

Artaxerxes II

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BAncHist (Hons) (Macquarie University)

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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May, 2015.

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Abstract

This thesis codifies what is known of events under Artaxerxes II in order to expand our understanding of the man and his reign. A secondary purpose of the thesis is to assess the validity of the negative image of Artaxerxes II which has persisted in modern literature. In the author's opinion, Artaxerxes II has been unfairly maligned. The thesis contends that the information available for Artaxerxes II's reign has been underutilised in scholarship up to this point. Although the sources are fragmented and challenging, Artaxerxes II can be seen to have deftly manipulated the Greeks while furthering his own aims. Thus, this work presents a critical re-appraisal of the hostile Greek and Roman sources, combined with a new study of numismatic evidence. This involves re-evaluation of scholarship focused on the eastern Mediterranean during the fourth century, and the standard interpretations of interaction between the Greek world and the Achaemenid Empire under Artaxerxes II.

The reassessment here works chronologically through his reign. This begins with an analysis of the information for Artaxerxes II's early life and reign. The second chapter presents the evidence for the Persian response to the Spartan incursions of the 390s, including a thesis for a partnership with Athens to continue beyond the decade. It then presents a revised chronology of the 380s, and an account of the Egyptian campaign of the 370s and its diplomatic vanguard in the 375/4 King's Peace rescript. The final chapter argues that the Satraps' Revolt does not necessitate the rejection of evidence arbitrarily, as current interpretations do. The evidence can be read coherently. In the midst of these discussions, the thesis challenges the notion that Artaxerxes II was distant and afforded his satraps too much autonomy by highlighting the ways local administrators engaged with his imperial ideology through coin types.

Declaration

I certify that this work has not been previously submitted for a degree, nor has it been submitted as part of requirements for a degree to any other university or institution other than Macquarie University.

I also certify that the thesis is an original piece of research and was written by me. Any help and assistance that I have received in my research and the preparation of the thesis have been appropriately acknowledged. All sources have been acknowledged.

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Acknowledgements

I would first like to thank my principal supervisor, A/Prof. Paul McKechnie, not only for bearing the brunt of the workload, but for suggesting a thesis on Artaxerxes II in the first place. The process of studying Achaemenid Persia has been challenging, but an immensely rewarding experience.

My associate supervisors, A/Prof. Javier Alvarez-Mon and A/Prof. Ken Sheedy also deserve a great deal of thanks. Javier only signed on as associate supervisor when he arrived at Macquarie in 2014, but in his brief tenure proved extremely valuable for his perspectives on art. I owe Ken a great deal of gratitude for his detailed commentary and numismatic expertise.

While my supervisors suffered through a plethora of drafts and painful prose, that burden also spread to others at Macquarie, and I am very grateful for their expertise and criticism: Dr. Gil Davis, Dr. David Phillips (now retired, but who first kindled in me a love of Greek history, and has always provided sage advice), and Ms. Heidi Senn. To these I must add those from other institutions who read various sections and replied to my correspondence with infinite patience, especially Mr. George Cawkwell of Oxford University, Prof. Michael Crawford of University College, London, Prof. Mark Garrison of Trinity University, Dr. Doug Kelly of the Australian National University (retired), Prof. Tony Spalinger of the University of Auckland, and Dr. Matthew Trundle, also of the University of Auckland. To these I add Prof. Stephen Hodkinson, of the University of Nottingham, and Prof. Chris Tuplin, of the University of Liverpool, both of whom were kind enough to spend a great deal of time with me, discussing academia and Achaemenid Persia.

My various conference trips and research visits were made available through Macquarie's Post-Graduate Research Fund, and departmental funding. Both were facilitated by the efficient genius of the Department's administrators, Mrs. Angela Abberton and Mrs. Raina Kim. My numismatic projects were developed with the 2013 Junior Fellowship at the Australian Centre for Ancient Numismatic Studies. Ken, for a second time, receives thanks for his instruction and experience. In the course of that Fellowship, I also made use of the extensive library of Noble Numismatics. I thank the

firm's proprietor, Mr. Jim Noble, and consultant, Mr. Colin Pitchfork, for granting me access and especially Mr. Pitchfork for his remarkable knowledge of all ancient coins.

Throughout my candidacy, I was supported by the Australian Postgraduate Award, which was supplemented by a number of teaching appointments for Macquarie undergraduate units (internally, for Open Universities Australia, and for the Indigenous Tutorial Assistance Scheme). I especially thank Paul and Gil for allowing me to work with them on Macquarie's introductory Greek history unit, and Dr. Chris Forbes for allowing me to assist in his unit on Alexander the Great and the Hellenistic Age.

I thank my family for the continual support they have provided. I owe my parents gratitude for encouraging me to pursue a passion rather than a career. Zoe, my partner, receives the final and most important acknowledgement as the keystone for the entire process.

Abbreviations and Conventions

Abbreviations

Abbreviations for ancient authors and works follow *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 3rd edition. Periodical abbreviations follow *L'Année Philologique*.

The following ancient sources, owing to their frequent citation, will appear in abbreviated forms:

<i>An.</i>	Xenophon, <i>Anabasis</i> .
<i>Art.</i>	Plutarch, <i>Life of Artaxerxes</i> .
<i>Ctes.</i>	Ctesias of Cnidus (<i>FGrHist</i> 688) in Stronk, Jan P., ed. & trans. <i>Ctesias' Persian History</i> . Düsseldorf: Wellem Verlag, 2010.
<i>Dein.</i>	Deinon (<i>FGrHist</i> 690).
<i>Diod.</i>	Diodorus Siculus.
<i>Ephorus</i>	Ephorus of Cyme (<i>FGrHist</i> 70).
<i>Hell.</i>	Xenophon, <i>Hellenica</i> .
<i>Hell. Oxy.</i>	McKechnie, Paul, and S. J. Kern, eds. & trans. <i>Hellenica Oxyrhynchia: Edited with Translation and Commentary</i> . Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1988. The author is alternatively referred to as 'P'.
<i>Philoch.</i>	Philochorus of Athens (<i>FGrHist</i> 328).
<i>Theopomp.</i>	Theopompus of Chios (<i>FGrHist</i> 115).

Abbreviations not found in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* or *L'Année Philologique* are as follows:

<i>ABC</i>	Grayson, Albert Kirk, ed. <i>Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles</i> . Locust Valley: J.J. Augustin, 1975.
<i>AMIran</i>	<i>Archäologische Mitteilungen aus Iran</i> .
<i>AMIT</i>	<i>Archäologische Mitteilungen aus Iran und Turan</i> .
<i>ANS</i>	American Numismatic Society.
<i>ANSMN</i>	<i>American Numismatic Society Museum Notes</i> .
<i>AP</i>	Cowley, A., ed. <i>Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century B.C.</i> Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923.
<i>Auctiones AG.</i>	<i>Auctiones S. A.</i> , Basel.
<i>Babelon, Traité 2</i>	Babelon, Ernest. <i>Traité des monnaies grecques et romaines</i> . Vol. 2.2, Bologna: Arnaldo Forni, 1965.
<i>Baldwin's</i>	A. H. Baldwin and Sons, London.
<i>BM</i>	British Museum.
<i>BMAP</i>	Kraeling, Emil Gottlieb Heinrich, ed. <i>The Brooklyn Museum Aramaic Papyri: New Documents of the Fifth Century B.C. from the Jewish Colony at Elephantine</i> . New York: Arno

	Press, 1969.
BMC Cilicia	Hill, George Francis, ed., <i>Catalogue of the Greek Coins of Lycaonia, Isauria, and Cilicia</i> . A Catalogue of Greek Coins in the British Museum 22. Bologna: Arnaldo Forni, 1964.
BMC Cyprus	Hill, George Francis, ed., <i>Catalogue of the Greek Coins of Cyprus</i> . A Catalogue of Greek Coins in the British Museum 25. Bologna: Arnaldo Forni, 1964.
BMC Ionia	Head, Barclay V., ed., <i>Catalogue of the Greek Coins of Ionia</i> . A Catalogue of Greek Coins in the British Museum 17. Bologna: Arnaldo Forni, 1964.
CDAFI	<i>Cahiers de la Délégation Française en Iran</i> .
CSSH	<i>Comparative Studies in Society and History</i> .
CH	<i>Coin Hoards</i> .
CNG	Classical Numismatic Group, London.
Elsen	Jean Elsen & ses Fils s.a., Bruxelles.
Gorny	Gorny & Mosch, München.
Hauck & Aufhäuser	Hauck & Aufhäuser Bank, Luxemburg.
Hess-Divo	Hess-Divo AG, Zürich.
Hirsch	G. Hirsch Nachfolger, München.
IGCH	Thompson, Margaret, Otto Mørkholm, Colin M. Kraay, and Sydney P. Noe. <i>An Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards</i> . New York: American Numismatic Society, 1973.
INR	<i>Israel Numismatic Research</i> .
JSSEA	<i>Journal of the Society for the Study of Egyptian Antiquities</i> .
Künker	Fritz Rudolf Künker GmbH & Co. KG.
Lanz	Numismatik Lanz, München.
Leu	Bank Leu/Leu Numismatik AG/ LHS Numismatik.
M&M Basel	Münzen und Medaillen, AG, Basel.
M&M GmbH	Münzen und Medaillen, GmbH, Weil am Rhein/Stuttgart.
MDAI(K)	<i>Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts Abteilung Kairo</i> .
MFAB	Museum of Fine Arts, Boston.
NABU	<i>Nouvelles Assyriologiques Brèves et Utilitaires</i> .
NFA	<i>Numismatic Fine Arts</i> .
Peus	Dr. Busso Peus, Nachfolger Munzhandlung, Frankfurt a. M.
PFT	Hallock, Richard Treadwell, ed. <i>Persepolis Fortification Tablets</i> . Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.
PTT	Cameron, George G., ed. <i>Persepolis Treasury Tablets</i> . Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948.
RO	Rhodes, P. J., and R. Osborne, eds. <i>Greek Historical Inscriptions, 404-323 BC</i> . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Sachs-Hunger	Sachs, Abraham J., and H. Hunger, eds. <i>Astronomical Diaries and Related Texts from Babylonia: Diaries from 652 B.C. to 262 B.C.</i> Vol. 1. Wien, 1988.


SNG Ashmolean-Cilicia	Ashton, R. and S. Ireland, eds., <i>Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum: Volume V, Ashmolean Museum, Oxford. Part XI, Caria to Commagene (except Cyprus)</i> , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
SNG Berry	<i>Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum: The Burton Y. Berry Collection. Part II, Megaris to Egypt</i> . New York: American Numismatic Society, 1962.
SNG Copenhagen-Cilicia	<i>Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum: The Royal Collection of Coins and Medals, Danish National Museum. Volume Six: Phrygia to Cilicia</i> . West Milford: Sunrise Publications, 1982.
SNG Levante-Cilicia	Levante, E., ed., <i>Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum: Switzerland, 1, Levante-Cilicia</i> , Berne: Crédit Suisse, 1986.
SNG Lockett	<i>Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum: Volume III, The Lockett Collection. Part V: Lesbos-Cyrenaica: Addenda (Gold and Silver)</i> . London: Oxford University Press, 1957.
SNG Paris-Cilicia	Levante, E., ed., <i>Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum: France 2. Cabinet des Médailles: Cilicie</i> . Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 1993.
SNG Tübingen	<i>Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum: Deutschland. Münzsammlung der Universität Tübingen. 6 Heft</i> . Hirmer Verlag: München, 1998.
SNG v. Aulock	<i>Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum: Deutschland. Sammlung v. Aulock. 3 Heft</i> . Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 1964.
Sotheby's	Sotheby's, London/New York.
Tod	Tod, Marcus N., ed. <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions</i> . 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946-1948.

Conventions

The names of ancient authors, their works and the spelling of individuals' names are in the Latinised style. Greek text is from the Loeb Classical Library editions. Greek and Latin translations are also adapted from the Loebes.

All references to 'Artaxerxes' are to Artaxerxes II.

All dates are BC unless otherwise noted.



Map of the Persian Empire and Royal Road (Brosius, *The Persians*, 54-55).



“Artaxerxes II is generally regarded as an amiable man who lacked the fibre to be a really successful ruler of a vast empire.”

Boyce, *History of Zoroastrianism*, 2: 263.

“He seems to have been effeminate, enervated, and easily influenced—weak, but also cruel and mistrustful, engulfed as he was in harem intrigues.”

Schmitt, *Encyclopaedia Iranica* s.v. Artaxerxes II.

Artaxerxes II displayed “the petulence [*sic*] of an aged autocrat.”

Moysey, “Diodoros, the Satraps and the Decline of the Persian Empire,” 121.

“Good government and lasting peace did not exist in the time of Artaxerxes II because of the king’s incompetence and weakness as a ruler.”

Mildenberg, “Artaxerxes III Ochus,” 201.

“Artaxerxes II was a disaster.”

Badian *apud* Mildenberg, “Artaxerxes III Ochus,” 201.

“Artaxerxes II (Mnemon) seems, to judge by the long and widespread Satraps’ Revolt, to have been a somewhat ineffective king.”

Cawkwell, *Greek Wars*, 199.

“The Empire was now [at the end of Artaxerxes’ reign] unquestionably in decline and was becoming increasingly vulnerable to an external invasion.”

Farrokh, *Shadows in the Desert*, 93.

“The empire must have seemed at its lowest ebb, but when Artaxerxes II died ... the fortunes of the empire dramatically revived.”

Sekunda, “The Might of the Persian Empire,” 83.

“He was remembered as a weak, unreliable and blood-thirsty monarch, influenced largely by his mother, a monarch who did not maintain the frontiers of the empire.”

Katouzian, *The Persians*, 36.

“Generally, the reign of Artaxerxes III brought in a restoration of the empire.”

Olbrycht, “Macedonia and Persia,” 346.

Introduction

Whereas the traditional narratives (to distil slightly the version given of them) saw the Persian empire as neutered and decadent in the wake of the Greek-Persian wars, only waiting for Alexander to deliver the fatal blow 150-odd years later, the new Achaemenid historians place the emphasis instead on the resilience of the Achaemenid empire and on the tolerance and pragmatism of its rulers. Out go the stereotypes of Achaemenid kings and queens as Oriental despots – of mad king Cambyses' depredations in Egypt or of the cruel punishments of Amestris, wife of Xerxes – and in their place emerge more moderate and less colourful figures: royal wives dedicated to the interests of their male relatives, or a Cambyses in line with his father Cyrus as a 'builder of empire.'

Harrison, *Writing Ancient Persia*, 17-18.

And yet, there is at least one monarch who remains rooted to this pre-revolutionary image: Artaxerxes II. The quotes on page xx encapsulate the modern characterisation of Artaxerxes; his reputation pervades studies of religion, encyclopaedias, numismatics, introductory works, inter-disciplinary works, and works designed for popular consumption. Before the new wave of Achaemenid history, this reputation would fit well into the broader narrative of the decline of the Achaemenid Empire, in which the empire peaked with Cyrus the Great and faced a turning point with the Persian Wars.¹ Seventeenth and eighteenth century scholars could, with this image, in turn portray Alexander as the reformer of Persia, who reignited her glory during his brief life.² Recent work has torn down that impression,³ and challenged the

¹ Pierre Briant, "The Theme of "Persian Decadence" in Eighteenth-Century European Historiography: Remarks on the Genesis of a Myth," in *The World of Achaemenid Persia*, ed. John Curtis and St. John Simpson (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), §2; cf. T. Harrison, "'Respectable in Its Ruins': Achaemenid Persia, Ancient and Modern," in *A Companion to Classical Receptions*, ed. Lorna Hardwick and Christopher Stray (Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 53 and T. Harrison, "Reinventing Ancient Persia," in *The World of Achaemenid Persia*, ed. John Curtis and St. John Simpson (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 21-32, which show that the idea of Persian decline was not so pronounced as is often presented. See also the epilogue to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*.

² Pierre Briant, "Alexander and the Persian Empire, between "Decline" and "Renovation"," in *Alexander the Great: A New History*, ed. Waldemar Heckel and L. Tritle (Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 171-72.

³ Josef Wiesehöfer, "The Achaemenid Empire in the Fourth Century B.C.E.: A Period of Decline?," in *Judah and the Judeans in the Fourth Century B.C.E.*, ed. O. Lipschits, Gary N. Knoppers, and Rainer Albertz (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2007), 11-30.

idea that it originated with the authors of the fourth century.⁴ Slowly, scholarship has revised the history of the Achaemenid kings slighted by the Greeks and the modern historians who followed – from Cambyses to Artaxerxes III to Darius III – but the longest reigning among them remains to be re-examined. This work in part addresses his denigration.

The task is to consider the reign of Artaxerxes in terms of the empire's goals, behaviour, and policies. By doing so, the prevailing generalisations of Artaxerxes will be moderated and a nuanced understanding of the period between 404 and 358 developed. Accordingly, this work is 'macro' in nature, and engages with the modern and ancient sources in order to provide a balanced characterisation of the reign of Artaxerxes.

The story of Artaxerxes and his reign is perforce a story of the western periphery of his realm. All literary evidence derives from the Greeks, and is based on their perception of the empire. Crucially, however, Egypt revolted from the Persians in 404, and four campaigns were launched against it under Artaxerxes. The first was distracted by the revolt of Cyrus the Younger in 401. The second was over a decade in the making, and was led by the general of the first attempt (Abrocomas), Artaxerxes' chiliarch (Tithraustes), and Artaxerxes' son-in-law (Pharnabazus). The third was launched in the 370s, led again by Pharnabazus, in turn supported by Iphicrates the Athenian. The fourth was undertaken by Artaxerxes' son and successor, Ochus.⁵ Artaxerxes wanted to reclaim Egypt. The challenges of this process led Stronk to wonder if it would not have been more effective for the Persians to ignore Egypt and create a border against it.⁶ The ideology of an Achaemenid king helps explain why Artaxerxes should be so persistent. Darius' inscription at Behistun is replete with assertions of his kingly virtues: king of twenty-three lands, Darius punished him "who

⁴ C. J. Tuplin, "The Sick Man of Asia?," in *Greek Historiography in the Fourth Century*, ed. G. Parmeggiani (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Forthcoming), 211-38. I wish to thank Prof. Tuplin for this reference.

⁵ First campaign: below, p. 38. Second campaign: below, pp. 144-59. Third campaign: below, pp. 259-60. Fourth campaign: below, pp. 292-93, 299.

⁶ Jan P. Stronk, "Review: Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire 525-332 BCE," *CJ Online* 2013.01.01 (2013): 2.

was faithless" (§8), overthrew revolts, and restored order.⁷ Artaxerxes, a century later, was party to the same ethos. And the wealth of Egypt must have played a role – modern scholarship accepts the importance of this factor.⁸

The Greeks understood the importance of Egypt during Artaxerxes' reign. In planning the invasion of the 370s, Artaxerxes is alleged to have been a meddlesome micromanager (Diod. 15.41.2). The King's Peace rescript of 375/4 is also framed in terms of Persia's need for Greek mercenaries (Diod. 15.38.1). In addition, the practicalities of invading Egypt affected Achaemenid decision making. Cyrus the Younger in 401 demonstrated how far a force could penetrate into the Persian heartland. Afterwards, Artaxerxes avoided a repeat of the circumstances Cyrus exploited. He would not invade Egypt again while Asia Minor was in unrest. Cyprus was equally important, as it held a strategic position alongside Phoenicia, where the ships and armies were marshalled for the invasions of Egypt.⁹ The Persians also needed to work with the Arabians before engaging Egypt. The king of the Arabs was important for facilitating the march into Egypt (for Cambyses in Hdt. 3.88), had a history of siding with the Egyptians (Diod. 13.46.6), and in the 380s was again hostile to the Persians (Diod. 15.2.2-3).¹⁰ The reformation of defences throughout Philistia in the fourth century is further evidence of the effort the Persians expended in order to settle these key territories.¹¹ Without stability in Anatolia, Cyprus, and Phoenicia, preparations for the reclamation of Egypt were stymied.¹²

⁷ Amélie Kuhrt, ed. *The Persian Empire: A Corpus of Sources from the Achaemenid Period* (London: Routledge, 2007), §5.A.1.

⁸ E.g. L. Llewellyn-Jones, "The Great Kings of the Fourth Century and the Greek Memory of the Persian Past," in *Greek Notions of the Past in the Archaic and Classical Eras: History without Historians*, ed. John Marincola, L. Llewellyn-Jones, and Calum Alasdair Maciver (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 319.

⁹ Gordon Shrimpton, "Persian Strategy against Egypt and the Date for the Battle of Citium," *Phoenix* 45, no. 1 (1991): 5-6.

¹⁰ See also Pierre Briant, *From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire*, trans. Peter T. Daniels (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2002), 685-86.

¹¹ See below, pp. 225-26.

¹² See, for further discussion of the Persian preoccupation with Egypt, Stephen Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BCE* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), xx-xxi.

In the course of considering the practicalities of Artaxerxes' goals, the Orientalist portrayals of him which pervade the ancient sources and have coloured modern understanding do not have to be accepted. Nonetheless, owing to the absence of a coherent modern analysis of Artaxerxes' reign, fragments of information have been used to perpetuate an idea that Artaxerxes responded emotionally to events on the periphery. These include a brief reference to Artaxerxes' hatred of the Spartans (*Art.* 22.1),¹³ and the notion that he acted in certain ways out of fear (e.g. responding to Evagoras: *Isoc.* 9.58-59).¹⁴ With the following reassessment, focus may instead be on the broader political context which dictated Artaxerxes' behaviour.

Historiographical Considerations

There exists, at the moment, sparse archaeological evidence which sheds light on the political affairs of Artaxerxes' empire.¹⁵ The floor of Artaxerxes' palace is extant,¹⁶ as is his tomb.¹⁷ So too do many formulaic inscriptions survive.¹⁸ But this

¹³ See below, pp. 89n11, 306-07.

¹⁴ In modern discussion, this frequently manifests as fear of a repeat of Cyrus' march. E.g. Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 130 in the context of Datames' raid across the Euphrates (*Polyaen.* 7.21.3); see also p. 102 on the recruitment of Greek mercenaries well before the 370s invasion of Egypt was launched (the move is attributed to fear of Greek mercenaries hired by the Egyptians). While the sentiment is plausible in Ruzicka's reconstruction of Datames' strike, the logic requires critical analysis before it is used. Stephen Ruzicka, "Glos, Son of Tamos, and the End of the Cypriot War," *Historia* 48, no. 1 (1999): 29 similarly makes the claim that Orontes' charges against Tiribazus (*Diod.* 15.8) conjured memories and fears of Cyrus in Artaxerxes. The assertion is dismissed below, p. 187. Michael Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt", 366-360 B.C.: Concerning Local Instability in the Achaemenid Far West* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1989), 42-43 also argues that Autophradates conjured fear of the conditions Cyrus exploited in order to have Ariobarzanes declared a rebel. Weiskopf's speculation is based on no evidence (see further below, pp. 282-84). See also Weiskopf on Artaxerxes' response to Evagoras (below, p. 139n183), and on removing Tiribazus from office in the 390s (below, p. 132n151).

¹⁵ E.g. Peter Magee et al., "The Achaemenid Empire in South Asia and Recent Excavations in Akra in Northwest Pakistan," *AJA* 109 (2005): 716-17. This is not to say that archaeology has no place for understanding Achaemenid history. When available and pertinent I shall make use of any evidence. See also the comments of L. Khatchadourian, "The Achaemenid Provinces in Archaeological Perspective," in *A Companion to the Archaeology of the Ancient Near East*, ed. Daniel T. Potts (London: Blackwell, 2012), 964.

¹⁶ R. Boucharlat and A. Labrousse, "Le palais d'Artaxerxès II sur la rive droite du Chaour à Suse," *CDAFI* 10 (1979): 19-136.

¹⁷ Erich F. Schmidt, *Persepolis III: The Royal Tombs and Other Monuments* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 99-102.

evidence has little bearing on the nature of Artaxerxes' characterisation among modern commentators. In order to understand the history of Artaxerxes' reign, we must turn to the Greek and Latin authors.

For this reason, Achaemenid history remains "snared within the coils of its ancient Greek narrative sources. It can argue for a change of optic, a view from Persepolis rather than Athens. It cannot in a truly meaningful sense overcome the Greek sources as evidence. Instead it has to confront them on their own terrain."¹⁹ The historian must revise and reinterpret the same literary works again and again. How can we truly mark what is new in Achaemenid history?²⁰

Notwithstanding these difficulties, Artaxerxes' reign leaves us better informed than the reigns of kings who have historically captured the interests of scholars, for example Cyrus the Great, Darius the Great, and Xerxes. For the political situation of fifth century Achaemenid monarchs, one must review Herodotus and the scant references available elsewhere. No extant literary sources are contemporary with the reigns of the most famous Achaemenids, and the abundant administrative records of Persepolis (the *PFT* and *PTT*) cannot reconstruct history. What little information is preserved in royal inscriptions poses challenges comparable to the Greek sources.

For Artaxerxes, however, we have two contemporaries in Xenophon and Isocrates. There is Plutarch's *Life of Artaxerxes*, which transmits information from

¹⁸ F. Vallat, "Les inscriptions du palais d'Artaxerxès II," *CDAFI* 10 (1979): 171-80; F. Vallat, "Les inscriptions du palais d'Artaxerxès II à Babylone," *NAPR* 2 (1989): 3-6; F. Vallat, "Les principales inscriptions achéménides à Suse," in *Le palais de Darius à Suse: une résidence royale sur la route de Persépolis à Babylone*, ed. Jean Perrot (Paris: PUPS, 2010), 300-17.

¹⁹ T. C. McCaskie, "'As on a Darkling Plain': Practitioners, Publics, Propagandists, and Ancient Historiography," *CSSH* 54, no. 1 (2012): 171. See also M. Van de Mieroop, "On Writing a History of the Ancient Near East," *BO* 54 (1997): 287-88; M. Van de Mieroop, "Recent Trends in the Study of Ancient Near Eastern History: Some Reflections," *JAH* 1, no. 1 (2013): 92-94. Following the excerpt on p. 1 of this thesis, Harrison goes on to discuss the difficulties and dangers of distilling a Persian version of events from the Greek sources: T. Harrison, *Writing Ancient Persia*, Classical Essays 5 (London: Bristol Classical Press, 2011), 19-38.

²⁰ As Pierre Briant asked in his 'Noruz lecture' in 2001, available at: <http://fis-iran.org/en/programs/noruzlectures/acheamenid-history> [sic]. Revised and expanded in Pierre Briant, "New Trends in Achaemenid History," *AHB* 17, no. 1-2 (2003): 33-47, but the revised product does not include comments on the habit of "painful epistemological questioning of the real results of the research."

another contemporary, Ctesias.²¹ Ctesias also survives in Photius' summary. Plutarch also cites Deinon's *Persica*.²² Furthermore, we have Diodorus, who relies heavily on another contemporary, Ephorus.²³ Finally, there is the fragmentary *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, Theopompus, and Philochorus. In the case of these resources, this work follows Sancisi-Weerdenburg's call for continual engagement with the Hellenic authors and their context, and relates what may be discovered from a rereading of the sources which resulted in the current depiction of Artaxerxes.²⁴ To these western sources we can add Babylonian astronomical texts.²⁵ While this source tradition is highly complex, the extensive analysis which has taken place over the preceding decades provides a firm foundation on which to build an analysis.

Artaxerxes' seal appeared at least twice in the West during his reign, on both occasions when a decision was made at court (*Hell.* 5.1.30, 7.1.39). Artaxerxes married a daughter to Pharnabazus, arguably the most prominent Persian satrap in the Greek sources (*Art.* 27.4; *Hell.* 5.1.28). More information about Greek missions to the court of the Achaemenid king is available between 404 and 358 than during any other reign. Tithraustes, the king's chiliarch (*Nep. Con.* 3), was present on the western periphery throughout the 390s, distributing funds and appointing commanders (e.g. *Hell. Oxy.*

²¹ On Ctesias' status as a historian, see below, p. 15n1

²² On Plutarch's sources, see the survey of Carsten Binder, "Plutarch und Ktesias. Beobachtungen zu den Quellen der Artaxerxes-Vita," in *Ktesias' Welt | Ktesias' World*, ed. Josef Wiesehofer, R. Rollinger, and G. B. Lanfranchi (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2011), 53-69.

²³ P. J. Stylianou, *A Historical Commentary on Diodorus Siculus, Book 15* (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press, 1998), 49-50. Cf. Kenneth S. Sacks, "Diodorus and his Sources: Conformity and Creativity," in *Greek Historiography*, ed. Simon Hornblower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 213-32 on Diodorus' originality, esp. pp. 216-17 on his adaptation of Ephorus.

²⁴ Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg, "The Fifth Oriental Monarchy and Hellenocentrism: Cyropaedia VIII viii and its Influence," in *The Greek Sources*, ed. Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Amélie Kuhrt, Achaemenid History 2 (Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, 1987), 131. In 2007, the call was reiterated with the addition that "the work of re-examining Greek historical writing on Persia is still far from complete": John O. Hyland, "Thucydides' Portrait of Tissaphernes Re-examined," in *Persian Responses: Political and Cultural Interaction with (in) the Achaemenid Empire*, ed. C. J. Tuplin (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2007), 1. See also Hermann Bengtson, *Einführung in die alte Geschichte*, 6th ed. (München: Beck, 1969), 85.

²⁵ See, generally, Amélie Kuhrt, "Survey of Written Sources Available for the History of Babylonia Under the Later Achaemenids (concentrating on the period from Artaxerxes II to Darius III)," in *Sources, Structures and Synthesis*, ed. Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Amélie Kuhrt, Achaemenid History 1 (Leiden: 1987), 147-55.

19.3). We know that Artaxerxes took an active role in his administration by the substitutions he made (e.g. Tiribazus and Strouthas), and the punishments he meted out (e.g. to Orontes). In addition to these details, we know of the extensive royal road system which kept the king informed of events on the periphery of the empire.²⁶ And we know that Artaxerxes kept a close eye on the West, as a result of his interest in Egypt and the delicate political balance to be orchestrated prior to any invasion.

The numismatic evidence for this period is also noteworthy. Satrapal coinage flourished under Artaxerxes. During his reign, mints in the West began to produce intricate blends of local, Achaemenid, and Hellenic art. The iconographic innovations which occurred in the first half of the fourth century, when considered alongside the political situation, provide insight into the relationship between centre and periphery.

We may therefore be positive about the amount of information available for the reign of Artaxerxes.²⁷ While the conclusions regarding the Achaemenid Empire must be acknowledged as reasoned inferences,²⁸ and one must acknowledge the concerns regarding any 'laundering' of the Greek evidence and the ultimate accuracy of those inferences,²⁹ this is also true of all history.³⁰ Briant was correct to assert that some information can be found amongst the Greek evidence.³¹

The information that is available for Persia between 404 and 358 has never been assembled or interpreted for Artaxerxes' sake. The facts have been marshalled for sundry purposes. They should not be *the* facts about Artaxerxes. Carr noted the capacity of facts, when arranged in a certain order, to misrepresent history.³² That is

²⁶ D. F. Graf, "The Persian Royal Road System," in *Continuity and Change*, ed. Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg, Amélie Kuhrt, and Margaret Cool Root, Achaemenid History 8 (Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, 1994), 167-89; Henry P. Colburn, "Connectivity and Communication in the Achaemenid Empire," *JESHO* 56, no. 1 (2013): 29-52 (which calculates that it takes twelve days for a message to travel from Sardis to Susa).

²⁷ Cf. Chester G. Starr, "Greeks and Persians in the Fourth Century B.C. A Study in Cultural Contacts before Alexander (Part 1)," *IA* 11 (1975): 61; G. L. Cawkwell, "The King's Peace," *CQ* 31, no. 1 (1981): 69: "nothing about Xenophon's *Hellenica* is more outrageous than his treatment of the relations of Persia and the Greeks."

²⁸ Harrison, *Writing Ancient Persia*, 45-47.

²⁹ Harrison, "Reinventing Ancient Persia," 17; McCaskie, "As on a Darkling Plain," 164.

³⁰ Geoffrey Barraclough, *History in a Changing World* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1955), 14.

³¹ Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 8, 256.

³² E. H. Carr, *What is History?*, 2nd ed. (London: Penguin, 1987; reprint, 2008), 11.

often the case with Persia. Consequently, this thesis will address a range of disparate events and cumulatively demonstrate that modern commentators up to this point have only superficially engaged with the information available. Artaxerxes has been unfairly maligned as a result of the lack of consideration of the broader issues facing him.

Thesis Structure

Chapter One:

The opening chapter is a reconstruction of the first part of Artaxerxes' reign. The first section collates what is known of Artaxerxes' early life, and the events which led to his accession. It then traces the arrest of Cyrus the Younger, and his plot to wrest the throne from Artaxerxes. In discussing Cyrus' march, what little information is available to determine the royal response is compiled. The battle of Cunaxa is reassessed in depth: Xenophon's report of Egyptians at Cunaxa is analysed, and the thesis of the royal left-flank's 'intentional retreat' evaluated. In the final section, the repercussions of the revolt are presented.

Chapter Two:

This chapter analyses the key events of the 390s from a Persian perspective, namely the Spartan invasions of Asia Minor, the construction of a new Achaemenid fleet and its victory at Cnidus, the revolt of Evagoras, and the development of Artaxerxes' first campaign to reclaim Egypt. Throughout this chapter Egypt and the requirement for peace in Asia Minor are argued to have been the determiners of Achaemenid behaviour.

It first establishes that Persian responses to the Spartans reflect a coordinated effort to restrict Spartan movement to regions north of Caria and Cilicia. The latter was a site for the construction of the new fleet, alongside Phoenicia (*Hell.* 3.4.1) and Cyprus (Diod. 14.39.1-2). The strategy responded to the limitations of Agesilaus' army (his was a small expeditionary force, with limited supplies). To lengthen Agesilaus' expedition and drain his force served Persian interests. The satraps focused defence on key Achaemenid sites, while avoiding pitched battle.

Section two argues that the fleet constructed and operated by Pharnabazus and Conon was part of a plan to create a peaceful buffer between Asia and mainland Greece, and that Athens was a crucial partner as a counterweight to Sparta.

Section three reassesses scholarly portrayal of Evagoras I of Salamis and the beginnings of his revolt. It also examines the administrative changes which took place in western Asia over the course of the 390s. These changes are also indicative of Artaxerxes' efforts to encourage stability in the western empire after the tumult caused by Cyrus' rebellion.

Section four assesses the hypothesis of George Cawkwell, who posited that the first invasion of Egypt under Artaxerxes occurred after 392/1.

Chapter Three:

The function of this chapter is twofold. In the first section, the King's Peace will be discussed. Scholarship on the Peace has largely remained idle since the 1990s.³³ While most arguments have concerned the clauses of the Peace as they relate to Greek ambitions, this section probes Artaxerxes' aims. What did he hope to achieve? Was the Peace successful from a Persian point of view? Is it fair to say that the Greeks exploited the terms of the Peace? The first section emphasises that Artaxerxes probably did not care if the King's Peace truly resulted in peace in Greece; the agreement was to serve Artaxerxes' own ends.

³³ Cawkwell, "King's Peace," 69-83 and Ralf Urban, *Der Königsfrieden von 387/86 v. Chr: Vorgeschichte, Zustandekommen, Ergebnis und politische Umsetzung* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1991), *passim* remain the most thorough examinations. These may be supplemented with T. T. B. Ryder, *Koine Eirene: General Peace and Local Independence in Ancient Greece* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 34-36; Robin Seager, "The King's Peace and the Balance of Power in Greece 386-362 BC," *Athenaeum* 52 (1974): 36-63; R. K. Sinclair, "The King's Peace and the Employment of Military and Naval Forces," *Chiron* 8 (1978): 29-54; E. Badian, "The King's Peace," in *Georgica: Greek Studies in Honour of George Cawkwell*, ed. Michael A. Flower and Mark Toher, BICS Supplement 58 (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 1991), 25-48; Martin Jehne, *Koine Eirene: Untersuchungen zu den Befriedungs- und Stabilisierungsbemühungen in der griechischen Poliswelt des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1994), 31-48; I. A. F. Bruce, "Philochorus on the King's Peace," in *In Altum: Seventy-Five Years of Classical Studies in Newfoundland*, ed. M. Joyal (St John's, Newfoundland: 2001), 57-62; John Buckler, *Aegean Greece in the Fourth Century BC* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2003), 167-180; Sviatoslav Dmitriev, *The Greek Slogan of Freedom and Early Roman Politics in Greece* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 27-31, app. 4.

The second section focuses on the Cypriot revolt and the chronology of the 380s. This section undertakes a broad analysis of the various issues at hand. It proposes that there was a Cadusian campaign in this decade, and challenges the idea that the battle at Citium must have taken place in 386.

Chapter Four:

Whereas the other chapters of this thesis discuss Artaxerxes' acts on a large scale, this chapter turns to a smaller study of material culture under Artaxerxes. Coins present physical evidence, detached from the bias of the literary sources, to examine the relationship between the periphery and Artaxerxes' court. In chapter four, several ideas are presented.

First, a general portrait of numismatics under Artaxerxes is provided. This includes the evidence for Achaemenid expenditure under Artaxerxes, the rise of satrapal coinage, and the evidence for the growth of coinage in the eastern empire.

The second section considers satrapal engagement with the central authority in its clearest form: Tiribazus' Baal/Figure in the winged disc silver staters. As there has been no effective analysis of these series, it begins with a die-study. The iconography of the reverse is then discussed in depth. It is argued that numismatists should recognise current discourse on the figure in the winged disc, and cease referring to him as Ahuramazda. The reverse type is then examined in view of its historical context. The iconography sends a clear political message of solidarity with the central authority. As a case study, these coins are an effective demonstration that, in contrast to claims that Artaxerxes was withdrawn (above, p. xx), his influence was felt even at the periphery of the empire.

The third section embarks on a broader survey of Achaemenid influenced iconography in Samaria and Philistia. Current scholarship has focused only on the image of the king of Persia on coins, but Achaemenid influence is more pronounced than previously has been noted. The iconography is especially significant owing to the military presence of the Achaemenids in the Levant throughout the reign of Artaxerxes (while they marshalled for the invasions of Egypt). The frequent adoption of

Achaemenid iconography appears to have reflected this heavy presence of Persians in the area.

Chapter Five:

The 370s are an intermission in the discussion of Artaxerxes. Little is heard about the king or his court in this decade except in its relation to Egypt. Therefore, this chapter sheds light on the events of the decade which did not receive attention in Ruzicka's reconstruction.³⁴ The first section discusses Persian planning for the invasion of Egypt, including the logic behind the selection of commanders, the diplomatic manoeuvring to facilitate the invasion, and its success. The second section provides an overview of the campaign itself.

Historically, this period of the empire has been seen as proof of decline – Olmstead, for example, heads a section on this period "Disintegration in Asia."³⁵ On the face of it, one can see evidence for this belief with the latest failure in Egypt, but it should not be accepted without reflection.

Chapter Six:

The final chapter of this work reconsiders one of the most controversial episodes of Artaxerxes' reign, the Great Satraps' Revolt. The debate now encompasses the very title. Was this a 'Great Satraps' Revolt' or the product of local instability? For the sake of neutrality, the affair is here called the 'Satraps' Revolt.'³⁶

Commentators are divided between those who believe the revolt was a large, cohesive effort,³⁷ and those who follow Weiskopf's thesis – that the revolt was a series

³⁴ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 99-121.

³⁵ A. T. Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 405.

³⁶ Similar to Moysey's use of 'General Satrapal Revolt': Robert A. Moysey, "Observations on the Numismatic Evidence relating to the Great Satrap Revolt of 362/1," *REA* 91, no. 1 (1989): 116. Cf. J. M. Cook, *The Persian Empire* (London: Book Club Associates, 1983), 220-21 which also terms the instability 'Satraps' Revolts.'

³⁷ E.g. Simon Hornblower, "The Great Satraps' Revolt/Review: The So-Called 'Great Satraps' Revolt', 366-360 B.C.: Concerning Local Instability in the Achaemenid Far West by Michael Weiskopf," *CR* 40, no. 2 (1990): 363-65; Robert A. Moysey, "Diodoros, the Satraps and the Decline of the Persian Empire," *AHB* 5 (1991): 113-22; Robert A. Moysey, "Plutarch, Nepos and the Satrapal Revolt of 362/1 B.C.," *Historia* 41, no. 2 (1992): 158-68.

of localised rebellions.³⁸ The distinction is not, however, binary: the best way to conceptualise the revolt is in between the two opposing arguments. The satraps did support one another for the purposes of securing their separation from the central authority, but this only occurred when it was convenient. To oversimplify momentarily, the rebels were opportunists, taking advantage of their autonomy to improve their situations. They would operate in tandem where it suited their purposes, but, as the end of the revolt shows, survival overrode any desire to cooperate.

In this decade Artaxerxes also altered his long standing pro-Sparta policy. Artaxerxes did not turn to Athens (which would fit his usual methods for subduing the Greeks), but to Thebes. The change in policy is particularly interesting for its implications in light of instability in the western empire.

The tale of the king's decline in the final chapters of the *Life of Artaxerxes* permits the inference of a relationship between the timing of the Satraps' Revolt and a loss of authority in the centre. It remains disconcerting that Diodorus refers to the Satraps' Revolt (15.90-91), but is silent on these tales of court intrigue, while Plutarch, on the other hand, describes court machinations in Persia with no reference to revolt in the West. What truth can be derived from the end of Plutarch's *Life*?

Conclusion:

As a summary discussion, the final section surveys diplomacy in the reign of Artaxerxes. The evidence for his role in determining his kingdom's relations with the Greeks is accumulated as final evidence for his *modus operandi*. The conclusion further serves to illustrate that Artaxerxes did not fail to take interest in the periphery and the preservation of the empire's borders. To the contrary, Artaxerxes had a pragmatic

³⁸ Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, *passim*; R. B. Stevenson, *Persica: Greek Writing about Persia in the Fourth Century B.C.*, Scottish Classical Studies 5 (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1997), 101; Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 993, 997. Cf. the treatment of P. Debord, *L'Asie mineure au IV^e Siècle (412-323 a. C.). Pouvoirs et jeux politiques* (Paris: De Boccard, 1999), 302-74 and comment in Pierre Briant, *Bulletin d'Histoire Achéménide II*, *Persika* 1 (Paris: Éditions Tothm, 2001), 95.

approach to the border which, owing to the independence of Egypt at this time, occupied the centre of his attention.

CHAPTER ONE

The Early Reign of Artaxerxes II

The Birth of Artaxerxes to Cyrus' Challenge

The story of Artaxerxes' pre-accession life is a lesson in the frustrations of Achaemenid history. Dependence on fragmentary and faulty source material limits what can be said in any straightforward, accessible manner.¹ Nonetheless, there are references sound enough to permit a reconstruction.

Artaxerxes had, like his father, adopted a regnal name upon accession. The practice had been initiated by Darius II in an effort to associate this new branch of the Achaemenid royal family with its predecessors.² Four variants of Artaxerxes' pre-accession name are preserved. Ctesias is credited with two: Arsicas via Plutarch (Ctes. F15 a a), and Arsaces via Photius (Ctes. F15.51). Deinon, also recorded in Plutarch, identifies the name as Oarses (F14). Babylonian astronomical diaries use *Aršu* – "Arses who [is called King] Artaxerxes."³ These variants are not incompatible or contradictory. The Arsaces/Arsicas variation found within Ctesias may be a

¹ Broadly, see Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 5-9. See also, for example, the recent scholarship on the value of Ctesias: Jan P. Stronk, "Ctesias of Cnidus, a Reappraisal," *Mnemosyne* 60, no. 1 (2007): 25-58; L. Llewellyn-Jones and J. Robson, eds., *Ctesias' History of Persia: Tales of the Orient* (London: Routledge, 2010), 1-7; C. J. Tuplin, "Ctesias as Military Historian," in *Die Welt des Ktesias | Ctesias' World*, ed. Josef Wiesehofer, R. Rollinger, and G. B. Lanfranchi, *Classica et Orientalia* 1 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2011), 449-88; Eran Almagor, "Ctesias and the Importance of His Writings Revisited," *Electrum* 19 (2012): 9-40. On the dangers of an uncritical reading of Ctesias: Henry P. Colburn, "Orientalism, Postcolonialism, and the Achaemenid Empire: Meditations on Bruce Lincoln's Religion, Empire, and Torture," *BICS* 54, no. 2 (2011): 91-94.

² R. Van der Spek, "The Astronomical Diaries as a Source for Achaemenid and Seleucid History," *BO* 50 (1993): 95.

³ Examples are compiled in Abraham J. Sachs, "Achaemenid Royal Names in Babylonian Astronomical Texts," *AJAH* 2 (1977): 132-39.

transcription of the original Old Persian with the hypocoristic suffix **-ka-* or **-ika-*.⁴ The versions of Ctesias may reflect the affectionate, personal name employed by members of the royal family (with whom Ctesias was familiar).⁵ Schmitt's emendation of Oarses to ὁ Ἀρσῆς renders the Greek and Babylonian versions complementary.⁶ Thus, unlike any other variant, Deinon's version is corroborated by independent evidence. As a result, Plutarch's dismissal of Deinon's variation is unfair (*Art.* 1.2).⁷ Deinon appears to have provided the most accurate version of the original name: Arses.

Artaxerxes' date of birth is a similar trial, and some evidence may be dismissed as false. Plutarch, for example, claims that Artaxerxes was king for sixty-two years (*Art.* 30.5). Given Artaxerxes III Ochus' accession in 359/8, a sixty-two year reign would place Artaxerxes' accession in 421, seventeen years before Darius II died.⁸ In addition, Deinon records Artaxerxes' age at death as ninety-four (F20b b), placing his birth in 453/2. Lucian also provides an advanced age at Artaxerxes' death: eighty-six (*Macr.* 15), placing his date of birth in 445/4. Such early dates of birth are inconsistent with evidence of Ctesias. The physician states that Darius and Parysatis had thirteen children: two (the eldest, a girl, Amestris, and Artaxerxes himself) were born prior to Darius' accession in 424. The following eleven, beginning with Cyrus the Younger, came afterwards (F15.51; cf. *An.* 1.1.1 which claims Darius and Parysatis only had two children).⁹ Ctesias reports that only Amestris, Artaxerxes, Cyrus, Artostes, and

⁴ R. Schmitt, "Achaemenid Throne-Names," *AION* 42 (1982): 92.

⁵ Dominique Lenfant, ed. *La Perse, l'Inde, autres fragments* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 2004), 275n632. Cf. A. Nichols, *The Complete Fragments of Ctesias of Cnidus: Translation and Commentary with an Introduction* (University of Florida: Doctoral Thesis, 2008), 188: "However, this is based on the assumption that the Persians affectionately employed the diminutive as a term of endearment in the same manner as the Greeks."

⁶ R. Schmitt, "Thronnamen bei den Achaimeniden," *BN, Neue Folge* 12 (1977): 423. Pace Stevenson, *Persica*, 77.

⁷ Cf. *Plut. Mor.* 340c (= *De Alex. fort.* 2.8), discussed below, p. 20.

⁸ Ochus' date of accession may be determined from *BM* 71537. See Leo Depuydt, *From Xerxes' Murder (465) to Arridaïos' Execution (317): Updates to Achaemenid Chronology (including errata in past reports)* (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2008), 37.

⁹ Cf. the suspicion cast on the entire claim of Cyrus' birth 'in the purple' by Dominique Lenfant, "La 'décadence' du Grand Roi et les ambitions de Cyrus le Jeune: aux sources perses d'un mythe occidental?," *REG* 114 (2001): 413-14. This would challenge the following chronological remarks, for Cyrus' age is used below as a possible complement for aging Artaxerxes. In the absence of evidence to disprove Ctesias' claim, I accept that Cyrus was born post-424. Lenfant's suggestion is plausible, however, and so these chronological notes should be considered tentative.

Oxendras survived for long. In addition to these siblings, we may add an illegitimate son of Darius who appears in the *Anabasis* (2.4.25). Plutarch's account also includes another brother, Ostanes, who is probably a variant rendering of Artostes (*Art.* 22.6).¹⁰ Ostanes' closeness to the imperial family is confirmed by the fact that his grandson is proclaimed king in 338/7 through the machinations of Bagoas (Diod. 17.5).

Besides Cyrus and Amestris, no siblings appear frequently in the source traditions. In order to accept both Ctesias and Deinon's information, one requires an improbable twenty-nine year gap (minimum) between Parysatis' second and third child.¹¹ Ctesias, as the king's physician, should be trusted to know the age of the king and his siblings over later authors (he claims to have garnered the information about the children from Parysatis herself: Ctes. F15.51¹²). The number of children born after Darius became king should also be cause for doubt, if a (minimum) twenty year gap between second and third child is accepted. It would be inexplicable for Parysatis to have two children, then have none for twenty years, then eleven more after becoming queen. Deinon and Lucian's figures should not be accepted.¹³

The most reliable method of determining the date of Artaxerxes' birth is through his marriage and the birth of his first child. The marriage of Artaxerxes and Stateira is said to have been after the three revolts against Darius II in Ctesias (F15.55), ca. 415.¹⁴ In addition, as factions in the succession struggle begin to form in the mid-

¹⁰ Nichols, *Fragments of Ctesias*, 185.

¹¹ It is made explicit in Ctes. F15.51 (also *Art.* 2.3) that they were Parysatis' children, not a concubine's.

¹² Cf. Lenfant, "La 'décadence' du Grand Roi," 414, who distrusts the information for the very reason that it came from Parysatis, who may have been attempting to legitimise Cyrus' position.

¹³ *Contra* Carsten Binder, *Plutarch's Vita des Artaxerxes: Ein historischer Kommentar* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 85.

¹⁴ 415 is the date determined by Stevenson, *Persica*, 75. On the dating of these revolts, see also D. M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, Cincinnati Classical Studies: New Series 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 80-81nn198-99.

360s, Darius, his son, is said to be fifty (*Art.* 26.2).¹⁵ Darius' date of birth is therefore ca. 415, aligning with the date for Artaxerxes' marriage inferred here. It must have been hoped at court that the king's eldest son's marriage would lead promptly to the birth of an heir, given the importance of continuing the family's hold on the throne. Furthermore, the marriage of Amestris and Terituchmes is complementary. Should they have been married at approximately the same time as Artaxerxes and Stateira (Ctesias is ambiguous, but it is plausible, as both marriages are related in tandem: Ctes. F15.55), and conceived a child at approximately the same time, Mitrdates' actions in the revolt of Terituchmes align with the above dating. Mitrdates seized the city of Zaris, and "was guarding it for the son of Terituchmes" (...καὶ πόλιν Ζάριν καταλαβών, ἐφύλασσε ταύτην τῷ παιδί τοῦ Τεριτούχμεω: Ctes. F15.56). Ctesias may have been indicating that Terituchmes' son by Amestris was not at this time capable of holding the city himself, and so Mitrdates was guarding the city until he came of age (not necessarily a long time: see below on age of maturity). The marriage of Stateira and Artaxerxes ca. 415 is, therefore, supported by a number of other details.

