analysis. The chapter ends with a series of figures with the comparison of some categories.

Chapter Six represents findings of in-depth interviews. The findings are displayed under each interview question. I classify them into different categories in order to identify dominant, secondary, and idiosyncratic frames in the participants' individual minds.

Chapter Seven, the last chapter in this project, aims to discuss the findings and draw conclusions from this project. The discussion is conducted to correspond with each research question and sub-research question. The conclusions address propositions proposed in the literature review chapter, claim the significance of the research to the theory building in the field as well as the limitation of the research. In the last section, I provide recommendations for both future research and the Chinese policy community, especially relating to the practice of soft power and public diplomacy in the western context.

1.3 Summary

In this chapter, I examined environmental issues in the world politics and Australia-China relations as background to the research project; made academic and social justifications. I proposed plans of the research, including statement of purpose, research questions and propositions, literature to be reviewed, research methods and outline of chapters. I will review the literature in the next chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW – IMAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL COMMUNICATION

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I firstly clarify and define the concept of image in a social-psychological perspective (section 2.2.1). The terminology of national image has been widely used by theorists from both fields of international relations (IR) and international communication (IC). However, the empirical findings indicate that national image tends to mainly contain attributes of state sovereignty. Hence, I review the concepts of nation and state, and then make an argument that the normal usage of national image perhaps relates to nation-state image (section 2.2.2).

After the comprehension of these concepts, I review the existing literature about national image study in both the fields of IR and IC, in order to trim the research threads running through these two fields and detect the research gap in existence by mutually referencing each other's research tradition (section 2.3). Moreover, I review the literature of China's national image study (section 2.3.3) and China's soft power and public diplomacy study (section 2.3.4). Since this project attempts to put national image in a new international relations context – climate change – I examine the literature of environmental communication, primarily in relation to media and communication research on environment (section 2.3.5). The propositions arise from the literature review and the research gap in each field. I make an audacious attempt at using national image in the new context of climate change as a breakthrough point to correlate these three

fields and conduct an interdisciplinary empirical research study. In the end, the research questions are proposed based on the propositions (section 2.4).

2.2 Define the Concepts of ‘Image’ and ‘Nation-state Image’

Walter Lippmann’s (1922, p. 9) statement that “images are the pictures in people’s head” in his research on public opinion is considered as the earliest scholarly exploration of image in sociology. Kenneth Boulding (1961) published his well-known book *The Image*, in which he interprets the images of ‘other’ and images of ‘self’ in life and society. Thereafter the term ‘image’ was conceptualized by Robert Jervis, R.Cottam and further developed by Herrmann and M. Cottam, and then it became popular and has been used to describe the aura of a public person, a party, a product, a nation, a people, and so forth (Hamada, 2001). In the following three decades, image research was quickly adopted in the fields of international relations and mass communication/international communication, primarily being associated with the concepts of national image and international image.

Influenced by perspectives of social cognitive theories and symbolic interactionism, international relations image theorists started image research with a psycho-cognitive orientation (or perceptual-psychological approach)³⁰. Image study began with the focus on individual belief systems, cognition and perception. Then the systematic study of the beliefs and images of foreign policy makers grew in popularity and significance (e.g., Holsti, 1968, 1986; Rokeach, 1960; Smith, Bruner, & White, 1956; Snyder, Bruck, & Sapin, 1954). Boulding’s (1959, p. 423) famous definition of image – “total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behaviour unit, or its internal view of itself and the universe” demonstrates its psychological attribute. Moreover, his famous assumption that, in the international system, the images of ‘others’ and image of ‘self’ held in policy makers’ cognitive systems are important independent variables affecting

³⁰ I will use the term – ‘psycho-cognitive’ approach in the following sections.

their decisions or choices of foreign policy, has led international image research in a social-psychological direction, which puts the lens of international relations on the effects of the individuals' cognition on policy preferences and international behaviour. Mass/international communication scholars have widely accepted the image concept from a social-psychological perspective. Li and Chitty (2009) identify that national image can be placed in two categories: *perceived* and *projected images*. Projected image is an active behaviour, which provides a precondition for the occurrence of perceived image.

2.2.1 Concepts of Image

Image is actually a very complicated term. Various types of image have appeared in both academic and practical traditions, such as folk image (mass image), official image, historical image, present image, national image, mythological image, media image, literacy image, public image, political image, economic image, image at biological level and so on and so forth. All these classifications reflect the multifarious nature of image. In this project, I will follow the social-psychological tradition to review and define the concept of image and national image.

In terms of a social-psychological perspective, a typology of image can show and even divide between that which is sent and the way that which is sent is received: *projected image* and *perceived image* ³¹(Xiufang Li & Chitty, 2009). Projected image is an active behaviour, which provides preconditions for the occurrence of perceived image, whilst perceived image is a subjective process (that can include cognitive and affective elements) of the projected image by individual receivers. Importantly, receivers (perceivers) are able to draw on several projected images, from different sources, in constructing their perceived image. The simple relationship summarized between *perceived image* and *projected image* is that individuals perceive the world

³¹ Robert Jervis perhaps firstly adapts these terminologies. He uses the terminology 'the projection of image', 'projecting image', 'desired image', 'perceptual predispositions', 'the perceptions actors have'. Jervis (1970, 1989). *The logic of images in international relations*. Columbia University Press.

via the projected images and form their own images in their minds based on their own perception and knowledge. I would like to call this *personalised image*, which includes the affective and cognitive components as well as the selective distillation of aspects of image from different sources. There can be several sources including various forms of media, training and education as well as interpersonal contact through daily life and travel. In terms of this social-psychological based typology, each category of image can be classified into two sub-images, such as projected political image and personalised political image, China's projected image and China's personalised image.

Additionally, I take the position that the projection of image could be endogenous (self-projected) and exogenous (other-projected). Likewise, the perception of an object could be accomplished both by self and others. In short, the categorization of image can be disclosed as: *projected image* (self-projected and other-projected) and *personalised image* (self-personalised and other-personalised). At the level of national image, projected image is manifested as a nation *brand* (self-projected) and *representation* of other nations (other-projected) in the media or in discourse. I will devote the following discussion to interpreting these two terminologies and will apply them to a macro level – national image, which is pertinent to the research in this project.

Some arguments have been made about the ontological relationship of projected and perceived image. I do not develop a view on which type of image has ontological primacy, as this question pertains to the relationship between cognition and object in social interactions that have such long evolutionary histories that first moments are impossible to capture. I argue that image is a unique humanized behaviour and result, so both the generation and perception of image cannot proceed without human engagement. Hence, whichever has ontological primacy, there is no doubt that they are an inseparable continuum in human experience of the world and representation of the world. In this project, I discuss China's environmental image as projected by Australian media, and the perception

of the environmental image in Australian individuals' minds, further to see the connection of these two types of images, so the discussion simply follows the sequence of projected image and personalised image.

1. Projected Image

Projected image, to repeat, is an active behaviour, which provides preconditions for the occurrence of perceived image. Jervis (1970, p. 18) divides behaviour into two categories: signals and indices. As he defines, signals "are statements or actions the meanings of which are established by tactic or explicit understandings among the actors. As all actors know, signals are issues mainly to influence the receiver's image of the sender." Indices relate to the inherent credibility of the statements and actions. Jervis argues that most of the signals issued by senders are a state's direct statements of intention, which can be either deceptive or honest. Thus, in most cases, projection of image cannot be purely objective, but is a purposive process, unless the object is 'out there' and not in interaction with human beings. And it is notable that projection does not simply and mechanically reflect reality, but constructively 'makes' and 'remakes' reality with new meanings as a process of human communication with all its variables. Surely, differential reception of projection is engendered by context as well as personal experience, resulting in personalisation of the image. Moreover, the projected image is influenced by 'frame sponsors', which are connected directing the perception and the frame selection by journalists for the reporting on an event (Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Van Gorp, 2007).

Images will not become visible until they are communicated (Xiufang Li & Chitty, 2009). There are many tools or channels for the projection of images of an object, but summed up as coming under three categories or three levels based on communication categories: interpersonal communication, organizational communication and mass communication.³² All these communicative patterns can effectively formulate and disseminate images.

³² For example, different specific forms can include education, travel, individual communication, group interaction, museum projection and so on so forth.

Nevertheless, as Castells (2004, p. 375) has argued about communication power, news media are the key structuring intermediary in the conduct of public affairs, so media perhaps act as the strongest image shaper and transmitter in the organized 'standardized representations' of an object (Rivenburgh, 1995) and can reach the largest audiences. "[W]e walk around with media-generated images of the world, using them to construct meaning about political and social issues" (Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992, p. 374). The nature of media determines that it can maximize the transmission speed, amount of messages and ways of representing the image. It can actively influence the way that individuals perceive images and refresh old images in their minds by strategically controlling the flow of messages and repeatedly selecting, priming and presenting external events like 'spectacular events' and 'cumulative events' (Kelman, 1965, p. 135).

2. Personalised Image

Only if a projected image traverses through a human cognitive process is it likely to enter the realm of human discourse and other behaviour. Lippmann (1922) expounds on the triangular relationship between the scene of action (event), the human picture of that scene (image), and the human response to that picture working itself out upon the scene of action (response) for the analysis of public opinion, which indicates an interactive process of these three elements. From this triangular relationship, we can see that image is a combinational construct whose subject is itself a collection of images in the individual memory of various aspects of reality (Hamada, 2001, p. 11; Mowlana, 1997a). An image only acts on people when individuals perceive the characters of the object to which it refers; furthermore, people may hold distinct opinions on one object because of different personal cognitive structures (Kelman, 1965). Consensual views of cognitions of aspects of the world are gradually shared by individuals in this constructive process. After this complex process of individuals processing received information and shaping an image, this 'picture in their head' (Lippmann, 1922) would respond behaviourally to that picture and thereby

influence the event. Drawing on Mead's (cited in Nimmo, 1976) perspective on the constructive process of image we might say that human beings construct their behaviour as responses to their perceptions of arrays of attributes projected by an object, event, or person, interpret perceived attributes and formulate images of others' intentions consistent with those perceptions, and ultimately impose those images on the world.

How can human beings perceive the world comprehensively when there is such a massive amount of information available? Lippmann (1922, p. 26) provides an answer with his concept of 'pseudo-environment', where he explicates that human beings have to reduce the comprehensive world to a simpler model. The pseudo-environment is constructed by different kinds of 'organized representation' of objects, which describe the systematic feature of image in an individual's cognitive system (Boulding, 1959).

It is noteworthy that personalised image is not immutable. Rather than staying with an image forever, "society continually remakes the image" (Boulding, 1956, p.64). Images are liminal. The image of a social object may have multiple historical (vertical) layers, each one sedimented in the social memory and competing with images of the same object in the minds of different beholders (horizontal images). Notwithstanding, once an image has been shaped in individuals' minds, it is not easy to change. Lippmann (1922, p. 40) proposes the concept of 'stereotypes', which refer to "a means of organising images, fixed simplified impressions and salient features chosen to stand for the whole". Hamada (2001) believes that image is often considered to be roughly equivalent to stereotypes. Li and Chitty (2009, p. 2) argue that "people's repertoires of images are primarily overlaid by stereotypes as well as personal experiences." Stereotypes are very difficult to change and play a negative role since "they can be very powerful inducements to lump people into unjustifiable categories" (Khalil, 1982 p. 2).

To sum up, the concept of image contains a dichotomous feature. The world that human beings perceive is a constructively mediated world. Human beings' perceptions of the world are changed incessantly by the constant

projection and re-projection of the world. Their behaviour is influenced by their personalised world images and influences the world. A simplified model indicates the basic relationship between world, projected image and perceived image.




Figure 2.1: A Simplified Model of Image Interactive Process with Reality and Behaviour

2.2.2 Nation-state Image – Redefine National Image

1. Nation-state Image

National image is a widely used image type located at macro level by both international relations and international communication scholars. The image theorists also define national image with a cognitive tradition. For instance, Kunczik (1997, p. 47) defines it as “the cognitive representation that a person holds of a given country – what a person believes to be true about a nation and its people.” Wang (2008, p. 12) takes the view that national image deals with “the climate of opinion formed by collective expressions of perceptions and judgements of a country by its overseas publics.” In terms of the classification of image that has been discussed above, the national image can also be categorized as ‘projected national image’ and ‘personalised national image’ in the social-psychological

dimension. Nevertheless, by examining the previous research on national image especially the mediated national image, it shows the vagueness of the concept of 'nation', which results in the simplification of national image study at certain level. Therefore, I would like to firstly clarify the notion of 'nation' before I continue the discussion of the concept of national image, and I will make an argument about the proposal of the concept of 'nation-state image' and provide four dimensions of nation-state image.

Since the interpretation of the concept of nation is not a main target in this project, I draw directly on perspectives of several scholars' from social science and communication about nation and nation-states as evidence to prove my argument about the vagueness and simplification of the concept in the national image study. According to Roosvall and Salovaara-Moring (2010, p. 10), the nation as a concept was invented c.1300. It literally refers to "that which has been born", with the racial and ethnic meaning. Political sense gradually mixed with this meaning to create the idea of a "large group of people with a common ancestry", so people identify their belongings based on their sense of territoriality and ethnicity. In history, the formation and evolution of a nation went with the legitimate process of sovereignty, which is considered as nation-state. Miscevic (cited in Roosvall & Salovaara-Moring, 2010, p. 11) offers definitions for nations and states – "nations are generally defined as consisting of an ethnic or cultural community, whereas states are political entities with a high degree of sovereignty." Holton (1998, p. 85) identifies that *nation* refers to "what might loosely be termed a 'people', to a cultural entity often defined in terms of ethnicity", while *state* refers to "a set of institutions through which public authority is exercised within a particular territory." Nation-state, as a hybrid word, links the idea of nation and the idea of state. Many states are co-incident with nations and we generally recognize the majority of them as nation-states (Roosvall & Salovaara-Moring, 2010). Therefore, more accurately speaking, the previous studies on national image actually relates to nation-state's image because the resulting images contain elements of political sovereignty. It is worth noting that the concept of national image in international relations is

normally related to state image as international relations is associated primarily with inter-state relations.

A nation-state refers to a large swathe of social dimensions and layers. Kymlicka (2002, p. 81) claims that a state can be further broken down into: 1) the system of representative democracy, including the electoral system, the legislative process, and political parties; 2) state administration, including courts, schools, welfare agencies, the army and police, and the like. In western democracies, people have widely accepted Hegel's (2001) idea of the distinction of the state and civil society. Habermas (1991) insists that the emergence of a public sphere is based on the separation of state and civil society, and legitimate governments are generated from the interaction with the civil society through the public sphere. Based on these perspectives, I argue that a nation-state image in the democratic context basically constitutes the image of the state (state image) and the image of the civil society (popular image). Moreover, government is the main structure of the state, so the government image associated with the ruling party is usually regarded as being representative of the state image. In many occasions, state image is simplified as government image. Other commonly mentioned categories of a nation image such as politics, economics, culture, military, environment and its people and so on and so forth can be all divided into these two dichotomous typologies, just a matter of weight in the process of projection and perception (e.g., sovereignty and security are issues of high politics, contain more weight in the dimension of state, while culture and education, which are considered issues in low politics, contain more weight in the dimension of civil society). Therefore a nation-state image (coloured by security and sovereignty) can be different from a popular image (coloured by culture and education). However, the classification ultimately depends on who are the actors conducting the behaviour.

In democracies, as Habermas (1991) argues, states should be generated by the civil society. This determines that governments have an obligation to receive supervision and criticism from civil society and from media in

particular as an independent sector. Moreover, when the government is considered to be lacking in legitimacy, a state's image is easily separated from the popular image or perceived as being an opposing image to the people and receives more criticism of its legitimacy and governance. The form of government (e.g., totalitarian, dictatorship, authoritarian, democracy, etc.) of a state is what is first perceived and evaluated by citizens and media of other nation-states and easily influences the overall perception of a state's image among foreign publics.

Certainly, a nation-state's image is not one-dimensional. The intrinsic attributes of the nation-state determine the comprehensiveness and complexity of image. It is polyhedral. It cannot be separated from the history of a nation-state. As it is hard to perceive the history and reality of a country in its entirety, Anderson (1983) suggests that nations are 'imagined communities'.

Boulding (1959, p. 122) believes that national image is a historical image, which is "basically a lie, or at least a perspective distortion of the truth." There are naturally some myths in people's cognitive system about other countries. However, I argue that historical images of other nation-states are inclined to tilt towards the cultural dimension. The dominant image of a nation-state is still based on the contemporary consistency of the state's policy, administration and its people, namely contemporary state (government) image and popular image. Overall, based on my arguments, there are two types of nation-state image in two dimensions: (self/other) projected state (government) image, (self/other) personalised state (government) image; (self/other) projected popular image, (self/other) personalised popular image.




Figure 2.2: Four Dimensions of National-state Image and Their Relationships

Note: The order of issues in the middle is arranged in terms of the weight in the state image and people image.

2. Mediated Nation-state Image

As discussed above, media are strong image shaper and transmitter. Roosvall and Salovaara-Moring (2010, p. 12) describe the crucial role of media in the dissemination of nationalism and the idea of the nation as such: “[T]he nation’s resilience has been based on the intimacy, routines and closeness of the daily rhythms of the people and the media.” In the international discourse, media’s role in projecting images seems to be more prominent. Governments employ media-sophisticated strategies to promote a positive image to influence the international public, and increasingly, attempt to brand their nations with the more ‘spectacular’ image strategy of hosting global media events (GMEs) including the Olympic Games in order to attract favourable, and saturated, media and public attention (Rivenburgh, 2010). The media ultimately construct the event, and the host image, for global audiences through their own agenda (ibid). Furthermore, the boundary limitation and lesser relevance of issues contribute to the public’s dependency on media in perceiving the outside world. As Choi

(2006) asserts, the public has become used to gaining images of world affairs through mediated images and responding to media discourse on global issues. My argument about the public's perception of global affairs is that while the foundational image of a country held by individuals is largely constructed through formal education, it is the evaluation framework of a country that is heavily influenced by media discourse, but is also influenced by other experiential sources.

Mass media, considered as professional information-delivering organizations, have a responsibility to reflect issues and events faithfully. However, the reality is that they cannot capture and reflect all the events or messages extant in the world at any given time, and also they cannot exercise pure objectivity. They have their own values and preferences based on national loyalty, professionalism, and market orientation. Media organizations follow selection criteria for stories predicated on 'news value' or newsworthiness, which consist of the characteristics such as the following:

Availability of pictures or film (for TV);

Brevity;

Dramatic occurrences;

Novelty value;

Suitability for simple reporting;

Grandness of scale;

Negativity;

Element of surprise;

Relevance/meaning;

Similarity to other reported events;

Contribution to programme balance;

Focus on elites (people/nations);

Personal or human interest frames

In terms of Brighton & Foy (2007, p. 9); Harrison (2006, p. 137).

In journalistic practice, news value is subject to external factors such as commercial interests, political pressure, media practitioners' experiences and preferences, limitations of time and space (Xiufang Li & Chitty, 2009). Riverburgh (2010) notes that the international media tend to be influenced by the factors of domestication and national bias in reporting GMEs. Media act more as subjective participants and are inclined to have greater reliance on certain frames or patterns. For instance, Rivenburgh cites a series of patterns for GMEs including four patterns of pre-event news stories and four reporting patterns during GMEs.³³ These certain frames or patterns mould certain mediated images of the country.

Surely, we have to admit that media is not the only speculum that permits audiences to perceive foreign nations, particularly in the advanced technology-featured modern world. Actually, more options are provided for the public to access information from foreign countries, which provides a good opportunity for countries to promote their image through nation branding, as well as to reframe other nations in order to improve bilateral relations.

2.3 Review of Previous Study on National Image and Research Gap

Reviewing the available literature of image theory, it can be seen there are basically two schools of image research: the traditional international relations theorists with a cognitive approach and the international communication theorists who focus on mediated image in the communication process.

³³ According to Rivenburgh, four patterns of pre-event news stories include security, site preparation, funding issues and political conflicts; During GME, four more reporting patterns include 1) Media attention shifts to event proceedings; 2) host culture visibility tends to mimic that nation's visibility in international news more generally; 3) the coverage of GME host is predominately event-based (versus enduring qualities of culture and place) and focused on logistics (traffic, facilities, politics, weather); 4) story selection about the host is driven by typical news values of drama, conflict, oddity and good visuals. Rivenburgh, N. (2010). In pursuit of a global image: Media events as political communication. In N. Couldry, A. Hepp & F. Krotz (Eds.), *Media events in a global age*: Routledge.

2.3.1 Review of Previous Study on National Image in the Field of International Relations

The traditional international relations image theorists basically examine the cognitive perceptions of group relations and the resulting images and strategic responses associated with these perceptions (Alexander, Levin, & Henry, 2005), deriving from Lippmann's (1922) basic question of the triangular relationship between reality, image and act. Several explicit aspects have been focused on by image scholars in the domain of international relations: 1) The role of image in international relations, particularly the effect of national/international images on foreign policy decision-making (e.g., Boulding, 1959; M. Cottam, 1986; R. Cottam, 1977; Richard K. Herrmann, 1985; Richard K. Herrmann, Tetlock, & Visser, 1999; Holsti, 1986; Jervis, 1970, 1976); 2) the relationship between structural features and the associated images (e.g., Alexander, et al., 2005; Richard K. Herrmann & Fischerkeller, 1995); 3) national/international images and international behaviour (Kaplowitz, 1990; Kelman, 1965).

Decision-making is probably the earliest topic in the study of international relations image study. Since the late 1950s, the psycho-cognitive approach has become pervasive in the area of foreign policy decision-making. The early image theorists, including Boulding (1959) and Festinger (1962), preliminarily propose and demonstrate the idea that decision makers identify the preferred position in decision-making lying in the image held in their minds rather than 'objective' reality, and the belief system including its structure and content plays an integral role in the cognitive process. Harold and Margaret Sprout's (1957, p. 328) famous statement – "what matters is how the policy maker imagines the milieu to be, not how it actually is", firstly distinguishes the 'psychological environment' (refers to the capabilities and intensions of relevant actors) from the 'operational environment' (refers to the decision makers' beliefs about the world and other actors). Robert Jervis (1976) systematically conceptualizes the cognitive variables and process in foreign policy decision-making by

applying theories and empirical findings from psychology in his book *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, which was regarded a landmark in the application of psychological factors to political policy-making.³⁴ He explicates the formation and alteration process of perception in decision-makers' cognitive system, the factors that may lead to misperception of decision-makers and the possible consequences that may be caused by this misperception in decision-making; moreover, he analyses the role of information and communication in the perception and misperception formation of the decision-makers. This work not only makes a great contribution to international politics from a psychological perspective, but also it addresses the problem of perception and misperception in international relations.

The followers have developed and diversified the research on image and decision-making in the cognitive dimension. Richard Cottam (1977) further develops the conceptualization of image theory. He focuses on motivations, motivational systems, worldviews, and the 'perceptual milieu' of foreign-policy-making (p.63) and proposes that foreign policy decisions are affected by the interaction of the motivational system and the leader's world view. He identifies a motivational system including economic interests, communal concerns, messianism, governmental factors and defence concerns and four components in his perceptual inferential scheme (certain pattern): threat, opportunity, culture, and capability, which he calls 'world view' (R. Herrmann and M. Cottam later call it 'images'). He assumes that individuals are likely to follow certain patterns when making perceptions about international situations. Based on this perceptual scheme, he also proposes some ideal types of images including enemy, ally, and imperial.

Two adherents, Richard Herrmann (1985) and Martha Cottam (1986), follow R. Cottam's tradition and step further on perceptions. R. Herrmann categorizes four perceptual-scheme components into three 'dimensions' and identifies several ideal types of images (enemy, ally, child, barbarian,

³⁴ Alexander George, comments on the back cover of *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* by Robert Jervis, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.

dependent ally, satellite of an enemy). M. Cottam divides images into perceptions about attributes (including military capability, domestic policy, economic structure, culture and supportiveness, flexibility and goals) and perceptions about alternative responses (including diplomatic exchanges, military force, economic force, doing nothing, and appealing to international forums). She identifies seven possible ideal types of images based on her argument that different values of these factors contribute to the formation of certain types of images, which include enemy, hegemonist, dependent ally of the enemy, neutral, ally, dependent of the perceiver's state, and puppet of the perceiver's state.

Guided by these theoretical and conceptual frameworks, there has been considerable empirical research on further exploring the relationship between decision-makers' belief system and their policy orientations and behaviours. The notable ones include:

Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1995), who identify five types of images – enemy image, the ally, barbarian, imperialist, and dependent (colonial) images, which arise from three critical structural features of perceived international relationships (goal compatibility, relative power/capability and relative cultural status, or sophistication). The enemy image emerges from the structure of goal incompatibility, equal power and status while ally image is perceived based on the structure of goal compatibility, equal power and status. Schafer (1997) operates experimental research to test the independent and interactive effects of two dimensions of international image: perceived historical relationship and cultural differences. The results indicate that images do influence the policy preferences. He further discovers the connection between identity, image and conflict behaviour, and the experimental results showing that increased feelings of security correspond to more cooperative behaviour and image of the other was not significantly related to conflict behaviour. Alexander et al. (2005) conduct empirical research to test the relationship between international relations structure and the associated image types, as well as how the individuals' social identity and social dominance contribute to such images. From the

late 1970s, some scholars started to pay more attention to the formation and change of perceptions of policy elites.

The national image approach has been most intensively applied to the study of American-Soviet relations during the Cold War and excessively emphasized enemy image. Apart from the ideal image types mentioned above, Bronfenbrenner (1961) coins *mirror image* hypothesis in the U.S.-Soviet Union relations, whilst Ralph White (1968) popularizes the notion of mirror images in *Nobody Wanted War: Misperception in Vietnam and Other Wars*. The mirror image refers to opponents holding an image that is diametrically 'opposite' to the other (Streufert, 1994), essentially a diabolical enemy image.

The empirical findings have proved the assumption that the policy makers can be influenced by the images held in their minds and their cognitive system can determine policy orientations and behaviours, and further have impact on the interstate relations. The premise that image has an impact on the foreign policy-making process provides theoretical support for the indispensability of investigating the social discourse (which mainly refers to media discourse and experts discourse) in the construction of national image in this project. Nevertheless, from the above selective literature review, it can be seen that some inadequacies exist especially in the new context of international relations.

The international image study has paid a great deal of attention to the linkage between image and foreign policy decision-making, but has neglected in relative terms the dynamic process of formation and change of perceptions (J. Wang, 2000). According to the perspective of constructivism in IR, international relationships are characterised by processes of interaction between nation-states. The national interest and identity of the states are defined under a process of social construction and intersubjective understanding between states (Wendt, 1992, 1999)³⁵. Hilsman (1967)

³⁵ International relations constructivism will be used as a theory in the theoretical framework chapter. I will provide explicit explanation and arguments in this chapter.

proposes a structure of foreign policy-making based on a set of concentric circles and argues that there are four circles in foreign policy decision-making.³⁶ Hence, foreign policy decision-making is actually a complex communication process within these four concentric circles, so the study can be focused on a broader policy-making environment and on the social discourse construction process correlating with these four circles. Seib (1997) argues that media act as one of the influential factors in the foreign policy formation process through setting agenda, propelling governments into action, and serving diplomatic functions. Naveh (2002) expounds the role of media as an environmental creator in the foreign policy making process. Of course, media is only one of the elements in the policy-making environment, but it can be a study object, which connects the field of international relations with the field of international communication.

Furthermore, the classification or identification of ideal types of national image based on the perceived international relations structural pattern or perceptual scheme easily gets into a structural dilemma, as international relations are characteristic of ‘structural uncertainty’ or ‘structural complexity’ after the Cold War (Wang, 2000). Due to the structural uncertainty, Wang argues that traditional theories about ‘enemy image’ have increasingly lost their validity, so a new typology of national images needs to be established to incorporate relationships beyond pure enemies and allies.³⁷ He proposes ‘limited adversaries’ or ‘cooperating adversaries’ based on his empirical research on U.S.-China’s mutual images in the post-Cold War context.

Nowadays, the environment of international relations becomes very complicated and variable. International relations tend to be issue-oriented.

³⁶ The innermost and smallest circle includes the president and his closest advisers, who unusually make the final decision on most foreign policy issues. Lower level bureaucrats, the military community, Congress, interest groups, and the political parties come into play in the second or the third circle. The press and public opinion stand at the periphery of the foreign policy decision-making circle.

³⁷ Herrmann and Fischerkeller actually have already pointed out in their research: “We need more than the enemy image” beyond the five ideal types of images of target actors. Herrmann, R. K., & Fischerkeller, M. P. (1995). Beyond the enemy image and spiral model: Cognitive-strategic research after the Cold War. *International Organization*, 49(3), 415-450.

The emergence and development of ‘international regimes’³⁸ (Krasner, 1982; Young, 1989) on the international stage requires and also makes it more possible that states with incompatible goals in some aspects can be cooperative with each other, particularly with the assistance of international organizations. The climate change issue has the most universal attributes. In the new context of international relations, as all the nation-states face common problems and have the same ultimate goal, climate change intrinsically appeals for collective action and cooperation of nation-states. Young (1989) interprets the difficulties of cooperation in solving collective action problems or escaping from social traps, so he proposes and expounds the method of achieving international cooperation for natural resources and the environment through building regimes.³⁹ The feature of the climate change problem determines that nation-states, which hold equal status and power, but have incompatible goals in many other realms (like the U.S. and its allies and China) will eventually seek to cooperate on issues. The analysts have provided the practical possibility of international cooperation on collective action problems. Hence, cooperation is indispensable in dealing with the climate change issue. Moreover, this cooperative demand and behaviour will generate a positive image.⁴⁰ This positive image can be an image of cooperation. Therefore, my first proposition is that in the same mould as ally image, there can be an alternative image – *cooperative image* in the context of dealing with global environmental affairs especially climate change.

³⁸ Stephen D. Krasner defines international regimes as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (p.186). Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes as intervening variables. *International Organization*, 36,2, Spring, 1982, pp.185-205.

³⁹ See more Oran R. Young (1989). *International cooperation: Building regimes for natural resources and the environment*. Cornell University Press.

⁴⁰ According to the Realist Group Conflict Theory (RGCT), the perceived group competition leads to negative intergroup attitudes and behavior, while the perceived group cooperation leads to positive intergroup attitudes and behavior. I will use RGCT as a theoretical support in the chapter that develops my theoretical framework.

2.3.2 Review of Previous Study on National Image in the Field of International Communication

International communication scholars look at the formation of national image in the communication process. Media, as an important channel for information flow and mechanism for the formation of public opinion, has been confirmed with its indispensable role in foreign policy-making process by communication scholars (e.g., Naveh, 2002; Soroka, 2003). Nye (2004) claims that information is power and a much larger part of the world's population has access to that power in this information era, hence, media has gained a growing attention to the national image study, in the field of IR. Some communication scholars call this mediated image *media image* (e.g., Mowlana, 1997a).

The national image research in the field of international communication basically focuses on three aspects: 1) How an object-nation is presented in a mass medium and how individuals perceive an object-nation (Yan, 1998); 2) how the mediated national image influences public opinion or perceptions and foreign policy preferences and behavior (e.g., Mowlana, 1997b; H. Wang, 2003); 3) recently, there has been an increasingly growing interest in the nation's self-image building (strategic image or nation branding) and developing communication strategies for international public relations and public diplomacy through looking at the national/international image (e.g., Chitty, 2011; Kunczik, 1997; Malek, 1997; Manheim & Albritton, 1984; N. Snow, 2009; N. Snow & Taylor, 2009).

A great deal of empirical research has been done to explore the media-projected national image, including self-projection or other-projection (e.g., Conroy & Hanson, 2008; Ding, 1999; Usluata, 1999; Zaghlami, 1999) and the perception of this mediated image (e.g., Kamalipour, 1995; Zweiri & Mruphy, 2011). The studies of other-projected image have focused on the media production process, aiming at finding out what the projected national image is by media (media content), how media project the image and why (media production); the 'why' questions normally relating to media

institution and news values. Chinese communication scholars have done quite a bit of work on this aspect. I will have further discussion in the following section of Chinese national image study review.

Regarding studies on the relationship between media image, public opinion, foreign policy preferences, as well as international public relations and public diplomacy, the existing literature has contributed to revealing the causal link between the public, decision makers (foreign and domestic), and the media (Baum & Potter, 2008). International communication scholars (e.g., Manheim & Albritton, 1984; McCombs, 2004, 2005a, 2005b; McNelly & Izcaray, 1986; Salwen & Matera, 1992; Seib, 1997; Semetko, Brzinski, Weaver, & Willnat, 1992; Soroka, 2003) have applied media agenda-setting as a main theoretical framework to support their debates on the role of media in the public opinion and foreign policy decision-making. Cohen (1963, p. 13) in his book *The Press and Foreign Policy*, made an enunciation of the public agenda-setting hypothesis – the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.” Issue salience is a core concept in agenda-setting research (McCombs, 2005a). This hypothesis has promoted the agenda-setting analysis in public opinion and foreign policy research. Soroka (2003) empirically proves the importance of mass media and issue salience in the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy. Manheim and Albritton (1984) conduct research to investigate how to change image by strategically setting agenda in terms of two dimensions of national image: visibility and valence. Visibility refers to the total amount of media coverage that a country receives from the media, while valence refers to the favourability of the country in the media. As such, a negative national image results from high visibility and low valence, whilst a positive national image comes from high visibility and high valence. In terms of these two dimensions, the national image study attempts to find out the visibility and valence and provide the possible improvements within these two dimensions in order to ultimately obtain a positive national image.

With the development of agenda-setting theory, agenda-setting, priming and framing are taken together as three elements of the impact on public opinion. The traditional agenda-setting is considered as the first-level agenda-setting, which relates to the salience of various issues on both the public agenda and the media agenda (Dearing & Rogers, 1996). Priming and framing are considered as the second-level agenda-setting, which focus on the attributes of each object – “the influence of attribute agendas in the news on the public’s attribute agenda” (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009, p. 6). Growing interests have been shifted to discovering attributes of the second-level of media agenda setting on the public opinion and foreign policy making. Communication scholars (e.g., McCombs, 1997, 2004, 2005a, 2005b; McCombs & Reynolds, 2009) suggest two components of attributes in the research: the affective descriptions and cognitive descriptions. Affective descriptions are connected with valences or tones expressed in the discussion of an object, while cognitive descriptions are associated with the information that describes an issue in the agenda (ibid). The present studies on media image and its influence on public opinion and foreign policy making pay a great amount of attention to the assessment of the affective dimension of second-level agenda-setting, particularly the tones (positive, negative and neutral) in media and policy agenda, as well as the favourability of foreign countries in the public agenda (C. Zhang & MeadowsIII, 2012).

After reviewing the previous literature, it can be found out that there are inadequacies existing in the empirical research on media image effects on public opinion, policy-making process and so on and so forth. The previous image studies are based on a proposition that the mass media has effects on the public opinion through agenda setting. However, the changing communication environments such as the emergence of cyberspace and the increasing possibility for personal visits to foreign countries, have challenged the effect that traditional media exerts on the public. Questions such as the following await answers from international communication scholars: *How much do policy elites and intermediate experts rely on media?*

How much does the public, especially post-modern publics, rely on media, especially traditional media, for international affairs? How much can media image form and change foreign public opinion and policy makers' cognition?

The second aspect of inadequacy also relates to the effect of agenda-setting. It is obviously not enough to find out the positive and negative image through the dimensions of visibility and valence for the strategic implementation of soft power and public diplomacy. This deficit currently exists in China's national image studies. I will explicitly interpret this in the next section.

As I have reviewed above, it can be seen that the main trend of image study in the field of international relations has different emphases from that in the field of international communication. These two fields can draw on each other's research traditions to enrich their literature. Image study in IR can pay attention to the role of media and the communication process, while the image study in IC can show concerns about the relationship between the media projected image types and the international relationship structural pattern as well as its impact on decision makers and public opinion in a cognitive approach.

Certainly, there has been some convergence of image study between these two fields, which can provide some insights for the interdisciplinary research. There is one weighty piece of work in IR, which perhaps can be regarded as one of the earliest contributions to this convergence. It is Robert Jervis's (1970) book, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*. In this book, Jervis clearly clarifies the images between the senders and receivers in a communicative process. He examines the factors and process that states can apply to persuade other states to accept their projected desired images, and to influence the inferences that other states draw, to ultimately achieve the goals of the states. He attempts to provide strategies for successfully projecting desired images and being accepted 'on the cheap' (p.4). He proposes two concepts: signals and indices, which draw on the perspective of symbols and meanings from symbolic interactionism and then apply these

meanings to the field of IR. The conception of signals indicates the significance of strategic depictions and discourse in the interstate relations. The conception of indices, relates to the credibility of the message. Jervis expounds the relations of signals with lies and ambiguity and the manipulation of indices, which provides a conceptual basis for the strategic projection of desired image or national branding as well as the implementation of soft power and public diplomacy by states in the domain of international communication.

2.3.3 Review of Previous Study on China's National Image

Regarding China's national image, my discussion of existing literature mainly focuses on the empirical research in the field of international communication. I will firstly offer a very rough description of the previous classical works or research results on China's national image in the historical perspective and in the field of international relations.

The early studies on China's national image, beginning perhaps in the middle of the last century, primarily focus on the image of Chinese people and the society in a historical perspective. Several well-known works include Ross's (1911) *The changing Chinese*, Isaacs's (1958) *Scratches on Our Minds: American Views of China and India*, Mackerras' (1989) *Western Images of China*, Roberts's (1992) *China through Western Eyes: The Nineteenth Century*, Broinowski's (1992) *The Yellow Lady: Australian Impressions of Asia*, Jespersen's (1996) *American Images of China: 1931-1949*, and Hodder's (2000) *In China's Image: Chinese Self-perception in Western Thought*. Although these works do not apply any empirical methods to analyse the image of China, they collectively provide a comprehensive understanding of the early perceptions of the western people of China in a long historical process.

With its spectacular economic growth at the end of the 20th century, China is now considered to be an ascendant superpower. Studies of China's image have gained increasing attention from western scholars. Most international

relations theorists examine China's image in U.S. perceptions and the influence of the resulting images on both the U.S. and China's foreign policy preferences. During the Cold War period, classical mirror image and enemy image of China were widely advocated by realist scholars. Nowadays, more and more scholars (e.g., D. Chen, 2008; McGiffert, 2003; J. Wang, 2000) point out the complexity and transformation of U.S.-China interstate relations and new typologies such as 'limited adversaries' or 'cooperating adversaries' (J. Wang, 2000) have been proposed based on empirical research.

In China's domestic academia in the field of international communication, national image study emerged in the 1990s. The early 'national image projects' were undertaken by the Communication University of China (CUC) and the International Communication Centre at Tsinghua University (TICC). Some influential works include *American Media and China's National Image:1995-2005* (美国媒体和中国形象) (Y. He, 2005); *Image of China in World Mainstream Media* (镜像中国：世界主流媒体中的中国形象) (Liu & He, 2006b). It is noticeable that there was a popular theory proposed by TICC – 'China Threat Theory' (中国威胁论) and 'Demonizing China' (妖魔化中国) (Xiguang Li & Liu, 1996). Their book *Behind the Truth of Demonizing China* (妖魔化中国的背后) argues that American media treats China as a threat and expounds how American media distorts/demonizes China's image. In recent years, as soft power has been identified as an important national policy, the Chinese government has invested a great deal in strategic image building through international public relations including strategic advertising campaigns, branding itself through global media events such as the Beijing Olympic Games, Shanghai Expo and through giving the state-run international broadcaster a greater overseas presence to enhance the Chinese voice in the international community.⁴¹

⁴¹ China's Central Television (CCTV) launched its American service in February 2012, aiming at being competitive with other mainstream international broadcasters such as CNN, the BBC and al-Jazeera. CCTV established their own studios in several important cities in the North America and has brought on a number of journalists with experience in Western news organisations to staff the service.

Accompanying these developments, Chinese communication scholars have shown growing interest in analyzing China's strategic self-image projection and foreign policy making, as well as recommending strategies of public diplomacy and soft power implementation to improve the projected image of China. Some influential works include *China's Image by International View* (中国形象：中国国家形象的国际传播现状与对策) (Liu & He, 2006a); *Communication Strategies in National Image Construction* (国家形象建构中的传播策略) (Duan, 2007); *The Construction and Communication of China's National Image in the New Media Environment* (新传媒环境中国国家形象的构建与传播) (H. He & Liu, 2008); *The Shaping of China's National Image* (国家形象:探究中国国家形象构建新战略) (Hu, 2011); *China's International Image: A Constructivist Reading in the Age of Global Communication* (中国国家形象：全球传播时代建构主义的解读) (Z. Li, 2011).

Such research focuses on the representation of China's national image by international mainstream media primarily including the most influential American, British and French broadsheets, or the images of China in a historical thread, the perceptions of the targeted countries' publics, the analysis of the reasons for the resulting images and strategies of improvements of China's national image. These studies contribute to the investigation of China's national image portrayed by western media. It is reasonable to consider media as a window to knowing western perceptions of China's national image. However, excessive focuses on media reporting styles, contents, effects and so on, have been criticized as media centralization (Yang, 2011). Moreover, it has detected the simplification and stereotypes existing in the previous studies by reviewing the available literature.

Firstly, the research pattern of national image study is unitary. According to Yang, the previous studies simply treat media as a unitary study object, excessively concerned about the media reporting contents and styles. The studies normally follow a pattern: describe targeted media institutions – analyse media content – analyse causal factors of the resulting images –

provide strategies. Most of the studies consider western media as a media group associated with their governments and the tool of governments. The causal analysis is usually stereotyped as ideological divergence and biased reporting intention, which becomes ideological determinism, or is ascribed to cultural difference. The elements of ideology and bias cannot be avoided in the international coverage. Nevertheless, if the causal analysis remains at this level, it is not very helpful as it is barely likely to change the other countries' media institution and ideology. The conclusion can only become a result of other-critique and self-comfort, but cannot prescribe pertinent remedies for promoting national image.

My suggestion here is that future research can draw on the perspective of IR constructivism, taking media as one element of the construction of social discourse to discover how the social discourse in foreign countries constructs China's national image through the method of framing analysis and how the resulting images influence the public opinion and perceptions of policy makers, then further impacts on the foreign policy towards China. Concerning China's side, the research can focus on how Chinese media interprets the situation including the issue itself, the foreign media coverage as well as self and other foreign policies, so that the research can help with the intersubjective understanding of each side and provide pertinent strategies to improve the existing image, furthermore, to reform or change national image in the international coverage and foreign public perceptions. The possible research pattern can be:




Figure 2.3: A Possible New Research Pattern for National Image Study

Secondly, the conceptual building of national image theory is still insufficient. Some Chinese scholars have already attempted to employ international relations (IR) constructivism as a conceptual framework; however, the previous research on the question of “what attributes or components are contained in the nation image in the current discourse” is vague, and also the application of the IR constructivism theory for the empirical analysis has not been explicitly conducted. For instance, in Li’s (2011) book *China’s International Image: A Constructivist Reading in the Age of Global Communication*, he discusses the conception of national image in the constructivism framework in both the Western and Chinese context, as well as the attributes and features of national image. In the practical section, he examines the historical and contemporary of China’s national images including the formation and development. This is a breakthrough in the theoretical dimension in the Chinese national image study. Nevertheless, the research does not clearly define the concept of national image and lacks empirical evidence under the constructivism theory to prove the construction of national images.

As I have argued about the concept of nation-state above, the previous literature on national image study is more oriented to nation-state image. After examining the previous empirical research findings, it can be seen that the China’s national image portrayed by western media is focused on the Chinese government (party-state) behaviour.⁴² However, the previous research has not clearly distinguished the government (party-state) image and the popular image. The vagueness of the concept certainly cannot provide constructive strategies for the improvement of national image. Based on the previous studies on national image, I propose a second proposition: China’s national image portrayed by international media is basically a government (party-state) image. I will conduct the empirical research through applying framing devices to prove this proposition.

⁴² Government and state are separate but overlap in the party state. The communist party is a big factor in this image. For instance, China is portrayed as a communist regime in the western discourse.

Thirdly, the methodological approach of national image study hasn't been well developed. Examining those empirical studies, most of them tend to analyse national image represented in the media in terms of the structure of topics or thematic structures through content analysis. The topic-oriented results of national image usually contain aspects of politics (China policy, power, political system, foreign policy, ideology, Taiwan policy), economy (economic system, economic capabilities, U.S.-China economic relations), military (military might), society (religion, race), culture (pop culture, lifestyles) and education (B. Zhang, 2012).⁴³ Under these categories, the analysis normally focuses on the visibility and valence, and then goes to the positive and negative results. For instance, Yu (1988) lists a series of stories that the American public gets from the media which cover China's human rights abuses, intellectual property violations, nuclear proliferation, arms sales, prison labour, Tibetan conflicts and confrontations with Taiwan. And the conclusion is that the image of China according to American media is largely negative, unbalanced, and discouraging, which is characterised as a 'dark image' (p.66). As I argued in the previous section, positive and negative categories of national image are no longer sufficient for the current national image study. At a preliminary stage, studies based on these categories help one find out the salience of topics that foreign coverage is concerned about, but they could not constructively provide descriptions that will allow for formulation of detailed strategies for the improvement of image in other targeted countries. My suggestion here is that it is better to focus on a certain category (e.g., environment) to further discover the frames of other-projected image. As the frames are relatively stable, this will allow strategic promotion of national image through public diplomacy in order to generate soft power or the power of attractiveness.

Last but not least, after reviewing the previous literature on image and China's national image in both the fields of international relations and international communication, a dearth of research on the image of China in

⁴³ Zhang lists the objects studies in major articles on Chinese perceptions of the United States, covering the time span from 1973 to 2000. Zhang, B. (2012). *Chinese perceptions of the U.S: An exploration of China's foreign policy motivations*: Lexington Books.

relation to environment in the Australian context is discernible. Recently, with the salience of climate change negotiation on the international political agenda, particularly after Copenhagen Climate Change Conference 2009, there has been some research on foreign media reporting China's environmental issues or foreign media constructing discourse on China's environment – without addressing the notion of national image (e.g., Chai, 2005; J. Chen & Wang, 2011; Deng, 2010; Guo, 2010; Jilong Wang, 2011). However, it is noted that these research objects are still focused on American and European (French and British) mainstream media, but few researchers have focused on China's national image in the Australian context. Moreover, these studies do not transcend the limitations that I discussed above.

In this project, I select but one category – environment, the latest issue of international salience – with the aim of uncovering the media framing of China's national image in relation to environment. The commonality (as a common good for the entire world) and speciality (as a grave danger for the entire world) of the environment makes it fertile ground for investigation of new structural features in international relations and for the definition of new ideal types of national image. Furthermore, I attempt to do this empirical research in the context of Australia-China relations. The Sino-Australian relationship has a special characteristic – Australia is a loyal ally of the United States, but tightly dependent on the Chinese economy. The discovery of the construction process of Australian social discourse about China's environmental image can diversify national image research.

2.3.4 Review of Previous Study on China's Soft Power and Public Diplomacy

In the section 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, I mentioned that the trend of national image study turns to developing strategic communication for public diplomacy through investigating national/international image. As image cultivation has been closely associated with the domain of public diplomacy and soft power, many communication scholars relate national image to soft power

and public diplomacy in order to provide some insights into the practice of soft power and public diplomacy, and some other scholars are engrossed in research on the conception as well as the exercise of soft power and public diplomacy. Soft power and public diplomacy associated with strategic communication have been developing a relatively independent branch in the field of international communication. In this section, I review existing literature about China's soft power and public diplomacy, separating it from the examination of literature of national image study.

Since soft power was identified as a national strategy in 1997, the Chinese government has implemented considerable public diplomacy exercises to promote China's national image and increase the influence of Chinese soft power in the world. Certainly, the Chinese practice of soft power and public diplomacy has prompted a great deal of discussion, evaluation, controversy and criticism from both practitioners and scholars (e.g., Breslin, 2011; Ching, 2012; Gill & Huang, 2006; Huang & Ding, 2006; Kurlantzick, 2006, 2007; M. Li, 2008; Nye, 2005, 2011a, 2012; Rawnsley, 2009; Y. Wang, 2008).

Regarding China's power, a Chinese international relations scholar, Honghua Men (门洪华) (2005) in his book, *China's Grand Strategy: A Framework Analysis* (中国大战略的框架：国家实力、战略观念与国际制度), identifies its several concepts for the evaluation of power: power (实力), national power (国家实力), overall national strength or comprehensive national capacity (综合国力) and international competitiveness (国际竞争力). He covers hard power and soft power in the domain of national power. From the basic elements of being a great power or superpower,⁴⁴ Men believes that China is not a superpower at present, but that it has latent capacity to become a fully-fledged power or comprehensive power. He identifies three stages in the process of China's rise: to establish a 'leading position' (主导地位) in East Asia by 2010; to play a leading role as a 'quasi-world power' (准

⁴⁴ Yoichi Funabashi, Michael Oksenberg and Heinrich Weiss identify the basic elements of being a world power: economy, military, culture and political influence. Funabashi, Y., Oksenberg, M., & Weiss, H. (1994). *An emerging China in a world of interdependence*. New York: The Trilateral Commission.

世界大国) in the large Asia-Pacific region by 2020; to develop into a ‘world-level power’ (世界性大国) by 2050.⁴⁵

Men points out the leading ideas of China’s grand strategy. China should take defensive realism (防御性现实主义) as a core, economism (经济主义) as a primary task, regional primacy (区域优先) as a priority, institutionalism (制度主义) as means (including participant consciousness), cooperation (合作主义) as a path, and imagism (形象主义) (including responsibility consciousness) as an objective. He emphasizes several strategies in his analysis of China’s soft power, including the basic role of hard power, promoting Chinese traditional culture, optimizing and improving China’s development pattern and enhancing China’s participative ability on the international stage in implementing China’s soft power. In the Chinese discourse, the development of China’s soft power with China’s grand strategy is primarily discussed with reference to a ‘peaceful rise’ (和平崛起), ‘peaceful development’ (和平发展) and the building of a ‘harmonious world’ (和谐世界)(Wuthnow, 2008).