It is also reasonable to infer that Artaxerxes was at least fifteen when he married. Fifteen is traditionally the age of religious maturity in Zoroastrianism (though this assumes that Avestan texts, composed much later, may shed light on fifth century BC Achaemenids),¹⁶ and at sixteen or seventeen boys are enrolled as young men (Xen.

¹⁵ Cf. C. Lindskog and K. Ziegler, eds., *Plutarchus Vitae Parallelae*, 2nd ed., vol. 3.1 (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1971), 346: the Loeb's πεντηκοστόν may be amended to πέμπτον καὶ εἰκοστόν. This has led Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 1002 to say "Plutarch's presentation implies on the contrary that the decision goes back to shortly after the battle of Cunaxa; Darius was without doubt born around 424 (cf. Ctesias [in *FGrHist*] §45), so he was about 25 around 400 (hence the attempts to correct the manuscripts in this direction)." This is unsatisfactory to me, as Plutarch says that Artaxerxes made the decision to name an heir because he was advanced in years (thus precluding a date of 400). Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that Artaxerxes would not marry until after 420, but have begot his eldest son by 424. This being the case, I accept the reading as πεντηκοστόν, and that the events took place in the 360s. R. B. Stevenson, "Lies and Invention in Deinon's Persica," in *The Greek Sources*, ed. Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Amélie Kuhrt, Achaemenid History 2 (Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, 1987), 33 and Binder, *Kommentar*, 336 also date *Art.* 26 to the 360s.

¹⁶ *Vendidad* 18.54; Jenny Rose, *Zoroastrianism: an Introduction* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2011), 4. There is also the question of whether the Achaemenids were Zoroastrian: see Jean Kellens, "Questions préalables," in *La religion iranienne à l'époque achéménide*, ed. Jean Kellens, *Suppléments à Iranica antiqua* 5 (Gent: Brill, 1991), 81-86, and more recent summary in P. O. Skjærvø, "Achaemenid Religion," *Religion Compass* 8, no. 6 (2014): 181-83.

Cyr. 1.2.9). If Artaxerxes was approximately fifteen when he married ca. 415, one may conclude that 430 is a reasonable *terminus ante quem* for his birth. While it is not impossible that Artaxerxes was born in the 450s or 440s, the relative timing of the births that Ctesias provides introduces an improbable gap for Parysatis to have had no children. Accordingly, I prefer the 430s as the most plausible period in which Artaxerxes was born.

Three other facts support the 430s. First, the *terminus post quem* for the birth of Artaxerxes' first daughter ca. 415 means that she was almost fifteen when married to Orontes (in or before 401: *An.* 3.4.13) – an appropriate age. Secondly, the appointment of Cyrus the Younger as overlord of Asia at the age of sixteen is confirmation that Achaemenids considered maturity to be reached at approximately fifteen.¹⁷ Thirdly, Xenophon states that youths (aged between sixteen and twenty-seven) would pass their nights around government buildings, except those who are married (*Cyr.* 1.2.4). While we are left with a span of ten years during which it was normal enough for a male to be married, Xenophon may show that a marriage around the age of sixteen is possible. Furthermore, we know that marriage for the royal household was not an improvised matter, but was steeped in politics,¹⁸ and that Artaxerxes and Stateira possibly wed at the same time as Amestris married Terituchmes, Stateira's brother (Ctes. F15.55). If Artaxerxes was married at a young age, it may be explained by the political expediency of having his marriage coincide with that of his sister. Cumulatively, these inferences show that aging Artaxerxes at approximately fifteen when he married is reasonable.

The broad details of Artaxerxes' youth are comparatively easily reconstructed. We have no knowledge of his character besides Plutarch's assertion that he was gentler in everything and naturally milder in his impulses than Cyrus, though that should be treated with suspicion as it creates a tidy contrast between characters for Plutarch to exploit in the war between brothers later (*Art.* 2.1). As with all noble Persians, Artaxerxes would have been educated at the court of his father, and taught the

¹⁷ See below, p. 23. Cf. Lenfant, "La 'décadence' du Grand Roi," 413.

¹⁸ Maria Brosius, *Women in Ancient Persia, 559-331 BC* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 38, 42-47.

fundamentals of Persian virtue: to speak the truth, to shoot a bow, and to ride a horse (Hdt. 1.136). Early in the reign of Darius II, within the first seven years, Artaxerxes was granted a Babylonian estate.¹⁹ Estates of this kind were common amongst the Persian nobility, and they rarely required the direct attention of the owner. Land holdings were operated by local bailiffs. Artaxerxes' was managed by a single overseer – Labaši, son of Nabu-mit-uballit. The management of the estate was also linked to canal management and a complex series of administrative appointments. This Babylonian evidence aligns with an important stage of Artaxerxes' education. If Artaxerxes' birth is placed at some point in the 430s this estate appears to be listed in the prince's name as he is nearing adolescence. Furthermore, it was traditionally at sixteen or seventeen that Persian nobles would be treated as young men nearing adulthood. It was at this age that they would begin hunting with the king, and spend their days around government buildings, waiting to serve the authorities (Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.9). Given Artaxerxes' approximate age at the time this estate came into his name, it is possible that he spent some time being educated in the methods of administration here, amidst the routine lessons of the Magi.

Graf has also linked Artaxerxes to the royal courier service via Plutarch.²⁰ Plutarch refers to a certain Oarses, who through the machinations of Bagoas was stripped of the "garb of courier" and placed in the royal raiment (*De Alex. fort.* 2.8 = *Mor.* 340c). It is preferable to associate the name Oarses here with Arses, ruler from 338/7-336/5. The association should be made on the basis of two facts. First, no evidence attests to the role of Bagoas in Artaxerxes' accession, yet he is heavily featured in the investiture of Arses (Diod. 17.5). Furthermore, Plutarch rejects the name Oarses in association with Artaxerxes in his *Life* (1.2); it would be inexplicable for Plutarch to accept the name elsewhere. Even so, Artaxerxes may have been involved in the courier service in his youth. Like Artaxerxes, Darius III and Arses were not born

¹⁹ Matthew W. Stolper, *Entrepreneurs and Empire: the Murasû Archive, the Murasû Firm, and Persian Rule in Babylonia* (Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 1985), 54-62; M. A. Dandamaev, *Iranians in Achaemenid Babylonia*, Columbia Lectures on Iranian Studies 6 (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1992), 14-15.

²⁰ Graf, "The Persian Royal Road System," 167.

unto the king – they would enter the royal household through later machinations.²¹ They were, however, both part of the courier service (see above for Arses; Darius III: *Mor.* 327f; *Alex.* 18.5). Their participation in the institution may denote its position as a training program for high ranked Achaemenids. Xenophon similarly makes reference to the king's son responding to reports of unrest (*Cyr.* 8.6.16). Familiarity with the royal road and the operations of the empire through its courier service can only have been beneficial to a future administrator.

Circa 415 Artaxerxes married Stateira. Since Stateira was a daughter of Idernes, and at the same time Amestris married another of Idernes' children, Terituchmes, the marriage was a political statement (Ctes. F15.55). Although we have no extant evidence of Idernes' position, we can infer that he was of very senior rank. Possibly he was a descendant of Vidarna, one of Darius I's seven conspirators.²² Stateira herself received accolades from Ctesias, which Plutarch deemed worthy of inclusion in his own biography: she was a beautiful and excellent woman (*Art.* 2.1), who was also popular with the common people (*Art.* 5.3). Her popularity with the people, however, did not extend to her mother-in-law. Parysatis, Artaxerxes' mother, was the matriarch of the royal household. She emerged from the accession of Darius II as his chief advisor, and her machinations captured the imagination of Plutarch.²³ Yet Stateira was no delicate woman. She was equally deft in her manipulation of Artaxerxes and was capable of violent acts of retribution.²⁴ The volatile relationship between Stateira and Parysatis would come to a head in the following years.

Artaxerxes' loyalty to Stateira was cemented at a young age in the aftermath of the revolt of Terituchmes (Ctes. F15.55-56). Terituchmes loathed Amestris, having fallen passionately in love with his half-sister Rhoxane. He planned to kill his wife with an elaborate scheme involving a sack and three hundred knife-wielding accomplices, before launching a revolt. The extent of this revolt is unclear. It seems certain that Amestris herself was imprisoned, but the assassination did not materialise.

²¹ Darius III: Ael. *VH* 12.43; Diod. 17.5; Strabo 15.3.24. Arses (grandson of Ostanes): Diod. 17.5.

²² Lenfant, *La Perse*, 139n622; Nichols, *Fragments of Ctesias*, 186.

²³ Chief advisor: Ctes. F15.51. Plutarch: *Art.* 14-17, 19. Other tales: Ctes. F15.52, 56. Power: see Brosius, *Women in Ancient Persia*, 110-16.

²⁴ Manipulation: *Art.* 18.3. Violence: see treatment of Udiastes below, pp. 22-23.

A close friend of Terituchmes, Udiastes, learned of the reward offered for the freedom of Amestris, and so killed Terituchmes. The son of Udiastes, Mitrdates, was angered by his father's actions and so seized the city of Zaris, intending to hand it over to the son of Terituchmes. This is the extent of the revolt as it is preserved in Ctesias. In response to the rebellion, Parysatis ordered the entire family slain. Terituchmes' mother, two brothers and two sisters were buried alive, and Rhoxane was hewn in pieces. The son of Terituchmes, for whom Mitrdates held Zaris, evidently did not establish a revolt of any note, as he receives no mention. As a mark of his devotion to Stateira, though, Artaxerxes pleaded with Parysatis and convinced her to spare his wife. Curiously, it is Parysatis who ordered the death of Terituchmes' family, not Darius. This passage of Ctesias is somewhat confused: after Parysatis secured the death of the others by her own order, Darius ordered her to do the same to Stateira. It is tempting to attribute both orders to Parysatis alone, given her reputation, but this would be unfounded. More likely it was Darius who gave the order, to be fulfilled by his wife.²⁵ The revolt was a matter of extreme importance to the monarchy, and it is unlikely that Darius would leave his wife to take care of affairs without sanction. F15.56 was inserted with knowledge of later behaviour: "at the same time, Darius told Parysatis that she would greatly regret it [sparing Stateira] one day." It is probably Ctesian embellishment. Ctesias' authority is again called into question by the presence of Stateira's brother at negotiations with the Ten Thousand (*An.* 2.3.17), suggesting that the family-wide slaughter was not as complete as Ctesias indicates. Equally, no mention is made of Idernes (despite a number of other family members being explicitly named), or the unnamed son of Terituchmes. Perhaps Artaxerxes secured immunity for all innocent parties, not just his wife.

Following Stateira's reprieve, we find the first indication of her true character. At Stateira's command, the tongue of Udiastes (the killer of her brother, Terituchmes) was torn out by the roots, and he was left to die (Ctes. F16.58). If the summary of Photius reflects the chronological order of the original, it would appear that Stateira waited to take her revenge until after Artaxerxes had taken the throne. The timing

²⁵ Brosius, *Women in Ancient Persia*, 115-16.

would then also signify the growing influence of Stateira, who was defying the Parysatis and the late Darius by punishing the hero of the revolt. Parysatis was greatly aggrieved by the murder of Udiastes, and this, it seems, was one source of the enmity between Artaxerxes' wife and mother.

During this period Persia had been a third party in the Peloponnesian War. Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus operated independently in Greek affairs during this time, with the former having a greater influence on events.²⁶ The general strategy was to play the warring Greeks against each other, for the benefit of Persia.²⁷ This changed with the arrival of Cyrus the Younger in 407 (*Hell.* 1.4.1-4).

Cyrus was approximately sixteen years of age at the time (Darius' accession in 424 serving as a *terminus post quem* for his birth), and had been appointed satrap of Lydia, Greater Phrygia and Cappadocia, in addition to being commander of all troops which muster in the plain of Castolus (*An.* 1.9.7; *Hell.* 1.4.3-4). With this appointment, Darius mitigated the unconstructive competition between Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes. Cyrus met Pharnabazus on his journey west, who was escorting Athenians to see the king. Upon hearing the Athenians' desire, Cyrus responded that he did not care what Pharnabazus did with them, as long as they were not permitted to return home (*Hell.* 1.4.5-6). His treatment of the Athenian ambassadors signalled the change to a pro-Sparta Persian policy. If Sommerstein's interpretation of Aristophanes' *Frogs* (1026-29) is accepted, the alliance was a blow to Athenian confidence, and they looked forward to the end of Darius' reign.²⁸

Lysander met the prince in Sardis. It is at this point that we hear of the level of Persian commitment to their new Spartan allies – Cyrus was granted 500 talents to fund the war effort (*Hell.* 1.5.1-3). Cyrus' dedication to the cause, and to Lysander soon became apparent as he later granted Lysander access to all the tribute of the region, in addition to his personal funds (*Hell.* 2.1.14). This provision of funds comes at an important juncture and signifies the closeness of the relationship between Cyrus and

²⁶ See Jack Martin Balcer, "The Ancient Persian Satrapies and Satraps in Western Anatolia," *AMIran* 26 (1993): 84-88 on their positions.

²⁷ See Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 591-600.

²⁸ Alan H. Sommerstein, *Frogs* (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1996), 4-7; Llewellyn-Jones, "Great Kings of the Fourth Century," 342-43.

Lysander – the funds were granted at the moment when Cyrus departed to visit his father, effectively leaving Lysander to spend the money as he saw fit.

Lysander utilised these funds to outfit his fleet for the final offensive against Athens. In the months which followed he was victorious at Aegospotami, besieged Athens, received its surrender, and conquered the Athenians' last supporters at Samos.

Despite his abundant funds, Cyrus attempted to cause friction by withholding wages (*Hell.* 1.6.6-11). He similarly discarded the heretofore effective policy of Tissaphernes in playing the warring Greeks against each other. His pro-Spartan agenda was so overt that the Athenians resorted to asking Tissaphernes' assistance in contacting Darius (*Hell.* 1.5.8). On this basis, Flower is right to acknowledge that Xenophon's portrait is not universally positive as was traditionally thought by scholars.²⁹ Elsewhere, Cyrus was reported to be the favourite son of Parysatis (*Art.* 2.3), and it appears that from very early in his life he was groomed for a position of power. Lewis speculated that his appointment to the coastal satrapies was in anticipation of a possible succession struggle on the death of Darius.³⁰ As the favourite, it would be fitting that Cyrus is said to be "high strung and impetuous" (*Art.* 2.1). Given his characterisation by the Greeks, it may be safely asserted that Cyrus showed himself to be amiable (to his friends), and a capable satrap in his brief tenure (*An.* 1.1.5, 9.13).

During his time as governor, there is a glimpse of autocratic and contemptible behaviour in Cyrus (*Plut. Lys.* 6.5-7). We are also told that two of Cyrus' cousins were murdered for refusing him the honours usually reserved for a king. Darius was reluctant to impose a penalty for this atrocity, and it was only at the bidding of the victims' mother and father that Cyrus was recalled for punishment (*Hell.* 2.1.9). As a mark of the challenges of Cyrus' character, Darius recalled Cyrus under the guise of illness, perhaps fearing that his son would not obey if he knew the true reasons for his message. The chronology is, however, problematic. Despite asking for Cyrus' return for the sake of punishment (under the guise of illness), Darius did actually pass away in the same period.

²⁹ Michael A. Flower, *Xenophon's Anabasis, or, the Expedition of Cyrus* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 188-94.

³⁰ Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 134-35.

The passages concerning Cyrus' crime, departure, and Darius' death are preserved in Xenophon:

Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.1.8-10:

τούτῳ δὲ τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ καὶ Κῦρος ἀπέκτεινεν Αὐτοβοισάκην καὶ Μιτραῖον, υἱεῖς ὄντας τῆς Δαρειαίου ἀδελφῆς τῆς τοῦ Ξέρξου τοῦ Δαρείου πατρός, ὅτι αὐτῷ ἀπαντῶντες οὐ διέωσαν διὰ τῆς κόρης τὰς χεῖρας, ὃ ποιοῦσι βασιλεῖ μόνον: ἡ δὲ κόρη ἐστὶ μακρότερον ἢ χεῖρις, ἐν ἣ τὴν χεῖρα ἔχων οὐδὲν ἂν δύναιτο ποιῆσαι. Τεραμένης μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἔλεγον πρὸς Δαρειαῖον δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ περιόψεται τὴν λίαν ὕβριν τούτου: ὁ δὲ αὐτὸν μεταπέμπεται ὡς ἀρρωστών, πέμψας ἀγγέλους. τῷ δ' ἐπιόντι ἔτει...

"It was in this year that Cyrus put to death Autoboesaces and Mitraeus, who were sons of Darius' sister – the daughter of Darius' father Xerxes – because upon meeting him they did not thrust their hands through the *core*, an honour they show the king alone. (The *core* is a longer sleeve than the *cheiris*, and a man who had his hand in one would be powerless to do anything.) In consequence, Hieramenes and his wife said to Darius that it would be shameful if he were to overlook such wanton violence on the part of Cyrus; and Darius, on the plea that he was ill, sent messengers and summoned Cyrus to come to him. In the following year..."

Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.1.13:

Κῦρος δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις μετεπέμψατο Λύσανδρον, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ παρὰ τοῦ πατρός ἦκεν ἄγγελος λέγων ὅτι ἀρρωστών ἐκείνον καλοίη, ὦν ἐν Θαμνηρίοις τῆς Μηδίας ἐγγὺς Καδουσίων, ἐφ' οὓς ἐστράτευσεν ἀφεστῶτας.

"At this point Cyrus sent for Lysander, for a messenger had come to him from his father with word that he was ill and summoned him, he being at Thamneria, in Media, near the country of the Cadusians, against whom he had made an expedition, for they were in revolt."

Xenophon, *Anabasis* 1.1.1-2:

ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡσθένει Δαρεῖος καὶ ὑπώπτευε τελευτὴν τοῦ βίου, ἐβούλετο τῷ παιδὲ ἀμφοτέρῳ παρεῖναι. ὁ μὲν οὖν πρεσβύτερος παρὼν ἐτύγχανε: Κῦρον δὲ μεταπέμπεται ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἣς αὐτὸν σατράπην ἐποίησε, καὶ στρατηγὸν δὲ αὐτὸν ἀπέδειξε πάντων ὅσοι ἐς Καστωλοῦ πεδίον ἀθροίζονται. ἀναβαίνει οὖν ὁ Κῦρος λαβὼν Τισσαφέρην ὡς φίλον, καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔχων ὀπλίτας ἀνέβη τριακοσίους, ἄρχοντα δὲ αὐτῶν Ξενίαν Παρράσιον.

"Now when Darius lay sick and suspected that the end of his life was near, he wished to have both his sons with him. The elder, as it chanced, was with him already; but Cyrus he summoned from the province over which he had made him satrap, and he had also appointed him commander of all the forces that muster in the plain of Castolus. Cyrus accordingly went up to his father, taking with him Tissaphernes as a friend and accompanied by three hundred Greek hoplites, under the command of Xenias of Parrhasia."

While Darius may have recalled Cyrus while pretending to be ill, no mention of any pretext is made in *Hell.* 2.1.13. No source mentions Cyrus' punishment. Darius does actually die of an illness in this period. Two trips – one for punishment, another for the king's true illness – might if things were otherwise be a solution, but in this case is untenable. Cyrus' lofty expectations are not diminished in Plutarch (*Art.* 2.2), as they would surely be if he was punished for his pretensions in an earlier trip. Rather, it is clear that Darius was genuinely ill in 405, when Cyrus departed his province (Diod. 13.104.4; *Hell.* 2.1.13), and between September 405 and April 404, Artaxerxes ascended the throne.³¹ These passages will be reconsidered below.

Artaxerxes' accession was troublesome from the start (as virtually all Achaemenid accessions were). Cyrus evidently journeyed to Darius' side expecting to be named king. This was no doubt thanks to his mother's favouritism. Darius failed by not officially nominating an heir; Artaxerxes in his turn sought to avoid the ensuing situation for his preferred successor by naming one (though that failed to impede Ochus: *Art.* 26.2-5). Parysatis would argue for Cyrus' appointment while her husband was on his deathbed: as Cyrus was the first child born after Darius took the throne, he should be named king (*Art.* 2.2-3). This argument was based on an inapplicable precedent set by Xerxes I (*Hdt.* 7.2-4): Xerxes' argument was founded not on when he was born, but by whom. Xerxes was born to a different mother than Artobazanes; Atossa was still present to argue his case and through her he claimed direct descent from Cyrus the Great.³² Parysatis' argument was specious. Both Cyrus and Artaxerxes were born to her (*Ctes.* F15.51). As the eldest, there was some expectation that Artaxerxes would be designated heir (primogeniture was not a feature of Achaemenid kingship),³³ and Parysatis could not circumvent it. Whatever the minutiae of the argument were, the outcome is sure: Arses became king, and took the name Artaxerxes.

³¹ See Depuydt, *Updates to Achaemenid Chronology*, 35.

³² Cook, *Persian Empire*, 74-75.

³³ L. Llewellyn-Jones, *King and Court in Ancient Persia* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 15-16.

The adoption of a throne name served multiple purposes. As a son of Darius II, with a weaker link to the line of Cyrus the Great, Artaxerxes sought to firmly link himself with the truest kings of the Achaemenids. Similarly, the adoption of a grandfather's name was a common trend amongst the Achaemenids.³⁴ But the name Artaxerxes was more than that. Correctly, it was rendered *Artaxšaça-*. A combination of *Arta* – truth, justice, right order – and *xšaça-* – power, empire. This translates to “[him] whose reign is in accordance with Arta” or “whose reign is through Arta.”³⁵ Furthermore, Artaxerxes could associate himself with the politico-religious program of his forebear. Artaxerxes I was not a warlike king, but held a long, steady reign. Artaxerxes was true to this message, becoming the longest reigning Persian monarch. His own name was adopted by his countrymen in pious remembrance of a profoundly important monarch.³⁶

Prior to the accession, there was a period of mourning throughout Asia for the death of the king (cf. Polyæn. 7.17.1). This also apparently included a period of *anomia*. During this time Artaxerxes conducted his father's remains into his tomb in the grand funeral procession. The initiation ritual then took place in a Persian sanctuary at Pasargadae. Here he would put on the robe of Cyrus the Elder, eat a cake of figs, chew turpentine-wood, and drink a cup of sour milk.³⁷ The ritual may be reminiscent of the Persians' pastoral heritage.³⁸ It served to validate the new king politically and religiously: Artaxerxes connected himself with the founder of the Achaemenid Empire.³⁹ These acts were particularly significant for Artaxerxes. Darius II was only

³⁴ Schmitt, "Achaemenid Throne-Names," 92.

³⁵ Jan Tavernier, *Iranica in the Achaemenid Period (ca. 550 - 330 B.C.): Linguistic Study of Old Iranian Proper Names and Loanwords, Attested in non-Iranian Texts* (Leuven: Peeters, 2007), §1.2.5.

³⁶ Mary Boyce, *A History of Zoroastrianism*, 3 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1975-1991), 2: 263; Saïd Armir Arjomand, "Artaxerxes, Ardašīr, and Bahman," *JAOS* 118 (1998): 245-48.

³⁷ See Boyce, *History of Zoroastrianism*, 2: 209 on the possible significance of the threefold consumption; cf. Albert de Jong, "Religion at the Achaemenid Court," in *Der Achämenidenhof | The Achaemenid Court*, ed. Bruno Jacobs and Robert Rollinger (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010), 545-46.

³⁸ Pierre Briant, "Le roi est mort: vive le roi! Remarques sur les rites et rituels de succession chez les Achéménides," in *La Religion iranienne à l'époque achéménide*, ed. Jean Kellens, Suppléments à *Iranica antiqua* 5 (Gent: Iranica antiqua, 1991), 7. More recently on the mourning and ritual investiture: Llewellyn-Jones, *King and Court in Ancient Persia*, 13-15.

³⁹ de Jong, "Religion at the Achaemenid Court," 546.

half royal, and so Artaxerxes needed to ensure that he would still be seen as the proper king, in the hope of avoiding the succession struggles from which his father emerged.

It is at this juncture Cyrus is accused of plotting to kill Artaxerxes. Xenophon does not allow his reader to entertain the possibility that this plot was authentic, and tersely states that Tissaphernes cast an accusation at Cyrus, before continuing his narrative (*An.* 1.1.3). Plutarch recorded two comparatively full accounts (*Art.* 3). In the first, Tissaphernes brought a priest to Artaxerxes who revealed the plot, and Cyrus was arrested. In the second, Cyrus was discovered within the sanctuary where Artaxerxes was to undertake the initial ritual. This is a particularly damning accusation, conjuring images of Cyrus skulking about in dark places, jealous of his brother's success. The clearly negative portrayal of Cyrus has prompted association with Deinon, as another reflection of his royal source material.⁴⁰ There is clear royal bias. It would, after all, be difficult for Cyrus to be released were he actually discovered within the sanctuary. Ctesias is complementary, for he suggested that when Cyrus was accused, he fled to his mother, Parysatis, by whose intervention he was cleared (Ctes. F16.59). Parysatis' influence in securing Cyrus' release is another fact of the affair – every source agrees on her role (*An.* 1.1.3; *Art.* 3.5). A parallel may be drawn between her action here, and her harbouring of Gigis against the will of Artaxerxes after the death of Stateira (*Art.* 19.5). It was clearly no accident that Cyrus should seek refuge in his mother's compound; she was capable of denying the king access while negotiating. As all sources assert that Cyrus was arrested,⁴¹ it may be that Cyrus was arrested and deposited in Parysatis' compound as a form of punishment.

The charges of Tissaphernes were plausible. Plutarch's statements on Cyrus' royal expectations have been noted above. Parysatis' grooming is likewise a steady theme. Cyrus' affectations in the *Anabasis* also denote great ambition. After launching his campaign against Artaxerxes, Cyrus gave gifts reserved for the king (*An.* 1.2.27)

⁴⁰ See Stevenson, *Persica*, 26; Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 616; Binder, *Kommentar*, 112-13.

⁴¹ *An.* 1.1.3; *Art.* 3.4. In a search of the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae Online* for the stem συλλαμβά- in Xenophon's body of work, sixteen results are returned. Every reference where the object of the verb is a person (nine examples) is a case of physical, hostile, arrest and imprisonment. References to arrest: *An.* 1.1.3, 1.6.4; *Cyr.* 2.4.23, 8.8.6; *Hell.* 2.3.12, 2.3.38, 2.3.39, 5.4.12, 7.4.36. Xenophon's other uses of the verb (none of which refer to any kind of imprisonment): *Cyr.* 1.6.25, 3.1.28; *Eq. mag.* 1.22; *Lac.* 2.6; *Mem.* 2.3.18, 2.6.37; *Oec.* 13.10.

and prior to the battle at Cunaxa received salutes from his men as though he were king (*An.* 1.8.21). Likewise, numismatic evidence lends some weight to the notion that he held himself in high regard – Cyrus produced his own coins as early as 407, when satrapal coinage was in its infancy.⁴² And Achaemenid succession was always tumultuous – it bred an atmosphere conducive to violent competition. The evidence indicates that Cyrus was well positioned to make an attempt for the throne.

Equally, Tissaphernes had reason to falsely accuse the prince. Tissaphernes came with Cyrus and 300 Greek bodyguards to Darius, nominally as *philos* (*An.* 1.1.2). Lewis is quick to dismiss the assertion by Plutarch (*Lys.* 4.2) that Tissaphernes and Cyrus were enemies at this stage, but this may be a rash obviation. Lewis thinks this assertion “will be embroidery in light of later events.”⁴³ The same logic may be applied to Xenophon’s claim that Tissaphernes was a friend. Xenophon has far greater motive to portray Tissaphernes in a negative light. In this same section of the *Anabasis* he fails to elaborate on Tissaphernes’ accusations: its plausibility is never entertained. Let us consider the evidence, though. Xenophon reviles Tissaphernes.⁴⁴ Just as one might attribute Plutarch’s statement to later embroidery, it is equally, if not more, likely that Xenophon inserted his claim of friendship between Cyrus and Tissaphernes as a further demonstration of Tissaphernes’ fickleness and untrustworthiness. Xenophon would have us believe that Tissaphernes was Cyrus’ friend, and betrayed him, just as he deceived the Greeks during the Peloponnesian War pay disputes, betrayed the generals of the Ten Thousand after Cunaxa (*An.* 2.5.31-34), and broke his truce with Agesilaus in 396 (*Xen. Ages.* 1.10; *Hell.* 3.4.6). That Xenophon would set Tissaphernes up as a treacherous man, who not only lied in accusing Cyrus falsely, but betrayed the bonds of friendship so important to Greeks, is unsurprising. The following will highlight the possibility that Tissaphernes was even at this early stage considered a

⁴² Wolfram Weiser, “Die Eulen von Kyros dem Jüngeren: Zu den ersten Münzporträts lebender Menschen,” *ZPE* 76 (1989): 267-96; cf. Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 616.

⁴³ Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 134n152.

⁴⁴ E.g. *An.* 2.5.39, 3.2.4-6, 3.2.8. See Gabriel Danzig, “Xenophon’s Wicked Persian, or What’s Wrong with Tissaphernes? Xenophon’s Views on Lying and Breaking Oaths,” in *Persian Responses: Political and Cultural Interaction with (in) the Achaemenid Empire* ed. C. J. Tuplin (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2007), 27, 31-33.

threat to Cyrus, and was brought to Darius' side not as a friend, but in order to prevent him derailing Cyrus' pro-Spartan strategy.

Tissaphernes was a strong and cunning man. He obtained his satrapy via meritorious conduct while putting down the revolt of Pissouthnes (Ctes. F15.53) and had had been granted a free hand to conduct affairs in the region for five years. Now, an inexperienced prince had superseded his position (*Hell.* 1.4.3; *An.* 1.1.2, 1.9.7).⁴⁵ Despite acting on the king's orders, and being aware of the possibility for future rewards,⁴⁶ Tissaphernes cannot have appreciated the intervention. Tissaphernes' heretofore effective strategy of playing both sides against each other was abandoned (while in recent years the Persians had sided increasingly with the Peloponnesians, Tissaphernes continually proved to be a niggardly paymaster), and Cyrus was receptive to Lacedaemonian complaints against Tissaphernes (Lysander waited for Cyrus, and immediately complained about Tissaphernes: *Hell.* 1.5.1-2). Particularly telling is that, while he is on hand, Tissaphernes' advice is rejected (*Hell.* 1.5.9). Depending on one's interpretation of Xenophon's statement that after Cyrus died Tissaphernes regained control "of both the lands he governed before and those Cyrus governed" (*Hell.* 3.1.3), one might argue that Tissaphernes lost his position entirely at this time and was without a satrapy.⁴⁷ I suspect that Tissaphernes lost all control of his lands while Cyrus was *karanos*, and served as a high ranking advisor at Cyrus' court.⁴⁸ A reduced position lends weight to the notion that Tissaphernes resented his treatment. Consider also the evidence of IG I³ 113, which suggests that around 410 Tissaphernes had a relationship with the Athenians, a relationship perhaps called upon after Tissaphernes was shunned and the Athenians became concerned over now

⁴⁵ A. Andrewes, "Two Notes on Lysander," *Phoenix* 25, no. 3 (1971): 208.

⁴⁶ Stephen Ruzicka, "Cyrus and Tissaphernes, 407-401 B.C.," *CJ* 80, no. 3 (1985): 207.

⁴⁷ Those who believe Tissaphernes was still a satrap, with a reduced constituency: Olmstead, *History*, 369; Andrewes, "Two Notes," 206-26; Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 119; C. D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979), 36, 101-02. Simon Hornblower, *Mausolus* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), 33 asserts that Tissaphernes lost his position entirely. Cf. discussion of Antony G. Keen, "Persian *Karanoi* and their Relationship to the Satrapal System," in *Ancient History in a Modern University: Proceedings of a Conference Held at Macquarie University, 8-13 July, 1993*, ed. T.W. Hillard, et al. (Sydney: Eerdmans, 1998), 88-95; Hilmar Klinkott, *Der Satrap: ein achaimenidischer Amtsträger und seine Handlungsspielräume* (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Antike, 2005), 125.

⁴⁸ Ruzicka, "Cyrus and Tissaphernes," 207.

clear Persian support of the Spartans – they attempted to meet with Cyrus to negotiate via Tissaphernes (*Hell.* 1.5.8). It is, therefore, plausible to envisage Tissaphernes being taken to the king's side as a guarantee that he would not countermand any orders of Cyrus while Cyrus was indisposed.

There is no consensus on Cyrus' alleged plot to assassinate Artaxerxes. Conflict is known to have occurred.⁴⁹ Sometimes Cyrus' plot is considered authentic, but no attempt is made to reconcile the different accounts.⁵⁰ Otherwise, the sanctuary story is considered royal propaganda issued at a later date and dismissed.⁵¹ All modern commentators agree that Cyrus was sent back to Asia Minor with a reduced command, and Tissaphernes rewarded.⁵² The tradition demands further inquiry.

Cyrus' detention seems undoubtable – all sources agree that it was the arrest which spurred Cyrus to plot for the throne. Similarly, it seems unlikely that Cyrus was genuinely found plotting – it is difficult to see how Artaxerxes would allow his brother to return to the coast if he had truly planned his assassination. Humanely, an argument may be made that Artaxerxes was genial and unwilling to murder his brother, or that Parysatis held significant power over the pair. This is questionable. Achaemenid succession was treacherous business, and Artaxerxes had examples of this in his own father's accession. He must have recognised the risks. He also showed later that bloodshed did not stay his hand when torturing his mother's attendants (*Art.* 19.5-6) and having his son executed (*Art.* 29.6-7). Furthermore, one may wax lyrical about the influence of Parysatis, but her influence at this time was evidently countered by that of Stateira. Stateira was strong enough to accuse Parysatis of complicity in the plot at court, and would convince Artaxerxes to go against Parysatis' wishes in the killing of Udiastes and Clearchus (*Ctes.* F28.5). If it was a false accusation, and Cyrus'

⁴⁹ Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 616.

⁵⁰ Matt Waters, *Ancient Persia: A Concise History of the Achaemenid Empire, 550-330 BCE* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 177.

⁵¹ Stevenson, *Persica*, 94. Olmstead, *History*, 372 may show its age by accepting the sanctuary story.

⁵² Ruzicka, "Cyrus and Tissaphernes," 207-09 presents the evidence and details. Tissaphernes probably held Ionia (*An.* 1.1.6) and Caria (where he had a home: *Hell.* 3.2.12) after the accusations against Cyrus.

innocence was proven to Artaxerxes, why would Tissaphernes, a demonstrable liar, be rewarded? And why would Cyrus be demoted?

It may be argued that Cyrus was 'demoted' only because the Peloponnesian War had finally been ended – there was no longer need for a unified command. This cannot be taken far. The alternative theory Plutarch derides (*Art.* 3.5; 4.1) – that Cyrus revolted because of lack of supplies – indicates that Cyrus did not have a satrapy as large as he would like or one that he considered reasonably sized.⁵³ Clearly his new command had far less control than he expected, rather than a reasonable reduction.⁵⁴

Stevenson has cast doubt on the reality of Tissaphernes' accusation.⁵⁵ She notes that Ctesias had just as much cause to alter the accounts as Deinon might have. The implication may be that Ctesias fabricated the entire false charge – Tissaphernes made no accusation. Ctesias certainly had motivation to do so out of his fondness for Cyrus and hostility to Tissaphernes, and Xenophon had even greater cause to repeat such a claim. A solution to the above problems may lie in this line of thought.

Accordingly, we return to *Hellenica* 2.1.8-10. The passage is an interpolation – the error in naming Darius' father and the variant spellings of Darius indicate as much.

⁵³ Modern knowledge of the Persian rationing system of payment allows us to reject Plutarch's dismissal: Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 403, 422-36; Binder, *Kommentar*, 132-33.

⁵⁴ See Ruzicka, "Cyrus and Tissaphernes," 205-06.

⁵⁵ Stevenson, *Persica*, 94; cf. *An.* 2.5.

There is little consensus otherwise.⁵⁶ The mistake in Darius' father is resolved easily - a change of Xerxes to Artaxerxes would render the datum admissible.⁵⁷ Δαρεῖαῖος is generally considered a more accurate transliteration of Persian *Dārayavauš* than Xenophon's Δαρεῖος, and thus has been linked with Ctesias, being the only contemporary Greek writer who uses this form. This point must be emphasised – although the passage reflects an insertion by a later scribe, it seems that Ctesias was the ultimate source, and therefore the passage should not be dismissed as false. In fact, it may explain this mysterious detention of Cyrus and the contradictions of our sources.

What if the imprisonment Cyrus resented was a result of his killing of Autoboesaces and Mitraeus? The new king became the target of Cyrus' resentment as Artaxerxes carried out the punishment Darius imposed from his sick bed. There is a tradition concerning advice imparted to Artaxerxes by Darius on his deathbed – Justin (5.11.1) states that “about the same time died Darius, king of Persia, leaving two sons Artaxerxes and Cyrus. He bequeathed the kingdom to Artaxerxes, and to Cyrus the

⁵⁶ G. E. Underhill, *A Commentary with Introduction and Appendix on the Hellenica of Xenophon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900), 359 allows for the possibility that it originated in Ctesias, but believes the story to be spurious (p. xxxix); Brownson, in the Loeb Edition of the *Hellenica*, thinks it a characteristically clumsy imitation of a Thucydidean interpolation and may largely be discounted as conjecture (see note to the text and p. 16n3); A. Santoro, "A proposito del cerimoniale delle "mani coperte" nel mondo achemenide," *RSO* 47 (1972): 37-42 says the interpolations do not withstand examination; Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 104n83 implicitly grants it some credence by positing that it is from Ctesias, as does Flower, *Xenophon's Anabasis*, 192; Cook, *Persian Empire*, 211 accepts the story; Peter Krentz, ed. *Hellenica I-II.3.10* (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1989), 172 appears to think it genuine; on the Thucydidean similarities: Vivienne J. Gray, "Continuous History and Xenophon Hellenica 1-2.3.10," *AJP* 112 (1991): 202n2; Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 986 is non-committal, as is Cawkwell in the Penguin Edition of the *Hellenica* (notes on p. 61 and 98); Thomas Braun, "Xenophon's Dangerous Liaisons," in *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*, ed. Robin Lane Fox (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2004), 122 believes it to have almost certainly derived from Ctesias, but likewise does not commit himself to trusting the tale; the story has not made it into the edition of Ctesias by Jan P. Stronk, ed. *Ctesias' Persian History*, vol. 1 (Düsseldorf: Wellem Verlag, 2010), *per litteras* Stronk has said that it remains unverifiable, and was excluded not out of any great misgivings, but because the line must be drawn somewhere; John O. Hyland, *Tissaphernes and the Achaemenid Empire in Thucydides and Xenophon* (University of Chicago: Doctoral Thesis, 2005), 14 thinks it an authentic account, but doesn't discuss its origin. The theory of F. Altheim and R. Stiehl, *Die aramäische Sprache unter den Achämeniden* (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1963), 150-51 has not gained much credence (Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 104n83 calls it "highly unlikely").

⁵⁷ G. Cousin, *Kyros le Jeune en Asie Mineure (printemps 408-juillet 401)* (Paris; Nancy, 1904), 32-33.

cities over which he had been satrap." This would also explain why Cyrus should be permitted to return to the coast, despite there being no need after the Peloponnesian War ended.⁵⁸ In this scenario we accept the *Hell.* 2.1.8-10 interpolation as truth, and accept that Cyrus was detained against his will. The detention was implemented by Artaxerxes. Now the promotion of Tissaphernes and demotion of Cyrus makes sense. Tissaphernes was not rewarded for being caught lying, but rather for being a fine governor in the Ionian War and to take over the provinces Cyrus no longer controlled. Cyrus' demotion was the result of his wanton disrespect for his family, to be coupled with a brief detention away from his base of power – the coastal satrapies. The story in which Cyrus was caught inside the sanctuary, preparing to murder Artaxerxes, was later propaganda – Artaxerxes made use of a genuine imprisonment to further propagate a newly cultivated identity of Cyrus. If Artaxerxes could have had his version gain acceptance, he could quite literally alter the identity of Cyrus in such a manner that their entire history would be different. In the royal version, Artaxerxes was wronged by his jealous brother, but thanks to Artaxerxes' generosity and kindness, Cyrus was offered another opportunity for redemption, only to throw it in the face of his benefactor by again plotting for the throne. If Lenfant is correct that Cyrus was a manipulator of the myth of Persian decadence, it does not seem strange that Artaxerxes should attempt to manipulate his brother's image.⁵⁹ Similar changes of history were attempted in revising the manner of Cyrus' death at Cunaxa (*Art.* 14-15), and on a grand scale in Darius I's manipulation of his genealogy and the revolt of Bardiya in the Behistun inscription.⁶⁰ The story of Tissaphernes' false accusations against Cyrus developed out of Cyrus' own camp: it was a grander tale of imprisonment than his punishment for kingly affectations. Xenophon found such a narrative adhering to his general image of Cyrus and Tissaphernes, and so propagated

⁵⁸ Advice: Athenaeus (12.548e). In this passage the specific mention of reign length and the nature of the man would seem to indicate that Athenaeus is referring to the succession of Darius II to Artaxerxes II, rather than Artaxerxes II to III. See Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 986.

⁵⁹ Lenfant, "La 'décadence' du Grand Roi," 407-38.

⁶⁰ See Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 121-27 on the inscription. On manipulation, see summary comments in Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 110-14; Kuhrt, *Persian Empire*, 152n4. On manipulation of genealogy, see R. Rollinger, "Der Stammbaum des achaimenidischen Königshauses oder die Frage der Legimität der Herrschaft des Dareios," *AMIT* 30 (1998): 155-209.

the account in preference to the ignominy of Cyrus' actual rebuke. Xenophon's tale may have developed out of Tissaphernes' role in indicting Cyrus: he was no doubt aware of the murder (was this why he was brought to court – to assist in the questioning of Cyrus over Autoboesaces and Mitraeus?). It is important to note here their use of language in the source closest to the affair – Ctesias merely says that Tissaphernes *slandered* Cyrus. That is, he said something against the character of Cyrus. The standard translation may form part of our inherent bias against Tissaphernes; διαβάλλεται does not necessarily mean “falsely charged.”⁶¹ No mention is made of a murder charge; emphasis is rather placed on his disgrace at the hands of Artaxerxes. It is also possible to modify the translation “...took refuge with his mother, by whose intervention he was cleared of the charge” (Ctes. F16.59), to read with different emphasis: “by whose intervention he was *released* (ἀπολύεται) from the charge [his punishment having satisfied Artaxerxes].”⁶² There is some cause to rethink the affair on the basis of this hypothesis.

Cyrus appears to have returned to his province with reduced powers, probably governing only Lydia. Tissaphernes clearly had some position of authority in the region after 404, though it is difficult to precisely define (possibly he became *karanos*), and it was swiftly undermined by Cyrus.⁶³ Tissaphernes' appointment served a dual purpose – rewarding him for his actions and facilitating the monitoring of Cyrus.

By maintaining that his efforts were focused against Tissaphernes, and effectively using a “web of *xenia*”⁶⁴ to recruit his army, Cyrus disguised his intentions to usurp the throne. The first stage in the planning process was recruitment. All garrisons under Cyrus' control were instructed to recruit as many Peloponnesian soldiers as possible, ostensibly to prevent Tissaphernes attacking their cities (*An.*

⁶¹ Pointed out by Danzig, “Xenophon's Wicked Persian,” 31, discussing Xenophon's use of the term in this same context.

⁶² Lenfant, *La Perse*, 142 similarly prefers a synonym for acquit: “il se réfugie auprès de sa mère Parysatis et se lave de cette accusation” (my italics). Cf. p. 276n642.

⁶³ See discussion in Andrewes, “Two Notes,” 206-16; Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 136-37; Ruzicka, “Cyrus and Tissaphernes,” 208-09; C. D. Hamilton, “Lysander, Agesilaus, Spartan Imperialism and the Greeks of Asia Minor,” *AncW* 23, no. 1 (1992): 38.

⁶⁴ Matthew Trundle, *Greek Mercenaries: From the Late Archaic Period to Alexander* (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), 76.

1.1.6).⁶⁵ This ruse played on Greek fears, for many of the cities Cyrus had in his possession originally belonged to Tissaphernes; all of his former subjects had handed themselves over to Cyrus (Miletus initially had not, but soon followed: *An.* 1.1.6-7). At the same time Cyrus proposed to Artaxerxes that he should be granted full control over the Ionian cities, rather than allowing them to be under Tissaphernes' influence. This request was aided by Parysatis, and helped propagate the notion that Cyrus was building his forces against Tissaphernes (*An.* 1.1.8).⁶⁶ Tissaphernes unwittingly legitimised this deception through his heavy handed attempt to maintain control of Miletus via execution and banishment of political dissidents (*An.* 1.1.6-7; Diod. 13.104.6⁶⁷).

While continuing his plans against Tissaphernes, Cyrus funded Clearchus' war against the Thracians at the Hellespont. The colonies of the Hellespont were favourably disposed to this war and so themselves contributed to the maintenance of Clearchus' army (*An.* 1.1.9). This left Clearchus indebted to Cyrus, and granted Cyrus influence over another army of mercenaries to the north. The force was unknowingly maintained by the people of the Hellespont until Cyrus should require it, and not linked to him by aim or action. The same ruse was employed for Aristippus the Thessalian (*An.* 1.1.10).

In addition to these three mercenary forces, Cyrus purchased the loyalty of three other Greek generals. Proxenus the Boeotian was tasked with recruiting a force for a campaign against the Pisidians (*An.* 1.1.11). Both Sophaenetes the Stymphalian

⁶⁵ See J. Roy, "The Mercenaries of Cyrus," *Historia* 16, no. 3 (1967): 297-302 and Serge Yalichev, *Mercenaries of the Ancient World* (London: Constable, 1997), 122-27 for the specifics of this process. For an updated discussion see John W. I. Lee, *A Greek Army on the March: Soldiers and Survival in Xenophon's Anabasis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 44-48.

⁶⁶ Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 617 thinks Artaxerxes would not have believed Cyrus to be building forces against another satrap; communication between Sardis and the centre was too frequent for the king to have been unawares. Briant asserts that this fits "a little too successfully into the tendentious portrait of the king found especially in the opening chapters of Plutarch."

⁶⁷ Though Diodorus says the satrap was Pharnabazus, general consensus is that he means Tissaphernes here. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 121n92; Bruno Bleckmann, *Athens Weg in die Niederlage. Die letzten Jahre des Peloponnesischen Kriegs* (Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner, 1998), 51-53; contra Debord, *L'Asie mineure*, 95n102. Cf. Hyland, *Tissaphernes and the Achaemenid Empire*, 144-45, where it is suggested that Xenophon omitted certain details to maintain Cyrus' positive image (like Cyrus' Milesians in fact being oligarchs "implicated in sacrilege and murder").

and Socrates the Achaean were requested to recruit forces for a war against Tissaphernes, to be made with the assistance of the Milesian exiles (*An.* 1.1.11). Thus, Cyrus recruited his mercenaries in six separate groups, not counting the garrisons. The justification for amassing his forces - that it was in response to Tissaphernes' aggression against Ionia - directed attention towards the most objectionable figure in Persian politics. The Ionians themselves, as demonstrated by their defection to Cyrus, were at this point set against Tissaphernes. It had been some years since Tissaphernes first managed to extract tribute from the Hellenic cities in this region; the first reason for his approach to the Spartans was because Athens hindered his collection (*Thuc.* 8.5.5). It seems likely that the Ionians would continue to harbour resentment against the man who had first enabled the extraction of tribute from Greeks; the pro-Lysandrian oligarchic governments installed in the region led to a closer relationship with Cyrus.⁶⁸ The call to recruit Peloponnesians undoubtedly played on recent dissatisfaction stemming from pay disputes, which had seemingly become a characteristic strategy of Tissaphernes to encourage dissent (*Thuc.* 8.29, 78), and on Cyrus' strong relationship with the Lacedaemonians. Cyrus' pretences ultimately proved successful as the force was only identified as being too large for solely addressing the Pisidian problem (Cyrus' advertised reason for gathering the force together) once it had mustered at Sardis (*An.* 1.2.4). This story may be contrasted with that of Diodorus Siculus, obtained from Ephorus, which contends that it was Alcibiades (not Tissaphernes) who discovered the secret plans to make war on Artaxerxes. Alcibiades was then put to death by Pharnabazus, who wished to reap the

⁶⁸ Cf. *Isoc.* 5.95 which claims that Cyrus was unpopular with the Greeks owing to his cooperation with the Spartans, and facilitation of decarchies in the region, while Artaxerxes was popular because he opposed it. As there is no corroborating evidence, Isocrates in this instance should be dismissed. In this speech Isocrates is generally more favourable to Artaxerxes than elsewhere; §95 appears to be spin in order to help Isocrates' argument. See also *Isoc.* 5.99-101, 125, 139.

rewards of bringing the warning himself (Diod. 14.11). Ephorus' contention is, however, most unlikely.⁶⁹

The genius of Cyrus' recruitment strategy becomes apparent when Artaxerxes' preoccupation with Egypt is realised. Amyrtaeus' revolt may be dated to 404,⁷⁰ but Artaxerxes was still recognised as king as late as 401 in Elephantine, possibly as late as 398.⁷¹ Therefore, Amyrtaeus had not totally secured Egypt; he remained vulnerable for some time. Artaxerxes, for his part, would have wished to put down the revolt as soon as possible. It is generally accepted that a force under Abrocomas was mustered and dispatched in 401:⁷² the movement of Abrocomas from the Euphrates into Phoenicia with a substantial army suggests an impending assault on Egypt (*An.* 1.3.20; 1.4.5). Xenophon and Ephorus (*apud* Diodorus) also agree on one particular point in this series of events: it took Artaxerxes so long to respond to Cyrus' threat because he was preoccupied (*An.* 1.2.4-5; Diod. 14.22.1). It is unlikely that Cyrus was unaware of events in Egypt, particularly with his closeness to Tamos, an Egyptian who served as commander in Ionia. Cyrus may well have taken advantage of his brother's preoccupation to launch his campaign. That Tamos fled to Egypt, expecting sanctuary, after Cyrus' defeat similarly may indicate some relationship between Cyrus and the Egyptians (Diod. 14.35.4). On the other hand, Tamos may have been fleeing his former

⁶⁹ Ephorus' tradition is also preserved in Nepos (*Alc.* 9.3-4) and Plutarch (*Alc.* 37.8-39). See Bernadotte Perrin, "The Death of Alcibiades," *TAPhA* 37 (1906): 25-37; Walter M. Ellis, *Alcibiades* (London: Routledge, 1989), 92-97; David Gribble, *Alcibiades and Athens: A Study in Literary Presentation* (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press, 1999), 281. See Ruzicka, "Cyrus and Tissaphernes," 211n22, following Jean Hatzfeld, *Alcibiade, étude sur l'histoire d'Athènes à la fin du v siècle* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1951), 340-49 for a refutation of Ephorus. *Contra* Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 617-19, who accepts the tale; Briant explains the subsequent years of apparent inactivity with Artaxerxes' captivation with Egypt. Cf. John O. Hyland, "Pharnabazos, Cyrus' Rebellion, and the Spartan War of 399," *Arta* 2008.003 (2008): 6-8 (§1A), who also is unwilling to dismiss Ephorus. See also below, pp. 42-44.

⁷⁰ *AP* 35. This revolt may have been foreshadowed by another in both Upper and Lower Egypt in 411/10, if D. M. Lewis, "The Phoenician Fleet in 411," *Historia* 7, no. 4 (1958): 392-97 is accepted.

⁷¹ *BMAP* 12. Possibly 398: A. Lemaire, "La fin de la première période perse en Égypte et la chronologie judéenne vers 400 av. J.-C.," *Transeuphratène* 9 (1995): 53, 56. See also data presented in Kuhrt, *Persian Empire*, §9.57n5; Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 37-40.

⁷² See Olmstead, *History*, 374; Ruzicka, "Cyrus and Tissaphernes," 210n21; Stylianou, *Commentary*, 388; Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 619 and notes. On Abrocomas' exact position, see Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 39n9.

master, Tissaphernes (Thuc. 8.31.2). Cyrus undoubtedly took advantage of Abrocomas' presence: he told his Greeks at Tarsus that he was marching not against the Pisidians, nor the king, nor Tissaphernes, but a rival satrap in Syria (Diod. 14.20.5). Rumours of a large army to the south (reportedly 300,000: *An.* 1.4.5) helped validate Cyrus' claims. Cyrus cunningly disguised the true purposes of his expedition and relied on his brother's interest in Egypt to draw forces out of the region. Though Xenophon claims that the enterprise was not discovered until the forces mustered at Sardis, Cyrus' accusation that Orontas held Sardis against him suggests that Artaxerxes may have heard of the campaign early and had instructed what few forces he had in the region to resist (*An.* 1.6.6). Briant contends that Artaxerxes was aware of Cyrus' plan to revolt by 404, based on his reading of the tradition preserved in Ephorus, Nepos and Plutarch of Alcibiades' death.⁷³ The theory has some merits. It is difficult to have complete trust, though, as it relies on Artaxerxes having learned of the revolt years before it launched, but permitting Cyrus to recruit with no opposition. Although some resistance was offered at Sardis by Orontas, preoccupation with Egypt does not suffice to explain the complete lack of defensive arrangements constructed by Artaxerxes, or why some opposition was not offered at the most obvious place – the Cilician-Syrian Gates, where even a hastily gathered force might be able to hinder progress (Abrocomas' proximity is indicated by the arrival of his former mercenaries at Issus; he might have occupied the pass). Cyrus certainly was surprised that he encountered no resistance here (*An.* 1.4.4-5). The strategic significance of the Gates was immense – even Alexander would dedicate serious force to their occupation (Arr. *Anab.* 2.5.1; Diod. 17.32.2).⁷⁴ That no forces were present, and Abrocomas did not attempt to hinder progress here indicates that Artaxerxes was taken completely by surprise, and withdrew all available resources. Had Artaxerxes been aware of Cyrus' intentions as early as 404/3, as Briant suggests by accepting the stories about Alcibiades, he would not have withdrawn all forces from the most readily defensible position.

⁷³ Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 617-19; cf. the observation of Hyland, *Tissaphernes and the Achaemenid Empire*, 146: perhaps Xenophon perpetuated his version as it lent credibility to Xenophon's own claims of ignorance about Cyrus' ambitions.

⁷⁴ See A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander* (Oxford New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1980), 192-93.

The successes of Cyrus' recruitment strategy may be summarised as follows. (1) The Greeks were favourably disposed towards the expedition and became more likely to provide assistance owing to their faith in the ostensible aim to fight Tissaphernes. The troops were devoted to the defence of Ionia against an aggressor previously demonstrated to withhold pay, who had thus obtained a poor reputation amongst Greeks. (2) Greek cities not previously considered part of Cyrus' control were successfully obtained as further resource to employ in the expedition (i.e. those of Ionia which were nominally under Tissaphernes' authority). (3) Parysatis' machinations at court ensured that Artaxerxes dismissed reports of Cyrus' burgeoning military capabilities as a response to satrapal rivalry with Tissaphernes. Artaxerxes' preoccupation with Egypt drew forces away from Asia Minor and clouded his judgement. (4) Further suspicion was assuaged by prompt payment of tribute to the king from areas previously under the control of Tissaphernes (*An.* 1.1.8). (5) Friendship with Cyrus made the Spartans receptive to requests for military aid (*Hell.* 3.1.1; *Art.* 6.2).⁷⁵ In light of the deftness of Cyrus' strategy, and the complicity of his mother Parysatis, it is likely that Cyrus' ambitions were in existence before his incarceration, and that he might have acted on impulse when they were thwarted. The story that Cyrus attempted to assassinate his brother is subject to little discussion in modern scholarship, but a solution is found by accepting that Cyrus was imprisoned for exceeding his station. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that Cyrus and Tissaphernes would have had difficulty maintaining an amicable relationship after Cyrus' power became tangible. Irrespective of their relationship prior to this journey, Tissaphernes became a convenient focus for Cyrus' plan to wrest the throne from his brother. With the assistance of his mother at court, Cyrus developed a strategy to amass mercenaries and was soon able to launch the campaign for the control of the Achaemenid Empire.

⁷⁵ Diodorus states that 800 troops and twenty-five triremes were provided under the command of Samus (14.19.3-5). In *Anabasis* the admiral commanding Spartan forces is Pythagoras and the numbers are 700 hoplites, thirty-five ships (1.4.2-3). In *Hellenica* Samius is the admiral (3.1.1). In Xenophon another Spartan general called Cheirisophus also arrives (*An.* 1.4.4) with a fleet of his own. Note that in Plutarch (*Art.* 6.2) there is no reference to any Spartan commander besides Clearchus. See J. M. Bigwood, "The Ancient Accounts of the Battle of Cunaxa," *AJPh* 104, no. 4 (1983): 344n24.

The Revolt of Cyrus

When the time came to launch his expedition, Cyrus mustered the mercenaries and Persian troops in order (professedly) to drive Pisidians from his land (*An.* 1.2.1).⁷⁶ Diodorus has the mercenaries being informed that their target includes Cilicia, also in revolt against the king (Diod. 14.19.3). Prior to leaving the bounds of his jurisdiction, Cyrus appointed his kin as satraps of Lydia and Phrygia, and gave Ionia, Aeolis and neighbouring areas to his friend Tamos (Diod. 14.19.6). One of his first challenges was the Cilician Gates.⁷⁷ The local ruler, the Syennesis, faced Cyrus pragmatically, pledging his allegiance and sending one son to assist the prince, and dispatching another to Artaxerxes, to assure the king of his loyalty.⁷⁸ Loyalty became a focus for Cyrus when considering his substantial Greek contingent. Shortly into the march, Cyrus allowed the Greeks to hold a festival, complete with procession and games (*An.* 1.2.10). Cyrus also allowed the Greeks to pillage the lands they marched through as hostile territory (*An.* 1.2.19). Allowing such harsh treatment of the local populace was a move designed to placate the Greeks and encourage loyalty. The side effect of this behaviour would be local distaste for the army passing through the land. One would expect resentment towards a large body of troops marching through any area, owing to the need for

⁷⁶ For analysis of the Ten Thousand, see Roy, "The Mercenaries of Cyrus," 287-323 (on the composition of the Ten Thousand); G. Nussbaum, *The Ten Thousand: A Study in Social Organization and Action in Xenophon's Anabasis* (Leiden: Brill, 1967), and bibliographies therein; H. D. Westlake, "Diodorus and the Expedition of Cyrus," *Phoenix* 41, no. 3 (1987): 241-54 (historiographical study of Diodorus' sources for book 14.19-31. Reprinted in H. D. Westlake, *Studies in Thucydides and Greek History* (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1989), 260-73); Robin Lane Fox, ed. *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), throughout. For the Battle at Cunaxa, see below, pp. 50-71.

⁷⁷ On the Cilician Gates, see C. J. Tuplin, "Xenophon and the Garrisons of the Persian Empire," *AMIran* 20 (1987): 209-10. On the route into Cilicia see Frank Williams, "Xenophon's Dana and the Passage of Cyrus' Army over the Taurus Mountains," *Historia* 45, no. 3 (1996): 284-314, the reassessment of C. J. Tuplin, "A Foreigner's Perspective: Xenophon in Anatolia," in *The Achaemenid Impact on Local Populations and Cultures in Anatolia (Sixth-Fourth Centuries B.C.)*, ed. Inci Delemen, et al. (Istanbul: Turkish Institute of Archaeology, 2007), §2, and literature cited therein.

⁷⁸ *An.* 1.2.1; Ctes. F16.63; Diod. 14.20.3. On the Syennesis, see Olivier Casabonne, "Local Powers and Persian Model in Achaemenid Cilicia: A Reassessment," *Olba* 2 (1999): 59-61.

locals to provide some fresh produce as supplies, and Cyrus' facilitation of Greek looting can only have compounded this feeling.⁷⁹

More than likely, these acts were a challenge to the royalist supporters. Later in the march, on the approach to the Euphrates (*An.* 1.4.10), Cyrus had his army destroy the palace and gardens of Belesys, "late" governor of Syria. Extant Babylonian evidence has identified this man as Bēšunu, and shown that he was still performing transactions six months after the death of Cyrus (and was therefore still alive).⁸⁰ With the distinction of being one of the few satraps not to be related to the royal family or of Iranian origin, and with a history dating back to the reign of Artaxerxes I, Bēšunu was a significant figure in the Persian administration. By destroying Bēšunu's property, Cyrus may have been appealing to the aristocratic Iranian factions who were upset at the displacement of a traditional Iranian governor for this Babylonian administrator.⁸¹ While Cyrus was radical in his closeness to the Greeks, he may have also courted traditional Iranian factions in order to develop his legitimacy. The developing factions at court became so marked that even Isocrates made reference to them (4.145).⁸²

In 2008, John Hyland published an article which, in part, discussed Cyrus' associations with other local satraps in his extended command.⁸³ Prominent in this paper is the reconsideration of Pharnabazus' role in the early stages of Cyrus' revolt. It is argued that Pharnabazus' tacit support of Cyrus affected his career trajectory through to the 390s.⁸⁴ First, the account of Alcibiades' death in Ephorus is accepted and utilised as a point in demonstrating Pharnabazus' complicity, a tale noted above as

⁷⁹ Cf. Alexander the Great's reluctance to loot Greek cities in Asia Minor, and reasonable treatment of those who did not resist. See summary treatment in N. G. L. Hammond, *Alexander the Great* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1980), 77-79.

⁸⁰ See Matthew W. Stolper, "Belsunu the Satrap," in *Language, Literature and History: Philological and Historical Studies Presented to Erica Reiner*, ed. F. Rochberg-Halton (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1987), 389-402.

⁸¹ Matthew W. Stolper, "The Kasr Archive," in *Centre and Periphery*, ed. Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Amélie Kuhrt, *Achaemenid History 4* (Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, 1990), 202-03.

⁸² On other loyalties: Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 623-24.

⁸³ Hyland, "Pharnabazos, Cyrus' Rebellion," 1-15.

⁸⁴ Cf. Olmstead, *History*, 373, who similarly links Pharnabazus with the rebellion, and the praise of Paul Cartledge, *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 193.

requiring belief that, despite notification, Artaxerxes made no plans to stop Cyrus, and still managed to be caught unawares. Beyond this issue, Paphlagonian cavalry at Cunaxa and Spartan connections are argued to have tarnished Pharnabazus' reputation in the eyes of Tissaphernes, Persia's greatest beneficiary from the victory. While many points of the article are appealing, the rationale for this particular assertion is not convincing. Hyland places emphasis on the Paphlagonian cavalry at Cunaxa, and the approval Pharnabazus must have granted for the force to have travelled through his province to Cyrus' side: "what were his Paphlagonian dependents doing in a prominent position in the rebel army, battling against Tissaphernes?"⁸⁵ Though we hear nothing in Xenophon of any defensive measures, comparison is drawn between this silence and the energetic defence of the province employed against the Spartans in the 390s. The fault in this argument is the emphasis on the silence of our sources. Regrettably, we know not whence these Paphlagonians originated (specifically), or at what time they mustered. It does not seem fair to emphasise their travel over Pharnabazus' province as a sign of his complicity in the revolt.⁸⁶ First, the Paphlagonians were not great supporters of the king and the Persians clearly did not have firm control of their behaviour in this period – even after Artaxerxes' victory their King, Otys, refused to attend court (*Hell.* 4.1.3) – so it may be unfair to imply that Pharnabazus had the capacity to hinder their journey to Cunaxa. While the Persian Empire was enormous, this did not signify firm control over all regions. The Cadusians were a continual source of trouble.⁸⁷ The Paphlagonians were similarly fickle. Temnus and Aegae were reportedly not subject to the king (*Hell.* 4.8.5). And the Mysians were also difficult to control – some would support Agesilaus, others would not (*Hell. Oxy.* 21.1). Secondly, without knowledge of when this Paphlagonian contingent made the journey to Cyrus, we cannot assume that they were not serving

⁸⁵ Hyland, "Pharnabazos, Cyrus' Rebellion," 8-9.

⁸⁶ Similarly, Hyland's concern over how the army of Clearchus journeyed to Cyrus (apparently via Pharnabazus' satrapy) may be affected by the reconstruction presented in chapter two which emphasises the division between the Greek and Persian cities of Asia Minor. See below, pp. 91-94.

⁸⁷ Discussed below, p. 275.

Cyrus for some time, or made the journey to Cyrus as part of his successful recruitment.

Hyland's argument on the grounds of Pharnabazus' familiarity with the Spartans is more compelling.⁸⁸ But Pharnabazus' response to the Cyreans in his province during their retreat is called into question. Hyland asks: why did he not do this in their *anabasis*?⁸⁹ Emphasis is placed on how quickly the troops were assembled in the second instance, as opposed to the first, where equal time might have been available. This is debatable – as Tissaphernes began funnelling the Ten Thousand away from the heartland, northwards, Pharnabazus would have known that the Ten Thousand must eventually journey through his province. Evidence of his forewarning lies in the Greeks' first sighting of the Persians in his satrapy, where a prepared line of cavalry marshalled against the Cyreans (*An.* 6.5.7). Pharnabazus had ample time to respond to the Greeks, and the cavalry's availability here should not be contrasted against the first occasion, which offered scarce warning. Similarly, there is no evidence that Pharnabazus or his subordinates authorised the journey of Clearchus across his satrapy;⁹⁰ presence in the satrapy should not be thought to imply the satrap's approval. Thirdly, if Pharnabazus' tacit support of Cyrus jeopardised his career in the 390s, why did it not adversely affect Ariaeus? Ariaeus went beyond tacit support, and fought with Cyrus at Cunaxa. Yet he was forgiven and eventually was a leading administrator in the 390s in Asia Minor. It seems strange that Pharnabazus' behaviour should affect his career so much, and not Ariaeus. Albeit we know little of the personal relationships fostered amongst the Persian nobility, it does not seem fair to conjecture that Pharnabazus' difficulties were exacerbated by his support of Cyrus while Ariaeus seemingly was forgiven at the highest levels quickly. Fourthly, Tithraustes' behaviour when he came to command Asia Minor would also belie Hyland's hypothesis of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus' rivalry –pushing the Greeks north was a standard part of controlling Caria, and not restricted to Tissaphernes on the basis of personal

⁸⁸ Hyland, "Pharnabazos, Cyrus' Rebellion," 11-12.

⁸⁹ Hyland, "Pharnabazos, Cyrus' Rebellion," 8-9.

⁹⁰ Hyland, "Pharnabazos, Cyrus' Rebellion," 12.

rivalry.⁹¹ On this basis I am sceptical of the supposition that Pharnabazus tacitly supported Cyrus.

Despite Xenophon's protestations that Cyrus was close friends with the Greek leaders (*An.* 1.1.9-11) and was able to gain the loyalty of all his guests (*An.* 1.1.5), it is clear that the loyalty was limited. The mercenaries soon voiced frustration with Cyrus' irregular payment (*An.* 1.2.11-12). Xenophon's claims are symptomatic of a wider reputation held by Cyrus for magnanimity and for developing great loyalty amongst his followers. Xenophon frequently asserts the greatness of this man and his qualities as a leader. In his *Oeconomicus* (4.18) he continues this theme and has Socrates declare that Cyrus would have been a most excellent ruler, had he lived; throughout his campaign to seize the Persian throne, while many abandoned the cause of the king, no one deserted Cyrus *to the king* (παρὰ μὲν Κύρου οὐδεὶς λέγεται αὐτομολῆσαι πρὸς βασιλέα, παρὰ δὲ βασιλέως πολλὰ μυριάδες πρὸς Κύρον).⁹² The claim is repeated in the *Anabasis* (1.9.29). There it is claimed that Orontas was the only person to attempt defection. The claims are also found in Ctesias (F16.63), and are a reflection of how far Cyrus' reputation spread. In fact, Xenophon's terminology is very careful. His phrasing restricts the claim to defections between the two royal brothers (i.e. defectors who left Cyrus, but did not join Artaxerxes, do not count). Xenophon's point is to show Cyrus' excellent leadership and authority in contrast to Artaxerxes. We do, however, know that Xenophon is being circumspect here. Cyrus clearly struggled with maintaining loyalty as much as any leader. His issues with retaining the loyalty of his Greek mercenaries are catalogued below, and were only rectified via great expenditure. Still, two Greek generals and some soldiers abandon the campaign soon after it leaves Cilicia (*An.* 1.4.7). The Persian soldiers were no different. We find the attempted desertion of Orontas, considered among the greatest military strategists in the Persian Empire, who not only attempted to abandon Cyrus' cause, but was to take

⁹¹ See below, pp. 111-12.

⁹² On desertions among the Cyreans: Robert J. Bonner, "Desertions from the "Ten Thousand"," *CPh* 15, no. 1 (1920): 85-88. On Xenophon's claims: Vincent Azoulay, "Exchange as Entrapment: Mercenary Xenophon?," in *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*, ed. Robin Lane Fox (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 300n26.

a thousand horsemen with him to the king.⁹³ There is also the case of Cyrus punishing two Persians who attempt to betray Cyrus. One of these two was a wearer of the royal purple (*An.* 1.2.20). Why were they betraying Cyrus? Was it for their own ends, or for the king? It seems unlikely that they were operating independent of the succession struggle: they acted for Artaxerxes. So Xenophon's phrasing, while delicate, is misleading.⁹⁴

Having marched into Cilicia, it became apparent that the region was not in revolt, and the march was held up for a full twenty days by the disillusioned mercenaries (*An.* 1.3.1).⁹⁵ Their argument was that the current task breached the terms of their original contract. The situation became so tense that violence erupted, giving a sure indication of the difficulties of maintaining such a vast mercenary force. Cyrus became quite perplexed by the situation (*An.* 1.3.8), and appears to have been completely reliant on Clearchus to restore order. In the course of this disagreement, after first being assaulted by his troops, Clearchus swore to them that he will not march to the king's capital (*An.* 1.3.7) – despite his close relationship with Cyrus, the true cause of the mission had not yet been revealed to him (or he is a liar). The Greeks decided to request an explanation from Cyrus about the true cause of their mission, and he duly obliged. The story was now altered so as to identify Cyrus' rival Abrocomas as the target. Abrocomas was a genuine threat: as soon as he learned of Cyrus' presence in Cilicia, he departed to the king with his army (*An.* 1.4.5). When the Cyrean dispute was resolved, the march continued.

The Cilician-Syrian Gates were the first obstacle for Cyrus' troops to cross after Sardis, which was held briefly by Orontas against the advancing army.⁹⁶ Cyrus clearly expected the Syrian Gates to be another matter entirely: ships were requested for the sole purpose of taking them. At Issus four hundred hoplites previously serving Abrocomas had arrived and were absorbed into Cyrus' army. Their presence reflects

⁹³ See below, p. 48.

⁹⁴ Braun, "Xenophon's Dangerous Liaisons," dedicates most of his chapter to objectively assessing Cyrus' reputation. The conclusion is that it stems from an inflation of his character.

⁹⁵ Cf. Diod. 14.20.1-21.2. Xenophon's version is more likely: if Cyrus' behaved as admirably as Diodorus presents, it seems unlikely that Xenophon would have missed the opportunity to relate him doing so.

⁹⁶ Though cf. the reservations of Tuplin, "A Foreigner's Perspective," 23-24.

Abrocomas' own proximity. Xenophon's description is suitably detailed (*An.* 1.4.4-5). The fortification consisted of two walls – one on the Cilician side and the other on the Syrian border.⁹⁷ Xenophon indicates that Cyrus was specifically concerned about the presence of a king's garrison at one of the Gates. The king's garrison reported to be guarding one of the Gates was not likely to be purchased or intimidated; the garrison was appointed for the precise reason that this was a strategically vital bottleneck to the empire's centre.⁹⁸ That no garrison was found speaks of both Cyrus' excellent timing and Artaxerxes' situation. There is no plausible explanation for why this garrison was missing, other than that it had been depleted in coordination with Abrocomas' expedition, or was withdrawn to Artaxerxes' side upon word of Cyrus' enterprise.

After leaving Cilicia the Greek generals Xenias and Pasion left the expedition (*An.* 1.4.7), owing to the resentment they harboured over the defection of many of their troops to Clearchus. Undoubtedly Xenophon trumped up that feeling over the one of consternation induced by Cyrus' lying about their purpose. Xenias was a comparatively old acquaintance of Cyrus, having acted as leader of his bodyguard on the journey to Darius' deathbed (*An.* 1.1.1), and possibly as leading general of the Cyreans.⁹⁹ Xenias had also brought the most sizeable contingent of mercenaries.¹⁰⁰ Once the army had reached the Euphrates, Cyrus chose to reveal the true nature of his campaign. The news was received with trepidation, and Cyrus was forced to make a gift of money to the Greek contingent in order to make amends (*An.* 1.4.11-3).¹⁰¹ The

⁹⁷ N. G. L. Hammond, "One or Two Passes at the Cilicia-Syria Border?," *AncW* 25, no. 1 (1994): 18.

⁹⁸ On garrisons and the likelihood that some were appointed specifically by the king to avoid subversion: Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 145-54; Simon Hornblower, "Persia," in *The Fourth Century B.C.*, ed. John Boardman, et al., *The Cambridge Ancient History* 6 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 53. For discussion of Persian garrisons generally see C. J. Tuplin, "Persian garrisons in Xenophon and Other Sources," in *Method and Theory*, ed. Amélie Kuhrt and Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg, *Achaemenid History* 3 (Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, 1988), 67-70 and the expanded version of the article: Tuplin, "Garrisons of the Persian Empire," 167-245.

⁹⁹ Lee, *Greek Army on the March*, 45.

¹⁰⁰ See the table in Roy, "The Mercenaries of Cyrus," 301-02.

¹⁰¹ Depending on the validity of Diodorus' account of the confrontation at Tarsus, this may be either the first or second pay increase.

troubles which followed illustrate the tenuous hold of the Greek generals and Cyrus himself (*An.* 1.5.12).

Following the confrontation, Orontas, Persian royal family member, friend of Cyrus, and accomplished strategist, is discovered to have been plotting a mass defection (*An.* 1.6). Cyrus' forces were encountering difficulties at the hands of an estimated two thousand horsemen, who were burning resources. Orontas offered to ambush and kill those horsemen ravaging prospective supplies. His actual plan was to have as many of his cavalry as possible defect to the king's side once they were away from the main army. The necessity for a swift and decisive response from Cyrus highlights the effectiveness of the king's raids. Xenophon earlier made it clear that the king became aware of Cyrus' advance at an early stage in the incursion, and this harassment marks the first point at which Artaxerxes' forces are seen to have taken action after the hints of Orontas' efforts at Sardis. Orontas' plot was revealed by the messenger charged with conducting a letter to Artaxerxes; he was sentenced to death. The plan of Orontas again illustrates the tenuous balance between factions, and hints at omnipresent mistrust. That such a highly placed figure within Cyrus' forces could have attempted to rebel speaks of the need for both commanders to constantly assert their worth as prospective leader of the empire.

Xenophon's focus and the absence of fragments of Ctesias make it difficult to reconstruct the royal response to Cyrus. The ease with which Cyrus marched was met with alarm at court. Plutarch tells us that Parysatis was blamed most for the war, and her friends came under suspicion (*Art.* 6.4-5). Stateira appears to have been the most vitriolic in her attacks, lambasting the king's mother and raising her ire. Having learned of the size of Cyrus' force, one of Artaxerxes' first moves was to recall Abrocomas and his body of troops and strip his territory of resources. On his return, Abrocomas was instructed to burn the crossings of the Euphrates, thus directing Cyrus along the banks of the river (*An.* 1.4.18). For his part, Cyrus accelerated his movements.¹⁰² Artaxerxes' next focus became accumulating an army large enough to stave off the assault. Initially these forces were mustered at the ancient Iranian fortress

¹⁰² Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 628 addresses the contrast in speed here against that before he reached the Euphrates.

of Ecbatana, but when distant contingents were delayed (Diodorus identifies Indians in particular), Artaxerxes set off to meet his brother (Diod. 14.22.1). At Cunaxa, near Babylon, Artaxerxes began construction of a defensive trench twelve parasangs (approximately sixty-six kilometres¹⁰³) in length, according to Xenophon, or one hundred stadia (nineteen kilometres), according to Plutarch (*Art.* 7.2) to the wall of Media (*An.* 1.7.15-16). It was ten metres wide and six deep, with only a six metre space for the passage of Cyrus' army. The wall of Media was not a new construction, but the trench was a clever adaptation of existing works to funnel Cyrus.¹⁰⁴ Despite this formidable obstacle, Artaxerxes failed to position any defensive force here. Perhaps the construction was not considered complete enough to ensure the ultimate showdown ended in Artaxerxes' victory. Cyrus faced no threat and marched eleven days before his brother would face him (*An.* 1.7.18). Plutarch maintains that Artaxerxes refused to offer battle from fear. Plutarch then has Tiribazus coaxing the king to stop fleeing and face his brother (*Art.* 7.3). This tale should be treated prudently as it fits suspiciously well with Plutarch's image of the king as cowardly and dilatory (*Art.* 4.3). The attribution of the story to Deinon seems reasonable, but there is no sure proof.¹⁰⁵ In Xenophon, the royal army is led by four commanders: Abrocomas, Tissaphernes, Gobryas, and Arbaces (*An.* 1.7.11). Yet in the same passage Xenophon states that Abrocomas arrived too late for the battle. So why does he attribute a leadership position to Abrocomas? It is a confusing claim. Perhaps Cyrus was already aware of the main leaders in the royal faction and had informed the Greeks of the enemy's composition. Perhaps Xenophon read the detail later in Ctesias. It was, after all, quite difficult for Xenophon to have noted the commanders in the battle itself. In the absence of Abrocomas, Gobryas was likely the effective commander in chief of the royal force, given his position as a governor of Babylonia and the man most aware of the region.¹⁰⁶

Two days after crossing the trench, Cyrus had been lulled into a false sense of security, trusting the prophecies of his *mantis* (*An.* 1.7.18) and brashly allowing his

¹⁰³ Following the lengths provided by Kuhrt, *Persian Empire*, §9.20.

¹⁰⁴ Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 627-28.

¹⁰⁵ Stevenson, *Persica*, 29; see also discussion of Binder, *Kommentar*, *ad locum*.

¹⁰⁶ Dandamaev, *Iranians in Achaemenid Babylonia*, 79.

army to advance in disarray, no longer maintaining the discipline he showed when they marched in full formation (*An.* 1.7.1, 14). It would be too much to claim that permitting easy passage through the trench was an intentional strategy – it was far too large to have been constructed purely as a distraction – but it certainly played into the king's hands. By all accounts, the timing of Artaxerxes' advance was perfect. Cyrus' army marched in a disorderly fashion, and was caught completely unawares (*An.* 1.7.19-8.3; *Art.* 7.3). Furthermore, when news arrived of the advancing army, Cyrus was just about to halt his march and make camp, and so his soldiers were even less prepared for battle (*An.* 1.8.1). Xenophon recounts the chaotic preparations of Cyrus and the Greeks, and it becomes clear that Cyrus did not respond to the quickly developing situation well. He went to battle without a helmet (*An.* 1.8.6),¹⁰⁷ attempted to move Clearchus away from the protective boundary of the Euphrates (*An.* 1.8.12-13), and was unaware of the army's watchword (*An.* 1.8.15-17). The general picture is one of panic. The royal army, however, put on an impressive display. The Greeks prepared for a typical barbaric response: disorderly conduct and shouted war cries – Cyrus went down their line warning them against being intimidated by such a display (*An.* 1.8.11; *Art.* 7.3-4). Instead, the king's army marched forward in disciplined silence, the antithesis of the army he was marshalled against.

The battle itself has received numerous treatments over the years.¹⁰⁸ Few question the royal army's strategy in the battle. There is a reason for this: very little is said on the matter. Conversely, we should not limit our inquiry to things which are immediately apparent. What can we determine of the battle and Persian strategy? Xenophon's overall picture is relatively clear, albeit with a heavy emphasis on the Greeks. If Diodorus is to be believed, Ariaeus' flank was eventually exposed and he

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Sherylee R. Bassett, "The Death of Cyrus the Younger," *CQ* 49, no. 2 (1999): 277.

¹⁰⁸ Marie Pancritius, *Studien über die Schlacht bei Kunaxa* (Berlin: Alexander Duncker, 1906), 31-43; Johannes Kromayer and Georg Veith, *Antike Schlachtfelder: Bausteine zu einer antiken Kriegsgeschichte*, vol. 4 (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1924-31), 235-42; Otto Lendle, "Der Bericht Xenophons über die Schlacht von Kunaxa," *Gymnasium* 73 (1966): 429-52; H. Gugel, "Die Aufstellung von Kyros' Heer in der Schlacht von Kunaxa," *Gymnasium* 78 (1971): 241-43; Paul A. Rahe, "The Military Situation in Western Asia on the Eve of Cunaxa," *AJPh* 101, no. 1 (1980): 79-96; Bigwood, "Ancient Accounts," 340-57; Westlake, "Diodorus and the Expedition," 241-54; G. Wylie, "Cunaxa and Xenophon," *AC* 61 (1992): 119-34; C. T. H. R. Ehrhardt, "Two Notes on Xenophon, *Anabasis*," *AHB* 8, no. 1 (1994): 1-4; Bassett, "Death of Cyrus," 473-83.

retreated as the enemy began surrounding his position (Diod. 14.24.1). This would be consistent with the considerably larger army of the king and the extended battle line this afforded him.¹⁰⁹ The battle lines were straightforward. On Cyrus' line, the Greeks held the right flank, with the Paphlagonian cavalry between their side and the Euphrates. With the Greeks were numerous peltasts. Cyrus was in the centre of the line, again with cavalry. To his left were the Persian contingents, with Ariaeus in command. The royal army's centre was reportedly outside the entirety of Cyrus' left flank (*An.* 1.8.13), but this is preposterous.¹¹⁰ More likely Artaxerxes was simply well beyond the Greeks' left. We know nothing of what was marshalled against Ariaeus, but we know that the king was in the centre, with cavalry (the six thousand routed by Cyrus is probably an exaggeration, but there were undoubtedly some present: *An.* 1.8.24-25). Various attempts have been made at quantifying the armies at Cunaxa.¹¹¹ Gabrielli's efforts remain the most detailed,¹¹² but Wylie provides the best illustration of the ancient sources' fallacies: he calculates that a battle line of 400,000 royal soldiers (as in Diodorus) would have stretched twenty-eight miles.¹¹³ Briant's pessimism regarding our chances of estimating the armies is hard to argue against;¹¹⁴ it is unlikely we can ever know with any certainty. Facing the Greeks, on the far left flank, were horsemen in white cuirasses (under the command of Tissaphernes, supposedly) – perhaps a reference to Anahita¹¹⁵ – next to them were troops with wicker shields (γερροφόροι), likely facing the Greek peltasts, and next to them hoplites (that is, heavily armed troops in Xenophon's eyes) with wooden shields reaching to their feet (ὀπλῖται σὺν ποδήρεσι ξυλίναις ἀσπίσιν), reportedly Egyptians (*An.* 1.8.9). Then, there were more horsemen in white cuirasses and bowmen between these forces and

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Bigwood, "Ancient Accounts," 353. Ariaeus is placed at Cyrus' side in Ctesias (F20.1). Both Diodorus (14.24.1) and Xenophon (*An.* 1.8.5) place him on the left flank – they are to be trusted.

¹¹⁰ Bigwood, "Ancient Accounts," 342.

¹¹¹ See Bigwood, "Ancient Accounts," 341-42.

¹¹² Marcel Gabrielli, "Transports et logistique militaire dans l'*Anabase*," in *Dans les pas des Dix-Mille: peuples et pays du Proche-Orient vus par un Grec*, ed. Pierre Briant (Toulouse: Presses universitaires du Mirail, 1995), 111-14.

¹¹³ Wylie, "Cunaxa and Xenophon," 123.

¹¹⁴ Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 629.

¹¹⁵ N. Sekunda, "The Persians," in *Warfare in the Ancient World*, ed. John Hackett (London: Guild Publishing, 1989), 95.

the centre.¹¹⁶ The formations were divided by nation. In front of these forces were 150 scythe-bearing chariots.

As the armies closed, the Greek line billowed out and they began to run. The scythe-bearing chariots were allowed to pass through the line, and other chariots turned against the Persians themselves. The Egyptians broke and fled before an arrow was fired at the Greeks. Similarly, the cavalry charge was of limited effectiveness on the field of battle itself; they charged the peltasts, who split, inflicting severe casualties, and the cavalry continued on to plunder Cyrus' camp. The Greeks continued their pursuit of their foes off the battlefield, effectively removing themselves as a threat from the battle. While the Paphlagonian cavalry is not mentioned, Lendle has plausibly proposed that they, as the Greeks advanced beyond the Persian line, moved to the centre to protect Cyrus' now-exposed right flank.¹¹⁷

The Egyptians of *Anabasis* 1.8.9 are yet to receive anything more than passing commentary, despite their appearance in several works for the purposes of substantiation and comparison.¹¹⁸ Therefore, the following considers Xenophon's description and its significance. Xenophon says that the left flank of the royal battle line began with cavalry, then there were troops with wicker shields, then there were "hoplites with wooden shields which reached to the feet. These were said to be Egyptians" (ὀπλίται σὺν ποδήρεσι ξυλίναις ἀσπίσιν. Αἰγύπτιοι δ' οὗτοι ἐλέγοντο εἶναι). Next to the Egyptians were more cavalry and more bowmen. Curiously, while Xenophon clearly believed the hoplites were Egyptian, his description is not corroborated by Egyptian evidence. The origin of these soldiers remains a mystery. Discussion will take place across two notes: (1) Observations on the Egyptians at Cunaxa. (2) Royal tactics at Cunaxa.

¹¹⁶ See C. J. Tuplin, "All the King's Horse: In Search of Achaemenid Persian Cavalry," in *New Perspectives on Ancient Warfare*, ed. Garrett G. Fagan and Matthew Trundle, *History of Warfare* 59 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010), 167-70 on the cavalry armour.

¹¹⁷ Lendle, "Der Bericht Xenophons," 444.

¹¹⁸ E.g. Delebecque in p. 53n130; Tuplin, "Garrisons of the Persian Empire," 221; they appear to serve as partial inspiration for the depiction in D. Head, *The Achaemenid Persian Army* (Stockport: Montvert Publications, 1992), pl. 4C; Stylianou, *Commentary*, 344; Alexander K. Nefiodkin, "On the Origin of the Scythed Chariots," *Historia* 53, no. 3 (2004): 373; M. B. Charles, "Herodotus, Body Armour and Achaemenid Infantry," *Historia* 61, no. 3 (2012): 261n15.

Observations on the Egyptians at Cunaxa¹¹⁹

Can we trust Xenophon's description?

Xenophon's reliability is a vexed question, as is the precision of ancient battle accounts in general.¹²⁰ It stands to reason that one should justify trust in a feature unique to Xenophon. There are several reasons for doing so. First, Xenophon's observations were not made in the heat of battle, when they are most suspect,¹²¹ but before the Cyreans advance and the sources diverge.¹²² Then, after the battle, Xenophon reveals that he had opportunity to inspect the Egyptians' equipment closely. In both situations the Egyptian shields are identically described (*An.* 1.8.9; 2.1.6). The consistency and context suggest that Xenophon had a clear idea of what he was conveying. Secondly, the Egyptians were marshalled opposite the Cyreans, in the position most visible to Xenophon. Xenophon did not attempt to detail the right wing of the royal army – in which case one might justifiably question his veracity, given the distance – but only described what he himself, or his sources, might have observed. The discrimination would suggest that Xenophon was not inclined to lie about the appearance of the Egyptians. Thirdly, while the *Anabasis* is the only source which attests to the presence of Egyptians, we are fortunate that Xenophon was an eye-witness. Ctesias, the only other autoptic source, is too fragmentary, and Diodorus wrote several centuries later. No inference should be drawn from their silence. Finally, any bias and disingenuity is limited in *Anabasis* 1.8.9. Xenophon offers no opinion on the Egyptians, he merely reports their appearance. By the time the Persian line breaks, the Egyptians are no longer singled out or criticised. Xenophon saw the Egyptian equipment before and after the battle, and notes its characteristics without any (feasibly misleading) commentary.

¹¹⁹ A revised version of this section and that on royal tactics at Cunaxa has been published as John Shannahan, "Two Notes on the Battle of Cunaxa," *AHB* 28, no. 1-2 (2014): 61-81.

¹²⁰ E.g. N. Whatley, "On the Possibility of Reconstructing Marathon and Other Ancient Battles," *JHS* 84 (1964): 119-39.

¹²¹ Whatley, "Reconstructing Marathon and Other Ancient Battles," 120-22.

¹²² Westlake, "Diodorus and the Expedition," 244.

On this basis I accept Xenophon's description of the equipment. But can the same trust be extended to the nationality Xenophon applies to the soldiers? Unnamed people said that the troops were Egyptian. Xenophon, however, was not incredulous. Gray has shown Xenophon's nuanced use of citations in the *Anabasis*. The report on Cunaxa, especially, is replete with citations designed to validate what might be disbelieved.¹²³ It is most probable that the same end was pursued in 1.8.9. Perhaps Xenophon felt the need to justify his claim because Egypt was in revolt at the time of Cyrus' march. Artaxerxes II may have been recognised as king in Egypt as late as 398, but turmoil in the province's north must have made any march from Egypt to Babylon unlikely.¹²⁴ So were the Egyptians settled in Babylonia?¹²⁵ Were they mercenaries?¹²⁶ Were they part of a levied military force from Egypt, dispatched before the revolt, as Xenophon indicates was exacted from Cilicia and Cyprus (Xen. *Cyr.* 7.4.2)? Xenophon asserts that every satrapy maintained such a force (*Oec.* 4.5-7), and the practice might have resulted in an Egyptian force, loyal to the Persians, departing when the province took independence. Perhaps, if Briant is correct to say that Artaxerxes was aware of Cyrus' rebellion,¹²⁷ the Egyptians were assembled in the imperial heartland as an early move to counter Cyrus' force. Xenophon also attempts to explain their presence in Babylonia through his *Cyropaedia* (where Cyrus rewarded their valour with cities: 7.1.45), but that should not be taken at face value, given the nature of the work. The limited evidence means that no definitive answers can be offered here. Nonetheless, it can be stated with certainty that Xenophon believed he was looking at Egyptians. This becomes clear after considering Xenophon's depiction of Egyptians in the *Cyropaedia*.

In the description of the Egyptians at Cunaxa, they are first contrasted against the traditional, lightly armoured Persian troops (γεροφόροι) by their denomination as ὀπλίται. The size of their shields is also noted – "reaching to the feet" (ποδήρεσι). Comments on Egyptian shield size are repeated elsewhere in Xenophon's work, and

¹²³ Vivienne J. Gray, "Interventions and Citations in Xenophon, *Hellenica* and *Anabasis*," CQ 53, no. 1 (2003): 115-23, esp. 118-19.

¹²⁴ See above, p. 38nn70-71.

¹²⁵ Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 987.

¹²⁶ Yalichev, *Mercenaries of the Ancient World*, 134.

¹²⁷ Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 616-20.

reinforce the image: the shields are shoulder height, one may crouch behind them, and they reach to the feet.¹²⁸ Xenophon's description also specifies that each nation at Cunaxa was in a "full rectangle" (ἐν πλακίῳ πλήρει). The Egyptians at Thymbrara replicate this array, as they were in a vast block of ten thousand men. The block was, we are told, their traditional method of marshalling for battle.¹²⁹ This formation would also suggest that the Egyptians were not typical shield-bearers in front of archers (*sparabara*),¹³⁰ a formation which retained the Assyrian ratio of fifty archers to fifty shield-bearers.¹³¹ The parallel between Thymbrara and Cunaxa is unlikely to be coincidence: it probably reflects Xenophon's confidence in his representation.¹³² The Egyptians certainly had a reputation for their infantry in antiquity which persisted amongst non-Xenophontic works.¹³³ The consistency of Xenophon when describing Egyptians, and his explicit connection between those of the *Cyropaedia* and those of his

¹²⁸ Shoulder height: Xen. *Cyr.* 7.1.33. Crouch: Xen. *Cyr.* 7.1.40. ποδήρεσι: Xen. *Cyr.* 6.2.10.

¹²⁹ Xen. *Cyr.* 6.3.20, 4.17. While Cyrus first mocks their capacity to fight in such a manner, he later acknowledges the advantages offered by their armament (Xen. *Cyr.* 6.4.17, 7.1.33).

¹³⁰ See, for example, Head, *The Achaemenid Persian Army*, 22-27; N. Sekunda, *The Persian Army 560-330BC* (Oxford: Osprey, 1992), 18-19. See also Xen. *Cyr.* 8.5.11-12, which appears to describe these shield-bearers (calling their shields τὰ μεγάλα γέροα), and cf. below, pp. 56-57. See also, on Persian shields: Stefan Bittner, *Tracht und Bewaffnung des persischen Heeres zur Zeit der Achaimeniden* (München: K. Friedrich, 1985), 158-66.

¹³¹ Nigel Tallis, "Transport and Warfare," in *Forgotten Empire: The World of Ancient Persia*, ed. John Curtis and Nigel Tallis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 217.

¹³² Generally on the *Anabasis* providing information for the *Cyropaedia*: Bodil Due, *The Cyropaedia: Xenophon's Aims and Methods*, trans. Catherine Brejnholt (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1989), 141. J. K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 165-91 notes many links between the battle of Thymbrara in the *Cyropaedia* and that of Cunaxa; the former rectifies many errors of Cyrus the Younger. Agesilaus may have furnished Xenophon with extra detail, based on his time in Egypt, if a late date for the *Cyropaedia* is accepted: Deborah Levine Gera, *Xenophon's Cyropaedia: Style, Genre, and Literary Technique* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 23-25. Edouard Delebecque, *Essai sur la vie de Xénophon* (Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1957), 423n58 rejects the association of the Egyptians at Cunaxa with those in the *Cyropaedia*, but is more prepared to consider Agesilaus' influence (pp. 404-05). Cf. the judgement of N. Sekunda, "Achaemenid Colonization in Lydia," *REA* 87 (1985): 19. The links noted in the following will demonstrate that Delebecque's dismissal may have been rash.

¹³³ Ach. Tat. 3.13; Hld. 9.14-20; Pl. *Ti.* 24b.

own day (*Cyr.* 6.2.10, 7.1.33), lead me to believe he can be trusted on the matter.¹³⁴ Ultimately, Xenophon was a militarily well informed eye-witness and he demonstrates faith in his identification.

The significance of Xenophon's choice of words.

Xenophon uses the term ἀσπίς to identify the shields of the Egyptians. This is important. Xenophon's vocabulary when discussing shields is not frivolous; it is rigid, predictable, and pragmatic. This is in contrast to Herodotus, for whom the term ἀσπίς, in particular, was very flexible. Greeks use ἀσπίδες in Herodotus, as do Salaminians, Assyrians, Paphlagonians, Mysians, Pisidians, Phoenicians, Egyptians, and Thessalians.¹³⁵ Persians use wicker for shields (ἀντὶ δὲ ἀσπίδων γέρορα), and take cover behind shield-barricades (γέρορα).¹³⁶ Xenophon, however, is rather different; the distinctions are glaring by comparison. The Persians, in the entire corpus of Xenophon's work, always use γέρορα. Even when barbarians are using large shields, they are γέρορα (*An.* 4.3.5). The Egyptians are the only non-Greeks to regularly employ ἀσπίδες.¹³⁷ While many Easterners in Herodotus use small ἀσπίδες, or ox-hide ἀσπίδες, or leather ἀσπίδες,¹³⁸ Xenophon employs a vocabulary with greater specificity. Chaldeans use γέρορα μακρά, other barbarians use ox-hide γέρορα, Cyrus the Great's soldiers use μεγάλα γέρορα, and Thracians use πέλται, as do Paphlagonians and a corps of Croesus.¹³⁹ The only exception is a group of Carians, who employ λευκάσπιδας, reflecting Carian use of white armour in this period (*Hell.*

¹³⁴ My opinion of Xenophon's depiction of the Egyptians' equipment is similar to Charles' when he considers Persian body armour: "the frequency with which body armour is associated in the *Cyropaedia* with infantry, and indeed cavalry, seems to suggest that Xenophon was very comfortable with the notion of Persian infantrymen being so equipped in a more genuinely historical context – he must have also expected no raised eyebrows on the part of his audience." Charles, "Herodotus, Body Armour and Achaemenid Infantry," 266.

¹³⁵ In listed order: Hdt. 5.112; 7.63; 7.72; 7.74; 7.76; 7.89 (Phoenicians and Egyptians); 8.27. Herodotus also gives ἀσπίδες to Mares, Colchians, Alarodians, and Saspies (7.79).

¹³⁶ Wicker for shields: Hdt. 7.61. Barricades: Hdt. 9.61-62, 99, 102.

¹³⁷ Xen. *An.* 1.8.9, 2.1.6; *Cyr.* 6.4.17, 7.1.33 (twice), 40.

¹³⁸ In listed order: Hdt. 7.72, 74; 7.76, 79 (both ox-hide and leather).

¹³⁹ In listed order: Xen. *An.* 4.3.5, 7.22-23, 5.4.12; *Cyr.* 8.5.11; *Mem.* 3.9.2; *Ages.* 3.4; *Cyr.* 7.1.24.

3.2.15).¹⁴⁰ Xenophon's terminology is specific to size, material, and type. Accordingly, the language dealing with the Egyptians is at odds with his usual terminology for non-Greeks, and is not idle wordplay. By applying terminology normally reserved for Hellenic forces to the Egyptians, Xenophon seems to indicate that the Egyptians held more similarities to the Cyreans than the other forces in the royal battle line. The *Cyropaedia* also acknowledges the distinction by explicitly contrasting the Persian $\theta\omega\rho\alpha\varsigma$ and $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\rho\rho\omicron\nu$ against the Egyptian $\alpha\sigma\pi\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ (*Cyr.* 7.1.33). Xenophon's military experience should work in his favour here; he was aware of the types of equipment available and their application, and he has a long standing reputation for a technical vocabulary.¹⁴¹

What do we know of fifth century Egyptian shields?

There is comparatively little attention afforded to Egyptian shields of the Persian period in current literature. Fortunately, however, there is ample artistic evidence showing trends from the New Kingdom onwards on which to base general remarks in relation to *Anabasis* 1.8.9.

In terms of construction, Greek and Egyptian shields were not entirely dissimilar; one can see why Xenophon thought Greek and Egyptian shields distinct from the lighter Persian wicker. Both were wooden and covered in an external layer – the Egyptians preferred hide, the Hellenes bronze.¹⁴² It is significant that Xenophon should identify the Egyptian shields as wooden ($\xi\upsilon\lambda\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota\varsigma$), as opposed to typical Persian wicker. The shields Xenophon saw were closely related to those he knew, and

¹⁴⁰ These Carians serve Tissaphernes. Tissaphernes' cavalry at Cunaxa also wears white cuirasses (*An.* 1.8.9).

¹⁴¹ E.g. Léopold Gautier, *La langue de Xénophon* (Genève: Georg & Co., 1911), 150-53.

¹⁴² See, on Egyptian shields: Anthony John Spalinger, "Notes on the Military in Egypt during the XXVth Dynasty," *JSSEA* 11 (1981): 32-58. See also general comments in Ian Shaw, *Egyptian Warfare and Weapons* (Buckinghamshire: Shire, 1991), 31-44; Alessandra Nibbi, "Some Remarks on the Ancient Egyptian Shield," *ZÄS* 130, no. 2 (2003): 170-81. On Greek shields see, for example, N. Sekunda, *Greek Hoplite 480-323, Warrior 27* (Oxford: Osprey, 2000), 10; Hans Van Wees, *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities* (London: Duckworth, 2004), 48; Peter Krentz, "War," in *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare*, ed. Philip A. Sabin, Hans van Wees, and Michael J. Whitby (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 151; Eero Jarva, "Arms and Armor: Part I Arming Greeks for Battle," in *The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World*, ed. Brian Campbell and Lawrence A. Tritle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 397-400.

he was not the first to note the similarities: Herodotus credits the Egyptians with introducing the Greeks to their shields (4.180, cf. 1.171). Historically, the greatest difference was in their shape; flat-bottomed and round topped for the Egyptians (though see below), circular for the Greeks. Xenophon's terminological distinctions appear to reflect real characteristics.