Some western scholars recognize the success of the exercise of China’s soft power and public diplomacy. For instance, Kurlantzick (2007) expounds that China’s soft power is transforming the world through comparing Chinese soft power with American soft power. He explains that China enunciates a broader idea of soft power in the Chinese context than does Nye, which includes “anything outside of the military and security system, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also more coercive economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment and participation in multilateral organizations” (p.6). China uses soft power to achieve its more difficult goals. Kurlantzick optimistically believes that China’s new benign image will help it prosecute its foreign policy more successfully, and he

⁴⁵ Honghua Men. (2007). Zhongguo ruanshili pinggu baogao, xia (Report on the analysis of China’s soft power, part 2), *Guoji guan cha* (International Observer), 3, p.43. Bijian Zheng, considered as the chief architect of the “peaceful rise” discourse, state that China will strive to achieve the status of a “middle-ranking great power” by 2050. See Bijian Zheng (2005). China’s ‘peaceful rise’ to great-power status. *Foreign Affairs* 84:5, pp.18-24. Thus it can be seen that the goal of China’s power by 2050 is differentiated between these two Chinese scholars. (Also see Wuthnow, 2008, p.5 footnote).

traces the growth and success of China's soft power in Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America and Central Asia. Moreover, the latest BBC survey shows growing positivity in the views of international publics about China's influence in the world.⁴⁶ The Lowy Institute Poll 2012 shows that 59% of Australian public have warm feelings towards China. The percentage increases 6 points compared with a 2011 poll.⁴⁷

Some other western scholars perceive great deficits in China's soft power.⁴⁸ Philip Seib expresses that China lacks consensus on a public diplomacy strategy and the outcome that China desires from its public diplomacy efforts.⁴⁹ Gary Rawnsley points out a degree of confusion about the questions of what soft power is, how it works and what the government would like to achieve by exercising it.⁵⁰ Joseph Nye emphasises that soft power depends upon credibility and reputation. He points out that China's deficit of soft power is related to its government's lack of credibility.⁵¹ Rawnsley identifies the problem of China's soft power as a 'credibility gap' that refers to a discrepancy between China's soft power message and its domestic and foreign policy behaviour. Political values, as one of the resources of soft power, have become a dilemma of China's soft power exercise.⁵² As China is still recognized as a communist regime or authoritarian regime, it always receives criticism in relation to human rights, transparency and censorship and so on and so forth. And the positive image of China is easily damaged by these issues in relation to political system. Chinese state media are struggling with credibility as well, because

⁴⁶ The latest BBC survey shows the views of China's influence in the world, retrieved June 4, 2012 from http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-05/14/content_15282521.htm.

⁴⁷ Hanson. (2012). Australia and New Zealand in the world: Public opinion and foreign policy. Retrieved July 10, 2012 from http://lowyinstitute.cachefly.net/files/lowy_poll_2012_web3.pdf.

⁴⁸ The following views have been expressed by the scholars including Joseph Nye, Gary Rawnsley, Philip Seib in the newspapers, blogs or conferences. I bring up these views here and will prove their views in the discussion chapter based on my empirical research.

⁴⁹ Seib, P. (2012, 6 June). The first soft-power superpower. http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/news/cpdblog_detail/the_first_soft-power_superpower/.

⁵⁰ Rawnsley, G. (2012, 6 June). An interesting few days in Chinese soft power. <http://www.pdic.blogspot.com.au/>.

⁵¹ Nye, J. (2011, 31 March). Don't magnify China's power. *China Daily*, from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2011-03/31/content_12252669.htm.

⁵² Rawnsley, G. (2012, 6 June). Chinese soft power and credibility. <http://www.pdic.blogspot.com.au/search?updated-max=2012-05-01T07:27:00-07:00&max-results=7>.

they are located within China's state system.⁵³ The western discourse has identified China as a great power because of the fact it has the second largest economy in the world, but Seib avers that China seems reluctant or very slow to accept the realities of being a superpower in the international arena.⁵⁴ Culture is an essential element of soft power. The Chinese government has poured considerable investment promoting Chinese language, Chinese arts, educational exchange, and international broadcasting services and so on. However, these scholars (Seib, Rawnsley) show doubts regarding China's cultural diplomacy. Seib argues that 'culture' is much more than the conventional elements of language and the arts, affecting attitudes toward human rights, environmental matters and many other issues. He is critical that Chinese cultural diplomacy inclines to be business-like rather than elevating political standing, which weakens the attractiveness of the culture.⁵⁵

From these views of China's soft power, it can be seen that there is a gap between Chinese and western discourse among scholars. I would like to make a third proposition: China's soft power and public diplomacy strategy is not compatible with the social discourse in western democracies. The findings of this project about China's images in the environmental context and the variable frames of the images can reflect the Australian social discourse on China's public diplomacy and soft power to a certain degree. It can detect whether the western discourse and Chinese discourse on China's soft power and public diplomacy match each other, and also prove the views expressed by the scholars mentioned above. It may make some contribution to the indication of the effects of China's soft power and public diplomacy in the Australian context and also in the context of other western democracies.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ See 49.

⁵⁵ Seib, P. (2012, 6 June). China's embrace of cultural diplomacy.

http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/newswire/cpdblog_detail/chinas_embrace_of_cultural_diplomacy/.

2.3.5 Review of Previous Study on Media and Communication on Environment

Environmental communication began with the emergence of the environment being a core political issue in the 1960s, and has boomed, becoming a distinctive field, over the last two decades (Hansen, 2011). It is defined by Cox (2010, p. 20 italics origin) as “*the pragmatic and constitutive vehicle for our understanding of the environment as well as our relationships to the natural world; it is the symbolic medium that we use in constructing environmental problems and negotiating society’s different responses to them*”. He identifies seven concerns that environmental communication scholars are currently pursuing, one of which is media and environmental journalism, which is pertinent to my project. I will primarily review literature on media and communication research on the environment.

In the domain of environmental communication, scholars believe that media plays an essential role in environmental communication and environmental politics (e.g., Boykoff & Roberts, 2007; Castells, 2004, 2009; Hansen, 1993; Lester, 2010; Meadows, 1991). As Lester (2010, p. 3) argues, although other spaces for information flow exist, “news privileges a form and style of information content and distribution that has ensured it remains central to contemporary society”. Environmental communication research started with concerns about analysis of news coverage of ‘environmental issues’ in the journalism tradition (e.g., Dunwoody & Griffin, 1993). Gradually, scholars found the research was “trapped in circular concerns with balance, bias and objectivity” (Hansen, 2011, p. 9), so the studies have evolved into a much broader spectrum of media and communication issues regarding science, medicine/health, environment and risk, and draw on “a rich body of theories and approaches to understand and elucidate the broader social, political roles of environmental communication” (ibid). Moreover, environmental communication scholars, influenced by the social constructivist perspective, began a systematic study of the influence of media depictions of the environment on public attitudes and political controversy with sociological

interpretations. Mainstream media and communication scholars favour framing as both theoretical framework and approach for communication issues. Environmental communication research is no exception. Scholars attempt to find out frames of environmental issues/problems embedded in the news and the framing process including framing building and framing setting by unpacking framing devices.⁵⁶ Framing analysis can contribute to strategic communication by discovering questions like what the issue/problem is; who/what is responsible; and what the solution is (Hansen, 2011; Ryan, 1991).

Examining the previous conceptual and empirical studies, it can be seen that media and communication research on the environment has massively focused on the media construction of environment as a social issue as well as media effects on both the public and political agenda, namely three basic communication directions – media production, media content and media effects. Hansen (2010) in his book *Environment, Media and Communication* proposes a series of questions, which reflect the main focuses and trends of studies in the field of media and communication on environment in detail. These questions include: How far has the rise of the environment on the political agenda been brought about by the mass media? How has the political agenda been brought about by the mass media? How is the political process influenced by media coverage of environmental issues? To what extent is media coverage itself influenced or structured by economic pressures, by the professional norms and practices of journalists, by news values and/or by the publicity and news management practices of the major stakeholders in environmental debate (including business, industry, government, environmental pressure groups, scientists, etc.)? Who gets to define what environmental issues are about or how they should be addressed and resolved? How do the mass media contribute to policing the boundaries of ‘acceptable’ public debate about the environment? How do mediated images contribute to the formation of public opinion? In what

⁵⁶ Framing, as a theory and an approach will be applied in this research. I will have further detailed discussion in the chapters of theoretical framework and methodology.

ways do different publics draw on media representations for making sense of environmental issues? How are nature and references to what is regarded as 'natural' used in media and public debate about controversial issues? How are nature and the natural used in advertising to sell everything from cosmetics and cars to corporate identity? (pp.7-8)

Environmental communication research has been rapidly and maturely developed, but it is noticeable that there is a possible area that has obtained scarce attention from the environmental communication scholars. Most empirical studies have been done in an indigenous direction, being concerned about a country's media constructing domestic environmental affairs in relation to domestic public and political concern (e.g., McGaurr & Lester, 2009). The comparison at the international level remains longitudinal direction, referring to vertical comparison between countries (Berglez, Birgitta Höijer, & Olausson, 2009; Dirikx & Gelders, 2009; Schäfer, 2011; M. Shanahan, 2009). Some communication scholars (e.g., Wu, 2009) have started to look at how international coverage frames environmental issues particularly climate change of other countries. Wu selects 47 news outlets based in 17 countries and regions to examine the representation of China in international coverage, in order to explore the global climate change discourse on China. This contributes to the environmental communication literature. Nevertheless, the effects of the media construction of other countries' environmental issues on the public perceptions of the other countries and foreign policy preferences in relation to environment, and the strategies developed by object countries for environmental public diplomacy could be an area for exploration. This interdisciplinary direction, which combines insights from international relations and international communication, could possibly diversify environmental communication research, and vice versa. Besides, I assume that the international coverage on other nations' environmental issues/problems incline to simplification, relating more to the environmental politics, so the empirical findings from studies of media framing environmental issues in the domestic public and policy agenda could

probably indicate the international reporting on other countries' environmental issues, which could help to broaden foreign policy options. In the end, based on reviewing literature of media and communication on environment, I would like to make a fourth proposition: International reporting on other countries' environmental issues or others' projected environmental images tends to relate to interstate relationships and global environmental politics.

2.4 Propositions and Research Questions

After reviewing available literature from three fields – international relations (IR), international communication (IC) and environmental communication (EC) – I found some research gaps in these three fields in relation to national image and transnational media and communication on environment. In the field of IR, as the new context of climate change for international relations emerges, it requires a new kind of thought and typology for the ideal type of national image for foreign policy makers to adapt this new international structural pattern. In the field of IC, the current research approach on national image is no longer sufficient to meet the practical needs of implementing soft power and public diplomacy, so a focus on certain specific categories is demanded. Environment, as a relatively new domain in the IC national image study, could be a new attempt at the exploration of news frames of national image. Regarding EC, the concerns about international reporting of other countries' environmental issues especially climate change could be a new area to explore. These three fields can derive some conceptual framework and methodological approaches from each other to enrich their research literature.

In this project, I make an attempt at this interdisciplinary combination by taking Australia and China as a case. I will conduct the empirical research on Australian media framing China's environmental issues to get a new typology of national image based on Australia-China relations. Besides the overall propositions raised in the introduction chapter, four sub-propositions

have been identified in the literature review of these three fields. I will come up with detailed research questions to go with these propositions here.

Overall Proposition:

Cooperation rather than conflict is the dominant theme of Australian public discourse and public perception in relation to environmental cooperation with China.

Sub-propositions:

Proposition1: (a) Cooperation with China in relation to the environmental dimension is the dominant Australian social discourse, and

(b) ‘cooperative image’ is a category of image that is pertinent to international issues that call for cooperation, such as climate change.

Proposition 2: China’s national image portrayed by international media is basically a government (party-state) image.

Proposition 3: China’s soft power and public diplomacy strategy is not compatible with the social discourse in the western democracies.

Proposition 4: International reporting on other countries’ environmental issues or others’ projected environmental images tends to relate to interstate relationships and global environmental politics.

Based on these four propositions, I develop a series of research questions as follows.

Research Questions:

Overall Research Question:

What is the dominant theme of Australian public discourse and public perception in relation to environmental cooperation with China?

Sub-research Questions:

1. How do Australian print media frame China's environmental image?
 - (1) What are the dominant frames of China's environmental image portrayed by *The Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald*?
 - (2) What are the frames of China's environmental image that are missing in *The Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald*?
2. What are the environmental images of China that two leading Australian broadsheets portray?
3. What are the Australian intermediate experts' individual frames of environmental images of China?
 - (1) What are the dominant frames of China's environmental image held in the intermediate experts' minds?
 - (2) How much are the intermediate experts' individual minds influenced by the news frames?
4. What are the possible indications of China's practice of soft power and public diplomacy in Australia in the environmental dimension in terms of environmental images of China portrayed in the Australian social discourse?
5. In the conceptual dimension, what framework is provided by social discourse for the evaluation of environmental image?

The logic of these research questions is that I will find out how the media frame China's environmental issues first, then I will investigate China's national image in relation to environment portrayed by Australian media through finding out dominant frames, as well as individual frames in the mediated experts' minds to see their perceptions of China's national image. The first three questions will help with the resolution of the first two propositions. The fourth question will facilitate the resolution of the third

proposition. The fourth question can be actually considered as an extension of the previous questions, attempting to provide some insights for the practice of Chinese soft power and public diplomacy based on the empirical research. The fifth research question will help with the resolution of the fourth proposition.

2. 5 Summary

After I reviewed the available literature in relation to national image and media in the fields of international relations, international communication and environmental communication, as well as finding out the research gap existing in these fields, it would seem that there is some possibility for the conduct of this project by referencing an interdisciplinary theoretical framework and approach. In the following chapter, I will draw on constructivism theory from international relations and framing theory and approach from both international communication and environmental communication to re-examine a major issue – media portrayed national image in the field of international communication.

CHAPTER THREE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I aim to discuss theories that are drawn on in the construction of my own theoretical framework for this project. I review symbolic interactionism to begin with (section 3.2) as the epistemological foundation for the other theories, especially for international image theory and framing theory. As the project revolves around international image and foreign policy, I examine international relations theories in section 3.3. I compare the three most popular international relations theories – realism, liberalism and constructivism – in the aspects of structure, self-help system, identity and interest as well as process, which are among the most heated topics of debate in relation to international theory. International relations constructivism theory provides a large landscape for image and framing theory. In section 3.4, I review the international image cultivation in the practice of public diplomacy and soft power. I examine the relationship between international structures, intentional image and potential international behaviour, and Realistic Group Conflict Theory to support this premise. Furthermore, I review the concepts of public diplomacy and soft power as well as associated strategies and resources. The following section (3.5) examines framing theory. I briefly review the development of framing research, expound the three paradigms of framing research and locate my project in the proper paradigm. Furthermore, I discuss the definition and typology of frames including the typology of news frames. Lastly, I develop a framing process model in the international context based on the three most

popular framing process models. I develop a theoretical framework in the last section (3.6).

3.2 Symbolic Interactionism

Symbolic Interactionism, as an approach to interpreting society, has an affinity with a number of intellectual traditions, most of which were spawned within North American society (Plummer, 1996, p. 226). Yet symbolic interactionism has been influenced by precursive thought identified as follows (Manis & Meltzer, 1978) both from, as I have noted through these groupings, the New World (pragmatism and functional psychology) and the Old World (evolutionism, German idealism and Scottish moralism). The conceptualizations of symbolic interactionism emerged from the ideas of pioneers such as George Herbert Mead, Robert E. Park, William James, John Dewey, Charles Horton Cooley, William Isaac Thomas, Florian Zanniecki, James Mark Baldwin, Robert Redfield, and Louis Wirth (Blumer, 1986). Symbolic interactionism suffered through a difficult period in the 1950s when structural-functionalism emerged as the dominant paradigm in sociology, but started to attract a larger following during the chaotic 1960s (Shibutani, 1988).

George Herbert Mead is credited with being the father of symbolic interactionism. Interactionists and other sociologists regarded him as the one ‘true founder of the symbolic interactionist tradition’(Plummer, 1996, p. 225; Reynolds, 2003) and one of the founding fathers of modern sociology (Shibutani, 1988). His perspectives of self, mind and society are generally regarded as the foundation theory that transformed the “inner structure of the theory of symbolic interactionism, moving it to a higher level of theoretical sophistication” (Martindale, 1981, p. 329; Reynolds, 2003). After him, symbolic interactionism developed in three directions, represented by the Chicago School, Iowa School and Indiana School, all of which claimed their theoretical orientation was based on Mead’s ideas. Herbert Blumer, a student of Mead, first coined the term ‘symbolic interaction’, to give a name

to Mead's approach.⁵⁷ Symbolic interactionism flourished as a way to interpret human group life and human society through a sociological lens.

Symbolic interactionists see the social world as a dynamic process that consists of individuals' interaction with each other symbolically. Social acts are considered to be the most fundamental elements in the emergence of mind, self and society by Mead. Interactionists stress that this social interaction is "a process that *forms* human conduct" (Blumer, 1986, p. 8), which distinguishes an automatic or direct reaction to others' actions. Interactionists employ the term *symbols* from Mead's 'use of significant symbols' to interpret how human group life is constructed and unfolds. The human world is constituted by *symbols* that are generated by individuals during human interaction. As Blumer (1986) explains, human beings act toward things in terms of meanings that they give to the stimuli. Humans create meanings through an interpretative process and give meanings to the objects. Then individuals learn what things mean by interacting with one another. Generalising further into the animal kingdom, a symbol (collectively called 'conventional signs'), may be seen as occurring "in an arbitrary relationship to what it represents, a relationship that has been created by and is shared among a group of animals" (Hewitt, 1997). In the human world, languages constitute the most important and powerful set of symbols we can identify (Hewitt, 1997).

Goffman, heavily influenced by Mead and Blumer, carries on the tradition of symbolic interactionism. His greatest contribution to symbolic interactionism is that he describes social interaction from a dramaturgical perspective in his book *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959) and he investigates the ways in which individuals frame their activities in the book *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (1974)

⁵⁷ Blumer's social interactionism is called by some interactionists (e.g., Low, 2008) as "Blumerian symbolic interactionism". Blumer stresses the influence from Mead in his opening page of his book: "I reply chiefly on the thought of George Herbert Mead who, above all others, laid the foundations of the symbolic interactionist approach, but I have been compelled to develop my own version, dealing explicitly with many crucial matters that were only implicit in the thought of Mead and others, and covering critical topics with which they were not concerned". Blumler, H. (1986). *Symbolic interactionism: Perspectives and method*: University of California Press.

where the concept of frame was first proposed. In this book, Goffman likens society to a theatre⁵⁸; the actor performing in a setting which consists of a stage and a backstage; his actions being directed by props; and the drama being watched by an audience. In the 'theatre', there are different kinds of 'frames', which structure a human being's real life experience, and allow participants to orient themselves and monitor their behaviour. These 'frames' are viewed by Goffman (1974, p. 10) as "an arbitrary slice or cut from the stream of ongoing activity"; the purpose of a frame is for individuals or groups "to locate, perceive, identify, and label" events and occurrences, thus rendering meaning, organising experiences and guiding actions (p.12). Goffman stresses the significance for us, as social individuals, to become familiar with the frames in order to understand and participate in social activities. Meanwhile, it is vital for us to unpack these 'frames' to discover the meaning behind social activities. Goffman's concept of frame provides a sociological basis for the development of framing theory in the field of communication.

The perspective of social construction cannot convincingly deny the influence of symbolic interactionism, though some constructionists seek to do just that. Social construction was introduced as an approach by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966). The core idea of social construction is that the common sense knowledge of everyday reality is derived from the interaction of persons and groups in the social system and reinforced as people act upon the understanding of it. Since common sense knowledge is negotiated by people, human *typifications*, *significations* and *institutions* come to be presented as part of an objective reality. Social reality is therefore said to be socially constructed.

Concerning the influence of symbolic interactionism on image theory, it is initially reflected in Blumer's (1986, pp. 10-11) thought about the nature of objects. As he states,

⁵⁸ It should be recalled here that William Shakespeare famously wrote "All the world's a stage And all the men and women merely players/They have their exits and their entrances/And one man in his time plays many parts..." in *As You Like It* II, VIII.

The position of symbolic interactionism is the “worlds” that exist for human beings and for their groups are composed of “objects” and that these objects are the product of symbolic interaction...This meaning sets the way in which he sees the object, the way in which he is prepared to act toward it, and the way in which he is ready to talk about it. An object may have a different meaning for different individuals. The meaning of objects for a person arises fundamentally out of the way they are defined to him by others with whom he interacts.

Human beings invest objects with meanings through their social interaction; they receive meanings from objects through interaction and form perceptions of objects in their minds. The mediated image of an object is no doubt an outcome of human interaction.

In conclusion, through a brief review of the theory of symbolic interactionism, it can be discerned that symbolic interactionism is a fundamental theory underpinning social construction, image theory and framing theory. In the context of international relations, it provides fundamental insights for constructivism in the field of international relations, which is concerned about the interaction among actors in an international system. The discussion of symbolic interactionism theory, as a starting point for this chapter, contributes to the laying of a foundation for the theoretical framework to be developed herein.

3.3 Constructivism (International Relations)

3.3.1 Constructivism (International Relations) and Some Main Debates

Constructivism, as a significant approach to interpreting the international world, has three layers of understanding involving metaphysics, social theory and international relations (IR) theory. The first two theoretical layers allowed constructivism to deal with the social world in general, but the third layer of international relations theory had to be introduced to it by

Nicholas Onuf (1989) to permit the socially constructed character of international relations to be addressed.

Constructivism (international relations, short for IR constructivism) is supposed to have been affected by five currents of thought from philosophical and sociological positions (neo-Kantian ‘objective hermeneutics’, linguistic ‘subjective hermeneutics’, critical theory and pragmatist philosophy of science) (E. Adler, 2002) and structuralist and symbolic interactionist sociology. The variety of roots of constructivism contributes to its middle ground role in international relations theory. After Onuf, a large following of scholars gathered in the constructivism camp, which generally includes ‘conventional constructivism’ (e.g., Emanuel Adler & Michael, 1998; Derian, 2009; Finnemore, 1996; Hopf, 2002; Katzenstein, 1996; Reus-Smit, 2005; Ruggie, 1986; Wendt, 1999) and ‘critical constructivism’ (e.g., Campbell, 1998; George, 1994; Linklater, 1998; Tickner, 1992; Walker, 1993).

Constructivism, as is the case with other international relations theories, is basically concerned with social theories of the relationship between agency, process, and social structure, which constitutes the debates among international relations theories (e.g., casual vs. Constitutive explanations, rationalism vs. Constructivism, Kantian vs. Weberian roots) (E. Adler, 2002). Wendt (1992, p. 391) detects the debate today is more concerned with the extent to which state action is influenced by ‘structure’ (anarchy and the distribution of power) versus ‘process’ (interaction and learning) and institutions. In this project, I do not attempt to join in these debates; I merely draw on conventional constructivist perspectives for the development of my theoretical framework and apply these perspectives to the empirical research. Hence, I draw on the work of constructivists – with emphasis on Wendt and his discussion of how international relations are socially constructed under conditions of anarchy – in order to lay a theoretical foundation for this project, focusing as it does on the role of endogenous social discourse in the construction of foreign relations. In the

following section, I start with the main debates between realism and liberalism in relation to some basic elements – identity, interest, self-help and anarchy – and review the core ideas of constructivism in order to clarify the position that I take in this project.

In international relations theories, both realists and liberalists view the structure of the interstate system as anarchic, which produces a self-help system. Neo-realists hold the position that the international structure is based on a distribution of material capabilities and is “a set of relatively unchangeable constraints on the behaviour of states” (Hopf, 1998, p. 172), so a nation-state’s interests are intrinsically formed based on these capabilities. They believe that the nation states act according to the logic of self-help, serving their own interests and will not subordinate their interests to another’s. The distribution of relative power drives states into recurrent security competitions, the condition of what is dubbed as a ‘competitive security system’ by Wendt and regarded as anarchy by Waltz (1959, 2001) and which condition may precipitate war. Liberalists insist that state preferences are the primary determinant of state behaviour and interstate bargaining outcomes. Individual states define their preferences with reference to domestic civil society first, and then engage in a process of interstate strategic interaction to reach a consensus; the possible state behaviour, therefore, is based on the preferences of all the states involved (Moravcsik, 1997). In this anarchic international system, the states are still self-regarding about their security, but they hold that absolute gains can be achieved through cooperation between states, the assumption of which is conceptualized as an ‘individualistic’ security system by Wendt. Regarding cooperation, liberalists emphasize the various opportunities for cooperation especially in the domain of low politics and through the usage of soft power.

Constructivists have developed a series of arguments on these debates. In respect of anarchy, Onuf (1998, p. 62) states that “*Anarchy* points to a condition of *rule* among states in which no one state or group of states rules over the rest,” but it does not mean there is an absence of rule. He claims

that the explicit rules may not inform the way agents conduct their relations, but rules may be hidden in the background. Wendt (1992, p. 395) strongly refutes the realists and liberalists by claiming, “anarchy is what states make of it,” echoing Onuf’s (1998, p. 59) statement, “people make the society, and society makes people.” Wendt argues that self-help is not a constitutive feature of anarchy, but an institution, generated in a process, not due to structure. Moreover, standing along with liberalism, he claims that international institutions can transform state identities and interests.

Constructivists share some common ideas with the liberalists such as interstate cooperation and the emphasis of the role of civil society. However, in the liberalist view, a dilemma emerges when states hold divergent preferences. The negotiation inclines to be conflictual in nature or return nil common outcomes. Even if a compromised outcome is generated at the interstate level, it may not be instrumental, as the outcome does not match the expected domestic preferences. Liberalists stress ‘demand’ made by states, but the individual demand determines that states cannot avoid the fundamental constraints on state behaviour. The reason for this, as explained by Wendt, is that both realists and liberalists negatively identify the security of self rather than positively identify security as an individual responsibility. Wendt proposes a ‘cooperative’ security system, contrasted with a ‘competitive’ security system (realism) and an ‘individualistic’ security system (liberalism), where interests of ‘self’ are constructed as collective action to achieve a common good. His identification is positive in that national interests are international interests *per se*. I take this proposition and argue that the inherent transnational interdependence feature of environment especially climate change makes the attributes of ‘cooperative’ security more visible and strengthens the internationalization of national security interests. In this anarchic world, climate change connects the states as a whole; all the states are required to collectively act on the same ultimate interest – climate change mitigation. When the states deal with supranational affairs, which contain their common interests, they

are more likely to connect their national interests with international interests.

Based on the assumption of ‘anarchy is what states make of it’, constructivists hold the view that the ‘structure of identity and interest’ (the concept is developed by Wendt) of a nation-state is ‘relationship-specific’, largely exogenous to interaction among states, instead of being intrinsic attributes of a ‘portfolio’. ‘Shared ideas’ or ‘intersubjective knowledge or understanding or meanings’, upheld by constructivists, are supposed to determine the structure of human association and construct the identities and interests of purposive actors (Mercer, 1995).

Then, how are these shared ideas or intersubjective knowledge produced? At the ontological level, constructivists view the social world as intersubjectively and collectively meaningful structures and processes (E. Adler, 2002). As the fundamental principle of constructivist social theory, “people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them” (Wendt, 1992, pp. 396-397), international relations constructivists believe that shared ideas or intersubjective knowledge is constructed under the undergoing process of interaction between interstate actors. Wendt (1992, p. 406) provides an explicit illustration indicating the interaction process between state actors and how the process and institutions influence each other.




Figure 3.1: The Codetermination of Institutions and Process

According to Wendt's illustration, states first undergo a process of defining their own situation. The states' action is based on their own definition and interpretation of others' action during the process of interaction. The identities and interests of states are ultimately defined based on this constituted intersubjective understanding. This illustration is hypothetically set up on the premise of initial non-interaction between the two states at all levels. Nevertheless, most situations are that the interaction between states has already commenced and a very complicated cognition of other states (nation image) has sedimented in the state's social memory. Enlightened by liberalists' insights of changing relationship to domestic and international civil society in the pre-strategic purposes of states, I have five points to argue about in the process of self-definition of the situation, before action formation, which I put in a complex social context.

Firstly, the four sectors (including government, corporate, civil society and media) of the state's domestic society, as endogenous factors, all contribute to the definition of situation; Secondly, the exogenous elements including

the dialogue with other states' governments, economic interdependence and the interaction with external civil society and so on and so forth, could exert a certain impact on the domestic definition of a situation and on the intersubjective understanding of states. Thirdly, I emphasize the media's role in constructing the expectations possessed by incorporating A and B to the self-definition in the process of states' self-definition. Media not only acts as an information delivery mechanism, but also plays a role in actively constructing other states' responsibilities in the international stage, which I call 'other-defined identity'.⁵⁹ The international discourse, especially media discourse, is an input to the state's formation of self-identity and interest. Fourthly, I emphasize the role of intermediate experts of State B in the interpretation of State A's action and the definition of the situation of their own state. And also, the intermediate experts influence the discourse in the foreign policy-making process. The intermediate experts, labelled as Lasswellian influentials or opinion leaders, normally lead public opinion through manipulating information flows and structuring the public debates on foreign policy. Intermediate experts act as a bridge connecting both decision makers and the general public, as well as influencing the opinions of both sides.⁶⁰ Lastly, I hold the view that interpretation of the state's action and intersubjective understanding of each other relate to one state's personalised image of the other state.

The illustration also demonstrates the role of intersubjective meanings arising out of interaction in the identity and interest formation and transformation of nation states. As with symbolic interactionism, constructivists believe that meaning is expressed through language and representation. Onuf (2002, p. 126) specifically stresses that language serves a constitutive function with the distinction of positivist view that "language serves *only* to represent the world as it is" (*italics original*). In his

⁵⁹ 'Other defined identity', relative to state's 'self-definition', refers to external discourse such as international media discourse, international experts' discourse and international public opinion. I argue here that media probably play a dominant role in defining other countries identity.

⁶⁰ I will have further discussion about intermediate experts in the session of interviewee selection in the methodology chapter.

three premises of systematic rendition of constructivism, Onuf (2002, p. 127)states:

Speech and its derivatives (rules, policies) are the media of social construction. People become agents by living in a world of language. They depend on language to express their wishes, to translate their wishes into goals, and finally to act on their goals. Performative speech is the basis of, and template for, normative conduct. Social construction is always normative.

This position provides theoretical support for my project, which aims to discover the meaning of social discourse in relation to environmental issues, presented by media and intermediate experts' individual cognition.

In this project, I concentrate on the discovery of the process of the State B's (Australia) interpretation of State A's (China) action and expectations of State B and its 'other defined identity' of State A, in order to provide State A with an interpretation of State B's subjective understanding of State A in order to illuminate State A's strategic interaction with State B. According to my arguments, I will briefly review the mainstream discourse on Australian China policy among the Australian intermediate experts here in order to facilitate the comprehensive understanding of Australian interpretations of China's action, and to further provide a broad framework for the understanding of the perceptions of China's environmental situation.

Foreign policy of a state is an index of action towards other states as well as the indicator of a state's subjective understanding of the other state. On the basis of the review of the Australian government's foreign policy towards China in the section of backgrounds to the problem in the introduction chapter, it can be seen that the Australia-China relations is promising, having evolved from 'strategic partnership' (Howard administration) to 'comprehensive, constructive and cooperative relationship' (current Gillard administration); meanwhile, there is the conundrum of the contemporary Australian China policy which mainly arises from the U.S.-China relationship.

3.3.2 Interpretations of China's Action in Australian Discourse

Regarding Australia's China policy options, there have been different interpretations of China's action such as in relation to the world security aspect of its rise, its economic role in the world, and correspondingly, different strategies adopted in handling Australian-China relations particularly with reference to the role of the U.S. in the Australian discourse. Several key arguments corresponding to China's rise in the Asia-Pacific region among Australian international relations scholars include Hugh White's 'power shift and great power concert', Michael Wesley's 'engagement with Asian powers', Andrew Phillips' 'enhancing middle powers', Derek McDougall's 'Australian approach of combination of soft balancing and accommodation'.

White (2010) considers that China's burgeoning economy contributes to its growing influence in the region as well as to the world power shift. He insists that the best approach for Australia in dealing with this power shift is the Sino-American accommodation and the establishment of a 'great power concert' in the region, as he assumes, "the best outcome for Australia would be for America to relinquish primacy and share power with China and the other major powers in a Concert of Asia" (p.55). However, he argues that if the uncontested American primacy is going away, Australia has to rethink its choice and strategies along with the U.S. and China. Wesley (2011) contends that China's rise shifts the previous world power distribution, and upholds that Australia should rely less on the U.S. instead to shift attention to the Asia-Pacific region by developing cooperative relationships with other powers to keep the power balance.

Phillips (2011) opposes White's idea of building the region's security architecture on the basis of a 'great power concert', and 'self-strengthening strategies', but upholds the idea of enhancing the participation and support of Asia's increasingly assertive middle powers. He also avers that it is exaggerating the role of China's rise and the great power rivalries. Bisley (2011) disagrees with both White's optimism about the assessment of

China's rising strength and pessimism about Australia's future policy options, by pinpointing the domestic problems of China, which weaken the assumed international role of China.

McDougall (2012) advocates an Australian approach, a strategy combining soft balancing and accommodation as well as hedging, in responding to China's rise. Soft balancing relates to the security domain while accommodation is relevant to the economy domain. He avers that soft balancing, differentiating from hard balancing, focuses more on diplomatic and political responses. McDougall claims that the selection between soft balancing and accommodation depends on the indices of power strength, geographical position, economic factors and domestic politics. He argues that major powers such as the U.S., Japan and India, incline to adopting a soft balancing approach while the middle and small powers prefer the accommodation approach. He argues that the economic ties with China may favour accommodation, but the political fears of China encourage soft balancing. He promotes the idea of maintaining the status quo by combining these two approaches, which offers flexibility for unexpected changes.

The analysis of these main debates in Australian discourse in relation to international relations scholars reveals the contradiction of the assessment of the role of rising China and the dilemma of the selection of Australian China strategies. The dominant discourse concedes the rise of China and its impact on recasting the region and the world. The main divergences of the Australian strategies towards China revolve around adopting the American approach or developing an Australian approach, accommodating China or softly balancing China.

Which option should policy makers select? It is importantly determined by the perceptions held in the policy makers' cognitive system, as McDougall (2012, p. 3) states that "perceptions of the significance of China's power are very important". Thus, in this project, I will investigate these 'perceptions' through exploring the images projected by the media and individual perceptions in the intermediate experts' minds, in order to further detect

the various perceptions and enrich the literature in relation to Australian discourse about Australian China policy.

3.4 International Image Cultivation through Public Diplomacy and the Use of Soft Power

3.4.1 International Image Cultivation and the Realist Group Conflict Theory

Symbolic interactionism theory explains that the social world dynamically unfolds through the interplay of symbols and minds that are generated through human interaction. Blumer (1986)'s statement suggests that symbols or meanings set the way for individuals to perceive an object – image, and individuals create further symbols or meanings that are based on this image. Put in the context of interstate relations, the constructivists believe that the states define their national interest and identity on the basis of their intersubjective understandings of each other. The intersubjective meanings arise from the perceptions and interpretations of each other's situation and action. These perceptions and interpretations relate to the images of these two states that are held by the correlating subjects (e.g., policy makers). Furthermore, the existing literatures of image in the fields of both international relations and international communication have revealed the crucial role played by national image in the foreign policy-making process. For instance, Kunczik (1997, p. 49) has expounded that decision makers are usually aware that they are living in a world of images. A decision maker acts upon his 'image' of the situation rather than upon 'objective' reality, based on his or her own belief system (Boulding, 1961; Festinger, 1962).

Concerning the image types, the international relations image theorists (e.g., Herrmann & Fischerkeller, 1995) propose several ideal image types such as the ally image, enemy image, barbarian image, imperialist image and dependent (colonial) image. These images arise from structural features of international relations, including goal compatibility, relative

power/capability and relative cultural status or sophistication; and can determine corresponding international behaviours such as cooperation, conflict, control and sabotage. Apparently, the ally image or the friend image is a positive image, which is more likely to lead to cooperative international behaviour; by contrast, enemy image is more likely to foster conflicts, and vice versa.

Along with this structural pattern, the Realist Group Conflict Theory (RGCT) (e.g., LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966), a social-psychological model of intergroup conflict, premises that the intergroup attitudes and behaviour reflect group interests and are based on the nature of, and compatibility of, group goals. When group goals are compatible, positive relations should result; whereas when group goals are incompatible, negative relations should result. Moreover, the RGCT presupposes that the perceived group competition leads to negative intergroup attitudes and behaviour towards outgroups. It does not require that actual competition over tangible resources exists. Rather it is the perception of competition that leads to conflict and hostility, and the perceived competition may be over a variety of real and symbolic resources. As stated by Sherif (1966, p. 15),

What determines the positive or negative nature of interaction between groups? In large part, it is the reciprocal interests of the groups involved and their relative significance to the group in question. The issues at stake between groups must be of considerable concern to the groups, if they are to play a part in intergroup relations. They may relate to values or goals shared by group members, a real or imagined threat to the safety of the group, an economic interest, a political advantage, a military consideration, prestige, or a number of others.

Furthermore, the intergroup threat and conflict increase as the perceived competition for resources increases between groups. The greater the intergroup threat and conflict are, the more hostility is expressed toward the source of the threat. This hostility helps justify the conflict and the unfavourable treatment of outgroup members (LeVine & Campbell, 1972).

Suffice to say, international image cultivation is of great significance in the construction of interstate relations. As Hertz (1981, p. 187) asserts, “half of power politics consists of image making. With the rising importance of publics in foreign affairs, image making has steadily increased.” A positive image of a nation certainly contributes to its achievement of foreign goals, attraction of overseas investment and successful public diplomacy. Then, how to make a positive national image and make the international public perceive a positive image?

3.4.2 International Image Cultivation, Public Diplomacy and Soft Power

The contexts of diplomacy have shifted from private to public venues, so governments have to conduct diplomacy publicly and incessantly in order to accommodate the new context (Chitty, 2009). In this new context of the information age, public diplomacy becomes indispensable and crucial in building long-term relationships and understanding with other states (Pratkanis, 2009). The term ‘public diplomacy’ was first coined by Edmund Gullion in 1965. It has been defined as:

Public diplomacy... deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications (cited in Cull, 2009, p. 19).

After Gullion, there have been various conceptions and controversies about public diplomacy proposed by international communication scholars. Pratkanis (2009, p. 12) defines it as “the *promotion* of the national interest by informing and *influencing the citizens of other nations*” (italics original). Heller and Persson (2009) emphasize the core purpose of *influencing* of public diplomacy in the distinction between public affairs (PA) from public

diplomacy (PD), of which the core purpose is informing. Armstrong (2009) argues that public diplomacy “is not about changing public opinion unilaterally, but the proactive engagement of global audiences in support of a foreign policy that will stand alone and influence public opinion positively.”⁶¹ These varied conceptions reveal several common elements of public diplomacy: engagement, influence, and international publics. The basic conception of public diplomacy relates to nation-states (who) influence international publics (whom) through information and relation-building (methods)⁶² attempting to create a favourable international environment for foreign policy. According to international image theory and the Realist Group Conflict Theory, the good mutual understanding and the stable positive relationship contribute to building up a positive national image of the state and achieving foreign goals, and vice versa. Thus, it can be seen that public diplomacy is a practice for the cultivation of positive international image.

Many nation-states are devoted to strategically promoting a positive national image to the foreign public in the practice of implementing public diplomacy such as establishing special information departments to release their information to the international public and promote their values and national interests abroad (e.g., USIA of the U.S. (1953-1999), Overseas Propaganda Department of China (1991-present). As Nye (2004, 2011b) claims, information is power. The mass media is always wielded as a very important instrument by governments to serve in the public diplomatic sphere as a source of international information (Kunczik, 1997) (e.g., VOA of the U.S., BBC of Britain, and ABC of Australia). These practices show the states’ efforts to inform, influence and engage the foreign public in the support of national objectives and foreign policies. However, the government dominated public diplomacy practice still focuses on the one-way exchange

⁶¹ Public diplomacy is not public relations, a blog on understanding, informing, empowering, and influencing global publics, published Matt Armstrong, 24 January, 2009. Retrieved June 3, 2012 from http://mountainrunner.us/2009/01/public_diplomacy_is_not_public_relations/#.T8tgV5hia88.

⁶² Zaharna states that the *information* and the *relation-building* are the two principle conceptions of communication in public diplomacy. Zaharna, R. (2011). *Strategic stakeholder engagement in public diplomacy*. Paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference.

of information of the state with the rest of the world. Snow (2009) labels it as the traditional public diplomacy – government to global publics (G2G). This model is characteristic of information-driven effects and outcomes. The modern public diplomacy (P2P), referring to “the way in which both government and private individuals and groups influence directly and indirectly those public attitudes and opinion that bear directly on another government’s foreign policy decisions” (N. Snow, 2009, p. 6), is more favoured in the new technology era. Chitty (2009, p. 315) also argues that “public diplomacy should not merely be a therapeutic response by government to an overseas public’s adverse reaction to foreign policy or a government’s response to negative portrayal of a nation state overseas. Ideally it should include the growing of foreign policy in a nursery of mutual understanding, under a greenhouse of constructive transparency.”

With the emergence of new media and information technologies and the spreading internationally of the values of civil society, the conditions for cultivating national image and wielding public diplomacy are growing more complex (Chitty, 2009). Particularly after 9/11, scholars from both international relations and international communication started to rethink the strategies of implementing public diplomacy especially linking to the concept of ‘soft power’.⁶³ Moreover, as Hayden (2012) claims, the common emphasis of public diplomacy on *influence* suggests a strong link between public diplomacy and soft power. “Public diplomacy is a policy label with a historical trajectory that has converged with the salience of soft power’s practical implications” (Hayden, 2012, p. 9).

The concept of ‘soft power’, coined by Joseph Nye in 1990, has been widely applied as a new approach to public diplomacy and image cultivation. Nye (2004, p. x) defines it as:

Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture,

⁶³ For instance, Nancy Snow relates Joseph Nye’s soft power in her article *Rethinking public diplomacy*. Snow and Taylor (eds.) 2009. *Routledge handbook of public diplomacy*. Routledge.

political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced.

Soft power attempts to win people's minds and hearts *per se*. It is considered as a preference to accommodate the new politics approach in the realm of noosphere – noopolitik, which refers to an approach to diplomacy and strategy for the information age that emphasises the shaping and sharing of ideas, values, norms, laws, and ethics through soft power (Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 2009, p. 357).

Soft power is usually applied in the sphere of public diplomacy and soft public diplomacy relies on soft power strengths and resources. There are three basic resources that the soft power of a country rests heavily on: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when others see them as legitimate and having moral authority) (Nye, 2011b, p. 84). Culture and political values are relatively stable, whilst foreign policies are variable and relate to action of the country. Nye (2004) expounds three dimensions of public diplomacy in wielding soft power including: 1) daily communications, which involves explaining the context of domestic, and foreign policy decisions; 2) strategic communication; 3) the development of lasting relationships with key individuals through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences, and access to media channels.

Nye proposes what soft power is and how to implement soft power. However, does soft power work? How does it work? How to measure the effect of soft power? These are questioned by some international communication scholars (e.g., Gary Rawnsley) and some still remain unanswered. Concerning the evaluation of soft power, some scholars (e.g., Jean-François Simard and Pierre C. Pahlavi) have proposed constructive methods.⁶⁴ From the available literature, it can be seen that most of the

⁶⁴ Jean-François Simard and Pierre C. Pahlavi develop an approach integrating all effects a posteriori as in a forensics-type research with multiple disciplines contributing to the development of a unified framework. Simard, J.-F., & Pahlavi, P. C. (2006). Soft power: From multidisciplinary measurement

evaluation is expected from public polls about valence and visibility (Manheim & Albritton, 1984) of the positive and negative image or influence of the country.⁶⁵ According to Nye (2011b, p. 104), politics in an information age “may ultimately be about ‘whose story wins’.” This indicates the significance of mastering the discourse in the international environment. What is this discourse about? What are the components of the discourse? These can perhaps be seen as indications for the evaluation of the implementation of soft power and public diplomacy in relation to certain aspects. Regarding how to discover the components of the discourse, I suggest here to investigate the frames of the discourse. In the following section, I will discuss framing theory.

3.5 Framing Theory

3.5.1 Brief Review of Framing Research

The framing concept originally evolved in the fields of cognitive psychology (e.g., Bartlett, 1932) and anthropology (e.g., Bateson, 1972). Subsequently, it was adopted by other disciplines with a broad theoretical approach that included perspectives from sociology (e.g., Goffman, 1974), economics (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), linguistics (e.g., Tannen, 1979), social movements research (e.g., David A. Snow & Benford, 1988), policy research (e.g., Schön & Rein, 1994), communication science, political communication (e.g., Gitlin, 1980), public relations research (e.g., Hallahan, 1999), and health communication (e.g., Rothman & Salovey, 1997) (see Van Gorp, 2007, p. 60).

The conception of framing is ascribed to the work of Erving Goffman and his 1974 book *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Goffman defines a frame as “an arbitrary slice or cut from the stream of ongoing activity” (p.10); the purpose of frame is for individuals or groups “to

to complexity study. *Vanguardd*. Retrieved June 4 from <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/SoftPowerMultidisciplinaryMeasurementComplexityStudy>.

⁶⁵ For instance, the latest BBC survey shows the views of China’s influence in the world. Retrieved June 4, 2012 from http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-05/14/content_15282521.htm.

locate, perceive, identify, and label events and occurrences, thus rendering meaning, organizing experiences, and guiding actions” (p.12). Goffman’s definition of framing reveals two basic questions embedded in the framing research: one is to find out what the frames are; the other is to find out how these frames interact with the individual’s perception and guide the individual action. After Goffman, considerable numbers of framing scholars have devoted themselves to building up framing theory and framing analysis as a methodological approach. The literature about framing in the field of communication can be roughly trisected into stages.

The initial stage (roughly from Goffman to early 1990s) is considered to be characteristic of ‘scattered conceptualization’ or ‘fractured paradigm’ (Entman, 1993). At this stage, framing, as a concept, was accepted and developed by communication scholars (e.g., Entman, 1991, 1993; Gitlin, 1980; Kinder & Sanders, 1990). And a great number of empirical studies about certain issues were conducted, employing framing analysis as a methodological approach (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). However, Entman (1993) states that framing research in this stage lacks structure and paradigmatic unity, as well as a commonly shared theoretical model and generally applicable facility of operationalization. Moreover, the previous framing research relies heavily on context-specificity. For instance, Brosius and Eps (1995) posit that the framing concept is not clearly explicated and applicable in their empirical research about news selection in the case of violence against aliens and asylum seekers in Germany.

Framing research developed very quickly between 1999 and 2001. The representative research outcome is Scheufele’s ‘four-cell typology’ model, which is probably the first comprehensive integrated model in framing research. Before Scheufele, some scholars (Iyengar, 1991; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Price, Tewksbury, & Powers, 1997) had already tried to examine the relationship between media and audience frames by manipulating the independent variable and measuring the dependent variable in their experimental studies, but their analyses provide operationalizations for only

one type of frame (Scheufele, 1999, p. 109). Scheufele (1999) attempts to systematise the fragmented approaches to framing in his paper *Framing as a Theory of Media Effects* in order to facilitate the classification of previous studies. He integrates them into a comprehensive model based on the premise that framing as a concept is embedded in the larger context of media effects research. In his ‘four-cell typology’ model, it classifies frames into four typologies: ‘media (news) frames as dependent variables’, ‘media as independent variables’, ‘individual (audience) frames as dependent variables’ and ‘individual frames as independent variables’. The four-cell typology model contributes to the theoretical building and clearance of the vagueness. As scheufele (1999, pp. 108-109) evaluates, “the four-cell typology can serve as a tool for theory building by providing a common set of conceptual definitions and theoretical statements about between-level and within-level relationships.” Furthermore, Scheufele clearly explicates framing as a continuous process. This conceptualization justifies the dynamic attribute of framing and makes the links between the inputs and outcomes. It echoes Entman (1993)’s locational conjecture⁶⁶, and leads the new direction of future framing research – framing scholars (e.g., D’Angelo, 2002; de Vreese, 2005) consider framing as a process.

Framing research boomed due to the efforts of the systemization of framing theory. The most distinguished conceptual research is perhaps D’Angelo’s ‘multiparadigmatic view’. In his article *News Framing as a Multiparadigmatic Research Program: A Response to Entman*, D’Angelo (2002, p. 871) argues, “theoretical and paradigmatic diversity has led to a comprehensive view of the framing process, not fragmented findings in isolated research agendas.” Drawing on Rosengren (1993) and Beniger (1993)’s general classification in the communication discipline, D’Angelo proposes three paradigms of news framing research, which are cognitive, the critical and constructionist. Apparently, D’Angelo’s multiparadigmatic view provides a broader space and options for framing research and

⁶⁶ Entman (1993) notes that frames have several locations, including the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture.

specifies the research directions in the complex framing process. The three paradigms and paradigmatic synthesis contribute to the construction of its own research tradition of the framing research and provide “a conjectural base in addition to the hard core from which researchers can design solid studies, interpret results, and turn apparent refutations into potentially promising leads for future research” (D'Angelo, 2002, p. 883).

3.5.2 Three Paradigms in the News Framing Research

As mentioned above, D'Angelo groups the framing research into three paradigms – cognitive, critical and constructionist. In this section, I will discuss these three paradigms based on D'Angelo's interpretation and try to locate this project in the appropriate paradigm.