Shields 'reaching to the feet' (ποδήρεσι) were historically common in the Near East, and appear with some regularity in art. These are commonly termed 'tower shields' in modern scholarship.¹⁴³ The Assyrians and Egyptians, in particular, were associated with their operation; Persian *sparabara* may have been inherited from the Assyrians,¹⁴⁴ who utilised such shields in the seventh century, predominantly in siege settings.¹⁴⁵ The Egyptians, on the other hand, are generally considered to have lagged behind their Asiatic neighbours in the realms of military technology.¹⁴⁶ Shields shrank as armour improved; as the Egyptians were slow to adopt such changes, their shields remained large enough to protect their bodies. Resistance to hot, constrictive armour may have also been a product of the climate. The minimal armour worn with tower shields may also allay doubt that Xenophon's terse description in the *Anabasis* omitted important details – Egyptians historically wore little heavy body armour. When armour was worn, it may have been linen; recent research has shown linen compared favourably to metal armour, and (perhaps most relevantly for Egyptian soldiers) fared

¹⁴³ T. A. Madhloom, *The Chronology of Neo-Assyrian Art* (London: Athlone, 1970), 54-58; Amy E. Barron, *Late Assyrian Arms and Armour: Art Versus Artifact* (University of Toronto: Doctoral Thesis, 2010), §IV.2. The Greeks also employed such shields in their past; recall Telemonian Ajax: Hom. *Il.* 15.644-47; cf. Van Wees, *Greek Warfare*, 250-51.

¹⁴⁴ Anne Bovon, "La représentation des guerriers perses et la notion de Barbare dans la première moitié du Ve siècle," *BCH* 87 (1963): 596.

¹⁴⁵ Barron, *Assyrian Arms and Armour*, 133; Tamás Dezső, *The Assyrian Army, I: The Structure of the Neo-Assyrian Army, 1: Infantry* (Budapest: Eötvös University Press, 2012), 100-02, 115. Herodotus (7.63) links Assyrian and Egyptian armature.

¹⁴⁶ Yigael Yadin, *The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands in the Light of Archaeological Study*, trans. M. Pearlman (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), 64-65; Shaw, *Egyptian Warfare*, 31-32; Anthony John Spalinger, *War in Ancient Egypt: The New Kingdom* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2005), 16.

better in hot climates.¹⁴⁷ Artistic examples of tower shields from the Old and Middle Kingdom are commonplace.¹⁴⁸

The problem is that Egyptian design had been trending away from tower shields prior to the fifth century. From the New Kingdom, there was a rise in the prevalence of body armour and helmets.¹⁴⁹ Correspondingly, shields became smaller.¹⁵⁰ By the seventh century, soldiers of Egypt were employing shields comparable in size to the typical Greek ἄσπίς (if not smaller),¹⁵¹ and circular shields.¹⁵² This is not to suggest that variations in shield size were impossible, but rather that tower shields were uncommon. On the other hand, on a statuette of Reshep held in the Louvre, a large shield is found (E 10486). There, however, Reshep is also holding bow and arrows – the figure would be more comparable to the Persian *sparabara* than the Egyptians of Xenophon's work. The key word in Xenophon's description of Egyptian soldiers throughout his works is ποδήρεσι. The most prevalent shields of Egyptian evidence cannot be considered to reach to the feet.¹⁵³ They are similar in size to a

¹⁴⁷ Gregory S. Aldrete, Scott Bartell, and Alicia Aldrete, *Reconstructing Ancient Linen Body Armor: Unraveling the Linothorax Mystery* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 125-28.

¹⁴⁸ E.g. John Coleman Darnell and Deborah Darnell, *Theban Desert Road Survey in the Egyptian Western Desert*, vol. 1 (Chicago: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, 2002), 74-75. See general comments in Robert B. Partridge, *Fighting Pharaohs: Weapons and Warfare in Ancient Egypt* (Manchester: Peartree, 2002), 52-53; Bridget McDermott, *Warfare in Ancient Egypt* (Gloucestershire: Sutton, 2004), 53.

¹⁴⁹ Yadin, *Art of Warfare*, 83-85; Shaw, *Egyptian Warfare*, 31-32, 42; Spalinger, *War in Ancient Egypt*, 120.

¹⁵⁰ See, for example, the shields found in Tutankhamun's tomb, measuring at their largest 72.5 cm by 51.5 cm: Bertha Porter and Rosalind L. B. Moss, *Topographical Bibliography of Ancient Egyptian Hieroglyphic Texts, Reliefs, and Paintings*, vol. 1.2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 581 contains bibliography and museum catalogue numbers. See also the shields portrayed at Medinet Habu (reign of Ramesses III): Harold H. Nelson, *Medinet Habu: Volume 1. Earlier Historical Records of Ramses III*, Oriental Institute Publications 8 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), pls. 31-32, 34-40.

¹⁵¹ Spalinger, "Notes," 32-58, esp. 45-46.

¹⁵² See Timothy Kendall, *Gebel Barkal Epigraphic Survey: 1986* (Boston: Museum of Fine Arts, 1986), fig. 10. Cf. W. B. Emery and L. P. Kirwan, *The Royal Tombs of Ballana and Qustul*, vol. 1 (Cairo: Government Press, 1938), 249, 372-73. See also the (unique) Egyptian production of Hittite-style shields in the reign of Ramesses II: E. B. Pusch, "'Pi-Ramesses-Beloved-of-Amun, Headquarters of thy Chariotry" - Egyptians and Hittites in the Delta Residence of the Ramessides," in *Pelizaeus Museum Hildesheim: The Egyptian Collection*, ed. Arne Eggebrecht and Robert Steven Bianchi (Mainz: Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 1996), 144, figs. 135-38.

¹⁵³ Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice*, 167n9 also notes the absence of tower shields in contemporary Egyptian artwork.

typical Greek hoplite's shield. Yet Xenophon never describes Greek hoplites' shields as ποδήρεσι. Therefore, neither would Xenophon describe the shields of the Piye Stela, for example, as ποδήρεσι. It logically follows that the shields Xenophon saw at Cunaxa were larger than the Cyreans' shields and the shields of the Egyptian evidence. Herodotus' description of Egyptian shields also matches the artistic evidence more closely than Xenophon's report: Egyptians used large spears and hollow shields with broad rims (ἀσπίδας δὲ κοίλας, τὰς ἴτους μεγάλας: Hdt. 7.89). Admittedly, Herodotus has recently been shown to generalise and misrepresent Persian armour, which precludes his use as deciding evidence here.¹⁵⁴ But the evidence is clear: there is a gap of several centuries between the peak in use of shields reaching to the feet and the battle of Cunaxa. The shields Xenophon describes parallel Old and Middle Kingdom designs, but are drastically different to the shields popular from the New Kingdom onwards.

What, then, can be concluded from this consideration of the Egyptians at Cunaxa? Perhaps their shields are a throw-back to archaic Egyptian shields, akin to Assyrian use of earlier technology.¹⁵⁵ But this would be a throwback of several centuries, which surely goes beyond the realms of credibility. Perhaps they were simply an uncommon variety of Egyptian soldier. But then how did the soldiers themselves get to Cunaxa when Egypt was in revolt? We are left with two inconvenient and contradictory facts: (1) Xenophon believed he described Egyptians at Cunaxa. (2) The seventh and sixth century evidence from Egypt demonstrates that tower shields were no longer favoured among infantrymen in the fifth century. They had begun to use armour, and shields which cannot be considered to reach near the feet. The most logical conclusion is that Xenophon was mistaken. He did not see Egyptians at Cunaxa. But he did see that equipment. Based on the tradition of tower shields in Mesopotamia as late as the seventh century, I suspect they originated east of

¹⁵⁴ Charles, "Herodotus, Body Armour and Achaemenid Infantry," 257-69; Roel Konijnendijk, "'Neither the Less Valorous Nor the Weaker': Persian Military Might and the Battle of Plataia," *Historia* 61, no. 1 (2012): 1-17. See also, on Herodotus and Egyptians: Christelle Fischer-Bovet, "Egyptian Warriors: The Machimoi of Herodotus and the Ptolemaic Army," *CQ* 63, no. 1 (2013): 209-36.

¹⁵⁵ Barron, *Assyrian Arms and Armour*, 134.

the Mediterranean, for there is little evidence for the use of such shields at this time in the West. These soldiers must be treated with great care if their nationality is important to any point in scholarship.

Royal Tactics at Cunaxa

Traditionally, the battle is considered to have demonstrated the superiority of the Greek infantry with straightforward tactics employed on both sides. The Greeks were too strong, but Ariaeus on the Cyrus' opposite flank was defeated.¹⁵⁶ The cavalry charge of Cyrus in the centre, while damaging, was mitigated by rallying of the troops (by Tissaphernes, in Diod. 14.23.6). Because of the straightforward manoeuvring of the armies in this battle, it has generally been accepted at face value. In the 1990s, however, a new approach to royal tactics was conceived. In these revisions, it was suggested that the retreat of the Persians was intentional – the Greeks were lured from the field of battle in order to negate their influence:

“It must be that he [Tissaphernes] gave orders to his infantry to flee as soon as the Greek charge had begun, and that the apparent conflict was a feint, to remove the Greeks from the battlefield. Tissaphernes himself and his cavalry broke through the light-armed Greeks and their supporting ‘barbarian’ cavalry on Cyrus’ extreme right, beside the Euphrates (*Anab.* I 10. 7), and so could have encircled the Greeks, as Clearchus feared (ib. 8. 13), or have attacked their unshielded right, but he did neither; instead, he rode straight on to seize Cyrus’ camp (I 10. 8). If he had forced the Greeks to halt, they might still have intervened in the decisive phase of the battle. [...] It is reasonable to suppose that the chariots were there to attack and disorder the Greek force if it tried to change its position from the right wing: to move diagonally towards the centre of the King’s force, as Cyrus wanted (*Anab.* I 8. 12), it would have to offer its right, unshielded side to the chariots.”¹⁵⁷

Here I wish to reopen discussion of tactics in the battle by offering some points of contention in Ehrhardt’s proposal: there is reason to doubt the ‘intentional retreat’ hypothesis. As Wylie’s comments were an aside, the following will deal primarily with

¹⁵⁶ *Contra* Joseph William Hewitt, "The Second Phase of the Battle of Cunaxa," *CJ* 15, no. 2 (1919): 83-93, supporting Boucher’s theory of the almost total defeat of the royal army; Boucher has no support in recent literature.

¹⁵⁷ Ehrhardt, "Two Notes," 2. See also Wylie, "Cunaxa and Xenophon," 129. This hypothesis has been most recently repeated in Robin Waterfield, *Xenophon’s Retreat: Greece, Persia, and the End of the Golden Age* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard, 2006), 18.

Ehrhardt's more complete theorizing. I identify three main problems with the thesis: the tactical risks and inconsistencies involved in the plan, the behaviour of the cavalry and chariots, and the equipment of the Egyptians.

First, one may consider the immediate tactical difficulties of the tactic. The move was an enormous gamble on the part of the royal Persians. The plan required nullifying both a contingent of cavalry and the scythed chariots. It also exposed Artaxerxes (in the centre) to attack, as there was no guarantee that the Greeks would pursue their opponents. It is for this reason that one should not consider the plan an improvisation. What would have happened if the Greeks stayed on the field and simply attacked the centre with no opposition? If Tissaphernes enacted the plan without notifying the king, what would Artaxerxes have thought, seeing his left flank retreat? It might prompt a response which would lose the battle. Ehrhardt addresses this question with a hypothesis of the chariots' role; his point will be answered below. In a battle for the control of the empire, it seems unnecessary to make such a move when one already greatly outnumbers the opposition. The horsemen, especially, might have been better employed elsewhere: it seems most unlikely that the king should nullify such valuable forces, rather than deploy them against the far more numerous troops on his right flank under Ariaeus – we should not forget that the Greeks made up only a small portion of Cyrus' total force. Under ten per cent in Xenophon (*An.* 1.7.11); modern scholars estimate thirty per cent.¹⁵⁸ Nor did the royal cavalry attempt to counter the Paphlagonian cavalry of Cyrus (or had that manoeuvre been precluded by the Paphlagonians' move towards Cyrus' centre?¹⁵⁹). Nor does Wylie's comment on the value of the left flank preclude the risk of withdrawing it. He states that "the notable lack of resistance of the king's left wing to the Greek attack may have been due

¹⁵⁸ Bigwood, "Ancient Accounts," 341n5; Gabrielli, "Transports et logistique militaire dans l'*Anabase*," 111-14; G. L. Cawkwell, *The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 248-49. Whatley's comment is worth noting as well – exact numbers are not so important in reconstructing such battles; it's relative size that contribute most to understanding, and our sources provide that information: Whatley, "Reconstructing Marathon and Other Ancient Battles," 127.

¹⁵⁹ Lendle, "Der Bericht Xenophons," 444; Otto Lendle, *Kommentar zu Xenophons Anabasis (Bücher 1-7)* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1995), 65.

to placement of the weakest troops there (e.g. Libyans, Ethiopians, Arabians)."¹⁶⁰ Thus, the left flank was not vital, or an unexpected loss? I am unsure if this statement derives from Diodorus, or if it is related to standard Greek practice of placing the strongest forces on the right flank. If the former, it should be cautioned that Diodorus' account is less reliable than Xenophon's.¹⁶¹ If the latter, some further consideration is necessary. The Greek battle order fundamentally derives from how a hoplite would naturally edge towards his neighbour's shield in an unconscious effort to remain within its protection (Thuc. 5.71).¹⁶² The motion resulted in hoplite armies effectively sliding across one another, causing each army's left flank to be overlapped, which often resulted in the defeat of that wing. Accordingly, the left wing was considered to be naturally weaker and prone to defeat by its opponents on the right wing of the enemy. Conversely, the right wing required stronger forces to resist the motion, drive home a victory, and be comfortable with an exposed, difficult-to-defend flank. Whether γερροφόροι adhered to such a fighting model is a question in itself – they, after all, did not form phalanxes like the Greeks. On the basis of the left flank's natural deficiencies, Wylie's point is reasonable, and perhaps one may argue for an 'intentional sacrifice' of the left flank at Cunaxa (imitated by the Spartans at Nemea?¹⁶³). Yet an intentional sacrifice is not the same as an intentional retreat. We must also remember that the second and third bravest divisions were positioned on each side of the left wing.¹⁶⁴ Just because the right flank is strong does not mean the left flank must be abandoned.

As an aside, which may have bearing if true, Artaxerxes may have been aware of Cyrus' battle line prior to the engagement, in which case he ignored intelligence by formulating a battle line as Wylie imagines. Cyrus' battle line was predetermined, and

¹⁶⁰ Wylie, "Cunaxa and Xenophon," 129.

¹⁶¹ Diod. 14.23.4. On Diodorus' worth, see the conclusion of Bigwood, "Ancient Accounts," 355; Westlake, "Diodorus and the Expedition," 254.

¹⁶² W. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974-), 2: 192; J. Lazenby, "The Killing Zone," in *Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience*, ed. Victor Davis Hanson (London: Routledge, 1991), 91-92. On this phenomenon and its practicalities, based on modern experimentation, see K. Randall, "Hoplite Phalanx Mechanics: Investigation of Footwork, Spacing and Shield Coverage," *Journal of Greco-Roman Studies* (서양고전학연구) 44 (2011): 124-27.

¹⁶³ *Hell.* 4.2.22; J. Lazenby, *The Spartan Army* (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1985), 139-43.

¹⁶⁴ Asclepiodotus 3.1; Hdt. 9.26-27; Hom. *Il.* 4.299; Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, 2: 192-93. Cf. examples in Frontin. *Str.* 2.3.1-9, 21-22.

he marched in that order for one stage, three parasangs (*An.* 1.7.1-2, 14). Royal scouts may have relayed that information prior to the battle, for a scouting party or vanguard was active at this time (*An.* 1.6.1, 8.1; Diod. 14.22.3). The activity of scouts is a contentious issue, but there was a marked increase in the practice beginning in the early fourth century.¹⁶⁵ The examples cited above from the *Anabasis* satisfy my belief that some forward force was employed by both sides in order to monitor the enemy and/or prevent ambush. It may have informed the king of Cyrus' plans: as will be further expounded below, the battle line Artaxerxes created was structured to counter the opposition in a manner which is not consistent with the intentional withdrawal of the left wing.

Setting aside the question of ancient military intelligence, when Artaxerxes forced battle upon his brother, he selected a location and time best suited to his own forces. Artaxerxes did not fight at the trench, where it was expected (*An.* 1.7.14-17). The king marched onto Cyrus' force when it was unprepared, maintaining utmost order (in contradiction to Cyrus' warning of clamour: *An.* 1.8.1-8, 11). While the Euphrates on Cyrus' right prevented an enveloping manoeuvre around the rebel flanks, it also was advantageous to Artaxerxes. The river would limit the natural motion of Cyrus' army towards the right, and would therefore mitigate advantages over the royal left flank gained by the motion. To propose, therefore, that Artaxerxes wasted choice of battle ground by placing his weakest troops against the Cyreans seems inconsistent with the evidence.

A faux-retreat would also necessitate abandonment of standard tactical theory, as Artaxerxes did not attempt any ambush after the Greeks became excited and disorganised by their pursuit. Albeit that the landscape made any ambush difficult to execute, it was the accepted purpose of luring any force away with a planned retreat (Frontin. *Str.* 3.11; Hdt. 7.211). And the Persians may have attempted to employ the tactic properly later: after the battle when Cyrus' camp was raided, a retreat of infantry was performed, which drew the Greeks towards a hill covered in a mass of Persian

¹⁶⁵ Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, 1: 132; Frank Russell, "Finding the Enemy: Military Intelligence," in *The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World*, ed. Brian Campbell and Lawrence A. Tritle (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 476.

cavalry. When the Greeks pursued in order, and stopped before the hill, the tactic was abandoned. The Cyreans did not break their ranks as they did in the battle earlier and so were much more difficult to attack (*An.* 1.10.11-15). On the other hand, this hill could be the one to which Artaxerxes withdrew after being wounded, if the royal standard was correctly identified.¹⁶⁶ Thus, he might have had no intention of engaging the Cyreans here (*An.* 1.10.12-13; *Art.* 13.1). In reality, theory differed greatly from practice, so I do not place great weight on this aspect.

On the cavalry and chariots, there are two facts inconsistent with the hypothesis of Ehrhardt. The first is the positioning of the chariots. Ehrhardt argues that the chariots were there to attack and disorder "the Greek force if it tried to change its position from the right wing [...] once it was certain that the Greeks would not move away from the river, Tissaphernes had to get the chariots out of the way as quickly as possible, and did so."¹⁶⁷ This seems to be an extraordinary waste of the weapon which Ehrhardt recognises as so potent when employed by Pharnabazus.¹⁶⁸ There can be no doubt that restricting the chariots' capacity to charge ignores the purpose of scythed chariots: to break up masses of heavy infantry.¹⁶⁹ Chariots must be permitted to advance; they are pointless if defensive and reactionary. One must wonder why the chariots were not employed elsewhere if they were to serve no offensive role.

Also inconsistent with the intentional retreat hypothesis is the behaviour of the cavalry. Why would cavalry charge peltasts (less encumbered than a hoplite, often armed with missiles, and thus able to dodge cavalry while posing danger of counter damage¹⁷⁰) instead of the disorganised hoplites? Ehrhardt proposes that Tissaphernes' cavalry broke through the Greek ranks, but did not attack the Cyreans' rear as they did not wish to keep the Greeks on the battlefield. Yet, if it was an intentional retreat, and the cavalry were aware of the prearranged plan, why send them to take the camp? Why not order the cavalry to wheel about once the Greeks began their pursuit and

¹⁶⁶ On which, see Campbell Bonner, "The Standard of Artaxerxes II," *CR* 61, no. 1 (1947): 9-10; Lendle, *Kommentar*, 89; Günther Martin, "Xenophon *Anabasis* 1.10.12: The Shield That Became a Lance," *Mnemosyne* 60, no. 1 (2007): 112-16.

¹⁶⁷ Ehrhardt, "Two Notes," 2.

¹⁶⁸ Ehrhardt, "Two Notes," 2.

¹⁶⁹ Nefiodkin, "On the Origin of the Scythed Chariots," 372-73.

¹⁷⁰ Rahe, "Military Situation," 83.

their ranks loosened? The cavalry could harass the Greek rear as they pursued their opponents, and push the Cyreans farther afield. At the battle of Cunaxa, if there was a plan to lure the Greeks from the field, the cavalry was entirely wasted. The Greeks did get as far as thirty stadia from the king in the end – surely at some point during that long pursuit the cavalry might have been better employed assisting in their dispersal and hindering their re-formation into a highly defensible force. It is of little value to assault the camp when one has already committed the wing to an intentional retreat; the cavalry could have been used as part of a prearranged plan to defeat the Greeks. Cyrus' greatest fear was certainly that his brother would get into the rear of them (*An.* 1.8.24). Xenophon reports that the Greek line spread out, and allowed gaps to form whenever chariots approached (*An.* 1.8.18-20). This would have been the ideal opportunity for the cavalry to regroup and attempt to drive away the Greeks. Parenthetically, one may note that incautious pursuit by one wing could bring about the defeat of that wing's entire army.¹⁷¹ Cavalry had especial value once the enemy was displaced from its phalanx, which Pharnabazus demonstrated in the 390s (*Hell.* 4.1.17-19; see also Polyæn. 7.14.3). On the other hand, if the retreat was not intentional, the cavalry manoeuvring makes sense. Discouraged by the failures of the chariots and their infantry support, they fled the field. Since it was apparently intentional, however, it is confusing. There would now be two distractions – soldiers fleeing in front and the cavalry behind. The Cyreans could not have engaged both, nor was either manoeuvre in itself valuable for defeating Cyrus' army. The behaviour is not consistent with a prearranged plan.¹⁷²

The equipment of the 'Egyptian' hoplites only strengthens this doubt. Equipped as they were, the hoplites were a natural counterweight to Greek infantry. A key point of Ehrhardt was that Tissaphernes "knew that the King had no infantry

¹⁷¹ Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, 2: 201 and examples.

¹⁷² One foreseeable counterargument may be that the royal cavalry sought to distract the Paphlagonian cavalry, rather than the Cyreans. I believe this again ignores the value of the cavalry in harassing the hoplites. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the Paphlagonians would be greatly concerned by the camp if they could win the battle itself. Regardless, given the disappearance of the Paphlagonians, it is entirely speculative to discuss their behaviour in depth.

which could withstand hoplites."¹⁷³ Recent study has shown that the Persian army was not so poorly matched against the Greek hoplite as the Greek sources might have us think.¹⁷⁴ Regardless, the above discussion of the 'Egyptians' demonstrates that they held heavier equipment than other Achaemenid forces at the battle. Their equipment was closer to the traditional Greek armature than any other attested force at Cunaxa. If the retreat was intentional, why would Artaxerxes have placed such troops here, and expected them to be capable of withdrawing? Surely they could have been utilised at another point in the line, and not wasted. If the retreat was planned, the most viable option was to utilise the γερροφόροι, who might have been capable of retreating in some semblance of order, or flee and regroup more easily without tiring, given their lighter equipment (wicker vs. wood). The 'Egyptian' hoplites at Cunaxa were not expected to flee.

Rather, the most straightforward scenario is the most likely. Royal strengths were placed against the greatest strength of Cyrus. The scythed-chariots were present to break up the Greek phalanx and permit a cavalry assault. Xenophon explicitly identifies the 'Egyptians' by way of comparison with the standard Persian troops. The latter are γερροφόροι, equipped with wicker shields. By contrast, the former are equipped with wooden (that is, material stronger than wicker) shields, reaching down to their feet. The size and weight of the hoplites' outfitting gives a firm indication of their purpose in the battle. I argue that the hoplites were present to hold fast against the Greeks. They would allow the charioteers and cavalry men to break up and disperse the Greek phalanx, while the bowmen rained arrows upon the enemy. Unfortunately (for the royal army), this plan was not at all effective. The bowmen apparently fled before the Cyreans came within bowshot (after the Greeks advanced at a rapid rate: *An.* 1.8.17-18); the chariots failed to adequately break up the Greeks; the cavalry had no impact; the hoplites' courage failed and they were easily routed.

¹⁷³ Ehrhardt, "Two Notes," 2. See also Rahe, "Military Situation," 80-83; Wylie, "Cunaxa and Xenophon," 119.

¹⁷⁴ Konijnendijk, "Persian Military Might," 7-10; cf. Christopher Matthew, "Towards the Hot Gates: The Events Leading to the Battle of Thermopylae," in *Beyond the Gates of Fire*, ed. Christopher Matthew and Matthew Trundle (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2013), 55-56.

On the left flank of the royal army, then, the Greeks broke ranks and pursued their foes. Meanwhile, the Persian cavalry continued through Cyrus' line and on to his camp. The battle continued with both armies missing a flank. This played into Artaxerxes' hands. It would be unreasonable to suggest that drawing off the Greeks was an intentional ploy, but it worked fantastically well. The greatest threat to the royal army was now removed; the Greeks were a trump card, a professional force Artaxerxes could not easily combat. With the Greeks out of the equation, Cyrus was greatly outnumbered, easily outmanoeuvred, and soon defeated. Although it is fair to acknowledge that if Clearchus was responsible for the defeat, Parysatis would hardly have continued affection for him (*Art.* 18.3; *Ctes.* F27.69),¹⁷⁵ it is clear that the Greeks made a mistake. Their haphazard chase was excessive. The pursuit should have been restricted enough to allow for a return to the battle once their opposition was seen from the field, which would have allowed them to have at least partially fulfilled Cyrus' request to attack the centre (*An.* 1.8.12). Cyrus, seeing the Greeks advancing, charged the centre of the king's line, where he was killed. Tissaphernes was then rewarded for his long-standing loyalty to Artaxerxes, and the warning he provided to the king of the impending revolt.

The analysis of the 'Egyptian' soldiers at Cunaxa reveals several points of interest. First, Xenophon, when discussing shields, further extends his reputation for military expertise through his employment of a technical vocabulary specific to type and material. He isolates the Egyptians as the only regular non-Greek users of the ἀσπίς. Xenophon firmly believed that he saw Egyptians. Secondly, Egyptian evidence contradicts Xenophon's distinctions. Egyptians may have used such large shields in the past, but the evidence closest to the fifth century shows that Egyptians at this time preferred round shields, similar to the typical Greek design. Thirdly, the equipment may help undermine reconstructions of the tactics employed in the battle. As it stands, there are persistent questions regarding the 'intentional retreat' hypothesis. On the other hand, Xenophon and Diodorus present such a confused reckoning of the battle that no interpretation can be entirely satisfactory: one can only pose questions and

¹⁷⁵ Wylie, "Cunaxa and Xenophon," 125n14.

discuss possibilities. On the basis of the above observations, I argue that we should avoid airbrushing the actions of the royal army's left flank and recognise its failure, while the right flank performed admirably.

The three extant descriptions of Cyrus' death are preserved by Plutarch and Xenophon.¹⁷⁶ In every case Cyrus rushes into individual battle with the king. Discrepancies begin to appear, though, between the early sources (Ctesias and Xenophon), and the later versions (recorded by Deinon). Both earlier accounts indicate that Artaxerxes was struck in the chest by Cyrus seriously enough to warrant medical care; Ctesias claims that he himself treated the wound. Xenophon asserts that in the process of striking his brother, Cyrus was himself wounded near the eye and killed in the ensuing struggle. This differs from Ctesias' version, preserved by Plutarch, where the blow to his chest forced Artaxerxes from the field. Ctesias then has Cyrus charging into battle a second time, whereupon he is wounded near the eye by a man named Mithridates. For Xenophon, only one wound is identified in the account; that which struck Cyrus near the eye. Ctesias, however, claims that after being hit near the eye and placed upon another horse, another unnamed individual punctured a vein at the back of Cyrus' knee, causing him to fall again, whereupon his wounded head hit a rock and he died. The value of Xenophon's treatment of events may be tempered by the knowledge of his motivations. It is common knowledge that he held Cyrus in high regard. Xenophon retells the story that Cyrus dies gloriously in combat against the king himself, rather than rushing headlong into battle once the king has departed the field. Moreover, it is a single identified blow which kills Cyrus, leaving a far more noble image in the mind of the reader than one in which Cyrus, with a blow to his face, a grievously wounded thigh, and possible further damage via forceful impact of the

¹⁷⁶ Ctes. F20 (= *Art.* 11); Ctes. F21 (= *An.* 1.8.24-29); Dein. F17 (= *Art.* 10).

skull on a rock, meets his end. The specific alterations of Ctesias' vocabulary and syntax similarly indicate a desire to create a more favourable image.¹⁷⁷

Both eye witness tales may be compared to that of Deinon, writing after Xenophon and Ctesias. Deinon's account differs substantially. Based on the nature of the story's alterations, Deinon reflected an official court version of the battle.¹⁷⁸ In Deinon's version, Cyrus does not wound the king, but rather misses entirely and takes the horse from under him. Artaxerxes becomes enraged, but not perturbed, at this turn of events and rides out against Cyrus again, who at this point is thoughtlessly rushing into the fray, before killing him. Deinon also notes that at the time of writing there existed an alternate story where a Carian felled Cyrus. Deinon's detailed account is what one would expect of an altered history formally promulgated at court in order to enhance the king's reputation; the king is elevated to the role of protagonist in the tale, and he emerges unscathed from the battle, implying that it was fate or a divine purpose that the king should be protected and continue his reign. The propagation of an official version is confirmed by the actions of Artaxerxes in suppressing those who truly played a role in his brother's death. Both Mithridates and the Carian who struck Cyrus in the leg are said by Plutarch to have been rewarded generously by Artaxerxes, and ordered to deny their true roles in the killing (*Art.* 14.3). Both men were ruthlessly punished when they eventually abandoned their silence. The Carian immediately abandoned the story, and was handed over to Parysatis for torture (*Art.* 14.4-5). Mithridates kept his silence for longer, but was undone by Parysatis' eunuch; Plutarch then tells in gory detail the finer aspects of 'the torture of the boats,' which was Mithridates' punishment (*Art.* 15- 16), and of a king's eunuch, Masabates, flayed alive

¹⁷⁷ Bassett, "Death of Cyrus," 476-78; see, however, the warning of Tuplin, commenting that the determination of specific injuries by means of ancient accounts is difficult: Tuplin, "Ctesias as Military Historian," 457-58, and more generally on Cyrus' death pp. 471-79. Wylie, "Cunaxa and Xenophon," 127-28 is forthright in his criticism of Cyrus' behaviour in the battle: "But Cyrus was no Alexander; he failed to keep his men together. Catching sight of the king and forgetting all else ... he made a dash at him. Ten minutes later he was dead." Wylie is criticised by Michael Whitby, "Xenophon's Ten Thousand as a Fighting Force," in *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*, ed. Robin Lane Fox (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2004), 224n24 who thinks he "slightly misrepresents" Xenophon's account, providing a "negative reconstruction of the battle" (p. 227n35). On the basis of the above discussion, I believe that Wylie's criticism of Cyrus in charging the king, at least, is justified.

¹⁷⁸ Stevenson, *Persica*, 90-91.

for his part in Cyrus' death (*Art.* 17). Xenophon himself appears to reject the idea that Artaxerxes had anything to do with Cyrus' death as well, for he says that "someone" dealt the fatal blow, rather than including Ctesias' story.¹⁷⁹

On Cyrus' death, the rebels quickly folded. On the left flank, Ariaeus fought well but was soon encircled by the enemy, and, on hearing of his master's death, retreated (*Diod.* 14.24.1). Artaxerxes was, at this time, incapacitated. A cavalry contingent was raiding Cyrus' camp, and the Greeks were pursuing their opponents from the field. Artaxerxes would remove Cyrus' head and hand (*Art.* 13.2). These he showed to those men wavering in their allegiance, and they paid him homage. Artaxerxes quashed the rebellion and re-established himself as legitimate king.

Upon learning of the death of Cyrus, the Greeks resolved to place Ariaeus on the throne (*An.* 2.1.4), who declined the offer (*An.* 2.2.1). Emissaries were then dispatched by Artaxerxes. The king's demands were simple: the Ten Thousand were to surrender their arms and seek the king's favour at court. The Greeks refused. Some thought they could prove themselves useful to the king in Egypt (*An.* 2.1.14); a few reneged and joined the king (*An.* 2.2.7).¹⁸⁰

The royal force then set about limiting the supplies of their enemies. The first village in which the Greeks wished to make camp was already occupied, forcing the mercenaries to continue their march to another town. The town in which they eventually bivouacked had already been stripped of all supplies – even the timbers were removed from the houses (*An.* 2.2.16).

The following day more heralds were dispatched, this time asking for a truce. While Xenophon attributes the move to fear, it was a reasonable course of action.

¹⁷⁹ John Dillery, "Review: Flower, Xenophon's *Anabasis*, or the Expedition of Cyrus," *BMCRev* 2014.03.54 (2014): second-to-last paragraph.

¹⁸⁰ On the possible Persian recruitment of the Cyreans, see Danzig, "Xenophon's Wicked Persian," 36. Xenophon's explicit noting of Phalinus as the only Greek present at the negotiations (*An.* 2.1.7; cf. *Diod.* 14.25.1-7) directly contradicts the claim of Ctesias that he accompanied the emissaries (Ctes. F23). General modern consensus is that the discrepancies arise from the different accounts of the eye witnesses at the scene: L. Holzapfel, "Rezension: C. Lanzani, I Persica di Ctesia fonte di storia greca," *Berliner philologische Wochenschrift* 25 (1905): 1269; J. Roy, "Xenophon's Evidence for the *Anabasis*," *Athenaeum* 46 (1968): 44n28; Truesdell S. Brown, "Suggestions for a Vita of Ctesias of Cnidus," *Historia* 27, no. 1 (1978): 13. On Phalinus, see Josef Hofstetter, *Die Griechen in Persien: Prosopographie der Griechen im persischen Reich vor Alexander* (Berlin: Reimer, 1978), no. 251.

Certainly the king wished to avoid battle – the Greeks were led to a place to receive provisions. Artaxerxes was also aware of the reaffirmed alliance between Ariaeus and the Greeks. No longer were the remnants of Cyrus' force weakened by separation. The Greeks were harassed and worn down in order to reduce their capacity for an outright fight, weaken their resolve, and facilitate acceptance of terms beneficial to the king.

Having been led to a village, the Greeks remained three days, and were approached by a mission from the king: Tissaphernes, a brother of Stateira, and three other Persians (*An.* 2.3.17). During these negotiations both factions speak frankly. Ariaeus' party gets no say. A reading of Diodorus would have us believe that the silence is because Tissaphernes was sure that Ariaeus would betray the Greeks, but this is probably anachronism (14.26.5). Tissaphernes asks bluntly what the Greeks' intentions are, and cautions moderation in answer. Clearchus duly obliges, and a truce is secured on the following terms.

Xenophon, *Anabasis* 2.3.21-23, 26-27:

...Κλέαρχος δ' ἔλεγεν: ἡμεῖς οὔτε συνήλθομεν ὡς βασιλεῖ πολεμήσοντες οὔτε ἐπορευόμεθα ἐπὶ βασιλέα, ἀλλὰ πολλὰς προφάσεις Κῦρος ἤϋρισκεν, ὡς καὶ σὺ εὖ οἶσθα, ἵνα ὑμᾶς τε ἀπαρασκεύους λάβοι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐνθάδε ἀγάγοι. ἐπεὶ μέντοι ἤδη αὐτὸν ἐωρῶμεν ἐν δεινῷ ὄντα, ἡσχύνθημεν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους προδοῦναι αὐτόν, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παρέχοντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ δὲ Κῦρος τέθνηκεν, οὔτε βασιλεῖ ἀντιποιούμεθα τῆς ἀρχῆς οὔτ' ἔστιν ὅτου ἕνεκα βουλοίμεθα ἂν τὴν βασιλείᾳς χώραν κακῶς ποιεῖν, οὐδ' αὐτὸν ἀποκτεῖναι ἂν ἐθέλοιμεν, πορευοίμεθα δ' ἂν οἴκαδε, εἴ τις ἡμᾶς μὴ λυποῖ: ἀδικοῦντα μέντοι πειρασόμεθα σὺν τοῖς θεοῖς ἀμύνασθαι: ἐὰν μέντοι τις ἡμᾶς καὶ εὖ ποιῶν ὑπάρχη, καὶ τούτου εἰς γε δύναμιν οὐχ ἡττησόμεθα εὖ ποιοῦντες. ... (§26) τέλος δὲ εἶπε: καὶ νῦν ἔξεστιν ὑμῖν πιστὰ λαβεῖν παρ' ἡμῶν ἢ μὴν φιλίαν παρέξιν ὑμῖν τὴν χώραν καὶ ἀδόλως ἀπάξιν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀγορὰν παρέχοντας: ὅπου δ' ἂν μὴ ἦ πρίασθαι, λαμβάνειν ὑμᾶς ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἐάσομεν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια. ὑμᾶς δὲ αὖ ἡμῖν δεήσει ὁμόσαι ἢ μὴν πορευέσθαι ὡς διὰ φιλίας ἀσινῶς σῖτα καὶ ποτὰ λαμβάνοντας ὅποταν μὴ ἀγορὰν παρέχωμεν, ἐὰν δὲ παρέχωμεν ἀγορὰν, ὠνουμένους ἔξιν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια.

"... Clearchus said: 'We neither gathered together with the intention of making war upon the King nor were we marching against the King, but Cyrus kept finding many pretexts, as you also are well aware, in order that he might take you unprepared and bring us hither. When, however, the time came when we saw that he was in danger, we felt ashamed in the sight of gods and men to desert him, seeing that in former days we had been putting ourselves in the way of being benefited by him. But since Cyrus is dead, we are neither contending with the King for his realm nor is there any reason why we should desire to do harm to the King's territory or wish to slay the King himself, but rather we should return to our homes, if no one should molest us. If, however, anyone seeks to injure us, we

shall try with the help of the gods to retaliate. On the other hand, if anyone is kind enough to do us a service, we shall not, so far as we have the power, be outdone in doing a service to him.' ... (§26) In conclusion he [Tissaphernes] said: 'And now you may receive pledges from us that in very truth the territory you pass through shall be friendly and that we will lead you back to Greece without treachery, providing you with a market; and wherever it is impossible to buy provisions, we will allow you to take them from the country. And you, on your side, will have to swear to us that in very truth you will proceed as you would through a friendly country, doing no damage and taking food and drink from the country only when we do not provide a market, but that, if we do provide a market, you will obtain provisions by purchase.'"

There are a number of crucial points to note in this exchange, especially in light of later events.¹⁸¹ Unlike previous interactions, here the Greeks appear less brash; they admit they were deceived and unwilling to march against the king, and express a desire to go home peacefully. They clearly tell the Persian emissaries that they have no desire for future employment in the East. The agreement reached is explicit. Of particular significance is the provision that the Greeks should only take provisions from the land when no market was provided. The term is twice stated – there can be no doubt that it was a genuine article of the pact. It is also clear in these sections that Artaxerxes has left Tissaphernes in command. Following agreement between the Greeks and Tissaphernes, he departs for twenty days (*An.* 4.1.1). Perhaps Tissaphernes had the king ratify the agreement. Perhaps Tissaphernes used the time to put his own plans into effect. Perhaps the heat was simply too great for either army to have marched.¹⁸² The appearance of king's representatives during this twenty day period in the camp of Ariaeus suggests that the time was also employed to subvert him.

Bassett goes on to argue that Tissaphernes always intended to destroy the Greeks (as Diodorus has him promise Artaxerxes: 14.26.5). The pretext on which he killed the generals (that the Greeks voided their treaty) is a certainty - Xenophon says as much. The argument that Tissaphernes always wished to destroy the Greeks is not as certain. Though I agree that neither Greeks nor Persians ever intended on abiding by their oaths should they come into conflict with their ambitions, my own

¹⁸¹ I generally agree with the thesis of Sherylee R. Bassett, "Innocent Victims or Perjurers Betrayed? The Arrest of the Generals in Xenophon's *Anabasis*," *CQ* 52, no. 2 (2002): 447-61. Cf. Hyland, *Tissaphernes and the Achaemenid Empire*, 163-71, which discusses traditional approaches before analysing Bassett's article.

¹⁸² Lee, *Greek Army on the March*, 27-28.

interpretation suggests to me that Tissaphernes and Artaxerxes initially wanted to recruit the Greeks under the command of Menon. For when negotiations failed with Menon, and the generals were all captured, Mithradates still appears to test whether there is any hope left of recruiting the Ten Thousand. When there was no resolution, the Persians made every effort to push the Cyreans out of the imperial heartland and minimise the damage they could inflict, rather than destroy them utterly – a pattern traced below.¹⁸³ Both Xenophon (*An.* 2.5.28) and Ctesias (F27.68) note that Tissaphernes cultivated a relationship with Menon.¹⁸⁴ The reference in Ctesias proves that the friendship was not fabricated by Xenophon as further evidence that Menon was insidious (cf. *An.* 2.6.21-29). These meetings suggest that Tissaphernes considered recruiting the Greeks under the leadership of Menon. This would be most feasible if one subscribes to the reconstruction of Roisman.¹⁸⁵ Clearchus was in fact subordinate to Menon of Thessaly at the outset of the expedition, and when Xenias departed. Several facts support this conclusion. First, in the earliest parades, Menon's force occupied the right wing, reserved for the best soldiers (*An.* 1.2.15); Menon and Clearchus subsequently reversed their positions.¹⁸⁶ Secondly, Menon had missions of prestige in Cilicia – escorting the queen (*An.* 1.2.20), and the move against the gates of Cilicia (*An.* 1.2.21). Menon had prior experience commanding the mercenaries which could be exploited if he was recruited to the Persian cause. In addition, Menon had personal reasons to oppose Clearchus: not only had Menon been demoted to accommodate for Clearchus' new authority, but Clearchus publicly flogged one of his

¹⁸³ See also W. W. How, "Arms, Tactics and Strategy in the Persian War," *JHS* 43 (1923): 125 and n65.

¹⁸⁴ Cf. Truesdell S. Brown, "Menon of Thessaly," *Historia* 35, no. 4 (1986): 394, who believes Ctesias to be Xenophon's source, rather than *An.* 2.5.28 being an independent attestation of the friendship.

¹⁸⁵ J. Roisman, "Klearchos in Xenophon's *Anabasis*," *SCI* 8-9 (1985-88): 33. I trust his rationale that Clearchus earned his position as most prominent mercenary, but I am more cautious about his overall character reconstruction as it is too sympathetic. Despite Roisman's refutation (p. 32n10), J. K. Anderson, *Xenophon* (London: Duckworth, 1974), 88 and n1 is right to think that Xenias was the overall leader of the mercenaries – he contributed the largest contingent and was a known entity to Cyrus, having served as leader of his bodyguard in 404. The extent of Clearchus' command claimed in Diod. 14.19.7-8 is hyperbole.

¹⁸⁶ Brown, "Menon of Thessaly," 390 implies that this change of position (i.e. the demotion of Menon) was the result of conflict between Clearchus and Menon (*An.* 1.5.11). Irrespective of the reason, Clearchus received a promotion over Menon.

men (*An.* 1.5.11). Finally, Menon was also a guest friend of Ariaeus (*An.* 2.1.5, 2.6.28), an exploitable relationship for the Persians. Menon's history, and the attempts by the Persians to engage with the Cyreans' leadership, clearly indicates that they sought to make use of the mercenaries after Cunaxa.

The claim that Menon duped the other generals then becomes important.¹⁸⁷ If true, this denotes a Persian move to remove those most responsible for the attacks against the king while retaining the Greek army for future employment. As negotiations continued, pressure on the Cyreans intensified. At the Tigris the Greeks were warned to be on their guard (*An.* 2.4.13-18), and they suspected Tissaphernes of duplicity (*An.* 2.5.3). Tissaphernes proposed that the Greeks could help against the Egyptians or be useful for putting down revolts (*An.* 2.5.13). These displays and the relationship developed between Clearchus and Tissaphernes are testament to the diplomatic affectations which prospered in the meetings. Xenophon makes out that Clearchus was convinced by these platitudes. Clearchus returned to camp espousing the friendship he developed with Tissaphernes and appeared distracted by internal camp politics: his suspicions were raised against Menon and soon the infamous meeting, at which the generals are captured, was planned. Xenophon portrays the meeting as Clearchus' own desire, against the wishes of the other Greeks (*An.* 2.5.29). His account is difficult to reconcile with that of Ctesias (F27.68), who says Clearchus opposed any meeting of all the generals and Tissaphernes. Roisman, in his portrait of Clearchus,¹⁸⁸ offers a possible explanation for this discrepancy: it could be the result of Xenophon's desire to portray himself in the best possible light. All the generals have fatal flaws, and this picture of Clearchus may simply be a fabrication to fit into Xenophon's presentation of a warlike man without the deceptive cunning for required

¹⁸⁷ See also discussion in Brown, "Menon of Thessaly," 398-99.

¹⁸⁸ Roisman, "Klearchos," 51. Cf. the appraisals of B. Laforse, "Xenophon's Clearchus," *SyllClass* 11 (2000): 74-88 and L. Tritle, "Xenophon's Portrait of Clearchus: A Study in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder," in *Xenophon and his World*, ed. C. J. Tuplin and Vincent Azoulay (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2004), 325-39. Roisman and Tritle have radically different approaches: Roisman attempts to dismiss Xenophon's harsh obituary as biased, preferring to work with the image of Clearchus present elsewhere; Tritle trusts what Xenophon says in these passages as a true account of Clearchus' character and bases his hypothesis on the attributes listed therein. Both approaches have their flaws, and the most complete picture of Clearchus emerges from a thorough consideration of both articles.

for negotiation. Conversely, Ctesias may have been taken in by Clearchus' own justifications for his behaviour, having befriended Clearchus while he was in prison (Ctes. F28). Perhaps Clearchus attempted to propagate a different story of his arrest through Ctesias, in which he stands as a paragon of forethought. At the meeting, the generals were arrested and sent to Babylon; the captains were executed. The Persians then rode over the plain killing those Greeks they encountered. When the Persians next engaged in meetings with the Cyreans, they employed familiar faces – Ariaeus, Artaozus, and Mithradates. Their justification for killing the generals was simple: Clearchus violated the truce (*An.* 2.5.35-38).

From this point the Greeks resolved to make their own way out of Persian territory, abandoning what loot they had collected for the sake of speed (*An.* 3.3.1).¹⁸⁹ During this time, Mithradates was dispatched for another attempt at convincing the Greeks to bow to the king. These overtures were not entirely unsuccessful, and led to at least one conversion in Nicarchus the Arcadian (*An.* 3.3.5). Persian tactics were then altered, and they began a policy of incessant harassment. Slingers, bowmen and horsemen were used to harry the Greeks as they departed (*An.* 3.3.6-11). It becomes clear in these passages that Mithradates had become commander of the Persian forces. Xenophon is confident that at this point the Persians were attempting to destroy the Greeks. But the forces dispatched to fight them do not support such a final solution. The king had an enormous army at his disposal, yet the force was limited to skirmishers (thus far). No doubt many troops were needed to monitor the dispersion of Cyrus' Persian forces, and food supplies were limited, but the Greeks are only attacked with light troops, who continually harass their foes and depart when confronted. Mithradates first appeared with two hundred horsemen and four hundred bowmen and slingers to harass the Greeks throughout the day while never coming close to arms (*An.* 3.3.7). The largest body of troops set against the Greeks numbered five thousand (fewer than the Cyreans: *An.* 3.4.2). Lightly armoured troops cannot have been intended to crush the opposition; they were sent to wear down Greek defences. The force of five thousand was actually an anomaly, for at that time the

¹⁸⁹ Generally, on the Ten Thousand's *anabasis*: Yalichev, *Mercenaries of the Ancient World*, 136-45.

Cyreans approached two deserted strongholds in which they could recuperate. To permit Cyrean use of the structures would contradict the Persian strategy. Notably, the first stronghold was found the day after Mithradates attempted his large scale torment of the Greeks (*An.* 3.4.7), and the second was one stage, six parasangs distant (*An.* 3.4.10). These deserted sites could not defend against a siege, but could stave off the light armoured troops at Mithradates' disposal (who relied on movement and avoiding close combat), so every effort was made to prevent the Greek occupation of the structures.

The reappearance of Tissaphernes – now with his cavalry, the army of Orontes, and the king's troops – confirms that Xenophon overplayed the defeat of Mithradates (*An.* 3.4.13). Tissaphernes had probably hoped that, with his mobile troops harassing the Greeks, when he eventually arrived with his army he could overcome them.

The pursuit then continued, with the Persians avoiding large scale conflict and continuing their previous strategy, albeit with now limited effectiveness thanks to the tenacity of the new Greek leadership (*An.* 3.4.16-31). In the days following, Tissaphernes attempted at least once to force direct conflict, overtaking the Greeks on the plains, but was thwarted by the encampment of the Greeks which permitted easy defence (*An.* 3.4.32). This continued until the large attack made as the Greeks approached the mountains, where the Persians were beaten (*An.* 3.4.39-5.1). Persian revenge came in the form of a raid on Greeks gathering provisions (*An.* 3.5.3).

The subsequent march through the Carduchians' territory left Tissaphernes behind. When through these mountains it became clear that the Persians had not abandoned their pursuit, and troops of Orontes (satrap of Armenia) were present to funnel the Greeks away from his satrapy (*An.* 4.3.3-4). These troops fled soon enough after the Carduchians came down the mountains to attack the Greeks (*An.* 4.3.20-21). Marching for several days they came to western Armenia and secured a treaty with Tiribazus, Orontes' lieutenant (*An.* 4.4.4-6). This treaty granted the Greeks plentiful supplies on the proviso that they not burn the land or villages. Here again the Greeks learned of Persian duplicity: Tiribazus intended to attack the Greeks in a narrow mountain pass. The Greeks naturally marched against the Persians and routed them without a fight (*An.* 4.4.16-22). The final, major confrontation with the Persians would

be against the subordinates of Pharnabazus: Spithridates and Rhathines (*An.* 6.5.7-32). Again the Persians would attempt to rely on cavalry, and again they would fail. The Greeks continued their march.