In the cognitive paradigm, the news framing process is tightly associated with individuals' prior knowledge and cognition of an issue or event. The research primarily “addresses how, to what extent, and under which circumstances frames in the news find resonance with individuals and lead them to accept and reproduce, negotiate and reinterpret or reject the frame”(de Vreese, 2003a, p. 25). In the media production process, cognitivists (e.g., Domke, McCoy, & Torres, 1999; Domke & Shah, 1995; Druckman, 2001a; McLeod & Detenber, 1999; Patterson, 1993; Popkin, 1993; Rhee, 1997; Schenck-Hamlin, Proctor, & Rumsey, 2000; Sotirovic, 2000; Tewksbury, Jones, Peske, Raymond, & Vig, 2000) hold that journalists routinely create news frames and are more responsive to the demands of pluralistic presentation of information, and they are interested in detecting thoughts that mirror propositions encoded in frames (D'Angelo, 2002). Regarding the framing effect, cognitivists are concerned about how news frames alter individuals' ‘trains of thought’ (Price, et al., 1997), specifically referring to individuals' cognitive information processing, attitudinal and behavioural change (de Vreese, 2003a).

In the critical paradigm, framing is considered to be inherently related to power. Scholars working in the critical paradigm (e.g., Akhavan-Majid &

Ramaprasad, 1998; Becker, 1984; Dobkin, 1993; Domke, 1996, 1997; Entman, 1991, 1993; Entman & Rojecki, 1993; Gitlin, 1980; Hackett & Zhao, 1994; Parenti, 1986; Rachlin, 1988; Reese & Buckalew, 1995; Solomon, 2000; Tucker, 1998; Watkins, 2001; Woo, 1996) see news selection as a process of media hegemony. They claim that frames are “the outcome of newsgathering routines by which journalists convey information about issues and events from the perspective of values held by political and economic elites” (cited in D'Angelo, 2002, p. 876). These ‘sponsors’ or elites frames dominate news coverage. Accordingly, “critical scholars often measure public opinion in the aggregate to show how it is swayed en masse by frames” (D'Angelo, 2002, p. 877).

In the constructionist paradigm, framing scholars (e.g., Julie L. Andsager, 2000; J.L. Andsager & Powers, 1999; Ashley & Olson, 1998; Ettema & Peer, 1996; Gamson, et al., 1992; Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, 1989; Goffman, 1974; Goshorn & Gandy, 1995; Hornig, 1992; Jasperson, Shan, Watts, Faber, & Fan, 1998; McQuail, 1994; Meyer, 1995; Molotch, 1997; Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992; Norris, 1995; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Powers & Andsager, 1999; Pride, 1995; D.A. Snow & Benford, 1992; Terkildsen, Schnell, & Ling, 1998; Tulloch & Chapman, 1992)⁶⁷ consider that framing is “investigated as part of a system of articulations of public opinion and political socialization” (cited in de Vreese, 2002, p.25; Crigler, 1996; D'Angelo, 2002; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). McQuail (1994) claims that media’s impact on the construction of social reality is reflected as framing images of reality in a predicable and patterned way. Gamson and Modigliani (1989) interpret ‘media discourse’ as a set of ‘interpretive packages’ that give meaning to an issue. Each package has its internal structure. The constructionist research emphasizes that there is not a single frame in the same topic, but a core or shared common frame existing for the display of the package. What journalists do is to create those ‘interpretive packages’ and then reflect and add to the ‘issue culture’ of the topic (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, 1989). Constructionists believe that news

⁶⁷ The examples of these framing scholars are drawn on from research of Van Gorp and de Vreese.

frames potentially help the public perceive policy issues (Julie L. Andsager, 2000; J.L. Andsager & Powers, 1999) and are associated with the success of social or community movements (Molotch, 1997; Pride, 1995). Regarding framing effects, “constructionists shift the locus of framing effects from the information-processing context to articulations of public opinion and political socialization” (cited in D’Angelo, 2002, p. 878; see also Crigler, 1996; Gamson & Mogdilians, 1987, 1989; Pan & Kosicki, 1993).

Framing research has been mainly focused on cognitive paradigm and constructionist paradigm, and some scholars (e.g., Iyengar, 1991) have tried to synthesize these two paradigms in their studies. However, a critical voice about media frames and their influence, emerging from Carragee and Roefs (2004)’s study, is that a number of trends in framing research have neglected the relationship between media frames and broader issues of political and social power. They argue that media frames are shaped in the process of political hegemony and media hegemony in some context. A combination or synthesis of different paradigms has been suggested and interpreted by some framing research scholars (D’Angelo, 2002; de Vreese, 2003a; McLeod & Detenber, 1999).

Concerning this project, I intend to investigate how the Australian media discourse constructs China’s environmental image, by unpacking the ‘interpretive packages’; and I also attempt to discover the individual frames in the intermediate experts’ minds, aiming at examining individuals’ encounters with news frames. Thus, this project works ‘across’ two paradigms – cognitive and constructionist.

3.5.3 Framing in the News: Definition and Typology

Although there are different foci in the different paradigms in framing research, they face the same question – what is the *frame*? Framing is used as an alternative term by framing scholars together with frame. Framing can be both a noun and a verb. As a verb, it is considered to be a dynamic process, including the stages of frame creation and modification; as a noun,

it is equivalent to the concept of 'frame'. It is the outcome of the framing process, becoming a 'persistent pattern' (Gitlin, 1980) or 'framework' (Van Gorp, 2007) embedded in the news.

There have been a number of definitions of framing in both theoretical and empirical literature. By examining those definitions, it is found out that there are two types of frames embraced by previous studies – media (news) frames and individual (audience) frames. In the earlier period of communication studies, Tuchman(1978) had already claimed that mass media actively set frames for readers and audiences to comprehend and interpret public events (p.ix). Scheufele (1999) explicates that framing can be specified as two concepts in relation to the schemes for both presenting and comprehending news on the premise of framing as a theory of media effects. Framing scholars (e.g., Entman, 1991; Friedland & Zhong, 1996; Gitlin, 1980; Kinder & Sanders, 1990; Scheufele, 1999) decompose framing into media and audience frames and linkages between them. For instance, Kinder and Sanders (1990, p. 74) suggest that there are two sorts of frames which cover media frames, serving as 'devices embedded in political discourse', and individual frames (audience frames), serving as 'internal structures of the mind'. Scheufele (1999) develops two dimensions by classifying previous framing research approaches: the type of frames examined (media frames vs. audience frames) and the way frames are operationalized (independent variable or dependent variable). He examines media and audience frames as independent or dependent variables. In the following section, I will firstly discuss the definitions of these two types of frames and then discuss the typology of news frames.

3.5.3.1 Media (News) Frames vs. Individual (Audience) Frames

Media (News) frames. Tuchman (1978, p. 193), influenced by Goffman, claims that "The news frames organize everyday reality and the news frame is part and parcel of everyday reality... [it] is an essential feature of news." Gitlin (1980, p. 7) offers a more specific definition that frames are "persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of

selection, emphasis and exclusion by which symbol handlers routinely organize discourse.” The persistent patterns can serve as working routines for journalists, which help them to quickly identify and classify information (Scheufele, 1999) and “to package it for efficient replay to their audiences ” (Gitlin, 1980, p. 7). Gamson and Modigliani (1989, p. 3) state that “A frame is a central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue.” Entman (1993, p. 52) conceptualizes news frames more in detail with the emphasis of attributes of selection and salience, “To frame is to *select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation* for the item described” (emphasis in original). Cappella and Jamieson (1997) suggest the function of news frames that may be able to activate knowledge, stimulate stocks of cultural morals and values, and create context.

The above selected popular definitions of news frames either interpret the attributes of news frames such as ‘persistent patterns’ and ‘a central organizing idea’, or reveal the function of news frames in the journalistic practice. Drawing on the essence of these definitions, I attempt to offer a new definition considering framing as a communicative process: framing is certain persistent patterns that are gradually formed in the journalistic practice and is influenced by both internal and external environments, and are applied for journalistic routines; the salience of selected aspects in the patterns potentially influence audiences’ cognition, affection and evaluation of the given issues.

Individual frames (Audience frames). Individual frames are defined by Entman (1993, p. 53) as “mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information,” which can help audiences comprehend and interpret the world. The definition brings up two questions: what the ‘stored ideas’ are and how the ideas interact with media frames. These ‘stored ideas’ are called ‘a version of reality’ (Neuman, et al.,

1992), including previous knowledge or cognition or perception about certain issues existing in individuals' minds. In the constructionist tradition in relation to media effects, the version of reality is considered to be "built from personal experience, interaction with peers, and interpreted selections from the mass media" (ibid, p.120).

These two types of frames correspond to the two types of image – projected image and personalised image – which have been discussed in the previous literature review chapter. The media projected image is the organised 'standard representations' (Rivenburgh, 1995, p. 6). These 'standard representations' are equivalent to the 'persistent patterns'. News discourse frames images projected by media. The projection of image is a very purposive process; so is the framing process. The personalised image refers to the personal cognitive structures or 'the individual memory of various aspects of reality' (Hamada, 2001, p. 11) in the individuals' minds. This corresponds to the 'stored ideas' or 'a version of reality' of the individual frames. Thus, it can be seen that uncovering the frames in the news and frames in the individuals' minds is the key to detecting the images projected by the media and personalised images in the individuals' cognitive system.

3.5.3.2 A Typology of News Frames

Neither immutable nor simplistic, there are different types of frames for newsmakers to employ in their coverage of an issue. By synthesizing previous research and different types of news frames, it is found that there are two popular types of news frames with reference to the nature and content of the frame. Iyengar (1991) identifies them as *episodic frames* and *thematic frames*. De Vreese (2003a, 2003b, 2005) labels them as *issue-specific frames (episodic frames)* and *generic frames (thematic frames)*. In this project, I adapt de Vreese's typology of news frames. The issue-specific frames are characterized as context-bound frames, certain frames pertinent only to specific topics or events, whilst the generic frames transcend thematic limitations and can be identified in relation to different topics,

some even over time and in different cultural contexts (de Vreese, 2003a, p. 28).

Iyengar (1991, p. 14) explains “the essential difference between episodic and thematic framing is that episodic framing depicts concrete events that illustrate issues, while thematic framing presents collective or general evidence.” De Vreese also offers an explicit explication of their pros and cons with reference to the distinction of these two types of news frames in the framing research. Issue-specific frames are exclusive, interrelating to specific topics or events, so an issue-specific approach to news frames study can provide a profound level of specificity and detail for the investigation of issues or events. However, the deficit is that the specific attribute determines the difficulty in generalizing, comparing and applying the frames drawing on specific analysis as empirical evidence for theory building. Iyengar (1991) criticizes episodic framing because it tends to elicit individualistic rather than societal attributions of responsibility. Conversely, generic news frames are inclusive and less confined to a specific issue. They can be used in different topics and transcend cultural and political context. This attribute increases the possibilities for making comparisons beyond the topic limits (de Vreese, 2003a) and helps to place the interpretation of social issues in a profound and broad context to evoke the societal attributions of responsibility (Iyengar, 1991). However, generic frames sometimes cannot cover exclusive features of certain issues, which lose their pertinence in the same series.

Regarding the comparison of frames, I argue that issue-specific news frames can also facilitate comparisons between different media organizations. As different media organizations or journalists may generate different issue-specific frames when dealing with the same issue or event, the analysis of issue-specific frames at a profound level in relation to specificity can not only help to find out the different frames adapted by different media organizations, but also further explore the reasons for the distinction in relation to media conventions or regulations, news values and broad social

environments.⁶⁸ Moreover, the analysis of effects of issue-specific frames on public and policy-making can provide indication for strategic communication in certain events.

Issue-specific frames and generic frames are interconnected. Generic frames are extracted, developed and modified from a variety of issue-specific frames, whereas issue-specific frames are imbedded in generic frames. In this project, I attempt to explore the news frames of China's environmental issues in the Australian media discourse and intermediate experts' discourse, and further to extract general frames of environmental image in the international context. Thus, I will find out both issue-specific news frames and generic news frames of China's environmental issues in the Australian newspapers. I will examine three specific issues to detect issue-specific frames in the two Australian broadsheets, and examine a 9-year long-term coverage in order to extract generic frames in relation to the media reporting of other country's environmental issues in the international context.

3.5.4 Framing as a Process in the International Relations

As discussed at the outset, framing scholars have widely accepted that framing is a dynamic communicative process. It has been identified that the framing process includes two basic construction stages: frame building and frame setting (D'Angelo, 2002; de Vreese, 2003a; Scheufele, 1999). Frame building relates to a process of news production, concerned with the influential factors on media content, whereas frame setting refers to the effects of news frames and the interaction with individual characteristics (de Vreese, 2003a), concerned with the salience of issue attributes (Scheufele, 1999).

Framing scholars have developed a model outlining the framing process and linkages between elements in relation to frames. In this section, I will

⁶⁸ Iyengar (1991) suggests that norms and standards within news organisations and news production reinforce episodic framing.

discuss three popular models developed by Scheufele (1999), D'Angelo (2002) and de Vreese (2003), and develop an integrated model of framing process drawn on these three models.

1) Scheufele (1999): A process model of framing.





Figure 3.2: Scheufele's Process Model of Framing

Scheufele's model breaks down the framing processes into inputs, processes, and outcomes, and also separates the domain of media and audience. He examines the linkages between these three processes in the two dimensions: how the internal and external inputs influence the formation of media frames in the frame-building process, how the media frames influence the audience frames, how these audience frames influence the audiences' (journalists) perception and action, and then how the individuals input their personal attitudes in the frame-building process.

2) D'Angelo (2002): A model of the news framing process



Note. [1] = Frame construction flow; [2] = Framing effects flow; [3] = Frame definition flow.

Figure 3.3: D'Angelo's Model of the News Framing Process

D'Angelo's model decomposes news framing process into three sub-processes:

1) a frame construction flow; 2) a framing effects flow, and 3) a frame definition flow. The frame construction flow represents a combination of two framing processes that are framing building and framing setting. The model shows the interconnection of three paradigmatic approaches. It indicates that how news frames potentially influence individuals' cognitive perception and collective action.

3) De Vreese (2003): An integrated process model of news framing




Figure 3.4: De Vreese's Integrated Process Model of News Framing

De Vreese's integrated model is very concise, consisting of the schema of media production, media content and media effects in a one-way flow. In the framing building process, the model shows the influential factors on the

formation of two types of news frames. Framing effects in his model focus on individual-level effects (cognition, attitude, and behaviour) of framing generated by two different types of frames (issue-specific frames and generic frames).

These three models reveal the process of news framing. Scheufele depicts a cycle starting from the inputs and ending with the outcomes. He ascribes the inputs more to the internal factors and the outcomes to individuals' cognitive elements. This model does not cover the constructionist paradigm. De Vreese's model shares some similarities to Scheufele's. He displays a one-way flow of the framing process. He pinpoints that both the internal factors and external factors influence the generation of news frames. The model reflects the framing effects on individuals' cognition and behaviour. D'Angelo's model contains three paradigmatic approaches and gives detailed conceptualisations and elements from each flow.

Drawing on these three news process models, I develop a new integrated model of news frame process in relation to international coverage in the international context and its interaction with international relations. The model draws on David Easton's (1965) idea of input-output model in the systems theoretic approach.




Figure 3.5: A Process Model of Framing in Relation to International Relations

Note: Social factors: politics, economy, culture, military, etc.

Internal factors: media hegemony, editorial policy, news values, individual prior frames etc.

Individual frames (Individual-level effects): information processing, cognitive effects, cognitive effects, attitudinal effects, behavioural effects etc.

Social effects: public opinion, policymaking, social movement, mobilization etc.

International context: international media discourse, international public opinion, etc.

This news framing process model integrates previous models, constituted by two threads. Framing process is put in both the social and international contexts and interconnects with three paradigms. The presupposition of the model is that society is socially constructed and social construction can make society change; meanwhile, individuals have an impact on social change. Moreover, this framing process is part of the constructive process in international relations.

The first thread of the model premises that framing building process is influenced by both social factors and internal media factors in the domestic context. Concerning the frames in the international news, they interact with the international environment mainly containing international relations, international media discourse and international public opinion. These external and internal inputs may not all work in the media production process, or have different influence. For instance, in the news discourse, ideally, news value is considered to be the most important rule for the selection of news resources and the presentation of the issues, but practically, the selection and presentation of the issues can be dominated by the media hegemony or economic pressure, or sometimes, international relations can dominate the frames in the news about international affairs. Editors' personal preferences can determine the news frames formation or selection in the certain issues as well. Notwithstanding, these inputs are important indicators for framing research to investigate the reasons for the formation of media frames and also to make comparison of the reasons for different news frames being generated in different social contexts as well as international context.

I emphasize the pre-existing individual frames as a factor in the framing building process. The individual prior cognitive structure including prior knowledge (D'Angelo, 2002), their perceptions (e.g., editorial policy, news issues, international situation) and their journalistic writing style all latently influence the formation of news frames. In the framing setting stage, I differentiate individual-level from social-level effects. The individual here includes journalists and audiences. Journalists select these identified standard frames when they deal with issues. According to 'resonance model' (Schwartz, 1974), when certain issues or events match the memories or some fixed frames in journalists' minds, resonance occurs, then journalists select these frames to fit that issue. Moreover, in journalistic practice, there is limited time to release the news, especially exclusive news, so journalists process news resources very quickly normally based on the frames existing in their minds. For other audiences, frames influence their information processing, attitudes and behaviour towards the issues. At a social level, the direct or indirect impact by news frames reflects in the occurrence of public opinion, policymaking, social movement, mobilization and so on.

The second thread of the model reveals the relationship between framing process in the media discourse, foreign policy and international relations. News frames construct the media discourse. The salience of frames in international news coverage will potentially influence public opinion on international affairs. The various social factors influenced by the framing process such as media discourse and public opinion affect the foreign policy-making. Foreign policy influences international relations, international media discourse and international public opinion. All the factors will influence the framing process as inputs.


3.6 Theoretical Framework for This Project

Until now, I have examined four theories – symbolic interactionism, IR constructivism, international image cultivation in public diplomacy and soft power, and framing theory. The core premise of symbolic interactionism is that human beings live in a world constituted by symbols. These symbols

are generated by the interaction with each other and are entitled to meanings. The society dynamically proceeds by the guidance of these meanings. All the other theories deal with symbols, meanings and interactive process. IR constructivism focuses on intersubjective meanings in the international context; image and framing theories discuss the discourse and perception at both a social and individual level.

Based on the above discussion, I have developed a theoretical framework for this project.

Country A



Country B

Figure 3.6: Theoretical Framework for This Project

Note: FP issues refer to foreign policy issues.

This theoretical framework, composing by three components, reveals the relationship between framing, national image and foreign policy in the international relations constructivism paradigm. I place the framing process at micro level. It is a dynamic process for a country to frame or construct foreign policy issues in the domestic context. The inner layer shows the relationship between frames and image. News frames project media images and individual frames structure and personalise the image in the individuals' cognitive system. The outer layer represents the social discourse about certain foreign policy issues in a country (Country A). The social discourse portrays national image of the foreign country (Country B), which has impacts on foreign policy options towards the foreign country. Country B perceives and interprets the national image of Country A and its foreign policy action, meanwhile, its own framing process projects the national image of Country A. The subjective understanding of country A results in the foreign policy towards Country A, and vice versa (Country B → Country A). Public diplomacy and soft power work in the social discourse framing process, aiming at promoting a positive national image in the foreign country's social discourse, further influencing foreign policy options.

In this project, it is my premise that China is Country A and Australia is Country B. I will explore how the social discourse of Australia frames China's national image in relation to environment, and what these types of national image are in the Australian social discourse. Furthermore, I will examine whether China's dominant discourse of soft power and public diplomacy matches Australian social discourse of China's image and find out the gap between these two discourses.

3. 7 Summary

In this chapter, I discussed four theories to construct my own theoretical framework to support this project. The arrangement of these theories suggests the hierarchic relations between them. Symbolic interactionism is an epistemological guide. IR constructivism is a theory at macro level relating to international relations. National image or international image

connects the domestic context with the international circumstance. Framing happens in the domestic context, indicating the constructive process of national image of other countries. In the review of each theory, I discussed the interrelation of with other theories and this project.

The theoretical framework demonstrates that framing is the key for this project. Thus, to discover frames in the news and individuals' minds is the first step in the project. Framing devices carry frames (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; D'Angelo, 2002). To explore these frames is to unpack these framing devices. At methodological level, framing scholars develop an approach – framing analysis – to investigate frames. I will further discuss framing analysis in the following methodology chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter attempts to devise an appropriate methodological model to help resolve the proposed research questions, to design specific research procedures for fieldwork research, to analyse findings and elaborate on the limitations of the research. It commences with a review of research questions that provides an explicit interpretation of the research questions (section 4.2). This review is followed by a discussion of social scientific approaches both at ontological and epistemological levels, attempting to locate the research (section 4.3). Such a discussion is of particular importance in a thesis that is about image, a cognitive construct. After the identification of locus, the research briefly interprets characteristics of methodologies in the interpretivism paradigm. Section 4.4 discusses the most suitable methods by analyzing their features and merits applied in this project. It ends with a methodological model connected with the corresponding propositions and research questions. In section 4.5, I provide explicit design of the research in the procedures of samplings (media selection and time periods), framing and reasoning devices identification (develop an exclusive set of devices), the application of inductive and deductive approaches, in-depth interviews design (interviewees selection and framing interviewing questions) and codes and coding. In section 4.6 in relation to the collection of the data, I propose the methods of data collection including the way of obtaining news articles and the detailed procedures of conducting in-depth interviews.

4.2 Research Questions Review

As methods are considered as tools, which serve to collect data and resolve questions, it is apparent that the best way for method selection is to follow question-centred and method-best-served principles. I will interpret these five sub-research questions which are designed under an overall research question with the following aspects in this section – pinpoint the core elements of each research question, and explain the purposes of these questions aim to achieve and the internal logic these five research questions have. The interpretation will also help understand how these sub-research questions serve the solution of the overall research question.

1. How do Australian print media frame China's environmental image?
 - (1) What are the dominant frames of China's environmental image portrayed by *The Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald*?
 - (2) What are the frames of China's environmental image that are missing in *The Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald*?
2. What are the environmental images of China that two leading Australian broadsheets portray?
3. What are the Australian intermediate experts' individual frames of environmental images of China?
 - (1) What are the dominant frames of China's environmental image held in the intermediate experts' minds?
 - (2) How much are the intermediate experts' individual minds influenced by the news frames?
4. What are the possible indications of China's practice of soft power and public diplomacy in Australia in the environmental dimension in terms of environmental images of China portrayed in the Australian social discourse?
5. In the conceptual dimension, what framework is provided by social discourse for the evaluation of environmental image?

The first research question focuses on excavating 'how these frames are created' in the framing building process, with the purpose of exploring the

discursive construction of the Australian press. To resolve the question of ‘how’, requires employing certain framing devices to unpack the news structure through finding out the weight (percentages and portions) of each device and how the press applies each device in framing news stories. The analysis of the weight of each device helps find out the dominant frames and missing frames in the two selected broadsheets.

The second and the third research questions aim to discover ‘what the frames are’ in the media discourse (news frames) and individual minds of intermediate experts (individual frames), which is pertinent to the two typologies of framing in the section discussing framing theory in the chapter dealing with my theoretical framework.

The second research question aims to discover news frames through newspaper analysis. Media, as an important message delivery platform, reflects the construction process of policy issues in social discourse, as well as contributes to the construction of the discourse itself – in relation to these issues. The analysis of media discourse opens a window on social discourse.

Within the third research question, it firstly discusses the dominant frames of the environmental image of China held in intermediate experts’ individual minds. The term ‘intermediate experts’⁶⁹, refers to Lasswellian influentials and elites⁷⁰, who are not at the very apex or lower reaches of the policy pyramid. They do not include ministers and permanent secretaries of ministries, for instance. They also do not include people working in local grassroots areas who do not have broader expertise on the overall policy community and publics. Intermediate experts have

⁶⁹ Some scholars use the term ‘intermediate experts’ while others prefer ‘intermediate elites’. This study adopts the former. Chitty (2011, p.263) broadly uses the term experts, elaborating that “[e]xperts are likely, as a collectivity, to be aware of the range of views on their subject within the larger societies and groups within which they live and with whom they engage respectively.”

⁷⁰ Lasswell (1958) used the terms influentials and elites interchangeably to identify those who seek ascendancy in society through specific sets of skills, either in manipulating flows of symbols, flows of instruments of violence or flows of goods and services. This is a more particular political economic usage of the term elite than the modern sociological usages as (1) a cohesive ruling oligarchy that runs an organisation or a state (normally called a governing or ruling elite) and social group that is more highly educated (the educated elite), much wealthier (the upper class or the wealth elite), more privileged (the nobles, aristocrats, or status elite) (Ober, 1989, p.11).

sophisticated knowledge, experience and influence, and tend to lead public opinion through manipulating information flows in support of their political agendas, as experts in the particular policy domain they have knowledge of policy issues as well as publics within that domain. It is therefore worthwhile uncovering the frames in their individual minds in relation to policy issues.

The second sub-research question of Q3 investigates the effects that the news frames exert on intermediate experts' individual perceptions on China's environmental image. The analysis of how much the individuals are influenced by the media frames indicates the independence or dependence of the individual frames so that I can further develop a framework for the environmental image. The answers gleaned through this question reveal an inner layer of social discourse construction process with respect to China's environmental image in the Australian context. Considering the means to the discovery of these two types of frames, news frames can be discerned by media text analysis, whilst individual frames can be found out through verbal engagement with targeted individuals.

The fourth question, based on the first three research questions, seeks to provide a broader framework for the discussion of possible suggestions in relation to how China can more effectively implement soft power and public diplomacy relating to environment in Australia. The explicit image types arising from the news discourse and individual minds help the policy community make targeted strategies to maintain the positive images and improve negative images through applying soft power and public diplomacy resources.

The fifth research question relates to conceptual building of a new image type. Through the discussion about all rounds of frames⁷¹ about the environmental image of China, a new category of environmental image will be ultimately constructed based on the generic frames abstracted from the

⁷¹ All rounds of frames refer to the selective frames by the two Australian newspapers and the missing frames that could be alternatives for foreign options.

second and third research question, and a framework for evaluating environmental image in other international contexts will be developed.

4.3 Discussion of Social Scientific Approaches and Research Identification

In social sciences, all the approaches we discuss are based on three dimensions: *ontology* (the existence of a real and objective world); *epistemology* (the possibility of knowing this world and forms that this knowledge may take); *methodology* (technical instruments for the acquisition of the knowledge) (Corbetta, 2003). These three dimensions are all connected and cannot be viewed in isolation (King & Horrocks, 2010).

Under these three dimensions, there are several social scientific paradigms. Corbetta (2003) proclaims two general paradigms, which have historically oriented social research since its inception: the *empiricist* vision and the *humanist* vision. In his discussion, he utilizes the canonical terms *positivism* and *interpretivism*, which are considered to be less consolidated. Four broad approaches are identified in the social sciences by Donatella della Porta and Keating (2008): *positivist*, *post-positivist*, *interpretivist* and *humanistic*. I will briefly discuss these four approaches at both ontological and epistemological levels and then identify this project with its corresponding location – interpretivism. After that, I will focus on *interpretivism* at a methodological level, the purpose of which is to discuss the selection of methods in the research. The discussion certainly contributes to locating the research in a certain paradigm and to facilitating the following of the linear tradition of that paradigm.

4.3.1 Social Scientific Approaches at Ontological and Epistemological Level

The positivist position is situated within the epistemological tradition of *objectivism*, where objects in the world have meaning that exists independently from any subjective consciousness of them (King & Horrocks,

2010). The traditional positivist discipline arose from the middle of the nineteenth century, with the birth of social sciences and sociology. Durkheim gave a first try to translating the positivist principles of thought into empirical procedures. The core idea of positivism is that “the world exists as an objective entity, outside of the mind of the observer, and in principle it is knowable in its entirety” (Porta & Keating, 2008, p. 23) or in its true essence (Corbetta, 2003). The positivist is alleged to be dualistic in nature and objective, assuming that researchers are able to distance/separate themselves from the object and conduct their research in a natural way, without influencing the observed object. Positivists supposedly build knowledge of a reality that exists beyond the human mind. They aim to discover natural law, causality (causes and effects), empirical verification and explanation that objectively exist in the social society. The human experience of the world is also considered to be a reflection of reality and that this reality provides the foundation for human knowledge.

Up to the twentieth century, the positivist approach was under revision and adjustment in order to overcome its intrinsic limitations. It evolved into *neo-positivism* (in the period from the 1930s to the 1960s) and *post-positivism* (from the end of the 1960s). These share the same basic assumption with traditional *positivism* in that reality is considered to be objective and independent, but neo-positivists and post-positivists developed the idea that reality is imperfectly knowable because our knowledge of it is often socially conditioned and subject to challenge and reinterpretation (Porta & Keating, 2008).

Neo-positivists and post-positivists apply modified dualism-objectivity, recognizing the researchers’ inevitably disturbing influence on the object of study, and the continuity of the reaction effect. The discovery of objective knowledge is viewed as an ideal goal and reference criterion, but one that can only be achieved approximately (Corbetta, 2003).

The idea of interpretivism originates from a series of German philosophers (e.g., Wilhelm Dilthey, Heinrich Richert, Edmund Husserl, Max Weber,

Georg Simmel). Wilhelm Dilthey (1988) argues that social science seeks *comprehension* (*Verstehen*) or interpretation in the way of knowing nature and the social worlds, a point stressed by Max Weber. Weber (1978, p. 4) redefines sociology as “a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action and thereby with a casual explanation of its course and consequences.” Regarding questions of objectivity and generalization in social sciences, Weber proposes the concept of *ideal type*, which is interpreted as “*an abstraction that comes from empirically observed regularities*” (cited in Corbetta, 2003, p. 22), ranging from micro level to macro level in society, individual behaviour, social structure and institutions. Meanwhile, Weber believes that the ideal types are constructed in an ideal heuristic manner and offer theoretical models that help the researcher to interpret reality.

Following Weberian thought, Corbetta (2003) claims that the interpretivist approach – at the ontological level – has equal status to constructivism and relativism. The knowable world is one of meanings constructed through individuals’ interactions (constructivism) and these meanings vary among individuals and cultures (relativism). In this sense, interpretivism indeed stands in the same line of non-dualism and non-objectivity. Interpretivists hold that reality and its observers cannot be separated, being deeply intertwined. Full understanding of reality depends on individuals’ subjective interpretation of and intervention in reality.

The fourth approach discussed is humanistic and emphasises subjectivity. Humanists do not admit any possibility of objectivity in experiencing reality but merely believe that the world is subjectively constructed and interpreted by human beings. As Geertz (1973, p. 5) claims, humanistic social science is “not an experiential science in search of laws but an interpretative science in search of meaning.” Human behaviour is always filtered by the subjective understandings of external reality on the part of the people being studied and the researcher him/herself (Porta & Keating, 2008).

Corbetta takes the view that the Weberian interpretive approach precipitated the rise of such approaches as phenomenological sociology (e.g., Husserl and Schutz), symbolic interactionism (e.g., Mead and Blumer) and ethnomethodology (e.g., Garfinkel and Cicourel). They all share a strong conviction that the sociologist's core work is to explore meaning-endowed individual action. Interpretivism, as a broad paradigm, is utilized as a general term for all the theoretical visions in which reality is not simply observed, but rather is interpreted (Corbetta, 2003).

The present research is instructed by the intertwining of theoretical frameworks of symbolic interactionism and constructivism, aiming to discover the meaning of texts and motivation behind the texts, and therefore fits into the paradigm of interpretivism. In the following part, the discussion revolves around the methodologies in the interpretivism paradigm, providing an explicit elaboration about the selection of methods for the research.

4.3.2 Methodological Principles in the Interpretivism Paradigm

Methodology is a process where the design of the research and choice of particular methods, and their justification in relation to the research project, are made evident (King & Horrocks, 2010). It refers to the technical instruments that we apply to acquire knowledge and the way in which methods are used. In the following section, I will discuss the principles of methodology in the interpretivism paradigm, which contributes to the selection of instrumental methods for this project.

Positivists strive to provide causal explanations on the assumption of a cause-effect relationship by identifying one or several antecedent factors that are responsible for the occurrence of the event or behaviour in question (Chava Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2007; Héritier, 2008). By contrast, interpretivists seek to discover the meaning, behind the events, which human beings attribute to their behaviour and the external world. The understanding of human nature and discovery of the motivations

behind human behaviours are the dominant focus in interpretivist research. Context is considered to be the most important element, as interpretivists believe that the research process cannot avoid the engagement and self-interpretation of observers (Flyvbjerg, 2001) and that society and cultures are variable and incessantly changing through social interaction. Therefore, interpretivists take the outcomes as specific explanations of certain cases rather than apply the outcomes as universal laws. The abstractions and generalizations are utilized in the form of ideal types and possibility or opportunity structures (Corbetta, 2003).

The interpretivist approach is featured as empathetic interaction between the researcher and the object of study (ibid), so the research techniques and the ways of analysing empirical reality are qualitative and subjective. Interpretivists mainly conduct inductive research, deriving broad theories from specific data through what is labelled as a *grounded theory* approach. A deductive approach may also be employed by interpretivists. Such interpretivists conduct their research in a similar way to inductive researchers, but do so in order to test existing theories. The new outcomes from particular research can both test existing theories and enlarge frameworks of literature.

Concerning the techniques or procedures that researchers use to collect and analyse data, some scholars (Corbetta, 2003; Porta & Keating, 2008; Williams, 2000) favour the simplified distinction made between quantitative (positivist) and qualitative (interpretivist) methods corresponding to positivism and interpretivism paradigms. I adopt some ideas from the qualitative approach in the discussion at the end of this project. In the following part, I analyse a set of choices provided by Porta and Keating (2008), which consists of the framing of research questions, the number of cases analysed, the criteria for selection of these cases, and the relationship of the researcher to the research question – in order to guide the research design and methods selection in this project.

Regarding the framing of the research questions, interpretivists usually conduct research inductively, seeking for explanations for specific cases. Traditionally, interpretivists deny the possibility and appropriateness of generalization of their research. They emphasize discovery, description and meaning rather than prediction, control and measurement (Klenke, 2008, p. 33). However, Williams (2000) argues that generalisation is inevitable, desirable and possible, so he points out that interpretivism actually employs ‘*moderatum* generalization’ (p.215). The generalization under the interpretivist approach is situated in a certain context. The adaptation of generalised and conceptualised theories resides in distinct contexts. In the same or similar discourse, interpretivists are able to deductively build up frameworks by utilising previous theories or categories to test research questions. New frameworks can be expanded or altered in terms of specific cases, which facilitate the further development of previously enunciated theories. The view in this project is congruent with the ideas of interpretivism discussed above. A series of research questions set up in this project aim to discover the frames of media representation of China’s environmental issues, describe the media representation and analyse the meaning embodied in news discourse. More importantly, I aim to test the reasoning frames proposed by Entman (1993) and generalise the concept of environmental image that may be used in other international contexts.

Regarding case number and selection criteria, in contrast with the ‘large sample oriented’ positivist approach, interpretivists select a small number of cases and precisely specify the differences. The selection of cases is based on the researchers’ inherent interest, which denotes complex social processes, rather than being characterised by the features of representativeness, validity and reliability in the positivist tradition. The interpretivist analysis addresses cases as complex entities and stresses the importance of context. Like qualitative research, the interpretivist approach employs purposive or theoretical sampling rather than random sampling.

Last but not least, in the relationship of the researcher to the research, interpretivists tend to actively engage themselves in their research. Qualitative data are derived from participants' perspectives. "Participants and researchers collaborate in the design, data collection, and interpretation [to] arrive at a 'story' that reflects the voice of participants" (Klenke, 2008, p. 11). The project creates a theoretical framework and examines both historical and contemporary contexts for image analysis. The project samples data for particular research purposes. The research does not utilise common anthropological methods such as observation or focus groups, but the researcher does get involved in the process of research design, data collection and interpretation, particularly in the inductive procedure, and the researcher engages in the coding process and abstracts a series of categories from the qualitative analysis of news texts, which are used as categories in the deductive analysis. The transcription of interviews, the last point, reflects participants' perspectives on the issues of concern.

4.4 Selection of Methods

Within the interpretivist (qualitative) paradigm, the most commonly employed methods for systematically exploring texts are qualitative content analysis, discourse analysis, rhetorical analysis, ethnographic content analysis and conversation analysis (Krippendorff, 2004), as well as narrative analysis and interpretative analysis (Corbetta, 2003) and semiotics; methods for data collection normally include interviewing, participant observation and focus groups.

According to the research questions and the interpretation of these questions, qualitative framing analysis (a modified framing analysis), qualitative content analysis and in-depth interviews are identified as proper and effective methods to resolve these five research questions. In the following section, an explicit elaboration on the selection of these methods, including the interpretation of intrinsic features of these three methods and the reasons for the selection of them, is provided.

4.4.1 Qualitative Modified Framing Analysis

Framing has been referred to variously as a methodology, a paradigm (Entman, 1993), a theory (Scheufele, 1999) and an approach (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). It can also be a method of analysis – or an analytical technique (Endres, 2004). In communication research, framing analysis has emerged as the favoured method for news text interpretation in the last decade.

As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, a frame is an “internal structure of the mind” and frames are “devices embedded in political discourse” (Kinder & Sanders, 1990, p. 74). Van Gorp (2005, p. 487) identifies that a frame itself is “a specification of the idea that connects the different framing and reasoning devices in a news article”. The purpose of framing analysis is to unpack or reveal the interpretive packages that shape the meaning of an issue, by identifying ‘symbolic devices’ or ‘framing devices’ and ‘reasoning devices’ (Gamson & Lasch, 1981; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Van Gorp, 2005) that are embedded in news texts. It helps to resolve the questions of “How do language choices invite us to understand an issue or event” and “how news frames act to affect the political consciousness of news audiences” (Kuypers, 2010, p. 298). *Strategic frame analysis*TM (SFA), developed by the FrameWorks Institute⁷², has become an approach that is particularly useful for studying the public perception of policy issues. As a method, SFA is designed to find out how the public perceives a specific issue, what consequences those perceptions hold for policy and what may be done to increase policy choices.

Returning to review the research questions, that cover the discovery of news frames (Q2), experts’ perceptions on policy issues (Q3) and what might be improved to develop strategies to ultimately increase foreign policy options (Q4) and ‘how’ the lexicon is used to frame an issue (Q1), it seems clear that framing analysis is the most pertinent method. The first step in conducting a framing analysis is to identify ‘framing devices’ and ‘reasoning devices’.

⁷² FrameWorks Institute website: <http://www.frameworksinstitute.org/>.

Following this it is necessary to apply these devices to uncover frames in the news. The method of this project is described as a ‘modified framing analysis’ because the study identifies ‘framing devices’ for image analysis by combining the ideas of SFA and other framing analysis. Also modified are ‘reasoning devices’ that are used in the framing analysis. The selection of ‘framing devices’ and the usage of ‘reasoning devices’ will be explained in the research design section.

4.4.2 Qualitative Content Analysis

Content analysis, credited with “the longest established method of text analysis among the set of empirical methods of social investigation” (Titscher, Meyer, Wodak, & Vetter, 2000, p. 55), is defined as a family of procedures for studying the contents and themes of written or transcribed texts (Insch, Moore, & Murphy, 1997) and is fundamentally concerned with readings of texts and the meaning of symbols (Krippendorff, 2004). Content analysis covers a wide range of approaches and techniques ranging from purely qualitative (interpretivism approach) to highly quantitative (positivism approach). This project selects qualitative content analysis.

Qualitative approaches to content analysis, virtually, have their roots in literary theory, the social sciences (symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology) and critical scholarship (Marxist approaches, British cultural studies, feminist theory) (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 17). Qualitative approaches to content analysis have been developed and have demonstrated its utility as a method of text analysis. Mayring (2000, p. 2) offers a widely acknowledged definition of qualitative content analysis:

Qualitative content analysis defines itself within this framework as an approach of empirical, methodological controlled analysis of texts within their context of communication, following content analytical rules and step by step models, without rash quantification.

Some communication scholars (e.g., Van Gorp, 2010) employ content analysis as a compatible method for analysing frames with framing

analysis. Content analysis can assist in taking subjectivity out of framing analysis, as it traditionally provides standards of validity and reliability (Van Gorp, 2010). Although Van Gorp (2010) argues that some level of subjectivity is unavoidable, it can restrain subjectivity to a large extent. Content analysis also has the virtue of being able to deal with large amounts of data, a capacity that is required in the present study.

In this project, I use qualitative content analysis as a complementary method for framing analysis. Framing analysis in a qualitative approach will construct a repertoire of frames from three case studies, and content analysis will be used for data analysis over a nine-year period.

4.4.3 In-depth Interviews

The third research question relates to inquiring perspectives and experiences on a certain social issue – China’s environmental issue – from intermediate experts. Interviewing has been considered as one of the most widely used techniques for conducting systematic social inquiry by social researchers (Gubrium & Holstein, 2001). There are many classifications of types of interviews.⁷³ This project employs in-depth interviewing as a method.

In-depth interviewing is developed from an interpretivist perspective that sees that “repeated FTF encounters between the researcher and informants directed toward understanding informants’ perspectives on their lives, experiences or situations as expressed in their own words” (S. J. Taylor & Bogdan, 1984, p. 77). In the interview process, interviewees construct narratives about their social world including their personal experiences,

⁷³ For instance: Flick (2012) classifies into focused interview, the semi-standardised interview, the problem-centred interview, the expert interview, the ethnographic interview and semi-structured interview. Creswell (2013) classifies into face-to-face interview, telephone interview, group interview. Klenke (2008) classifies into structured interviewing, unstructured interviewing (open-ended interviewing), semi-structured interviewing, in-depth interview, focus group interviews, telephone interviewing, internet interviews, virtual focus groups interviews. Weerakkody (2009) classifies styles of research interviews: structured interview, semi-structured interview and unstructured interview; types or genres of research interviews: ethnographic conversations, depth interviews, narrative interviews, postmodern interviews.

feelings and perspectives in collaboration with the interviewers, so that they can give an authentic insight into the issues that interviewers are concerned about (Silverman, 2006). Interviewers are able to deeply and directly explore interviewees' thoughts and experiences that cannot normally be obtained through text analysis that can avoid the simplicity of single method of media analysis.

As may be seen, in-depth interviewing is a very effective method to uncover individual frames in peoples' minds. The project conducts in-depth interviews to uncover interviewees' mental frames of China – individual frames – in order to address the third research question. It is notable here that the interview content is analysed by the method of content analysis in a qualitative approach.

4.4.4 Inductive and Deductive Approaches

There are two possible approaches for news text analysis, viz. inductive and deductive. In the view of Semetko and Valkenburg (2000, p. 95), “the inductive approach involves analysing a news story with an open view to attempt to reveal the array of possible frames, beginning with very loosely defined preconceptions of these frames.” The frames of an issue basically emerge from content analysis, and may be characterised as issue-specific frames (episodic frames). Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) point out that this method is labour intensive, often based on small samples, and can be difficult to replicate. In contrast, a deductive approach involves “predefining certain frames as content analytic variables to verify the extent to which these frames occur in the news” (ibid). Different from the inductive approach, it can be replicated easily and may cope with large samples. As I will deal with three specific cases and a nine-year period of coverage in this project, I will combine these two approaches.

The combination of these two approaches has been indeed proposed by framing scholars. Van Corp (2010) proposes the combining of inductive framing analysis (IFA) and deductive content analysis (DCA). He indicates

that inductive framing analysis reconstructs a repertoire of frame packages, whilst the deductive content analysis provides techniques for validating the reliability of the results. This project basically draws on Van Corp (2010)'s idea of combining IFA and DCA to reveal possible news frames in a large amount of samples. However, there is also an admixture of inductive and deductive approaches in the analysis of this project. This will be explained in the research design section.




Figure 4.1: The Framework of Methods Corresponding to Research Questions and Propositions

Note: Research question 4 and 5 are interpreted based on the first three research questions, thus, all three methods indirectly serve these two questions.

4.5 Operationalisation of Methods

As the study employs multiple methods to deal with the large amount of samples, I devise a set of procedures by incorporating the core elements of research procedures of these three methods. Therein, for the news texts analysis, I mainly draw on the ideas of Krippendorff's (2004) procedures of content analysis and Van Gorp (2010)'s procedures of inductive framing analysis.⁷⁴ The set of procedures of research design in this project consists of *sampling* (including newspaper selection and time periods), *framing*

⁷⁴ Krippendorff (2004)'s suggestion on the procedures of content analysis includes *design, unitizing, sampling, recording/coding, drawing inferences, validation*. Van Gorp (2010) suggests four steps for the inductive framing analysis for the construction of framing matrix: 1) Collect source material; 2) Open coding of the texts; 3) Arranging the codes around "Axes" of meaning; 4) Selective coding.

devices identification, codes and codings (including identifying codes from the literature review and coding design) and *in-depth interviewing design* (including interviewees' selection, framing interview questions and interviewing analysis). I will discuss four research procedures and their criteria in the following parts.

4.5.1 Sampling

Both methods of framing analysis and content analysis require collecting proper materials for the text analysis. In order to select all the textual units to answer the proposed research questions, the project adopts *relevance sampling* (or *purposive sampling*) as its sampling method, which proceeds with the sampling by following a conceptual hierarchy, systematically lowering the number of units that are considered for an analysis, to get the population of relevant texts rather than the representative of population texts (Krippendorff, 2004). In the sampling procedure, I attempt to discuss two steps: media selection and time period' identification. Complementarily, the sample of messages from content will not be discussed in the sampling section, as this project will employ certain framing devices to examine the news stories, which will be implicitly discussed in the section of framing devices identification.

Step 1: Media selection

Level 1: The mass media selected for content analytic process focuses on print newspapers.

The text analysis mainly targets Australian traditional mainstream print newspapers. There are three reasons for the selection of newspapers over other mass media types, including radio, TV and Internet. First and foremost, it has been proved that the most significant differences of news frame usage are not between media (television vs. the press), but between sensationalist vs. serious types of news outlets (Semetko & Valkenhurg, 2000). I argue here, for foreign news, as a society inherently shares similar stereotypes and perceptions on a foreign country, different media forms

(social media is not included) share similar media frames in the process of creating news stories. Hence, the selection of media – especially from among traditionally elite media – has not much impact on the accuracy of the ultimate outcome. Secondly, there is the difficulty associated with preservation of traditional radio and TV texts. Even though these media have online versions now, it is still impossible to garner all the data in an eleven-year period. The third reason is that newspapers have their unique merits – independence and in-depth reporting. The press has a strong tradition of independence from government in most democratic societies (Tiffen, 2010). Their independence helps in the retention of the loyalty of an elite readership. Although there have been new challenges (Radio, TV and the Internet) to the viability of newspapers, the press has never lost its advantage of in-depth reporting. The in-depth reporting (e.g., features) and opinion news (e.g., editorials) offers more complex material for the analysis of frames in the news.

Level 2: The selected print newspapers include two dominant broadsheets – *The Australian*, and *The Sydney Morning Herald (SMH)*. The selection mainly follows the principles of level, representativeness, ownership, circulation, popularity and significance.

The reason for selecting dominant broadsheets rather than tabloids is because international affairs are normally germane to more serious hard news rather than sensational soft news, and influential broadsheets normally construct dominant discourse on international affairs and are preferred organs for opinion leaders to disseminate their standpoints (Hannerz, 2004). Moreover, dominant broadsheets are without doubt influential to the Australian public and Lasswellian influentials or elites⁷⁵ in international affairs.

The Australian press is identified as having the most concentrated press ownership among established democracies as well as a decentralized

⁷⁵ Lasswellian influentials or elites have been discussed in the Section 4.2.

national press with little competition in local markets (Tiffen, 2010). There are two main media groups in Australia – News Limited/News Corporation and Fairfax Media, which owns all the Australian newspapers ⁷⁶ at both national and regional levels (except *The Western Australian*). These two media groups are not only commercial rivals, but also have political divergence.⁷⁷ As media organisations have their own guidelines and rules in shaping the news reporting, the study selects one representative newspaper, which indeed has great influence on the agenda setting and the ways the other media report national politics, ⁷⁸ from each media group.

The Australian, owned by News Limited, brands itself as ‘the heart of the nation’ and is Australia’s only national broadsheet (Manne, 2011). As a leading newspaper in the country, “*The Australian* was decades ahead of its time as a national daily covering a vast region” (Henningham, 1993, p. 60). With the profile of the biggest-selling national daily newspaper in the country⁷⁹, it is considered as one of the most influential media that shapes public opinion on the issues that affect Australia and a must-read newspaper for policy makers. As Manne (2011, p. 7) comments:

The Australian is... the only newspaper that is read by virtually all members of the group of insiders I call the political class, a group that includes politicians, leading public servants, business people and the most politically engaged citizens. Even those members of the political class who loathe the paper understand that they cannot afford to ignore it.

Concerning its political viewpoint, *The Australian* “is generally conservative in tone and heavily oriented toward business; it has a range of columnists of

⁷⁶ There are two national and ten state/territory daily newspapers, 37 regional dailies and 470 other regional and suburban newspapers until now. Retrieved June, 2011 from <http://www.newspapers.com.au/>.

⁷⁷ News Limited is centre right-wing oriented and Fairfax leans to the left of centre.

⁷⁸ According to Manne (2011, p.7), as *The Australian* dominates the Canberra coverage, “it influences the way the much more widely read News Limited tabloids, like the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Herald Sun*, report national politics and frequently sets the agenda of commercial radio and television and the ABC, even the upmarket breakfast program on Radio National.

⁷⁹ The Australian has a good record of circulation, with weekday sales of 135,000 and Saturday sales 305,000. Circulation rose by 11% between 1992 and 2007 as revealed by the statistics of Australian metropolitan and national daily newspaper circulations Tiffen, R. (2010). The press. In S. Cunningham & G. Turner (Eds.), *The media and communication in Australia* (pp. 123-149): Allen & Unwin.

varying political persuasions but mostly to the right” (Clancy, 2004, p. 126). *The Australian* is considered as “an unusually ideological paper, committed to advancing the causes of neoliberalism in economics and neoconservatism in the sphere of foreign policy” (Manne, 2011, p. 4). In regard to climate change, *The Australian* holds a sceptical position, advocating minimal action on climate change.

The Sydney Morning Herald (SMH), another important daily broadsheet in Australia, is owned by Fairfax Media. It is one of the earliest newspapers in Australia, appearing first in 1831. It has historically been credited with lofty standards of journalism. *The Sydney Morning Herald* and the *Melbourne Age* both have around 40 per cent of the circulation in their respective cities. These two distinguished newspapers have been included by Merrill, an expert on international journalism, among the world’s top twenty newspapers (Henningham, 1993; Merrill & Fisher, 1980).