The Repercussions of the Revolt

As the Ten Thousand were guided from the region, Artaxerxes returned to Babylon (Diod. 14.26.4). His army was not disbanded, but went with Tissaphernes to fight the Cyreans (arriving after the defeat of Mithradates). Having ended Cyrus' revolt, the king had other concerns. Egypt was of primary importance, and Cyrus' march had resulted in the diversion of an army intended to quash the rebellion before it could be fully established. Court propaganda soon spread the tale that Artaxerxes himself killed Cyrus. The generals of the Ten Thousand were put on display in Babylon; people flocked to see the mighty Greeks in chains (Ctes. F27.69). Cyrus' head was impaled and put on display along with the Greek generals (*An.* 3.1.17). They were a concrete display of Artaxerxes' authority and military prowess. In the years which followed, inscriptions were raised reaffirming Artaxerxes' legitimacy and expounding his greatness, just as they had been by his predecessors.¹⁹⁰ At approximately this time Artaxerxes built his own palace in the western section of Nebuchadnezzar II's in Babylon.¹⁹¹

Eventually the generals of the Ten Thousand were beheaded and their corpses exposed (*Art.* 18.5 = Ctes. F28.5). The exposure was shocking to a Greek, but probably not intended to be insulting by the Persians, who routinely exposed corpses in accordance with their purity beliefs.¹⁹² Parysatis, according to Ctesias, convinced

¹⁹⁰ A²Sa; A²Sb; A²Sd; A²Hc; Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 630. Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 989 has effectively rendered the views of George G. Cameron, "Ancient Persia," in *The Idea of History in the Ancient Near East*, ed. Robert Claude Dentan and Roland Herbert Bainton (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), 96 on this propaganda obsolete. Cf. D. P. Orsi, "Tracce di tendenza anticirea (Plutarco, *Vita di Artaserse*, capp. 1-19)," *Sileno* 5-6 (1979-80): 113-46.

¹⁹¹ Vallat, "Les inscriptions du palais d'Artaxerxès II à Babylone," 3-6; Kuhrt, *Persian Empire*, fig. 12.10 and note.

¹⁹² *Vendidad* 5.1-4, 6.26-51; Albert de Jong, *Traditions of the Magi: Zoroastrianism in Greek and Latin Literature* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 440-44.

Artaxerxes to spare the life of Clearchus, because of his service to Cyrus. Stateira, opposed to everything Parysatis wished, quickly convinced the king to go back on his word. Clearchus was beheaded alongside the other generals (Ctes. F27-28). Menon, on the other hand, appears to have lingered for some time (Ctes. F28.5). The *Vita* in the *Anabasis* also maintains that Menon was not put to death with the other generals, but was put to death as a scoundrel after a year of torture (2.6.29).¹⁹³

The retreat of the Ten Thousand and the deception of their generals would hold a crucial place in the Greek psyche over the coming decades. The role of Xenophon should not be forgotten either. Many historians have looked back on the influence of Xenophon's work as panhellenist.¹⁹⁴ Whether they were or not, undoubtedly the events narrated were influential in encouraging others to undertake such campaigns. Agesilaus made himself a great enemy of the Persians over the 390s and beyond, and every student of the period is aware of the vitriolic commentary of Isocrates. The rhetoric which surrounded the Ten Thousand would facilitate multiple Lacedaemonian expeditions and the ambitions of Jason, Philip, and Alexander. Hirsch argues that in the fifth century there is cause to believe the Persians were to be trusted; certainly an abidance by oaths and truth-telling were central precepts of noble behaviour to the Persians.¹⁹⁵ The deception of the Ten Thousand destroyed this image. The Persians, epitomised by Tissaphernes, were never to be trusted (Hirsch asserts). Their character for the remainder of the fourth century was sealed by Greek interpretation of the events which befell Clearchus and his compatriots. While his

¹⁹³ See Brown, "Menon of Thessaly," 401-02.

¹⁹⁴ On the topic: John Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of his Times* (London; New York: Routledge, 1995), chap. 4; Tim Rood, "Panhellenism and Self-Presentation: Xenophon's Speeches," in *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*, ed. Robin Lane Fox (New Haven: 2004), 305-29; C. J. Tuplin, "The Persian Empire," in *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*, ed. Robin Lane Fox (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 181-83. H. Erbse, "Xenophon's *Anabasis*," in *Xenophon*, ed. V. J. Gray, Oxford Readings in Classical Studies 15 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 476-501 (first presented in 1965) discusses Xenophon's motivations more broadly.

¹⁹⁵ Steven W. Hirsch, *The Friendship of the Barbarians: Xenophon and the Persian Empire* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1985), 28-29. Founded on *Cyropaedia* 8.8.2-3. On the value of telling the truth to Persians (as viewed by a Greek): Hdt. 1.136.

general point may stand, on an individual level friendships between Greeks and Persians were not unusual (e.g. *An.* 5.3.6-10; *Hell.* 4.1.29-41¹⁹⁶).

The intervention of Stateira in the death of Clearchus, according to Ctesias (though derided by Plutarch), was the final insult to Parysatis (F28.6). Plutarch dismisses this as folly, but he readily admits that Parysatis always had a lurking jealousy and hatred of the king's wife (*Art.* 19.1). Chronologically, there are two possible points at which to place this plot. Deinon has it during the rebellion of Cyrus, and Ctesias after (*Art.* 6.6). Plutarch's conclusions concerning the preferable dating are sound: we have no reason to doubt that the murder took place after the rebellion. In addition to Plutarch's logical inference, one should consider the stories about the death of Clearchus, which necessitated both Parysatis' and Stateira's presence at the king's side. The accounts of Ctesias and Deinon are preserved and compared in Plutarch's *Life* 19.¹⁹⁷ Artaxerxes' mother plotted to kill Stateira by poison. Parysatis' confidant, Gigis, worked alongside her to prepare a poisoned dinner of a small bird. Artaxerxes' response gives some indication of the real power bases at the Persian court, but requires careful consideration. Plutarch indicates that Stateira's death was not immediate, and that she blamed Parysatis before she died. This is feasible. At any rate, Artaxerxes would have been a fool not to know his mother was at the heart of the affair given her hatred of his wife, and granted that the two had only recently begun eating together again (even then suspecting each other of poison: *Art.* 19.2), that Stateira had died after eating with Parysatis, and of course that Parysatis was a known *pharmakos* (Ctes. F16.60-61).

Artaxerxes reacted immediately and harshly. All of his mother's attendants were arrested and subjected to torture. Gigis managed to escape this fate for some time, but Artaxerxes eventually laid a trap and condemned her to death as poisoner. Parysatis herself received no such punishment. She was banished to Babylon for her crimes. Tissaphernes had allowed the Cyreans to plunder her estates and villages (*An.*

¹⁹⁶ On this episode, see below, p. 113.

¹⁹⁷ See Stevenson, "Lies and Invention," 27-30; Stevenson, *Persica*, 67-76; Binder, *Kommentar*, 267-73 for detailed modern discussion. Cf. the account of Ctesias in Photius (F27.70) and the critical view of Deinon in Robert Drews, *The Greek Accounts of Eastern History* (Washington: Center for Hellenic Studies, 1973), 118.

2.4.27, 5.27); perhaps this indicates that the death of Cyrus and the plot to kill Stateira took place in close coordination. On the other hand, the ransacking may simply reflect the new order of power at court, and Tissaphernes, as a victor in the succession struggle, chose that moment to assert his new power over the losers. Artaxerxes' reaction to Stateira's death - violent, cruel, and immediate - is of even greater note considering the man's reputed mild nature and dilatoriness. Here we find the strong leader who would later campaign against the Cadusians; this is the moment which defies that effeminate character pleading at the hem of his mother's robe for his young wife to be spared at the beginning of Plutarch's biography.

We have, in reality, the biases of three individuals to account for in this episode: those of Ctesias, Deinon, and Plutarch. Ctesias is in some ways beneficial, for he is writing soon after the events themselves, and speaks of current opinion, rather than that tempered by decades of propaganda. Deinon repeats a version designed to shift blame from Parysatis to Gigis - rather than being an unwilling accomplice in her mistress' plot, Gigis is now the central criminal - a reflection of the reparations between mother and child which were to come.¹⁹⁸

Parysatis was forgiven for her sins after an unknown amount of time in exile, but we do know that she lived until at least 395, as evidenced by her satisfaction at the death of Tissaphernes (*Art.* 23.1) and her identification in a Babylonian legal text.¹⁹⁹ She also, reportedly, influenced Artaxerxes to take his next wife from among his children (*Art.* 23.6). Wiesehöfer conjectures that the Greek sources may have confused the position of actual wife of the king with the court title held by the mother of the current heir.²⁰⁰ The position was significant at court for its recognition of the king's heirs, but otherwise its duties are uncertain.²⁰¹ Artaxerxes' eldest son, Darius, was probably nearing maturity at the turn of the century - he was fifty in the 360s (*Art.* 26.2) - and Atossa's assumption of the court position would secure Darius' position by excluding

¹⁹⁸ Stevenson, *Persica*, 72.

¹⁹⁹ VAT 15618 in Matthew W. Stolper, "Parysatis in Babylon," in *If a Man builds a Joyful House: Assyriological Studies in Honour of Erle Verdun Leichty*, ed. Erle Leichty and Ann K. Guinan, Cuneiform Monographs 31 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2006), 463-72.

²⁰⁰ Josef Wiesehöfer, *Ancient Persia: 550 BC to 650 AD*, trans. Azizeh Azodi (London; New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001), 84-85.

²⁰¹ See Brosius, *Women in Ancient Persia*, 186-88.

other women from the role. As Wiesehöfer suggests, maybe Artaxerxes wanted a loyal woman in the position rather than a literal wife. Other references to Atossa in literature do not help clarify her position. Reports of the close relationship between Atossa and Artaxerxes may also reflect the relationship between father and daughter (*Art.* 23, 26), with added reports of incestuous behaviour by the Greeks serving to underscore their literary and political aims, rather than reflect reality.²⁰² The role of Parysatis in the story, and the love Artaxerxes held for Stateira, may suggest that the king did not immediately take Atossa as wife of the king, but that the decision took place after the forgiveness of Parysatis. It must ante-date 395, and post-date the death of Stateira ca. 401. The decision meant that Tiribazus did not receive Atossa in marriage himself – the source of great anger years later, Plutarch asserts (*Art.* 27.4-5) – but the story has serious problems.²⁰³ By the time Atossa was named wife of the king, no doubt Artaxerxes had already taken on concubines. His legitimate children, by Stateira, were all born by the end of the fifth century. With his lineage secure, Artaxerxes reportedly amassed an enormous harem of women. 360 is the figure provided by Plutarch (*Art.* 27.2). At least one was a former consort of Cyrus (*Art.* 26-27). Plutarch's figures are supplemented by Justin, who numbers his sons at 115 (10.1). At least one bastard – Arsames – was powerful enough to be considered a threat by Ochus (*Art.* 30.1). Undoubtedly there are seeds of truth amongst those reports, but little can be discerned about Artaxerxes' private life from such evidence.

Tissaphernes emerged as the greatest beneficiary of Cyrus' expedition. Artaxerxes rewarded him for his conduct at Cunaxa and deliverance of the Greek generals by granting him control over Cyrus' command. Tissaphernes, therefore, was in command of Lydia, Cappadocia, Greater Phrygia, Caria and Ionia. Perhaps it was in conjunction with the promotion of Tissaphernes that Datames' father, Camisares, was

²⁰² J. M. Bigwood, "«Incestuous» Marriage in Achaemenid Iran: Myths and Realities," *Klio* 91, no. 2 (2009): 326. de Jong, *Traditions of the Magi: Zoroastrianism in Greek and Latin Literature*, 424-32 finds a great deal of corroborating evidence for ancient incestuous marriage, but is overall sceptical of the value of the ancient Greek and Latin evidence for the practice among Achaemenids.

²⁰³ See below, pp. 296-97.

promoted in Cilicia (Nep. *Dat.* 14.1.1).²⁰⁴ The documentary sources preserve few details of how Tissaphernes re-established the king's authority in the region. The flight of Tamos to Egypt exemplifies the trepidation which surrounded the defeat of Cyrus. Tamos likely thought he had no recourse, and was too close to Cyrus to escape persecution.²⁰⁵ He was murdered with his family in Egypt (Diod. 14.35.4-5). Artaxerxes, however, clearly did not instruct Tissaphernes to punish Cyrus' supporters. The king was aware of the precarious situation in the West and of the possibility that any harsh reaction here might prompt further chaos. Royal clemency is demonstrated by the acceptance of Glos (Tamos' son) at the court of Tissaphernes, and in the acceptance of Ariaeus, who apparently gave up his ambitions for greater power with the demise of Cyrus (*An.* 2.2.1). Artaxerxes was the victor and was respected as such. Given the treatment of Parysatis' property by Tissaphernes (above), it would not be surprising if Artaxerxes stripped land from his opponents and rewarded his supporters in a similar manner. Darius II did the same upon his victory.²⁰⁶ Through such an act Artaxerxes could limit the power of any lingering opponents, re-establish his own court hierarchy through the redistribution of land, and restabilise the heartland of the empire. The presence of a bastard brother of Artaxerxes marching from Susa and Ecbatana may similarly reflect the efforts made to reassert royal control (*An.* 2.4.25).

The promotion of Tissaphernes was coupled with the marriage of Orontes to Artaxerxes' daughter (*An.* 2.4.8; *Art.* 27); the Persian court was reconfiguring itself around the victors of Cunaxa. While the Persians appear to have readily accepted Tissaphernes' new position, the Greeks of Asia Minor reacted strongly. Tissaphernes was already unpopular in the region, as evidenced when his cities turned themselves

²⁰⁴ N. Sekunda, "Some Notes on the Life of Datames," *Iran* 26 (1988): 36. I follow Casabonne in that the administrative region was not dramatically reformed at this time; the Syennesis was not replaced with a Persian official: Olivier Casabonne, "Le syennésis cilicien et Cyrus: l'apport des sources numismatiques," in *Dans les pas des Dix-Mille. Peuples et pays du Proche-Orient vus par un Grec*, ed. Pierre Briant (1995), 147-72.

²⁰⁵ Cf. my comment above, pp. 38-39 – Tamos may have simply been fleeing the wrath of his former master.

²⁰⁶ Matthew W. Stolper, "Mesopotamia, 482-330 B.C.," in *The Fourth Century B.C.*, ed. John Boardman, et al., *The Cambridge Ancient History* 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 246.

over to Cyrus rather than cede power to him, and for his actions in the Peloponnesian War. Their reaction, as preserved in the sources, may have been exacerbated by the Spartan-installed garrisons, decarchies, and harmosts throughout the region, which were pro-Cyrus and pro-Sparta.²⁰⁷ Tissaphernes asked no more than any other satrap of the region had over the past two decades, but his reputation and authority had been further undermined by the events following Cunaxa.²⁰⁸ The Asiatic Greeks were resistant, refusing to grant Tissaphernes entry to their cities, and turned to the new power over the Aegean – the Lacedaemonians. Their pleas were met favourably in Sparta and Thibron was dispatched to Asia Minor (*Hell.* 3.1.3).²⁰⁹ Thibron turned to another notable force in the region and recruited the Ten Thousand for his campaign (*An.* 7.6.1).²¹⁰ The Greeks appear not to have considered their efforts a war against Persia itself, but rather a personal vendetta against a man they reviled in this first invasion (*An.* 7.6.1, 7).²¹¹ Certainly, Tissaphernes reacted strongly to their resistance in a manner which did not allow for recourse. Despite the warnings issued by Spartan ambassadors, Tissaphernes laid siege to Cyme, plundered its land and took many hostages. These individuals were ransomed back to the Greeks at the onset of winter 400 (*Diod.* 14.35.6-7). Was this abrupt and violent response a product of Tissaphernes' own autocracy, or a sign of new policies towards the Greeks implemented by Artaxerxes? Both options are plausible. Tissaphernes wished to impose his authority and held no love for the Greeks who embarrassed him by going over to Cyrus, and

²⁰⁷ *Diod.* 14.10.1, 13.1; *Plut. Lys.* 13.3-4. Cf. *Isoc.* 5.95 (on which see above, p. 37n68).

²⁰⁸ Cf. H. D. Westlake, "Spartan Intervention in Asia, 400-397 B.C.," *Historia* 35, no. 4 (1986): 406-07 on the support of democracy/oligarchy by the satraps of the region and its implications (reprinted in Westlake, *Studies in Thucydides and Greek History*, 239-59).

²⁰⁹ Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 125 speculates that the Asiatic Greek response to Tissaphernes was supported by Sparta due to the possible presence of a clause in the Ionian cities' peace treaty that they should have both autonomy and support from their allies against any Persian threat. Cf. the doubts of Robin Seager and C. J. Tuplin, "The Freedom of the Greeks of Asia: On the Origins of a Concept and the Creation of a Slogan," *JHS* 100 (1980): 144n36; Westlake, "Spartan Intervention," 408n11.

²¹⁰ Tissaphernes himself supplemented his army with Greek mercenaries in this period: we are already aware of Phalinus, the infantry expert in *An.* 2.1.7. See further *Hell.* 3.2.15; *Polyaen.* 7.16.1; the sling shot discussed in Clive Foss, "A Bullet of Tissaphernes," *JHS* 95 (1975): 25-30.

²¹¹ Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 139; *contra* the narrative of Cartledge, *Agasilaos*, 353, which places this invasion as an intentional first step in a war for the liberty of Asiatic Greeks.

Artaxerxes held similar sentiments. The king clearly aimed for more obedient Hellenes now.

Thus, with the demise of Cyrus the Younger, Artaxerxes established his primacy. Regrettably, the sources for events at court after Artaxerxes' victory are coloured by their stereotyped descriptions. Plutarch and Ctesias delight in the intrigue between Parysatis and Stateira. Plutarch especially focuses on grotesque torture scenes to emphasise the barbarity of the Persian court. These tales may hold a kernel of truth, but there are few ways for modern historians to move beyond such stories. On the other hand, those who served Artaxerxes well during the revolt were certainly rewarded, for they reappear in the sources as high level officials. The men who served Artaxerxes in the West remained significant to the Greek sources: Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus both continue to play important roles in the Persian relationship with the Greeks. One conclusion can be firmly drawn from what followed the revolt of Cyrus: Artaxerxes secured his position well enough to remain on the throne for several decades before he was challenged.

CHAPTER TWO

399-390: Combating the Greeks

Responses to Thibron, Dercylidas, and Agesilaus

Tissaphernes' mission, after Cyrus' revolt, was to stabilise Asia Minor.¹ He needed to prevent any repeat of Cyrus' march, which was a legitimate concern (the rhetoric of Agesilaus was threatening in this regard²), and facilitate the preparation of the next Egyptian invasion. Tissaphernes was, however, unpopular amongst the Asiatic Greeks. He was considered a deceitful betrayer of the Ten Thousand's generals, and the Asiatic Greeks feared his response after their support of Cyrus' venture. As a result of their fear of Tissaphernes, and their desire to be free (from Tissaphernes, or the Persian Empire?) the Asiatic Greeks petitioned the Spartans for protection (*Hell.* 3.1.3). The Spartans allocated an army typical of a small expeditionary force, with one thousand emancipated Helots and four thousand other Peloponnesians.³ Thibron, the commander, supplemented this force with a further three hundred cavalrymen from Athens, paid from his own pocket, with further contingents from other mainland Greek cities. Following arrival in Ephesus, the remnants of the Ten Thousand were recruited (*Hell.* 3.1.4-6), possibly with a further two thousand mercenaries (Diod.

¹ I follow the chronology and logic of H. D. Westlake, "Decline and Fall of Tissaphernes," *Historia* 30, no. 3 (1981): 262 for Tissaphernes' appointment as supreme commander (reprinted in Westlake, *Studies in Thucydides and Greek History*, 289-309). This took place in 400, not 398/7 as Xenophon indicates. Cf. Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 45 who prefers Xenophon's date as "in 400 it was not at all clear that there was a significant military problem in western Anatolia requiring such a command. Sustained and wide-ranging operations made the danger clear by 398." I am inclined to think that the need to stabilise Asia after a serious revolt warranted a reinstitution of an overall command until it was determined that the Greeks would not again carve into the *chora*; but Ruzicka's rationale cannot be ruled out.

² See below, pp. 105-06.

³ Diod. 14.36.1 says that the contingent of one thousand were actually citizens.

14.36.2). The ultimate size of the expeditionary force was in the order of twelve thousand troops. So began a series of campaigns in Asia Minor against the Persians.

The general perception of the Spartan invasions is that they were ineffective, despite Greek claims to the contrary.⁴ Nonetheless, scholarship has dedicated little time to exploring Persian responses to the invasions.⁵ Across fifteen works discussing the Spartan invasions,⁶ only two dedicate time to considering the Persian response to the attacks. Briant's treatment is measured, but brief.⁷ Westlake's conclusion that Dercylidas "outwitted, or at least held his own, against the wiliest of opponents"⁸ warrants further attention. Broadly, there are three prevalent judgements of the Persian response to the attacks of the Spartans, particularly the first invasions of Thibron and Dercylidas: (1) the behaviour was an extension of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus' rivalry in the Peloponnesian War. (2) The response was the result of a long-running satrapal rivalry. (3) The response was the result of political

⁴ E.g. Westlake, "Spartan Intervention," 415-16; Jan P. Stronk, "Sparta and Persia: 412-386," *Talanta* 22/23 (1990/91): 128-34; C. J. Tuplin, *The Failings of Empire: A Reading of Xenophon Hellenica* 2.3.11-7.5.27 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1993), 50; Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 643-45; Cawkwell, *Greek Wars*, 162-63.

⁵ The forthcoming exception is C. J. Tuplin, "From Arshama to Alexander: Reflections on Persian Responses to Attack," in *Festschrift for Giovanni Lanfranchi*, ed. A. Greco (Not Known: Not Known, Forthcoming), 16-17, which will briefly addresses the strategy employed against the Spartan invasions, arriving independently at the same conclusion argued here. I wish to thank Prof. Tuplin for this reference.

⁶ Charles Dugas, "La campagne d'Agésilas en Asie Mineure (395): Xénophon et l'Anonyme d'Oxyrynchos," *BCH* 34 (1910): 58-95; G. L. Cawkwell, "Agesilaus and Sparta," *CQ* 26, no. 1 (1976): 62-84; Robin Seager, "Agesilaus in Asia: Propaganda and Objective," *LCM* 2 (1977): 183-84; D. H. Kelly, "Agesilaus' Strategy in Asia Minor, 396-5 BC," *LCM* 3 (1978): 97-98; Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, 107-19, 125-34; Seager and Tuplin, "Freedom of the Greeks," 141-54; Westlake, "Decline and Fall," 257-79; Westlake, "Spartan Intervention," 405-26; Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 191-94, 353-59; Hamilton, "Lysander, Agesilaus, Spartan Imperialism," 35-50; Peter Krentz, "Thibron and the Thirty," *AncW* 15 (1987): 75-79; C. D. Hamilton, *Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 197-203; Debord, *L'Asie mineure*, 94-95; Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 634-45; Bruno Bleckmann, *Fiktion als Geschichte: neue Studien zum Autor der Hellenika Oxyrhynchia und zur Historiographie des vierten vorchristlichen Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), chap. 5.

⁷ Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 641-43.

⁸ Westlake, "Spartan Intervention," 423.

entanglements which arose during Cyrus' revolt.⁹ All these judgements draw on a simplifying stereotype to do with intra-Persian fighting.

Two passages of our Greek histories have undue influence on modern interpretations of events and may explain gaps in previous discussions. The first is Diodorus' statement that the satraps of Artaxerxes are "not fully in control but refer all matters to the King and have to await the response on every single issue" (15.41.5), made in context of the Egyptian invasion of the 370s. This passage has fed interpretations which portray Artaxerxes as a micromanager.¹⁰ The portrait contradicts the standard interpretations of Persian behaviour in the early 390s, in which satraps are so obsessed with their own rivalries that any common Achaemenid cause is precluded. The second influential passage resides in Plutarch's *Life of Artaxerxes* (22.1), which says that Artaxerxes hated the Spartans above all mankind. This passage has become an easy escape clause for many modern historians to justify the behaviour of the Persians without devoting much thought to how it reinforces the Greek stereotype of the emotional, illogical Persian. It is most prominently applied to the failed peace negotiations of 392/1, which have been explained with the assertion that Artaxerxes' hatred led to their failure.¹¹

Yet the above are not the only points of contention in modern discussion. Dandamaev erroneously states that Agesilaus weathered a winter in Dascylium itself,¹² and his account of the Greek campaigns adheres to an outdated view of the campaigns and the empire, as he claims that "the Persians adhered little significance to their difficulties in Asia Minor, and they regarded these problems as forming part of the

⁹ (1) Westlake, "Decline and Fall," 277. (2) Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 16; Debord, *L'Asie mineure*, 94-95; Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 594. (3) Hyland, "Pharnabazos, Cyrus' Rebellion," 1-27.

¹⁰ E.g. Cook, *Persian Empire*, 217-18; Cawkwell, *Greek Wars*, 148.

¹¹ Hornblower, "Persia," 75. Cf. other comments which draw on Artaxerxes' reported opinion of Spartans in Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 26, 146; Cook, *Persian Empire*, 215; Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 63; Flower, *Xenophon's Anabasis*, 15. The sentiment has ancient antecedents: Xenophon attributes Strouthas' behaviour ca. 392 to his memory of the harm the Spartans did to the king (*Hell.* 4.8.17); cf. Justin 6.6.2-3, which hints at hatreds inspired by wars with the Greeks. See also comments below, pp. 306-07.

¹² M. A. Dandamaev, *A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire*, trans. W. J. Vogelsang (Leiden; New York: Brill, 1989), 291. An error attributable to ambiguous translation?

many border fights which harassed the empire."¹³ It is also deceptive for Lewis to state that Thibron's march was "a substantial thrust inland against his [Tissaphernes'] main bases, Magnesia and Tralles."¹⁴ Undoubtedly Magnesia was important,¹⁵ but Thibron apparently attached comparatively little value to that target, as he immediately attempted to take Tralles, and was turned away (Diod. 14.36.3). Nor was either city representative of a "substantial thrust inland," as Thibron failed to move more than 15km away from the coast. Even from Briant, one might infer that Tissaphernes' truce with Dercylidas was very much to do with protecting Tissaphernes' estates.¹⁶

In sum, there is need to reconsider Persian responses (i.e. political efforts, military engagements, and movement of troops). The following also considers the *poleis* which the Persians attempted to defend, and where exactly the greatest emphasis was placed in the defence of Asia Minor. Throughout these sections, Egypt is again hypothesised to be the primary point of interest for Artaxerxes. But, while attacking Egypt, Artaxerxes did not wish to leave an opening to be exploited in the manner of Cyrus. While the Spartan campaigns had limited supplies, the remnants of the Ten Thousand provided the core of a force which might seek to imitate Cyrus – Artaxerxes had no way of knowing what might or might not eventuate from the Spartan invasions, and so reacted conservatively to avoid recreating the conditions Cyrus exploited. Thus, stability was the necessary precursor to the Egyptian invasion. The most recent modern analysis has touched on this point, though with a heavier emphasis on the importance of the new fleet for the security of the Levant, Phoenicia, and Cilicia, and the necessity for the fortification of the southern borders with Egypt.¹⁷ Tissaphernes failed to implement any effective strategies. When Pharnabazus proposed a new naval strategy to divert Sparta's attention away from Asia Minor, it was accepted, and there are indications in the sources that the Achaemenid response became targeted at bleeding the Spartans and diverting their attention to affairs on mainland Greece.

¹³ Dandamaev, *Political History*, 288.

¹⁴ Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 139.

¹⁵ A primary base of Tissaphernes? Thuc. 8.50.3; Balcer, "Ancient Persian Satrapies," 83.

¹⁶ Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 635.

¹⁷ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 43, 48, 52.

Throughout the invasions the Persians did not engage with the Spartans where anti-Persian sentiment was high. There is a line of longitude almost 28 degrees east of the Prime Meridian on which several key strongholds of the Persian Empire lie. Dascylium, Sardis, and Tralles are positioned here. At each of these cities, the Spartans were turned away. When Agesilaus ranged east of this line, he encountered greater resistance than on the coast. There is a divide between the coastal, Asiatic Greek cities and the non-Greek cities where Persian influence was more operative further inland. The divide was not ethnic; no doubt all were to some degree diverse. Rather, the evidence suggests a difference in the people's sensibilities. Agesilaus' struggle to secure a food supply strongly suggests that he was not dealing with a supportive local population (*Hell. Oxy.* 12.1, 22.2).

Advances in our understanding of the region's cultural make-up, through archaeological data, similarly reinforce the extent of Persian power in the region. The clay bullae in Dascylium, in addition to extensive literary evidence, attest to the city's position as a stronghold of Achaemenid Persia.¹⁸ The same can be said of Sardis and Phrygia.¹⁹ The most recent works further underscore the diversity of Achaemenid Anatolia, and the flexible methods for controlling the region through garrisons, soldiers of mixed ethnicity, and fortification.²⁰ The diversity of each city's inhabitants reflected its political history. Unlike many coastal cities which turned themselves over to the Spartans, cities inland did not have traditionally anti-Persian ties, and they were not so easy to convert. Nor is the divide between Persian and Greek territories in Asia Minor restricted to modern inference. Diodorus preserves an indication of the ancient inhabitants' conceptions of space in the region (12.4; cf. *Plut. Cim.* 19.3): in the

¹⁸ Summarised in Takuji Abe, "Dascylium: An Overview of the Achaemenid Satrapal City," *The Kyoto Journal of Ancient History* 12 (2012): 1-17.

¹⁹ Sardis: Elspeth Dusinger, *Aspects of Empire in Achaemenid Sardis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 29-30. Phrygia: Frédéric Maffre, "Example of the Persian Occupation in the Satrapy of Phrygia through the Study of the Population from the Asian Provinces in the Achaemenid Empire (Semites/Iranians)," in *The Achaemenid Impact on Local Populations and Cultures in Anatolia (Sixth-Fourth Centuries B.C.)*, ed. Inci Delemen, et al. (Istanbul: Turkish Institute of Archaeology, 2007), 225-45; Frédéric Maffre, "Indigenous Aristocracies in Hellenistic Phrygia," in *Persian Responses: Political and Cultural Interaction with (in) the Achaemenid Empire*, ed. C. J. Tuplin (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2007), 117-42.

²⁰ Elspeth Dusinger, *Empire, Authority, and Autonomy in Achaemenid Anatolia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), *passim*, on military control: pp. 83-94, 107-08.

infamous Peace of Callias, the Persians were not to come within three days march of the sea.²¹ Similar hints at the complex political situation in Anatolia are found when Agesilaus deals with the Mysians: some will support him, others will not (*Hell. Oxy.* 21.1).

Persian resistance was offered at strategically significant locations, especially in the attempt to restrict Greek movement south of the Maeander and the vital locations there.²² Many cities captured by the Spartans were former members of the Delian League (which should be considered indicative of historical dissatisfaction with the Persians), and were only recent Persian acquisitions. Similar divisions existed in Aeolis from an administrative standpoint. The positions of Mania and Alexandros at the beginning of the fourth century denote the subdivision of the land by the Achaemenid rulers (*Hell.* 3.1.12-15; Polyae. 6.10).²³ The results support the hypothesis of Lewis, who offered a tentative thesis that the coastal Greek cities were aligned with individual satraps, and were not always considered part of the administrative structure of the empire.²⁴ The following, however, does not argue for a type of Maginot line against which Harding rails.²⁵ Rather, it proposes that the Persians utilised existing divisions to limit lasting damage by the Spartans through the sacking of cities and defeat of armies. In contrast to the perceived incisiveness of the campaigns asserted by the modern commentators noted above, the Persians were largely successful at limiting the threat of the Spartans.

²¹ See sources collated in George Francis Hill, Russell Meiggs, and A. Andrewes, *Sources for Greek History between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 344.

²² Strategically vital locations: Antony G. Keen, "Gateway from the Mediterranean to the Aegean: the Strategic Value of Lycia down to the Fourth Century B.C.," in *Akten des II. Internationalen Lykien-Symposiums, Wien, 6.-12. Mai 1990*, ed. Gerhard Dobesch and Jürgen Borchhardt (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1993), 70-77; Antony G. Keen, "Athenian Campaigns in Karia and Lykia during the Peloponnesian War," *JHS* 113 (1993): 152-57.

²³ Pierre Briant, "Contrainte militaire, dépendance rurale et exploitation des territoires en Asie achéménide," *Index* 8 (1978/79): 67.

²⁴ Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 122.

²⁵ Phillip Harding, "Athenian Foreign Policy in the Fourth Century," *Klio* 77 (1995): 108n19. Relevant discussion cited therein.

Cyzicus, located approximately 28km north of Dascylium,²⁶ is a primary example of the divisions between Persian and Greek space in Asia Minor. Dascylium was Pharnabazus' satrapal headquarters, a place the author of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* calls "exceedingly strong" and fortified by the king (*Hell. Oxy.* 22.3).²⁷ Cyzicus should fall under the influence of Dascylium. It was close to a powerful Achaemenid centre, and both Thucydides (8.107) and Diodorus (13.40.6) say that Cyzicus was not fortified.²⁸ But Cyzicus was not controlled from Dascylium. Cyrus the Great apparently favoured one Pytharchus of Cyzicus, and did not reduce the city to client status; nor did the city permit Pytharchus to make himself king (Agathocles *FGrHist* 472 F6). Herodotus indicates that Cyzicus forged a special relationship with the satrapy at Dascylium (6.33). The city went over to Darius, and so did not suffer the imposition of foreign powers. But clearly this relationship did not last. In the late fifth century Cyzicus was attacked for turning itself over to Pharnabazus (Diod. 13.50-51; *Hell.* 1.1.19-23²⁹). Yet, when Spithradates fled Pharnabazus, fearing for his life, he went via Lysander's base at Cyzicus (*Hell.* 3.4.10; Plut. *Ages.* 8.3). Similarly, when Agesilaus wished to stash his loot at the end of the campaign, securing it from the Persians necessitated moving it to around Cyzicus (*Hell. Oxy.* 22.4). It was from cities like Cyzicus that the Persians withdrew in the face of the Spartan invasion. These cities had chequered pasts and were untrustworthy. Investment in the protection of a *polis* which might cease paying tribute and be difficult to protect or recover was unwise. One finds a similar political past amongst most cities captured by the Spartans, and heavy resistance is only offered at those with demonstrably strong ties to the Persians. There

²⁶ All distances in the following are approximations made following the maps of Roger S. Bagnall and Richard J. Talbert, eds., *Barrington Atlas of the Greek and Roman World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), nos. 51-52, 56, 61-62, 65-66.

²⁷ Supported by the archaeological evidence: A. Erdoğan, "Beobachtungen zur achämenidischen Architektur Daskyleions," in *The Achaemenid Impact on Local Populations and Cultures in Anatolia (Sixth-Fourth Centuries B.C.)*, ed. İnci Delemen, et al. (Istanbul: Turkish Institute of Archaeology, 2007), 177-94.

²⁸ Cf. Diod. 15.81.6; Nep. *Tim.* 1.3, where Timotheus relieved a siege of Cyzicus – by the 360s the city had some defensive network.

²⁹ Cf. Vivienne J. Gray, "The Value of Diodorus Siculus for the Years 411-386 BC," *Hermes* 115, no. 1 (1987): 82-83.

is a distinction between what the Persians could control and maintain in northern Asia Minor in the face of the Spartan assaults and what they could not.

An emphasis on this division also resolves the problems raised by Hyland, who queries the ease with which Clearchus and the Paphlagonian cavalry of Cyrus journeyed through Pharnabazus' province: there was a divide between areas nominally under Pharnabazus' control, and those areas where Greek influence was predominant.³⁰ Hyland's contrast of the apparently easy passage of the Paphlagonians against the defence of Gordium by Rhathines may be inapplicable, given that Gordium was well within the Persian sphere of control, and approaching it was unlike any coastal journey made by the rebellious force to join Cyrus at the outset of the march inland (similar to final route of the Ten Thousand) – unless, that is, the Paphlagonians met Cyrus after he began his march.

Thibron, the first Spartan commander, departed by the winter of 400 and made for Ephesus (Diod. 14.36.2). Tissaphernes is not known to have made any immediate response. The only indication of his influence is the lingering presence of cavalry during Thibron's early marches, where the Spartan negated their effect by sticking to high ground (*Hell.* 3.1.5). The Persian strategy was Periclean in nature, for he allowed the Greeks to roam and employed guerrilla tactics. A similar plan was employed for Cyrus, who faced a challenge at Sardis, and struggled with cavalry raids, but otherwise faced no major action until he was at Cunaxa. The Asiatic Greeks, when Thibron arrived, were effectively given back to the Lacedaemonians. Most cities captured by the Greeks had anti-Persian stances, and were mostly satellite cities (dependent *poleis* unwilling to differ from their larger neighbours or constrained by external influence³¹). Xenophon is later scornful of the Ionian Greeks' behaviour when confronted by Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes' combined army; clearly these Greeks would side with whoever had the largest army in the region (*Hell.* 3.2.17).

³⁰ Hyland, "Pharnabazos, Cyrus' Rebellion," 9, 12.

³¹ On satellite states: Mogens Hansen, "The 'Autonomous City-State'. Ancient Fact or Modern Fiction?," in *Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis*, ed. Mogens Hansen and Kurt A. Raaflaub (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1995), 21-45, esp. §3.

Ephesus was an old Spartan ally, serving as a base of operations in the past and in future expeditions (*An.* 1.5.7).³² From Ephesus, Thibron marched to Magnesia, 15km distant. Recognising that neither Ephesus nor Magnesia had any particular value for his mission, Thibron immediately turned east to Tralles (Diod. 14.36.3). There he was turned away. The city of Tralles lay on the Maeander and protected the route eastwards. After coming to an agreement in 397 with Dercylidas, Tissaphernes withdraws to Tralles (*Hell.* 3.2.19), and Cyrus kept hostages there (*An.* 1.4.8), so the city clearly was important. Tralles was the first strategic target of the Spartan campaign, and the first point of concerted Persian resistance. Teuthrania and Halisarna handed themselves over to the Spartans, as did Gambrium, Palaegambrium, Myrina, and Grynium – the final four were under the control of two local dynasts who were brothers. Further north, Pergamon joined the Spartan cause, but was not going to behave differently with the Ten Thousand present (*An.* 7.8.8). Teuthrania and Halisarna both had old ties to the Spartans, like Pergamon, and are only ever mentioned in tandem, which means one would expect such places to act in coordination.³³ Not one of these cities was beyond 30km distance from Pergamon. Both Myrina and Grynium were members of the Delian League.³⁴ Teuthrania, Halisarna, and Gambrium are all within 12km of Pergamon. Palaegambrium appears on no map. Judging by the prefix, it was merely the old site of its sister Gambrium.³⁵ None of these cities was large enough to resist. Most had anti-Persian links. None was worth defending.

Egyptian Larisa was the second strategic target. It reportedly had Persian ties (*Xen. Cyr.* 7.1.45), resisted Thibron, and beat him back. It guarded the entrance to the Hermus River and the plains which led to Sardis.

Thibron then made no captures away from the coast, taking only cities which were in the direct proximity of those favourably disposed to the Spartans, was

³² H. W. Parke, "The Development of the Second Spartan Empire (405-371 B.C.)," *JHS* 50 (1930): 49 discusses Lysander's relationship with the city.

³³ These cities were gifts to Demaratus by Xerxes (ca. 480). Tandem: Here and *An.* 7.8.17.

³⁴ Mogens Hansen and Thomas Heine Nielsen, eds., *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), nos. 822 (Myrina), 809 (Grynium).

³⁵ LSJ s.v. παλαιός.

thwarted whenever he attempted to take a Persian centre, and failed even to prevent his troops looting those whom he was sent to protect. He was absorbed in discus-throwing when Tissaphernes appeared with a strong cavalry force at Magnesia, forcing a Spartan withdrawal to Ephesus (*Hell.* 4.8.18). Thibron was stripped of his command. Dercylidas was appointed his successor as the expedition turned its attention to an attack on Caria.³⁶

Dercylidas was turned away from Caria without a fight. This came after Thibron was specifically tasked with attacking Caria, the area most bountiful for the Spartans to attack, and most advantageous for their troops. Dercylidas apparently preferred to fight Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes individually, and so came to an agreement with Tissaphernes and marched to Pharnabazus' satrapy (*Hell.* 3.1.9-10; Justin 6.1.2-3). Xenophon's argument that Dercylidas harboured a grudge against Pharnabazus, making him receptive to Tissaphernes' negotiations, is a matter of contention; it is feasible that Tissaphernes bribed the man to keep away from his estates.³⁷

The portrait of continued rivalry between the Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes is generally accepted here. But do the subsequent efforts of Dercylidas suggest that Pharnabazus suffered? Xenophon certainly is keen to say as much. Dercylidas, after his truce with Tissaphernes, marched north through Aeolis. This was Pharnabazus' territory, but its recent history suggests that his control was only nominal. Pharnabazus had delegated control to a lower official named Zenis, who died and was in turn succeeded by his wife.³⁸ This woman, Mania, used a Greek mercenary force to

³⁶ For discussion of the handover and Xenophon's treatment of Thibron and Dercylidas, see Krentz, "Thibron and the Thirty," 75-79.

³⁷ As Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 140 conjectures; cf. Westlake, "Decline and Fall," 259; Buckler, *Aegean Greece*, 47.

³⁸ Possibly a 'duke' if one accepts Sekunda's terminology: N. Sekunda, "Persian settlement in Hellenistic Phrygia," in *Method and Theory*, ed. Amélie Kuhrt and Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg, *Achaemenid History 3* (Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, 1988), 175-96. On the administrative divisions here, see also Balcer, "Ancient Persian Satrapies," 86-87. For prosopography of Mania and Zenis, see Hofstetter, *Die Griechen in Persien*, nos. 209 and 336.

take Larisa (not Egyptian Larisa), Hamaxitus, and Colonae for Pharnabazus.³⁹ Mania, however, was betrayed by her son-in-law, who took Scepsis and Gergis from her (*Hell.* 3.1.12-15). He attempted to curry favour with Pharnabazus, who was offended by the death of Mania, and so vowed to avenge her death. It was at this point that Dercylidas arrived. Larisa, Hamaxitus, Colonae, Neandria, Ilium, and Cocylum turned themselves over. As they were only recent Persian acquisitions, with the death of the local Persian authority (and therefore the end of regular pay: *Hell.* 3.1.16), it is unsurprising that their garrisons went to the Spartans. As all were within 20km of Hamaxitus, one suspects that they all fell under the control of Zenis and Mania and operated as satellite cities. All but Cocylum were former members of the Delian League.⁴⁰

Cebren was the first city to be taken with a fight. Still, the city was clearly Greek at heart. Another former member of the Delian League,⁴¹ the city was kept loyal with the presence of a Persian garrison, which the inhabitants subverted (*Hell.* 3.1.18). The next objectives, Gergis and Scepsis, were easier targets. Geographically they were within the influence of one another, and Scepsis was also a former member of the Delian League.⁴² These cities were also former possessions of Mania, but had recently been taken over by her killer, Meidias, who resided now in Scepsis and quickly capitulated to Dercylidas. When approaching Gergis, the garrison saw Meidias and willingly opened the gates to their city upon request (*Hell.* 3.1.21-28).

Throughout these passages, there are intimations of forthcoming intervention by Pharnabazus (*Hell.* 3.1.17, 20); the intervention never eventuates. Pharnabazus was clearly located near enough to pose a threat and respond to the Greek efforts, yet he appears to restrict himself to his areas of direct control (nearer to the line at 28°E). This is the point at which Xenophon makes the grand statement that Dercylidas had captured nine cities in eight days (*Hell.* 3.2.1). Similar hyperbole is found later, when

³⁹ See Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 128n123 for possible chronology. On the mercenaries of Mania: Tuplin, "Garrisons of the Persian Empire," 176.

⁴⁰ Hansen and Nielsen, *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*, nos. 778 (Hamaxitus), 779 (Ilium), 782 (Colonae), 785 (Neandria), 784 (Larisa).

⁴¹ Hansen and Nielsen, *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*, no. 780.

⁴² Hansen and Nielsen, *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis*, no. 792.

Jason of Pherae reportedly says that those who went up with Agesilaus “brought the king to extremities” (*Hell.* 6.1.12).⁴³ The reality is somewhat less noteworthy. Only one city was taken with a fight. The remainders were only recent Persian acquisitions, bound to follow the lead of their more powerful neighbours, or had no strategic value. Most had old ties to the Delian League.

As winter of 399/8 approached, Dercylidas proposed a truce to Pharnabazus, and departed for Thrace, where he was to make substantial profits from plundering the local warlords (*Hell.* 3.2.1-5). On his return, he renewed his truce with Pharnabazus (*Hell.* 3.2.9) and made his way south. The Ionian cities had grown tired of Dercylidas’ actions and the lurking presence of Tissaphernes, and informed the Lacedaemonians that an attack on Caria would force Tissaphernes to acknowledge their autonomy. Thence the army came through Ionia, where it happened upon the armies of both Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus working in conjunction. The Spartan made overtures about his desire to fight, but readily accepted the terms proposed by Tissaphernes; both parties withdrew to liaise with their leaders. The fact remains that Dercylidas’ success was not owing to his brilliance as a leader, but rather founded upon the Persians’ avoidance of confrontation until necessary and the Spartan’s focus on easy targets.⁴⁴

The sequence which led to the unification of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus afford us excellent insight into Artaxerxes’ efforts to address these events. Xenophon, while failing to mention that Pharnabazus had visited the king prior to his reconciliation with Tissaphernes, claims that Pharnabazus made amends with his rival. Xenophon cites jealousy as the reason for his obstinacy (*Hell.* 3.2.13), but there is no reason to believe that Xenophon had any real understanding of what was said between the two. The silence may be attributable to Xenophon’s tendency to focus on Tissaphernes, who Xenophon alone reports as responsible for the ships Herodas saw in

⁴³ This speech was propaganda inserted by Xenophon: Vivienne J. Gray, “The Years 375 to 371 BC: A Case Study in the Reliability of Diodorus Siculus and Xenophon,” *CQ* 30, no. 2 (1980): 312-14.

⁴⁴ As Tuplin, *Failings*, 50 and Westlake, “Spartan Intervention,” 415-16 emphasise.

Phoenicia (*Hell.* 3.4.1). The other sources for Pharnabazus' journey to court indicate that Tissaphernes was not at the centre of the ship building plan.⁴⁵

Diodorus (14.39.1) records the journey of Pharnabazus to Artaxerxes (after the first truce with Dercylidas), and the plan he proposed while at court. Artaxerxes must have been, at this point, frustrated by affairs in Asia Minor. Tissaphernes was appointed to secure the region to allow the western empire as a whole to focus on reclaiming Egypt. Two years passed and still the region was in danger of bursting into widespread conflict. Pharnabazus conceived a new strategy to handle both the Greeks and Egyptians. The construction of a fleet, headed by an Athenian, would eventually create a buffer zone in the Aegean and facilitate stability, before it would move to support the eventual invasion of Egypt. Isocrates (9.55) and Plutarch (*Ages.* 6.1) support a reading that the fleet was part of a larger plan (Isocrates' comments are Hellenocentric and arouse scepticism, as they are made in the context of promoting the genius of Evagoras and Conon). Athens played a crucial role in this plan as a counterweight to Sparta.⁴⁶

Several things contributed to the decision to adopt the plan, and the Greeks erred in not noticing the change which occurred after Pharnabazus returned from court. Tissaphernes had failed to secure Achaemenid control over the Greeks and was incapable of stabilising the region, both through his own deficiencies as a statesman and because of his appalling reputation among the Greeks of his satrapy.⁴⁷ With the plan of Pharnabazus, Artaxerxes had radically changed his policy. Egypt was now a secondary priority; his patience was strained by the constant interference from mainland Greece and he was convinced by Pharnabazus' plan. Prior to this moment, Tissaphernes' role was to maintain power in the region without provoking widespread conflict between Greek and Persian armies, while Egypt was subdued. This did not continue. Ships were commissioned, with a view to them supporting a subsequent invasion of Egypt. Pharnabazus was appointed as commander, to work with a hired

⁴⁵ See below, pp. 103-04.

⁴⁶ Argued at length in the following section.

⁴⁷ Westlake, "Decline and Fall," 257 concurs that it was Tissaphernes' own failings which led to his decline, not a fickle, barbaric king.

naval expert, Conon the Athenian. Conon would have wide ranging powers and the support of the king's treasury in a sign of Artaxerxes' dedication to this change in policy after Conon made it clear that Persian paymasters were lackadaisical (Diod. 14.81.6; cf. *Nep. Con.* 4.1). The Aegean was to be secured and the Spartans ejected from Asia Minor. Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus were instructed to cooperate.⁴⁸ These directives were supported by provision of greater numbers of troops and cavalry. Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus appear together when Dercylidas attempts to move south into Caria – they had previously been ranging across their inland territories near the Maeander, installing garrisons (Diod. 14.39.4-6; *Hell.* 3.2.14).

While Artaxerxes is not explicitly identified as the source of the above policy alterations, his hand is detectable at a number of points in the 390s. His involvement reflects the importance Artaxerxes attached to affairs in the West, and challenges the notion that the responses to the Spartans reflected continued satrapal rivalry or a disjointed effort by the Persians. Most prominently, Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes began working together. Tissaphernes remained overall commander in the region, and Pharnabazus acknowledged that fact. In the passages following the reconciliation Herodas saw the manning of warships in Phoenicia – the first signs the Greeks saw of Pharnabazus' naval strategy (*Hell.* 3.4.1). It is unlikely to be coincidence that, at the same time, Pharnabazus was suddenly willing to visit Tissaphernes, assist in the garrisoning around the Maeander, and join Tissaphernes' army in order to drive Dercylidas away from Caria (*Hell.* 3.2.12-20). In the following years, upon Tissaphernes' failure to stabilise the region, Tithraustes was sent by the king to manage affairs – he immediately attempted to pacify the situation, speaking in the king's name (*Hell.* 3.4.25; cf. *Nep. Con.* 3 where he is identified as chiliarch), in order to keep Agesilaus away from ship building districts (while it may seem odd that Tithraustes pushed Agesilaus towards Pharnabazus' satrapy, this was to keep him away from the entrance to the imperial heartland rather than out of rivalry – Tithraustes and

⁴⁸ Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 140-41.

Pharnabazus were soon cooperating against the Spartan: *Hell. Oxy.* 19.1).⁴⁹ Tithraustes also employed bribery to ensure mainland Greeks would make trouble for the Spartans. So too is Ariaeus found with Tithraustes in order to assist in the removal of Tissaphernes (Diod. 14.80.6-8). Tithraustes then plays a hand in funding the pay dispute of Conon – Conon may have gone to Artaxerxes himself for this dispute, but in any case Artaxerxes played a role in having his close adviser manage the issue.⁵⁰ And in the late 390s Artaxerxes demonstrates willingness to be involved in western affairs through the removal of Tiribazus, installation of Strouthas, and creation of new satrapies in the region. These manoeuvres indicate that Artaxerxes was aware of events in the West and that he ordered his agents to intervene in specific ways to pacify the region.

The cooperation of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus had the desired effect: Dercylidas provisionally agreed to a truce where both parties believed they secured what they wanted. These negotiations are odd. Tissaphernes came to an agreement with Dercylidas, rather than entering combat. Yet it is not a sign of weakness. It is a key point that Tissaphernes' demands no longer included the demand for the submission of the Asiatic Greeks – merely that the Greek army should depart and the Spartan governors be removed (*Hell.* 3.2.20).⁵¹ That is, he made concessions. Concessions repeated later by Tithraustes to Agesilaus (*Hell.* 3.4.25). This aligns with a strategy demanding stability in Asia, rather than complete submission.

Time played into Persian hands during these negotiations. By resorting to diplomatic means, more time was gained for the bolstering of their fleet. Westlake is critical of the notion that Tissaphernes was buying time to allow the navy to be put

⁴⁹ On the importance of Cilicia as a ship building district, see H. Wallinga, "Naval Installations in Cilicia Pedias: the Defense of the Parathalassia in Achaemenid Times and after," in *De Anatolia Antiqua I*, ed. Jacques Des Courtis, Jean-Charles Moretti, and François Planet, Bibliothèque de l'Institut français d'études anatoliennes d'Istanbul 32 (Paris: Libr. d'Amérique et d'Orient, 1991), 276-81.

⁵⁰ See below, pp. 121-22.

⁵¹ On the removal of Spartan governors, see the discussion of Hamilton, "Lysander, Agesilaus, Spartan Imperialism," 40-46, including previous literature. I generally follow Hamilton's conclusion.

into commission.⁵² This is reasonable; buying time was not the sole priority. But limiting the possibility for widespread conflict was, and consideration of what the Persians hoped to achieve in the period explains the behaviour Westlake struggles to accommodate in his discussion of Tissaphernes' general reluctance to enter direct conflict.

The shift in Persian policy was tangible not only in the presence of a unified army in Ionia: a Spartan embassy to the court of the king was seized at this time (Ctes. F30.74).⁵³ It remains plausible that these envoys were at court to negotiate settlement with the Persian king, and that they were detained as a result of Artaxerxes' shift in policy.⁵⁴ Tissaphernes sought to conceal this change in strategy and grant Conon and Pharnabazus time. Ships were constructed in Phoenicia, Cilicia and Cyprus.⁵⁵ One must also take into consideration the fortified sites of this region. By maintaining a defensive posture, and utilising fortifications and garrisons which naturally defended against war efforts south of the Maeander, the Persians took advantage of their position – they did not take a weak stance. Mylasa had its own series of fortifications to inhibit hostile movement.⁵⁶ In Caria there are numerous fortified positions making entry to the region difficult, and these fortifications were expanded in the decades following Hecatomnid accession to power in the 390s.⁵⁷ Ionia and Aeolis featured similar fortification systems which moderated entry through the region into Cilicia and

⁵² Westlake, "Decline and Fall," 263; cf. Hamilton, "Lysander, Agesilaus, Spartan Imperialism," 45.

⁵³ Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 140n40 dates the passage here. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, 116 believes this embassy to be comprised of the same individuals who served as Spartan commissioners to assess Dercylidas' command. Westlake, "Decline and Fall," 260n12 initially follows Hamilton's hypothesis, but is less convinced later (Westlake, "Spartan Intervention," 417n34).

⁵⁴ Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, 116.

⁵⁵ Diod. 14.39; Philoch. F144; *Hell.* 3.4.1.

⁵⁶ Olivier Henry, "Hekatomnos, Persian Satrap or Greek Dynast? The Tomb at Berber Ini," in *Hellenistic Karia*, ed. Riet van Bremen and Jan-Mathieu Carbon (Bordeaux: De Boccard, 2010), 111-13 incorporates up to date literature.

⁵⁷ Isabelle Pimouguet-Pédarros, *Archéologie de la défense: histoire des fortifications antiques de Carie (époques classique et hellénistique)* (Paris: Presses universitaires Franc-Comtoises, 2000), 314-15.

beyond.⁵⁸ These defensive systems did not arise in the first decades of the fourth century by coincidence; the defensive works, built at some expense, responded to threats to the empire and reflected an effort to inhibit military movement through Caria and Cilicia and into the Achaemenid heartland along the route of Cyrus the Younger.

The first step in commissioning Artaxerxes' fleet was to re-establish relations with Evagoras and ensure stability in Cyprus.⁵⁹ Evagoras was an opportunist, and at this juncture opposed to the Spartans,⁶⁰ and so he agreed to resume tribute. Ctesias himself served on the diplomatic mission to Evagoras, and in the negotiations between Artaxerxes and Conon for the Athenian's recruitment (Ctes. F30). Five hundred talents were allocated to the construction of the fleet in Cyprus, where one hundred triremes were to be built (Diod. 14.39.1-2). Pharnabazus made this journey, and was entrusted with naval command. Forty ships soon departed under Conon to Cilicia, which were to serve as the foundation of Pharnabazus' preparations for war (Diod. 14.39.4; Philoch. F144), before the satrap himself returned to join with Tissaphernes against Dercylidas. In this same period Ctesias went to Sparta as ambassador, for unspecified reasons.⁶¹

The accounts of Conon's recruitment are contentious. Isocrates (9.55; 5.63) and Pausanias (1.3.2) state that Conon and Evagoras together proposed the plan to Artaxerxes. As Ctesias makes no mention of Evagoras in such a role (F30.73; *Art.* 21.2-3), coupled with the motive Isocrates had for manipulating the history to give Evagoras a primary role in events (as he was presenting a speech in Evagoras' honour), Isocrates should be dismissed. Pausanias' version appears to derive from Isocrates, owing to the similarities, and should be treated similarly. Ctesias (F30.73) and Plutarch

⁵⁸ Ismail Gezgin-Izmir, "Defensive Systems in Aiolis and Ionia Regions in the Achaemenid Period," in *Achaemenid Anatolia*, ed. T. Bakir, et al. (Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, 2001), 181-88.

⁵⁹ Eugene A. Costa, Jr., "Evagoras I and the Persians, ca. 411 to 391 B.C.," *Historia* 23, no. 1 (1974): 48n50 is right to emphasise that despite the focus of our sources on Evagoras, he was not the only king tasked with construction.

⁶⁰ Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 636.

⁶¹ On this mission: Ryszard Wysocki, "Ctesias of Cnidus' Mission to Sparta and the Course of the Carian Campaign in 397 B.C.," *Eos* 82, no. 2 (1994): 253-64 (Polish, with English summary on p. 264).

(Art. 21.2-3) give the credit to Conon, with a primary role for Ctesias.⁶² Diodorus (14.39.1), Justin (6.2), and Orosius (3.1.7) all give Pharnabazus credit. No modern scholarly consensus has been reached. Some think Evagoras and Conon devised the scheme.⁶³ Others think it was solely Conon's initiative.⁶⁴ Others seem to suggest that the idea originated with both Evagoras and Pharnabazus independently.⁶⁵ Another source suggests the same, but with Conon and Pharnabazus independently.⁶⁶ Diodorus' account seems the most likely,⁶⁷ owing to the possible Hellenocentrism Plutarch's account, and the possibility that Ctesias overstated his own role in the situation.⁶⁸ Pharnabazus must have had a primary role in events, given that he was the one to appoint Conon (Ctes. F30.74).⁶⁹

The fleet's construction was concealed effectively; the Spartans heard nothing until its launch (*Hell.* 3.4.1). The report which they did receive was founded on the word of a Syracusan named Herodas, who discovered the fleet gathering in Phoenicia. His report indicates that Cyprus was not the only construction site, and a great army was possibly gathered as well (*Xen. Ages.* 1.6). The news was met with concern in Sparta. In Xenophon it is explicit that Herodas had no knowledge of the fleet's ultimate intentions. Quite possibly the fleet's sole purpose was to support an invasion of Egypt and the Spartans jumped to the wrong conclusion in presuming Artaxerxes was

⁶² See Lenfant, *La Perse*, 285nn739-40.

⁶³ Franz Georg Maier, "Cyprus and Phoenicia," in *The Fourth Century B.C.*, ed. D. M. Lewis, et al., *The Cambridge Ancient History 6* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 314; Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 46.

⁶⁴ Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, 2: 120n21.

⁶⁵ Brown, "Suggestions," 14.

⁶⁶ Olmstead, *History*, 378-79.

⁶⁷ As do many: Cook, *Persian Empire*, 213; Westlake, "Spartan Intervention," 422; Hamilton, "Lysander, Agesilaus, Spartan Imperialism," 49; Duane A. March, "Konon and the Great King's Fleet, 396-394," *Historia* 46, no. 3 (1997): 258; Buckler, *Aegean Greece*, 54; P. J. Rhodes, *A History of the Classical Greek World: 478-323 B.C.* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2006), 207-08. A. Zournatzi, *Evagoras I, Athens and Persia: ca. 412 to 387/6* (University of California, Berkeley: Doctoral Thesis, 1991), 101-04 is more agnostic on the matter.

⁶⁸ Stevenson, *Persica*, 114-17.

⁶⁹ On the possibility of Ctesias being selected thanks to his earlier acquaintance with Evagoras, see Walther Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien: Untersuchungen zur griechisch-persischen Geschichte des IV. Jahrhunderts v. Chr* (Hildesheim: Olms, 1892; reprint, 1987), 49. I do not see any evidence for Brown's assertion that Parysatis "can hardly be doubted" to have been instrumental in having Ctesias appointed for the mission to Cyprus (Brown, "Suggestions," 13, 15, a theory he derives from George Grote, *A History of Greece* (London: J. Murray, 1869-1870), 9: 78).

focused on the Greeks.⁷⁰ Xenophon presents Agesilaus' invasion of Asia from the same perspective: as an attempt to busy the Persians so they could not invade Greece (Xen. *Ages.* 1.7). The fleet undoubtedly served as a defensive force against Egyptian attacks as well, after the Egyptians appropriated the fleet Tamos brought with him.⁷¹ The fleet was ultimately focused on the invasion of Egypt, but it was initially a component in a larger plan to calm the Aegean, restrict hostile posturing by the Spartan fleet, and limit Spartan influence on the islands and coastal cities of Asia Minor. It would take until Conon's visit for the offensive value of the fleet to be acknowledged by Artaxerxes.

Lacedaemon responded by sending Lysander and Agesilaus to Asia with an expanded force. In a sign of growing resentment of Spartan autocracy, when greater contributions were sought from the allies, Boeotia, Corinth and Athens refused outright.⁷² Agesilaus left with six months' supplies, thirty Spartiates, two thousand emancipated Helots, and six thousand of the allies.

This expedition is marked by its heavy handed trumpeting of ambitions to liberate the Greeks of Asia and subdue Persia (as far as overthrowing the king).⁷³ The first step in this crusade for Agesilaus, fancying himself as a second Agamemnon, was to emulate the Homeric hero by sacrificing at Aulis. The Boeotarchs – more precisely, men working for them – infuriated the Spartan king by quashing the ceremony mid-event and hurling the sacrificial victims from the altar (*Hell.* 3.4.4; *Plut. Ages.* 6.6). Tempers on the mainland were fraying. Agesilaus, unhappy with this blatant rebuke, left for Asia, landing at Gerastus, before reforming his army and heading to Ephesus.⁷⁴

In the *Agesilaus* (1.37) Xenophon claims that the Asiatic Greek cities lived in unbroken harmony and prosperity under Agesilaus; Plutarch (*Ages.* 15.1) makes the balder statement that Agesilaus merely settled the region. Regardless of the spin, it

⁷⁰ Cawkwell, *Greek Wars*, 163. Cawkwell's chronology here has merits and will be discussed at length below. On the destination for the fleet, cf. Gerald Proietti, *Xenophon's Sparta: An Introduction* (Leiden: Brill, 1987), 92-93.

⁷¹ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 45.

⁷² See Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 356-57 for discussion of the significance. Pausanias (3.9.2) states that the Corinthians were actually most eager to partake in the expedition and withdrew with great reluctance.

⁷³ *Diod.* 15.31; *Nep. Ages.* 4.1; *Plut. Ages.* 15.1-3, *Pel.* 30; *Xen. Ages.* 1.8, 36; *Hell.* 3.5.1.

⁷⁴ Hamilton, *Agesilaus*, 32 (cf. p. 96) maintains that Agesilaus was deeply affected by this episode.

seems that the cities were in a state of disarray upon Agesilaus' arrival – neither democracies nor oligarchies (*Hell.* 3.4.7) – and they often sent to Lysander in order to determine the current state of affairs. Lysander, for his part, was involved in order to re-establish his influence in the region (*Hell.* 3.4.2). The disarray was an extension of strife which was apparent while Dercylidas was present. Isocrates (4.144) and Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.2.11) both attest to the raids of Chian exiles in Ionia. Clearly the Persians were not the only problem faced by Asiatic Greeks. These factors highlight the true aim of the mission: to settle affairs on the coast in Sparta's favour. While Xenophon deceptively portrays the mission as moral and honourable, modern scholars are more sceptical. Imperialism is widely held accountable for Agesilaus' behaviour; Panhellenism was merely a ruse.⁷⁵ Even Isocrates hints at Agesilaus' private ambition to establish Spartan authority over the region (5.86-88).⁷⁶

As Agesilaus journeyed to Asia, ambassadors of Lacedaemon were dispatched to Egypt (Diod. 14.79.4; cf. Justin 6.2.1). Nepherites was receptive to Peloponnesian requests. A gift was made of equipment for one hundred triremes and five hundred thousand measures of grain. Isocrates would later attest to the longstanding relationship between Egypt and Sparta (6.63), and the mission of Agesilaus to Egypt in the 360s similarly reflects the links between states. At the time of the Lacedaemonian mission to Nepherites, the Persian fleet was blockaded by Pharax, at the head of the Peloponnesian fleet, in Caunus. This situation was resolved when Pharnabazus and Artaphernes arrived with support (Diod. 14.79.5).⁷⁷

In addition to the complications posed by the now-active Persian fleet, the Peloponnesians suffered a major blow when Rhodes ejected all Spartan forces (Diod.

⁷⁵ E.g. S. Perlman, "Panhellenism, the Polis and Imperialism," *Historia* 25, no. 1 (1976): 17-19; Seager, "Agesilaus in Asia," 183-84; Seager and Tuplin, "Freedom of the Greeks," 144; Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 192 (cf. p. 180); Hamilton, *Agesilaus*, 96; Hamilton, "Lysander, Agesilaus, Spartan Imperialism," 49. Cawkwell, "Agesilaus and Sparta," 67 wonders if Those in Sparta themselves may not have even viewed the expedition as it was portrayed, given that only six months' provisions were granted. Conversely, perhaps the Egyptian supplies which were intercepted at Rhodes (below) were intended to supply the force.

⁷⁶ See also S. Perlman, "Isocrates' "Philippus": A Reinterpretation," *Historia* 6, no. 3 (1957): 313.

⁷⁷ This might be identifiable with *Hell. Oxy.* 9.2-3; see Paul McKechnie and S. J. Kern, eds., *Hellenica Oxyrynchia: Edited with Translation and Commentary* (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1988), 140 for problems.

14.79.6); Pausanias reports that this came at the behest of Conon himself (6.7.6). Rhodes had served as a major naval base between 398 and this expulsion in 396.⁷⁸ The defection of Rhodes then proved fruitful for the Persians as the Spartan ambassadors returning from Egypt with ship equipment and grain unwittingly sailed into the harbour of their enemy, not having learned of the changes in allegiance (Diod. 14.79.7-8). Further reinforcements soon arrived for Conon, in the order of ninety triremes, and he continued his campaign.

When he had arrived in Asia, Agesilaus made a truce with Tissaphernes (Xen. *Ages.* 1.10; *Hell.* 3.4.6). Xenophon claims that Tissaphernes immediately violated the oath, then declared war on Agesilaus. It might be closer to the truth to say that hostile postures were assumed by both parties when no agreement was reached. Agesilaus' forceful language is reflected throughout our source tradition and his later behaviour supports that he yearned for a fight (Plut. *Ages.* 9.1; Polyae. 2.1.8). Plutarch indicates that he was glad when the truce was broken by the Persians, and when Tithraustes offers autonomy to the Greeks Agesilaus was taken aback (*Hell.* 3.4.25).⁷⁹ Persian behaviour is again consistent. Infantry was sent to protect Caria and the South; cavalry was sent to protect the Maeander Plain and what lay eastwards (*Hell.* 3.4.12). The tactic was identical to 399-97. Opposition was only reached when Agesilaus moved on Dascylium, and there the Greeks suffered defeat. The following campaigning season Tissaphernes again marshalled troops across Caria and the Maeander plain, again preventing any incursion south.

The manoeuvring of the armies, culminating in the battle outside Sardis, is infamous for the scholarly debate which has surrounded the conflicting accounts of the Oxyrhynchus Historian and Xenophon. Diodorus (14.80) also offers a summary of the account, but generally receives less attention as he is faced with the accounts of two contemporaries who are considered more trustworthy. What follows is a brief summary of the events and their discrepancies. The discrepancies are such that

⁷⁸ See Richard M. Berthold, "Fourth Century Rhodes," *Historia* 29, no. 1 (1980): 35-36 and especially n17 for discussion of the chronology. See H. D. Westlake, "Conon and Rhodes: The Troubled Aftermath of Synoecism," *GRBS* 24, no. 4 (1983): 333-44 for discussion of Rhodes in this decade.

⁷⁹ Seager, "Agesilaus in Asia," 183. Cf. Kelly, "Agesilaus' Strategy in Asia Minor," 97.

Cawkwell's speculation that P and Xenophon were relating separate events cannot be lightly dismissed.⁸⁰ It is in this campaign that the Persian strategy failed. Agesilaus, having assembled his troops at Ephesus, was presumed to be planning a march on Caria. The satrap's troops were duly dispatched to guard this region, while cavalry was focused on the plain of Maeander. Instead, Agesilaus moved north. The Spartan king's ruse may have been inspired by Lysander's recruitment of Spithridates, who had been slighted by Pharnabazus (*Hell.* 3.4.10); Spithridates' familiarity with the northern provinces must have been valuable. Marching close to Dascylium, the Greek cavalry was routed with ease. But as the supporting hoplites arrived, the Persians withdrew. Thus, Agesilaus' next task became the building of an army capable of tackling the Persians on their own terms (*Hell.* 3.4.15-19).

In spring 395 Agesilaus announced that he was to march on Sardis. At this point, the sources lose all coherence. Broadly, the key points of the narrative in each source are as follows. P begins the march by stating that Agesilaus marched into the Caustrian plain, in close proximity to the mountains, while keeping an eye on the enemy (11.2; Diod. 14.80.1). Tissaphernes followed closely, harassing the Greeks from the rear, prompting Agesilaus to rearrange his troops into a square (11.3). That night Xenocles was placed in command of a number of hoplites and peltasts and instructed to ambush the Persians (11.4). The next day, Xenocles ambushed the Persians at a run, causing the Persians to flee over the plain. Agesilaus then dispatched more lightly armoured troops and cavalry to pursue, but they could not inflict further damage

⁸⁰ G. L. Cawkwell, "The Oxyrhynchus Historian. Review: An Historical Commentary on the 'Hellenica Oxyrhynchia' by I. A. F. Bruce," *CR* 18, no. 3 (1968): 288-90. A sample of discussion: Georg Busolt, "Der Neue Historiker und Xenophon," *Hermes* 43, no. 2 (1908): 255-85; Dugas, "La campagne d'Agésilas," 58-95; I. A. F. Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the 'Hellenica Oxyrhynchia'* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 150-56; J. K. Anderson, "The Battle of Sardis in 395 B.C.," *CSCA* 7 (1974): 27-53; Vivienne J. Gray, "Two Different Approaches to the Battle of Sardis in 395 B.C. Xenophon Hellenica 3.4.20-24 and Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 11 (6).4-6," *CSCA* 12 (1979): 183-200; L. Botha, "The Asiatic Campaign of Agesilaus - The Topography of the Route from Ephesus to Sardis," *AClass* 31 (1988): 71-80; James G. DeVoto, "Agesilaos and Tissaphernes near Sardis in 395 BC," *Hermes* 116, no. 1 (1988): 41-53; McKechnie and Kern, *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, 140-46; G. Wylie, "Agesilaus and the Battle of Sardis," *Klio* 74 (1992): 118-30; Dillery, *Xenophon*, 109-14; Bleckmann, *Fiktion als Geschichte*, V.2.2. More generally on the topography of the region: Clive Foss, "Explorations in Mount Tmolus," *CSCA* 11 (1978): 21-60.

(11.6). The death toll for the Persians stood at six hundred, and their camp was looted (cf. the exaggerated figure of six thousand preserved in Diod. 14.80.4). Agesilaus lingered for several days before leaving for Phrygia (12.1), ravaging the surrounding land but avoiding Sardis, where the Persians had regrouped (cf. Diod. 14.80.8).

Xenophon has Agesilaus announcing his plans to the army – they intended to march the shortest route (*Hell.* 3.4.20). Tissaphernes, in this version, again thought Agesilaus was to assault Caria, and sent his infantry to protect the estates again. Marching for three days, plundering the land, Agesilaus finally made contact with the enemy. The Persian commander (not Tissaphernes, who was in Sardis: *Hell.* 3.4.25) sent his baggage across the river to make camp. The Persian cavalry killed some of the Greeks spread across the plain, and eventually battle lines were drawn. When the battle was joined, the Persians were limited by their lack of infantry and fled.

There are three clear and irreconcilable differences. (1) In P the Persians harass the Greeks for days before battle is finally joined, but in Xenophon the battle is sudden and immediate – an ambush, led by Xenocles. (2) In P the Greeks adopt a square formation to stave off the Greek attacks. (3) Tissaphernes was in Sardis, according to Xenophon; P says he was at the battle. The discussions above provide the significance of each point and their respective conclusions. Scholarly opinion trends towards accepting Xenophon's account, but no solution seems possible without the introduction of new evidence.

On the Persian response to the battle, the sources are unanimous. Tissaphernes had failed Artaxerxes for the final time. Given the rapid turn-around between defeat at Sardis and the removal of Tissaphernes, Tithraustes had most likely already been sent as replacement before the defeat; now he was to serve his death warrant as well, if previous failures had not been sufficient to require those ends (Diod. 14.80.6-8; Xen. *Ages.* 1.35; *Hell.* 3.4.25).⁸¹ Diodorus and Plutarch claim that this formed part of Parysatis' final revenge against those who partook in the killing of Cyrus. Mildenberg has taken up the tradition at face value, and it probably forms the basis for his claim

⁸¹ Peter Krentz, ed. *Hellenika II.3.11 - IV.2.8* (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1995), 191-92 posits that Xenophon exaggerated in order to give Agesilaus' victory greater significance.

that Parysatis was the true source of motivation for the execution.⁸² This is an uncritical repetition of dubious sources for Artaxerxes' life, and should be moderated. These are, in fact, the final references to Parysatis in the classical sources, and the first instance after her banishment following the murder of Stateira. They scream of inclusion for narrative purposes – the execution of Tissaphernes neatly ties together the plot of Cyrus and Parysatis. Undoubtedly, if Parysatis was forgiven at court by 395, she would have been pleased by the decision. But to attribute a primary role to Parysatis on the basis of Plutarch and Diodorus is to succumb too easily to their Orientalist tales, especially because in the *Life of Artaxerxes* women are constantly given roles of power over the dilatory king to serve the Greek point of view.

Fundamentally, the rapid arrival of Tithraustes in the West should serve as an immediate warning that Diodorus and Plutarch may have injected their own additions here. Perhaps as a sign of the clemency in Artaxerxes' administration (cf. *Art.* 4.3), Ariaeus, the former aide of Cyrus, plays a role in assisting Tithraustes. His allegiance to Cyrus had clearly not destroyed his career, and now he was again operating at the highest levels of Achaemenid administration. Sekunda reasonably posits that Ariaeus and Tithraustes had entered a feudal-type relationship.⁸³ The link with Tithraustes is unlikely to be coincidence, and he was certainly now an agent of the king. Ariaeus appears throughout our sources, so his role is not entirely fictionalised; he and Tissaphernes were co-commanders shortly after (*Hell. Oxy.* 19.3), and Ariaeus later appeared in Sardis as well (*Hell.* 4.1.27). Ariaeus arrested Tissaphernes and cut off his head, which was sent on to the king. While the death of Tissaphernes and the king's rage in Diodorus are portrayed as the result of Tissaphernes' role as instigator in the war, it is clear that Tissaphernes was not capable of performing his duties as required. Having come into power after playing a key role in suppressing the revolt of Pisouthnes, Tissaphernes' career reached its zenith at Cunaxa; thenceforth he was in decline and surpassed by the rising Pharnabazus.

⁸² Leo Mildenberg, "Artaxerxes III Ochus (358 – 338 B.C.). A Note on the Malign King," *ZPalV* 115, no. 2 (1999): 202.

⁸³ N. Sekunda, "Achaemenid Settlement in Caria, Lycia and Greater Phrygia," in *Asia Minor and Egypt: Old Cultures in a New Empire*, ed. Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Amélie Kuhrt, Achaemenid History 6 (Leiden: 1991), 113.

One of Tithraustes' first acts was to request Agesilaus leave Asia. The Spartan king was informed that under Tithraustes' rule the Greeks would be free, their only obligation being the traditional tribute. Agesilaus agreed to a truce with Tithraustes, but did not commit to agreeing with the overall plan. He stated that he must confer with those in Sparta (cf. Xen. *Ages.* 4.6). The proposal of Tithraustes indicates that Artaxerxes was willing to resolve his issues by diplomacy, and represents another attempt to pacify Asia Minor. The execution of Tissaphernes removed a sizeable barrier between Greeks and Achaemenids and must have alleviated the tensions with the Ionian Greeks. The Persians were not ignorant of the detrimental effect Tissaphernes' reputation; Pharnabazus would acknowledge it later (*Hell.* 4.1.32-33). Tissaphernes' execution was a repudiation of ties to his diplomacy, and facilitated the proposal of a solution which served both parties. Tithraustes' payment of thirty talents to Agesilaus was an act of good faith.⁸⁴ We cannot determine whether the Persians truly expected Agesilaus to abandon his campaign, but they certainly encouraged him to do so. Tithraustes, if Pausanias (3.9.7) is to be believed, had a grudge against the Lacedaemonians for untold reasons; the passage suggests that this came to bear on Artaxerxes' decision to dispatch this man in particular. Tithraustes' immediate pact with Agesilaus, in contradiction to his personal sentiments, may be indicative of the force of the king's instructions. Conversely, it may be a matter of editorialising on the part of Pausanias; there is no way to tell. Perhaps Pausanias conflated Artaxerxes and Tithraustes when considering Artaxerxes' reported distaste for all Spartans (*Art.* 22.1).

The truce with Agesilaus and request for him to turn north against Pharnabazus might, on the face of it, seem difficult to reconcile with the enactment of a new foreign policy to solve the Egyptian and Greek problems in the West. It would appear to be a reversion to old satrapal habits of squabbling with each other. This is not the case. *Hell. Oxy.* 19.1 indicates that Tithraustes and Pharnabazus were not

⁸⁴ Though see G. L. Schepens, "Timocrates' Money: Ancient and Modern Controversies," in *Poikilma: studi in onore di Michele R. Cataudella in occasione del 60 compleanno*, ed. Michele R. Cataudella and Serena Bianchetti (La Spezia: Agorà, 2001), 1213-15 on the Spartan desire to portray the Persian as beleaguered and at a loss.

bickering rivals, but working in coordination.⁸⁵ The diversion of the Greeks north was a sound strategic decision. Xenophon admitted that Caria was unsuitable for cavalry (*Hell.* 3.4.12). Furthermore, he noted that a campaign in the plains of Phrygia was impossible, owing to the strength of Pharnabazus' cavalry (*Xen. Ages.* 1.23). Tissaphernes, when Agesilaus first marches, concentrates his infantry in Caria, while directing his unusable cavalry north. Tithraustes was also making the best move for himself and for the Persian strategy. By marching north, Agesilaus was journeying across the terrain most suited to the Achaemenid strength – horse – and travelling through the Greek cities of the coast. Tithraustes prevented Agesilaus from campaigning in a region which would require conflict between Persian infantry and Greek hoplites, where the Achaemenids were more likely to fail. He similarly directed the Greeks away from the construction zones of the new fleet in Cilicia.⁸⁶ Instead, the campaign was now open for the strongest Persian forces to conduct warfare in the manner most desirable to them. Tithraustes' act equally helps dispel the assertion that Tissaphernes was merely protecting his estates when he pushed the Spartans north. Tithraustes mimicked him precisely, with less interest in the property of Caria. There was strategic benefit to the behaviour.

Success at Sardis led to the most demonstrative aspect of Agesilaus' campaign – his push east. Xenophon makes no mention of any move beyond our line at 28 degrees east, though he is not alone in that regard. Isocrates is equally delicate in his wording. While Agesilaus could have conquered all of Asia (5.120), and conquered all the territory this side of the Halys River (4.144), no mention is made of his losses. From Sardis he went north through Lydia, and began ravaging the land. Here there is further evidence for the divide between Achaemenid and the coastal Greek cities. Agesilaus failed to take Leonton Cephalae, and, although he had made an agreement with the Mysians, they laid an ambush, attacking his rear guard. The ultimate failure came at Gordium, where Rhathines' tenacious defence prevented any further progress

⁸⁵ As Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 142n51 notes. Lewis was inclined to read the text as an allusion to unknown hostility, following Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien*, 68.

⁸⁶ Eduard Meyer, *Theopomps Hellenika: mit einer Beilage über die Rede an die Larisaeer und die Verfassung Thessaliens* (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1909; reprint, 1966), 21.

(*Hell. Oxy.* 21.2). Indeed, Rhathines appears to have been a key part of the plan to defend the western satrapies, as he was charged first with leading Pharnabazus' army, then with defending the interior.⁸⁷ When Agesilaus had failed at Gordium, he had no recourse. Gordium is isolated from the Asiatic Greek cities to which Agesilaus could turn for support (as he did following the loss to Pharnabazus, with the reappropriation of industry at Ephesus: *Hell.* 3.4.14-19). Furthermore, the city might have been Agesilaus' final gamble for a truly incisive campaign – a royal road route connecting Gordium to the heartland of the empire (if it existed) would have made his march quicker and easier.⁸⁸ Several sources attest to the difficulty of the march to and from Gordium, ranging from the ambushes launched by Mysians (*Hell. Oxy.* 21.2) to the use of human shields (perhaps the same episode: Polyæn. 2.1.30; Frontin. *Str.* 1.4.2). So, Agesilaus was forced to move back west. Moving northwards, closer to the coast, Agesilaus failed in his attempt to take Miletou Teichos, twenty kilometres east of Dascylium.

While P narrates these events, Xenophon is conspicuously silent. Xenophon eagerly listed the many inconsequential cities taken by Thibron and Dercylidas; why did he not do the same for the apparently glorious razing of Agesilaus? It may be because Persian tactics of withdrawing to their own border strongholds proved effective in limiting the impact of the Greeks.⁸⁹ The Greek cities of the coast were of little consequence – the Persians could retake them once the Spartans left if they so desired – the key was maintaining control of the points which led to the heart of the empire.

While around Dascylium for the winter (*Hell.* 4.1.15), Pharnabazus' cavalry again inflicted losses upon Agesilaus. Two scythe-bearing chariots and four hundred horsemen fell upon the Greeks while they were scattered across the plain (*Hell.* 4.1.17-19). The fact that Pharnabazus could surprise the Greeks in this manner appears to be

⁸⁷ Sekunda, "Achaemenid Settlement," 138.

⁸⁸ Graf, "The Persian Royal Road System," 177. P. Debord, "Les Routes Royales en Asie Mineure Occidentale," in *Dans les pas des Dix-Mille: peuples et pays du Proche-Orient vus par un Grec*, ed. Pierre Briant (Toulouse: Presses universitaires du Mirail, 1995), 93 and Khatchadourian, "The Achaemenid Provinces," 966 accepts the existence of a royal road here.

⁸⁹ Bruce, *Commentary*, 134 similarly attributes the silence to the lack of success.

the result of a concerted effort to maintain his mobility. Xenophon derides the satrap for living in this manner when the Greeks sack a camp in retaliation with a night assault (*Hell.* 4.1.25), but the tactic paid dividends and suited the campaign the Persians wished to fight. It is when distributing the loot from the night raid that the Greeks are deserted by Spithridates and the Paphlagonians. The loss of Spithridates was said to be a heavy blow to Agesilaus (*Hell.* 4.1.28). Tactically, Spithridates was of enormous worth: he was valuable for any expedition north and he brought the Paphlagonian king over to the Greeks side.⁹⁰

In time a meeting was arranged between Pharnabazus and Agesilaus (*Hell.* 4.1.29-41).⁹¹ There Pharnabazus voiced his disappointment with not being granted the position of *karanos* in the West. This claim is suspicious, as Pharnabazus had recently been rewarded with a position of some power in relation to the fleet. Pharnabazus apparently told the Spartan that if he was subordinated to another general again, he would happily revolt. But, if he was treated satisfactorily, he would make war on Agesilaus to the best of his abilities. The details of the conversation seem to be a romanticised tale to reinforce the traditional image of the fickle Persian. The fact that Pharnabazus' son became a *xenos* of Agesilaus indicates that some meeting occurred; the details remain difficult to assert confidently (*Plut. Ages.* 13.1-4).⁹²

Agesilaus withdrew to bolster his army. Preparations were interrupted, however, by the arrival of Epicydidas in Asia, who urged Agesilaus to respond to the growing crisis in Greece. Agesilaus left Euxenus as governor in Asia with four thousand men (*Hell.* 4.2.5). These four thousand would make no assaults on the empire registered by our historians; clearly Agesilaus was the architect of the Spartan offensive and without his influence, it stagnated. Despite his claims (*Hell.* 4.2.3-4),

⁹⁰ The Spartan and Persian seem to have had a close relationship as well: Agesilaus was infatuated with Spithridates' son (*Xen. Ages.* 5.4-7) and attempted to broker a marriage between Spithridates and the Paphlagonian king's daughter (*Hell.* 4.1.6-15). See Vivienne J. Gray, *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins' University Press, 1989), 49-52.

⁹¹ No mention of this meeting is made in the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*. The portrayal of this discussion as an "illustration of ethical achievement" (Gray, *Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, 53) does not lend it great credibility. See discussion in Gray, *Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, 52-58; Hyland, *Tissaphernes and the Achaemenid Empire*, 206-09.

⁹² A. Bresson, "Un 'Athénien' à Sparte ou Plutarque lecteur de Xénophon," *REG* 115 (2002): 46-51.

Agesilaus never returned to fight the Persians, and did not take the opportunity offered by Tachos in the 360s to again war against Artaxerxes.

The Persians, for their part, continued the tactic of avoiding confrontation with the coastal Greek cities. After Cnidus, both Pharnabazus and the Persians in general were well received by the eastern Greeks, who were content with the state of affairs (*Hell.* 4.8.2, 27, 31). Local inscriptions from 386 indicate that at least some of the Asiatic Greeks were not passed to Persia for some time.⁹³ The literary historians provide no evidence of any move made by the Persians to reclaim any Greek city, as would be expected if they were as concerned with their own rivalries as the Greeks indicate.

Thus, Agesilaus marched north across the Hellespont into Europe, having taken nothing of strategic importance in the campaign, and failing to change the situation for the Asiatic Greeks whom he professed to represent. The situation was arguably worse for the local Greek population when Agesilaus was present. Xenophon attempts to manipulate Agesilaus' changes in policy to reflect his magnanimity: Agesilaus recognises that a land plundered and depopulated cannot sustain his army, and so adopts a genial face for the local Greeks. The problem is that this depopulation and plunder was enacted by Agesilaus himself, in order to increase the wealth of himself and his friends (*Xen. Ages.* 1.18-20).

The Persian strategy, as argued above, focused on limiting Greek influence by withdrawing from the traditionally Greek coastal cities, maintaining power in the key strategic points protecting the Persian heartland, and operating with mobile warfare. There is a consistency in their behaviour which should be taken to be indicative of an overall strategy. We must remain sceptical of the Greek reports of in-fighting. The Persians lost no major city to the Greeks, only material goods.

⁹³ Inscriptions: Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 369 M14; RO 18. Discussion: Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 85n56; Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 194.

The Role of Athens and the Persian Fleet

The fleet created in accordance with Pharnabazus' plan initially languished. This changed after Conon's mission to court. Artaxerxes granted the Athenian access to the funding he desired, and the fleet became an offensive force. Athens was promoted as a partner of the Achaemenid Empire, and in turn stemmed Spartan imperialism across the eastern Aegean. The significance of the Atheno-Persian partnership of the 390s is too often considered from the late 390s,⁹⁴ presented in an Athenocentric fashion, or depicted as haphazard.⁹⁵ Here it is argued that the plan's origins are detectable early in the decade, and the Persian investment in Athens is more significant than previously realised.

While Agesilaus campaigned in Asia Minor, trouble brewed in mainland Greece. It would eventually lead to direct conflict, termed the 'Corinthian War.' The politics which led to war are not easily summarised, as the amount of scholarship on the issue indicates.⁹⁶ In short, the primary contributing factors were fear and resentment of Sparta's imperialism. In these early years of the 390s, Athens' receptiveness to Persian overtures is clearly visible, and foreshadows their eventual relationship.

Persia was in the minds of Athenian politicians from 397 onwards.⁹⁷ By this point Epicrates and Cephalus were already calling for closer ties with Conon and

⁹⁴ E.g. Stephen Ruzicka, "Athens and the Politics of the Eastern Mediterranean in the Fourth Century BC," *AncW* 23, no. 1 (1992): 63-70. Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 29 and Zournatzi, *Evagoras I, Athens and Persia*, 147-49 similarly begin post-392 and -394.

⁹⁵ On Athenocentric and haphazard interpretations, see below, pp. 127-28.

⁹⁶ See, for example, dedicated discussions in: I. A. F. Bruce, "Internal Politics and the Outbreak of the Corinthian War," *Emerita* 28 (1960): 75-86; Donald Kagan, "The Economic Origins of the Corinthian War," *PP* 80 (1961): 321-41; S. Perlman, "The Causes and the Outbreak of the Corinthian War," *CQ* 14, no. 1 (1964): 64-81; Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, 182-208; J. E. Lendon, "The Oxyrhynchus Historian and the Origins of the Corinthian War," *Historia* 38, no. 3 (1989): 300-13.

⁹⁷ Generally on Athens' actions at this time: I. A. F. Bruce, "Athenian Foreign Policy in 396-395 B.C.," *CJ* 58, no. 7 (1963): 289-95; I. A. F. Bruce, "Athenian Embassies in the Early Fourth Century B.C.," *Historia* 15, no. 3 (1966): 272-81.

Artaxerxes' fleet (*Hell. Oxy.* 6-7).⁹⁸ Their efforts should be placed in the context of Athens' unwillingness to help Thibron on his journey to Asia to make war on the Persians; Athens dispatched cavalry to Asia not out of loyalty to Sparta, but to rid themselves of oligarchs (*Hell.* 3.1.4). She denied outright Agesilaus' request for help when he was forming his expedition (*Paus.* 3.9.2). Then came the mission of Demaenetus to Conon in 397/6 (*Hell. Oxy.* 6.1⁹⁹). Demaenetus made a secret agreement with the council, and was to take a state warship. When news spread, there was uproar amongst the notables, prompting the councillors to deny complicity and inform the Spartan harmost of Aegina. They permitted whatever punishment he thought necessary, saying Demaenetus had acted without the city's approval. A key detail in this affair is the steady repetition that it was the notables and property owners opposing the move to incite war – they were happy with the current state of affairs. The opposition stemmed from the fact that the notables would be bearing the brunt of the costs of war. In the following years, the economic hardship of war was reduced by the lease of sailors to the Persian fleet.¹⁰⁰ Soon after, an embassy under Hagnias and Telesegorus was sent to Artaxerxes for unknown reasons (*Hell. Oxy.* 7.1). On their return they were captured by Pharaoh, sent on to the Spartans, and put to death. The apparent lack of a reaction from Athens on the execution of these envoys may indicate that the mission was not sanctioned by the authorities in Athens. Alternatively, it may have been so blatantly concerned with war between Persia and Sparta that the danger of arousing hostility was too great to admit official participation.¹⁰¹ Isocrates, speaking of the period, says "how many embassies did we not dispatch to the Great King to

⁹⁸ Barry S. Strauss, *Athens after the Peloponnesian War: Class, Faction and Policy 403-386 BC* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 103.

⁹⁹ Dating following McKechnie and Kern, *Hellenica Oxyrynchia*, 132.

¹⁰⁰ Isoc. 4.142; *Hell. Oxy.* 7.1; Borimir Jordan, "The Meaning of the Technical Term "Hyperesia" in Naval Contexts of the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.," *CSCA* 2 (1969): 200; Borimir Jordan, *The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period: A Study of Athenian Naval Administration and Military Organization in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 257. Cf., on *hyperesia*, J. S. Morrison, "Hyperesia in Naval Contexts in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC," *JHS* 104 (1984): 48-59.

¹⁰¹ Bruce, "Athenian Embassies," 277. S. Perlman, "Athenian Democracy and the Revival of Imperialistic Expansion at the Beginning of the Fourth Century B.C.," *CPh* 63, no. 4 (1968): 258-59 also considers SIG⁴ 118 as evidence of Thrasybulus' party making overtures to the Persians independent of Conon's relationship.

convince him that it was neither just nor expedient for one state to dominate the Hellenes?" (8.68).

There was a history of Athenian attempts to bridge the divide with the Persians; it was a situation which could be exploited for mutual benefit. The mission of Timocrates was a reciprocal act by the Persians to cultivate hostility against Sparta. Opinions in Athens were wavering, and Achaemenid gold allayed the financial misgivings of those most responsible for opposition to war. Across the other main parties – Thebes and Corinth, in particular – the mission answered similar concerns.

There are four main points of contention regarding Timocrates' mission: (1) when did the mission take place? (2) Who ordered the mission? (3) What was its purpose? (4) How effective was it? The two primary sources are P and Xenophon. Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.5.1-2) says that Tithraustes, perplexed about the situation in Asia Minor, sent Timocrates, with gold to the value of fifty talents, to give to various Greek leaders and incite war against the Spartans; the statement is made in the context of 395. P says that it was Pharnabazus who sent Timocrates (7.5) and context would indicate that this took place around 397. In addition to these sources, Polyaeus claims that Pharnabazus sent the mission (1.48.3), urged on by Conon. 1.48.3 must be balanced with Polyaeus 3.5.1, where Tissaphernes sends Timocrates. Pausanias (3.9.8) corroborates with Xenophon, saying that Tithraustes dispatched the Rhodian. Plutarch credits Artaxerxes with the decision (*Art.* 20.3). Given the closeness of all possible parties with Artaxerxes, the evidence for missions to Artaxerxes (above), and the king's interest in the region, he would have approved of the mission.

The chronology is a matter for debate. Xenophon says the mission occurred in 395, in which case it couldn't have prompted the outbreak of the Corinthian War, as the war was already underway. Several solutions are available. Lenschau no longer seems to have support for dating the mission to 394.¹⁰² Others suggest that P and

¹⁰² T. Lenschau, "Die Sendung des Timokrates und der Ausbruch des Korinthischen Krieges," *Philologische Wochenschrift* 53 (1933): 1325-28.

Xenophon speak of separate missions, one in 396 and another in 395.¹⁰³ The two-mission hypothesis has the benefit of explaining the incompatible versions of P and Xenophon. If two missions are not accepted, the account of P is more reasonable as it is difficult to account for Xenophon's claim that this money started the war in the context of 395. The list of recipients of Persian gold, and the conspicuous presence of the Athenians Epicrates and Cephalus in P (7.2),¹⁰⁴ but not in Xenophon, may possibly be explained with this hypothesis of two trips.¹⁰⁵ The other benefit of multiple trips is in explaining the limited funds Xenophon claims were granted to Timocrates. Fifty talents was clearly inadequate for conducting a campaign, but were it an ongoing process, with incremental payments, the details make more sense. More recently, Rung has surveyed the scholarship and decided on a single trip in the early summer of 395.¹⁰⁶ This is based on a thorough revision of the possible date Tithraustes could have arrived in Sardis. The fact remains that a sure date is a matter of conjecture. The conclusion of Rung is followed here, which considers one trip to have taken place, and which appears to be the best possible inference in view of the totality of the evidence. The funds are interpreted not as money for campaigning, but as bribery for key parties (to coax them into campaigning substantially at their own cost), to be followed by later

¹⁰³ B. Barbieri, *Conone* (Rome: A. Signorelli, 1955), 90-100; Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, 182-208. Barbieri first proposed that the mission of Timocrates preceded the capture and execution of Hagnias' embassy, thus placing the Rhodian's expedition in 397. Robin Seager, "Thrasybulus, Conon and Athenian Imperialism, 396-386 B.C.," *JHS* 87 (1967): 95n2 proved this dating incorrect. The consequence of denying two missions generally results in Xenophon being considered incorrect: e.g. Krentz, *Hellenika* II.3.11 - IV.2.8, 195. Cf. discussions in Meyer, *Theopomps Hellenika*, 41-56; Peter Funke, *Homónoia und Arché: Athen und die griechische Staatenwelt vom Ende des peloponnesischen Krieges bis zum Königsfrieden (404/3-387/6 v. Chr.)* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1980), 55n30; E. Rung, "Xenophon, the Oxyrynchus Historian and the Mission of Timocrates to Greece," in *Xenophon and his World*, ed. C. J. Tuplin and Vincent Azoulay (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2004), 413-26. See also the open approach of Schepens, "Timocrates' Money," 1195-1218; G. L. Schepens, "Timocrates' Mission to Greece - Once Again," in *Xenophon: Ethical Principles and Historical Enquiry*, ed. F. Hobden and C. J. Tuplin (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 413-26. More generally, D. M. Lewis, "Persian Gold in Greek International Relations," *REA* 91 (1989): 232-33 postulates that the conflicting accounts could have been the result of the rumours which must have abounded as word of the mission spread. This speculation is dismissed by J. Buckler, "The Incident at Mt Parnassus, 395 BC," in *Xenophon and His World*, ed. C. J. Tuplin and Vincent Azoulay (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2004), 400, who thinks it more likely the result of Xenophontic impudence.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. J. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families, 600-300 B.C.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 181.

¹⁰⁵ Noted by Bruce, "Athenian Embassies," 276-77, and reiterated in Bruce, *Commentary*, 58-60.

¹⁰⁶ Rung, "Xenophon, the Oxyrynchus Historian," §4.

payments (as suggested by *Hell. Oxy.* 18.1¹⁰⁷). The significance in the context of the Atheno-Persian partnership will be explained below.¹⁰⁸

The question of who sent Timocrates may be answered with the earlier hypothesis forwarding a unified policy in the West, conceived by Pharnabazus with Conon serving as vocal advocate and senior officer. Polyaeus, likely following P, states that the idea emerged with Conon. Should Pharnabazus have originally proposed the naval strategy to Artaxerxes, and secured Conon's services, it would come as no surprise that he should also have a hand in the sending of Timocrates. Similarly, the relationship fostered between Conon and Pharnabazus would have facilitated such an idea. The notion that Conon offered Timocrates to Pharnabazus, having made his acquaintance in Rhodes, is also quite possible (*Polyaen.* 1.48.3): Conon entered the Rhodian harbour in 396 on the city's defection from Sparta (*Diod.* 14.79.5) and was influential in the democratic revolution in the following year (*Hell. Oxy.* 18.1-3).¹⁰⁹ Polyaeus is trusted here. Rung's reconciliation of the sources is again of most value: he proposes that Pharnabazus took the idea to Tithraustes, who sent Timocrates.¹¹⁰

Setting these concerns aside, what was Artaxerxes hoping to achieve? Xenophon was right when he said that the Rhodian was dispatched to incite war on the mainland, though he may have misunderstood the rationale. The Persians wished to have the Spartans divided, fighting on two fronts. The conflict on the mainland was known to the Achaemenids, and the Greeks themselves were thinking in coordination with the Persians to bring about the end of Spartan hegemony.¹¹¹ Beyond these immediate aims, the Achaemenids planned for the moment when the Spartans ceased to be an immediate threat in Asia Minor. The victors in the conflict would preferably

¹⁰⁷ Perlman, "Outbreak of the Corinthian War," 73n1; M. L. Cook, "Timocrates' 50 Talents and the Cost of Ancient Warfare," *Eranos* 88 (1990): 69-97. Pharnabazus' payments in 393 should also be considered an extension of these promises: *Hell.* 4.8.8.

¹⁰⁸ Below, pp. 128-30.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. I. A. F. Bruce, "The Democratic Revolution at Rhodes," *CQ* 11, no. 2 (1961): 166-70.

¹¹⁰ Rung, "Xenophon, the Oxyrynchus Historian," §5; cf. Berthold, "Fourth Century Rhodes," 37, where it is proposed that the idea arose in Conon's personal negotiations with Artaxerxes.

¹¹¹ If one follows the account of C. D. Hamilton, "The Politics of Revolution in Corinth, 395-386 B.C.," *Historia* 21, no. 1 (1972): 25: "The allies hoped to achieve this [i.e. forcing Sparta to renounce imperialism], in concert with Persia, by exerting pressure on two fronts."

be benevolent and disinclined to continue interfering in eastern affairs. The Persians' benign facade would later be found in their treatment of the island cities as their fleet advanced across the Aegean (*Hell.* 4.8.1-2). No brute force would be applied on the mainland to inhibit Sparta. That decision was pragmatic – any military force sent to forcefully subdue the Greeks for an extended period would only diminish the Persian ability to take Egypt. Whichever way the concept is approached, the decision was sound. War with Sparta was the consequence, and Agesilaus was withdrawn from Asia (*Hell.* 4.2.5), just as Artaxerxes needed.

By this stage, the King's fleet had begun to operate, but was still seen as a defensive guard fleet.¹¹² Conon left Cyprus with forty ships in 395, moving north, before being intercepted and blockaded at Caunus by 120 Peloponnesian triremes (*Diod.* 14.39.4-5; *Hell. Oxy.* 9.2; *Philoch.* F144-45).¹¹³ Pharnabazus and Artaphernes arrived, and drove the Peloponnesians to Rhodes. Soon after, Conon was reinforced with the arrival of ninety triremes from Cilicia and Phoenicia (*Hell. Oxy.* 9.2-3; cf. *Diod.* 14.97.7). At approximately the same time, the harbour of the Peloponnesian navy, Rhodes, revolted and ejected the Spartan fleet. Consequently, the Lacedaemonian fleet withdrew to Cnidus. By 395 Conon was using Rhodes as his own base, and the city had intercepted a cargo of grain sent from Egypt to Laconia; the ships had sailed directly into the hands of the Rhodians, not realising that the city had defected (*Diod.* 14.79.7).