In the regard to political viewpoints, *The Sydney Morning Herald* advocates two broad themes – market libertarianism and social liberalism. *SMH* reasserted its deep-rooted principle of editorial independence in 2004, and declared, “the *Herald* no longer will endorse a political party.”⁸⁰ Its non-partisan stance has helped *SMH* expand its loyalty base.

Step 2: Time periods

The entire timeline of data sampling ranges from year 2000 until year 2011. This period is divided into two sub periods. One is from 2000 to 2008 and is the nine-year period in which thematic frames are scrutinised to identify generic and alterative patterns of frames over a long span. The second period is where three cases are situated – in the years of 2008, 2009 and 2011 respectively – that is examined in order to uncover issue-specific frames. A couple of points are presented below for the consideration of the start of the timeline.

⁸⁰ *The Sydney Morning Herald* released an editorial, titled ‘It’s time for a vote of greater independence’. Retrieved June 6, 2011 from <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/10/07/1097089491671.html>.

There are a few reasons for the selection of time periods. The indicator that environmental protection had become an official worldwide concern was the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm in 1972. However, a following series of international conventions including Vienna 1985, Montreal 1987, 1992 UNCED did not get strong responses from national governments to international protocols (Tomlinson, 1994). The environmental issue has increasingly entered into world politics since the 21st century. Australia has always kept pace with world trends in environmental protection.⁸¹ In the 1980s, the success of the Franklin River Campaign not only triggered public environmental consciousness, but also propelled the environment onto the Australian political agenda by virtue of the emergence of the Greens. Nevertheless, Australian media only genuinely cast attention on environmental issues beginning in the 1990s, when investigative journalism became popular in newspapers like *SMH*. Environmental journalism began to evolve and the Eureka Award for environmental journalism was introduced, which indicated environmental issues had formally stepped into the sight line of media. Incidentally, investigative journalism provided framing analysts with greater opportunities for examining thematic frames.

China, without doubt, has recently been the cynosure of all eyes at a global level because of its role in climate change. The events at the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference and their coverage offer the best evidence of China's increasing visibility in this area. China's environmental situation did not attract media attention until the end of 2006, when it released its first national assessment of global warming on 27 December (Wu, 2009). Wu's investigation on news stories about 'China' and 'climate change' or 'global warming' from 1998 to 2008, shows there was scant attention paid to China and its environmental issues until 2000 (1998:2, 1999:0

⁸¹ It has been criticised by conservatives like Gerard Henderson, Executive Director of The Sydney Institute, for being ahead of countries like the US and China. ABC Q&A 7 February 2011. Retrieved June 6, 2011 from http://www.abc.net.au/tv/qanda/txt/s3125637.htm?show=panellists#GERARD_HENDERSON.

respectively).⁸² Therefore, it is reasonable for the research to focus on the 21st century to examine the frames existing in the two newspapers.

I divide the two timelines by the year 2008, which overlaps the nine-year period study and the case of Beijing Olympic Games. In 2008, on one hand, as China hosted the Olympic Games, one of the most magnificent global media events (GMEs), China drew a great deal of attention from media, including to its environmental situation; on the other hand, some environmental disasters such as the Wenchuan earthquake occurred in this year, so there was considerable coverage about such issues as well. Since the coverage of these disasters was not connected with the Olympic Games, I separate them from the environmental reporting in relation to the Olympic Games and the long-term reporting from 2009 to 2011. The United Nations Climate Change Conferences were probably considered as the biggest media events in the environmental sphere. I have examined all the news articles relating to environmental issues in the two Australian newspapers in 2009, and 90 per cent of news stories were about COP15 (N=77). I assume there would be a similar proportion to reporting of UNCCC to other environmental issues in 2009, in 2010 and 2011 as well. Therefore, the UNCCC could represent the tendency of environmental reporting in those years. The reason that I do not select COP16 (Cancun UNCCC) as one of the UNCCC cases, is because COP16 (N=25) got much less coverage than COP15 and COP17.

4.5.2 Framing and Reasoning Devices Identification

As has been discussed in the section of method selection, the uncovering of frames is achieved through the identification of ‘framing devices’ and ‘reasoning devices’ in the verbal or media texts considered. Regarding ‘framing devices’, there have been several highly-used models identified by framing scholars.

⁸² The international media samples in Wu (2010)’s research include Australian Broadcasting Corporation, the AFP, the Associated Press, Chinadaily.com.cn, Deutsche Press-Agentur, the United Press International, and Xinhua News Agency (p.159).

Gamson and Modigliani (1989, p. 3) propose five ‘framing devices’: metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions and visual images.⁸³ Pan and Kosicki (1993, p. 59) provide alternative devices in the structural dimensions to analyse news discourse: syntactical structure, script structure, thematic structure, and rhetorical structure. In each structure, their corresponding subdevices are included.⁸⁴ Gamson and Modigliani’s five devices are classified in rhetoric structures, which are supposed to discern the stylistic choices in the text. FrameWorks Institute has developed a list of elements (or subdevices) in a frame for strategic frame analysis: context, numbers, messengers, messages, visuals, metaphors and simplifying models and tone⁸⁵ that may help people relate new information structures of expectation in their heads.

Drawing on those devices and subdevices mentioned above, I assemble framing devices and subdevices for national image analysis selectively in a new two-tiered framework. I select three structures from Pan and Kosicki’s four structural dimensions as the first level of framing devices – thematic structure, script structure and rhetorical structure.

Thematic structure refers to a core idea in a story, so the themes normally facilitate audience comprehension of core ideas of the text and, what is more, salient themes in an issue normally determine the primary perception

⁸³ Gamson and Modigliani (1989) describe each device: A metaphor is composed by two parts – “the principal subject that the metaphor is intended to illuminate and the associated subject that the metaphor evokes to enhance our understanding” (p.4); Exemplars depend on real events of the past or present rather than imagined or projected events; Catchphrases are supposed to be single theme statements, tag-lines, titles or slogans (that are intended to suggest a general frame) through which commentators capture events; Depictions, are interpretation packages wherein certain principle subjects are characterised in a particular fashion.

⁸⁴ Pan and Kosicki (1993) interpret these four structures: Syntactical structure refers to “the stable patterns of the arrangement of words or phrases into sentences” (p. 59), normally relating to an inverted pyramid structure; Script structure is “an established and stable sequence of activities and components of an event that have been internalised as a structured mental representation of the event” (p. 60), which includes the 5Ws (who, what, when, where, why); Thematic structure refers to a core idea in a story, which usually focuses on the summary and the main body. Pan and Kosicki (1993) suggest that a story of this kind contains certain “hypothesis-testing” features (p.60); Rhetorical structure refers to the stylistic choices made by journalists in relation to their intended effects.

⁸⁵ FrameWorks Institute provides interpretation of these framing devices: Context establishes the cause of the problem and who is responsible for solving it; An important finding from the cognitive sciences is the ability of the frame to overpower the numbers that follow; Messengers are the people who become the physical symbol of the issue. The message is reinforced or undermined by the choice of messenger; Metaphors and models complete ways of thinking that include patterns of reasoning; The tone of the communications can provide powerful cues capable of effectively and efficiently communicating (or hijacking) a frame.

of receivers on the issue. Script structure, containing the structured components of an event, helps audiences to understand who are the key actors in the presented issues, the key messages conveyed by actors, to further reveal latent salient actors in the news discourse, and also to disclose the perspectives expressed by media itself. The analysis of stylistic choices in the rhetorical structure helps to comprehend how journalists use language symbolically to invoke images, to increase the salience of a point, and to heighten the vividness of a report (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). I omit syntactical structure in the framing analysis of this project, because the concern of the project is about the images of environmental issues which the news texts project and the images that the receivers may get in the interpretation process, rather than the pattern of arrangement of words or phrases in each sentence. Different syntactical arrangements would have distinct latent effects on the receivers' perception of the issue, but as Pan and Kosicki claim that syntactical structure, normally characteristic of inverted pyramid structure, conveys very little information to make news a distinct genre of composition, therefore, I argue here that, for analysing image, the other three structural dimensions have more manifest elements to be unpacked in order to reveal the framework for image.

Under each structure, I identify the second level of framing devices – subdevices. I suggest the examination of headlines and leads that are supposed to condense the core meaning of the entire text as subdevices of thematic structure. Under script structure, I choose messengers (who), messages (what) and media's views as subdevices to discern the dominant actors selected by media and discourse constructed by those actors on foreign policy issues in the media. I restructure the rhetorical structure with subdevices of metaphors, depictions, tones and catchphrases, in order to detect stylistic choices in the representation of an issue.⁸⁶ It is noticed that metaphor is entailed with an essential role in both language and thought by the constructivist approach (Ortony, 1993) and in the way in which we think

⁸⁶ The connotations of these concepts can be found in footnote 83 and 85. The study doesn't select exemplars and visual images, because exemplars are not common in the samples of this study and the study doesn't select any visual images as samples.

and think about the world (Lakoff, 1993). The identified framing devices construct a framing matrix, which is viewed as the end product of the inductive phase of framing analysis (Van Gorp, 2010). The framing matrix, supposed to be a pattern that is filled with elements of framing devices, provides an explicit and clear structure including categories for the further deductive analysis.

Concerning ‘reasoning devices’, some framing scholars (e.g., Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Iyengar, 1991; Pan & Kosicki, 1993) propose the presence of causal reasoning⁸⁷, as a second step bridging frame and policy options, existing in the realm of news discourse, which is considered to be of direct relevance to public policy making (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Entman (Entman, 1993) identifies four framing functions in a text, namely to define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgements and suggest remedies.⁸⁸ Van Gorp (2005) connects these four functions with ‘reasoning devices’, which, along with ‘framing devices’, constitute a frame. This project employs Van Gorp’s terminology – reasoning devices – but I add ‘indicate effects’ (or consequences/results) to the four reasoning devices. Under the philosophical paradigm, it is believed that causality is associated with an event, and also, an action or event will produce a certain response to the event, namely an effect, which may lead to a result or change. I delineate that the function of ‘indicate effects’ is to denote the existence or possible consequences or responses generated by causal agents. Effects indication is an obviously important function of framing, particularly for weighing various policy options. Based on other framing scholars’ perspectives, I develop five reasoning devices for application in this project – define problems (problem definition), diagnose causes (causal interpretation), make moral judgement (moral evaluation), indicate effects (effect indication) and suggest remedies (treatment recommendation).

⁸⁷ Causal reasoning covers causal attributions of the roots of a problem, inference about the responsibility for treatment of the problem as well as appealing to higher level principles in framing an issue and in weighing various policy options (Pan & Kosicki, 1993).

⁸⁸ According to Entman (1993), define problems – determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits; diagnose causes – identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgments – evaluate causal agents and their effects; suggest remedies – offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects.

In this project, I use reasoning devices in the process of thematic structure analysis, and develop these five devices as categories of the thematic structures. The idea is based on Pan and Kosicki's (1993, p. 64) interpretation of policy options, thematic structure and causal reasoning:

Sometimes, policy options or preferences are implied in the news text in that readers could derive them from the central idea of the news discourse concerning an issue; at other times, policy options or preferences are explicitly stated in news discourse. The latter is particularly possible when the thematic structures of a news story clearly reveal causal inferences and responsibility attributions.

Suffice to say, the manifestation of causal reasoning inhering in a news story reflects policy options or preferences, and the causal reasoning could be revealed in the thematic structures. The identification of causal inferences and responsibility attributions, on the one hand, reveal the causal reasoning of frames in the news discourse; on the other hand, it provides insights for the possible policy options. This provides evidence for the arrangement of the analysis mentioned above in this project. A news story sometimes complicatedly contains several elements of causal reasoning. However, I argue there is a dominant or salient element of causal reasoning (or framing function or reasoning device) in each news story, which coordinates with the core idea of the story to represent the theme of the story. In this project, I transfer five reasoning devices into five *reasoning frames (or reasoning themes/categories)* – *problems, causation, effects, evaluation* and *solutions* in the thematic structural analysis. Under each reasoning category, I summarise the themes of news stories. The coding procedure will be explained in the coding section of this chapter and the detailed arrangement will be explained in the next findings chapter.




Figure 4.2: An Illustration of Identified Framing Devices, Sub-devices and Reasoning Devices for Framing Analysis

4.5.3 Application of Inductive and Deductive Approaches in the Project

The project will examine issue-specific frames (episodic frames) from three particular cases: the Beijing Olympic Games (across the span of 2008), the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (COP15) (across the span of 2009) and the Durban Climate Change Conference (COP17) (across the span of 2011), and will measure media content in a nine-year period (from 2000 to 2008), with the purpose of testing identified reasoning frames proposed by Entman (1993) and discovering generic frames in the environmental dimension. I will employ IFA with an open view to derive categories from these cases (the derived categories in the inductive process are DCI for short). If these DCIs match Entman's reasoning frames, I will classify themes and subthemes under these reasoning frames. In the coding section, I will summarize categories in relation to environment from literature (derived categories from literature in a deductive process, DCL for short), and employ them with DCIs to the deductive content analysis of news texts in the nine-year period.

4.5.4 In-depth Interviews Design

In-depth interviewing is employed to achieve three objectives in the project: to find out the frames of China's environmental image in the intermediate experts' minds (individual frames); to find out the frames existing in intermediate experts' minds that cannot be uncovered through text analysis and to find out the effects that media frames have on experts' individual frames; to find out the effects that media frames have on diplomatic policy making process towards China in terms of the experts' perspectives. The in-depth interview design consists of two procedures, namely interviewee selection and interview question design. The method of coding in-depth interviewing data will be discussed in the coding section.

Step 1: Interviewee selection

This project seeks to investigate the discursive construction process of foreign policy issues in the 'middle belt', which contains intermediaries and media, in order to ultimately provide more foreign policy options and strategies. Therefore, respondents for in-depth interviews in this project are selected from among intermediate experts. Intermediate experts are labelled as Lasswellian influentials, who tend to lead public opinion through manipulating information flows in support of their political agendas. In the two-step flow of communication model (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948), intermediate experts are categorised into opinion leaders, who are more central and influential in their groups, "often acting as intermediaries between the media and the public" (Weimann, 1994 p. 5). They pay close attention to an issue, frequently discuss the issue, playing a persuasive role in convincing others to adopt an opinion or course of action by filtering or mediating media messages to the public (Nisbet & Kotcher, 2009; Weimann, 1994).

In the available literature of public opinion and foreign policy in liberal democracies⁸⁹, the participants in the foreign policy-making process are

⁸⁹ As the study refers to Australia, the discussion focuses on liberal democratic countries, but not discussing political regimes like authoritarian regime.

broadly categorised into three groups: decision makers, intermediate experts (elites) and the general public. Regarding the interaction between mass public opinion and elites in the foreign policy making process, there has been dispute about “who influences whom” – mass influence elites (bottom-up model) and elites influence mass (top-down model).⁹⁰ Nevertheless, no matter who influences whom, the role of intermediate experts as bridges between decision makers and the general public and also the influence on both sides are undeniable. In the foreign policy-making process, these Lasswellian influentials or opinion leaders, play a vital role by structuring public debate on foreign policy, distributing information and influence from the mass media (media tends to privilege experts’ views in conveying purpose messages), and influencing the decisions of top foreign policy officials (Almond, 1950).⁹¹ What is more, regarding the public’s concerns with foreign policy issues, it is considered to be generally less informed and unconcerned about foreign policy problems than about domestic issues facing their respective countries (Almond, 1950; Caspary, 1970; Risse-Kappen, 1991).⁹² Hence, the public is viewed as susceptible to influence in relation to foreign policy from opinion leaders and through exposure to agenda-setting (Oldendick & Bardes, 1982).

How should one typify such intermediate experts? Chitty (2011) identifies four sectors by incorporating conventional social sectors with media – first (state), second (business), third (civil society and non-government) and fourth (media). He believes that experts reside in each of these four sectors. In this project, due to time and space limitations, I will select experts particularly in relation to scholars as interview participants.

Scholars have expertise and comprehensive knowledge and perspectives in their fields, and they are normally well connected with their counterparts in

⁹⁰ According to Risse-Kappen (1991), a ‘bottom-up’ approach assumes that the general public has a measurable and distinct impact on the foreign policy-making process (p.480); a ‘top-down’ process is a function of the elite consensus and elite cleavages trickle down to mass public opinion (p.481).

⁹¹ Almond (1950) gets the conclusion by analysing the role of American elites in structuring public debate and influencing top officials in his book *The American people and foreign policy*.

⁹² Smith (1985) proves that 20-30 percent of the public indicate serious concern about foreign affairs with empirical evidence (see also Risse-Kappen, 1991, p.481).

other social sectors. Scholars are always preferred as advisors by policy makers. This project follows two principles of the selection of scholars in order to ensure the comprehensiveness of the selective interviewees. The first principle refers to the variety of the selection. The selected scholars should not only be drawn from those who have conducted research on image, environmental communication, Australian media and the Sino-Australian relationship, but also those who research areas of environmental science, economics and political science. The second principle is that the selected scholars are engaging or previously engaged in the foreign policy making process as intermediate experts.

Guided by these two basic principles, I will select scholars, from Australian universities, with high profiles in their fields. And also, I will search for scholars who are active in the Lowy Institute for International Policy⁹³, which is of particular interest as a think tank on foreign policy and with special interest in China.

Step 2: Framing interview questions

I select semi-structured interviewing to construct interview questions. Parker states that an interview in qualitative research is always “semi-structured because it invariably carries the traces of power that holds things in place and it reveals an interviewee’s, a co-researcher’s creative ability to refuse and resist what the researcher wants to happen”(cited in Klenke, 2008, p. 127).

With the combination of the use of close-ended and open-ended questions, a semi-structured interviewing protocol was developed that lists topics without fixed wording or fixed ordering of questions, to be posed to all respondents. This type of interviewing allows for greater flexibility so that

⁹³ The Lowy Institute is an independent international policy think tank. Its objective is to generate new ideas and dialogue on international developments and Australia’s role in the world. Its interests range across all dimensions of the international policy debate including economic, political and strategic issues. The two core tasks of the Lowy Institute are to produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s international policy and to promote wide discussion of Australia’s role in the world. Lowy Institute for International Policy website: <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/>.

interviewers can add more questions or vary the wording or order of the questions posed on the list (Klenke, 2008; Weerakkody, 2009).

An important characteristic of qualitative interview questions is that they should focus on *meaning* and *experience* rather than establish causal relationships or generalised patterns of behaviour or general trends in the phenomenon (King & Horrocks, 2010), so a proper research question should be like “[h]ow do interviewees think of /view this issue?”⁹⁴ King and Horrocks interpret Patton’s (1990) argument about six types of question that can be asked in a qualitative research interview, each seeking to elicit a particular kind of information from the participant. I list these six questions and their explanations to give an insight for the interviewing design in this project.

- Background/demographic questions refer to straightforward descriptive questions about the personal characteristics of participants, such as their age, gender and occupation.
- Experience/behaviour questions focus on specific and overt actions.
- Opinion/value questions ask what the participant thinks about the topic at hand, and how their thoughts relate to their values, goals and intentions.
- Feeling questions focus on participants’ emotional experiences.
- Knowledge questions relate to factual information the participant holds.
- Sensory questions relate to sensory aspects experience.

According to the principles mentioned above, I design 13 interview questions. I submit the interview questions along with my Human Ethics application to the Human Ethics Office of Macquarie University. The Office

⁹⁴ King and Horrocks (2010) offer examples about both improper and proper research questions in the qualitative interview: Question 1: What causes young women to develop eating disorders? Question 2: Are women more strongly influenced than men by media representations of body image? Question 3: How do young women view the presentation of body image ideals in magazines and newspapers? Question 1 is addressed to find out the causal relationship so it should fit in the quantitative methods within the hypothetico-deductive tradition. Question 2 is designed to find out the general trends, and is also not seen as an appropriate question for a qualitative study. Question 3 is considered as a proper question for qualitative interview since it pays attention to individual perspectives.

sends the application to the Faculty of Arts Ethics Review Committee. The Faculty of Arts Ethics Review Committee approves my research proposal and questions.

To provide greater details I should say that firstly, I design a short questionnaire in order to know the main channels that the interviewees' get information from.

1) Which newspaper do you rely on for international news?

A. *The Australian* B. *Sydney Morning Herald* C. *The Australian Financial Review*

D. *The Canberra Times* E. *The Monthly* F. *Daily Telegraph* G. Others (specify)

2) Which newspaper that you read regularly is a good source of Chinese news?

A. *The Australian* B. *Sydney Morning Herald* C. *The Australian Financial Review*

D. *The Canberra Times* E. *The Monthly* F. *Daily Telegraph* G. Others (specify)

3) What resources do you usually use to get information about China's environmental issues?

The interview questions include:

1) What image or word picture firstly comes to your mind when you think of China as an environmental actor?

2) What do you think of China's environmental situation during the Beijing Olympics?

3) What do you think about China's actions in the Copenhagen Conference in 2009?

4) Do you think China's environmental image has changed in your mind in the last decade? If yes, can you offer more details? How has it changed?

5) How or in what way do you examine or assess China's environmental issues?

6) Can you give me a full picture of China's environment in your mind now?

-
- 7) What do you think about the public's perception of China as an environmental actor? Do you think public opinion towards China's environmental issues is influenced by the representation of China in the media? If yes, can you furnish me with some examples? If no, can you tell me what is the main element that influences public opinion towards China? Do you think the Australian public's perception of China's environmental image has changed in the last decade? If yes, can you offer more details?
 - 8) What images or word pictures of China as an environmental actor are used by the different newspapers you read?
 - 9) How are you influenced by the way in which the media, that you consume, frames Chinese environmental stories? Does your perception or judgment on China's environment heavily rely on the media's representation or not?
 - 10) What do you think the media's role is in the foreign policy making process? When you are engaged in foreign policy discourses about China, will your opinions be based on mediated frames? If yes, how much do you rely on media frames? Can you give some examples? If no, can you explain why?
 - 11) What is your suggestion about how the media should represent China's environmental issues? In another words, what is your suggestion about how the media should reframe China's environmental image in order to increase foreign policy options?
 - 12) What do you think the weight of environmental negotiations is in the triangular relationship between Australia, the U.S. and China?
 - 13) What do you think of the future of Australia-China relations?

4.5.5 Codes/Coding

Step 1: Identify codes/categories from literature

In the last section, I discussed reasoning frames (*problems, causation, effects, evaluation, and solutions*) and their usage in the analysis of thematic structures. These five categories are considered as generic categories. The themes of sampled data will be firstly classified into these five categories.

Under each category, I attempt to discover issue-specific frames, which connote two levels – at the first level, an environmental issue is regarded as an specific issue differentiating from other issues such as political issue, economic issue, cultural issue; at the second level, it refers to particular events in the environmental domain, in this project, it specifically relates to the three cases. I try to identify the categories (sub frames or sub themes) from literature in relation to the environment, which are used as categories in both framing analysis and content analysis.

According to the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and available literature in relation to the environment, the categories that I could assemble are listed as follows: *environmental issues, environmental governance, environmental policy, environmental law, environmental assessment, environmental (green) economy, poverty and environment, environmental co-operation, environmental protection, environmental science, environmental health, environmental education and training, environmental technology*. Six priorities of environment, stressed by the United Nations Environmental Programme, include *climate change, disasters and conflicts, ecosystem management, environmental governance, harmful substances, resource efficiency*. Regarding environmental issues, a list is provided below.

Table 4.1: Categories of Environmental Issues

Main categories	Sub-categories
Climate change	
Conservation	
Energy	
Environmental degradation	
Environmental health	
Intensive farming	
Land degradation	Land pollution; Desertification
Land use	
Genetic engineering	
Nuclear issues	
Nanotechnology	
Ozone depletion	
Pollution	Water pollution; Air pollution
Reservoirs	
Resource depletion	Consumerism; Fishing; Logging; Mining
Overpopulation	
Toxins	
Waste	
Biodiversity	

With respect to script structures, the identification of messengers basically follows the pattern of Chitty's (2011) four sectors and the general public which have been analysed in the section on interviewees' selection, namely first (state), second (business), third (civil society and NGOs) and fourth (media). I specify the actors from each sector as government officials, business people, NGOs, media (including other media and the selected two newspapers) and the general public in which all the sectors reside in the end.

Step 2: Coding of news texts

In the framing analysis process, I will code data from three selected cases. The analysis will follow the sequences of three structural dimensions. I will first inductively analyse 10 per cent data from three cases to test the feasibility of the application of reasoning frames in the thematic structural analysis. If it is applicable, I will classify themes and sub-themes under these reasoning frames.

In the thematic structures, I will firstly identify and classify the causal attribution of each article into each reasoning category. Secondly, I will categorise themes and sub-themes within each reasoning category. For the themes and sub-themes, I will use an inductive approach to abstract themes from news texts, along with a deductive approach to identify themes in terms of categories from literature listed above.

In the script structures, I will discover the key messengers in each news story and the messages conveyed by them. The summarisation of messages will be inductively interpreted from messages. In the rhetorical structures, the depictions will be classified in terms of the categories from themes and sub-themes. Concerning metaphors, I will find out the two components of metaphor – tenor and vehicle⁹⁵ – and represent them in the form of a table with the excerpts followed by displaying the context of the metaphors.

In the nine-year period data analysis, I will conduct deductive content analysis. The categories of frames are both from previous inductive framing analysis of the three cases and previous literature, which has been listed in the first step of coding above. The procedure is the same as thematic structure in the framing analysis.

Step 3: Coding of interviewees for anonymity

I will transcribe all the interviews in order to ensure accuracy and reliability. And then I will employ content analysis to analyse interviewing texts.

In the presentation of findings, I will code the interviewees for anonymity. The coding orders will be arranged in an alphabetical order according to the first name of the interviewees. I will summarize the interviewees' research areas and expertise and note their visits to China, visits to China at the

⁹⁵ The terms tenor and vehicle were introduced by British rhetorician I.A. Richards. According to Richards (1936), 'tenor' means the purport or general drift of thought regarding the subject of a metaphor; by 'vehicle' the image which embodies the tenor. According to Polanyi and Prosch (1977, p.260), the intrinsic connection between tenor and vehicle is that "The tenor bears on the vehicle, but, as in the case of a symbol, the vehicle (the focal object) returns back to the tenor (the subsidiary element) and enhances its meaning, so that the tenor, in addition to bearing on, also becomes embodied in the vehicle" (also see Prosch, 1986, p.157).

time of the Beijing Olympics, their attendance at COP15 and their engagement in the foreign policy process. Apart from the first category, the other questions are all ‘yes’ or ‘no’ question. I will present these in the form of a table. Concerning the first three questions relating to frequent media usage by interviewees, I will present the results in the form of table as well. In the findings representation section, I will categorise the answers of interviewees into categories and sub categories following each interview question, presenting them in the form of tables, followed by examples of sentences from the interviewees’ original answers.

Table 4.2: A Methodological Framework of This Project

Research location: Interpretivism				
Questions	Methods	Research Design		
		1.Sampling	Media selection: <i>The Australian / SMH</i> Time periods: <i>Timeline 1: 2000-2008</i> <i>Timeline 2: Olympic Games 2008; COP15 2009; COP17 2011</i>	
Q1. How to frame News frames (dominant/ missing frames)	IFA	2.Framing/ reasoning devices identification	Reasoning devices: problems; causation; evaluation; effects; solutions. Framing devices: <i>Thematic structures:</i> headlines/leads <i>Script structures:</i> messengers/ messages/ media views <i>Rhetorical structures:</i> metaphors/tones/ depictions/ catchphrases	5. Codes/coding
Q2. News frames				<i>Reasoning categories:</i> problems/ causation/ effects/ evaluation/ solutions
Q4. Indications of soft power and public diplomacy implementation	DCA	3.Interviewees selection	Intermediated experts – scholars <i>Principles:</i> variety & engagement	<i>Issue-specific frames:</i> environmental categories from literature/ categories abstracted from three cases
Q5. Conceptual framework for environmental image				
Q3.Individual frames	In-depth interviews	4.Framing interview questions	Semi-structured questions	
Q4.				
Q5.				

4.6 Data Collection

4.6.1 Media Text Collection

The data will be collected in two stages: for three cases and for reportage from 2000 to 2008, and there are two similar ways for each stage.

As the first step, I will use 'Factiva' database that can be accessed at the Macquarie University library website. In the search builder, I will set up keywords and define the time period in the case of each newspaper. In the case of the Beijing Olympic Games, the keywords will be set up as 'China or Chinese' and 'Olympics or Olympic Games', the timeline will be confined to the entire year of 2008; in the case of the COP15, the keywords will be set up as 'China or Chinese' and 'Climate or Copenhagen', the timeline will be confined to the entire year of 2009; in the case of COP17, the keywords will be set up as 'China or Chinese' and 'Climate or Durban', the timeline will be confined to the entire year of 2011; in the reportage from 2000 to 2008, I will adopt broad keywords 'China or Chinese', and the dates will be confined to the period between 2000 to 2008. I will manually select the news articles in relation to the environment. If there are repetitive articles, I will filter these manually.

As a second step, I will examine some samples of hard copies of these two newspapers in the microfilm in the university library in order to ensure that all the relevant articles are included. I will also randomly select some samples in each year and examine the complete hardcopies to find out if there are some special pages or issues for China or environmental issues to make sure that no article is overlooked. I will scan the whole article from microfilm, when it does not appear in 'Factiva' search. If the full text of coverage in a newspaper is not accessible on either the website or Factiva, I will obtain all the data from microfilm collections.

4.6.2 Conducting In-depths Interviews

I will contact potential interviewees by email, with a brief project introduction and explanation of the interview purpose and an attached consent form. Once the people approached agree to participate in the interview, I will arrange and confirm the interviewing time and venues with them. Before I conduct the interviews, I will conduct research on their research areas and experiences in order to better interact with interviewees and activate their memories in order to excavate their cognition of China's environment in terms of their own expertise and personal experiences during the interviewing.

When I conduct the interviews, I will firstly invite interviewees to read the consent form carefully and sign the form if they agree. After that, I will briefly describe my project and highlight the main purposes; and also, in order to expeditiously bring them into the interviewing context, I will talk about their research fields and ask about some of their experiences particularly of their visits to China, which can effectively activate their memories and perceptions of China's environmental images. During the interviews, I will strictly follow the designed list of questions in order to ensure the systematic analysis, but apart from that, I will propose follow-up questions in terms of their answers to each question. I will select the valuable follow-up questions and represent the answers in the findings chapter with special annotation. I will seek their advice on the usage of an audio recorder before the interviewing starts. If they agree, I will record the whole interview and complete the transcription afterwards in order to ensure accuracy and reliability.

4.7 Summary

In this chapter, I elaborated methodological matters including research questions review, research location, methods selection, research design, data collection and limitations of the research, and ultimately developed a methodological framework. I will conduct the fieldwork research based on

these methodological approaches. In the next chapter I will present findings of the news text analysis in relation to three cases and long-term coverage through methods of inductive framing analysis and deductive content analysis.

CHAPTER FIVE

FINDINGS 1 – FRAMES OF CHINA IN THE TWO AUSTRALIAN NEWSPAPERS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents findings about frames of China's environmental image portrayed in the two selected Australian newspapers – *The Australian* and *The Sydney Morning Herald (SMH)*. Section 5.3 displays the findings of three case studies – Beijing Olympic Games (2008) and UN Conferences on Climate Change (COP15 2009 and COP17 2011) – through the method of modified framing analysis in an inductive approach. The findings of three cases presented in the section follow the sequences of *framing package* including three framing structures – thematic structures, script structures and rhetoric structures, and *framing matrix*. Section 5.4 presents findings of coverage about China's environment from 2000 to 2008, through a deductive method of qualitative content analysis. The findings are confined to thematic structures. The categories of themes are derived both from inductive analysis of the three cases and from literature which has been identified in the methodology chapter. The chapter ends with a collection of figures that compare some categories (section 5.5). The comparison is made between three cases and the long-term coverage from 2000 to 2008, with the purpose of detecting the variation of these categories in different time periods.

5.2 Overture – Frame Structures Instruction

Thematic Structures:

The study seeks to find out three levels of themes of the coverage from these two newspapers, namely reasoning themes, themes and sub themes under reasoning themes. The categories of reasoning themes are basically identified based on Entman's (1993) idea of classification of frames – problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and treatment remediation. In this study, the reasoning themes are categorised as *problems*, *causation*, *evaluation*, *outcomes* and *solutions*.

Problems indicate a series of environmental problems or issues existing in China. *Causation* refers to the forces that give rise to the action or outcomes. *Evaluation* means making judgment on the environmental problems, causal agents, outcomes and solutions. The sub-themes pertaining to the evaluative theme are defined following the principle that the media itself or a third party makes judgments about the issue itself, its management by government, or outcomes. The *evaluative* theme normally consists of opinion pieces such as features and editorials. The category of *outcomes* is added in the main thematic categories and refers to consequences or results of the problems or actions. *Solutions* refer to the nation-state actors seeking remedies or measures for resolving environmental problems and creating a promising environmental future.

Script Structures:

In the analysis of script structures the main foci are on messengers, messages and media views. Messengers are principal actors who are active in a media discourse. The study, based on Chitty's (2009) identification of four composite actors – state, corporate, civil society and media, in webs of social discourse – classifies five messengers that are covered in the media reportage, namely government officials, business people, experts (scholars & professionals), NGOs, general public and other media. The category of

government officials is pertinent to the state as actor, while business people are pertinent to corporate actors. Chitty (2009) notes that experts are to be found in each composite actor. This study relies on experts drawn from civil society (broadly defined to include academia) particularly to scholars and professionals, and excludes actors from the state and corporate sectors. The classification of messages conveyed by messengers and media views is based on the categories of thematic structures.

Rhetorical Structures:

The section of rhetorical structures includes three devices – catchphrases, metaphors and depictions. They are presented in the form of tables. Metaphors are reported in a table along with examples. Depictions and catchphrases, put together, are classified in terms of the categories of thematic structures.

5.3 Case Studies

5.3.1 Case 1 – Beijing Olympic Games 2008

There are 41 news articles about China's environment in relation to Beijing Olympics found in the two newspapers.

Framing Package

I. Thematic Structures




Figure 5.1: Ratio of Reasoning Frames of Beijing Olympic Games 2008

Reasoning frame 1: Problems (15/41)

Theme 1: Environmental issues (14/15)

Sub theme 1: Traffic congestion (2/14)

Examples:

New vehicles registered in Beijing (*Sydney Morning Herald (SMH)*, 23 January, 2007)

Call for DFAT alert on China traffic danger (*The Australian*, 24 July, 2008)

Sub theme 2: Weather (3/14)

Examples:

Smog to dictate start of the events (*The Australian*, 30 July, 2008)

Smog blankets Games city (*The Australian*, 5 August, 2008)

Millions stranded in China's holiday freeze (*The Australian*, 5 February, 2008)

Sub theme 3: Pollution (9/14)

Pollution problems were mainly referred to the forms of water and air pollution in these two Australian newspapers.

Examples:

China's new team faces old problems (*The Australian*, 1 January, 2008)

Mutant seaweed threatens Olympic races (*The Australian*, 27 June, 2008)

Algal bloom hits Qingdao Olympic sailing venue (*The Australian*, 28 June, 2008)

Life and breath: Deek warns marathoners of cruel road ahead (*The Australian*, 21 July, 2008)

Need for Beijing smog masks hard to see (*The Australian*, 22 July, 2008)

Air of absurdity in China's no-fog forecast (*The Australian*, 28 July, 2008)

China's Game events: smog fighting (*The Australian*, 29 July, 2008)

Swimmers arrive to smoke on the water (*The Australian*, 5 August, 2008)

China told haze would be hard to beat (*The Australian*, 8 August, 2008)

Theme 2: Political malady (1/15)

Political malady refers to the criticism of China's political problems especially censorship and corruption, existing in the political system in relation to environmental issues.

Examples:

China's rain of terror (*The Australian*, 14 August, 2008)




Figure 5.2: Themes under the Problematic Frame in the Case of Beijing Olympic Games

Reasoning frame 2: Evaluation (12/41)

Theme 1: Evaluation on environmental governance (1/12)

Environmental governance is characterized as “the set of regulatory processes, mechanisms and organizations through which political actors influence environmental actions and outcomes” (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006, p. 298). Environmental governance can broadly refer to a wide range of actors including government, corporations, institutions and civil society at both

international stage and national level. However, the project adopts a narrower domain, which specifically refers to the policy and practice of the governments of nation-state in relation to environmental protection in the domestic context.

Examples:

China hasn't done enough: Coates (*The Australian*, 8 August, 2008)

Theme 2: Evaluation on environmental situation (11/12)

Environmental situation is a broad perspective of series on environmental problems and sets of circumstances in China evaluated by both media and athletes.

Sub theme 1: Media's evaluation (2/11)

Examples:

A light in the fog (*SMH*, 19 July, 2008)

China's green streaks (*The Australian*, 26 July, 2008)

Sub theme 2: Athlete's evaluation (9/11)

Examples:

Aussie Swimmers have no Beijing concerns (*SMH*, 4 November, 2007)

Asthmatic Schipper upbeat over Beijing (*The Australian*, 14 February, 2008)

Olympic bosses say air will be safe (*The Australian*, 11 March, 2008)

Smog fears halt Haile's golden run (*The Australian*, 12 March, 2008)

Gabrselassie expects more drops outs (*The Australian*, 18 March, 2008)

Australians to miss Beijing Games opening ceremony (*The Australian*, 17 June, 2008)

Air cleared over Games snub (*The Australian*, 18 June, 2008)

Opals biggest fear is breathing (*The Australian*, 24 July, 2008)

Rookies get feel for lie of land (*The Australian*, 31 July, 2008)




Figure 5.3: Themes under the Evaluative Frame in the Case of Beijing Olympic Games




Figure 5.4: Tones of the Evaluative Frame in the Case of Beijing Olympic Games

Reasoning theme 3: Effects (3/41)

Examples:

China car ban cuts pollution 40%: study (*SMH*, 1 May, 2007)

The ghost games (*The Australian*, 8 July, 2008)

Bustling Beijing set to fall silent (*The Australian*, 19 July, 2008)

Reasoning theme 4: Solutions (11/41)

Theme 1: Environmental measures (10/11)

Environmental measures mainly relates to government policies, regulations or plans for environmental mitigation and protection.

Sub theme 1: Car ban (9/10)

Examples:

China car ban cuts pollution 40%: study (*SMH*, 1 May, 2007)

Beijing's car ban no choke (*The Australian*, 6 July, 2007)

China yanks cars off road to clear smog (*SMH*, 18 August, 2007)

China clears roads to clear Olympic air (*SMH*, 20 August, 2007)

Traffic controls to lessen Beijing smog (*SMH*, 22 August, 2007)

Beijing halts car repairs, painting (*The Australian*, 16 April, 2008)

China to cut cars during Olympics (*The Australian*, 20 June, 2008)

Beijing takes 300,000 cars off roads (*SMH*, 1 July, 2008)

Tough measures to clear Beijing smog (*The Australian*, 28 July, 2008)

Sub theme 2: Smoking ban (1/10)

Examples:

Beijing smokers face bans so athletes can catch their breath (*The Australian*, 18 June, 2008)

Theme 2: Co-operation on climate change and clean energy technologies (1/11)

Co-operation refers to intergovernmental co-operation or interstate co-operation on affairs in aspects of economic and technological interchange, political dialogue.

Examples:

Energy alternatives offer clean start (*The Australian*, 12 April, 2008)




Figure 5.5: Themes under the Solutions Frame in the Case of Beijing Olympic Games

II. Script Structures

1. Messengers & Messages

Table 5.1: Messengers & Messages in the Two Australian Newspapers in the Case of Beijing Olympic Games

Messengers	Messages
1. Government officials	
<i>Australia</i>	1. Concerns about environmental situation. 2. Concerns about the government solutions to environment mitigation.
<i>China</i>	1. Interpret environment situation. 2. Interpret solutions to environmental mitigation. 3. Promise a good environmental condition to the athletes.
<i>International organisations</i>	1. Possible alternative plan due to the pollution. 2. China's environmental problems.
<i>Others</i>	1. Analyse reasons for China's pollution.
2. Business people	
<i>China</i>	1. Suggestions and concerns about the effect of the government's measures.
3. Experts (scholars & professionals)	
<i>Australia</i>	1. Negative views on host city's environmental condition. 2. Positive views on host city's environmental condition. 3. Measures taken for the participation.
<i>China</i>	1. China's pollution. 2. New technologies for coal.
<i>U.S.</i>	1. China's insufficient action in addressing air pollution. 2. Praise on China's pollution measurement. 3. China's environmental problems. 4. America's strategy to handling China's pollution. 5. Criticise the stringent government control for environmental mitigation.
<i>Others</i>	1. Criticise the pollution. 2. Criticise the stringent government control for environmental mitigation.
4. NGOs	
<i>International NGOs</i>	1. Analyse environmental problems. 2. Government solutions to environmental mitigation.
5. General public	
<i>China</i>	1. Comments on car ban.
6. Other media	
<i>China</i>	1. Government will take more stringent measures for environment mitigation. 2. Official statements on car ban. 3. Air pollution causes deaths. 4. Traffic problem. 5. Stringent government control for environmental mitigation.
<i>U.S.</i>	1. U.S. strategy for athletes' handling China's pollution.




Figure 5.6: Messengers (actors) in the Environmental Coverage in relation to China in the Case of Beijing Olympic Games

Examples:

1) Government officials

Australia

A. Australian Olympic Committee President (Spokesman)

“That’s not a snub to the Chinese, it happens at every Games. Those who compete in the first couple of days don’t march. And those in remote locations would lose three days of training to come.” (*The Australian*, 18 June, 2008)

“It doesn’t appear to be a great improvement.”

“Let’s hope that there’s more solutions (to the air pollution problem) that will kick in. That’s what we are all hoping for.” (*The Australian*, 30 July, 2008)

“The measures they have taken, by their standards, are probably very great”

“We have to wait and keep fingers crossed and make sure we have all the medical support on the road the various spots for that and the marathon” (*The Australian*, 8 August, 2008)

B. Pedestrian Council of Australia (Chairman)

“[T]o avoid Australians being killed or injured in road crashes in China” (*The Australian*, 24 July, 2008)

China

A. Ambassador for Climate Change

“Australia, Canada and the US put together would not be enough to feed the 1.3 billion people of China – even if you were willing to do so.” (*SMH*, 19 July, 2008)

B. Beijing’s Air Quality Monitoring Centre (Director)

“Over 50 years they have made their air quality good enough,” he says. “We started late. We’ve only had 10 years.” (*SMH*, 19 July, 2008)

C. Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau (Director&Spokesman)

If pollution remained at unacceptable levels as the Games approached, he would take even tougher steps. (*The Australian*, 16 April, 2008)

“The air quality in Beijing must be improved. Seventy per cent of the year the air is good, but for the remaining 30 per cent, the air quality still does not meet the standard.” (*The Australian*, 28 July, 2008)

D. Beijing Mayor

“The task of bringing environmental pollution and traffic congestion under control remain arduous.” (*The Australian*, 20 June, 2008)

E. Beijing Municipal Traffic Management Bureau (Spokesman & Vice-Director)

“August 8 will be the start of autumn,” Mr Du said. “It is a very good season. I believe the air quality will be improved during the Games. Our goal for this year is to reach 70 per cent of the targeted days, a total of 256 days of good air quality.” (*The Australian*, 28 July, 2008)

F. Beijing Olympic Organizing Committee (Deputy Director & Spokeswoman)

The system was intended to take 1.3 million cars off the road every day - more than a third of the city’s 3 million vehicles. (*SMH*, 18 August, 2007)

“We will implement an emergency plan 48 hours in advance (of the Games) if the air quality deteriorates.” (*The Australian*, 28 July, 2008)

G. China Environmental Protection Bureau (Director & Deputy Director)

“The test was successful. These four days the wind speed was slow, while the humidity and temperature were high.” (*SMH*, 22 August, 2007)

“We can ensure that the air will be fine”;

“When China submitted its bid to host the Olympic Games in 2001, it made a solid commitment to (improve air quality).” (*The Australian*, 11 March, 2008)

H. Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (Deputy Director-general)

A successful attack on smoking during the Olympics “could create an important model for the rest of the country.” (*The Australian*, 18 June, 2008)

I. Premier

The country’s future hinged on the fostering of “environmentally friendly industries.” (*The Australian*, 28 June, 2007)

J. President

“We have to be clear-minded that the inclement weather and severe disaster will continue to plague certain regions in the south,” said a statement issued after the meeting. “Relief work will continue to face challenges, posing a tough task.” (*The Australian*, 5 February, 2008)

K. Other officials

“China profoundly thwarts all outside attempts to interfere with the internal weather issues of other countries.

“But we will not tolerate atmospheric events that threaten our national interests. The blue skies you are seeing now are clouds with Chinese characteristics.” (*The Australian*, 14 August, 2008)

International Government Organisations (IGOs)

A. International Olympic Committee (President)

It will postpone or cancel endurance events if conditions pose a danger to athletes’ health. (*The Australian*, 12 March, 2007)

B. World Bank

At least 460,000 Chinese people die prematurely each year from breathing polluted air and drinking dirty water. (*The Australian*, 6 July, 2007)

“China is at a much lower level of per capita income today than those countries were in the 1960s, and yet it has already begun serious efforts to reduce water and air pollution and to improve energy efficiency.” (*SMH*, 19 July, 2008)

Others

A. Malaysia’s Second Minister of Finance

“The companies that are polluting in China are owned by Americans and Europeans and Japanese and others. They are benefitting from the cheap labour. They are benefitting from the resources.” (*The Australian*, 28 June, 2007)

2) Business people

China

A. Beijing Youth Travel Service (a spokesman)

“Summer is usually the peak season for tourism, but not this summer. We don’t have any student tours right now, for instance, and no group tours registered for August at all.” (*The Australian*, 19 July, 2008)

B. Chairman of Car Club

People who abstained from driving during the Games should receive a reduction in the road maintenance fees all car owners are required to pay. (*SMH*, 18 August, 2007)

C. China Comfort Travel Agency (a spokeswoman)

“Higher hotel prices, tightened security and other concerns have diminished people’s interest in travelling to Beijing. We’ve got an Olympic travel package on the market, but the response is short of ideal.” (*The Australian*, 19 July, 2008)

3) Experts

Australia

A. AAP Computer Technician

“My eyes started streaming within minutes of going on the roof of the main press centre.” (*The Australian*, 5 August, 2008)

B. Athletes

“I found the experience was alright even though the pollution was really bad then. So hopefully if I stay on top of my health then my asthma won’t flare up and it shouldn’t be a problem.” (*SMH*, 14 February, 2008)

“The conditions will be very, very cruel, and in an event like the marathon it is so tough.” (*The Australian*, 21 June, 2008)

“The air quality being a bit thicker, I did feel it today when I got out of bed, whereas (Sunday) was perfect.”

“I think it will take today’s training session to work through it but we literally suck it up and get on with it.” (*The Australian*, 5 August, 2008)

C. Athletics Australian Spokesman

“The advice from experts in this area is that Beijing is not the best place to do the final preparations for competition for a whole range of reasons.”

“The heat, the humidity, the air quality, access to the training facilities, all of those things are a factor.” (*The Australian*, 17 June, 2008)

D. Australian Olympic Sailing Program (Director)

“In addition, the crews have had to deal with so much other crap in the water – all sorts of flotsam and jetsam – everything from raw effluent to dead animals. Its all a big pain in the arse, this close to the Games.” (*The Australian*, 28 June, 2008)

E. Australian Olympic Team Medical Director

“We are screening everyone for existing breathing problems, we are treating people aggressively and then, que sera, sera.” (*The Australian*, 6 June, 2008)

F. Climatologist

“It’s certainly not conditions I fancy running a marathon in.” (*The Australian*, 8 August, 2008)

G. Coach

“I have confidence that we have the strategies in place to deal with the heat and humidity, but we have less control over sickness and air quality.” (*The Australian*, 6 June, 2008)

H. Environmental Consultant

He also shows an improbably large number of pollution readings just inside the threshold for what Beijing calls a “blue sky day.” (*SMH*, 19 July, 2008)

I. Former Australian Team Doctor

“But the two weeks before that was diabolical. I went to hockey training one day and I was fetching balls and my eyes, nose and throat were hurting and

the players were all coughing and spluttering.” (*The Australian*, 21 June, 2008)

J. High Performance Team (Director)

“It’s hot and steamy but nothing more than what we expected,” said Brett Mace, high performance director for the team, who arrived in Hong Kong on Monday.

“It all looks OK.” (*The Australian*, 31 July, 2008)

China

A. Beijing University of Chemical Technology (Professor)

He knows of no other technology in the world that comes close. “This ... will replace all the coal we currently use in the area.” (*SMH*, 19 July, 2008)

B. Medical Expert

Pollution in Guangzhou was so bad that anyone over 50 had black lungs. (*SMH*, 19 July, 2008)

U.S.

A. Harvard University’s China Project (Executive Director)

“The notion that Beijing could have made its air permanently clean in seven years from the day it was awarded the Olympics was always a pipe dream.” (*The Australian*, 8 August, 2008)

B. Harvard University of Environmental Studies (Professor)

“I was frankly surprised that we were able to see it and that it was such a clean-cut experiment.”

“One of the big issues in the Olympics, a very serious problem, is the possibility that ozone levels during the Olympics will be very high.” (*SMH*, 1 May, 2007)

C. Lawyer

“China’s toxic air reflects its equally foul human rights record.”

“It appears doubtful that Beijing will take the robust and decisive measures required to ensure safe air for the Olympics.” (*The Australian*, 12 March, 2008)

D. U.S. Olympic Committee (Sport Physiologist)

“Some of our strategies and equipment are, quite honestly, top secret and we are hesitant to lay all our cards on the table for our competitors to mimic.” (*The Australian*, 22 July, 2008)

Others

A. Foreign Journalists

“These endlessly sunny days and blue skies are really starting to freak me out,” one said. “It’s like those perfectly drilled routines in the opening ceremony. Sure they looked great, but so many people doing exactly the same thing is far too militaristic and I, Robot for my liking.” (*The Australian*, 14 August, 2008)

B. Marathon World Record-holder

“The pollution in China is a threat to my health and it would be difficult for me to run 42km in my current condition.” (*The Australian*, 12 March, 2008)

C. Mexican Journalist

“For the first time in my life, I am in a place more polluted than Mexico City.” (*The Australian*, 28 July, 2008)

4) NGOs***International NGOs*****A. Greenpeace (China’s Campaign Director)**

“The problem is that the city’s air quality is unstable.” (*The Australian*, 29 July, 2008)

B. Meteorologistes Sans Frontieres (Spokeswoman)

“The Government claims no civilian weather conditions were injured,” “But we’ve spoken to precipitation that was illegally imprisoned and beaten. There are also reports that ringleader clouds are being harvested for the black-market trade in drinking water.” (*The Australian*, 14 August, 2008)

C. The Climate Group (Head of Beijing Office)

“It’s not very well known internationally but China’s Government, private sector and general public are taking very aggressive action on renewable energy and energy efficiency.” (*SMH*, 19 July, 2008)

5) General public***China*****A. A consultant and a car owner**

“This is a big thing for our country. Everyone should support it and put the greater good ahead of their own personal interests.” (*SMH*, 18 August, 2007)

B. A driver

“The traffic ban is good for us, it brings better business.” (*SMH*, 18 August, 2007)

C. A retired gas company technician

A few Beijingers would probably try to flout the rule by taking their license plates off or swapping their plates. (*SMH*, 18 August, 2007)

D. A stock trader

“It’s not good to forbid so many people from driving.”

“I feel like the government should be able to come up with a better plan than this.” (*SMH*, 18 August, 2007)

E. A woman surnamed Li

“I thought it was very good. There was an immediate effect on the traffic.” (*The Australian*, 22 August, 2007)

6) Media

China

A. China Daily

Acknowledging the failure of the initial car ban introduced on July 20, Beijing authorities are expected to announce more stringent emergency measures soon. (*The Australian*, 29 July, 2008)

B. The South China Morning Post

The South China Morning Post reported yesterday that live music venues had been ordered to close, and that bar owners in Sanlitun, Beijing's most popular area for eating and drinking, had been instructed by police to remove outside tables and not to serve black people or Mongolians to try to stamp out drug dealing and prostitution during the Games. (*The Australian*, 19 July, 2008)

C. The Xinhua News Agency

The plan would remove only 400,000 private cars daily. Officials with Beijing's traffic management bureau said they could not supply an estimate or reconcile the other figures. (*SMH*, 18 August, 2007)

U.S.

A. The Wall Street Journal

The U.S. Olympic Committee was distributing a new mask, developed as a secret project, to its 600 athletes. (*The Australian*, 22 July, 2008)

III. Rhetorical Structures

1. Metaphors

Table 5.2: Metaphors about China's Environment in the Two Australian Newspapers in the Case of Beijing Olympic Games

Tenors	Vehicles	Excerpts
China	Waking tiger	The Chinese and their developing world colleagues are beginning to blame foreign companies for the life-threatening pollution wracking the waking tiger . ---Pollution: Foreign firms get the blame (<i>The Australian</i> , 28 June, 2007)
Seaweed	As thick as a carpet	The seaweed is as thick as a carpet , there's no way you can sail through it. If it's still here in August, it could be a real problem ---Mutant seaweed threatens Olympic races (<i>The Australian</i> , 27 June, 2008) The bright green algae, described as " thick as a carpet " and akin to "sailing on a massive bed of grass". ---Algal bloom hits Qingdao Olympic sailing venue (<i>The Australian</i> , 28 June, 2008)

Beijing Olympic Games	The ghost Games	<p>AS the giant Olympic clock in Tiananmen Square counts down to the start of the Games, Beijing is abuzz: not with what's going to happen in a month's time but with what's not happening.</p> <p>The three top priorities of China's Communist Party, which has ruled the country for 59 years without any coherent challenge, are control, control, control.</p> <p>--- The ghost Games (<i>The Australian</i>, 8 July, 2008)</p>
Smog	Smog blankets Games city	<p>The sights of Beijing, from the main Olympic stadium to the city's western and northern hills, disappeared again under a dense cloud of grey smog yesterday, prompting the International Olympic Committee to start its own pollution watch.</p> <p>---Smog blankets Games city(<i>The Australian</i>, 5 August, 2008)</p>
Smog	Pea soup	<p>With 64 days before the opening ceremony on August 8, the Chinese capital was again swathed in pea soup smog yesterday, raising fears internationally that Olympic organisers will be unable to improve air quality to an acceptable level for the Games.</p> <p>--- Just 64 days to clear Beijing's air for Olympics (<i>The Australian</i>, 6 June, 2008)</p>
China	Lie of land	<p>The Australian team arrived in Hong Kong, which has been selected as the site of the equestrian events because of possible quarantine problems in China, a few days after the city sustained its worst day of pollution and exceptionally hot weather with temperatures reaching 36.6 Celsius at the Olympic site at Shatin, raising concerns that it could affect the competition which begins on Saturday week. ---Rookies get feel for lie of land (<i>The Australian</i>, 31 July, 2008)</p>
China's environment	Green streaks	<p>CHINA is on everyone's mind these days, and not just because the Olympics are only a fortnight away. There was the tragedy of the recent earthquake in Sichuan province, and then severe flooding in several southern provinces. As well, the extraordinary economic development of the past decade, relying on energy-intensive heavy industries, has made China one of the world's worst CO2 emitters.</p> <p>---China's green streaks (<i>The Australian</i>, 26 July, 2008)</p>
Rain dispersal rockets by Chinese military	Rain of terror	<p>CHINA has defended its decision to launch a bloody military crackdown on Beijing's weather for the remainder of the Olympics.</p> <p>--- China's rain of terror (<i>The Australian</i>, 14</p>

		August, 2008)
Venue	A sailor's nightmare	British Olympic sailor Ben Ainslie has described the venue as " a sailor's nightmare. " --- Mutant seaweed threatens Olympic races (<i>The Australian</i> , 27 June, 2008)
Hope of cleaning up air	A light in the fog	Cleaning up the atmosphere is a waste of time without China, but it's not all gloom and doom. --- A light in the fog (<i>SMH</i> , 19 July, 2008)

2. Depictions and Catchphrases

Table 5.3: Depictions and Catchphrases about China's Environment in the Two Australian Newspapers in the Case of Beijing Olympic Games

Categories	Depictions/catchphrases
Environmental problems	<i>Environment:</i> The heavily polluted environment; Poor environment; Fast-decaying environment; Environmental crisis; Drive environment to breaking point.
	<i>Pollution:</i> The worst day of pollution; The world largest emitter; One of the world's worst CO2 emitters; One of the most polluted cities; Terrible pollution; Notorious pollution; Horrendous pollution; Heavy pollution; Smoke on the water; Most polluted cities; Mining has devastated the landscape and poisoned rivers and valleys; Heavily polluting vehicles.
	<i>Water:</i> Water contaminated by pollution; Dirty water.
	<i>Air:</i> Toxic air; Polluted air; Hazardous to merely bad air; Dirty air; Contaminated air; Serious air pollution; Poor air quality; Beijing's air quality is routinely rated among the worst in the world.

	<p><i>Weather</i> Smoggy skies; Smog to dictate start of the events; Smog threat; Ringleader clouds; Persistent dense fog; Perpetually gridlocked streets; Notorious smog; Muggy heat; Eye-stinging pea-soup haze; Exceptionally hot weather; Dissident weather elements; Dirty haze; Dense smog; Choking smog; Beijing was blanked in a dense white haze; A toxic, photochemical smog.</p> <p><i>Traffic:</i> The polluted and congested street of Beijing; The dangers of walking in China; Real threat to road safety; One of the most congested cities; Cruel road; Clogged streets; Clogged highways; Beijing's notoriously clogged streets; Beijing's traffic police die young; Perpetually gridlocked streets;</p>
Environmental governance	<p><i>Measures:</i> Traffic controls; Tough measures; Ambitious plans; Smog fighting; Green Olympics; Critical phase of pollution control; Brutal climate censorship; Beijing deathly under the pre-Olympic Games controls; Aggressive action on renewable energy and energy efficiency; A massive pollution clean-up.</p> <p><i>Evaluation:</i> Unsuccessful pollution-reducing efforts; Treating the problem seriously; Question China's ability to hand emergencies; More positive role in the world with tighter controls at home; Green credentials.</p>
Environmental consequences	<p>Olympics had appeared doomed to angst and disconnection; Environmental interdependence.</p>
Environmental solutions	<p>World-leading clean energy; Smog masks; Environmental friendly industries.</p>
China's polity	<p>Recentralising authority; Authoritarian state.</p>

Table 5.4: Framing Matrix 1 – Coverage of Beijing Olympic Games 2008

Thematic structures	Reasoning themes	Problems	Causation	Evaluation	Effects	Solutions
	Themes	Environmental issues Political malady		Evaluation on environmental governance; Evaluation on environmental situation	Success of pollution mitigation; Silent city	Measures; Cooperation
Script structures	Messengers & Messages	Messengers	Australia	China	U.S.	Inter-national organizations; Others
		Messengers				
		Government officials	Situation; Solution	Situation; Solution; Promise		Alternative plan; Problems
		Experts (scholars & professionals)	Situation; Strategies	Pollution; Technology	Problems; Solutions; Strategies; Government control.	Problems; Government control
		NGOs				Problems; Solutions
		Business people		Government measures		
		General Public		Government measures		
		Media		Environmental condition; Solution	Strategy	
Rhetoric structures	Depictions/catchphrases	Problems See table 5.3	Governance	Consequences	Solutions	China's polity
	Metaphors	See table 5.2				

5.3.2 Case 2 – UN Climate Change Conferences – Copenhagen 2009 (COP15)

There are 77 news articles about China's environment in relation to COP15 found out in the two newspapers.

Framing Package

I. Thematic Structures:




Figure 5.7: Ratio of Reasoning Frames of COP15 2009

Reasoning theme 1: Problems (6/77)

Theme 1: Environmental issues (3/6)

Sub theme 1: Water crisis (1/3)

Examples:

China heads for low watermark (*The Australian*, 7 December, 2009)

Sub theme 2: Energy (1/3)

Examples:

The dirty little secret behind China's clean energy (*The Australian*, 29 September, 2009)

Sub theme 3: Global warming (1/3)

Examples:

Perils of warming chill China (*The Australian*, 9 November, 2009)

Theme 2: Environmental threat (1/6)

This category indicates the impact of the environmental hazard of China on the rest of the world.

Examples:

Green or yellow, peril refuses to go away (*The Australian*, 10 October, 2009)

Theme 3: Political malady (2/6)

Examples:

The great leap backwards (*The Australian*, 16 November, 2009)

China's intransigence a sign of insecurity (*The Australian*, 29 December, 2009)




Figure 5.8: Themes under the Problematic Frame in the Case of COP15

Reasoning theme 2: Causation (1/77)

Theme 1: Unimportant issue breaks the climate change negotiation (1/1)

Examples:

Copenhagen hijacked by second-order issues (*The Australian*, 19 December, 2009)

Reasoning theme 3: Evaluation (54/77)

Theme 1: International relationships in the environmental dimension (18/54)

Environmental politics is gaining more and more weight in international politics; it has great influence on international relationships, and the two Australian newspapers showed great concerns about the intergovernmental

relationships and the change of world order in the context of climate change. I categorize it as 'international relationships in the environmental dimension' in this project. The international relationship, as an evaluative object, is constructed in the media discourse.

Sub theme 1: U.S.-China relationship (11/18)

Examples:

US, China agree on regular dialogue (*The Australian*, 3 April, 2009)

China the main target of a White House passion (*The Australian*, 25 May, 2009)

Beijing and Washington search for ways to cross the troubled waters (*The Australian*, 28 July, 2009)

US and China's friendlier climate (*The Australian*, 29 July, 2009)

Optimism at US-China talks (*The Australian*, 30 July, 2009)

China-US spat taking focus off G20 (*The Australian*, 21 September, 2009)

US demands Chinese move on emission targets (*The Australian*, 6 November, 2009)

Yes we can: climate hopes revived (*The Australian*, 18 November, 2009)

Careful words but no leaps forward (*SMH*, 18 November, 2009)

Obama's great leap (*The Australian*, 25 November, 2009)

Talks should at least be a big step on the way (*SMH*, 8 December, 2009)

Sub theme 2: Australia-China relationship (4/18)

Examples:

Wong to mend fences on China trip (*The Australian*, 10 October, 2009)

Wong meets Chinese leader - Surprise talks cover climate change, Stern Hu (*The Australian*, 15 October, 2009)

Wong in giant leap forward on climate (*SMH*, 16 October, 2009)

The time for waiting is over: China has taken its great political leap forward (*SMH*, 22 December, 2009)

Sub theme 3: U.S.-Australia-China triangular relationship (1/18)

Examples:

The U.S. Alliance system is the only security that works (*The Australian*, 26 December, 2009)

Sub theme 4: World order (2/18)

Examples:

Obama tour shows new order (*The Australian*, 19 November, 2009)

Climate powers in slow burn (*The Australian*, 22 December, 2009)




Figure 5.9: Subthemes under the Theme of International Relationship in the Environmental Dimension in the Case of COP15

Theme 2: Responsibility (6/54)

The international governance of climate change has been informed by two norms concerning *who* should take responsibility to mitigate climate change, and *how* much mitigation should be pursued.⁹⁶ China has been identified as the largest carbon emitter in the world, but China assesses the responsibilities and capabilities in different measurements from the western countries. Hence, questions of “Who should take responsibility in the environmental mitigation?” “Will China take responsibility?” have been main controversial disputes in the international negotiations as well as in the media discourse. The media discussion on these controversies provides the evaluative perspective on China’s responsibility.

Examples:

Will China play ball? (*The Australian*, 17 November, 2009)

⁹⁶ Hayley Stevenson. (2007). Australian foreign policy and the challenge of climate change. Retrieved July 15, 2012 from <http://apo.org.au/research/australian-foreign-policy-and-challenge-climate-change>.

Greens hope China will up the ante on carbon (*The Australian*, 28 November, 2009)

Heat on China to break impasse –Wong’s message for Beijing (*The Australian*, 14 December, 2009)

China must be part of the Copenhagen solution (*The Australian*, 14 December, 2009)

Garnaut, the scalpel-sharp seer, still looks to China (*SMH*, 15 December, 2009)

Don’t look to Beijing for global leadership (*The Australian*, 24 December, 2009)

Theme 3: Attitudes and actions on climate change (14/54)

The two Australian newspapers made judgments on the Chinese government’s attitudes and actions on climate change. Some news articles praised China’s positive attitudes and actions on tackling climate change issues, while others were critical.

Examples:

China pans US over climate demands (*SMH*, 28 May, 2009)

Chinese energy is greener than ours (*The Australian*, 27 July, 2009)

US, China push issue of climate change (*SMH*, 29 July, 2009)

China and US pledge action on emissions (*SMH*, 23 September, 2009)

Questions marks as Hu’s UN statement falls short (*The Australian*, 24 September, 2009)

Rudd push for global power shift – PM praises China on climate (*The Australian*, 24 September, 2009)

Praise for China and Japan on emissions (*The Australian*, 24 September, 2009)

Hu steals Obama’s climate thunder (*The Australian*, 24 September, 2009)

World leaders meet (*SMH*, 24 September, 2009)

China looks ready to open doors on climate change (*SMH*, 12 October, 2009)

China claiming lead on climate (*SMH*, 14 October, 2009)

China realises greening can be good for business (*SMH*, 15 October, 2009)

China, US put targets on table (*The Australian*, 27 November, 2009)

China offers to cut emissions (*The Australian*, 27 November, 2009)

Theme 4: Climate change negotiation (16/54)

In the process of climate change negotiation, China's reaction before and during the UN climate change conferences was evaluated by the two Australian newspapers.

Examples:

Curb wasteful lifestyles, Chinese urge (*The Australian*, 16 April, 2009)

Europe tells China, US to cut deeper (*The Australian*, 9 December, 2009)

Climate deal backers 'like Nazi appeasers' (*The Australian*, 10 December, 2009)

The rich seek binding deal with Beijing on emissions (*The Australian*, 11 December, 2009)

Talks fracture over cuts to save Tuvalu (*SMH*, 11 December, 2009)

Two big guns steal the show (*The Australian*, 12 December, 2009)

China fights for its right to develop (*The Australian*, 12 December, 2009)

China pours cold water on deal as tempers flare (*SMH*, 12 December, 2009)

G77 plays game of chicken as time runs out (*SMH*, 16 December, 2009)

Jet, ship tax to fund climate poor (*The Australian*, 17 December, 2009)

Tactics everywhere but no compromise (*The Australian*, 18 December, 2009)

Weak climate deal looms (*The Australian*, 19 December, 2009)

Obama refused to cool his heels (*The Australian*, 21 December, 2009)

Clearly the accord is not enough, but at least it's a start (*SMH*, 21 December, 2009)

How the climate deal unraveled (*SMH*, 21 December, 2009)

Is China too big to negotiate? (*The Australian*, 24 December, 2009)




Figure 5.10: Themes under the Evaluative Frame in the Case of COP15




Figure 5.11: Tones of the Evaluative Frame in the Case of COP15

Reasoning frame 4: Effects (8/77)

Theme 1: Climate change negotiation failed (8/8)

Examples:

China rejects draft climate deal – Developed nations ‘impeding progress’
(*The Australian*, 12 December, 2009)

Exercise set to fail (*The Australian*, 14 December, 2009)

Climate talks set for failure – China dampens hopes (*The Australian*, 18 December, 2009)

Happy ending only for China (*The Australian*, 21 December, 2009)

China changes global climate (*SMH*, 22 December, 2009)

Many players but pact was the work of just two (*The Australian*, 21 December, 2009)

China's climate stonewall (*The Australian*, 21 December, 2009)

Let's face it: the ETS is dead (*The Australian*, 26 December, 2009)

Reasoning frame 5: Solutions (8/77)

Theme 1: Green economy (New technologies/clean energy) (6/8)

According to United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) (2010), a green economy is the one that results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities. Promoting a green economy is a fundamental remedy for environmental mitigation and protection.

Examples:

China tests wind on clean energy and make its move (*SMH*, 11 July, 2009)

The sky falls in on solar industry (*The Australian*, 28 August, 2009)

Renewable rivals (*The Australian*, 19 November, 2009)

Green fields abound in pots of gold (*The Australian*, 12 December, 2009)

Private sector can trump politics on climate change (*SMH*, 18 December, 2009)

George Bush key to Green future (*The Australian*, 31 December, 2009)

Theme 2: New policies (1/8)

Policies for environmental protection are part of environmental governance. A proper policy is considered as an effective solution to environmental degradation.

Examples:

Seven proven policies that will help build a cleaner planet (*The Australian*, 6 July, 2009)

Theme 3: Co-operation on climate change (1/8)

Examples:

Unless we all act together on climate change, everyone loses (*SMH*, 22 September, 2009)




Figure 5.12: Themes under the Solutions Frame in the Case of COP15

II. Script Structures

1. Messengers & Messages

Table 5.5: Messengers & Messages/Media Views in the Two Australian Newspapers in the Case of COP15

Messengers	Messages/Media Views
1. Government officials	
<i>Australia</i>	1. Praise for the action on cutting emission in China. 2. Urge China to get back into negotiation. 3. China should take leadership in climate change action. 4. China is willing to undertake responsibility.
<i>China</i>	1. China would take action on climate change. 2. Have climate change a win-win. 3. Call for co-operation on climate change. 3. China provides specific target and plan. 4. Investment on mining in Australia. 5. Water problem. 6. Positive outcome of Copenhagen Conference. 7. Urge developed countries to cut more emissions. 8. Work together with the U.S. to resolve global issues. 9. Australia's role in bridging developed and developing countries. 10. Developed countries hindered the progress of negotiation.
<i>U.S.</i>	1. Developing countries should act on climate change together. 2. Co-ordinate with China on environmental challenges. 3. China is reluctant to its commitments. 4. The U.S. and China will define Copenhagen. 5. China and the U.S. can resolve world issues together. 6. China and the U.S. should design a 'green global economy'. 7. China and the U.S. discussion on financial crisis.
<i>International organisations</i>	1. The accord is an essential beginning. 2. China is a world leader in climate change. 3. China takes responsibility. 4. China dampens the hope of Copenhagen.
<i>Other developed countries</i>	1. China and the U.S. are decisive. 2. Aid developing countries. 3. China hijacked the Copenhagen summit. 4. The U.S. may hinder the progress of a binding agreement.
<i>Other developing countries</i>	1. India's plan to cut emissions. 2. Copenhagen deal is the worst one in the history.

2. Business people	1. China's energy need.
3. Experts	
<i>Australia</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. China takes leadership. 2. China has greener energy. 3. China's growth will lead disaster. 4. China defies the developed world on global issue. 5. China and the U.S. work together on global issues. 6. China should take responsibility. 7. U.S.-China relationship.
<i>China</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Western wasteful lifestyle. 2. Insufficient carbon target of developed countries. 3. China is America's main target in climate change. 4. China takes leadership. 5. China's water supply problem. 6. Qinghai-Tibet plateau glaciers problem.
<i>U.S.</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. China lacks of commitment. 2. China and the U.S. work on global issues. 3. China's environmental problems.
<i>Others</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Developing countries will need to play their part. 2. China's environmental problem.
4. NGOs	
<i>International NGOs</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. China takes positive step. 2. There should be more global pressure on China to take its responsibility. 3. China avoids transparency. 4. China takes leadership in clean energy.
<i>China</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. China takes leadership in renewable energy.
5. General public	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. U.S.-China bound relationship. 2. Tibet's environmental problem.
6. Media (other media)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. U.S. requests China to take the same responsibility in climate change. 2. China's emission target. 3. U.S.-China relationship. 4. China increases wind-power capacity.
7. The Australian/SMH (media views)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. New world order regarding to environmental politics. 2. Emphases the significance of the Australia-U.S. ally. 3. Australia's large view on China. 4. China's leadership in climate change issue. 5. China is not responsible for its leadership. 6. China hijacked the Copenhagen and won in the climate change negotiation. 7. China takes the lead in new technology and clean energy. 8. China's political system problem.




Figure 5.13: Messengers (actors) in the Environmental Coverage in relation to China in the Case of COP15

Examples:

1) Government officials

Australia

A. Prime Minister

KEVIN Rudd has praised new offers from China and Japan on cutting greenhouse gas emissions before the Copenhagen climate change conference. (*The Australian*, 24 September, 2009)

“I urge our Chinese friends to get back into the negotiations.”

“If the developed world became carbon neutral and the developing world continued to grow on current trends, then the truth is that the emerging economies alone would be responsible for more than half of total global emissions by 2050, and this would create a temperature rise of between 3.2 degrees and 4 degrees Celsius...” “History is calling on us all to frame a grand bargain on climate change.” (*The Australian*, 18 December, 2009)

B. Climate Change Minister

More important than the form of the agreement is what it contains, and that has to be verifiable commitments from all large emitters. (*The Australian*, 12 December, 2009)

“The world is looking to China for leadership, just as the world looks to the US for leadership, and for China to play a constructive role.” (*The Australian*, 14 December, 2009)

C. Foreign Minister

“We are optimistic.” Smith says without adducing compelling reasons beyond his adoption of Beijing’s rhetoric, “that China will emerge into a harmonious world as a responsible stakeholder”. (*The Australian*, 25 November, 2009)

D. Shadow Minister for Climate Action, the Environment and Heritage

Copenhagen told us that China is willing to exercise real power to forestall a global agreement and maximise its own growth. (*The Australian*, 31 December, 2009)

E. Australian-based Consultancy (Director)

“Kyoto has long been viewed as the sacred cow of international climate policy, yet it has serious flaws, the most obvious being that it does not require anything of China and is unacceptable to the US.” (*The Australian*, 12 December, 2009)

China

A. President

“China stood ready to build a better future for all” (*SMH*, 23 September, 2009)

“The world expects us to make a decision in the face of climate change, an issue which bears on mankind’s survival and development,” Mr Hu said, as he outlined the specifics of China’s contribution. “We should foster the idea that helping others is helping one’s self, and make our endeavour on climate change a win-win.” (*The Australian*, 24 September, 2009)

China would lower energy intensity as the country grew, while raising output of renewable energy and nuclear power. China aims to cut carbon dioxide emissions per unit of gross domestic product by a “notable margin” by 2020, Mr Hu said, without setting a concrete cap. (*The Australian*, 29 September, 2009)

B. Premier

“We should work together to help solve problems concerning all nations of the world.” (*The Australian*, 25 November, 2009)

“We will honour our words with real action. China’s measures are unconditional and they are not dependent on the reduction targets of other nations.” (*The Australian*, 21 December, 2009)

C. Vice-Premier

Its “modernisation drive” is what matters most to Australia. He urged “Australia’s adherence to an open and non-discriminatory foreign investment policy,” without offering a reciprocal openness. (*The Australian*, 25 November, 2009)

D. Executive Vice-Premier

China's water resources had become a serious economic and social development constraint: saving water and improving water use and efficiency were priorities. (*The Australian*, 7 December, 2009)

E. Foreign Minister

The conference "yielded significant and positive fruits". Premier Wen Jiabao, leader of China's delegation, "brought hope and confidence to the world in its fight against climate change." (*The Australian*, 22 December, 2009)

F. Vice-Foreign Minister

His country would consider voluntary "international exchanges" of information about its greenhouse efforts. (*The Australian*, 19 December, 2009)

G. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman

Mr Wen's attendance would "fully demonstrate the great importance attached by the Chinese government to this issue." (*The Australian*, 27 November, 2009)

H. The Chief Climate Negotiator

China was leaving Copenhagen "happy". (*The Australian*, 21 December, 2009)

I. Chinese Strategist

"There will be a deal at Copenhagen" to replace the Kyoto Protocol, but he has belittled the carbon-reduction proposals of the Obama Administration and the Rudd Government as inadequate. (*SMH*, 28 May, 2009)

J. Climate Ambassador

Yu Qingtai, China's climate ambassador, told journalists in Copenhagen: "We announced those targets, we don't intend to put them up for discussion." (*The Australian*, 21 December, 2009)

K. State Councillor

"China is ready to work together with the US to stay firmly committed to building ... positive, co-operative and comprehensive relations for the 21st century, so that we can bring benefits to our two peoples and our two countries and the whole world, and to our children, and our children's children." (*The Australian*, 30 July, 2009)

L. National Development and Reform Commission (Director-general)

China wanted a comprehensive and ambitious treaty, but warned negotiations on important differences might have to be postponed if they could not be resolved. "We do not believe that it is right to force the ideas that others cannot accept at this time." (*SMH*, 12 December, 2009)

M. A senior Chinese climate change official

"The Australian Government has announced many times that they want to play as a bridge between developed and developing countries." (*SMH*, 12 October, 2009)

U.S.

A. President

“We cannot meet this challenge unless all the largest emitters of greenhouse gas pollution act together. There is no other way.” (*SMH*, 23 September, 2009)

“Without any accountability, any agreement would be empty words on a page,” Obama said, reportedly offending the Chinese Premier so much that he returned to his hotel. (*The Australian*, 21 December, 2009)

B. Secretary of State

Ms Clinton and her delegation also emphasised their intention to closely co-ordinate with Beijing on confronting global climate change and other environmental challenges. “What we see here is the type of in-depth co-operation that we have to encourage,” Ms Clinton said during the visit to the Taiyanggong power plant. (*The Australian*, 23 February, 2009)

C. U.S. Special Envoy on Climate Change (The chief U.S. climate negotiator)

“But I do think that we will get there, and I think that there is a lot of interest on the Chinese side fundamentally to arrive at a constructive and successful outcome in Copenhagen.” (*SMH*, 29 July, 2009)

China, the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, had to take on a binding and verifiable commitment. But China’s reluctance to “internationalise” its commitments was exposed by a proposal from a Queanbeyan-based Australian representing the tiny Pacific island of Tuvalu. (*The Australian*, 11 December, 2009)

D. The Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee

“Copenhagen will be defined by what the US and China agree on in the next few weeks.” (*SMH*, 28 May, 2009)

E. U.S. Ambassador to Beijing

China and the US, he says, are the “only two countries in the world that together can solve certain issues, whether they are clean energy, climate change, regional security or those dealing with the global economy”. (*The Australian*, 25 November, 2009)

F. Treasury Secretary

Beijing and Washington “have acted together” to help the world recover from the financial slump and that it was time to design a “green global economy.” (*The Australian*, 28 July, 2009)

China had laid out very ambitious reforms to shift its future growth away from export industries that were investment and carbon-intensive. (*The Australian*, 30 July, 2009)

G. The U.S. Treasury Secretary's Senior Co-ordinator for China

"We talked about China's exchange-rate policy, they talked about their desire to reform the international monetary system, and I'll just leave it at that." (*The Australian*, 29 July, 2009)

IGOs

A. The United Nations Secretary-General

"We have sealed the deal." "This accord cannot be everything that everyone hoped for, but it is an essential beginning." (*SMH*, 21 December, 2009)

B. The United Nations Climate Chief (UN Climate Convention Executive Secretary)

China's stimulus package would position it as a world leader in fighting global warming, and well ahead of the US in dealing with climate change. (*SMH*, 15 October, 2009)

C. World Bank (President)

Optimistic definition of China as "a responsible international stakeholder". (*The Australian*, 10 December, 2009)

D. European Commission (President)

He admitted that throughout the long day and night all hope of an ambitious politically binding agreement had been crushed by China and the US. "We have been fighting not to go backwards," he said. (*SMH*, 21 December, 2009)

E. The European Union Minister of the Environment

"We are really prepared to really discuss all issues in the negotiations." (*SMH*, 16 December, 2009)

Other developed countries

A. British Climate Change Secretary

Ed Miliband showed accusing China of "hijacking" the summit. "This was a chaotic process dogged by procedural games ... We cannot again allow negotiations on real points of substance to be hijacked in this way." (*SMH*, 22 December, 2009)

B. Swedish Prime Minister

The hold-up in the US Senate climate bill made it impossible to meet the deadline next month for adopting a binding agreement. (*The Australian*, 6 November, 2009)

C. Swedish Environment Minister

The US and China cover half the world's emissions so it will be absolutely decisive what they deliver. It would be astonishing if President Obama arrived here next week and just delivered what was in last week's press release." (*The Australian*, 9 December, 2009)

Other developing countries

A. Sudanese Negotiator, Chair of the G77

Copenhagen deal is “the worst development in climate change negotiations in history.” (*The Australian*, 22 December, 2009)

2) Business people

China

A. Vice-president of the Chinese Wind Power Association

“China will need to add a substantial amount of coal-fired power capacity by 2020 in line with its expanding economy, and the idea is to bring some of the capacity earlier than necessary in order to facilitate the wind-power transmission.” (*The Australian*, 29 September, 2009)

3) Experts

Australia

A. The Lowy Institute (Director for East Asia program)

For the first time the world is experiencing the emergence of global powers – China and India - that are also developing nations.

“In the past, large powers were relatively rich, like-minded states,” says Cook. “That is not the case any more ... This was clearly a case of the big boys getting into a room together to cut a deal. That is a big change for Australia. The world is moving towards less of a role for middle powers, even though the results have major implications for us.” (*SMH*, 22 December, 2009)

B. The Lowy Institute (Director of Global Issues)

China’s announcement will help bridge the gap between developed and developing countries that has bedevilled climate change talks. (*SMH*, 8 December, 2009)

C. Strategic Studies at the Australian National University (Professor)

“2009 has been the year in which China’s growing political power has become an inescapable fact of international politics ... The idea that we can dictate to China its position on issues is an anachronistic fancy. Copenhagen has been a demonstration of that.”

D. Australian National University’s Climate Change Institute (Deputy Director)

“It’s clearly a breakthrough to have China saying it will consider adopting a numerical target like that.” (*SMH*, 12 October, 2009)

E. Powering Australia yearbook (Editorial Director)

“Chinese energy is greener than ours” (*The Australian*, 27 July, 2009)

F. Spiked (Editor)

Even worse, China’s growth might end up killing us all. We are frequently told that China is the world’s biggest emitter of carbon dioxide and, in the

words of one green observer, is putting the world on “the fast track to irreversible disaster”. (*The Australian*, 10 October, 2009)

G. Centre for Independent Studies (Foreign Policy Fellow)

China’s intransigence at the Copenhagen summit was seen by many as a rising superpower defying the US and the developed world on an important global issue.

Many leaders and opinion makers in the West are getting China wrong. (*The Australian*, 29 December, 2009)

H. The U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney (Chief Executive)

Within the G20 and beyond, what China and the US do alone, together or in conflict will increasingly define the global bounds of the possible for fixing finance, reviving trade, resisting protectionism and tackling climate change. (*The Australian*, 21 Septmeber, 2009)

H. Advisor to Prime Minister

China is hesitating to sign an internationally enforceable commitment. “China has to take a big gulp and do it, because there’s no other way to make an international agreement work,” Garnaut says, “even if it seems unfair, even if it is unfair.” (*SMH*, 15 December, 2009)

China

A. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Professor)

The planet could not afford countries such as Australia and the US having such “wasteful and luxurious” lifestyles. Australia’s target of 5 to 15 per cent reductions on 2000 levels by 2020 was “certainly insufficient”, when compared with targets set by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (*The Australian*, 16 April, 2009)

China had been “too aggressive” in reducing emissions, citing cases of cities that had erected streets of solar panel lights that did not work. (*SMH*, 28 May, 2009)

B. Beijing University (Professor)

“China is harder to change, and the criticism will keep coming back to us.” (*The Australian*, 25 May, 2009)

C. An Eminent Scientist and Explorer

“Owing to global warming, glaciers on the Qinghai-Tibet plateau are retreating extensively at a speed faster than in any other part of the world,” he said. (*The Australian*, 9 November, 2009)

D. Climate Change Modeling Team (Leader)

“By 2030 we assume Chinese energy efficiency will be the best in the world.” (*SMH*, 14 October, 2009)

U.S.

A. China Expert

“These are all areas where China’s national interests are deeply affected, but there is not yet a commensurate commitment to match interests with tangible contributions.” (*The Australian*, 25 November, 2009)

B. China Advisor to Former U.S. President

“For the first time in the history of our relationship, global issues are at the top of the agenda.” Yet, also for the first time, China is acting to frame how the US is perceived, especially in Asia, portraying it as a guest made welcome through Chinese generosity. The joint statement says: “China welcomes the US as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the region.” (*The Australian*, 25 November, 2009)

C. U.S. Journalist

“Obama was humiliated and stonewalled by the haughty Chinese leaders, in contrast to the titanic American presidents of yore who spoke sternly to Mao and his successors and therefore always got just what they wanted in Beijing.” (*SMH*, 8 December, 2009)

D. Writer

According to the academic Monica Chui, the China-bashing dime-store novels of the late 19th century yellow peril era were also packed with images of the Chinese as “filth, pollutants and toxins”. (*The Australian*, 10 October, 2009)

Other countries

A. Environmentalist Writer in Britain

The upshot of China’s “economic miracle” has been “dust, waste and dirty water”. Other Western greens tell us that China’s use of coal is turning the country into a “rapidly advancing dystopia where rivers run black”. (*The Australian*, 10 October, 2009)

4) NGOs

International NGOs

A. Greenpeace-China (Climate and Energy Campaign Manager)

“This is definitely a very positive step China is taking just one week before Copenhagen.” “But we think China can do more than this.” (*The Australian*, 27 November, 2009)

B. International Crisis Group

Global pressure should be increased on Beijing “to accept that it has global responsibilities as well as interests”. (*The Australian*, 25 November, 2009)

C. World Wildlife Fund International (Director-general)

James Leape accused Mr Obama’s climate envoy, Todd Stern, of “descending into legal wrangling” and the Chinese delegation of avoiding transparency. (*The Australian*, 18 December, 2009)

D. ClimateWorks (Chief Executive)

“China is moving.” They want to be leaders in green technology. China has already adopted the most aggressive energy efficiency program in the world. It is committed to reducing the energy intensity of its economy energy used per dollar of goods produced by 20 per cent in five years. (*SMH*, 11 July, 2009)

E. The Climate Group (China Director)

“We are definitely a good guy now. Where have people been?”

“The top leadership in China decided to take an alternative paradigm for the sake of the country. Renewable energy is now considered as a strategic element in the country’s future competitiveness internationally.” (*SMH*, 15 October, 2009)

5) General Public

China

A. Leading Chinese Blogger

“Is the G2 [the US and China] bound to end in divorce?” China’s elites have long been enamoured of the US, but the US is like a bridegroom who constantly fails to read the twisted mind of his bride. The parties can afford neither to divorce nor to live happily ever after.” (*The Australian*, 25 November, 2009)

B. A Tibetan Herder

“In the 1970s and 80s, there was rich grassland and sheep grazed everywhere, but the weather has become hotter and drier.” (*The Australian*, 9 November, 2009)

6) Media

China

A. Xinhua News Agency

“In the 30 years, the US continues to adjust its way in dealing with China, according to the power balance between the two and the changing international situation.” (*The Australian*, 11 November, 2009)

B. The China Economic Quarterly

Ahead of the Copenhagen conference, the Chinese government announced that the country would reduce the intensity of carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP in 2020 by 40 to 45 per cent compared with the level of 2005. (*The Australian*, 7 December, 2009)

U.S.

A. The Washington Post

The Washington Post said the one concrete advance – that the US may offer a target for carbon-emission cuts to boost climate negotiations in Copenhagen next month if China offers its own proposal. (*The Australian*, 11 November, 2009)

2. Media Views

A. A new world order in relation to environmental politics emerged.

China's and India's tough, consistent stance reflects a new world order that has emerged from a far broader context than that of environmental politics. It comes from the massive shift of the global economic balance, from the West to Asia.

--- Climate powers in slow burn (*The Australian*, 22 December, 2009)

B. Emphasises the significance of the Australia-U.S. ally.

This is a foolish line of thinking. We are of course independent from the US and at any given time there will be plenty of things Canberra disagrees with Washington about. But our fundamental strategic alignment is as an ally of the US and as a part of the US system. Every serious player in the world recognises this and deals with us on this basis.

--- The U.S. Alliance system is the only security that works (*The Australian*, 25 November, 2009)

Australia and China are becoming unlikely allies in the struggle to keep alive hopes of a meaningful new climate change agreement at Copenhagen.

--- Wong in giant leap forward on climate (*SMH*, 16 October, 2009)

C. Australia has narrow view on China.

Australia largely views China through a more narrow prism: that of its demand for our resources and, to a lesser extent, for student places.

--- Obama's great leap (*The Australian*, 25 November, 2009)

D. China takes leadership in climate change issue.

What the accord shows is that China holds a great deal of power, and the fate of future negotiations depends on China's approval. The US, Europe and Australia will be unable to turn the Titanic around without China on board.

--- Clearly the accord is not enough, but at least it's a start (*SMH*, 21 December, 2009)

E. China is not responsible for its leadership in the international stage.

Climate is shaping as an issue that will test how China deals with the international responsibilities that sit alongside its emerging superpower status. In Copenhagen it failed that test.

--- China's climate stonewall (*The Australian*, 21 December, 2009)

The befuddled Australians who spruik a role of global leadership for China fail to recognise how utterly domestic the focus of its leadership is.

Yet China is taking significant greenhouse mitigation measures, because it is sensibly concerned about its own environment.

---Don't look to Beijing for leadership (*The Australian*, 24 December, 2009)

F. China hijacked the Copenhagen negotiation.

BLOCKING tactics by China and the developing world have brought the Copenhagen climate talks to the brink of collapse, leaving more than 140 world leaders facing the prospect of achieving only a weak political statement.

--- Climate talks set for failure-China dampens hopes (*The Australian*, 18 December, 2009)

China destroyed Copenhagen with its obstructionism and its determination that nothing it does, and thereby nothing that any other developing nation does, on this issue should be subject to any external verification.

--- The U.S. alliance system is the only security that works (*The Australian*, 26 December, 2009)

G. China was the winner in the climate change negotiation.

CHINA won, the world lost. That is the big message from Copenhagen. Global climate change was not the only issue on the agenda. Global political power was also an issue, and the change in the world's political power alignment turned out to be more substantial than the response to global warming.

--- China changes global climate (*SMH*, 22 December, 2009)

H. China takes the lead in new technology and clean energy.

International non-government organisation the Climate Group recently reported on the extent to which green businesses and technology development have become a mainstream element of China's growth strategy. The country is already the world leader in solar energy, supplying 40 per cent of the world's photovoltaic panels.

--- Green fields abound in pots of gold (*SMH*, 12 December, 2009)

China is leading the world on commercial-scale wind farming and is building nuclear power plants faster than anyone else because it wants to reduce its dependence on foreign energy sources.

--- Private sector can trump politics on climate change (*SMH*, 18 December, 2009)

I. China has serious political problem.

When it comes to the big picture, China never knowingly takes a backward step; or, if it does, it hates to concede doing so. Its Communist Party, after 60 years in power, still feels that its legitimacy remains threatened.

It views displaying weakness – for instance, by allowing foreigners to assess whether it is meeting its emission targets – as potentially undermining the credibility of the regime.

--- Is China too big to negotiate? (*The Australian*, 24 December, 2009)

III. Rhetorical Structures

1. Metaphors

Table 5.6: Metaphors about China's Environment in the Two Australian Newspapers in the Case of COP15

Tenors	Vehicles	Excerpts
China's booming economy	The tiger in the road	Chinese analysts say the country's lack of uranium is " the tiger in the road " to fulfilling its nuclear power ambitions and that Australia offers the most obvious solution. --- China's bid for nuclear supplies Australian uranium sought (<i>SMH</i> , 22 April, 2009)
China	Authoritarian giant	Perhaps awkwardly for the world's democracies, the big emitter that could do the most to reduce global warming in the medium term is the authoritarian giant , China. ---World leaders meet (<i>SMH</i> , 24 September, 2009)
Engage in climate change deal	Play ball	The public admission that the Copenhagen talks next month will not lead to any binding agreements on carbon means Mr Obama cannot realistically make much of climate change during discussions in Beijing today. In truth, China has shown scant interest in engaging globally other than to protect its own economic and security interests. --- Will China play ball ? (<i>The Australian</i> , 17 November, 2009)
Repair its tattered relations with China	Mend fences	THE federal government will use its compromise position on climate change to help repair its tattered relations with China, sending Climate Change and Water Minister Penny Wong on a flying visit to China next week as global shuttle diplomacy on the issue escalates ahead of December's Copenhagen meeting. ---Wong to mend fences on China trip (<i>The Australian</i> , 10 October, 2009)
An over-productive people whose use of coal and other filthy fossil fuels might pollute Western society and put the whole world on the fast track to irreversible disaster.	Green peril	IN the past, the Chinese were insultingly referred to as the yellow peril, an alien breed whose weird ways might corrupt Western civilisation and even bring it to its knees. Today the Chinese are looked on as a green peril , an over-productive people whose use of coal and other filthy fossil fuels might pollute Western society and put the whole world on the fast track to irreversible disaster. --- Green or yellow, peril refuses to go away (<i>The Australian</i> , 10 October, 2009)

China is unwilling to commit to a firm emissions reduction target	Climate change villain	CHINA has long been labelled a global climate change villain – unwilling to commit to a firm emissions reduction target and rigid towards reducing its carbon footprint to the same level as developed countries despite being the world's largest emitter of carbon dioxide. --- China realises greening can be good for business (<i>SMH</i> , 15 October, 2009)
China makes contribution to the world environment	Good guy, bad guy	“We are definitely a good guy now. Where have people been?” she said. “For a long time China was painted as a bad guy . Countries like China and India have been in that category, but starting this year, with more and more information being disclosed to the international community, they are starting to recognise the contribution that China has been making. ---China realises greening can be good for business (<i>SMH</i> , 15 October, 2009)
China had named a target	China played its cards on climate change	WHEN China played its cards on climate change on Thursday night, the initial response from the international environmental community was relief that it had named a target -- followed yesterday by muted disappointment that it is not committing to reducing overall emissions. ---Green hope China will up the ante on carbon (<i>The Australian</i> , 28 November, 2009)
China and the U.S. are reluctant to bind commitments into international agreement	Two big guns steal the show	Both superpowers have been reluctant to bind those commitments into an international agreement and neither is prepared to do its bit if the other does not. --- Two big guns steal the show (<i>The Australian</i> , 12 December, 2009)
China refuses to take on targets under an international treaty which forces the suspension of formal talks	Pours cold water on deal	China has raised the possibility that the faltering United Nations climate conference will fail to reach even a political deal to cut greenhouse gas emissions, reflecting huge divisions about the design of a new treaty that has forced the suspension of formal talks in Copenhagen. --- China pours cold water on deal as tempers flare (<i>SMH</i> , 12 December, 2009)
China is angry about the deal	Tempers flare	The director-general of China’s National Development and Reform Commission, Su Wei, told reporters that China wanted a comprehensive and ambitious treaty, but warned negotiations on important differences might have to be postponed if they could not be resolved. “We do not believe that it is right to force the ideas that others cannot accept at this time,” he said. ---China pours cold water on deal as tempers flare (<i>SMH</i> , 12 December, 2009)

The complete refusal of the Chinese to engage in the talks	China's climate stonewall	<p>Part of the problem was the complete refusal of the Chinese to engage in the talks.</p> <p>The conference had been bogged down for almost two weeks by procedural blocking tactics by developing countries and China, which senior negotiators believe were almost entirely engineered by the Chinese.</p> <p>--- China's climate stonewall (<i>The Australian</i>, 21 December, 2009)</p>
China's directed G77	A rabble without a cause	<p>It descended into a farce of anti-Western, anti-capitalist rhetoric, with the Group of 77 developing nations, which China directed and manipulated from start to finish, revealed as a rabble without a cause.</p> <p>--- China changes global climate (<i>SMH</i>, 22 December, 2009)</p>
China	Elephant	<p>Formally, it was "Chindia" – China and India. China is the elephant in that paring.</p> <p>---Let's face it: the ETS is dead (<i>The Australian</i>, 26 December, 2009)</p>

2. Depictions and Catchphrases

Table 5.7: Depictions and Catchphrases about China's Environment in the Two Australian Newspapers in the Case of COP15

Categories	Depictions/catchphrases
Environmental problems	<p>The world's largest, and fastest growing, greenhouse gas emitter;</p> <p>The biggest greenhouse gas polluting nation (the world's biggest/largest emitter);</p> <p>Highest total emissions;</p> <p>Rapidly advancing dystopia where rivers run black;</p> <p>Putting the world on the fast track to irreversible disaster;</p> <p>Particularly dirty;</p> <p>Filth, pollutants and toxins;</p> <p>Fastest-growing polluter;</p> <p>Dust, waste and dirty water;</p> <p>Carriers of diseases and pollutants;</p> <p>A severe shortage of water</p>
Responsibility	<p>Vague promises;</p> <p>Reluctance;</p> <p>Nebulous promises;</p> <p>Defiance of world opinion;</p> <p>China's brazen stonewalling of efforts;</p> <p>Hold the fate of the earth</p>
Leadership	<p>Unsatisfactory great power;</p> <p>The pivotal power of the 21st century;</p> <p>That's the world of the future;</p> <p>Superpower;</p> <p>Rapidly shifting global power;</p> <p>Biggest power;</p> <p>More powerful than ever;</p> <p>Leading the world on commercial-scale wind farming;</p> <p>Key player;</p> <p>Group of Two (G2);</p> <p>Greater global leadership;</p> <p>Dominate the global solar industry;</p> <p>Champions of globalization;</p> <p>Big player;</p> <p>A world leader in greenhouse gas reduction efforts;</p> <p>A lonely rising power</p>
Role in the environmental politics	<p>The U.S. and China that dominated the Copenhagen summit;</p> <p>The key to success (progress) at Copenhagen;</p> <p>Repeatedly blocked negotiations;</p> <p>Wrested control of the strategic decision-making;</p> <p>Peculiarly threatening nation;</p> <p>Increasingly defiant and dismissive of the West;</p> <p>Hijacking the summit;</p> <p>Harbingers of climatic disorder;</p> <p>Developing countries gamed by China;</p> <p>Dramatic change;</p> <p>Weightier offer;</p> <p>Dictated the multilateral talks;</p>

	Determine the outcome of the Copenhagen submit; Destroyer; Copenhagen debacle; China solution; A leader in debate; A farce of anti-Western, anti-capitalist
China's politics	Weaknesses and insecurities of the regime; Vulnerabilities and humiliation; Dysfunctional heart of China; Authoritarianism
Solutions	Green global economy

Table 5.8: Framing Matrix 2 – Coverage of COP15 2009

Thematic Structures	Reasoning themes	Problems	Causation	Evaluation	Effects	Solutions
	Themes	Environmental issues; Environmental threat; Political malady	Funding issue	International relationships in the environmental dimension; Res-ponsibility; Attitudes & actions; Negotiation	COP15 failed	Green economy (New technology& clean energy); New policies; Cooperation
Script Structures	Messengers & Messages	Messengers	Australia	China	U.S.	Others
		Messengers				
		Government officials	Action; Leadership; Res-ponsibility	Leadership; Action; Cooperation; Outcome; Australia’s role	Negotiation; Co-operation; Res-ponsibility; Outcome	Leadership; Responsibility; Action; Outcome
		Experts (scholars & professionals)	World order; Leadership; Responsibility ; Problems; Clean energy; U.S.-China relationship	Res-ponsibility; Action; U.S.-China relationship; Leadership; Problems	Co-Operation; Problems	Action; Problems
		Business people	Energy transmission			
		General public		U.S.-China relationship; Problems		
		NGOs	Action; Res-ponsibility; Problems; Leadership	Leadership		
		Media	New world order; Australia-U.S. relationship; Leadership; Negotiation; Leadership; New technology and energy; Polity			
Rhetoric Structures	Depictions/ catch-phrases	Problems See table 5.7	Res-ponsibility	Leadership	Role in the environmental politics	
	Metaphors	See table 5.6				

5.3.3 Case 3 – UN Climate Change Conferences – Durban 2011 (COP17)

There are 29 news articles about China's environment in relation to COP17 found out in the two newspapers.