Yet the fleet and armies of Conon were disillusioned with their Achaemenid paymasters. The Persians were underpaying the fleet: Isocrates (4.142) claims that they had not received pay in fifteen months. The dissatisfaction was widespread enough to prompt the Cypriot contingent of the flotilla to sail to Caunus and split. There the army joined the mutiny. In response, Conon journeyed to court.¹¹⁴ While the sources alternatively recognise Tithraustes or Artaxerxes as the point of contact, these differences are not difficult to overcome: Artaxerxes or his chiliarch were involved in

¹¹² On dating and issues: March, "Konon," 257-69.

¹¹³ Diodorus reports that the navarch was Pharax, while P says that it was Pollis. See discussion in March, "Konon," 260-62. Cf. reconstruction and analysis of *Philoch.* F144-45 in Phillip Harding, ed. *Didymos on Demosthenes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 179-82.

¹¹⁴ Cf. *Diod.* 14.81.4-6; *Hell. Oxy.* 19-20; Justin 6.2.12-13; *Nep. Con.* 3.

every case.¹¹⁵ Whatever the case, authorisation came from the highest levels. Artaxerxes, when propositioned, allowed Conon to be his own paymaster.¹¹⁶ At the same time he was evidently convinced of the fleet's offensive potential.¹¹⁷ P says that Tithraustes granted Conon 220 talents in funds from the resources of Tissaphernes, then secured a further 700 to continue funding the campaign. The army at Caunus was put down by Conon personally and brutally. In Rhodes another group rebelled. Like those from Cyprus, the leaders were killed.

Both Diodorus (14.81.6) and Nepos (*Con.* 4.2) have Conon selecting Pharnabazus to be his co-admiral at this time. The portrayal of Conon as instigator of the entire affair is suspicious, and indicative of general overemphasis on Conon's role in the change of strategy. It is bizarre that Pharnabazus should be involved in the instigation of the plan, and the appointment of Conon, and then be so uninvolved as to require Conon's personal assistance to secure his transfer back to the fleet, only to then be the one giving orders to Conon after Cnidus. On this matter, Hellenocentrism is present. Conon may have been depicted as having a greater role than he really had, and the story that it was Conon who appointed Pharnabazus flags the fact. The sources are also happy to appropriate the battle at Cnidus as an Athenian victory,¹¹⁸ and this is further reason to doubt their historicity. The supplies for one hundred ships captured in 396 might also have bearing on this matter (Diod. 14.79.4). Without proper attention, these supplies could not be utilised effectively. Conon, given his involvement with Rhodes, was likely charged with determining the exploitation of these supplies, and their use for Persian ends can be reasonably conjectured to have been part of the argument used on Artaxerxes. While the Achaemenids were preoccupied with affairs

¹¹⁵ Bruce, *Commentary*, 124.

¹¹⁶ See sources and discussion in March, "Konon," 267n28. Given Bowden's recent efforts to detail Roman period author's obsession with *proskynesis* and its possible fabrication in Alexander's reign, evidence is growing that Justin may have manufactured the tale to inflate the status of Conon: Hugh Bowden, "On Kissing and Making Up: Court Protocol and Historiography in Alexander the Great's 'Experiment with *Proskynesis*'," *BICS* 56, no. 2 (2013): 55-77.

¹¹⁷ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 53-55.

¹¹⁸ See below, p. 131n147.

in Asia Minor the fleet suffered from inattention; Conon secured proper funding as soon as there was respite.

Conon proved to be a capable bursar. In 394, a sizeable portion of the fleet was relaunched for the first time since the Spartans were expelled from Rhodes. More than ninety triremes began the hunt to eradicate the Peloponnesian forces in the Aegean. Pharnabazus and Conon were in joint command at this time, as another signal of Persian intent to make a decisive push. While lingering in Loryma, they heard of the enemy armada near Physcus, whence the Spartans were driven to Cnidus. An engagement was forced. While Peisander, the Spartan navarch, took the early advantage, the second contingent of Conon's force closed, driving Peisander's ship to the shore and routing the remainder. Fifty enemy triremes were captured of the eighty-five present, and the Persians were left unopposed in the Aegean (Diod. 14.83.4-7; *Hell.* 4.3.11-13).

Following their victory, Pharnabazus and Conon moved north along the Asiatic coast, sweeping the entrenched Spartans out of Asia Minor. Here Diodorus and Xenophon are complementary; Diodorus provides a specific list of the cities who defected, and Xenophon clarifies the chronology of events. Cos seceded, followed by Nisyros and Teos, Chios ejected its garrison, and then Mytilene, Ephesus and Erythrae.¹¹⁹

In each of the cities 'liberated' from Laconian rule, Pharnabazus was at pains to assure their autonomy and freedom from garrisons. Xenophon says that Conon advised against the imposition of garrisons (*Hell.* 4.8.2). There is bias here. The absence of Persian garrisons after Agesilaus' departure from Asia Minor confirms that the Persians themselves were not interested in garrisoning Greek cities at this time. On an

¹¹⁹ In the past, Byzantium and Cnidus were considered possible additions to this list of defectors. This was based on incorrect dating of the Heracles ΣΥΝ coins: G. L. Cawkwell, "A Note on the Heracles Coinage Alliance of 394 BC," *NC* 16, 6th Series (1956): 69-75; G. L. Cawkwell, "The ΣΥΝ Coins Again," *JHS* 83 (1963): 152-54; J. M. Cook, "Cnidian Peraea and Spartan Coins," *JHS* 81 (1961): 67-68; Debord, *L'Asie mineure*, app. 3; Buckler, *Aegean Greece*, 133, 181-83. A 390s date for these coins is no longer tenable: S. Karwiese, "Lysander as Herakliskos Drakonopnigon," *NC* 140 (1980): 1-27; P. Kinns, "Ionia: The Pattern of Coinage during the Last Century of the Persian Empire," *REA* 91 (1989): 188 and n37; R. Ashton et al., "The Hecatomnus Hoard," *CH* 9 (2002): 99-100, 136-38; Andrew R. Meadows, "The Chian Revolution: Changing Patterns of Hoarding in 4th-Century BC Western Asia Minor," *BCH Suppl.* 53 (2011): 287-88.

Athenocentric interpretation, perhaps Conon did suggest the idea, and did so not out of Persian interest, but to make it easier for Athens to eventually reclaim these cities. Timotheus' efforts to foster support of Athens amongst western states ca. 375 followed the same strategy.¹²⁰ On the other hand, given the absence of evidence for Persian garrisons at this time, it is fair to say that the move suited both parties.

The autonomy offered to the 'liberated' Greeks had the desired effect. Pharnabazus was soon popular along the coast, and received gifts of friendship from many cities (*Hell.* 4.8.2). Conon was honoured as *proxenos* and awarded a statue in Erythrae (*RO* 8),¹²¹ had his likeness preserved in bronze statues at Samos and Ephesus (*Paus.* 6.3.16), and would return home to accolades. The only resistance offered was at the Hellespont, where Dercylidas maintained his garrisons in Abydus and Sestus. When the Lacedaemonian refused to accede to his demands, Pharnabazus ordered Conon to blockade the southern entrance to the Hellespont while the territory of Abydus was razed. When the blockade failed to force a result, Conon was directed to befriend the cities of the Hellespont in order to marshal the most sizeable fleet possible for the spring. This move has been overlooked by modern literature.¹²² Yet it is of extreme significance, and will be examined shortly.

After winter, in spring 393, a mercenary force was gathered alongside the fleet, and Conon and Pharnabazus moved across the Aegean. Melos was made the first base (*Hell.* 4.8.7). This was a statement of intent. Melos and Athens had a chequered past. Originally the island was a Laconian colony, independent and neutral in the Peloponnesian War. This ended with Athenian invasions in 426 and in 416/5. The installed Athenian administration persisted until 405, when it was expelled by Lysander. The crucial detail is in the tribute assessment. In 425/4 Melos was assessed to

¹²⁰ Robin Seager, "The King's Peace and the Second Athenian Confederacy," in *The Fourth Century B.C.*, ed. D. M. Lewis, et al., *The Cambridge Ancient History* 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 174.

¹²¹ On the possible location of the statue, see John Ma, "A Gilt Statue for Konon at Erythrai?," *ZPE* 157 (2006): 124-26.

¹²² I have seen two retellings of the episode, without consideration of the significance (Zournatzi, *Evagoras I, Athens and Persia*, 148n39; Buckler, *Aegean Greece*, 132), and one use of the passage as evidence that Conon still acted under Pharnabazus' orders (César Fornis, "Conón entre Persia y Atenas (394-391 a.C.)," *DHA* 34, no. 2 (2008): 46n68).

owe fifteen talents per year, more than likely a deliberately harsh assessment. The invasion of 416/5 was the ultimate consequence of the Melians' refusal to pay.¹²³ That a Dorian settlement with traditional ties to Sparta, persecuted by the Athenians, should be employed as a base of operations for the Persians and Athenians was a demonstration of the tide moving against Sparta. Though we do not know whether the Melians welcomed this occupation, there are no recorded signs of resistance. From Melos, Pharnabazus ravaged the territory around Pharae and made excursions along the coast to the south. These excursions may have been supported with information from Conon's Messenian staff (*Hell. Oxy.* 19.3).¹²⁴ It appears from Xenophon's account that Pharnabazus initially wished to use Pharae as his base of operations in Greece; it is claimed that he left the region after he found it destitute of harbours and supplies. Thence Pharnabazus and Conon sailed to Phoenicus, on the island of Cythera. Clearly someone had here read Herodotus (7.234-38); this was both a symbolic and tactical move. Conon could also draw upon the memory of Demosthenes in 414/3, who made use of the island to his own advantage (Thuc. 7.26).¹²⁵ The citizens of Phoenicus offered no resistance, and were permitted to flee for Laconia. Pharnabazus then repaired the wall of the Cytherians and installed a garrison. This garrison may have been partially composed of the mercenaries recruited in the winter of 394/3, whose purpose is not otherwise specified in the sources. The Athenian Nicophemus was appointed governor (the same man left in charge when Conon journeyed to Artaxerxes), and Pharnabazus continued his raids across the Peloponnese (Isoc. 4.119).

Pharnabazus then made his way to Corinth, where he addressed the allies and urged them to continue the war against the Spartans. Coming to an agreement, the Greeks were buoyed with the remainder of Pharnabazus' money and the Persian returned to Asia. With these funds a new Corinthian fleet was furnished, to obtain

¹²³ See, for discussion of Melos' assessment, Colin Renfrew, "Polity and Power: Interaction, Intensification and Exploitation," in *An Island Polity: The Archaeology of Exploitation in Melos*, ed. Colin Renfrew and John Malcolm Wagstaff (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 275-83.

¹²⁴ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 58.

¹²⁵ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 58-60. No doubt it was an added benefit that occupation of Cythera sealed trade routes between Sparta and Egypt at this time (per Ruzicka), but there were more immediate benefits to the garrison.

mastery of the gulf around Achaëa and Lechaëum (*Hell.* 4.8.10; Diod. 14.86). Conon suggested that Pharnabazus allow him to keep some of the fleet, to be maintained by contributions from the islands (*Hell.* 4.8.9).

The gift of ships to Conon is also overlooked in scholarship. Despite Cook's demonstration, over twenty years ago, that fifty talents were inadequate for the waging of a war,¹²⁶ Timocrates' mission has continued to capture the interests of scholarship for its chronological problems and political implications. Lewis' study of Persian gold also focused on the bribes offered by the Persians to politicians.¹²⁷ Instead, focus should be on the Persian investment in the political economy of Athens.

Athens was in a dire state at the beginning of the fourth century. Having lost the Peloponnesian War, Athens' long walls were torn down and her fleet restricted to twelve ships.¹²⁸ Athens was docile: Demaenetus was denounced for leaving Athens to join Conon, and the Spartans were assured that he would be punished (*Hell. Oxy.* 6.1). Lysias says the revenues of the state were weak (21.13), and the docks and walls were falling into ruin (30.22). Kagan says the "impotence of Athens after the Peloponnesian War can hardly be overemphasized."¹²⁹ The wealth of Athens was crucial to her success in the fifth century (Thuc. 1.83), and at this time she had suffered a great reduction.¹³⁰

There are scant references to Athenian naval activity in the 390s. Yet, by 387, Athens had seventy ships in her fleet.¹³¹ Around 389, Gorgopas was to protect Aegina with twelve ships (*Hell.* 5.1.5). The Athenians blockaded Nicolochus at approximately the same time with thirty-two ships in the Chersonese (*Hell.* 5.1.7). Also in 389, Thrasybulus had forty ships to take to the Hellespont (though he decided to go to

¹²⁶ Cook, "Timokrates' 50 Talents," 69-97.

¹²⁷ Lewis, "Persian Gold," 227-35.

¹²⁸ David H. Conwell, "What Athenian Fortifications were Destroyed in 404 BC?," in *Oikistes: Studies in Constitutions, Colonies, and Military Power in the Ancient World offered in Honor of A.J. Graham*, ed. Vanessa B. Gorman and Eric W. Robinson (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 321-38; Simon Hornblower, *The Greek World 479-323 BC*, Revised ed. (London; New York: Routledge, 1991), 152.

¹²⁹ Kagan, "Economic Origins," 323.

¹³⁰ E. David, *Aristophanes and Athenian Society of the Early Fourth Century B.C.* (Leiden: Brill, 1984), 3; Hornblower, *Greek World*, 172-73.

¹³¹ Sinclair, "King's Peace," 49; Michael Clark, "The Date of IG II² 1604," *ABSA* 85 (1990): 58.

Rhodes instead: *Hell.* 4.8.25-27; Diod. 14.94.2). A squadron of eight was sent in 387 to support the main force blockading Nicolochus (*Hell.* 5.1.26-27). At one harbour of the Piraeus at the time of Teleutias' raid there were reportedly twenty ships (*Hell.* 5.1.19-20). Ten ships under Chabrias were sent to help Evagoras (*Hell.* 5.1.10). Where did these vessels come from? Athens had no empire on which to draw. The long walls failed to be reconstructed without Persian help. This question has not perturbed scholarship. Clark, for example, simply states that Conon brought in the ships, and points to Diodorus' figure of eighty (14.85.2) as the size of the gift Pharnabazus gave to Athens.¹³² Considering that Clark goes on to give Athens' fleet a number of seventy in 387, this means that Persia did not supply the "core" of the Athenian fleet, but the entire navy.

The Persian motives and influence are passed over in silence. Similar Athenocentrism is present elsewhere. Despite Starr's argument against such bias,¹³³ it has been suggested that Conon fell out of favour with Persia owing to his use of money to re-establish Athenian sea power.¹³⁴ The interpretation of Pharnabazus and Conon's 'liberation' of Greek cities from Spartan garrisons has similarly been viewed as evidence of imperialist ambitions being executed by the Athenian.¹³⁵ Elsewhere, it is suggested that the Persians were confounded by the resurgence of Athens.¹³⁶ These interpretations must be tempered. If Conon was not to use the money to further his own ends, what did Artaxerxes think the money would do? If Pharnabazus did not agree with the garrison-free policy in the Aegean, or had another plan, why was it

¹³² Clark, "The Date of IG II² 1604," 58. I wonder if Conon actually received forty ships: he leaves Cyprus with this number (Diod. 14.39.4-5; cf. *Hell. Oxy.* 9.2) and sails to Sestus with the same number (*Hell.* 4.8.3). A gift of forty ships would then be consistent with the size of Conon's usual squadron.

¹³³ Starr, "Greeks and Persians (Part 1)," 64.

¹³⁴ Jack L. Cargill, *The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance?* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 7.

¹³⁵ Seager, "Thrasybulus, Conon," 101: "...whatever Conon told Pharnabazus the real motive for the advice he gave was to keep the Persian hold on the liberated cities as weak as could be contrived, in the hope that when the time was ripe they might more easily be brought under the hegemony of Athens."

¹³⁶ Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 646: "The Persians, willy-nilly, were once again squeezed between Sparta's desire to maintain its dominion and Athens's wish to reestablish its own." Cf. Buckler, *Aegean Greece*, 134-36, one of the few to credit the Persians with deep thought about their plans.

enacted? We should not assume that Conon simply overrode the Persian's opinion; Pharnabazus was in charge. Lest we forget that Pharnabazus and Artaxerxes were also popular amongst the Asiatic Greeks at this time (*Hell.* 4.8.27, 31) – it benefited the Persians to leave the Greeks in the West unguarded.¹³⁷ Conon and Pharnabazus' provision of autonomy and freedom from garrisons had, in reality, simply been the Greeks willingly stripping themselves of their defences. For the time being, they were at the will of the Persians.

In response to the above interpretations, here a Perso-centric hypothesis is offered. Artaxerxes orchestrated the revival of Athens. The ships Conon received from Pharnabazus were the most influential aspect. *Hellenica* 4.8.6 indicates that something more is at play. In that passage, Conon was instructed to gather together a fleet of ships from the Hellespont. But Artaxerxes had already commissioned a great fleet which stunned Herodas upon sight at Phoenicia. And, at Rhodes, equipment for one hundred triremes was intercepted. In addition, after the victory at Cnidus, Conon and Pharnabazus captured fifty triremes. Now, in the Hellespont, another fleet of ships is brought together. Why is Conon ordered to gather more ships? Against whom is this new force directed? Since more ships were commissioned, we may infer that the force captured at Cnidus was also appropriated for Persian ends. But there was no other force of note left in the Aegean against which the expanded fleet could operate.

The Hellespontine armada was created with Athens in mind – it was either to be part of the gift to Conon on arrival in Athens, or to supplement the Achaemenid fleet after Conon received his ships. The gift of triremes was designed in a manner to avoid depleting Persian fleets before the forthcoming invasion of Egypt, and to permit Athens to maintain her security against the Peloponnesians, while not having so many

¹³⁷ Stephen Ruzicka, "The Eastern Greek World," in *The Greek World in the Fourth Century: From the Fall of the Athenian Empire to the Successors of Alexander*, ed. Lawrence A. Tritle (London; New York: Routledge, 1997), 118-19: "the aftermath of Pharnabazus' autonomy proclamation of 394 had shown that 'autonomy' could be just another word for vulnerability and defenselessness."

ships that she could pose a serious threat to the eastern Aegean (that balance was also assisted by the provision of supplies to Corinth's navy).¹³⁸

This new naval force restored a sense of pride in the Athenian people.¹³⁹ But its true advantages were practical. When constructing a navy, Athens' problem was not money - it was the ability to obtain supplies for construction.¹⁴⁰ With a small fleet, Athens could guarantee supply routes and re-establish her footing in the Aegean. Furthermore, the wealthy citizens were no longer required to outlay as great an expense as they would have in 398 when they opposed war, as now they did not have to construct the fleet.

¹³⁸ *Hell.* 4.8.6 also supports the dating of Pharnabazus' satrap head/ship prow series from Cyzicus to 394/3. The obverse shows a tiarate head with the inscription ΦΑΡΝΑΒΑ. The reverse displays a ship's prow (taken to indicate a victory at sea), with dolphins on either side, and a tunny below (typical of the mint of Cyzicus): e.g. BM 1892.0703.1 = John Curtis and Nigel Tallis, eds., *Forgotten Empire: The World of Ancient Persia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), cat. 330; ANS 1944.100.42745; BMC Ionia p. 325, no. 12; SNG v. Aulock 1216.

Generally a date of 410 to 390 is offered. Recently, the date has been refined to two options: (1) after the victory of Pharnabazus in relieving the blockade of Conon, at Caunus, in 397/6: Frédéric Maffre, "le Monnayage de Pharnabaze frappé dans l'atelier de Cyzique," *NC* 164 (2004): 15-16. Or (2) after the battle at Cnidus in 394, where the Spartan fleet was destroyed by Conon and Pharnabazus: Jarosław Bodzek, "Naval Supremacy in the Monetary Iconography of the Achaemenids," in *The Orient and the Aegean: Papers presented at the Warsaw Symposium, 9th April 1999*, ed. Franciszek Stepniowski (Warsaw: Warsaw University, Institute of Archaeology, 2003), 9-24; Jarosław Bodzek, "Pharnabazus Once Again," *Notae Numismaticae* 5 (2004): 18-19.

A consideration of *Hell.* 4.8.6 firms the likelihood that these coins were minted following the battle at Cnidus, and celebrates the victory there. A 397/6 date would require the series to have been produced while the Spartans roamed Asia Minor. At this time Cyzicus was in a delicate position. When Agesilaus arrived, it was quickly taken for Spartan ends. When Spithridates fled Pharnabazus, fearing for his life, he went to Cyzicus, where Lysander had a base of operations (*Hell.* 3.4.10). Similarly, when Agesilaus wished to stash his loot at the end of the campaign, securing it from the Persians so he could pay his troops necessitated only a move to around Cyzicus (*Hell. Oxy.* 22.4). It seems likely that Pharnabazus did not have strong control of Cyzicus while the Spartans roamed the coast. He probably would not have risked sending his bullion to Cyzicus to be minted in this situation. The alternative dating, and the historical context post-394, is preferable. After Cnidus Pharnabazus had control of his satrapy and the coastal cities. Furthermore, in *Hell.* 4.8.6 Pharnabazus returned to Dascylium via the Hellespont, and instructed Conon to gather a fleet. Cyzicus was perfectly placed in this venture: Pharnabazus could send his bullion from Dascylium to Cyzicus and have it minted. The money could then be transferred along the coast by ship or land, now free of Spartan danger (though Sestus and Abydus remained hostile) and distributed.

¹³⁹ Josiah Ober, "Public Opinion and the Role of Sea Power in Athens, 404-322 B.C.," in *Naval History*, ed. Daniel M. Masterson (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1987), 28-30.

¹⁴⁰ Vincent Gabrielsen, *Financing the Athenian Fleet: Public Taxation and Social Relations* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 160.

But Artaxerxes' investment did not end there. His other expenditure also solidified Athens' capacity to counteract Sparta. Persian gold helped reconstruct the long walls.¹⁴¹ Their value requires no elucidation. An Athenian mercenary force, also funded with Persian gold, was encamped at Corinth.¹⁴² This assisted the Corinthian allies, but also protected Attica against possible raids by the Spartans. The Corinthians were further funded by other grants from Conon (*Hell.* 4.8.10). The mercenary force on Cythera, led by Conon's former subordinate, was also presumably funded by Persian gold; the garrison could overlook forces attempting to round the Peloponnese. The funding granted for the construction of a Corinthian fleet would also help the city police the Corinthian gulf. And Athenian sailors manned the fleet while Conon and Pharnabazus roamed the Aegean: when they returned home, they would be experienced servicemen for the new Athenian navy.¹⁴³

The by-products of this investment served Conon. Persian benefaction allowed Conon to quickly reposition himself as *princeps* in Athens, and he would not turn against the Persians quickly. In addition to the statues in Asia Minor, Conon was granted two statues in Athens and a description in a public text as "liberator of the allies."¹⁴⁴ This was followed by his own efforts to strengthen public support: there was a dedication on the Acropolis, the construction of a temple to Cnidian Aphrodite on the Piraeus, and a public banquet.¹⁴⁵ He then prosecuted Adeimantus, an admiral at Aegospotami, in order to mitigate his own failures (Dem. 19.191). Conon's popularity is also reflected in comedy.¹⁴⁶ The victory at Cnidus would eventually be appropriated

¹⁴¹ Diod. 14.85.2-3; *Hell.* 4.8.9; Philoch. F146; Plut. *Ages.* 23.1.

¹⁴² Harpocration, *Lexicon* s. v. Mercenary force in Corinth (Androtion, *FGrHist* 324 F48; Philoch. F150); Aristoph. *Plut.* 173 and Scholion; Justin. 6.5.2; Polyæn. 3.9.57: compiled in Phillip Harding, ed. *From the End of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsus*, Translated Documents of Greece and Rome 2 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), no. 22.

¹⁴³ See above, p. 117n100.

¹⁴⁴ Public text: Tod 128. Statues: Dem. 20.70; Isoc. 9.57; Nep. *Tim.* 2.3; Paus. 1.3.1-2.

¹⁴⁵ Dedication: Dem. 22.72. Temple: Paus. 1.1.3 (cf. IG II² 1657, which implies work near the sanctuary prior to Conon's arrival). Banquet: Robert J. Buck, *Thrasybulus and the Athenian Democracy: The Life of an Athenian Statesman* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1998), 107 (no source provided).

¹⁴⁶ Strauss, *Athens after the Peloponnesian War*, 127n24.

as an Athenian one, with the Persians often portrayed only as participants.¹⁴⁷ The manipulation of events is an indication of the underlying ambitions of Athens, but as long as Conon was responsive to Artaxerxes' situation, the behaviour was not a concern. And Persian employment must have contributed to the substantial fortune bequeathed to Conon's son (Lys. 19.39-41). There was no reason for Conon to alienate his investors.

The Atheno-Persian relationship is difficult to define. Certainly Persia and Athens were not formal allies.¹⁴⁸ There was also undoubtedly a desire to recover the empire among Athenians.¹⁴⁹ But Athens could not be funded in a war against Sparta without this effect. Tiribazus in the following year would attempt to mitigate Athens' power, but Artaxerxes showed his displeasure at the act clearly. Fundamentally, despite any signs of imperialism, Athens did not act on them under Conon. The situation was desirable for Artaxerxes: Sparta was mitigated, Athens genial, the Aegean subdued, and Asia Minor calm. Artaxerxes had not seen the West look like this in decades, and the Achaemenid plan was a success. While Athens and Persia had different aims, and the situation was unlikely to persist indefinitely, until Tiribazus' arrest of Conon the partnership was healthy, with neither side taking complete advantage of the other.

Within a year Sparta sent Antalcidas to Tiribazus in an attempt to secure an agreement with Artaxerxes (*Hell.* 4.8.12-17).¹⁵⁰ The mission reflects the success of the investment in Athens. When the Corinthian allies learned of this mission, their own ambassadors were sent. The Lacedaemonians presented favourable terms, which included a guarantee that they would cease to make claims to the Greek cities in Asia, and recognition that all Greek cities should be autonomous. Xenophon tells us that the Tiribazus provisionally agreed to the terms of Antalcidas and secretly granted him

¹⁴⁷ Dem. 10.4, 20.68-74; Isoc. 4.154, 5.63 and 129, 7.12 and 65, 9.56 and 68, 12.56. Conversely, sometimes Cnidus was considered a Persian victory: Isoc. 4.119 and 142-43; Lys. 2.56-57.

¹⁴⁸ Buck, *Thrasybulus*, 107-08

¹⁴⁹ C. D. Hamilton, "Isocrates, IG ii² 43, Greek Propaganda and Imperialism," *Traditio* 36 (1980): §2.

¹⁵⁰ See the analyses of Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, 27-33; Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, chap. 8 and James G. DeVoto, "Agesilaus, Antalcidas, and the Failed Peace of 392/91 B.C.," *CPh* 81, no. 3 (1986): 191-202 remain the best.

funds to rebuild a Peloponnesian fleet. The satrap followed this with the arrest of Conon (*Hell.* 4.8.16).

Antalcidas' proposals had some appeal. While Athens had made no moves into the territory of Artaxerxes, Athenian imperialism was present. Tiribazus might have thought to continue the strategy of playing Sparta and Athens against each other to the detriment of both. Evidently, however, Artaxerxes had a much clearer understanding of the situation; Tiribazus was to stay the course, not create new policy. In reality the terms of the peace offered nothing to which the king did not already have claim; Asia Minor was within his hands after Pharnabazus and Conon removed the Spartan garrisons and granted the cities autonomy. While there was a lingering presence of the Spartans left by Agesilaus, they showed no signs of aggression. Similarly, Athens had, up to this point, respected Artaxerxes' claims to Asia, without explicitly acknowledging their validity. There was no reason to alter the *status quo* in the West - especially if we are to believe that an Egyptian campaign was soon to be launched. Artaxerxes made his displeasure with Tiribazus immediately apparent. Pro-Athenian Strouthas was sent to the satrapy, Conon was released, and Tiribazus was dismissed (*Hell.* 4.8.17). Artaxerxes sent a clear signal that he desired to keep the pro-Athenian policy and enjoy a mutually beneficial relationship with the *polis*.¹⁵¹

As a sign of his relationship with Persia, Conon was still viewed as the best emissary available. Nepos suggests that Conon responded to a summons from the king when he was imprisoned by Tiribazus (*Nep. Con.* 4.3).¹⁵² Xenophon's version is preferable, given that he was a contemporary, but perhaps Nepos reflects another reason for Conon's mission to Persia. Conon was to die from illness within the year

¹⁵¹ Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 98 uses this episode as a demonstration that Artaxerxes feared a repeat of Cyrus, and feared granting his satraps too much autonomy. See my general comments above, p. 4n14. I prefer to interpret Artaxerxes' actions pragmatically - we have no evidence of fear in his actions, only that he removed a satrap who did not behave as he wished.

¹⁵² G. L. Cawkwell, "The Imperialism of Thrasybulus," *CQ* 26, no. 2 (1976): 271 and Seager, "Thrasybulus, Conon," 101 accept that Conon was recalled to see the king. Cf. Buck, *Thrasybulus*, 109n16, who accepts Xenophon's account.

after his release.¹⁵³ The death of Conon marks a distinct turning point in the formerly constructive relationship between Athens and Persia fostered in the 390s. Isocrates certainly utilises the event as a key example of Persian duplicity (4.154).

The negotiations likely took place in Sardis in winter or spring 392, and were soon followed by another conference in Sparta.¹⁵⁴ As with the Sardis negotiations, the Sparta conference ended with nothing resolved. The promotion of Strouthas would have had a significant impact on Athenian resolve at this time.¹⁵⁵ The pro-Spartan attitude of Tiribazus and the arrest of Conon hindered any imperial ventures by the Athenians during the summer of 392. The absence of Conon may have similarly permitted Thrasybulus to regain his ascendancy in Athenian politics; he made use of current disillusionment with his rival and Cnidus.¹⁵⁶ Both Athens and Sparta launched expeditions when their conferences failed. In 391 Thrasybulus took a fleet into the Aegean, initially in response to the Spartans, who took eight ships to Rhodes under the command of Ecdicus, and Thibron was again sent to raid the Persian *chora* of Asia Minor.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵³ Nep. *Con.* 5.4. Cf. Lys. 19.40-44 and Dein. F18, where he is executed in prison. Lysias and Deinon are usually dismissed as apocryphal. See, for example, D. J. Mosley, "Conon's Embassy to Persia," *RhM* 116 (1973): 20-21.

¹⁵⁴ Of which there is no reference in Xenophon. Our evidence derives from Andoc. 3 and Philoch. F149a. Some consider this fragment to be referring to 387/6 negotiations. See Frances Skoczylas Pownall, "'Presbeis Autokratores': Andokides' 'De Pace'," *Phoenix* 49, no. 2 (1995): 140-49; Antony G. Keen, "A 'Confused' Passage of Philochoros (F 149a) and the Peace of 392/1 B.C.," *Historia* 44, no. 1 (1995): 1-10; Antony G. Keen, "Philochoros F 149 A & B: A Further Note," *Historia* 47, no. 3 (1998): 375-78; Bruce, "Philochorus on the King's Peace," 57-62; Harding, *Didymos on Demosthenes*, 166-77; Rhodes, *History*, 193. Cf. Edward M. Harris, "The Authenticity of Andokides' *De Pace*: A Subversive Essay," in *Polis & Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History*, ed. Thomas Heine Nielsen, Lene Rubinstein, and Pernille Flensted-Jensen (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2000), 479-505.

¹⁵⁵ Following Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, 251-52, 258.

¹⁵⁶ See Seager, "Thrasybulus, Conon," 107-78. Seager's article remains the seminal work on the topic of Athenian imperialism in the 390s, and may be supplemented with Perlman, "Athenian Democracy," 257-67; Cawkwell, "Imperialism of Thrasybulus," 270-77; Barry S. Strauss, "Thrasybulus and Conon: A Rivalry in Athens in the 390s B.C.," *AJPh* 105, no. 1 (1984): 37-48.

¹⁵⁷ There is some conjecture over the dates of these events. Seager, "Thrasybulus, Conon," 109-10 forwards a date of 390/89 for the northern expedition of Thrasybulus. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, 294-96 thinks it more likely 389/8. Cawkwell, "Imperialism of Thrasybulus," 273-74 suggests the expedition began in 391. I accept a late 391/0 launch, with the northern elements comprising 390-89.

This reconstruction emphasises pragmatic policy making and a reluctance to attract Athens' hostility for the sake of obtaining a presently-impotent ally in Sparta as the reasons for Artaxerxes' rejection of Sparta's proposal. Hornblower's explanation for the rejection of the peace is too simplistic in crediting hatred of Lacedaemonians.¹⁵⁸ There were other, practical reasons to reject the proposal. Foremost among these was that Sparta offered nothing which Artaxerxes did not already have, and would have Persia offend Athens in addition. Likewise, Keen's emphasis on the Spartans' inability to keep their promises should not be taken as the main cause for the peace's failure; the same logic could be applied to the Peace of 387/6, yet this did not fail.¹⁵⁹ Any statesman of the period would have been a fool to put much weight on the words of peace. The Spartan desire to reclaim Asia was only tempered by current impotence, and the Spartans could never be trusted not to make more attempts. Both sets of rationale apply a very emotional nature to Artaxerxes' policy making which is not consistent with the sources.¹⁶⁰ Undoubtedly Spartans were not Artaxerxes' favourite Hellenes, but his hatred cannot have been so great that he would reject peace, then easily relinquish his emotions later when the situation called more urgently for changes of policy. While personally Artaxerxes may have found the Lacedaemonians deplorable, emotional responses should not be taken to have dictated his foreign policy.¹⁶¹

Thibron's attacks in Asia Minor were comparable to his earlier efforts (*Hell.* 4.8.17-19; *Diod.* 14.99.1-3). Utilising Ephesus as a base of operations, Thibron quickly subdued Priene, Leucophrys and Achilleum, before turning his attentions to plunder. Like earlier in the decade, the cities in which he was based were coastal and pro-Greek. Strouthas assembled his cavalry and surprised the enemy force, catching them in disorder and killing Thibron. Diodorus records that most of the expeditionary force was slain and the remainder scattered. The capture and ransom of Tigranes (Strouthas'

¹⁵⁸ Hornblower, "Persia," 75. See also above, p. 89n11.

¹⁵⁹ Keen, "'Confused' Passage," 7; Keen, "Philochoros F149," 375n3, emphasising the initial assertion.

¹⁶⁰ See also Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 146, attributing the demotion of Tiribazus to Artaxerxes remembering the hostility of the Spartans.

¹⁶¹ See also, on this hatred, below, p. 306-07.

son-in-law) en route to Sardis may indicate some incisive raiding conducted by Diphridas after Thibron's death (*Hell.* 4.8.21).

Eight Peloponnesian ships were directed to Rhodes, where the residual oligarchs from the earlier democratic revolution had requested assistance (*Hell.* 4.8.19-21; *Diod.* 14.97.2-3). The defencelessness of the cities here worked in the favour of any aggressor, and was not exploited or protected by the Persians. Tiribazus' funding of the Spartan fleet only exacerbated that fact (*Hell.* 4.8.16). The Persian fleet is nowhere to be seen. Perhaps it was moved to Phoenicia to plan for the invasion of Egypt. Perhaps it was relocated to support the forthcoming attempt to subdue Evagoras. Wherever the Persian fleet was, it was not utilised to defend against the Spartans.

While Artaxerxes must have considered himself to be in complete control of the Aegean in the middle of the decade, by the end events in the West had changed significantly. Athenian imperialism was now tangible, Sparta had again launched an invasion into Asia Minor, and Cyprus soon became troublesome.

Evagoras the Opportunist and Carian Commanders

Caria and Cyprus would become extremely significant in the following decade, and it is in the 390s that their powers grew to such an extent that they warranted direct intervention by the Great King himself. The following addresses the formative years in their rise to significance and assesses their circumstances with Persia's interests in mind.

Evagoras of Salamis had played a crucial role in Persia's success during the 390s. He housed Conon after his self-imposed exile, and was party to the negotiations which resulted in Conon's recruitment for the Persian navy. Evagoras was an opportunist, though, and would prove to be an agitator to Artaxerxes in the late 390s and 380s. The major source of information on Evagoras, Isocrates' *encomium* (speech 9), presents Evagoras as a victim of the king's fear. But such an image is not consistent with the other evidence, and is Hellenocentric. Modern commentators have tempered this presentation, but focused on whether Evagoras fostered an anti-Persian agenda. Costa's article, still the seminal work on Evagoras, effectively proved that Evagoras

did not have plans to attack Persia.¹⁶² As that facet of the debate is settled, the following engages with the presentation of Evagoras as a victim of the king's wrath.

Evagoras was no victim. He aggressively pursued a policy motivated by self-interest, and Artaxerxes' response was the result of entreaties made by loyal subjects. Evagoras miscalculated his station. The best appraisal of Evagoras is by Tuplin: "we cannot infer that he [Evagoras] was consciously embarking on a political agenda which was hostile to Persia: for him it was none of Persia's business."¹⁶³ This seems to encapsulate his attitude succinctly, and explains why he should be surprised when Artaxerxes reacted harshly to his actions, for it did not occur to Evagoras that he needed to think about his distant overlord. Evagoras' motives were personal and opportunistic, not systematically anti-Persian.

Evagoras rose to prominence in 410, when he ejected the leading man in Salamis, Abdemon.¹⁶⁴ Tracing his ancestry to the founder of the city, Evagoras installed himself as ruler (Diod. 14.98.1; Isoc. 9.30-32).¹⁶⁵ The sources do not refer to any Persian response, and evidently the Persians were not perturbed by this change of administration. Abdemon had only come to power in 415 (also by violence), and the continued, regular payment of Salamis' tribute was of greater concern than local rivalries. Had Evagoras been any less of a friend than Abdemon, himself called "a friend of the king" (Diod. 14.98.1), one would expect a "swift reaction ... especially since the indifference of the Salaminian population at this time made usurpation from without an apparently easy undertaking."¹⁶⁶ A parallel may be drawn to Pharnabazus' threats against Meidias in 398, who upset the order of the district by pursuing his own

¹⁶² Costa, "Evagoras," 40-56. Pace P. J. Stylianou, "The Age of Kingdoms: A Political History of Cyprus in the Archaic and Classical Periods," *Μελέται καὶ Ὑπομνήματα - Travaux et mémoires* 2 (1989): 467 [93].

¹⁶³ C. J. Tuplin, *Achaemenid Studies* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1996), 41-42.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. Theopomp. F103 which refers to a governor of Citium called Abdymon, also defeated by Evagoras.

¹⁶⁵ On the significance of the ancestry, see Gordon Shrimpton, *Theopompus the Historian* (Montreal; Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), 91 (regarding Theopomp. F103.2): "There is a relevance to the 'digression' on Agamemnon's capture of Cyprus. It makes the island part of the Hellenic world from ancient times and explains, if it does not justify, Evagoras the Greek's claim to legitimate rulership over that of Abdymon, whose name sounds distinctly barbarian."

¹⁶⁶ Costa, "Evagoras," 42-43. Cf. Stylianou, "Age of Kingdoms," 466-67 [92-93].

ambitions without heeding the governor's, or people's, sentiments: the Persians would take interest in those upsetting the order.

The years following Evagoras' accession are marked with a new building program in Salamis. Walls were erected, the port expanded (or possibly first constructed), and triremes built (Isoc. 9.47).¹⁶⁷ This program paid dividends with a boost in trade and migration (Isoc. 9.51).¹⁶⁸ Friendly relations with both Athens and Persia persisted (SEG X.127), with the former perhaps thinking Evagoras would assist in their fight against Persia.¹⁶⁹ It was in this period that Evagoras' opportunism reveals itself.

Prior to the negotiations with Artaxerxes ca. 397, Ctesias relates Evagoras' quarrel with his Persian overlord (F30.72). Ctesias was here acting as intermediary as Artaxerxes attempted to reconcile Evagoras and the otherwise unknown Anaxagoras, another king of Cyprus. Possibly this began with Evagoras taking advantage of the distraction caused by Cyrus' revolt.¹⁷⁰ This is followed by the negotiations concerning Conon and the new fleet, where one of the conditions of the agreement is that Evagoras is to resume his payment of tribute to the king; undoubtedly to gain the confidence of Artaxerxes, rather than a true submission.¹⁷¹ Costa argued that this cannot be reasonably considered part of a grander scheme to wrench Cyprus from Persia's control. Evagoras was, at this point, in Costa's opinion, "busy[ing] himself (presumably with Konon's aid) with an undertaking less grand but more practicable, i.e., the conquest of Cyprus by Salamis."¹⁷² While the Salaminian was clearly not attempting to wrest the island from Persia,¹⁷³ there can be no doubt that his ambition to unify the island under his own rule was bellicose and disruptive. Costa himself notes that Cyprus had been part of the Achaemenid Empire since the time of Cyrus, and had actively opposed Cimon's efforts to 'liberate' the island from Persia; Evagoras'

¹⁶⁷ On the port and defences in the context of his revolt, see further below, pp. 192-93.

¹⁶⁸ See Costa, "Evagoras," 44n26.

¹⁶⁹ Stylianou, "Age of Kingdoms," 461-62 [87-88].

¹⁷⁰ As speculated by Costa, "Evagoras," 47; Maier, "Cyprus and Phoenicia," 313.

¹⁷¹ See Lenfant, *La Perse*, 285n738.

¹⁷² Costa, "Evagoras," 47.

¹⁷³ *Contra* Stylianou, "Age of Kingdoms," 461-69 [87-95]. Cf. consideration of both arguments in Zournatzi, *Evagoras I, Athens and Persia*, 104-06, 128-47.

behaviour can be construed as nothing if not unsettling, from a Persian point of view.¹⁷⁴

The infrequent revolts (when they did occur, they were generally prompted by external influences¹⁷⁵), lack of Persian satrap, and the authority to mint coinage also signal the stability and autonomy which generally persisted on Cyprus.¹⁷⁶ The local kingdoms were, however, prepared to dissolve into local feuds, and their unification generally occurred in attempts to educe some greater independence from Persia.¹⁷⁷ All told, the island's revolts are marked with a certain tolerance on the part of the Persians;¹⁷⁸ the rival kingdoms kept each other in check. The island was also strategically significant: "Cyprus was crucial to the maintenance of Persia sea-power in the eastern Mediterranean, and thus to the security of the Persian domination of the coast of Southern Asia Minor, Phoenicia, Syria, and Egypt."¹⁷⁹

Accordingly, Evagoras' ambitions had serious implications for the Persian Empire and stability in the West. Between 393 and 392 he embarked on the conquest of Cyprus (Diod. 14.98.2; Ephorus F76). By the time representatives of Amathus, Soli, and Citium petitioned Artaxerxes in 391, Evagoras had already conquered a large portion of the island.¹⁸⁰ Considering the situation, Artaxerxes had very little recourse when petitioned by his subjects from the other kingdoms on Cyprus.

Several modern commentators have noted that Evagoras may have been justified in expecting a certain amount of leeway in this enterprise, having been so influential in securing the Aegean for Artaxerxes.¹⁸¹ Evagoras may have thought he

¹⁷⁴ Costa, "Evagoras," 41.

¹⁷⁵ Tuplin, *Achaemenid Studies*, 43-47.

¹⁷⁶ A. Zournatzi, "Cypriot Kingship: Perspectives in the Classical Period," *Tekmeria* 2 (1996): 166.

¹⁷⁷ Maier, "Cyprus and Phoenicia," 287.

¹⁷⁸ Tuplin, *Achaemenid Studies*, 47.

¹⁷⁹ Costa, "Evagoras," 47. Cf. Tuplin, *Achaemenid Studies*, chap. 1.B *passim*.

¹⁸⁰ There is also evidence of a victory trophy from Citium celebrating a victory of Evagoras dated to this campaign: Marguerite Yon and M. Sznycer, "Une inscription phénicienne royale de Kition (Chypre)," *Comptes rendus de l'academie des inscriptions et belles lettres* (1991): 791-823; Marguerite Yon and M. Sznycer, "A Phoenician Victory Trophy at Kition," *Report of the Department of Antiquities, Cyprus* (1992): 156-65; Marguerite Yon and William A. P. Childs, "Kition in the Tenth to Fourth Centuries B.C.," *BASO*, no. 308 (1997): 12-13. Cf. Kuhrt, *Persian Empire*, §9.50n1.

¹⁸¹ Costa, "Evagoras," 50; Maier, "Cyprus and Phoenicia," 314.

had some right, but Artaxerxes required him to remain as one of several vassal kings on Cyprus. Costa reconstructs events so as to have Artaxerxes as the instigator of the Cypriot revolt:

“It is apparent that the initiative in the development of the “Cypriote revolt” was taken by Artaxerxes, not Evagoras. The sources are agreed that there was no overt break with Persia on the part of the Salaminian king and that the Persians attacked Cyprus in 391 while Evagoras was still more or less faithful to his compacts with the King ... With the Spartan threat almost, though not completely, shattered, Artaxerxes decided to forestall any potential threat to this domination by attacking his erstwhile ally, Evagoras. This policy was dictated not by any overtly hostile behaviour on the part of Evagoras, but by the consideration that a united Cyprus, even if ostensibly friendly, was too great a threat to the western seaboard of the Empire to be tolerated.”¹⁸²

Although the second half of this excerpt is reasonable, the first half is misleading. The presentation of Evagoras as a victim, replete with modifiers – “no overt break with Persia”; “more or less faithful”; “[no] overtly hostile behaviour”¹⁸³ – is language which exculpates the Salaminian. It is reminiscent of Isocrates, who relates an image of a fearful Artaxerxes, terrified of Evagoras and his brilliance (surpassing even Cyrus), attacking the Salaminian without provocation (e.g. Isoc. 9.58-59). The terms “generally loyal” and “more or less faithful” are meaningless, and very few leaders, ancient or modern, would ever be satisfied with a “more or less” loyal subject.

Evagoras used every opportunity to further his own agenda. He had set a precedent, and in 391 pushed too far. Evagoras was tolerated when he threw out Abdemon, but he then attacked his neighbours and ceased tribute payments. In 398/7 he was reconciled with Persia and agreed to facilitate the construction of the king’s new fleet - resulting in a substantial boost to his building programs and the Salaminian

¹⁸² Costa, “Evagoras,” 55.

¹⁸³ To be coupled with similar terminology earlier in the article: e.g. “generally loyal” (p. 40). This rhetoric has persisted elsewhere in modern scholarship, where Evagoras is presented as a victim, or at least, undeserving of the response. e.g. Franz Georg Maier, “Factoids in Ancient History: The Case of Fifth-Century Cyprus,” *JHS* 105 (1985): 9: “in principle loyal” (terminology repeated in Maier, “Cyprus and Phoenicia,” 313). Also *contra* Nichols, *Fragments of Ctesias*, 197: Evagoras cannot be considered a “faithful tributary” prior to 394; only four years earlier he had to be reconciled with the king after refusing to pay tribute. See also Michael J. Osborne, “Orontes,” *Historia* 22, no. 4 (1973): 528: “Tiribazus suggested stiff terms indeed,” as though Evagoras deserved leniency.

economy – on the provision that he cease the assaults on his neighbours. Upon the cessation of the economic and strategic benefits brought on by building and housing the king's fleet, Evagoras quickly returned to his old ways. He quite possibly took advantage of a Persian military distracted with a new campaign against Egypt in the late 390s to launch another operation to conquer Cyprus.

Evagoras twice defied Artaxerxes in order to pursue his own ends, on an island which served as a major strategic outpost in the western Persian Empire.¹⁸⁴ To think that Evagoras was somehow a victim is preposterous; Persian retaliation was inevitable and politically justified. A united Cyprus was too dangerous to the western seaboard, especially under the leadership of a fickle king. For over a century the Persians had maintained power by preserving a delicate balance between autonomous vassal kingdoms on the island, thus neutralising possible threats. In no objective analysis can the intervention by Artaxerxes be seen as surprising or unprovoked – Evagoras was a wilfully unruly and disruptive king, who cared only for his own goals. With two previous rebellions already attempted, there was ample reason to doubt he would ever remain placid when opportunity presented itself. The supplication of other vassal kings from Amathus, Soli, and Citium to Artaxerxes required a response. To refuse their appeal was to sanction Evagoras and destroy the balance of power on the island. Furthermore, it would mean that the normally impassive people of Cyprus would be more inclined to support an attempt to defy Persian authority after such a precedent was set. In every sense – strategic (the balance on Cyprus could not be upset), egocentric (Artaxerxes would lose face and what little loyalty was to be had on Cyprus if he refused the request), and pre-emptive (the problem was much smaller now than it would be later if Evagoras had the entire island to himself; Egypt had shown that it could take an exceptionally long time to recover a province) – Artaxerxes was forced to take action. The reality is that Evagoras was a fool if he thought he could take the island for himself unopposed, and negligent to have been taken by surprise at the response. By making a bold, pre-emptive strike (in the sense that Evagoras was not yet thinking of Persia) against an unruly subject, Artaxerxes took his enemy

¹⁸⁴ See above, p. 137n179.

completely by surprise. Unfortunately the Achaemenid response was brought down from within by leadership which used the autonomy of the Persian military hierarchy to achieve its own ends.¹⁸⁵

At the beginning of 391, Artaxerxes instructed Hecatomnus to take command of a force, join an alliance with the other cities of Cyprus, and put down Evagoras (Diod. 14.98.3-4). The ambassadors dispatched to Artaxerxes apparently prompted the king to journey across the upper satrapies.¹⁸⁶ Theopompus here complements Diodorus, and it seems that Artaxerxes again favoured a two-commander approach, involving a Persian overseer and a non-Persian commander. Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, was general and commander on land, while Hecatomnus was navarch (Theopomp. F103.4). Given Hecatomnus' ethnicity, he may have been presumed to have greater experience with the naval tradition of his new satrapy, and so was trusted with leading a campaign against the island of Cyprus. Hecatomnus was on Cyprus within the year, and caught Evagoras completely by surprise.¹⁸⁷

The Salaminian turned to his Athenian allies for support, who dispatched ten ships under the command of Philocrates to assist. The entire fleet was captured by the Spartan navarch, Teleutias. The situation was perverse enough to elicit comment from

¹⁸⁵ Michael Weiskopf, *Achaemenid Systems of Governing in Anatolia (Iran, Turkey)* (University of California, Berkeley: Doctoral Thesis, 1982), 154-56 also challenges the presentation of Artaxerxes as instigator of the war, though he proposes that Artaxerxes was blinded by his need for a navy, and acted only upon persuasion by the Cypriot envoys that Evagoras would extend his influence into Persian territory as the Spartans had done into Anatolia. I believe the importance of Egypt at this time, and the knowledge of Achaemenid methods of maintaining control on Cyprus precludes this scenario. The situation did not need to be exaggerated by the Cypriot envoys (accepting that the envoys needed to persuade Artaxerxes to take action may unintentionally imply that Artaxerxes was incapable of recognising danger without hyperbole). As per Diodorus (15.98.3), Artaxerxes recognised the strategic situation and responded accordingly.