Framing Package

I. Thematic Structures:




Figure 5.14: Ratio of Reasoning Frames of COP17 2011

Reasoning frame 1: Problems (4/29)

Theme 1: Environmental issues (4/4)

Sub theme 1: Carbon emission (2/4)

Examples:

Nobody panic, everyone stay calm, China's carbon emissions are only rising.

A lot. (*The Australian*, 27 May, 2011)

China emissions will blow out – The carbon plan (*The Australian*, 14 July, 2011)

Sub theme 2: Energy (2/4)

Examples:

China's appetite for coal growing (*The Australian*, 16 March, 2011)

China's coal story poses a problem for Canberra (*The Australian*, 17 March, 2011)




Figure 5.15: Themes under the Problematic Frame in the Case of COP17

Reasoning frame 2: Evaluation (16/29)

Theme 1: International relationships in the environmental dimension (3/16)

Sub theme 1: Australia-China relationship (2/3)

Examples:

Pursuit of excellence the way to meet the rise and rise of China (*SMH*, 6 October, 2011)

Turnbull calls for leadership on climate (*SMH*, 6 October, 2011) p

Sub theme 2: U.S.-Australia-China triangular relationship (1/3)

Examples:

The challenge of China will bind Canberra closer to Washington (*The Australian*, 10 March, 2011)




Figure 5.16: Subthemes under the Theme of International Relationship in the Environmental Dimension in the Case of COP17

Theme 2: Responsibility (3/16)*Examples:*

World searches for consensus (*The Australian*, 9 April, 2011)

China pressed to face up to moral obligations (*The Australian*, 17 October, 2011)

China and India 'must cut emissions' (*The Australian*, 17 November, 2011)

Theme 3: Attitudes and actions on climate change (8/16)*Examples:*

PM sparks China climate role row (*The Australian*, 16 March, 2011)

Let's bust the furphy of China's inaction on emissions (*The Australian*, 1 April, 2011)

It's madness to sacrifice ourselves for nothing (*The Australian*, 9 April, 2011)

China set to take lead on emissions from West (*SMH*, 4 August, 2011)

In reality China's carbon tax far lower than ours (*The Australian*, 15 August, 2011)

China's delay in setting emissions target consigned Rudd's plan to failure (*SMH*, 1 September, 2011)

Chinese sceptics see global warming as US conspiracy (*SMH*, 8 October, 2011)

China's climate strategy (*The Australian*, 12 December, 2011)

Theme 4: Climate change negotiation (2/16)*Examples:*

Carbon tax can't work unless all share the load (*The Australian*, 28 November, 2011)

China talks the talk but climate deal hopes fade (*The Australian*, 5 December, 2011)




Figure 5.17: Themes under the Evaluative Frame in the Case of COP17




Figure 5.18: Tones of the Evaluative Frame in the Case of COP17

Reasoning theme 3: Effects (2/29)

Theme 1: New accord was achieved in the climate change negotiation (2/2)

Examples:

Durban dithers on new climate pact (*The Australian*, 10 December, 2011)

Durban pact at least creates climate for a binding deal (*SMH*, 12 December, 2011)

Reasoning theme 4: Solutions (7/29)

Theme 1: Green economy (new technologies/clean energy) (6/7)

Examples:

Clean, green opportunities going to waste (*The Australian*, 5 March, 2011)

China to tax the biggest polluters (*SMH*, 31 March, 2011)

Chinese the winner from solar subsidies (*The Australian*, 4 June, 2011)

Growth key to China's energy future (*The Australian*, 5 July, 2011)

Organise an energy race and companies will come (*SMH*, 27 August, 2011)

Clean energy presents array of opportunities (*The Australian*, 7 September, 2011)

Theme 2: Co-operation on climate change (1/7)

Examples:

Business planners working with China – The O'Farrell era (*The Australian*, 29 March, 2011)




Figure 5.19: Themes under the Solutions Frame in the Case of COP17

II. Script Structures

1. Messengers & Messages:

Table 5.9: Messengers & Messages in the Two Australian Newspapers in the Case of COP17

Messengers	Messages
1. Government officials	
<i>Australia</i>	1. Praise China's action on climate change. 2. Doubt China's action on climate change. 3. China should take more responsibility and leadership on climate change.
<i>China</i>	1. China is taking action on climate change. 2. China is taking leadership in climate change. 3. China does not rule out the climate change negotiation.
<i>U.S.</i>	1. China should get involved in the bargain. 2. China lack of ambition in tackling climate change.
2. Business people	
<i>Australia</i>	1. Chinese government supports new technology. 2. The growth in China's emission underscores the futility of Australia acting ahead of the world.
<i>International companies</i>	1. China replaces old coal-based power plants with renewable energy. 2. China's policy is for green race.
3. Experts	
<i>Australia</i>	1. China takes lead in green technology. 2. China's investment in clean technology provides Australia new opportunity. 3. China is taking action on climate change. 4. China has to participate in global climate change the mitigation. 5. China's carbon tax far lower than Australia. 6. China is playing commercial game in green technologies.
<i>China</i>	1. Global warming is the U.S. conspiracy.
<i>U.S.</i>	1. China sets to take lead on emissions. 2. The U.S. wants to bind with China in dealing with climate change.
<i>Others</i>	1. China emits far more greenhouse emissions.
4. Media (other media)	1. China is willing to make compromise for climate accord.
5. The Australian and SMH (media views)	1. China has severe environmental problems including pollution and carbon emission. 2. China won't take responsibility in cutting carbon emissions. 3. China is willing to engage in climate change negotiation. 4. China's new technology-based green economy.




Figure 5.20: Messengers (actors) in the Environmental Coverage in relation to China in the Case of COP17

Examples:

1) Government officials

Australia

A. Prime Minister

“There’s this image that somehow we’re the only ones (taking action on climate change), simply not true.”

“You know, China is closing down a dirty coal-fired power generation facility at the rate of one every one to two weeks. Putting up a wind turbine at the rate of one every hour.” (*The Australian*, 16 March, 2011)

B. The Climate Change and Energy Efficient Minister

“China is taking very significant action to reduce its carbon pollution and to transform to a new clean-energy economy”. (*SMH*, 31 March, 2011)

C. Productivity Commission

The implicit carbon price exists only in Combet’s dreams. China does not impose a carbon price across its economy. (*The Australian*, 9 April, 2011)

D. Treasury Chief

CHINA needs to show greater leadership in the face of global challenges and take the initiative on issues such as the stresses in the world economy, trade liberalisation and climate change. (*The Australian*, 17 October, 2011)

E. Opposition Leader

One of the biggest is that China is not taking action on climate change. (*The Australian*, 1 April, 2011)

F. National Development and Reform (Vice Chairman)

China was “trialling” legally binding carbon markets as a means of reducing emissions in some cities and provinces, but said decisions had not yet been made about the level of a carbon price or which companies would be liable to pay it. (*SMH*, 31 March, 2011)

G. Greens Leader

China's can-do green example ought to be our inspiration. (*The Australian*, 19 September, 2011)

H. The Parliamentary Secretary for Climate Change

The meeting agreed to promote "joint strategic programs of practical action and co-operation to promote low-carbon economies in both nations." (*The Australian*, 29 March, 2011)

China

A. National Development and Reform Commission (Chairman/Vice-Chairman)

China would show global leadership in fighting climate change. (*The Australian*, 19 September, 2011)

B. National Energy Administrator Chief

This month China should cap its use at four billion tonnes, a figure expected to be reached by 2015. (*The Australian*, 16 March, 2011)

C. Lead Negotiator

"We do not rule out the possibility of legally binding. It is possible for us, but it depends on the negotiations." (*The Australian*, 5 December, 2011)

U.S.

A. President

"So part of our insistence when we are in a multilateral forum, and I will continue to insist on this when we go to Durban, is that if we are taking a series of steps then it's important that emerging economies like China and India are also part of the bargain." (*The Australian*, 17 November, 2011)

B. Department of Climate Change (Secretary)

His department "expressed concern to Chinese diplomats over the lack of ambition in the (Chinese) stated goal of a 40 to 45 per cent reduction in carbon intensity by 2020." (*SMH*, 1 September, 2011)

2) Business People

Australia

A. Silex (Chief Executive)

Overseas manufacturers, led by the Chinese, were able to offer big discounts because of government production subsidies at home, and held about 95 per cent of the Australian market. (*The Australian*, 4 June, 2011)

B. Minerals Council (Chief Executive)

The growth in China's emissions "underscores the futility of Australia acting ahead of the world when there is no binding global climate change agreement." (*The Australian*, 14 July, 2011)

International companies

A. Beijing-based Green Energy Investor at Peony Capital

"China is systematically changing the composition of its primary energy supply by encouraging the closure of old, inefficient coal-based power plants,

and replacing them with renewable energy or with much more efficient installations.” (*The Australian*, 16 March, 2011)

B. World Business Council for Sustainable Development (President)

Stigson describes China’s 12th five-year plan, for 2011-2015, as a “game plan for the green race”. (*SMH*, 27 August, 2011)

3) Experts

Australia

A. Advisor to Prime Minister

“It is in China more than anywhere else that global climate change mitigation will be decided. If China does not participate in the global mitigation effort, its emissions will continue to grow rapidly and will account for a rising share of global emissions.” (*The Australian*, 9 April, 2011)

B. Former Liberal Leader

China was trying to move to the forefront in low-carbon technologies as a matter of national strategy. (*SMH*, 6 October, 2011)

C. Former Keating Government Minister

“The Chinese must think Gillard a fool [Vivid] wildly overstate China’s and wildly understate Australia’s implicit carbon price”. (*The Australian*, 15 August 2011)

D. Climate Institute (An Expert)

China’s action strengthened the argument for Australia to cut its emissions by 25 per cent of 2000 levels by 2020. (*The Australian*, 16 March, 2011)

E. Climate Change Policy at the Institute of Public Affairs (Director)

In reality China’s carbon tax far lower than ours (*The Australian*, 15 August, 2011)

F. Victoria University & Research Fellow at VU Centre for Strategic Economic Studies (Vice-Chancellor)

In 2009 China surpassed Germany and the US as the largest spender in the clean technology sector. Given our carbon footprint, the shift to a greener economy presents challenges for the Australian economy. (*The Australian*, 7 September, 2011)

G. University of Sydney (Adjunct Associate Professor)

China is playing a smart commercial game, its pro-green credentials are a mirage. But this is more about the Chinese seeking opportunities in global markets than a more environmentally friendly future at home. (*The Australian*, 19 September, 2011)

H. Australian National University (Academics)

“The rapid growth in coal-fired electricity generation in China as the major driver of emissions and coal’s increasing importance to China as an energy source.” (*The Australian*, 9 April, 2011)

I. A Commercial Lawyer

Guli argues that while Australia has only a limited capacity to make meaningful reductions in world carbon output it would be better off focusing its attentions on developing clean energy technology and leveraging its potential in the China market. “If our goal is to be a world leader, then the greatest contribution we could make is in becoming a leading clean-tech solution provider.” (*The Australian*, 5 March, 2011)

China

A. Advisor to the People’s Liberal Army

“The low-carbon economy, carbon politics and carbon taxes are actually driven by the West as the foundation for a new cycle of the virtual economy.” (*SMH*, 8 October, 2011)

U.S.

A. The Nobel Prize-winner

“China is starting to internalise these things.”

“They are coming to realise that they will soon be big enough economically to put pressure on the entire globe’s environment.” (*SMH*, 4 August, 2011)

B. Strategy and Policy with Union of Concerned Scientists (Director)

“India and the US have concerns about legally binding targets for precisely opposite reasons. The US wants India and China bound (by targets) and India does not want to be bound. It is almost a marriage of convenience. They can both exert pressure from different ends.” (*The Australian*, 5 December, 2011)

Others

A. The Netherlands Environment Assessment Agency

China now emits far more greenhouse emissions than any other country, with emissions doubling between 2003 and 2010. (*SMH*, 8 October, 2011)

4) Other media

A. German Daily

CHINA was willing to make compromises at the climate summit in Durban while the US continued to block any agreement. Chinese concessions on climate protection could shift the global economic power balance. (*The Australian*, 12 December, 2011)

2. Media Views

A. China’s pollution problem is severe. China faces huge environmental and pollution problems, of which carbon is apart.

--- It’s madness to sacrifice ourselves for nothing (*The Australian*, 9 April, 2011)

B. China’s carbon emission is increasing.

China is engaged in a massive, yes massive, increase in carbon emissions.

--- It’s madness to sacrifice ourselves for nothing (*The Australian*, 9 April, 2011)

China emissions will blow out.

--- China emissions will blow out (*The Australian*, 14 July, 2011)

C. China won't take responsibility in cutting carbon emissions.

China does not impose a carbon price across its economy. Beijing has never, ever promised to cut its carbon emissions.

--- It's madness to sacrifice ourselves for nothing (*The Australian*, 9 April, 2011)

D. China is willing to engage in climate change negotiation.

China's commitment to be part of a legally binding agreement to cut emissions also, to some extent, undercuts the federal opposition's view Australia is going it alone. Our biggest trading partner has made it clear it wants action on climate change, and it is willing to be held to account by the international community.

--- Durban pact at least creates climate for a binding deal (*SMH*, 12 December, 2011)

E. China's new technology-based green economy.

The lesson for Australia is that the Chinese emphasis is not on saving the world from climate change but instead building a world class, highly efficient, energy secure, technology based new economy.

--- Growth key to China's energy future (*The Australian*, 5 July, 2011)

III. Rhetorical Structures

1. Metaphors

Table 5.10: Metaphors about China's Environment in the Two Australian Newspapers in the Case of COP17

Tenors	Vehicles	Excerpts
China's non-carbon-based energy production and aggressive promises to cut carbon emissions	Green giant	China has been lauded internationally as a " green giant " for its non-carbon-based energy production and aggressive promises to cut carbon emissions.----A carbon tax can't save the planet (<i>The Australian</i> , 11 July, 2011)
The reality of the greening of China	Mirage	The greening of China a mirage (<i>The Australian</i> , 19 September, 2011)
China's responsibility in dealing with climate change	Moral obligations	China pressed to face up to moral obligations (<i>The Australian</i> , 17 October, 2011)
China cut carbon emission to clean up the environment	Chinese dragon is growing green scales	In anticipation of a price on carbon foreshadowed as part of its new five-year plan earlier this year, the Chinese Dragon is shedding some of its brown scales and growing green ones in their place . --- Clean energy presents an array of opportunities (<i>The Australian</i> , 7 September, 2011)

2. Depictions and Catchphrases

Table 5.11: Depictions and Catchphrases about China's Environment in the Two Australian Newspapers in the Case of COP17

Categories	Depictions/catchphrases
Environmental problems	The world largest emitter of greenhouse gas; The biggest polluter; Carbon polluter; Voracious power needs; Huge environmental and pollution problems; The major driver of emissions; The world's top producer of carbon emissions; Ubiquitous smog; Industrial haze blanketing places
Responsibility	Aggressive promises; Lack of ambition
Role in environmental politics	Abrasive diplomacy; Game plan for the green race; Unwarranted and unwelcome Chinese assertiveness; Key to the talks' success or failure
Leadership	A world leader in taking up renewable power; The world's biggest investor in clean technology (leading investor in low-carbon, clean-energy technology); Lead the world in clean energy; The world's largest producer of wind turbines and solar panels; The largest spender in the clean technology sector
China's politics	Communist state
Solutions	Highly efficient, energy secure, technology-based new economy; Winner from solar subsidies

Table 5.12: Framing Matrix 3 – Coverage of COP 17

Thematic structures	Reasoning themes	Problems	Causation	Evaluation	Effects	Solutions
	Themes	Environmental issues		International relationships in the environmental dimension; Responsibility; Attitudes & actions; Negotiation	Climate pact	Green economy; Co-operation
Script structures	Messengers & Messages	Messengers	Australia	China	U.S.	Others
		Messengers				
		Government officials	Action; Responsibility	Action; Leadership; Negotiation	Responsibility; Action	
		Experts (scholars & professionals)	Leadership; Technology; Action; Problems; Responsibility	Climate skeptics	Leadership; Cooperation	Problems
		Business people	Energy; Technology			Energy; Action
Rhetoric structures	Media	Problems; Responsibility; Negotiation; New technology				
	Depictions/catch-phrases	Problems	Responsibility	Leadership	Role in environmental politics See table 5.11	
	Metaphors	See table 5.10				

5. 4 Coverage of China's Environment (2000 – 2008)

There are 168 news articles about China's environment from 2000 to 2008 found in the two newspapers.

Thematic Structures:




Figure 5.21: Ratio of Reasoning Themes of Coverage (2000 to 2008)

Reasoning frame 1: Problems (84/168)

Theme 1: Environmental issues (74/84)

Sub theme 1: Catastrophe (34/74)

Examples:

Killer landslides strike China (*The Australian*, 17 August, 2002)

Millions in fear of Chinese water torture (*The Australian*, 24 August, 2002)

Relief for millions as dikes deny Yangtze (*The Australian*, 28 August, 2002)

242 die as quake hits west China (*The Australian*, 25 February, 2003)

Aftershocks lift China quake toll to 266 (*The Australian*, 27 February, 2003)

Gas leak sealed as toll hits 233 (*The Australian*, 30 December, 2003)

150,000 flee China gas leak (*The Australian*, 19 April, 2004)

Landslide swamps Chinese village (*The Australian*, 7 June, 2004)

105 dead as China pummelled by storms (*The Australian*, 8 September, 2004)

Beijing gags local media after mine blast kills 203 (*SMH*, 16 February, 2005)

Chinese city in chaos as water is cut off (*SMH*, 24 November, 2005)

Poisoned water flows through Chinese city (*SMH*, 25 November, 2005)

Another river is poisoned as city waits for water (*SMH*, 26 November, 2005)

China's deathtrap mines claim 30 more lives (*The Australian*, 10 June, 2005)

Huge typhoon ravages Chinese resort island (*The Australian*, 27 September, 2005)

Chinese city has its water cut off (*The Australian*, 24 November, 2005)

Blast cuts water to city of millions (*The Australian*, 24 November, 2005)

Poisoned river starts China panic (*The Australian*, 25 November, 2005)

13 dead as quake hits east China (*The Australian*, 28 November, 2005)

Scores die in mine blast near Chinese river disaster (*The Australian*, 29 November, 2005)

Chemical spill poisons another Chinese river (*The Australian*, 22 February, 2006)

Chinese mines toll fury spreads (*The Australian*, 1 December, 2006)

Little hope for 181 Chinese trapped in 'model mine' (*The Australian*, 21 August, 2007)

'My grandmother is still buried' (*SMH*, 14 May, 2008)

Tsunami quake may have had a hand in latest disaster (*SMH*, 14 May, 2008)

Death toll reaches 12,000 as aftershock hits capital (*SMH*, 14 May, 2008)

Thousands dead in China earthquake (*The Australian*, 13 May, 2008)

900 pupils buried alive in quake (*The Australian*, 13 May, 2008)

Rain and tremors hamper rescuers (*The Australian*, 14 May, 2008)

60 pandas safe, haven cut off – CHINA QUAKE (*The Australian*, 14 May, 2008)

Quake victims stranded – Thousands remain buried as toll soars (*The Australian*, 14 May, 2008)

Toll soars as rescuers dig deep (*The Australian*, 15 May, 2008)

Young boy's dying words 'like a knife through my heart' - CALAMITY IN ASIA (*The Australian*, 17 May, 2008)

Wedding party in ruins – Eerie record of China's disaster (*The Australian*, 24 May, 2008)

Sub theme 2: Energy (9/74)

Examples:

China steps on gas for fuel (*The Australian*, 10 January, 2000)

A damming indictment of China's power (*The Australian*, 10 March, 2003)

'Hungry dragon' needs to feed on resources (*The Australian*, 27 July, 2004)

China's oil thirst may plunge world into war (*The Australian*, 13 January, 2006)

China close to turning point, with energy and resources demand to keep rising – Economist Ross Garnaut says China is entering an era unprecedented in history (*The Australian*, 2 August, 2007)

By 2015, China will need half world's resources (*The Australian*, 2 February, 2008)

Energy-hungry China to pay \$600m for 60pc of AED Oil (*The Australian*, 3 March, 2008)

Peak oil hits new heights and the view is not pretty (*SMH*, 24 May, 2008)

China iron demand in doubt (*The Australian*, 10 October, 2008)

Sub theme 3: Pollution (7/74)

Examples:

China fights to clear the air (*The Australian*, 19 January, 2002)

Polluted China strives for a Green Olympics (*SMH*, 25 March, 2004)

Images show Beijing vehicle emission pollution is world's worst (*SMH*, 26 October, 2005)

Pall of pollution over Beijing Games (*The Australian*, 12 November, 2005)

China to top US as biggest polluter by 2010 (*The Australian*, 2 November, 2006)

Your pollution is killing you, China warned (*SMH*, 19 July, 2007)

Pollution shortens lives of China's traffic police (*The Australian*, 8 August, 2007)

Sub theme 4: Biodiversity (6/74)

Examples:

Asian indifference leaves dolphins facing extinction (*The Australian*, 14 February, 2000)

Sun sets on Yangtze goddess (*The Australian*, 16 February, 2000)

Cloning hope for dolphins (*The Australian*, 18 February, 2000)

Panda Births Celebrated Amid Fears Over Bamboo That Threatens Species (*SMH*, 22 August, 2001)

China blossoms at home (*The Australian*, 12 April, 2000)

Yangtze dolphins losing survival fight (*The Australian*, 27 October, 2005)

Sub theme 5: Dam (5/74)

Examples:

Water torture (*The Australian*, 10 March, 2003)

Yangtze dam to spark 'eco disaster' (*The Australian*, 31 May, 2003)

Yangtze River dam ahead of schedule (*The Australian*, 7 February, 2006)

China forced to move 4m to safety (*SMH*, 13 October, 2007)

Chinese dam exodus (*The Australian*, 13 October, 2007)

Sub theme 6: Carbon emission (4/74)

Examples:

China outstrips US on greenhouse emissions (*SMH*, 21 June, 2007)

China the biggest carbon emission problem, says BP (*The Australian*, 16 June, 2007)

China's carbon output tops US (*The Australian*, 21 June, 2007)

Race to set carbon record straight (*The Australian*, 14 June, 2008)

Sub theme 7: Nuclear (4/74)

Examples:

Nuclear question looms large at climate change talks (*SMH*, 12 January, 2006)

China rushes for nuke deals (*The Australian*, 5 April, 2006)

China cranks up nuclear power capacity (*The Australian*, 9 June, 2006)

Cultural revolution: Beijing goes easy on coal, boosts nuclear energy (*The Australian*, 15 March, 2008)

Sub theme 8: Water crisis (2/74)

Examples:

Chinese water torture has drought on tap – INDOX BEIJING (*The Australian*, 22 June, 2000)

Death by Chinese water torture (*The Australian*, 23 August, 2001)

Sub theme 9: Desertification (2/74)

Examples:

Foresters and farmers are turning China into a desert (*The Australian*, 30 January, 2002)

Chinese at mercy of desert storm (*The Australian*, 19 June, 2002)

Sub theme 10: Wildlife protection (1/74)

Examples:

Chinese cures fuel rampant wildlife trafficking (*The Australian*, 22 October, 2003)

Theme 2: Economic growth vs. environmental degradation (4/84)

Economic growth brings great harm to the environment. China's rapid economic growth and industrialization are supposed to be the greatest contribution to climate change and the world environmental degradation.

Examples:

China's growth wrecking environment: OECD (*The Australian*, 18 July, 2007)

Green vs. growth battle in Beijing (*The Australian*, 24 July, 2007)

Green GDP debate hides true social cost of China's economic growth (*The Australian*, 30 July, 2007)

It's ecology v economy, China warns (*The Australian*, 6 June 2006)

Theme 3: Political malady (6/84)

Examples:

Corruption busts Three Gorges dam (*The Australian*, 22 January, 2000)

Disaster looms, China warned (*The Australian*, 29 June, 2002)

Corruption thwarts China's clean-air laws (*SMH*, 22 August, 2006)

Scandal in China water clean-up (*The Australian*, 20 September, 2006)

Pollution facts suppressed by China (*SMH*, 5 July, 2007)

Grieving parents seek answers (*The Australian*, 19 May, 2008)




Figure 5.22: Themes under the Problematic Frame in the Long-term Coverage (2000 to 2008)

Reasoning frame 2: Causation (2/168)

Theme 1: Explanation on environmental crisis (2/2)

Massive tectonic fault line linked to Himalayas (*The Australian*, 14 May, 2008)

Graft and shonky building blamed as quake toll rises (*The Australian*, 15 May, 2008)

Reasoning frame 3: Evaluation (51/168)

Theme 1: International relationships in the environmental dimension (17/51)

Sub theme 1: Australia-China relationship (10/17)

Rudd woos China with resources – Labor will create a public/private ‘Australia Inc’ to secure China’s needs (*The Australian*, 2 July, 2004)

Uranium deal strengthens bond with China (*SMH*, 4 April, 2006)

Risks and rewards in greening of China (*The Australian*, 9 March, 2006)
PM in Chinese gas row (*The Australian*, 28 June, 2006)
Australia to benefit as Beijing becomes environmentally friendly (*The Australian*, 7 March, 2007)
Labor to push China on climate (*The Australian*, 18 April, 2007)
Rudd carbon push 'threatens China' (*The Australian*, 5 March, 2008)
Real changes in the wind as Rudd meets Chinese energy chiefs (*The Australian*, 9 April, 2008)
PM flags big battle on global emissions (*The Australian*, 10 April, 2008)
Energy alternatives offer a clean start for China-Aussie business ties (*The Australian*, 12 April, 2008)

Sub theme 2: U.S.-China relationship (1/17)

Partner China on energy, US urged (*The Australian*, 15 March, 2006)

Sub theme 3: U.S.-Australia-China relationship (4/17)

Australia could show China the way: Gore (*The Australian*, 12 September, 2006)
Rudd vows to help on US-China ties (*The Australian*, 2 April, 2008)
Australia, China and US in climate talks (*The Australian*, 15 September, 2008)
Bilateral ties will help push on climate (*The Australian*, 30 October, 2008)

Sub theme 4: Japan-China relationship (2/17)

Japan helping China to go green (*The Australian*, 9 April, 2007)
China, Japan to go green together (*The Australian*, 12 April, 2007)




Figure 5.23: Subthemes under the Theme of International Relationship in the Environmental Dimension in the pre-COP15 Long-term Coverage

Theme 2: Attitudes and actions on environmental protection (14/51)

Examples:

China slow to learn respect for environment (*SMH*, 28 May, 2001)

China refuses to cut energy use (*SMH*, 3 December, 2005)

Hu plays ball on climate change (*The Australian*, 23 June, 2005)

China drafts plan to curb emissions (*SMH*, 6 February, 2007)

China makes greener growth a priority (*SMH*, 6 March, 2007)

China thinks cleaner thoughts (*SMH*, 7 March, 2007)

China backs Kyoto as basis for greenhouse gas action (*SMH*, 7 September, 2007)

Beijing promises to turn climate strategy into a binding regime (*SMH*, 21 December, 2007)

Climate regime will bind (*SMH*, 21 December, 2007)

Booming China keen to go green (*The Australian*, 30 April, 2007)

Hu targets pollution, corruption (*The Australian*, 13 October, 2007)

China helpful on emissions (*The Australian*, 8 December, 2007)

Japan deal China's first step to emissions target (*The Australian*, 3 May, 2008)

Wong right to put off our targets (*The Australian*, 2 December, 2008)

Theme 3: Climate change negotiation (3/51)

Examples:

Emission claim from Campbell offends China (*The Australian*, 17 November, 2006)

China holds key to climate deal – Developing nations oppose energy targets – APEC 2007 (*The Australian*, 6 September, 2007)

Commit on gas cuts, Rudd urged (*SMH*, 6 December, 2007)

Theme 4: Environmental governance (17/51)

Examples:

The grass is greener when Olympic VIPs are in town (*SMH*, 21 February, 2001)

Bank warns China of environmental crisis (*SMH*, 11 August, 2001)

Officials blamed for China school flood (*The Australian*, 18 June, 2005)

Grim lessons from Harbin (*SMH*, 28 November, 2005)

China takes hard line on pollution after toxic spills (*SMH*, 8 February, 2006)

China claims forests are growing fast, too (*The Australian*, 18 July, 2007)

A tale of two disasters (*SMH*, 16 May, 2008)

Hu rushes in troops as earthquake kills over 100 (*The Australian*, 13 May, 2008)

Chinese troops rush to aid earthquake victims (*The Australian*, 13 May, 2008)

‘Grandpa Wen’ reaches out to earthquake survivors (*The Australian*, 17 May, 2008)

Beijing puts quake damage bill at \$21bn (*The Australian*, 17 May, 2008)

China bares its heart (*The Australian*, 17 May, 2008)

Foreign teams in rescue efforts (*The Australian*, 19 May, 2008)

Tears in silence as China mourns its quake victims (*The Australian*, 20 May, 2008)

China’s soft heart (*The Australian*, 23 May, 2008)

China slashes budgets to finance reconstruction after earthquake (*The Australian*, 29 May, 2008)

Forty starving earthquake survivors flown to relief camp (*The Australian*, 30 May, 2008)




Figure 5.24: Themes under the Evaluative Frame in the pre-COP15 Long-term Coverage




Figure 5.25: Tones of Themes under the Evaluative Frame in the Long-term Coverage (2000-2008)

Reasoning frame 4: Effects (6/168)

Theme 1: Dynasty extinction (1/6)

Examples:

Climate change ended dynasties in China, Mexico (*The Australian*, 8 January, 2007)

Theme 2: Threat to food supply (1/6)

Examples:

Climate change threat to China's food supply (*SMH*, 24 August, 2007)

Theme 3: Birth defects (1/6)*Examples:*

Birth defects lift with pollution (*The Australian*, 31 October, 2007)

Theme 4: Chemical costs (1/6)*Examples:*

China clean-up boosts chemical costs (*The Australian*, 8 March, 2008)

Theme 5: Economy (1/6)*Examples:*

Economy unshaken by killer quake (*The Australian*, 20 May, 2008)

Theme 6: Politics (1/6)*Examples:*

Quake that changed a nation (*The Australian*, 24 May, 2008)

Reasoning theme 5: Solutions (25/168)**Theme 1: Co-operation on environmental protection (11/25)***Examples:*

China signs up for Aussie clean coal (*The Australian*, 2 August, 2005)

China keen on Aussie company's revolutionary clean, green coal technology
(*The Australian*, 2 August, 2005)

Aussie expertise exported to make Chinese mines safer (*The Australian*, 4
April, 2006)

Australia, China join forces for clean coal push (*SMH*, 16 January, 2007)

Global swarming: locals flog eco-tech to China (*The Australian*, 7 March,
2007)

Clean coal for China vital: Downer (*The Australian*, 16 May, 2007)

Cleaning up China (*The Australian*, 22 June, 2007)

China wants gas to give it a greener tinge – APEC 2007 BUSINESS
SUMMIT (*The Australian*, 8 September, 2007)

Rudd's climate warning (*The Australian*, 12 April, 2008)

PM urges joint bid on climate (*The Australian*, 12 April, 2008)

Australia funds China clean coal (*The Australian*, 14 April, 2008)

Theme 2: Environmental measures (9/25)

Examples:

China takes steps to clear the air (*The Australian*, 23 November, 2000)

China splashes \$173bn on water (*The Australian*, 24 August, 2006)

China cracks down on big polluters (*The Australian*, 13 January, 2007)

China to get tough on green design (*The Australian*, 19 January, 2007)

China goes for green before growth (*The Australian*, 6 March, 2007)

China bans fuel from food crops (*The Australian*, 13 June, 2007)

China bins bags to cut plastic pollution (*The Australian*, 10 January, 2008)

Beijing makes room for green super-ministry (*The Australian*, 13 March, 2008)

Polluted China doles out \$50b in fuel subsidies (*SMH*, 20 June, 2008)

Theme 3: Green economy (new technologies and clean energy) (5/25)

Examples:

China partner in clean coal plant (*The Australian*, 22 February, 2006)

China pollution drive good news for coal exporters (*The Australian*, 7 March, 2007)

China is open to renewable power (*SMH*, 1 October, 2008)

Coal-fired power station construction heats up in China (*The Australian*, 17 March, 2008)

Biggest culprit turns to sun, wind – CLEAN ENERGY (*The Australian*, 11 October, 2008)




Figure 5.26: Themes under the Solutions Frame in the Long-term Coverage (2000-2008)

5.5 Lists of Figures of Comparison

There are a list of figures provided to make comparisons in order to see the differences and variation.




Figure 5.27: Comparison of Reasoning Frames




Figure 5.28: Comparison of Problematic Frames




Figure 5.29: Comparison of Evaluative Frames

Note: IR refers to International Relations




Figure 5.30: Comparison of Solutions Frames




Figure 5.31: Comparison of Subthemes of International Relationship in the Environmental Dimension




Figure 5.32: Comparison of Messengers

5.6 Summary

There are 315 news articles in total pertinent to the research. The chapter presented the findings of three cases (Olympic Games 2008, COP15 and COP 17) as well as long span covering the time from year of 2000 to 2008 of news reportage about China's environmental issues, based on principles discussed in the methodology chapter. In the next chapter, I will present the findings of in-depth interviews.

CHAPTER SIX

FINDINGS 2 – IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I present all the findings of the in-depth interviews. At the beginning (section 6.2), I briefly describe the conduct of the interviews and provide information on the interviewees, including their research area/expertise, visits to China and engagement in the foreign policy making process. Next, I display the resources for international news and news about China that the participants usually use. This attempts to discover whether the participating intermediate experts are influenced by media opinion and to what extent they might be influenced.

In the second section (6.3), I classify the findings into different categories under each question based on the transcriptions that I have completed, in order to identify dominant, secondary and idiosyncratic but noteworthy frames in the participants' minds. I assemble the findings in tables and provide some examples, selected from among the original expressions of interviewees, below the tables.

6.2 Introduction to the Interviewees' Background

In-depth interviews were conducted by me with thirteen participants (rather than with fourteen as originally anticipated), eleven of whom are scholars while two of whom are experts from the second and the third sectors. Their research covers areas of international relations (4), environmental politics (climate change politics) and climate change governance (3), climate change policy (2), economics (1), Chinese culture (1),

environmental science (1) and mass media (1). Some interviewees are engaged in multiple areas of research, so there is some overlapping in evidence.⁹⁷ Their specific research interests in relation to China include Australia-China relations, U.S.-China relations along with U.S.-Australia-China triangular relations, Australian foreign policy, contemporary Chinese policy-making, China and the world, China's environment, China's new energy, climate change negotiation, China's environmental policy, East Asia and China's trade and transformation, as well as Chinese literature and culture.

Two of the interviewees served as Australian diplomats in China. Twelve had been to China. Eleven of them are advisors to the current Australian Commonwealth government, some being official advisors to the government whilst others have personal relationships with some foreign policy makers. The foreign policy makers seek information or advice on foreign policy issues in relation to China through either private conversations with them or discussions at formal seminars or forums. I have provided below in Table 6.1 a brief introduction of dis-identified participants including their research areas and expertise, visits to China and engagement in the foreign policy-making process.

⁹⁷ For instance, some interviewees' research area covers mass media, international relations and contemporary politics.

Table 6.1: Background of the Interviewees

(Note: the codes are arranged in alphabetical order according to the first name of the interviewees)

Codes	Research areas (particular in relation to China)/expertise	Visits to China (Y/N)	Visited China around Olympics time /attended COP 15	Engagement in foreign policy making process (Y/N)
A	U.S.-China relations; China's energy security	Yes	After Olympics	No
B	Climate change politics/negotiation/policy	No		Yes
C	Climate change and energy policy/climate change politics	Yes	Attended COP15	Yes
D	Chinese policy-making; China's agriculture	Yes		Yes
E	Climate change and environmental policy	Yes	Attended COP15	Yes
F	Environmental politics/governance	No	Attended COP15	No
G	Environmental politics/governance	Yes	Attended COP15	No
H	China's environment and the world; Environmental governance	Yes	Before and after Olympics	Yes
I	Economic integration/policy; China's trade and transformation	Yes		Yes
J	Chinese culture	Yes		Yes
K	Australian relations with Asia; Media studies	Yes		Yes
L	U.S.-China relations; Australian foreign policy	Yes		Yes
M	Environmental science	Yes	Attended COP15	Yes

I asked the following three questions of them by administering a small questionnaire at the beginning of the interviews.

- (1) What are the newspapers and other resources that you rely on for international news?
- (2) What do you consider to be good sources of Chinese news?
- (3) What do you consider to be good sources of information about China's environmental issues?

The answers to three questions from participants are presented in the following table.

Table 6.2: Frequent Media (newspapers in particular) Usage by Interviewees

Co- des	Newspapers for international news	Newspapers/ good source of Chinese news	Other resources for the information about China's environmental issues
A	Washington Post; New York Times (NYT)	Email list-serves (includes articles from many different sources), blogs (Green Leap Forward, China Environmental Law)	Academic sources (e.g., books); conduct interviews in Beijing on related subjects (energy security in particular)
B	The Australian; SMH	AFR; SMH; NYT; The Guardian	Academic publications
C	The Age; AFR; Crikey; The Economist; The Guardian; NYT	The Age; Australian Financial Review (AFR); Crikey; Economist; Guardian; NYT	Chinese authority sources; academic analysis; official Chinese documents.
D	SMH; The Guardian; NYT	SMH; The Age; Chinese media (South China Morning Post; Nanfang Zhoumo; Sanlian Shenghuo Zhoukan; Cai Jing)	None
E	The Australian; AFR; SMH; The Age; NYT; Washington Post	All mixed	Material on internal sites/email distribution; Climate – L; ENB; Other sites/sources-Chinese official sites; NGOs; Think Tanks
F	SMH; The Canberra Times	SMH; The Canberra Times	SBS news; World environmental news (daily email from planet ark)
G	The Canberra Times	SMH	The Guardian; NYT
H	SMH; The British Financial Times; Washington Post; The Guardian	SMH	Halton environmental network; Chinese sources; Visit China
I	The Australian; China Daily; Japanese newspapers; The Economist	Web; International newspapers; Chinese newspapers	Web; Discussion with Chinese scholars; References to Chinese
J	The Australian; AFR;SMH; The Age;The Canberra Times; Media from U.S., UK and China	The Australian; SMH; The Age	Scholarly articles; Web groups; Chinese media (Xinhua website; Cai Jing)
K	SMH; The Age	SMH; The Age; ABC; Climate Spectator; Inside Story; Crikey (A daily email newspaper)	Washington Post; NYT; Open Democracy; Canada's Excellent Future; Publication of international and national organizations (e.g., IPCC, etc.)
L	The Australian; The Canberra Times; The Guardian; NYT; Washington Post; ABC; Economics	The Australian; SMH; The Canberra Times; Chinese media (Cai Jing; People's Dailly, Blogs)	None
M	BBC World News online	The Australian; AFR; SMH; The Age; The Monthly; The New York Review on Books	CLSA; South Asia;

6.3 Presentation of Findings

In this section, I present the answers of interviewees to each question in a sequential order. The presentation of findings is through table and examples. I summarise and abstract categories emerging from the interviewees' answers in the form of tables. Following each table, I provide some examples of interviewees' verbatim answers. The presentation of responses from interviewees is in alphabetical order.

1. What image or word picture firstly comes to your mind when you think of China as an environmental actor?

Table 6.3: Findings for Interview Question 1

Categories	Sub-categories	Codes
Environmental problems	General	
	Scale of the problem	I
	Have major environmental issues	J
	Contradictions	F
	Biggest challenge in protecting environment	E; H
	Industrialization	B
	Unsustainable development	F; H
	Terrible development history	M
	Resources depletion	
	Water crisis (Ground water resources, water in Tibetan plateau)	L
	Coal usage	L
	Pollution	
	Air pollution	D
	City pollution (urban)	A; F; L
	Polluted river	C
	Dirty	B
	Other environmental issues	
	Climate change issue (acid rain)	L
	Sand storms	L
	Desert expansion	L
	Impact on food supplies, food requirements	L
Environmental governance	Attitude	
	Attach more importance to environmental issues	J
	Take climate change problem seriously	E; K
	Have more consciousness about the problem	I
	Action	
	Play positive action on environmental protection/play its constructive role	G; J; M
	Quickly learn about the management of the problem	I
	Moving in a green direction	B
	China hasn't done well in controlling pollution	G
Global role	Not good at signing into international	K

	agreement	
	Not a good constructive participant	K
	Not coherent in international action	L
	Sensationally nationalism	K
	Global leadership in tackling climate change	G
Environmental technology/energy	Investment in renewable energy	F

Examples:

I think China is a country, which got its very major environmental issues of its own. One is because of its rapid development, it has quite negative effects on the region, then the global environment; at the same time, the country was particularly, in more recent years, it's attaching a lot of more importance to environmental issues, I think overall, on balance, it's playing positive role.

– J

I would say maybe three things. First of all, there's leadership comes to climate change; second, it hasn't done anything so well in controlling resources pollution; the third thing is that it probably could do more when it comes to plan its constructive role in global negotiations, especially climate change. – I

China is not always good at signing into international agreement. So actually I think there are two things here. China is actually taking climate change problem quite seriously, the other one is China in the international forums, is not necessarily being a good constructive participant. – D

2. What do you think of China's environmental situation during the Beijing Olympics?

Table 6.4: Findings for Interview Question 2

Categories	Sub categories	Codes
Environmental problems	Environmental problems existed	I
	Air pollution	K
Environmental management	Made efforts to improve environment (air, rain, subway, close down factories)	A; B; C; D; G; J; L; M
	Effective, but not a sustainable approach	A; C; I
Environmental politics	Environment was not a central issue, greening is part of China's national identity	H
	Unsuccessful Green Games brand	E; F

Examples:

1. *Dominant frame:* Make efforts to improve environment

Obviously, because China put enormous efforts into ensuring the environment of Beijing was good for the Olympics. It was quite good when the Olympics was on, a number of clear days. – J

2. *Secondary frame:* Chinese government adapted effective but not sustainable measures.

Obviously, they were problems to manage... Authorities had to do things to assist with resolving those problems, and that was pretty effective, that was in the short-term pretty effective. – I

3. *Tertiary frame:* Green branding and identity

The environment was not the central issue that was taking place in my view. What was really important about the Olympics was more the image of China now taking its rightful place in the world as a reemerging great power, it was all about China's national identity - and the greening is part of that. – H

3. What do you think about China's actions in the Copenhagen Conference in 2009?

Table 6.5: Findings for Interview Question 3

Categories	Sub categories	Codes
Environmental negotiation	Positive	
	Compromised quite a bit	A
	Played a huge role	G
	More ambitious than it was given credit for	F
	Lots of progress with China's participation	I
	Active engagement	E; J
	Negative	
	Didn't take the global leadership	G
	Uncooperative	A
	Unwilling to make sacrifices	F
	Unserious attitude	B
	Unambitious target	A
	Poor communication skills (little experience/unable deliver message to western media)	H; M
	High expectation of China made the failure	J; M
Environmental action	Active action	C; J; K
	Tougher standards than the US	A
Media reporting	Criticism	B
	Misunderstanding of China's action	H
	Simplify the issue	E; F; G; L; M
	Imbalanced	C
	Media have handy stereotypes	E

Examples:

1. *Dominant frame: environmental negotiation*

Obviously, China played a huge role in the Copenhagen Accord. – G

I think China was more ambitious than it was given credit for, but at the same time, I don't think China is willing to make any sacrifices to its development plans. – F

Some criticism about China is that China was very difficult to negotiate [with], they were on a bargaining position...I can understand it's unfair. They have done quite a lot to reduce the energy intensity. – C

And the Chinese were incapable of delivering alternative messages to the Western media. They didn't have the experience of a way to do that, so it was a disaster. – L

It's really interesting listening to the speeches of the leaders. Wen gave a very Chinese, almost technically taken on statistics about how much has been reduced. The Chinese say to me that you westerners are so good at talking about climate change, but so bad at doing anything. We are so good at doing things, but so bad at talking about it, because it is technocratic, statistics, it's not inspiring." – H

2. *Secondary frame: Media reporting*

I think that, certainly the Australian media, but not just Australian media, media internationally, really abused China as a scapegoat; I think that shows a lack of professionalism on the part of the journalists. – G

Pretty imbalanced. Not sending senior representatives to meet the US president looks very bad, undiplomatic, I'm quite critical on that. I don't think media had a great deal of understanding of what was actually going on in Copenhagen. – C

3. *Tertiary frame: Environmental action*

China is actually doing more in terms of cleaning up its own environment, and making serious efforts to engage the world for environment issues than most of the other major countries. – J

4. Do you think China's environmental image has changed in your mind in the last decade? If yes, can you offer more details? How has it changed?

Table 6.6: Findings for Interview Question 4

Changed	Details of how it changed	Codes
Yes	Impressive change	K
	A big change of environmental consciousness	E; J
	Governments take more active actions on environment	D; G; M
	Chinese policy positions have been made lots of progress	I; M
	Environment is better in some areas of countryside	H
	Large investment in renewable energy	C; D
	Energy security has changed; the understanding of what energy security is in China has changed.	A
	The whole position on participation in the solutions has changed	I
	Potentially much more positive terms	G
	No much perception on China's environment before, but diverse image now	B; L
	It is getting worse at the national level	H
	It is getting worse in agriculture terms	H
Not applicable		F; K

Examples:

1. *Dominant frame: Positive change*

I think they take it more seriously, I mean the central government, they take it more seriously than they used to, before the Environmental Ministry below the Ministerial ring, so that was the big change. And the renewable energy law legislation was also a pretty big step forward. – D

China's environmental effort has changed in the last decade, hugely, in geographic [terms]. It is very clear that the survival of Chinese Communist Party is threatened by the environmental degradation. It is one of the issues that are causing deep unrest, ultimately, water security, health issues, pollution, land shortage, illegal land taken, all of those issues are major threats to peace in China. And so the government feels that it needs to do something to address these issues. – M

I think it changed a lot. I think 10 years ago, when people talked about China's environment, they just talked about rapid growth leading to a sort of massive pollution, and degradation of the environment, that's all people talked about. But now, people talk about China, in potentially much more positive terms. Again, the commitment to renewable energy is the big one. – G

2. *Secondary frame: Negative change*

In agricultural terms, it's getting worse. At the national level, the Chinese environment is getting worse. It's getting even worse before it will get better, because as I said, the resources are still going into the industrialization development relative to the conservation and protection, so that's real question.

You can sort out the consumption and production to a limited extent, but you will pay the price for doing that. – H

5. How or in what way do you examine or assess China's environmental issues?

Table 6.7: Findings for Interview Question 5

Methods/aspects	Codes
See the opportunity of China to exercise a positive impact	I
The role of China plays in the global environment	G
The connection between democracy and the environment	G
Do fieldwork research	A; H
Get different perspectives	E; C; H
Access Chinese resources (policy in particular)	A; B; C; D; H; J; L; M
Access academic resources	B; C
Interact with Chinese scholars and experts	B; H
Keep comparative perspectives	D; H
Not applicable	F; K

Examples:

1. *Dominant frame: Access Chinese resources*

I try to look to the authoritative sources of data, five-year plans, short statements, behavior at conference like Copenhagen; I will use mixed official Chinese documents, searching from websites, as well as academic analysis, through Think Tanks source, environmental groups source, independent analysis of China's emissions. – C

I've always gone to China, investigated and done the fieldwork, spoken to the government people, to NGOs, to local communities, to middle class residents in Beijing, to farmers in GanSu, to really get a much broader perspective on what is happening. – H

2. *Secondary frame: Assess certain aspects*

I see rapid development of policy on the climate change issue; I see opportunities for the engagement of China in the whole problem of resolving the climate change question, as now moving faster than other countries including Australia. – I

6. Can you give me a full picture of China's environment in your mind now?

Table 6.8: Findings for Interview Question 6

Categories	Sub categories	Codes
Environmental problems	General	
	Terrible current situation	M
	A very mixed picture (extraordinary beauty and tragedy)	E; H
	A very large set of environmental issues (problems)	A; G; I; J
	Contradictions	E; F
	Environmental problems are intensive from urban communities	I
	Industrialization	B; I; L
	Unsustainable development	F
	Huge challenges in protecting environment	A
	Too much pressure from economic growth	A
	Resources depletion	
	Water crisis	A; D; J
	Water in Tibetan plateau	A
	Dirty coal mine	C
	Pollution	
	Air pollution	A; C; E; J
	Thick smoke	C
	Polluted river	C; E
	A massive polluting country	B
	Other environmental issues	
	Climate change issue (acid rain)	K
	Heavy haze	N
	Natural disasters	F
	Agriculture	F
	Desertification	A; F; J
	Land	J
	Health burden	M
Environmental governance	Chinese political system has the ability to respond to environmental issues	J
	Citizens don't have enough voice to complain about environmental problems	A
	Environmental situation requires top priority in policy making	I
	Growing public consciousness	B
	Shift to cleaning up the energy sources	M
	Put efforts and made progress	A; E
	Political constrain (should introduce democratic reform)	A; M
	Green growth plan	F
Global role	Global leadership in tackling climate change	I
Environmental technology/energy	Investment in renewable energy (technology)	C; F; H

7. What do you think about the public's perception of China as an environmental actor? Do you think public opinion towards China's environmental issues is influenced by the representation of China in the media? If yes, can you furnish me with some examples? If no, can you tell me what is the main element that influences public

opinion towards China? Do you think the Australian public's perception of China's environmental image has changed in the last decade? If yes, can you offer more details?

Table 6.9: Findings for Interview Question 7

Co-des	Public perception	Perception change (details)		Influenced by media
A	Not applicable			Not applicable
B	Wholly negative; big polluter; need more action	Not sure	None	Yes
C	Still negative associated with coal, the general development and high economic growth; big pollution; more positive image about renewable energy	Yes	Little image before, now more conscious of China's environment.	Yes
D	Negative perception	Not sure	None	Not sure
E	Negative image: large population and bad environment	Probably a little bit	Probably still negative	Yes
F	A huge emitter; negative image	Yes	Little image before, now more conscious of China's environment.	Yes
G	Doubt whether the public knows very much	Probably	None	Yes
H	A dirty image; China is doing more; cooperation with China	Yes	Chinese government is serious about environmental issues.	Not sure
I	The importance of China's impact and solution to the global environment	Yes	More conscious of China's environmental issues and impact; more understanding of environmental policy.	Media is one element
J	<i>One level:</i> Serious environmental problems; major contributor to global environmental degradation; <i>Second level:</i> Active action on environment; Sino-Australian cooperation on climate change; play a leading role in green technologies	Yes	Little image before, now more conscious of China's environment.	Yes (almost entirely governed by media)
K	<i>One side:</i> China is not an active actor on global warming; <i>The other side:</i> China is doing quite a lot.	Yes	Little image before, now more conscious of China's environment.	Maybe (the public have a range of views about China)
L	Environmental problems	Yes	Little image before,	Yes

	(city pollution, air pollution, polluted river)		now more conscious of China's environment.	
M	Badly polluted; China is doing more on environment; no sophisticated understanding of China's environmental situation	Yes	Little image before, now more conscious of China's environment.	Yes (totally)

8. What images or word pictures of China as an environmental actor are used by the different newspapers you read?

Table 6.10: Findings for Interview Question 8

Codes	Newspapers	Images or Pictures
A	NYT	China's new energy and technologies are more efficient. China adopts solar panels
B	The Australian	China is not playing its role; China should do more; China builds up coal fire plants every year
C	The Age	China is a responsible actor on climate change; take more actions to reduce emission; a good environmental actor
D	SMH	Fairly balanced; stories about China's pollution
E	Not applicable	Not applicable
F	SMH	Smoke and coal power plant
G	NYT; The Guardian	More complex stories about China; look at both positive and negative sides about China's environment
H	Not applicable	Don't reply on newspaper
I	Not applicable	Haven't got particular views from any particular outlets
J ⁹⁸	The Australian; SMH	Big, huge, massive; Truculent, stubborn, unhelpful; less negative now.
K	SMH; The Age Commercial media The Australian	Have a good range of perspectives; Have more negative stereotypes; Conservative, has anti-China mind on environmental issues
L ⁹⁹	The Australian; NYT	Bad news dominant
M ¹⁰⁰	The Australian; SMH	Extinct species; climate change issue; human right like environmentalists in jail; coal mining accidents; recycling

9. How are you influenced by the way in which the media, that you consume, frames Chinese environmental stories? Does your perception or judgment on China's environment heavily rely on media's representation or not?

Table 6.11: Findings for Interview Question 9

⁹⁸ Interviewee J didn't mention specific newspapers when describing the words or pictures. I added these two newspapers in terms of the regular newspapers that he/she reads for environmental news of China (see table 6.2).

⁹⁹ The same as above.

¹⁰⁰ The same as above.

Codes	Media influence	How
A	Not much	One source
B	Not much	One source
C	Not influenced	
D	Not influenced	
E	Not influenced	
F	Not influenced	
G	Not influenced	
H	Not influenced	
I	Not much	One source
J	Not influenced	
K	Not much	One source
L	Not much	One source
M	Not influenced	

10. What do you think the media's role is in the foreign policy making process? When you are engaged in foreign policy discourses about China, will your opinions be based on mediated frames? If yes, how much do you rely on media frames? Can you give some examples? If no, can you explain why?

Table 6.12: Findings for Interview Question 10

Codes	Media's role in foreign policy making process	Mediated frames influence
A	Not applicable	Not applicable
B	Play little role in foreign policy position except security and high visible issues, climate change included	Get stories from newspapers, but not rely on mediated frames.
C	Fairly minimal; Media ensure of providing services to the Australians	Little influence
D	Quite influential; Policy makers are concerned about the effect of media reporting	Little influence
E	Issues such as human rights, environmental issues, the media are crucially important	Little influence; Policy makers are influenced
F	Little influence as the public show little interest in most of the foreign policy issues	No engagement
G	Ideally to inform the public debate; Policy makers are concerned about the effect of media	Little influence
H	Policy makers are concerned about the effect of media	Little influence; invite media to debates
I	A vehicle for the representation of the views	Little influence
J	Play a major role – one source of information; Policy makers are concerned about the effect of media	Little influence
K	Media reporting urges more action of government	Get stories from newspapers, but not rely on mediated frames.
L	Inform and comment; Policy makers are concerned about the effect of media	Little influence

M	Play an important role – shape public opinion	Little influence
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Examples:

Department of Foreign Affairs has to spend lots of time every day looking at what the stories running in the media. Their foreign policy impact, working on what questions they are being asked in the question time in the parliament, that day coming up with suggested responses for the ministers may give these questions are asked in the parliament. – J

Go through the press cuttings on all the press every day to see what people were saying about foreign policy or event services. – L

11. What is your suggestion about how the media should represent China’s environmental issues? In another words, what is your suggestion about how the media should reframe China’s environmental image in order to increase foreign policy options?

Table 6.13: Findings for Interview Question 11

Suggestions	Codes
Have more diverse reporting and varieties of perspectives (people, different environmental practices in China; solution; new technology and Sino-Australian cooperation).	B; D; H; J; K; L
Provide more context and balance.	C
Reflect debates on foreign policy issues.	B; H
Get first-hand interviews from China.	G
Chinese specialists engage in Australian media.	I
Improve expertise in environmental area.	F
Use internet.	M
Australian media do not just focus on China’s environmental problems, but also focus on the transparency issue/China should have transparency for the foreign media.	A; E

Examples:

1. Dominant frame: Have more diverse reporting and varieties of perspectives

As for Australia’s media, it should of course continue to report on China’s serious environmental and ecological problems, but also carry more information on what China is doing to solve both its own problems in this area, and where it is contributing to regional or global environmental issue. More emphasis should be put on China's very active development of new green technologies, and areas where Australia and China have been cooperating on such questions. – J

It is really interesting to have wide perspectives of people, and bring those perspectives to the public, and then the public decides and makes their own minds about these things. – H

They need to have bit more variety and stop viewing China as one thing, that's not enough, because as you know, there are lots of different environmental practices from different parts of China, and different economic models in different parts of China. – D

2. *Secondary frame*: Reflect debates on foreign policy issues

We have to debate the foreign policies; the media should try to reflect as much as possible, and try to do a bit more investigation about what's actually happening beyond the lobby group tells us. – B

3. *Tertiary frame*: Chinese specialists engage in Australian media ¹⁰¹

My answer to the question is that it's important for Chinese analysts, we do lots of work together with Chinese specialists here including climate change in the environmental area for them to be actively engaged in Australia that was made opportunity for them to talk on Australian TV, to write articles in the Australian newspaper. – I

12. What do you think the weight of environmental negotiations is in the triangular relationship between Australia, the U.S. and China?

Table 6.14: Findings for Interview Question 12

Opinions	Codes
Sino-Australian cooperation can bring the US into a global agreement.	I
Environmental issues play a greater role in the triangular relationship especially on cooperation.	A; C; E; F; H; J
Clean technologies can contribute to the change of the triangular relationship.	B
It becomes a security issue in the triangular relationship.	D
Environment is concerned after trade (economy) and security issues.	G; L
China-European partnership will be better.	M
It is difficult.	K

Examples:

1. *Dominant frame*: Environment plays a greater role in the triangular relationship especially on cooperation.

I think one of the strategies that America is now looking to follow with China is identifying global issues, where the U.S., China and other countries can cooperate, rather than just looking purely at bilateral issues. And obviously,

¹⁰¹ I select only one example in the idiosyncratic frames, which I think it is a valuable point for the Chinese side.

from Australia's point of view, we think that's good, because we'd like to see better relations between China and the U.S., these issues we are also very concerned with, so I think in the future, environmental issues probably play a greater role in this triangular relationship, you know, the area that we can all agree on. – J

2. *Secondary frame*: Environment concerns come after trade (economy) and security issues.

I think it deserves a more that we get, but obviously most people would say security comes first, economy comes second, and environment comes third, you can say, well, global warming is a security issue, but people are still slow to accept that, until it a big enough issue in the international diplomacy. – L

3. *Tertiary frame*: Sino-Australian cooperation can bring the U.S. into a global agreement.¹⁰²

I think it's particularly important for Australia to work with China in the context of bringing the U.S. into a global agreement because if China can push ahead with sets of policy strategies will lead it to be able to commit to a global agreement to make sense, and Australia can work with China doing that, and other countries in the region can work with China doing that, that would help to bring the U.S. to the party. So I see Australia is working with China on this as an important to global outcome on the climate change issue. – I

13. What do you think of the future of Australia-China relations?

Table 6.15: Findings for Interview Question 13

Opinions	Codes
Becoming increasingly tied (trade and migration)	B; C; D; E; F; J
Consider how to move into a broader round of engagement with China	H
Focus on the bilateral relationship between the two countries in the future	I
Chinese environmental NGOs will more cooperate with Australian NGOs	M
Positive, but there are lots of unknown things underneath.	K
Depends on the U.S.-China relations	L
It is going to be difficult in general	A
An increasing tension in regard to climate change	C
Hard to predict	G

Examples:

1. *Dominant frame*: Becoming increasingly tied

¹⁰² I select only one idiosyncratic frame as example.

If we are serious about what our future is, it irrevocably ties up with the future of China, we need to be put really major efforts both in these major intellectual and government level, to work out how to build on this relationship. – J

I mean our economy is so dependent on what's going on in China, most about our resources export going there, so ultimately, our prosperity is dependent on China, certainly, under any government, whether under Liberal or Labor leadership, would be interested in maintaining good relationship with China, just for that economic factor. – F

2. *Secondary frames:*

1) Consider moving into a broader round engagement with China.

Australia-China relationship is essentially about economic relations. Historically, there is a huge comparative advantage in that. The problem is that China's growth and development and the powers that come with that means that you are getting shifts in the regional context, and Australia has to respond to those shifts, and position itself accordingly, and [the] economy won't be enough to do that, getting the trade right – enough to do that – even in the economic area, it's very challenging too, Chinese investment in Australia, so it's really the politics now and the challenge, it's working in the political round, diplomatic round, and security round, so the question is 'how smoothly we are going to move in to that broader round of engagement with China, what are our strategies, what are our policies, what are our approaches to doing that, and how do these correlate with our ongoing relationship with the U.S., lots of thinking that's needed to be done. – H

2) Positive, but there are lots of unknown things underneath

It's very positive. But many things can go wrong, if the economy is collapsed in China, if there is terrible human rights event, like 1989; There are more and more Chinese investment in Australia, if Chinese foreign investment has something wrong.

There are lots of unknown things. China is always going to be important to Australia from now on, it has been important for a long time. – K

3) Depends on U.S.-China relations

I don't have any real problems I can foresee. I think it will depend on a lot on the U.S.-China relations. Not totally comfortable with U.S.-China relations at the moment from both sides. We will be switched between the two. Now we play our cards well, we can in fact help both sides, particularly both sides. – L

4) An increasing tension in relation to climate change

China is absolutely the largest carbon emitter, now they are going to grow in the future. The emission grows, the climate change impact worsens. Australia is a vulnerable country, I think that will become an increasing sort of tension between the two countries, particularly among the Australian population, it increasingly sees China as a sort of climate change problem. – C

6.4 Summary

The findings of the in-depth interviews have been reported in this chapter. They will be used for the discussion of research questions 3 and 4. Three questions in the in-depth interviews (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5, and Q6) are useful for research question 3, which is about the discovery of individuals' frames of China's environmental image. Questions Q7, Q8, Q9, and Q10 are useful for the analysis of the effects of media discourse on these intermediate experts and the public, which can provide some insights for the Chinese soft power and public diplomacy in Australia (Research question 4) particularly towards these intermediate experts. Question 11 provides some suggestions from these experts on the reframing of China's environmental image by the Australian media in order to increase foreign policy options (Research question 4). The last two questions of the in-depth interviews reflect the perspectives on the U.S.-Australia-China triangular relationship and the Australia-China relationship, which provides insights for research question 5.

CHAPTER SEVEN

DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS

7.1 Introduction

This chapter consists of discussion and conclusions. I discuss the findings in terms of each research question in section 7.2. I firstly discuss how the two Australian newspapers frame China's environmental issues in section 7.2.1 by analysing three framing structures in each case and the nine-year period coverage. In the thematic structures, the discussion begins with the analysis of reasoning frames to investigate the dominant reasoning frames. Under each reasoning frame, I find out the main themes (dominant frames) and secondary themes through analysing the percentages of each frame. The script and the rhetorical structures are briefly discussed in this question. In section 7.2.2, I summarise the images including generic frames and issue-specific frames portrayed by the two newspapers. Section 7.2.3 uncovers the environmental images of China in the individuals' minds as well as comparing the frames in the news and in the individuals' minds. I explore whether the Chinese dominant discourse on China's soft power strategy and the Australian social discourse on China's environmental image match each other, and point out the problems existing in China's soft power strategy for the public diplomacy in the western context in section 7.2.4. I propose a conceptual framework for the evaluation of environmental image in the international context in section 7.2.5.

In section 7.3, I demonstrate how my propositions have been addressed, identify any shortcomings in the method, identify the significance in

relation to the field and the diplomatic policy communities of Australia and China and make suggestions for future research.

7.2 Discussion

7.2.1 Discussion Corresponding to Research Question 1

Question 1: How do Australian print media frame China's environmental image?

- (1) What are the dominant frames of China's environmental image portrayed by the two Australian newspapers?
- (2) What are the frames of China's environmental image that are missing in the two Australian newspapers?

7.2.1.1 Thematic Structures Analysis

1. Reasoning themes analysis

Three cases and the pre-COP 15 reportage show different adoption of reasoning themes (frames) in the two newspapers – *The Australian* and *SMH*. In the reportage of the Olympic Games in 2008 and Durban Climate Change Conference (COP17) in 2011, there are four reasoning themes presented by the two newspapers while the causation theme is excluded and the coverage in the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (COP15) in 2009 contains five reasoning themes. Nevertheless, the causation theme only occupies one per cent of all the coverage. In the pre-COP15 long-term reportage, five reasoning themes are covered, but as with the COP15 reporting pattern, the causation theme only accounts for one per cent.

The portions of each reasoning frame are differently distributed in the three cases and the pre-COP15 long-term reporting is exceedingly unbalanced as well. From figure 5.1 presented in the findings chapter, it can be seen that the dominant frame in the reportage of Beijing Olympic Games are *problems* (N=15, P=37% of all the reasoning frames), respectively followed by frames of *evaluation* (N=12, P= 29%), *solutions* (N=11, P= 27%) and

effects (N=3, P=7%). Figure 5.7 shows that the frame of *evaluation* dominates the reportage of COP15 (N=54; P=70%). The frames of *solutions*, *effects*, *problems* and *causation* respectively account for 10 per cent (N=8), 10 per cent (N=8), eight per cent (N= 6) and one per cent (N=1). Regarding COP17, figure 5.14 illustrates that the dominant frame is also *evaluation* (N=16, P=55%), then successively followed by the frames of *solutions* (N=7, P= 24%), *problems* (N=4, P=14%) and *effects* (N=2, P=7%). In the pre-COP 15 long-term coverage, figure 5.21 shows that the problematic frame holds the absolute dominant position (N=84, P=50%), then the sequence of frames from high to low visibility is respectively *evaluation* (N= 51, P=30%), *solutions* (N= 25, P=15%), *effects* (N= 6, P=4%) and *causation* (N=2, P=1%).

From the percentages listed above (also see fig. 5.27), it can be seen that the dominant frame overall is the *evaluative frame* (184 points in the percentage in total). Evaluation is the most salient frame in the reportage about UN climate change conferences (COP15 – 70%, COP17 – 55% respectively). In the case of the Beijing Olympic Games and the pre-COP 15 long-term reporting, the evaluative frame stands in the second position (29% and 30% respectively). The *problematic frame* is secondly weighted in the available data (109 point in the percentage in total). The portion of the problematic frame in the reporting of sports event is dominant, with eight per cent higher than the evaluative frame (37% vs.29%). In the pre-COP 15 long-term reporting of the environment, problematic frame is an absolutely dominant reasoning frame among the five, accounting for as much as half of the reportage. The tertiary frame is *solutions* (76 points in the percentage in total). The solutions frame holds the second place in the reporting of UN climate change conferences, although the portions (COP15 –10%, COP17 – 24% respectively) are far lower than the evaluative frame. Apart from causal frame, the *effects frame* is the least used frame (28 points in the percentage in total), which respectively possesses seven per cent, 10 per cent, seven per cent and four per cent in the coverage of three cases and pre-COP 15 reportage.

The *evaluative frame* is supposed to be the most influential element in the news discourse to shape the public perceptions and influence foreign policy options or preferences. The judgment contains the valence attributes namely positive and negative tones, which contribute to the formation of positive image and negative image. It is noted that, in the reporting of two UN climate change conferences, the two Australian newspapers (*The Australian* and *SMH*) showed the greatest interest in the evaluation of China's attitudes and actions on climate change negotiation in the domain of climate change politics. As climate change politics in the international stage tightly relate to a country's national interest, media discourse easily inclines toward making moral judgments about other countries' environmental situations including policy conditions, actions and so on so forth.

Before COP 15, China did not receive intensive attention about climate change issues until 2007 (Wu, 2009), so the *problematic frame* was the most highly adopted frame in the news discourse; the same was true in the reporting on the Olympic Games. The existing environmental problems were intensively exposed to the audiences especially domestic athletes and the public due to their concerns about the environmental situation in the host country. The representation of environmental problems depicts negative pictures for the information receivers, which contributes to the formation of a negative environmental image in the public's minds. The *solutions* frame is weighted at the middle level in the coverage (second frame in the two COPs reporting while third frame in the Olympic Games reporting). It is more salient than problematic frame in the reporting of climate change politics, which connotes that media discourse tends to investigate solutions to the environmental problems rather than discuss the problem itself. The presentation of the effects in relation to a result or consequence of an issue or action, could also contribute to the comprehension of the issue by the receivers. Nevertheless the *effects frame* gained low visibility in the overall coverage of the two Australian newspapers. The *causation frame* is a missing frame in the news discourse

in relation to the reporting of China's environment in the two Australian newspapers. Causal diagnosis normally provides audiences with a comprehensive understanding of the whole issue, helps them to understand the responsible subjects of the issue and to make judgments on the issue on their own. In the foreign policy- making process, causal diagnosis provides a broader framework and perspectives for possible policy options.

2. Thematic analysis under each reasoning theme

The presentation of the analysis in this section follows the sequences: the vertical axis follows the sequences of three cases and the pre-COP 15 long-term reporting, while the horizontal axis follows the weight of reasoning themes in the overall coverage (from high to low).

1) Themes under the evaluative frame

The themes under the evaluative frame are various in different cases. The evaluative frame in the Olympic Games reporting covers two main themes (see fig.5.3): 'evaluation on environmental governance' (N=1, P=8% of all themes under evaluative frame) and 'evaluation on environmental situation' (N=11, P=92%). In the frame of the governance evaluation, the media referred to the difficulties that the government faced when dealing with the environmental problems, and made their judgment on the efforts that the government made and the outcomes that it had achieved. The two Australian newspapers evaluated China's efforts made for the Olympics as a host country in the aspect of environment by intensively employing the athletes' concerns and views on China's environmental situation. Figure 5.4 reveals that the tones of the themes under the evaluative frame are negativity dominant (negative tone – 92% vs. positive tone – 8%).

Concerning the evaluative frame in the reporting of the two COPs, they had a more complicated construction than in the case of Beijing Olympic Games and they shared the same themes. Reviewing the themes that emerged from the coverage of the two COPs, figure 5.10 and 5.17 reveal that the two

Australian newspapers inclined to focus on the themes of the international relationships between three countries principally – Australia, China and the U.S. in the environmental dimension (COP15 – N= 18, P= 33%; COP17 – N=3, P=19% of all the themes under the evaluative frame), of the attitudes or actions on climate change that China has (COP15 – N= 14, P=26%; COP17 – N=8, P=50%), climate change negotiation (COP15 – N= 16, P=30%; COP17 – N=2, P=12%) and the responsibility in tackling climate change (COP15 – N= 6, P=11%; COP17 – N=3, P=19%). The themes under the evaluative frame reflect that the news discourse represented by the two Australian newspapers is concerned with the other countries' (particularly China and the U.S.) orientation and decision on a new climate change treaty before and at the two UN climate change conferences, which could influence Australia's decision and action on the climate change agreement, as well as the effects on Australian foreign relations with the two superpowers (the U.S. and China) in the process of climate change negotiation.

China is one of the key players and its attitudes and actions on climate change therefore drew a great deal of media attention in relation to the reporting of the two COPs, which is considered as the main theme in the matter of climate change politics. Figure 5.10 shows that there was 26 per cent of the evaluative frame (14 news articles) relating to China's attitudes and action on climate change in the reporting of COP15, whilst figure 5.17 shows that there was 50 per cent of the evaluative frame (eight news articles), with the largest proportion compared with other secondary frames under evaluative frames) in the case of COP17. Examining the coverage of COP15 relating to this sub theme, it can be seen that all the coverage was released before the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference and the tone of the coverage was positive (N=12, P=93% positive coverage of all the coverage of this sub theme) (e.g., Chinese energy is greener than ours, *The Australian*, 27 July, 2009; praise for China and Japan on emissions, *The Australian*, 24 September, 2009). The two Australian newspapers expressed positive views and high anticipation about China's stance and action on taking its leadership in reducing carbon emission prior to COP15.

Nevertheless, the media discourse about China's action on climate change was promptly converted to a more complicated discourse before the Durban climate change conference due to the unfavourable outcome of COP15. The reporting theme about China's attitude and action on climate change was mostly released before the conference (88 per cent of the reportage), but as opposed to the coverage of COP15, it reflected two-sided views on China's attitude and action on climate change – both China's positive move (e.g., China set to take lead on emissions from West, *SMH*, 4 August, 2011) and negative inaction (e.g., Let's bust the furphy of China's inaction on emissions, *The Australian*, 1 April, 2011; China's delay in setting emissions target consigned Rudd's plan to failure, *SMH*, 1 September, 2011). What is more, it covered one piece of news giving an account of Chinese sceptics' perspective on global warming (e.g., Chinese sceptics see global warming as US conspiracy, *SMH*, 8 October, 2011), which discloses the oppositional voice in China in relation to dealing with the climate change issue.

The theme of international relations in the environmental dimension is the secondary theme under the evaluative frame. Figure 5.9 reveals that the two Australian broadsheets afforded a great attention to including the Sino-American relationship (N=11, P=61% of theme 1), Sino-Australian relationship (N=4, P=22%) as well as the triangular relationship between the U.S., Australia and China (N=1, P=6%) in relation to climate change issues. The two newspapers even showed their estimation on a potential new world order constructed under the climate change politics (N=2, P=11%). By contrast, COP17 received much less attention about foreign relations in the two newspapers. Figure 5.16 shows that there was only one news article that claimed for Australia a clear option in the triangular relationship (N=1, P=33%) and two news articles were concerned about Australia-China relationship in the environmental dimension (N=2, P=67%). And the judgment on the international relationship in the COP17 reporting was not as strong as that in the coverage of COP15. It incorporated judgmental views on the manner in which Australia is dealing

with its relationship with China and about the triangular relationship of the three countries.

The tertiary theme under the evaluative frame is categorised as 'climate change negotiation'. The main aim of the United Nations climate change conferences is to reach an agreement through multilateral discussion, so the coverage about negotiation is normally on-site reporting (COP15 – P= 56% of on-site reporting, 31% of the reportage in relation to negotiation was released right after the conference; COP17 – P=100%). The negotiation theme is heavily weighted in the reporting of COP15 (P=30% of overall evaluative themes), while least weighted in the case of COP17 (P=12%). The negotiation theme contains the most negative tone among other themes under evaluative frame. In the negotiation process at the two COPs, China gained very low credibility as one of the key actors from the two Australian newspapers. The newspapers critically identified the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference as a total failure and ascribed the failure to China's inaction and non-cooperation. Compared with the pre-conference reporting about China's attitude and action on the climate change issue, the media discourse was dramatically dashed to the ground from the original high expectation of China's active participation in global affairs. Some editorials and features showed very incisive opinions on China's disappointing action at COP15. The lexical choices in news titles (e.g., steal, dampen, tactics, stonewall, hypocrisy) reflected the outrage, disappointment and discontent with the outcome of COP15 in the Australian media discourse. The Durban Conference was warily reported without great optimism at the pre-conference stage, so there was no intensive critical reportage about the negotiation process at COP17. There were two news articles expressing pessimistic views on the negotiation of the climate deal. Moreover, the reporting about Durban negotiations did not provide specific negative comments on China's action.

The last theme under the evaluative frame vis-à-vis climate change politics relates to the matter of responsibility in handling this transnational issue

between developed countries and developing countries. Apparently, two Australian broadsheets urged China to undertake responsibility and leadership in tackling the climate change issue on the international stage, as China is responsible for the largest volume of carbon emissions in the world (e.g., China must be part of the Copenhagen solution, *The Australian*, 14 December, 2009), as well as being suspected of not playing fair. (e.g., Will China play ball? *The Australian*, 17 November, 2009). The discussion about China's responsibility in the reporting of COP17 is similar to that in the COP15. The news discourse on the theme of responsibility in the two Australian newspapers shows that it has been clearly identified that China should take leadership in manipulating the climate change issue as a primary international actor, so they are concerned about China's obligation to take measures for climate change and its willingness in engaging in climate change affairs.

In the pre-COP 15 long-term reporting, the evaluative frame contains four themes – international relationships in the environmental dimension (N=17, P=33% of all the themes under the evaluative frame), environmental governance (N=17, P=33%), attitudes and actions on environmental protection (N=14, P=28%) and climate change negotiation (N=3, P=6%). It shared three common evaluative themes with the COPs reporting.

Concerning the dominant theme of international relationships, the main focus remains very similar to the COPs reporting, mainly on Australia-China relationships (N=10, P=59% of the theme 1), U.S.-China relationship (N=1, P=6%), U.S.-Australia-China triangular relationship (N=4, P=24%) (see fig.5.23). Japan-China relationships in the environmental aspect (N=2, P=12%) were given visibility in April in 2007. Figure 5.23 demonstrates that the theme of Sino-Australian relationship gains most weight among the four themes. The news discourse about these two countries' ties was limited to trade and commerce, particularly trade in energy resources between the two countries, excluding climate change politics. The news discourse in relation to the triangular relationship among these three countries ranks second,

showing that Australia was making efforts to play a bridging role in pushing the U.S. and China to cooperate on the climate change challenge. This reflects Australia's foreign policy of aiming at acting as 'middle power' in world politics to help with U.S.-China ties. It is noted that there was a positive view about Australia's role in weaving a trilateral dialogue on resolving global issues, such as climate change, before COPs.

The theme of 'environmental governance' shares the same percentage as the theme in relation to international relationship. It is a new theme that diverges from the themes of the two COPs – that appears in the reporting of the Olympic Games (N=1, P=8%). The COP reporting raised concerns about the question of responsibility. As explained in the findings chapter, environmental governance is associated with government policy and practice of handling domestic environmental issues. In the pre-COP15 long-term reporting, the newspapers were concerned about the government's ability to cope with environmental crises. The reporting contained issues in relation to floods (2005), toxic crises (2005) and earthquakes (2008). The reporting about environmental crises was focused on the government's measures of handling emergencies. In journalistic practice, it is common that the media is concerned with government reaction on the crisis and to evaluate government efficiency in handling the crisis. The reporting of Japan's tsunami in 2011 is a very good example.

The theme of 'attitudes and actions on environmental protection' is the secondary theme under the evaluative frame in the long-term coverage. The reportage in relation to this theme dramatically increased in 2007 (N=9, P=64%). Before 2007, the news discourse presented China's inactive stance in environmental mitigation (e.g., China refuses to cut energy use, *SMH*, 3 December, 2005). By contrast, in 2007, the overall reportage shows that China, as the second largest carbon emitter, reacted on dealing with the climate change issue and reduced carbon emission (e.g., Booming China keen to go green, *The Australian*, 30 April, 2007).

The last theme of ‘climate change negotiation’ in the pre-COP 15 long-term reporting receives the least emphasis, referring to negotiations at the UN climate change conference in 2006, at UN climate change talks in Bali and the APEC meeting in 2007. The coverage of these international conferences on climate change negotiation is much less than the reporting in relation to COP15 and COP17, which indicates that climate change negotiations received intensive attention on the world stage after COP15.

2) Themes under the problematic frame

As analysed in the first section of this chapter, the *problematic frame* is the secondary frame among the five reasoning frames. This frame accounts for the biggest proportion of the pre-COP 15 long-term reporting and the Olympic Games. Figure 5.22 reveals that, in the pre-COP15 long-term reporting, the problematic frame contains themes of environmental issues (N=74, P=88% of all the themes under the problematic frame), political malady (N=6, P=7%) and environmental growth vs. environmental degradation (N=4, P=5%), sharing the same two themes – environmental issues and political malady – with the Olympic Games reporting (N=14, P=93%; N=1, P=7%) (see fig.5.2) as well as the COP15 reporting (N=3, P=50%; N=2, P=33%) (see fig.5.8). There is a different theme in the COP15 reportage, which is categorised as ‘environmental threat’ (N=1, P=17%). The reporting of COP17 is relatively simple, which only covers the theme of environmental issues (N=4, P=100%) (see fig.5.15).

As we can see from the analysis above, the theme of ‘environmental issues’ is the dominant theme under the problematic frame. Figure 5.2 shows that the theme of environmental issues in the reportage of the Olympic Games covers issues of pollution (N=9, P=64% of theme one of environmental issues), weather (N=3, P=21%) and traffic congestion (N=2, P=14%). The Olympic Games is an international public *sports event* (Cull, 2009), normally the foreign public and media are more concerned about the circumstances in relation to the quality of both the internal and external environment and facilities that the host country provides; hence, the media always criticises

air and water quality, weather and traffic before the event in order to urge the host country to improve environmental conditions for the athletes. Since Beijing was notorious for its pollution, especially air pollution and water pollution, the pollution theme gained considerable visibility in the reporting of the Olympics. The environmental issues represented by the media in relation to COP15 covered global warming (N=1, P=33%), water crisis (N=1, P=33%) and energy (N=1, P=33%) (see fig.5.8); figure 5.15 reveals that it covered issues of carbon emission (N=2, P=50%) and energy (N=2, P=50%) in the reporting of COP17. Compared with other reasoning frames, the *problematic frame* relating to the two UN climate change conferences is obviously of less salience (see fig.5.28). The themes in the reporting of these two COPs were mainly about issues of ‘global warming’ and ‘energy demand’, which were directly related to the orientation of the UN climate change conferences to reaching certain consensus on the resolution of climate change issues.

With respect to pre-COP15 long-term reporting, the coverage of environmental issues contained various issues including catastrophe (N=34, P=46%), energy (N=9, 12%), pollution (N=7, P=9%), biodiversity (N=6, P=8%), dam (N=5, P=7%), carbon emission (N=4, P=5%), nuclear (N=4, P=5%), water crisis (N=2, 3%), desertification (N=2, P=3%) and wildlife protection (N=1, P=1%) (see fig.5.22). It can be seen that energy is the most common environmental issue that concerns the media, followed by pollution, carbon emission, water crisis and global warming. The most noticeable environmental issue in these 11 years is catastrophe, which covered natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, gas leaks, landslides, water pollution, and mining accidents. In journalistic practice, catastrophe has a few characteristics of news value such as negativity, element of surprise – so the disaster itself easily captures media attention. Moreover, as mentioned in the methodology chapter, disaster is one of the six priorities of environment stressed by the United Nations Environmental Programme. It demonstrates that the media show great concern about these hot issues in the world environmental politics domain. As discussed in the evaluative frame, the

government management of crises is a major concern in crisis reporting, hence, that is an area that the governments can work on in order to improve their images for foreign publics via the foreign media.

The theme of ‘political malady’ is the secondary theme under the problematic frame. Polity is the fundamental divergence between China and the western democracies at an ideological level. China is still recognised as a modern authoritarian regime by western liberal democracies, so the polity of China is always a target that the media throws criticism at. Many problems and outcomes are sometimes simply ascribed to China’s political system. Political malady refers to a series of serious political problems including corruption and lack of transparency emerging from the political system. The overall number of news articles themed ‘political malady’ is indeed small – Olympic Games (N=1, P=7% of theme of environmental problems), COP15 (N=2, P=33%), pre-COP15 long-term coverage (N=6, P=7%). However, the political problem of China is mentioned frequently in the Australian news discourse, normally embedded in the news, intermingled with other news stories, either put as causation in the analysis of the problems and outcomes, or an evaluative element that the media uses to make judgments.

Regarding the other two themes under the problematic frame, it reflects the consensus in the media discourse that China faces the contradiction of economic growth and environmental mitigation. The reportage in 2006 and 2007 shows the intensive focus on this theme in the Australian media discourse (e.g., It’s ecology vs economy, China warns, *The Australian*, 6 June, 2006; Green vs. growth battle in Beijing, *The Australian*, 24 July, 2007). In respect to the theme of environmental threat, the review, titled “Green or yellow, peril refuses to go away” (*The Australian*, 10 October, 2009), composed by an Australian-based expert, shows that China is considered as a threat to the world environment due to the problem of China’s rapid industrialisation and environmental degradation.

Figure 5.28 reveals that concerns about China's environmental problems were not evenly distributed. The media paid attention to the pollution, weather and traffic during the Olympic Games. The media had different concerns about China's environmental problems during the two COPs. The coverage during COP17 was less diverse but focused on energy and carbon emission. In the long-term general coverage, catastrophe was salient in the media agenda. Overall, China's environmental problems in relation to energy, political malady, pollution, carbon emission and water are the commonly concerned problems in the Australian media agenda.

3) Themes under the solutions frame

The last common thematic frame of these three cases is solutions. Figure 5.5 reveals that the reporting in relation to the Olympic Games covered themes of environmental measures (N=10, P=91% of all the themes under solutions frame) as well as cooperation on climate change and clean energy technologies (N=1, P=9%), under the solutions frame. In the theme of environmental measures, the coverage contained two specific bans, namely the car ban (N=9, P=90% of the subtheme of environmental measures) and the smoking ban (N=1, P=10%). The two Australian newspapers gave favourable attention to the measure of 'car ban'¹⁰³, which was a vital measure taken by the government to alleviate traffic pressure and mitigate air pollution. And what is more, 'car ban' was temporary and obligatory, so it aroused controversy of its efficiency and validity in the media. The smoking ban was interpreted in one article in *The Australian* (18 June, 2008). Regarding the cooperative theme, there is one article expressing an idea of the cooperation on climate change and clean energy technologies between these two countries due to the increasing environmental independence between Australia and China under the reality that China has become the largest energy exporter to Australia.

¹⁰³ Chinese government implemented temporary car ban in order to mitigate traffic jam and improve air quality during the Olympics. It regulated that vehicles with even and odd number plates had to run on alternate days on Beijing's road from 20 July to 20 September 2008. From 'The Official Website of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games' <http://en.beijing2008.cn/news/olympiccities/beijing/n214464001.shtml>.

In the reportage of the two COPs, the solutions frame shares the same themes – ‘green economy’ (new technologies and clean energy) (COP15 – N=6, P=75%; COP17 – N=6, P=86%), which is the main subject discussed under the solutions frame, and the theme of ‘cooperation’ on climate change (COP15 – N=1, P=12.5%; COP17 – N=1, P=14%) (see fig.5.12 and fig.5.19). There is one news article in relation to new policies in *The Australian* titled “Seven proven policies that will help build a cleaner planet” (6 July, 2009), the core idea of which was promoting seven proven policies that all countries in the world should follow and that the COP15 should scale up these policies. The pre-COP15 long-term reporting covered themes of co-operation on environmental protection (N=11, P=44%), environmental measures (N=9, P=36%) and green economy (new technologies and clean energy) (N=5, P=20%). Figure 5.30 shows that the ‘cooperation’ theme was covered in all the reportage. The pre-COP15 coverage had the largest portion. The development of a green economy (new technologies and clean energy) was salient during the two COPs and the percentage increasingly raised up from 2000 to 2011. The theme of environmental measures had the largest percentage in the reporting of Beijing Olympic Games, which proves that media are concerned with environmental measures for the mitigation of environmental problems in the host country in the GMEs.

4) Themes under frames of effects and causation

The two least-used reasoning frames are effects and causation. In the pre-COP15 long-term reporting, the themes in relation to outcomes or consequences led by environmental degradation include ‘dynasty extinction’, ‘threat to food supply’, ‘birth defects’, ‘chemical costs’, ‘economy’ and ‘politics’. In the reporting of the Olympic Games, the effects were represented as the outcome of reducing pollution by implementing a car ban and the reduction of tourists due to the rigid measures for promoting a ‘Green Olympics’. With respect to two COPs, the effects focused on the results of climate change negotiation. The COP15 reporting identified COP15 as a total failure with no consensus, whilst the coverage in relation

to COP17 indicated that the climate change negotiation reached a new pact. The causation frame was only adopted in the reportage of pre-COP15 and COP15. There are two news articles in the pre-COP 15 long-term reporting which offered an explanation on the environment wreck; therein, one was a scientific interpretation on Wenchuan earthquake and the other one referred to the accusation of authority faults for the extent of the Wenchuan earthquake including corruption and ignorance (e.g., Graft and shonky building blamed as quake toll rises, *The Australian*, 15 May, 2008). The reporting of COP15 explained that the climate change negotiation was hijacked by unimportant issues (e.g., Copenhagen hijacked by second-order issues, *The Australian*, 19 December, 2009).

Overall, from the above analysis, (also see figure 5.27, 5.28, 5.29 and 5.30), it can be seen that the dominant reasoning frame is evaluation, the secondary frame is problems, and the tertiary frame is solutions. The main theme under the evaluative frame is ‘attitudes and actions on climate change’; a secondary theme is ‘international relationships in the environmental dimension’; followed by ‘environmental negotiation’ and ‘responsibility’. Under the problematic frame, the main theme is ‘environmental issues’ (the mains ones including energy, pollution, carbon emission); the secondary theme is ‘political malady’, while the tertiary ones contain ‘environmental growth vs. environmental degradation’ and ‘environmental threat’. Under the solutions frame, the main theme is developing ‘green economy (new technologies and clean energy)’, the secondary theme is ‘cooperation on climate change’, whilst the tertiary one is ‘environmental measures’.

7.2.1.2 Script Structures Analysis

As has been discussed in the methodology chapter, script structures in this project contain messengers, messages and media views. These devices are to be discussed as follows:

1. Messengers

Concerning messengers, in the reporting of the Olympic Games (see fig.5.6), the key messengers are government officials (N=37, P=45%), followed by experts (N=35, P=42%), general public (N=5, P=6%), NGOs (N=3, P=4%) and business people (N=3, P=4%). Figure 5.13 illustrates a similar pattern to figure 5.6 in the COP15 coverage, which follows a sequence of government officials (N=118, P=69%), experts (N=36, P=21%), NGOs (N=7, P=4%), other media (N=7, P=4%), general public (N=3, P=2%) and business people (N=1, P=1%). Figure 5.20 indicates that the key messenger appearing in the reporting of COP17 is still government officials (N=21, P=48%), followed by experts (N=17, P=39%), business people (N=5, P=11%), other media (N=1, P=2%).

The analysis above (also see fig.5.32) shows that government officials apparently gained the most visibility in the overall reporting of these three cases (162 points of the percentage in total), whilst experts, mainly consisting of scholars and professionals like coaches of the Olympic teams and medical directors in these three cases, are secondary favoured messengers by the media (102 points in total). The rest of the three messengers respectively from the second sector which refers to business people (16 points in total), civil society including NGOs (8 points in total) and general public (8 points in total), and media relating to other media (6 points in total), had very weak voices in the reporting of these three cases.

It is noticeable that the messengers whom the two Australian newspapers picked up were mainly from Australia, China, the U.S. and some international government organizations (e.g., UN, World Bank, EU). Figure 5.6 shows that Chinese messengers almost covered all the categories except NGOs. The Chinese government officials (including Chinese President, Premier, mayor and officials from relevant environmental protection department) had the most visibility (N=19, P=51%) among the three categories of government officials. A number of messages were delivered by the president IOC and World Bank (N=14 in total). There were only four

Australian officials covered in the news discourse of Beijing Olympics. Figure 5.13 illustrates that Chinese government officials (N=37, P=31% of the category of governmental officials) and American government officials (N=36, P=30%) are the two key messengers in the reporting of COP15. The number of Australian officials maintains a middle position (N=23, P=19%), whilst officials from other countries (N=12, P=10%) including developed nations (e.g., EU, Sweden and Britain) and developing nations (e.g., India, Sudan and Papua New Guinea) and officials from international organizations including UN, World Bank and EU (N=10, P=8%) have the smallest portion. The COP17 reporting is the reverse. Figure 5.20 indicates that Australian government officials were the key messengers (N=17, P=81% of the category of government officials), while the Chinese and American officials occupied the second position by sharing the same visibility (N=2, P=10% respectively).

Concerning the category of experts, figure 5.6 demonstrates the absolute dominance of Australian experts in the news discourse (N=23, P=66% of category of experts), most of whom were Olympic professionals (e.g., athletes, coach, medical director). Six U.S. experts including scholars and lawyers were presented in the coverage. Others mainly contain foreign journalists and athletes from other countries. The reporting of two COPs has experts from Australia, China and the U.S. in both instances, but has very different composition. Figure 5.13 shows that the number of Chinese experts (N=18, P=50% of category of experts) is above that of Australia (N=11, P=31%) and the U.S. (N=4, P=11%). Figure 5.20 indicates that the Australian newspapers adopted messages from 14 Australian experts (P=82% of category of experts) and one expert from China and the U.S. separately in the reporting of COP17.

Regarding NGOs, figure 5.6 and figure 5.13 reveal that the two Australian newspapers primarily delivered messages from high-profile international environmental NGOs (e.g., Greenpeace, the Climate Groups, WWF, ClimateWorks). The reporting of the Beijing Olympics referred only to

Chinese business people (see fig.5.5), whereas Australian business people and those from international companies were involved in the reporting of COP17 (see fig.5.20). The general public got very little attention in the news discourse, and only the Chinese public were mentioned in the two cases. In the coverage of the Beijing Olympics, ordinary people were interviewed to comment on the environmental measures such as the car ban imposed by the government. The reporting of COP15 included perceptions on the relationship between the U.S. and China by a leading Chinese blogger and experiences about their living conditions by two Tibetans. The reporting of the two COPs cited other media resources or opinions. The coverage of COP15 quoted information from Chinese mainstream media (e.g., *China Daily*, Xinhua News Agency) (N=6) as well as from American media (e.g., the Wall Street Journal) (N=1). COP17 adopted information from only the German Daily (N=1).

2. Messages

The messages conveyed by these actors in relation to China's environmental issues in the news discourse intensively revolve around several points (see table 5.1, 5.5 and 5.9), namely China's environmental problems, government solutions to environmental mitigation, China's responsibility and leadership in climate change, as well as appeal for cooperation on dealing with climate change, clean energy and new technologies.

These messages emerged in the news discourse in relation to the Beijing Olympics, primarily focused on China's environmental problems and the government's countermeasures. Therein, it contained both positive and negative judgments, relatively neutral analysis of reasons for the problems and suggestions for solutions to the problems. For the two COPs, the messages picked up by the Australian newspapers reveal that the prime discussion in the social discourse was about China's leading role in dealing with climate change on the international stage and the appeal for transnational cooperative action. There were also both positive and negative tones among those messages, but overall, the positive tone was dominant

(see tables 5.5 and 5.9). Table 5.5 and table 5.9 reveal that Australian social elites (including governmental officials, experts and business people) came to a consensus that China should take responsibility and leadership, especially working together with the U.S. to tackle climate change. And they also agreed that China is leading new green technologies, so Australia should seize the opportunity to strengthen cooperation with China in this field. The discussion about cooperation on new technology with China was more heated in 2011. Certainly, there was also a negative voice doubting China's willingness to undertake its responsibility as well as its purpose and effect on developing new green technologies.

3. Media views

There were several opinion articles, including editorials, reviews and features in the reporting of the two COPs in the two Australian newspapers. The main concerns were about the Australian relationship with the U.S. regarding climate change politics, China's responsibility and leadership, and China's new technology based green economy. However, the difference is that the media views were much more negative and critical, particularly about China's willingness in taking responsibility and leadership in the climate change issue, which was also associated with China's action in climate change negotiation and its political system problem. Nevertheless, the media generally showed positive tone towards China's progress in developing new technologies and clean energy.

7.2.1.3 Rhetorical Structures Analysis

This rhetorical structural analysis, as has been identified in the methodology chapter, contains metaphors, depictions, catchphrases and tones. In this section, I will interpret these devices in the sequence of metaphors, depictions and catchphrases. The analysis of tones will be embraced in the analysis of these three devices. Concerning metaphors, I will analyse metaphor in terms of two aspects – the signified aspects by metaphors (tenors) and the tones.

The metaphors used in the reporting of the Beijing Olympics, shown in table 5.2, signify several aspects of meaning: China's strong economy strength (e.g., waking tiger), China's severe pollution (e.g., the seaweed is as thick as a carpet; smog blankets games city; pea soup smog; a sailor's nightmare; green streaks; lie of the land), the rigid method that the government adopted to mitigate pollution (e.g., rain of terror, the ghost Games) and the hope of pollution mitigation (e.g., a light in the fog). There is only one positive figurative utterance in the overall metaphors – a light in the fog – which refers to the possible positive outcome of China's efforts towards improving environment.

The metaphorical statements in the reporting of the two COPs are very different from those in the coverage of the Beijing Olympics especially the coverage about COP15, which has abundant and complicated metaphorical utterances. The metaphors presented in the news discourse relating to COP15 signify several aspects of meaning – severe environmental situations and a threat to the world (green peril; bad guy); willingness and action of engaging in climate change deals (e.g., play ball; play its card); China's lack of cooperation and action in the climate change negotiation (e.g., villain; two big guns steal the show; stonewall; a rabble; pours cold water on deal; tempers flare); increasing energy demand (e.g., the tiger in the road); China's power in the world (e.g., elephant; two big guns) and repair Sino-Australian relationship (e.g., mend fences). The above categorization shows that nine metaphorical utterances out of 13 are negative, one out of 13 is positive and the other two are neutral. There are four metaphors detected in the reporting of COP17, which signify several aspects – China's non-carbon-based energy production (e.g., green giant), promises or plans to cut emission (e.g., green giant; growing green scales), the responsibility that China should undertake for climate change (e.g., moral obligation) and the reality of China's green plan (e.g., mirage). There are two metaphorical utterances out of four that are positive, one out of four is negative and the remaining one is neutral. From the analysis above, it can be seen that the

overall negative metaphoric utterances are much more than the positive ones (4: 19).

Concerning depictions and catchphrases, table 5.3 shows that the reporting of the Beijing Olympics focused on categories of environmental problems, environmental governance, environmental consequences, environmental solutions and China's polity. Table 5.7 and 5.11 show that the reporting of the two COPs covered categories of environmental problems, responsibility, leadership, global role in environmental politics, China's polity and environmental solutions.

The coverage of the Beijing Olympics paid a great deal of attention to problems of pollution, air, weather, air, traffic and water. The two COPs focused more on carbon emission and pollution. 'The world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases/carbon emitter' is the most highly used depiction.

7.2.2 Discussion Corresponding to Research Question 2

Question 2: What are the environmental images of China that the two Australian broadsheets (*The Australian* and *SMH*) portray?

The interpretation of the environmental images of China portrayed by the Australian print media is based on the analysis of how the two Australian broadsheets frame China's environmental image. Following on from the previous presentations of findings, the percentage of each frame and the dominant frames at each level, and the environmental images of China portrayed by the newspapers will be abstracted and put in order in terms of the visibility of each frame (from high visibility to low visibility).

I. Global role (dominant frame)

1) Janus image – China has dual faces of attitudes and actions in dealing with global climate change issue.

With regard to attitudes and actions on tackling the climate change issue, China was portrayed as being two-faced. On one hand, the Australian

discourse showed that China held positive attitudes and was proactive in dealing with carbon emission. The Australian broadsheets covered perspectives that China actually is doing more on cutting gas emissions than the U.S., and has greener energy than Australia. For instance, “China is setting more of an example on green power than Rudd and Wong” (Orchison, 2009). “Mr Rudd also praised new offers from China and Japan on cutting greenhouse gas emissions ahead of the Copenhagen climate change conference, but gave only limited approval to the offering by Mr. Obama” (D. Shanahan, 2009). China gained a high profile in the climate change summit¹⁰⁴, which made its climate change diplomacy take another step (Garnaut, 2009). The expressions such as ‘play ball’, ‘respect for environment’, ‘draft plan’, ‘makes green priority’, ‘cleaner thoughts’, ‘promise’, ‘keen’, ‘helpful’, picked up by the newspapers intensively in the coverage in 2007 and 2008, demonstrate the reorganization of China’s active attitude that the Australian media gave to China. Moreover, the Australian newspapers recognized that China took an active stance to pledge action on emissions with the U.S. (Davies, 2009).

On the other hand, the Australian broadsheets depicted an inactive facet of China’s attitudes and actions on setting an emissions target. *The Australian* reported that China did not attach a concrete number to its pledge to curb carbon emissions, which did not live up to expectations at the UN meeting in September 2009 (L. Taylor, 2009c). *The Sydney Morning Herald* revealed that China delayed in setting an emissions target before the Durban Conference, and quoted the Australian Treasury secretary, “Australia’s emissions trading legislation would be ‘serious jeopardized’ if China did not inscribe its target in the UN agreement” (L. Taylor, 2011). However, overall, the positive facet has the advantage over the negative one regarding this image.

¹⁰⁴ The climate change summit was held by China, Japan and South Korea between 10 and 11 October, 2009.

2) Green giant image – China, as a superpower and the biggest carbon emitter should work with the U.S., and Australia’s decisions on international affairs rely on America-China relations.

China and the U.S. are framed as G2 – the two largest carbon emitters in the world – in the Australian media discourse. Australian media consider that a pact between the U.S. and China “is seen as the critical component of a broader deal” (Sainsbury, 2009c). The media used depictions such as ‘hopes’, ‘the U.S. and China that dominated the Copenhagen summit’ which show the significance and strength of the two superpowers in the developed and developing camps to the global climate change negotiation. The media adopted metaphorical expressions about the ‘green giant’ and ‘dragon’ to signify the strength of China in the green area. ‘Green giant’ in this context refers to how China gained compliments for its green efforts including non-carbon-based energy production and aggressive promises to cut carbon emissions. The dragon is a special symbol for China. The metaphor “the Chinese dragon is shedding some of its brown scales and growing green ones in their place” signifies that China made a new five-year-plan for the development of a green economy. The expressions of ‘giant’ and ‘dragon’ indicate the strength of China in the green area.

Because of the significance of China in mitigating environmental problems in the global arena, the Australian media expected that China should have friendly and effective dialogue with the U.S. and work together on the climate change issue. Before the COP15, China gained very positive valence in the stories about China-U.S. dialogue on a climate change deal. The media employed utterances of ‘optimism’, ‘hopes revived’ to depict the possible positive outcome if China and the U.S. could work together.

Since the U.S. and China are considered as the two most important countries in Australian foreign relations, Australian foreign policy is much influenced by their relationship and their decisions on international affairs. Australia attempts to build a multilateral system with these two countries and carefully positions itself in the triangular relationship with the U.S.

and China to maintain good relationships with both of them. For instance, after a series of diplomatic crises (e.g., Rejection of China's mining investment in Australia, Stern Hu issue), the Australian federal government intended to send Climate Change and Water Minister, Penny Wong, on a flying visit to China; the Australian media depicted it as 'mend fence' with the federal government using "its compromise position on climate change to help repair its tattered relations with China", and implementing "global shuttle diplomacy on the issue escalates ahead of December's Copenhagen meeting" (Sainsbury, 2009b). During Penny Wong's visit to China, *The Australian* reported that "global warming has begun thawing relations between Australia and China" (Sainsbury, 2009a).

Australian media made criticism of the American leaders' indecisive actions. However, when Australia sensed China could not achieve their expectations about China's role and responsibility in making a climate change deal, Australian media discourse showed its strong suspicion of its strategy of being close to China, and clarified and emphasized the position of U.S. alliance. *The Australian* released an opinion article – *US alliance system is only security that works* (Sheridan, 2009b), criticizing China as a destroyer of Copenhagen with its obstructionism and reaffirming that the best option for Australia to maintain security is to strengthen its ties of alliance with the U.S. The media's concerns about the Sino-American relationship in the environmental dimension reflect and confirm Australia's conundrum and uncomfortable position in U.S. and China relations.

3) Rabble image – China doesn't cooperate with the western countries in the climate change negotiation.

There was considerable news coverage about the on-site climate change negotiation particularly during the Copenhagen Conference, which was considered as a good test of China's sense of responsibility and its stance in cooperating with western countries. The Australian media identified the COP15 as a failure, and they ascribed it to China's inaction and noncooperation. For instance, the expression – 'China dampens hopes' (L.

Taylor, 2009b) shows the opinion of the Australian media towards the outcome of the COP15. A very popular case for China not technically cooperating with the developed countries that the two Australian broadsheets depicted, was that the Chinese Premier “refused to attend the Friday morning talks” and sent out a third-ranking junior official to attend the meeting (L. Taylor, 2009a). Moreover, China was considered to be using its increasingly greater power to strengthen its own economic growth rather than collaborate with the developed countries to work on this global issue. For instance, *The Australian* selected the comment that the Australian Shadow Minister for Climate Action, the Environment and Heritage made about China’s action in the COP15: “Copenhagen told us that China is willing to exercise real power to forestall a global agreement and maximize its own growth.” (31 December, 2009).

The Australian media framed the ending of the Copenhagen Conference as China’s triumph. China was the ‘big winner’ (L. Taylor, 2009a). *The Sydney Morning Herald* released an editorial – China changes global climate (22 December, 2009) – claiming, “China won, the world lost” in the climate change negotiations and considered that China lost in the test of being a responsible superpower. The Australian broadsheets used some harsh rhetorical depictions such as ‘defiance of world opinion’, ‘brazen stonewalling of efforts’, ‘hijacking’, ‘destroyer’, ‘debacle’, and the metaphorical words ‘bad guy’, ‘villain’ and ‘rabble’, which denote antagonism in the literature, to portray China as a negative character against the western camp in international climate change negotiations. The expressions ‘stonewall’, ‘pour cold water’, ‘tempers flare’ and ‘steal the show’, as behavioural depictions in relation to China’s action during the negotiation at COP15, corroborating the villain and rabble images, depict China’s non-cooperative actions in climate change negotiations.

Compared with the positive image in relation to China’s attitudes and actions, the climate change negotiation at COP15 shifted it to negative valence. The media showed suspicion of China’s willingness in working with

the U.S.-led developed countries. China was pushed back to the character of an opponent to Australia. The unstable images framed by the Australian media demonstrate an uncertainty about China's rise and its readiness to take its lead role in coping with international affairs. It also reflects the uncertainty of the Australian media about how far and close the Australia-China relationship should go. This echoes the controversies in the Australian mainstream debates, which were discussed in the theoretical framework chapter.

4) Uncertain leadership image – China should take responsibility and leadership in tackling climate change in the international stage, but sometimes China doesn't.

From the pre-COP15 nine-year coverage, it can be seen that the media discourse did not show strong and clear opinion that China should take responsibility and play a leading role in environmental issues in the international arena. The media started to massively define China's leadership since the COP15.

Since China surpassed the U.S., becoming the world largest carbon emitter in 2007, the Australian media started to call on China to play a responsible and leading role in the climate change deal with the U.S. in the international stage. Depictions such as 'hold the fate of the earth', 'biggest power' and 'a world leader in greenhouse gas reduction efforts' demonstrate that the media regarded China as a crucial actor in dealing with climate change. During the COP15, *The Australian* carried an editorial – *China must be part of the Copenhagen solution*, expressing very clear perspectives on China's role in the international community:

If it is to have clarity from the Copenhagen climate change summit, the world needs leadership from China and the U.S. A political agreement that keeps open the prospect of a legally binding agreement in the future will not be achieved without Beijing, in particular, recognising that it must be part of the solution. A cashed-up China, more powerful than ever since the global

financial crisis, must step up to play a lead role with the US. (14 December, 2009)

The editorial also shows Australian media construct the discourse that China, as a growing economic power, has an obligation to recognize and define its responsibility and leadership role in coping with international affairs. The editorial expressed that “Beijing should see climate change as an opportunity to begin playing that global role, adopting a mature approach that recognizes its responsibilities as a powerful developing nation” (ibid). Messages delivered by key actors also reveal that China is expected to take the leader in tackling environmental issues, particularly climate change, in the world arena. For instance, Australian Climate Change Minister expressed that “The world is looking to China for leadership, just as the world looks to the U.S. for leadership, and for China to play a constructive role.” (*The Australian*, 14 December, 2009)

The Australian media expected China to take its world leadership, but when China did not play cricket, the media would offer criticism and express its displeasure characterizing China as an ‘unsatisfactory great power’ and warning thus: “don’t look to Beijing for global leadership” (Sheridan, 2009a). The initial compliments about China’s greenhouse mitigation measures were translated to “China only [being] concerned about its own environment” (ibid). This image has some controversy in the Australian news discourse, because the outcome of climate change negotiation does not match the Australian media’s expectation of China’s action in this issue.

II. Environmental problems (secondary frame)

1) Dirty/Green peril image – China has very severe environmental problems, and these have had led to serious environmental consequences.

The rapid economic growth in China has contributed to severe environmental degradation. The Australian newspapers have released a great number of news stories in relation to China’s series of environmental

problems since 2000, covering categories of catastrophes, pollution, biodiversity, energy, dam, carbon emission, nuclear, water crisis, desertification, wildlife, traffic and weather.

The Australian broadsheets selected very negative words and phrases to depict China's environmental problems. For instance, in the reporting of Beijing Olympics, the newspapers used metaphors such as 'nightmare', 'pea soup', 'seaweed as thick as carpet', to signify the environmental situation in China. The metaphors emphasised an intolerant image of China's environment. The various lexical choices adapted by the Australian newspapers portrayed a seriously poor environment image. The rhetorical words such as 'worst', 'most', 'notorious', 'horrendous', 'heavily', 'devastated', 'poor', 'highest' and 'severe' exaggeratedly depicted China's dirty environmental image, and the adjectives vividly presented the extent of the current poor situation. After China was identified as the largest carbon emitter, China has been intensively framed as 'the world largest carbon emitter' in the Australian media discourse. This is the most highly used catchphrase in the Australian news discourse to portray China, particularly since the Copenhagen Conference. The 'largest carbon emitter' almost becomes the label of China. It appears as an adjunct to 'China' in most of the news stories in relation to environment or climate change.

As China has a very poor environmental situation at home, it is considered that it would contribute to damaging the world eco system if China does not take action to mitigate the environment. The Australian media select the expression 'green peril' to denote China as an environmental threat to the world. This expression was carried on from the phrase 'yellow peril'. It is a stereotyped metaphor for the portrayal of Chinese people immigrating to the Western countries as coolie slaves or labourers in literature and news discourse since the 19th century. Now the Australian media translated it to 'green peril' to describe the menace from China to the world environment.

As analysed in the first research question, the frame of China's environmental problems was the most salient frame in the reporting of

Beijing Olympics and in the pre-COP15 long-term coverage. Various environmental issues gained concerns from these two Australian broadsheets. In climate change negotiations, the theme of environmental problems was as salient as those two periods. The newspapers intensively described the reality of China being the largest carbon emitter in the world, but the emphasis was shifted to China's duty and responsibility to the world's climate change mitigation.

III. Environmental governance (tertiary frame)

1) Efficient image (effective but tough governance) – China's environmental governance is domestically efficient, but the measures adapted are very rigid.

The theme of environmental governance was normally raised associated with environmental problems or specific events. In the pre-COP15 long-term coverage, news stories in relation to environmental governance were all involved with environmental crisis or disasters such as flood and river pollution in 2005, toxic spills in 2006 and earthquake in 2008. China's environmental policy such as its five-year plan gained visibility during the two COPs as well.

Government is considered as a key actor in addressing environmental emergencies. The emergency measures taken by the government are normally regarded as a means for evaluating the efficiency of the government. The Chinese government received criticism for its tardy response to the environmental disasters that occurred before 2008. For instance, in the famous Songhua River toxic spill issue, *SMH* released a news article – *China takes hard line on pollution after toxic spills* – criticizing Chinese local governments' delay in releasing information to the public about the issue – "It took 10 days for the first public acknowledgement of a serious accident" (Toy, 2006). By contrast, the Chinese government gained credibility for its efficient response to tackling the issue during the Wenchuan earthquake. *SMH* compared the different approaches that the

two governments – Burma and China – adopted to cope with similar natural disasters in its editorial – *A tale of two disasters*. In the news article, it criticized the Burmese government’s inadequate response, but commented favourably on that of the Chinese government:

In China a huge earthquake elicited a rapid response, and unusual openness from a country that in the past might have chosen the Burmese approach. It too has a closed political system, monopolised by one institution, the Communist Party and its military wing, the People’s Liberation Army. Yet for all its shortcomings, the regime has a dynamism and a sense of responsibility. The result is that aid is getting quickly to those who need it, at least as fast as the rugged terrain of Sichuan and the damaged road system allow.

The Olympic torch has been something of a fiasco for China; the quick and candid response to its earthquake, fortuitously, has done much to mend the damage. (May 16, 2008)

During the Olympic Games, the two Australian broadsheets reported several major environmental measures taken by the Chinese government including a car ban, smoking ban and shutting down factories to mitigate air pollution and traffic congestion. In the reportage, the newspapers used depictions such as ‘controls’, ‘tough’, ‘stringent’ and ‘tighter’ to describe the rigid measures taken by the government. A news article, released by *The Australian*, picked up a metaphorical utterance ‘the ghost Games’ as a title to indicate the strict controls by the Chinese authority. The article commented on the specific actions that the government took, criticizing them as ‘fever pitch behaviour’ and the authority was portrayed as a ‘control-obsessed Communist Party’ (Callick, 2008).

China’s environmental policy gained compliments, for the active approach taken in coping with international climate change affairs, in some news coverage during the two COPs. For instance, the news article *Hu steals Obama’s thunder* cited four specific national plans that China would have for environmental mitigation in the next phase, and commented that “the Chinese leader committed China to increasing conservation and energy

efficiency by cutting carbon dioxide emissions” (Norington, 2009b). *The Australian* released a news article, titled *China, US put targets on table*, commenting that “the announcement marks the first time China has put specific numbers on a September pledge by President Hu Jintao to reduce the intensity of its carbon emissions as a percentage of economic growth by 2020” (Norington, 2009a).

From the above analysis, it can be seen that Australian discourse acknowledged the Chinese government’s efficient governance in relation to the environment, including both measures and policy. However, some measures were considered as tough or rigid, which was often related to the political system.

2) Authoritarian image – China has authoritarian political system.

Along with the ideological divergence from the Cold War, the Australian media differentiate China from the democracies (mainly including the west, Japan and South Korea) based on China’s polity. China’s polity is considered as a modern authoritarian political system, which always receives criticism from western media. The commonly used rhetorical vocabularies in the Australian media are ‘authoritarianism’, ‘recentralizing authority’, ‘authoritarian state’ and ‘communist state’.

The authoritarian system, related to the frame of environmental problems, is represented as ‘political malady’. It is always related to other political problems such as censorship and corruption, and is also considered as the primary reason for the insecurity of the international community. In the pre-COP15 long-term reportage, the Australian media afforded some attention to corruption, especially in the reporting of disasters. During the Beijing Olympics, *The Australian* released an article, titled *China’s rain of terror* (Tom, 2008). It offered a negative interpretation of events, notably that the Chinese government had ordered troops to launch ‘rain dispersal rockets’ to intercept a cloud belt moving towards the stadium. The article related this strict government measure to media censorship as well. The

harsh utterances picked up in the article such as ‘terror’, ‘military crackdown’ and ‘dissident weather’, portrayed China as a rigid authoritarian state. The metaphorical expression – ‘lie of the land’ indicates that China’s promise of providing ‘Green Olympics’ to the world was a lie, which portrays an unreliable and deceitful image of China. In the reporting of the two COPs, the Australian media correlated China’s political system with its unstable stance in the international arena. For instance, in the case of COP15, the depictions such as ‘weakness and insecurities of the regime’, ‘vulnerabilities and humiliation’ and ‘dysfunctional heart of China’ prove that the Australian newspapers regarded China as an unstable and unrealizable regime, which contributes to the insecurity in dealing with international affairs. The metaphorical expression – ‘mirage’ – indicates that China’s pro-green plan is not reliable. Nevertheless, according to the portion of the theme of political malady, the authoritarian image is no longer a prime image of China, especially when China shows active attitudes and actions in dealing with the climate change issue in the international stage.

IV. International cooperation (quaternary frame)

1) Cooperative image – The effective solution to cope with climate change is to cooperate with China to develop clean energy and new technology – based green economy.

The analysis of the first research question reveals that themes of cooperation and green economy (new technologies and clean energy) are the two common themes covered in three cases and the pre-COP15 long-term coverage. The Australian news discourse has promoted the cooperative idea of dealing with the climate change issue, cooperation on new technologies and clean energy in particular since 2005. At that time, Australian newspapers held a view that Australia could help China to alleviate carbon emission by providing clean coal and technology (see examples of theme one under reasoning theme five in the pre-COP15 coverage). This idea has been becoming more and more popular since China became the largest trade

partner, especially since China got much more involved with the coal mining industry in Australia. *The Australian* released a feature – *Energy alternatives offer clean start* (Howard, 2008) before the Clean Energy and Environment Dialogue in Beijing in April, 2008, which emphasized the increasing environmental interdependence between Australia and China, the importance of Australia in helping China to maintain its continuing and sustainable growth, and expressed the idea that Australia could grasp the chance to help China clean its energy.

China and Australia are increasingly locked into environmental interdependence. The way we manage this together will matter greatly, certainly for our two economies and societies, but also for the planet as a whole.

The good news is that Australia has a genuine role to play in working with China at a number of levels.

China has gained positive acknowledgement from the Australian newspapers about its efforts in developing new technologies and applying clean energy to its economy since 2009. Moreover, the newspapers delivered a message and view that China is taking leadership in clean energy and green technologies particularly solar industry (e.g., Chinese the winner from solar subsidies, *The Australian*, 4 June, 2011). This voice became very strong, which was reflected in the debate on Australia's carbon tax in 2011. The development of clean energy and new technologies nowadays and investigating the Chinese market have become a trend, not only to help to mitigate carbon emission, but also, more importantly, as a way of seizing the new growth opportunities and opportunity in competing in the new race of the green economy.

“If our goal is to be a world leader, then the greatest contribution we could make is in becoming a leading clean-tech solution provider...”

Australia needs to develop a strategic plan to help its clean-tech companies access the China market, particularly small to medium-size enterprises (Sainsbury, 2011).

At government level, Australia has agreed to promote low-carbon economies and co-operation on climate change action at the meeting between China's special representative on climate change and 40 Australian business executives and leading officials. Cooperation is obviously becoming a trend in the climate change domain between Australia and China. The Australian newspapers also advocated an opinion that the whole world should act together on climate change; otherwise, everyone would lose during the COP15 period (e.g., Unless we all act together on climate change, everyone loses, *SMH*, 22 September, 2009). Certainly, according to the percentage of the cooperative theme, it is so far not a dominant theme in the Australian media discourse, and the cooperation areas are still confined to new technologies and clean energy.

From the above analysis of the various images portrayed by the two Australian broadsheets, it can be seen that the Australian media discourse about China has become much more nuanced, presenting much more than a simple 'black' and 'white' image. Ideological divergence still exists in the Australian media discourse; particularly when international negotiations cannot get the outcome that Australia expects, the critique about China's political system will easily emerge. Nevertheless, the depiction of China shouldering attributed international responsibility and engaging in cooperation is obviously stronger nowadays.

7.2.3 Discussion Corresponding to Research Question 3

Question 3: What are the Australian intermediate experts' individual frames of environmental image of China?

- (1) What are the dominant frames of China's environmental image held in the intermediate experts' minds?
- (2) How much are the intermediate experts' individual minds influenced by the news frames?

The first and sixth questions are very direct questions in relation to China's environmental images in the intermediate experts' minds. In terms of their answers, the individual frames in these intermediate experts' minds cover four aspects: China's environmental problems, environmental governance, its global role and cooperation on environmental technology/energy. The dominant frame in the participants' minds is the frame of environmental problems. The secondary individual frame relates to China's environmental governance. The second and third interviewing questions relate to two cases – the Beijing Olympic Games and UN Copenhagen Conference. I will summarize the images in the individuals' minds from these four interviewing questions.

1) Dirty image – China has severe environmental problems.

All the participants generally view China as a dirty place with a very large number of environmental problems. China is undergoing the same problems of industrialization as did the UK in the last century. The rapid economic growth leads to the terrible current environmental situation and very unsustainable development. China is facing a very contradictory situation of how to coordinate the economic growth and environmental mitigation. There is only one interviewee who holds a positive view about China's beautiful landscape, but also argues that China faces an extraordinary tragedy in its environmental degradation.

Six participants mentioned that China's pollution image in their minds included polluted air and rivers. Interviewee K believes that Beijing had very serious air pollution during the Olympic Games. Interviewee L holds the view that resources depletion in China including water shortage and massive coal usage has become very severe. Two interviewees (A and L) show their concerns about a water crisis on the Tibetan plateau. Other environmental issues, which came across the participants' minds, include climate change issue, sand storms, desertification, food supplies, land, agriculture, disasters and health. Regarding the change of China's environmental image in their minds, interviewee H expresses the view that

China's environment is getting worse in relation to agriculture terms and at the national level.

2) Active governance image – Chinese government is taking effective action to mitigate environment.

The participants express their perspectives on Chinese government's attitudes and actions on environmental protection and mitigation in relation to environmental governance. The majority of participants who refer to environmental governance hold positive views that the Chinese government plays an active and constructive role in dealing with domestic environmental affairs and has made considerable progress. The interviewees (E, I, J, K) agree that the Chinese government has more and more awareness of the domestic environmental problems, as well as the public consciousness of environmental protection being increased (Interviewee B). Interviewee J shows confidence in the ability of the government to respond to environmental issues within the current Chinese political system. Interviewee F compliments the Chinese government on its green growth plan. Interviewee I agrees that China has a positive environmental policy, but suggests that China should make the policy of environmental protection the top priority in the development of the country based on its severe environmental situation. In response to Question 4, four interviewees (D, G, I, M) show positive tones on the Chinese government's actions and progress of environmental policy. For instance, interviewee M says, "Chinese government's environmental policy is good, it has been shown to be the case in the carbon price." Interviewee D comments, "I think they take it more seriously, I mean the central government, they take it more seriously than they used to, before the Environmental Ministry below the Ministerial ring, so that was the big change. And the renewable energy law legislation was also a pretty big step forward."

Most of the participants (eight out of 13) agree that the Chinese government made great efforts to improve Beijing's environment for the Beijing Olympic Games, including mitigating air pollution, closing down factories, building

up new sub lines and monitoring weather. For instance, Interviewee G thinks that Chinese authorities “did a pretty good job in cleaning up Beijing for the Olympics.” Interviewee L uses the word ‘remarkable’ to describe the outcome of the Chinese government’s ultimate cleaning up the host city. Interviewee M comments that China “did a really good job.” Interviewee J says:

Obviously, because China put enormous efforts into ensuring the environment of Beijing was good for the Olympic... It was quite good when the Olympics was on, a number of clear days.

Three interviewees (A, C, I) hold a view that the Chinese authorities applied a very effective approach, but it is not a sustainable approach to environmental improvement for the Beijing Olympics. For instance, Interviewee I thinks that “there were problems to manage”, so “the authorities had to do things to assist with resolving that problem”, and, the interviewee thinks that the approach “was pretty effective, that was short-term, pretty effective.”

A few negative voices from the participants include: 1) China has not done well in controlling pollution (Interviewee G); 2) Chinese government does not provide enough methods to have the public’s voices heard in relation to environmental problems (Interviewee A); 3) China’s current political system restrain the resolution to the environmental problems, so democratic reform should be introduced (Interviewee A, M).

3) Dual global role image – China plays both an active and passive role in environmental affairs internationally.

The findings of interview Question 1, 3 and 6 show that seven participants think that China played an active role in the environmental negotiation. Interviewee G, who attended the COP15, thinks “Obviously, China played a huge role in the Copenhagen Accord.” And the interviewee thinks that China could be a leader in handling climate change in the future. Interviewee F, who also attended the COP15, thinks “China was more

ambitious than it was given credit for.” Interviewee I offers a personal judgment on China’s action at COP15,

My own judgment is that there was lots of progress made in Copenhagen including China’s movement to acceptance of its more responsibility of dealing with the climate change issue. That was a big progress. Exact result at Copenhagen, and Chinese participation was better than most the media probably gained credit.

Interviewee J compliments China on engagement in the world on environmental affairs – “China is actually doing more in terms of cleaning up its own environment, and making [more] serious efforts to engage the world on environment issues than most of the other major countries”. Interviewee A thinks that China made compromises in the climate change negotiation at COP15 and actually has tougher standards than other countries.

By contrast, the findings also show that some of the participants hold negative views of China’s global role in dealing with environmental affairs internationally, based on the first, third and sixth interview questions. Interviewee K says:

Comparing with other superpowers, like America, China is not always good at signing into international agreement. So actually I think there are two things here. China is actually taking climate change problem quite seriously, the other one is China in the international forums, is not necessarily being a good constructive participant.

Sometimes, they are very sensationally nationalism, willing to protect their national autonomies, it is very similar to the U.S., which is not good for international cooperation, allows them to be misrepresented, especially by conservative groups.

This perspective indicates that China still needs to learn how to accommodate its obligated role in the international arena.

Some participants (A, B, G, F) show negative views of China’s passive role regarding China’s actions at COP15, including that China did not have an

ambitious enough target, had an uncooperative stance, showed unwillingness to make sacrifices, had a less than serious attitude and poor communication skills. For instance, Interviewee F says, “I think China was more ambitious than it was given credit for, but at the same time, I do not think China is willing to make any sacrifices to its development plans.”

4) Cooperative image

According to interview Q1, Q3, Q4, Q6, Q12 and Q13, there are four interviewees (C, D, F, H) expressing the view that China has put considerable investment into renewable energy and new technology and is leading the market in green energy and technology. For instance, Interviewee C expresses the view that “what has changed is the positive attitudes on climate change, particularly in relation to renewable energy, is their large investment in that, now prioritizing the five-year plan.”

In the question of the weight of environmental negotiation in the triangular relationship, six interviewees (A, C, E, F, H, and J) believe that environmental issues play a greater role in the U.S.-Australia-China triangular relationship especially on cooperation. For instance, Interviewee J expresses the view that “I think one of the strategies that America is now looking to follow with China is identifying global issues, where the U.S., China and other countries can cooperate, rather than just looking purely at bilateral issues. And obviously, from Australia’s point of view, we think that’s good.” Interviewee I believes that the Sino-Australian cooperation can bring the U.S. into a global agreement.

I think it’s particularly important for Australia to work with China in the context of bringing the U.S. into a global agreement because if China can push ahead with sets of policy strategies will lead it to be able to commit to a global agreement to make sense, and Australia can work with China doing that, and other countries in the region can work with China doing that, that would help to bring the U.S. to the party.

On the question about the future of the Sino-Australian relationship, nine interviewees out of 13 believe that the mainstream trend is to strengthen cooperation between Australia and China. For instance, Interviewee C says that “[i]t is a great opportunity for cooperation in the development of clean energy technology, in changing good environmental services, both ways.” Interviewee J believes that “[i]f we are serious about what our future is, it irrevocably ties up with the future of China, we need to put really major efforts both in these major intellectual and government levels, to work out how to build on this relationship.”

Concerning the sub-research question 2 about how much the intermediate experts’ individual minds are influenced by the news frames, the answers can be found from interview Q5, Q9, Q10 and the pre-interviewing question about the usage of newspapers about international news and Chinese news in relation to environment. The main newspapers that these interviewees read for international news and Chinese news include newspapers from Australia (11/13), the U.S. (9/13), the UK (8/13), China (4/13) and Japan (1/13). The interviewees mention 11 Australian media as their resources for international and Chinese news. Therein, seven interviewees read *The Australian*; by contrast, ten interviewees read *SMH*. Regarding the way of assessing China’s environmental issues, none of interviewees selects media as a tool or accessible resources. Most of them prefer to get Chinese resources and academic resources. Seven interviewees say that their perceptions or judgement on China’s environment are not influenced by media discourse at all. Five of them consider media as one source and not heavily influenced by media (Q9). When these interviewees get engaged in foreign policy-making process (Q10), eight interviewees clearly state that media have very little influence on their opinions, while two of them convey that they get stories from media but do not rely on mediated frames.

7.2.4 Discussion Corresponding to Research Question 4

Question 4: What are the possible indications of China’s practice of soft power and public diplomacy in Australia in the environmental dimension in

terms of environmental images of China portrayed in the Australian social discourse?

Among eight types of images in the news frames, they cover three negative images (rabble image, dirty/green peril image and authoritarian image), two positive images (green giant image and cooperative image) and three images containing both positive and negative aspects (uncertain leadership image, Janus image and efficient but rigid image). In the three types of images uncovered from intermediate experts' minds, there are two types of positive image (active environmental governance and cooperative image), one negative image (dirty image) and one image containing both positive and negative aspects (dual global role image). Apparently, there is sufficient space to work on in order to promote China's environmental images in the practice of soft power and public diplomacy.

From the analysis of Australian social discourse on China's environment, it can be seen that it does not reference the dominant discourse in China in relation to China's grand strategy, namely 'peaceful rise', 'peaceful development' and the building of a 'harmonious world' (which includes the green economy plan). Instead, the Australian social discourse is much more concerned about China's global role in dealing with environmental affairs particularly climate change in the international arena. Chinese dominant discourse identifies that China is not a great power or superpower so far, by 2050, about 40 years later, China will develop into a 'world-level power' (Men, 2007a, 2007b). Nevertheless, since the Copenhagen Conference, the Australian social discourse has clearly recognized China as a superpower,¹⁰⁵ and it appeals for China to take responsibility and leadership as a superpower in dealing with global affairs. This contradictory situation echoes Seib's view about China's slow acceptance of the realities of being a superpower. It proves that China's self-identification and the western discourse about China's global role do not match each other. This mismatch

¹⁰⁵ The depictions about China of the two Australian broadsheets in the two COPs clearly use words such as superpower and giant, which shows that they consider China as a superpower in the world stage. The interviewees' also show that China should play a leadership role as a great power.

probably results in misunderstandings about China's global behaviour or foreign policy behaviour in the international climate change negotiation.

According to Men (Men, 2007a, 2007b), China's soft power strategy covers the cultural dimension, the Chinese development pattern and participatory ability in global affairs. Obviously, in the Australian discourse in relation to environmental dimension, China's participatory ability in global affairs does not receive too much credibility, which is reflected in several images: rabble image, dual global role image, uncertain leadership image and Janus image. This probably is still rooted in the different identifications (self and others) of China's global role. Furthermore, China's soft power strategy does not clearly cover political values, which is recognized as one of the three soft power resources in Nye's definition. It uses the terminology of 'China's development pattern'. What is China's development pattern? It is clearly defined in the Chinese discourse as 'socialism with Chinese characteristics'.

¹⁰⁶ In the Australian media discourse, China is portrayed through an authoritarian image rather than having 'Chinese characteristics'. This image is not visible when the news covers stories in relation to China's active attitudes or actions on the climate change issue, especially about China's active talks with the U.S. on the issue. Nevertheless, when China does not show its active stance in the international climate change negotiation, the authoritarian image is normally silently brought up especially in the editorials or features and considered as the causal reason for all the relevant issues. It can be inferred that the liberal democracies still recognize China as an authoritarian regime. The authoritarian government is always criticized as being short of credibility. This political divergence is perhaps the fundamental reason for the perception of 'credibility gap' (Rawnsley, 2012)¹⁰⁷ in the western discourse, and for the different interpretations about both domestic and intentional issues. The mismatch about China's global role and the political values results in the divergent discourses on China's exercise of soft power between the western

¹⁰⁶ It was firstly proposed by Xiaoping Deng, and identified as national ideology.

¹⁰⁷ See footnote 50.

democracies and China. Concerning Rawnsley's argument regarding the confusion about questions of what soft power is, how it works and what the government would like to achieve by exercising it, I argue that it is not confused as they are clearly defined in the Chinese discourse, but it is the incompatibility or discrepancy of the soft power strategy in the discourse of western democracies. As public diplomacy aims to influence the foreign public, the first step probably should be to know the foreign public's cognition in relation to basic aspects of political consciousness, economic sense and cultural identity. The research on Australian social discourse about China's environment in this project may provide some insights for the adjustment of the soft power strategy in order to enhance China's influence in the implantation of public diplomacy in the western democracies.

Coming back to the environmental image of China, China has two positive images as depicted in the Australian social discourse, namely a green giant image and a cooperative image. The green giant image relates to the capability of China as a superpower in dealing with the global climate change issue, as well as its positive dialogue with the U.S. and the possible positive effects on the global climate change issue from the dialogue. The cooperative image in the Australian media discourse primarily refers to Australia's expectation of cooperating with China in new technologies and clean energy for a green economy.

With reference to China's environmental problems, the Australian discourse represents a dirty image. In spite of that, the intermediate experts express positive views on the Chinese government's active governance in coping with these problems. The Australian media also shows positive tones on Chinese environmental governance in relation to some issues (e.g., Wenchuan earthquake in 2008) and five-year plan. Regarding the public diplomacy strategy of China, these are potential areas that China may work on to maintain and enhance the positive images. Moreover, some intermediate experts express the view that China actually has very good environmental policy at national level, but it has not been successfully

delivered to the Australian media and public or reflected in the Australian social discourse. An example given by a few interviewees (Interviewees G, H and M) is China's action at the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference. China delivered very specific statistics about its action on climate change mitigation, but failed to attract attention and affection from the developed world. One important reason is owing to the communication skills and the failure of delivering the messages to western media.¹⁰⁸ The statistics of key messengers in the Australian media discourse reveal that government officials are the primary actors and experts are the secondary ones. As key actors in implementing soft power and public diplomacy, their communication skills become particularly essential in delivering information to the international media and publics. These elements also provide some insights for improving public diplomacy strategy at practical level.

Overall, speaking of some indications to the exercise of China's soft power and public diplomacy in the western democracies from the analysis of China's environmental images in the Australian social discourse, several points can be summarized for accommodating the western context: 1) Clearly identify and transport its global role; 2) Clearly identify and transport its political values; 3) Strengthen the participatory ability in the international affairs; 4) Enhance the credibility in international community; 5) Raise the cooperative stance in the international stage; 6) Improve communication skills. The first two points are a long-term 'grand strategy', but are the core strategy for the other strategies including the participatory ability and credibility. Bilateral or multilateral cooperation on global affairs is becoming a tendency in international relations. According to international

¹⁰⁸Interviewee H analysed the speeches of three leaders respectively of China, the U.S. and Australia. The interviewee commented that the U.S. President's speech is very skillful and the Australian Prime Minister's speech doesn't really relate to specific action but is emotional. Chinese Premier listed lots of statistics in his speech to show the action – how much China had done on climate change mitigation, but the interviewee expresses that for westerners, the speech is "very dry and quite boring". The interviewee believes that "inside China, it is not so dry and formal, it is very much more alive, energetic", but in the international stage, China's communication skills are really poor. Interviewee M reveals that the Chinese team had very little experience in those negotiations. And the Chinese were incapable of delivering alternative message to the Western media. They didn't have the experience of a way to do that, so it was a disaster.

image theory and the Realistic Group Conflict Theory, a cooperative interstate relationship results in a positive image. Likewise, a cooperative stance contributes to a positive cooperative interstate relationship. The last point is an important practical strategy, like a bridge, relating to successfully transporting Chinese discourse to the international community.

7.2.5 Discussion Corresponding to Research Question 5

Question 5: In the conceptual dimension, what framework is provided by social discourse for the evaluation of environmental image?

From the analysis of news frames (Q2) and individual frames (Q3), it can be seen that the intermediate experts' minds cover the same general frames as those in the two Australian newspapers – *environmental problems*, *environmental governance*, *global role*, and *global cooperation*. Certainly, the news frames of China's environment images are much more diverse than the individual frames. The answers to interview Q 8 also reveal that the intermediate experts' perceptions of China's environment portrayed by the two Australian broadsheets cover these three categories (see table 6.10). Concerning public opinion on China's environmental image, I asked for the intermediate experts' perspectives in the in-depth interviews. The interviewees' perspectives about public perceptions on China's environment cover China's environmental problems, China's environmental governance (more about action), China's global role and China's cooperation with Australia (see table 6.9). With respect to media influence on public opinion, eight of the interviewees (8/13) think that Australian public opinion in this aspect is influenced by media, one of whom expresses the view that public perceptions are almost entirely governed by media. One of them (1/13) thinks that media is one of the elements which influences public opinion. Three of them (3/13) show that they are not sure about it. Hence, it can be concluded that the public's individual frames of China's environmental images also cover these four categories.

These four frames can be categorized as generic frames in the media and communication research on environment in the international domain. In other words, the international coverage and the individual perceptions of other countries' environmental issues contain frames of *environmental problems*, *environmental governance*, *global role*, and *global cooperation*.

The first two frames refer to the target country's domestic environmental situation including problems and governance. The problem-governance pattern reveals that social discourse is concerned first about the problem itself, then about the government's function in resolving the problem. The third and fourth frames indicate that social discourse pays attention to the target country's global role and its international cooperation in dealing with environmental affairs, because the environment is a global issue. Apart from these frames, according to the literature on environmental communication, particularly Hansen's series of questions about media and communication on environment, the framework of other-projected environmental image can probably be extended to cover frames about 'environmental movement' (efforts toward environmental mitigation made by civil society), 'the environmental debate among major stakeholders' and 'public debate on environment'. According to the analysis of news frames in this project, I would like to suggest that the causal frame in the reasoning frames could be strengthened. Such fortification can probably help with more comprehensive understanding of the environmental situation of other countries.

Based on the outcomes and analysis of the research questions, I attempt to develop a conceptual framework for the evaluation of environmental image, and also for the formulation of pertinent strategies for the implementation of public diplomacy and soft power.




Figure 7.1: A Framework for the Findings of Research Questions

This framework presents findings of all the research questions. It provides generic frames and issue-specific frames arising from the news text analysis and individuals' minds. The generic frames compose a conceptual framework for the evaluation of environmental image in the international context. The strategies are pertinently developed to improve these negative image types.

7.3 Conclusions

7.3.1 Corresponding to Propositions

In this project, I discussed the Australian social discourse framing China's image in relation to environment with the methods of framing analysis, content analysis and in-depth interviews. The webs of social discourse here are adapted as media discourse and intermediate experts' discourse. In the discussion section, I answered the research questions based on the findings of news frames and individual frames. I will examine the propositions in this section in terms of the findings and discussion.

As reviewed in the first chapter about Australia-China relations, Australian foreign policy in the Howard administration was identified as a ‘strategic economic partnership’. In the Rudd administration, it was featured as a ‘constructive bilateral relationship’, and the Sino-Australian relationship went beyond a mere economic partnership. The current Gillard government argues that the U.S.-Australia-China triangular relationship should be built on common interests and cooperation. Australian foreign policy towards China follows a cooperative path and the range of cooperation is being extended beyond economic ties. Meanwhile, Australia intends to play its ‘middle power’ role in the U.S.-China relationship through promoting cooperation.

According to the discussion of research question 1, 2 and 3, cooperation with China in relation to the environmental dimension has emerged in Australian social discourse. It has been focused mainly on the cooperation with China in the domain of new technologies and clean energy in the news discourse. The individual frames reveal that the trend of Sino-Australian relationships in the future is, in intermediate experts’ minds, cooperation, although most of them believe that Australia and China will strengthen the relationship primarily in the domains of trade and migration. The discussion in section 7.2.2 and section 7.2.3 demonstrates that cooperation with China is not the dominant social discourse in the environmental domain so far, but a quaternary frame. Nevertheless, it indicates that public and media have increasingly accepted the idea of cooperation in the climate change context.

The social discourse about cooperation with China in relation to environmental dimension proves that the ‘cooperative image’ has been framed in both media discourse and intermediate experts’ minds. According to Herrmann and Fischerkeller’s three critical structural patterns, China and Australia have quasi goal compatibility – with environmental mutuality and economic dependency, but also with political divergence, and unequal power. China is considered as ‘great power’ while Australia identifies itself

as a ‘middle power’. Nevertheless, the Australian social discourse still shows a predilection towards cooperation between the two countries. Thus, it can be inferred that, in the climate change context, despite the political divergence, cooperation is the main trend of interstate relations. And the ‘cooperative image’ is a category of image that is pertinent to international issues that call for cooperation such as climate change, and which addresses the first proposition.

The image types abstracted in relation to environment demonstrate that the Australian media are concerned about government behaviour in both the domestic and international arenas. The analysis of script structure reveals that the key actors or messengers in the media discourse are government officials. The results serve to uphold the second proposition that China’s national image portrayed by international media is basically a government (party-state) image. This statement provides insights for the national image research, which should separate the government (party-state) image from the popular image.

Regarding the third proposition, the discussion of the fourth research question has proved that China’s soft power and public diplomacy strategy, which includes a cultural dimension, the Chinese development pattern and its participatory ability in global affairs does not match the Australian social discourse due to differences in the identification of global roles and the lack of clarity about political values. Thus, it can be inferred that China’s soft power and public diplomacy strategy is not compatible with the social discourse in the western democracies, taking Australia as a typical western democracy.

When one examines the conceptual framework for the evaluation of environmental image, it can be seen that the framework contains four planks – *environmental problems*, *environmental governance*, *global role*, and *global cooperation*. These four frames prove the fourth proposition that international reporting on other countries’ environmental issues or others’

projected environmental images tend to relate to interstate relationships and global environmental politics.

7.3.2 Significance and Limitation of the Research

In this project, I reviewed some inadequacies in the previous literature of image study. I attempted to connect image research in the field of international relations (IR) and international communication (IC) by focusing on one category – environment. I drew on the image types and international relationship patterns in the field of IR, and used media as a tool to discover the media projected (others) image of the country. Meanwhile, I employed framing theory and framing analysis as a methodological approach from the field of communication to discover the frames in the social discourse and to further develop new image types. As the project relates to environment, I drew on the research focuses in the field of environmental communication (EC) to develop the categories or frames for the empirical research.

This interdisciplinary research helps to break through the barriers by drawing on research traditions in each discipline; likewise, the findings enrich these three research fields. I developed a new typology of national image – ‘cooperative image’ – to incorporate relationships beyond allies and enemies, and also to enrich the image types in international image theory in the field of IR. In terms of the adjacent field of IC, I went beyond the two-dimensional visibility-valence pattern by employing framing analysis comprehensively as a methodological approach to discover frames in the discourse. The method that I crafted, drawing on elements from other method constructions, will be a useful tool to investigate specific image types and, furthermore, to help the policy community make effective strategies. This project also contributes to the development of a conceptual framework for the evaluation of environmental image. Additionally it contributes to providing a new possible research direction in the field of EC, which is about the research on international media constructing other countries’ environmental issues. The methodological approach – deductive

framing analysis and inductive content analysis, developed in this project, can be drawn on in future research, in order to discover issue-specific frames of the transnational reporting of other countries' environmental issues. The framework of generic frames in the international reporting will be broadened by the future research. Generic frames in the transnational reporting will be developed in the future research.

Certainly, there are limitations attached to this project. Firstly, the generalization is confined to the limited samples, which including the following aspects: 1) I only selected Australia and China as two sampling countries. Whether the conclusions can be applied in the context of other western democracies including the U.S. and the multi-state European Union requires further demonstration. 2) I merely selected two mainstream broadsheets in Australia for the exploration of the Australian media discourse. Although I have argued the representative nature of these two broadsheets, other media forms particularly TV and social media are important platforms to discover media discourse. 3) The webs of social discourse covered media and intermediate experts, the majority of whom are academics who express their views in public forums that inform the policy community. The second sector (corporate) and the third sector (civil society, especially NGOs) were not included. Rather their voices were hearkened to in the media discourse. Corporations and environmental NGOs are two important factors that influence public opinion. Further empirical findings will therefore be needed to test the conceptualization in this project in relation to the new typology of cooperative image and the framework for the evaluation of environmental image.

A second limitation of the research arises from the methodology. I located the framing analysis and qualitative content analysis in the interpretivist paradigm. It inevitably has the hallmark limitation of any interpretivist approach – as well as, of course, the benefits of this approach. The sampling and coding processes were both subjective. The first round of selection of news articles was from the Factiva database, the second round of selection

was of samples. The categories were inductively abstracted from the three cases (including Beijing Olympic Games, COP15, COP17) were all subjective process. Thus, the validity and generalizability of the research are confined to subjective domains to a certain degree. However the subjective approach was taken for specific reasons outlined earlier.

7.3.3 Recommendations

The propositions addressed in this project may provide some insights for the future cooperation between Australia and China, the policy community in China regarding the promotion of its national image, as well as the practice of soft power and public diplomacy.

The first proposition reveals that cooperation has become the trend in the Australia-China relations in the climate change context in the Australian social discourse; the positive social discourse mainly includes Australia-China's cooperation on new technology and clean energy. From the existing Australian social discourse, it can be seen that there is plenty of potential for Australia-China cooperation in the environmental domain in the future. Based on the research outcome of this project, several suggestions may be made for future cooperation between Australia and China: 1) Continue to enhance the cooperation between Australia and China in the field of clean energy and new technology including through promotion of private sector initiatives that marry Australian technology and Chinese industry and capital; 2) Clarify the roles in the cooperation particularly in terms of cooperation in multilateral relations but also in relation to practical cooperation between national and subnational institutions in the two countries; 3) Increase credibility in the cooperative process through joint releases to the media; 4) Broaden possible cooperative opportunities and engagement areas in relation to the environment.

According to the second proposition, the government (party-state) image represents the national image in media discourse; hence, the policy community should separate the government image and popular image, and

develop specific strategies to promote the government (party-state) image. Several suggestions have been addressed in the discussion section as follows: 1) Clearly identify and interpret its global role; 2) Clearly identify and interpret its political values; 3) Strengthen its participatory ability in international affairs; 4) Enhance its credibility in the international community; 5) Raise its cooperative stance in the international stage; 6) Improve its communication skills.

This project is just the tip of the iceberg in the national image study, but it can be an example for future research on how: 1) to separate government (party-state) image and popular image; 2) to find out frames of the two types of images (perceived image and personalised image). Based on this project, several research questions can be further mooted: What are the national images in relation to different categories (e.g., politics, economy, military, and culture) portrayed in the social discourse of other countries? Why does foreign society portray these images of the nation state? How do these images influence public opinion? How do these images interact with the policy makers' cognition and decision-making? What are the differences between these other-projected images and the self-projected images (national branding)? What are the frames of environmental issues in international coverage?

The climate is right for enhanced cooperation between China and western democracies in the global arena of environmental politics and this cooperation can prompt greater modernization in all realms for the Chinese people.

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10 December 2010

Reference: 5201001399(D)

Dear Prof. Chitty,

FINAL APPROVAL

Title of project: 'China's environmental image in the Australian media'

Thank you for your responses to the Faculty of Arts Human Research Ethics Committee conditions of approval, as outlined in our emails dated 25th November and 9th December 2011. Your responses have been reviewed by the Chair of the Committee and approval of the above application is granted effective 10th December 2010, and you may now proceed with your research. The following personnel are authorised to conduct this research:

Prof. Naren Chitty - Chief Investigator/Supervisor
Ms Li Ji - Co-Investigator

Please note the following standard requirements of approval:

1. The approval of this project is **conditional** upon your continuing compliance with the *National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007)*.
2. Approval will be for a period of five (5) years subject to the provision of annual reports. **Your first progress report is due on 10th December 2011.**

If you complete the work earlier than you had planned, you must submit a Final Report as soon as the work is completed. If the project has been discontinued or not commenced for any reason, you are also required to submit a Final Report on the project.

Progress Reports and Final Reports are available at the following website:
http://www.research.mq.edu.au/researchers/ethics/human_ethics/forms

3. If the project has run for more than five (5) years, you cannot renew approval for the project. You will need to complete and submit a Final Report and submit a new application for the project. (The five year limit on renewal of approvals allows the Committee to fully re-review research in an environment where legislation, guidelines and requirements are continually changing, for example, new child protection and privacy laws).

4. All amendments to the project must be reviewed and approved by the Committee before implementation. Please complete and submit a Request for Amendment Form available at the following website:

http://www.research.mq.edu.au/for/researchers/how_to_obtain_ethics_approval/human_research_ethics/forms

5. Please notify the Committee immediately in the event of any adverse effects on participants or of any unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project.

6. At all times you are responsible for the ethical conduct of your research in accordance with the guidelines established by the University. This information is available at:

<http://www.research.mq.edu.au/policy>

http://www.research.mq.edu.au/for/researchers/how_to_obtain_ethics_approval/human_research_ethics/policy

If you will be applying for or have applied for internal or external funding for the above project, it is your responsibility to provide Macquarie University's Research Grants Management Assistant with a copy of this letter as soon as possible. Internal and External funding agencies will not be informed that you have final approval for your project and funds will not be released until the Research Grants Management Assistant has received a copy of this letter.

Yours sincerely



Andrew Buck
Professor
Associate Dean Research Faculty of Arts
Chair, Faculty of Arts Human Research Ethics Committee

Chief Investigator's / Supervisor's Name:

Naren Chitty

Chief Investigator's / Supervisor's Title

Professor

Information and Consent Form

Name of Project: China's Environmental Image in the Australian Media

You are invited to participate in a study of how China's environmental image is portrayed in the Australian media. Australian broadsheets will be analysed to identify potential developments in the policy discourse. Additionally, experts will be interviewed about Australian media's portrayal of China as an environmental player.

The study is being conducted by Naren Chitty, Department of Media, Music, Communication and Cultural Studies (MMCCS) [Tel: (02) 98502160; Email: naren.chitty@mq.edu.au] and Li Ji in order to meet the latter's requirements of Doctor of Philosophy under the supervision of the former.

If you decide to participate, you will be asked to participate in a single in-depth interview, of around one hour duration, to answer prepared questions. The interviews will be recorded on an audio recording device, if you have no objection to this. There will be no pressure, or risks, attached to the interview. No payment or other remuneration will be provided for participating in the interview.

While no personal details will be sought, any information or personal details gathered in the course of the study will be treated as confidential. Individual will only be identified in any

publication of the results if consent is provided for identification. Otherwise results will be published in a de-identified form. Only the investigators will have access to the data. A summary of the results of the data will be made available to you in the form of a conference paper.

Participation in this study is entirely voluntary: you are not obliged to participate and if you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time without having to give a reason and without consequence.

I, _____ have read and understand the information above and any questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to participate in this research, knowing that I can withdraw from further participation in the research at any time without consequence. I have been given a copy of this form to keep.

I consent to having my interview audio-recorded (Yes/No).

I consent to being identified in the thesis (Yes/No).

Participant's Name: _____
(Block letters)

Participant's Signature: _____ Date: _____

Investigator's Name: LI JI _____
(Block letters)

Investigator's Signature: _____ Date: _____

The ethical aspects of this study have been approved by the Macquarie University Human Research Ethics Committee. If you have any complaints or reservations about any ethical aspect of your participation in this research, you may contact the Committee through the Director, Research Ethics (telephone (02) 9850 7854; email ethics@mq.edu.au). Any complaint you make will be treated in confidence and investigated, and you will be informed of the outcome.

(INVESTIGATOR'S [OR PARTICIPANT'S] COPY)