¹⁸⁶ Here following Catherine I. Reid, "Ephoros Fragment 76 and Diodoros on the Cypriote War," *Phoenix* 28, no. 1 (1974): 136n37; Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 37n10; Stylianou, *Commentary*, 154-55 in preferring the MSS reading αὐτός to Dindorf's οὔτος. This solution is even more attractive if one considers the threat posed by Evagoras to a campaign against Egypt – the king would, in such circumstances, have far greater cause to come west. Cf. Stephen Ruzicka, *Politics of a Persian Dynasty: The Hekatomnids in the Fourth Century BC*, Oklahoma Series in Classical Culture 14 (1992), 21 and n19 accepts Dindorf's terminology, and accounts for the journey by stating that Hecatomnus travelled through the cities of the upper satrapies collecting recently constructed ships. Both options have difficulties in accounting for the route taken.

¹⁸⁷ Cf. Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 69 where it is postulated that Artaxerxes' "attack" was merely an assertion of power and the establishment of a base to support the invasion of Egypt.

Xenophon. Athens was aiding an enemy of the king, and the Spartans preventing the enemies of Persia from making war (*Hell.* 4.8.24).¹⁸⁸ Cawkwell has suggested a means to reconcile the strange behaviour and the passage of Xenophon: he hypothesises that the passage of Xenophon may have been written in hindsight, and that the early years of the war were not initially seen as a conflict between Evagoras and Persia, but between Evagoras and other Cypriots.¹⁸⁹ While Hecatomnus undoubtedly began operations in the 390s, there remains no reference to how his force was applied. For the sake of continuity, the Cypriot campaign will itself be discussed in the following chapter, where it may be analysed in its entirety.

Hecatomnus had come into a position of power with the creation of a new satrapy in 392/1.¹⁹⁰ His appointment as satrap of Caria was likely concurrent with that of Autophradates in Lydia (*Theopomp.* F103.4) and Strouthas in Ionia (*RO* 16).¹⁹¹ The moves were an evolution from the earlier unified commands of Cyrus and Tissaphernes in the early 390s. Strouthas, Autophradates, and Hecatomnus were appointments made in response to the growing crisis in the West with continual Spartan interference; Strouthas in immediate response to the precocious acceptance of Sparta's peace proposals by Tiribazus. By promoting a local as satrap of Caria, Artaxerxes appears to be responding to the issues he found with Iranian appointments:

“...ambitious proconsuls (like Pissouthnes or Kyros) in hellenophone satrapies had both the motive and the opportunity for revolt from the central authority: the motive was the Persian throne, to which none but an Iranian might decently aspire; the opportunity was Greek manpower like Lykon's Athenians or Xenophon's Spartans ... Local men like the Hekatomnids might nibble at the

¹⁸⁸ The fleet of Athens and the subsequent forces dispatched are infamous in scholarship for the troubles they pose in reconciling *Hell.* 4.8.24, 5.1.10, *Lysias* 19, and *Nep. Chab.* 2.2. For discussion see C. J. Tuplin, "Lysias XIX, the Cypriot War and Thrasybulos' Naval Expedition," *Philologus* 127, no. 2 (1983): 170-86; P. J. Stylianou, "How Many Naval Squadrons Did Athens Send to Evagoras?," *Historia* 37, no. 4 (1988): 463-71; V. Howan, "Three Fleets or Two?," *ASCS 32 Selected Proceedings* (2011): 1-9.

¹⁸⁹ Cawkwell, "Imperialism of Thrasybulus," 274. Tuplin, *Achaemenid Studies*, 12 makes a similar point.

¹⁹⁰ There is a period of 395-91 where no satrap is known to hold authority in which a satrapy of Hecatomnus' father, Hyssaldomus, might be placed. I follow Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 36 in preferring the view that the first satrap of Caria was Hecatomnus.

¹⁹¹ Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 37n11. See also, on his appointment, Ruzicka, *Politics of a Persian Dynasty*, 18-19.

borders of a neighbouring dynast, satrap, or city-state; they could hardly entertain designs on the Persian Empire itself."¹⁹²

The elevation of indigenous individuals to positions of power is further seen in Phrygia where, by the end of the Persian Empire, indigenous figures were part of the satrapal family and held positions of influence.¹⁹³ The specific task for the new satraps was most likely in keeping with royal aims for the previous decade: secure their respective satrapies against Sparta. Smaller satrapies meant that each governor could maintain a closer eye on events than a single man in Sardis might. The disappearance of the satrapy of Ionia by the end of the 380s likewise indicates that Strouthas was installed in direct response to current events; once affairs stabilised, the area now deemed the satrapy of Ionia could revert to its former state.

The implications of these appointments have elicited little comment in modern scholarship, but are significant indicators of Artaxerxes' responses to the western periphery. Artaxerxes here responded to the greatest issue of the decade – stability in the West. The creation of new satrapies (and the appointment of non-Persians to fill their high ranks) was intended to allay the effects of rebellious Iranian satraps with too wide a sphere of influence. In addition to resolving (theoretically) the historical frailties of the region, the political leanings of these satraps indicate a measured response to current events. Pharnabazus' success with moderate policy towards the Greeks had proved successful, and the appointment of a local dynast was a continued experiment in avoiding the failings of Tissaphernes. The pro-Athenian Strouthas was the beneficiary of a clear political decision to restrict the fallout brought on by Tiribazus' treatment of Conon. Hecatomnus' war against the Coans would support the view that the policy was effective in creating satraps with limited ambitions, though it clearly did not prevent belligerence.¹⁹⁴ To be sure, these individuals were always part of the

¹⁹² Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 32, cf. 38.

¹⁹³ Maffre, "Example of the Persian Occupation," 234-38.

¹⁹⁴ On Hecatomnus and the Coans, see Susan M. Sherwin-White, *Ancient Cos: An Historical Study from the Dorian Settlement to the Imperial Period*, Hypomnemata 51 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1978), 41.

administration. For example, Hecatomnus' father previously carried the title satrap,¹⁹⁵ but he was not *the* satrap of the region – he was an officer reporting to the satrap in Sardis. The difference is that now Artaxerxes further divided the land in order to facilitate a closer administrative presence by Persian officials. The creation of new satrapies with new forms of leadership in the late 390s underlines the importance of the western empire to Artaxerxes. The affairs here held primacy, and resulted in a personal journey to the West when Evagoras was first attacked. His focus would remain here for decades to come.

The 390s ended in a swirl of confusion. Having begun the decade reeling from the revolt of Cyrus, the Achaemenid Empire reasserted its strength in Greek affairs through application of a winning naval strategy, under the guidance of Pharnabazus and Conon, and ended the decade with a lightning campaign conducted on an opportunistic local king who overstepped his mark. Affairs in Asia Minor came full circle: the decade began with Greek insurrection, stabilised with the victory at Cnidus and the publicity campaign of Pharnabazus and Conon in 394, before the Spartans again intruded in Persian territory. The power of Sparta fluctuated over these ten years, and at the close of the decade the Spartans were in a much weaker position than they would have hoped. The Athenians experienced the greatest change in fortune; at the end of the 390s imperialism had returned, the long walls were rebuilt, and Athenian fleets again patrolled the Aegean.

Artaxerxes' First Invasion of Egypt: 392/1 – 390/89?¹⁹⁶

The facilitation of a new invasion of Egypt was a primary concern for the western Achaemenid Empire since the failure of the first campaign under Abrocomas. The fundamental issue of this matter is the timing: when did it happen? As Egypt is argued

¹⁹⁵ William A. P. Childs, "Lycian Relations with Persians and Greeks in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries Re-Examined," *AS* 31 (1981): 74n121.

¹⁹⁶ A revised version of this section has been accepted for publication as John Shannahan, "Artaxerxes II's First Invasion of Egypt," in *Ptolemy I Soter and the Transformation of Egypt: 404-282 BC*, edited by Paul McKechnie. Forthcoming.

throughout this thesis to have been a significant factor in decisions made by Artaxerxes, the following re-examines the question.

The source of conjecture is the single piece of evidence referring to the invasion, Isocrates' *Panegyricus* (4.140):

καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀποστάσης Αἰγύπτου τί διαπέπρακται πρὸς τοὺς ἔχοντας αὐτήν; οὐκ ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτον κατέπεμψε τοὺς εὐδοκιμωτάτους Περσῶν, Ἀβροκόμαν καὶ Τιθραύστην καὶ Φαρνάβαζον, οὗτοι δὲ τρί' ἔτη μείναντες, καὶ πλείω κακὰ παθόντες ἢ ποιήσαντες, τελευτῶντες οὕτως αἰσχροῶς ἀπηλλάγησαν, ὥστε τοὺς ἀφεστῶτας μηκέτι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀγαπᾶν, ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ τῶν ὁμόρων ζητεῖν ἐπάρχειν;

"Take, first, the case of Egypt: since its revolt from the King, what progress has he made against its inhabitants? Did he not dispatch to this war the most renowned of the Persians, Abrocomas and Tithraustes and Pharnabazus, and did not they, after remaining there three years and suffering more disasters than they inflicted, finally withdraw in such disgrace that the rebels are no longer content with their freedom, but are already trying to extend their dominion over the neighbouring peoples as well?"

Published around 380, this speech is commonly held to be referring to a campaign beginning shortly after the King's Peace. Indeed, the King's Peace is generally identified as a precursor to the invasion of Egypt: it freed Artaxerxes to move against the dissidents on Cyprus and Egypt.¹⁹⁷

Currently, there are two prevailing contentions for the date of this invasion of Egypt. The ca. 385-83 date is the more prevalent (henceforth the '385 date').¹⁹⁸ The alternative date, 389-87, is espoused primarily by two historians – P. J. Stylianou and

¹⁹⁷ E.g. Hornblower, *Greek World*, 199.

¹⁹⁸ A view popularized by Karl Julius Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, 2nd ed. (Berlin; Leipzig: De Gruyter, 1923; reprint, 1967), Vol. 3, Part 2, 228-29 (§90). This date is followed by Olmstead, *History*, 399; J. D. Ray, "Egypt: Dependence and Independence (425-343 B.C.)," in *Sources, Structures and Synthesis*, ed. Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg, Achaemenid History 1 (Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, 1987), 82; Dandamaev, *Political History*, 297; Alan B. Lloyd, "Egypt, 404-332 B.C.," in *The Fourth Century B.C.*, ed. John Boardman, et al., *The Cambridge Ancient History* 6 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 347; Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 652; Kuhrt, *Persian Empire*, 395.

Stephen Ruzicka (henceforth the '389 date').¹⁹⁹ Both options are tarnished by the dearth of extant evidence. Compounding the issue are the other problematic dates of the period. The battle of Citium and the possible Cadusian campaign of Artaxerxes are both inexorably linked to discussion of this invasion. In this area of scholarship no party has been able to present a wholly convincing argument.²⁰⁰ One cannot exclude the possibility that Isocrates is grossly exaggerating a response against Egyptian incursions into Persian territory.²⁰¹

The 389 date initially lost favour following the critique of Eduard Meyer.²⁰² Meyer hinged his dismissal predominantly on a reference in Xenophon which (he believed) placed Pharnabazus in his province in 387, thus precluding the satrap's involvement in an expedition against Egypt (*Hell.* 5.1.28, see also 4.8.31, 33). Proponents of a 389 date have responded that the passages in question are not specific enough to confirm Pharnabazus' presence for any extended period.²⁰³ *Per litteras*, Prof. Ruzicka has elucidated *Hellenica* 5.1.28, and emphasised the role of ἤδη in the passage to denote that the events described had "already" taken place sometime in the past – Xenophon was explaining the absence of Pharnabazus to an audience accustomed to his presence. The interpretation of the passage as a summary of several years is reasonable. On this basis, both Stylianou and Ruzicka prefer to date the journey of Pharnabazus to court and his marriage to 389, shortly before the launch of the

¹⁹⁹ Originally proffered by Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien*, 152-55. Their support may be traced to the early 1980s: Stephen Ruzicka, "Clazomenae and Persian Foreign Policy, 387/6 B.C.," *Phoenix* 37, no. 2 (1983): 106; Stylianou, *Commentary*, 143-54 (the revision of Stylianou's 1981 doctoral thesis), which on these pages is focused predominantly on the chronology of the war on Cyprus.

²⁰⁰ There exist other options. Gordon Shrimpton proposes a date of 387/6 for the invasion: Shrimpton, "Persian Strategy," 1-20; see discussion in Tuplin, *Achaemenid Studies*, 9-15. Sekunda, "Life of Datames," 40, suggests 384-80. Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 249n1 has collected a number of current opinions on the matter.

²⁰¹ Dominique Mallet, *Les rapports des Grecs avec l'Égypte: la conquête de Cambyse, 525, à celle d'Alexandre, 331* (Cairo: Institut Français d'archéologie orientale, 1922), 91-92.

²⁰² Eduard Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, 3rd ed., vol. 5 (Stuttgart; Berlin: J.G. Cotta, 1921), 311-12 (§897).

²⁰³ Stylianou, *Commentary*, 149-50.

expedition.²⁰⁴ Unfortunately, it is impossible to know exactly what Xenophon was thinking when the passage was composed. The ambiguity of the text cannot exclude the possibility that Xenophon inserted the comment in the context of 387 because the events took place then. Despite such arguments, a critic of a 389 date will accept the 387 date of Pharnabazus' marriage, and will ask why the king would marry his daughter to a failed general.²⁰⁵ One could counter that Pharnabazus' exemplary performance throughout the 390s warranted reward, as he was mastermind and executor of the plan to inhibit the Spartans. Furthermore, one might point to the recent argument that Pharnabazus was in reality naval commander, and was not held responsible for the failures on land.²⁰⁶ Equally, one could also point to the argument that the invasion can be divided into two stages, the first under Abrocomas alone, then under joint command of Pharnabazus and Tithraustes.²⁰⁷ Both arguments are speculative.

One of the strengths of the 389 date is the terminology of Isocrates: the καὶ πρῶτον of §140 and the μετὰ δὲ ταῦτ' of §141. While no great weight can be placed on the choice of language here, it is certainly odd that Isocrates should use this formulation in a non-temporal sense, despite the use of πρῶτον earlier. An investigation, utilising the resources of the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae Online*, reinforces the oddity for interpretations placing the invasion after the King's Peace. A search, limited to works of Isocrates, of "μετ" and "ταυτ"/ "ταυθ" (shortened to allow for elided characters) within two words proximity returns twenty-seven examples of Isocrates applying the preposition μετὰ with the neuter accusative ταῦτα in its various forms, in twelve different speeches.²⁰⁸ Of these twenty-seven, twenty-three of the examples are clearly utilising μετὰ ταῦτα in a temporal sense. Isocrates routinely uses

²⁰⁴ Stylianou, *Commentary*, 149-50; Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 72. Cf. the dates provided for the marriage by those who do not subscribe to an early dating of the invasion: Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 147: in the context of Tiribazus negotiating with Antalcidas; Seager, "The Corinthian War," 116: alongside the restoration of Tiribazus; Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 992: "around 387."

²⁰⁵ Shrimpton, "Persian Strategy," 15.

²⁰⁶ See below, p. 153n229.

²⁰⁷ Sekunda, "Life of Datames," 40.

²⁰⁸ Isoc. 4.43, 88, 100, 141; 5.95, 112; 7.7; 10.26, 35, 62; 11.15; 12.44, 53, 74, 166, 179, 204; 15.232; 16.7, 21, 31; 17.11, 17; 18.7; 19.9, 20, 22.

the phrase as part of a chronological sequence; rarely is it used in an order of rank. The temporal sense is reinforced when the phrase is used in conjunction with *πρῶτον*. Six of the examples found are preceded by *πρῶτον* or a variant thereof (excluding 4.140-41). In every case Isocrates is listing a chronological sequence: first the earlier event, then the later.²⁰⁹ It appears to indicate that Isocrates was referring to an event before the King's Peace.²¹⁰

Objections to the 385 date, while more numerous, have a heavier emphasis placed on probability. The known activities of Chabrias in the 380s are a primary point of contention.²¹¹ When the King's Peace prevented Chabrias from serving in Cyprus, he travelled to Egypt (Dem. 20.76). Several years later, Pharnabazus demanded that Athens recall Chabrias from Egypt.²¹² The question is, why did Pharnabazus not demand this recall in the 385-83 campaign? Furthermore, Diodorus states that Chabrias prepared (*παρεσκευάζετο*) for the Persians – he had no direct hand in their repulsion, as would surely have occurred if the invasion was 385-83 (15.29.2).²¹³ The counterpoint notes that no evidence confirms Chabrias went directly to Egypt after Cyprus; he might have journeyed to the province after the first invasion, though there is no evidence for that claim either.

Other arguments against a 385 date are based on revisions of the 380s. Traditionally, it has been held that the Persians squandered their time after Citium;²¹⁴ Cyprus was not subdued because the concurrent campaign against Egypt took

²⁰⁹ Isoc. 10.35; 17.17; 10.61-62; 15.232; 12.43-44, 204.

²¹⁰ I conducted this search prior to seeing Tuplin, *Achaemenid Studies*, 11-12, which comes to the same conclusion. Tuplin also notes that Isocrates prefers *πρῶτον μὲν ... ἔπειτα δέ* when working in topical or logical order.

²¹¹ See Stylianou, *Commentary*, 150-51.

²¹² Diod. 15.29.2; Nep. *Chab.* 3; Theopomp. F105.

²¹³ Stylianou, *Commentary*, 151 goes on (with reserve) to note the conspicuous silence of all the Greek sources on Chabrias having a role in the defeat of the Achaemenids.

²¹⁴ R. Van der Spek, "The Chronology of the Wars of Artaxerxes II in the Babylonian Astronomical Diaries," in *Studies in Persian History: Essays in Honour of David M. Lewis*, ed. Maria Brosius and Amélie Kuhrt, Achaemenid History 11 (Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, 1998), 246-47 places Citium in 386. Cf. Stylianou, *Commentary*, 152-53, placing Citium ca. 384, and Tuplin, *Achaemenid Studies*, 11-15 on chronological problems with an early date for Citium. In the following chapter, I will argue for a ca. 384 date for the battle of Citium, and discuss the matter in depth.

precedence.²¹⁵ If it is accepted that a 380s date for a Cadusian campaign is not beyond cavil,²¹⁶ and that a Cadusian war may have occurred during the same period as the stagnation on Cyprus, it may be plausibly noted that concurrent campaigns against Egypt, the Cadusians, and Cyprus are difficult to accommodate. The relationship Egypt and Cyprus maintained with dissidents in the Persian Empire could also support a link between a 380s Cadusian campaign (Diod. 15.2.3-4), the turmoil in Phoenicia and Cilicia ongoing in 380 (Isoc. 4.161-62; Thuys also demanded attention in this period: *Nep. Dat.* 2.2),²¹⁷ and the altar bases of Acoris discovered in Phoenicia.²¹⁸ The turmoil and altar bases in Phoenicia are particularly interesting. The king of the Arabs had previously joined forces with the Egyptians to threaten Phoenicia (Diod. 13.46.6), and there is a historical precedent for the importance of the Arabs in facilitating any Persian invasion of Egypt (Hdt. 3.88): the Arabs were already supporting Evagoras at this time (Diod. 15.2.3-4), and they must have been a source of concern. The fortifications which sprung up across the border between Judaea and Egypt further suggest that the local turmoil demanded extensive responses by the Persians.²¹⁹ These occurrences may, in fact, be correlative and further cause to doubt the ability of the Persians to invade Egypt at this point. It is highly unlikely that Artaxerxes, who struggled to manage Evagoras while the Greeks interfered in Asia, or invade Egypt in the intervening years between incursions, should willingly enter a campaign in Egypt while revolt brewed in the West. Such rationale can only be strengthened with the knowledge that the campaign against the Cadusians was unlikely to have been entered voluntarily. Rather, their reputation for rebellion would

²¹⁵ See below, p. 181n65.

²¹⁶ Van der Spek notes the problems posed by *Nep. Dat.* 1.2: Van der Spek, "Chronology," 249n10. See also Binder, *Kommentar*, 316-21, and below, pp. 181-85.

²¹⁷ On the turmoil, see also Tuplin, *Achaemenid Studies*, 10-11.

²¹⁸ Claude Traunecker, "Essai sur l'histoire de la XXIX^e dynastie," *BIAO* 79 (1979): 435; cf. Lloyd, "Egypt," 347n50; Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 254n1.

²¹⁹ A. Fantalkin and Oren Tal, "Redating Lachish Level I: Identifying Achaemenid Imperial Policy at the Southern Frontier of the Fifth Satrapy," in *Judah and the Judeans in the Persian Period*, ed. O. Lipschits and M. Oeming (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2006), 167-98; A. Fantalkin and Oren Tal, "Judah and its Neighbors in the Fourth Century BCE: A Time of Major Transformations," in *From Judah to Judaea: Socio-Economic Structures and Processes in the Persian Period*, ed. Johannes Unsok Ro (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2012), 133-96.

suggest that war was forced upon the Persians.²²⁰ Clearly discord in the 380s was widespread enough to call into question the desire and ability of the Persians to launch an invasion of Egypt in its midst.²²¹

Accordingly, both popular dates have plausible reasons for doubt. In 2005, Cawkwell proffered a new dating which appears to have gone unnoticed in scholarship.²²² He proposed that the most plausible period in which to locate Artaxerxes' first invasion is immediately following the return of Pharnabazus from his Greek tour. The relevant passage is as follows:

"It seems more probable that the attempted invasion belongs in the period after Pharnabazus returned from his triumphant voyage with Conon to Greece in 393 BC when Tiribazus had replaced Tithraustes in Sardis, thus setting him free for service elsewhere, and before the revolt of Evagoras in 390 BC had begun to look serious. On this hypothesis the victory in the battle of Cnidus in August 394 by which Spartan naval power was utterly destroyed made it possible for Pharnabazus, admiral of the Persian fleet, to take his victorious navy to support an invasion. Artaxerxes, in short, took on the all-important task of resolving the Egyptian problem as soon as he could, and he would have begun it earlier if Sparta had not misapprehended his naval preparations."²²³

This was then supplemented with a note:

"Kienitz assigns this campaign to 385-3 with surprising confidence considering that the only evidence is the statement of Isocrates (4.140), according to whom it ended in failure. He has been followed generally (cf. Lloyd) but any dating of the campaign between the King's Peace and 380 BC, the date of Isocrates' *Panegyricus*, raises a serious difficulty, namely, its relation to the King's war against Evagoras of Cyprus. Conceivably the King might have tried to deal with the Egyptian rebellion straight after the King's Peace and before he dealt with Evagoras or even during the Cyprian War, but that war is comparatively fully recorded by Diodorus (15.2-4 and 8-9) and a Persian failure in Egypt should surely have affected the course of events. It appears not to have done so, and Theopompus' twelfth book the epitome of which is to be found in Photius (F103) covered the King's Peace and the war against Evagoras but there is no word of an unsuccessful attempt to deal with Egypt. It seems therefore preferable to put this mysterious campaign in 392 and the immediately following year, and if this is perchance correct, it would be

²²⁰ See below, p. 275.

²²¹ Pace Shrimpton, "Persian Strategy," 17; Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 650 who place both an Egyptian and Cadusian campaign in the same period.

²²² Cawkwell, *Greek Wars*, 162-63, 171n28.

²²³ Cawkwell, *Greek Wars*, 162-63.

consistent with the King being on as soon as possible with a campaign aborted by Sparta's heady intervention in Asia in 397/396."²²⁴

The textual note is more specific, limiting the invasion to 392 and the year following (henceforth this option is the '392 date' or 'Cawkwell's date'). The immediate temptation is to dismiss Cawkwell's hypothesis as too early, citing Diodorus (14.110.4: Artaxerxes could not face Evagoras, much less Egypt, until the Greeks were subdued) and Justin (6.6: where the invasion is chronologically amidst negotiations for the King's Peace). There are, however, good reasons to think Cawkwell's suggestion plausible. Isocrates is certainly not specific enough to exclude 392 on the basis of it being too early, and the chronology matches - this Egyptian campaign remains before the war on Cyprus.

The cruxes of Cawkwell's position are an argument from silence and a question of probability. The question is posed, why would Photius' summary of Theopompus (F103), in an otherwise extensive treatment of the 380s, not mention a war against Egypt? An *argumentum e silentio* is dangerous. While the silence is conspicuous, the same argument may equally be applied to any other dating. Why did neither Xenophon, nor Diodorus mention a campaign in the 390s? The universal applicability of the argument renders Theopompus' silence redundant.

Opportunity and probability must take precedence. The period between 392 and 390 was the first opportunity since 401 for an invasion of Egypt to be launched. Prior to 392 the Persians were unable to devote the resources necessary for the reclamation of Egypt – continual Greek interference in Asia Minor, coupled with legitimate fears of a repeat of Cyrus' thrust to Cunaxa, resulted in cautious imperial policy. An invasion of Egypt would not be attempted while the western borders were insecure. As time progressed, the restoration of Achaemenid authority in Egypt became the primary concern of Artaxerxes's reign. Nearly all the echoes of foreign policy from court reaching the Greek historians indicated that Egypt was central to the empire's ambitions.

²²⁴ Cawkwell, *Greek Wars*, 171n28; Kienitz = Friedrich Karl Kienitz, *Die politische Geschichte Ägyptens vom 7. bis zum 4. Jahrhundert vor der Zeitwende* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1953), 85; Lloyd = Lloyd, "Egypt," 347.

The argument of 'first opportunity' necessitates reconstruction from 401. The substantial army led by Abrocomas in this year is generally considered to be indicative of an attack on Egypt.²²⁵ Amyrtaeus' revolt may be dated to 404, but Artaxerxes was still recognised as king as late as 401 (possibly 398) in Elephantine.²²⁶ The implication is that Amyrtaeus' power, at this early stage, was limited to the Nile Delta. The solution was to remove Amyrtaeus while his control was limited to Lower Egypt. Abrocomas was dispatched to resolve the issue at the first opportunity, but diverted by the revolt of Cyrus the Younger. Cyrus' influence was not limited to his direct interference with this campaign. Following Cyrus' death Tamos fled to Egypt, expecting sanctuary (Diod. 14.35.4-5); it is certain that the captured armada would serve to defend against attack.²²⁷

Soon after Tissaphernes returned to Asia Minor, the Spartans launched an incursion to protect the Asiatic Greeks. The campaigning of Thibron and Dercylidas, while limited, would have been a legitimate concern for the Persians. No large invasion could be launched while the Spartans were looming. A repeat of events which led to the absence of Abrocomas from Cunaxa was to be avoided.

One may then note, as Cawkwell does, the report of Herodas in 397 (*Hell.* 3.4.1; cf. *Xen. Ag.* 1.6). The Hellenes presumed that the fleet was indicative of an attack on Greece. In response, Agesilaus launched his campaign in Asia Minor, which occupied Persia until 394. It is fanciful to attribute Artaxerxes with ambitions for Greece. Cawkwell conjectures that this fleet was directed at Egypt.²²⁸ More probable is a design for the security of Asia, followed by a redeployment of the fleet for Egypt; the actions

²²⁵ *An.* 1.3.20, 4.5. Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien*, 151; Cook, *Persian Empire*, 84; Ruzicka, "Cyrus and Tissaphernes," 210n21; Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 619 and notes.

²²⁶ See above, p. 38nn70-71. On Psammetichus and Amyrtaeus, see Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 244n11.

²²⁷ Cf. Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 39-40, where it is speculated that "Amyrtaeus' original aim in killing Tamos ... was to redeem himself in Artaxerxes' eyes by claiming responsibility for the punishment of one of Cyrus' leading collaborators." Amyrtaeus might have initially thought this – there is no way to tell – but it is unlikely that Artaxerxes looked favourably upon the killing. There is no record of reprisals against Cyrus' Persian supporters by Artaxerxes: Tissaphernes pillaged Parysatis' land, but Ariaeus was forgiven and Glos (Tamos' son) was married into Tiribazus' family.

²²⁸ Cawkwell, *Greek Wars*, 162-63; Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 48, 64 draws similar inferences, having the fleet's first concern being the Levant.

of the fleet after Cnidus would certainly suggest as much. When Agesilaus was withdrawn from Asia in 394, after the battle at Cnidus and the outbreak of the Corinthian War, little is heard of the Persian Empire. The victory over the Spartans was the fruition of a plan conceived in 398 to secure the Aegean against further Greek attacks in Asia. Following Cnidus, Pharnabazus and Conon cruised the Aegean clearing Peloponnesian garrisons. While attempting to remove Dercylidas from Sestus and Abydus at the Hellespont Pharnabazus ordered Conon to try and win over the cities of the Hellespont, with the goal of gathering together as large a fleet as possible by spring (*Hell.* 4.8.6). The significance of this act has been expounded above. Was Pharnabazus preparing for the inevitable separation of himself and Conon, and bolstering the combined fleet before he left to support the invasion of Egypt?²²⁹

In light of Amyrtaeus' appropriation of the Ionian fleet (via Tamos), the navy's importance was compounded. This fleet was always necessary to sail *pari passu* with the Persian expeditionary corps to Egypt, but now it must have operated with greater prestige. Not only were the Egyptians defended by a substantial armada annexed from the Ionian Greeks, but this was supplemented with the construction of their own force – earlier in the decade stocks were provisioned well enough to permit the allocation of supplies for one hundred triremes to the Spartans (Diod. 14.79.4; cf. Justin 6.2.1).

Ancillary moves made to secure Asia support a reconstruction leading to an invasion in the late 390s and necessitate a rehashing of my earlier arguments. Artaxerxes placed great trust in the Athenians after Cnidus. As old enemies of Sparta with a traditional naval focus, they were natural allies for the king, who at this stage

²²⁹ There is a tendency to identify the first invasion of Egypt as "Pharnabazus'" (e.g. Shrimpton, "Persian Strategy," 8n14; C. M. Harrison, "Numismatic Problems in the Achaemenid West: The Undue Modern Influence of 'Tissaphernes'," in *Oikistes: Studies in Constitutions, Colonies, and Military Power in the Ancient World offered in Honor of A.J. Graham*, ed. Vanessa B. Gorman and Eric W. Robinson (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 306). Cawkwell, *Greek Wars*, 163 may be right to identify Pharnabazus with the fleet command (Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 72-73, comments similarly). The primacy of Pharnabazus is generally associated with his marriage to Apame – entrance to the royal family, followed by a promotion. It seems more likely to credit Abrocomas (known general with a history of large commands) and Tithraustes (close associate of the king) with land command, while Pharnabazus continued leading the naval contingent. Such a role would be analogous to Tiribazus' in 387/6, when he led a naval force in support of Antalcidas, which was followed with extended naval command while Orontes managed the land forces on Cyprus.

simply wanted Asia Minor to be left alone. Conon was permitted to reap the advantages of being seen as benefactor across Ionia as he liberated the Greeks from Spartan garrisons. The important fact for Artaxerxes was that the Spartan presence was removed, and no garrisons were taking their place. With Conon returned to Athens in a position of supremacy over his rival Thrasybulus, Artaxerxes trusted Athens to be an enforcer in the Aegean, protecting the western satrapies from interference while Egypt was reclaimed by counteracting any Spartan initiative. This facilitated stability, and the genial attitude towards the Asiatic Greeks further encouraged a positive reception of the Achaemenids. Pharnabazus was personally well received, the general Persian relationship with Athens was amicable, and the eastern Greeks were content with the *status quo*. While coalition forces were trusted for the most part, only in the most crucial position, Cythera, did Pharnabazus install his own men. Here, only men loyal to Persian gold would suffice. Even these men were, however, to be under the governorship of an Athenian. The money of Timocrates formed part of this initiative to solidify the Corinthian allies as a counterweight to the Spartans. The initial, limited offering was backed up with the aforementioned provision of Persian ships, gold for rebuilding the long walls, and further funds when Pharnabazus addressed the allies in 393. Here, significantly, the Athenians were provided with funds to assist in the defence of the Corinthian Isthmus, thus defending against the major threat to Athenian ascendancy – a raid by the still-dangerous Spartans.

As matters stood in 392/1, the Spartans were offering nothing in their conferences that the Persians could not already take. There were few overt signs of Athenian imperialism, and with Conon in a position of power the situation was passable. An invasion was desirable in this period, and the circumstances permit its insertion here. Unfortunately, the delicate balance struck to secure Asia Minor was upset when Tiribazus arrested Conon. Besides estranging Conon from Persia, it sullied the relationship cultivated with Athens. Athens, Thebes, and Argos voiced concerns over the provision of autonomy for all Greeks, which may have resulted in the loss of several constituencies. Athenian concerns may have also arose from necessary Athenian concessions in Greece to Sparta – is this a by-product of fearing the

withdrawal of Persian support, apparently signalled by the arrest of Conon?²³⁰ When Tiribazus returned to the king for final approval, however, he was promptly removed from office and replaced by pro-Athenian Strouthas. The king made no effort to continue negotiations. Consider, however, the broader context in which Artaxerxes was working. By Cawkwell's dating, his campaign against Egypt had been just launched. It is reasonable to think that, having just committed to a major campaign in Egypt, Artaxerxes would be unwilling to cause friction unless absolutely necessary. Artaxerxes did not pursue the peace proposed by Antalcidas as he did in 387 because he had no motivation to do so. In his eyes, Sparta was rendered defunct as a hindrance and Athens and her allies were kept satisfied by his benefaction. While Artaxerxes was aware of growing Athenian influence in the Aegean, at that time it was unimportant.²³¹ A campaign in Egypt explains the harsh reaction from the king against Tiribazus over the imprisonment of Conon and the secret agreement: Artaxerxes needed to act swiftly to prevent retaliation from the Athenians when it could not be afforded. He was happy with affairs stagnating while Egypt was engaged.

Thus, in 392, there was for the first time since 400 no disruptive Greek presence in Asia Minor. The most problematic Hellenes, the Spartans, were without a navy and beset by the Corinthian allies, funded by Persian gold. Athenian-Persian relations were well-placed; the relationship of Conon and Persia was mutually beneficial. Conon was returned to a position of power in Athens, and in turn had some residual loyalty to his benefactors. An argument advanced on the basis of first opportunity has serious merits when considered in this context; to place an invasion in 392/1 conforms to the period's history.

Other, more speculative, associations may similarly be drawn. Specifically, the timing of Evagoras' 393-92 push for greater power and the troubles of Acoris with Psammuthis. It seems plausible that Evagoras initially did take advantage of Cyrus the Younger's revolt to stop paying his tribute and to make a move against the other

²³⁰ Strauss, "Thrasybulus and Conon," 48n46.

²³¹ Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, 29-30 and Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, 248 both make the point that Athens was no threat at this point.

kingdoms of Cyprus.²³² One might draw a parallel between this early mark of opportunism and apply it to the efforts began in the late 390s by Evagoras to resume conquest of Cyprus. Here, again, Evagoras may have been attempting to take advantage of Artaxerxes' focus on Egypt, and may have relaunched his enterprise when forces were again committed to another foe. The dating of a trophy celebrating victory over Evagoras to 392 supports that he was active militarily in the 390s.²³³ The 392 date, and the movement of the Persian fleet from the Aegean to Egypt, might also explain the lack of Persian resistance to the Spartans as they returned to the eastern Aegean in 391 to retake the islands lost to Pharnabazus and Conon. The interrupted reign of Acoris might also hint at greater troubles in Egypt in the late 390s and early 380s, possibly another example of a rebel taking advantage of a distracted king.²³⁴ In an interesting coincidence, the dating for Psammuthis' actions are divided between a 392/1 date (coinciding with Cawkwell's option),²³⁵ and a 389/8 date (coinciding with the 389 invasion date of Stylianou and Ruzicka).²³⁶ The implications of either date are identical for Cawkwell's date, which would have spanned either period. The happenstance is certainly interesting.

While the above reconstruction may be desirable, there are several issues to note regarding its validity. The three major objections to Cawkwell's dating are (1) Justin's chronology (which places the King's Peace after the invasion of Egypt), (2) the marriage of Pharnabazus, and (3) the promotion of Ariobarzanes.

Regarding the first: Justin 6.6 cannot be used to any great effect. He condenses several years of events into a short passage, and asserts that the war against Egypt was initiated because the Egyptians sent aid to the Spartans (referring to the shipments ca. 396?). The fact remains that Justin cannot be trusted in this instance. Both Xenophon and Isocrates were contemporaries, and Diodorus could rely on Ephorus. Justin is

²³² Costa, "Evagoras," 47 and Maier, "Cyprus and Phoenicia," 313 draw this inference.

²³³ See above, p. 138n180.

²³⁴ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 74-75 applies this interruption to his own dating.

²³⁵ As J. D. Ray, "Psammuthis and Hakoris," *JEA* 72 (1986): 154-55 follows.

²³⁶ As Jean-Yves Carrez-Maratray, "Psammétique le tyran: Pouvoir, usurpation et alliances en Méditerranée orientale au IV^e siècle av. J.-C.," *Transeuphratène* 30 (2005): 47-55, 62-63 proposes, and Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 252n26 finds agreeable.

writing an epitome of a source itself far removed; no great weight should be placed on individual sections of the *Epitome* in this context.

On the second point: how can the marriage of Pharnabazus to a royal daughter be explained in a 392 date? A royal marriage is a political statement; is it likely that Artaxerxes would marry his daughter to a failed general? Ruzicka's interpretation of *Hellenica* 5.1.28 means that this marriage could be placed anywhere between 389 and 387. That deftly nullifies the passage's use against any 380s date; the marriage took place before the invasion. But the same interpretation of §28 cannot be reasonably applied to reposition the marriage in the 390s, for Xenophon had the perfect time to mention the union when Pharnabazus left Greece (e.g. *Hell.* 4.8.31, 33). If one accepts the traditional reading of §28 and its context, placing the marriage in 387, enough time may have passed between the 392 invasion and 387 for Pharnabazus to have redeemed himself. Criticism would have abated in the interim, or perhaps Pharnabazus was linked with the naval command, and so was not blamed for the failures of his co-commander. Pharnabazus could, if that hypothetical situation existed, have still retained the favour of the king from his exploits in the Aegean and so have been married into the royal family on those grounds. The situation requires some reasoning, but logic can be found.

The third objection is the promotion of Ariobarzanes.²³⁷ Again, Ruzicka's reading of §28 as a summary permits the redating of Ariobarzanes' promotion to sometime before the invasion in a 389 framework. Nonetheless, Ariobarzanes' promotion must post-date *Hellenica* 4.8.31 and 33, for at that time Hellespontine cities and Aeolis are still identified as belonging to Pharnabazus. A 389 promotion is easily accommodated in both a 389 and 385 date for the invasion of Egypt: Pharnabazus was married into the royal family and promoted to command on the expedition; Ariobarzanes was promoted as his replacement at Dascylium. But how can Ariobarzanes' promotion be accommodated in a 392 invasion? It has already been noted that Pharnabazus' marriage cannot be reasonably moved into the 390s. Is the answer that Ariobarzanes was promoted when Pharnabazus married into the royal

²³⁷ On this promotion, see Weiskopf, *Achaemenid Systems*, 120-27; Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 27-28. Cf. Sekunda, "Persian settlement in Hellespontine Phrygia," 187.

family, and that the substitution was not related to the Egyptian invasion at all? This response seems the only plausible one. But I am left with misgivings. Xenophon states that Pharnabazus went to court in response to a summons from the king; on this occasion Pharnabazus married the king's daughter. But why did Pharnabazus stay at court, in Cawkwell's chronology? In a 389 and 385 date, it seems obvious, because Pharnabazus married the king's daughter, and was then ordered to prepare for the Egyptian invasion. If the marriage took place after the first invasion, there is no discernable reason for Pharnabazus to remain at court. Perhaps Pharnabazus simply entered court life. But I continue have doubts about the lack of explanation for his stay there. Typically, the sources permit some inferences to explain Artaxerxes' changes in administration: Tissaphernes failed in his duties; Tithraustes enacted a new policy; Tiribazus erred; Strouthas was to reconcile the Persians and Athenians; Datames took control of the Egyptian expedition as it began to stagnate (*Nep. Dat.* 3). And, on Cawkwell's chronology, the satrapy of Dascylium would have been operating without Pharnabazus for an extended period of time – during his operations with the fleet, and in preparing for Egypt, and in the multiple-year campaign in Egypt. Pharnabazus' presence was not necessary for the satrapy to operate. That raises the question of why any substitution was necessary. On the other hand, Artaxerxes made a number of changes throughout Asia Minor in the preceding decade; he had close control of what satraps would move where. The failure of the Egyptian campaign and the poor standing of Pharnabazus in the following years could also explain the familial strife which led to the exile of Pharnabazus' son (by Ariobarzanes?) – at the time Pharnabazus was himself in a dire position and could no longer protect his family.²³⁸ Therefore, on this line of thought, maybe the opportunity was taken to replace Pharnabazus when Artaxerxes began to see the value of the Spartans again.²³⁹ Perhaps Pharnabazus had proved too successful against the Peloponnesians and could no longer recultivate ties. Ariobarzanes, for his part, was a guest-friend of Antalcidas and could forge a new relationship (*Hell.* 5.1.28). Yet, Pharnabazus was a good diplomat. His relationship with the Lacedaemonians was strong enough to jeopardise his

²³⁸ On the exile, see below, p. 283.

²³⁹ As intimated by Maria Brosius, *The Persians: An Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2006), 28.

position, in one reconstruction.²⁴⁰ Furthermore, his son's guest friendship with Agesilaus should allow even a poor diplomat to recultivate ties – Agesilaus certainly liked Pharnabazus' son to help him in his exile (*Hell.* 4.1.39-40; *Plut. Ag.* 13.1-4).²⁴¹ Pharnabazus' own ties, then complemented with Ariobarzanes' and his own son's, should have been perceived as a strength in working with the Spartans again. The most reasonable response to the issue posed by Ariobarzanes' promotion is that Ariobarzanes replaced Pharnabazus because the latter was to remain at court.

Having been through these mental gymnastics, it becomes clear than we can work around the issues perceived here. Cawkwell has created a date in many respects preferable to current alternatives; his interpretation of the evidence may be employed to illuminate aspects of Persian policy in the 390s. Furthermore, it prompts us to question the timing of Evagoras' revolt at the end of the 390s, and the apparent struggles of Acoris, whose accession and the troublesome King X coincide with his alternative date. Could Evagoras have made use of the dedicated Persian assault to launch a rebellion? Might Acoris have legitimised his kingship with a victory against the Achaemenids? Might, other than explaining the actions of the Persian king, this invasion also cast light on the early history of the XXIXth Dynasty? But, while the 392 date is attractive in many respects, it ultimately does not answer persistent complications well enough to be viewed as a solution. The hypothesis must remain conjecture, to be placed alongside that of Judeich as an alternative to popular satisfaction with 385-83. There remain, however, faults with every option. For myself, I am not yet convinced that Cawkwell's date is the answer; I am inclined to accept a 389 date for the invasion of Egypt. *Hellenica* 5.1.28 poses considerable hurdles to a 392 date for the invasion. As it stands, the evidence is so fragmentary and contradictory that one can (infuriatingly) not commit to any conclusion with greater force than "probably" when it comes to Artaxerxes's invasion. Cawkwell has not received that "probably" yet.²⁴²

²⁴⁰ Hyland, "Pharnabazos, Cyrus' Rebellion," 9-27.

²⁴¹ See discussion in Bresson, "Un 'Athénien' à Sparte," 41-48.

²⁴² Though also consider comments at Cawkwell, *Greek Wars*, 21.

CHAPTER THREE

389-380: The King's Peace and Cyprus

The King's Peace (387/6): Purpose and Influence

Discussion of the King's Peace must begin with 390/89 and the sending of Thrasybulus to Rhodes. Thrasybulus' decision to focus on the allegiance of cities in the Hellespont shored up Athenian control of the thoroughfare to the Black Sea and vital trade routes. Sometime after this, Antalcidas made another mission to the Persians, this time going with Tiribazus to the court of Artaxerxes (Tiribazus having reassumed his satrapal position, and now avoiding a repeat of his error in 392/1). This mission proved successful in a number of ways. Artaxerxes found Antalcidas to be excellent company (*Art.* 22). More significantly for the Spartans, when Antalcidas and Tiribazus were sent back down to the coast, the Persians were committed to assisting the Spartan cause against the resurgent imperialism of Athens without Conon (*Hell.* 5.1.25). Upon hearing that Iphicrates and Diotimus had blockaded Nicolochus and his ships in Abydos, Antalcidas went overland to provide assistance. After capturing some of the enemy in the manoeuvres which followed, Antalcidas was joined by Tiribazus with his own ships and others from Ariobarzanes (*Hell.* 5.1.28). Thus, more than eighty warships of Persia and Sparta were roaming the northern Aegean in response to the actions of Athens. Athens then feared a repeat of the end of the Peloponnesian War, and the Hellespont's closure (*Hell.* 5.1.29). That fear made Athens more receptive to peace than she had been earlier. Tiribazus then called together "those who desired to give ear to the peace which the king had sent down" (*Hell.* 5.1.30). When the Greeks assembled, he showed the king's seal, and decreed the following:

Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νομίζει δίκαιον τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομενᾶς καὶ Κύπρον, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμους ἀφείναι πλὴν Λήμνου καὶ Ἰμβροῦ καὶ Σκύρου: ταύτας δὲ ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εἶναι Ἀθηναίων. ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται, τούτοις ἐγὼ πολεμήσω μετὰ τῶν ταῦτα βουλομένων καὶ πεζῇ καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ χρήμασιν.

“King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands, and that the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left independent, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; and these should belong, as of old, to the Athenians. But whichever of the two parties does not accept this peace, upon them I will make war, in company with those who desire this arrangement, both by land and by sea, with ships and with money.”¹

The terms as they appear in Xenophon should not be considered verbatim extracts of the treaty.² Xenophon seems to have preserved the key elements; other articles may be inferred from later iterations and the other literary sources. The display of the king’s seal prior to the reading of the decree is particularly intriguing. The king’s seal rarely appears in the literary sources, and Allen has recently discussed the pageantry of oral recitation and the display of letters as objects in the Achaemenid Empire.³ Xenophon retains the sense of theatre in his presentation. Tiribazus is positioned as an authority of the Achaemenid Empire; Artaxerxes rendered his decision to settle the situation. The Greeks agreed to Artaxerxes’ terms and the King’s Peace came into effect.

This agreement is generally conceived in Hellenocentric terms as nearly everything which is known about it derives from Greek sources, and the Peace controlled the Greeks rather than the Persians. This is found most obviously in its alternative formulation as the Peace of Antalcidas. It is also presented as a completion of Alcibiades’ plan for the Persians to work the Greeks against each other.⁴ But Artaxerxes has claim to the strategy in his own right owing to his continual execution of it and its attribution to him in other sources (Polyaen. 7.16.2). Fundamentally, ample

¹ *Hell.* 5.1.31. Cf. *Art.* 21-22; Diod. 14.110.5; Justin 6.6.2; Theopomp. F103.

² Cawkwell, “King’s Peace,” 71-72.

³ Lindsay Allen, “The Letter as Object: On the Experience of Achaemenid Letters,” *BICS* 56, no. 2 (2013): 32. The rarity of the seal in literary sources is discussed below, p. 304.

⁴ Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 649.

scholarship has appeared on the Greek manipulation of the Peace,⁵ and it is presented in terms of whether it brought Artaxerxes peace (as though peace in itself was the desired end result).⁶ Even Cawkwell - who comes closest to a Persian perspective when assessing the question "did the king have no real influence on Greek affairs?"⁷ - fails to discern the Peace's value to Artaxerxes. This, the following contends, should be the focus.

Artaxerxes wished to restrict Greek interference so that he might respond to Evagoras and reclaim Egypt (Justin 6.6.2). What, specifically, in the terms of the Peace facilitated this? How exactly did Artaxerxes view the Spartans? Xenophon indicates that they were his allies when Antalcidas returned from court – their joint naval operations would support the notion – but were they officially listed as *prostatai*? The Spartans certainly acted as such in their administration of how signatories could agree to the Peace (*Hell.* 5.1.32) and in their treatment of Mantinea.⁸ But if Artaxerxes flagged the official acceptance of a pro-Spartan stance with the King's Peace and his campaigns with Antalcidas, and had the Athenians greatly fearing a repeat of 404 after defeat and blockade in the Hellespont, why would Artaxerxes have bothered conceding territory to the Athenians (with Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros)? The charge against Tiribazus that he was friendly with the Spartans (Diod. 15.8.4), an accusation which received enough traction at court to elicit his arrest, and the Spartan support of Glos ca. 381/0 (Diod. 15.9.5), would indicate that if there was any Persian-Spartan alliance, it was strained.

Artaxerxes sought to divide his enemies (Xen. *Ages.* 7.7). The King's Peace was a tool to prolong discord among the Greeks. Isocrates' scepticism contains a good representation of the Peace for our purposes. He says, "do we not in our wars against each other rest our hopes of salvation on him, who would gladly destroy both Athens and Lacedaemon?" (4.121; see also *Hell.* 5.1.6, where the Spartans acted in order to please Tiribazus); he claims that only the worst of the Peace's articles are still observed

⁵ The most authoritative of which is Seager, "The King's Peace and the Balance of Power," 36-63. Seager, "The King's Peace and the Second Athenian Confederacy," 156-86 does not discuss any Persian interests in 387.

⁶ Buckler, *Aegean Greece*, 185.

⁷ Cawkwell, *Greek Wars*, 176-77.

⁸ On Mantinea, see below, pp. 170-71.

(4.176); he asserts that the treaty stands as a memorial of the humiliation of all Hellas (4.180). Isocrates reflects the Peace's effectiveness. The Greeks were divided by the Peace, and their exploitation of its terms prolonged their absorption in their own affairs (and thus, they left the Persians to their own devices). It is not satisfactory to study the Peace in terms of how different parties manipulated it. Rather, its contents should be assessed in terms of its effects on Artaxerxes' plans. The Peace was a weapon to be wielded against non-compliant Greeks. While it is true that current scholarship does not dismiss the Great King as unimportant, and the threat of Persian violence may be questioned,⁹ this chapter and those following argue that this Achaemenid posturing was intentional. The King's Peace should be considered offensive diplomacy, in order to further defensive policy. Artaxerxes aggressively imposed a diplomatic solution in order to preclude a military threat he may not have been able to counter.

Affairs in 387 were tense in the Greek world. The death of Conon, Persia's Athenian partner, coincided with a resurgence in imperial ambition at Athens.¹⁰ As Sparta finally gave up claims over Asia Minor, Athens returned. The apparent change in Persian policy after the return of Tiribazus, and the new blockade of Athenian grain supply, were troubling to Athens (*Hell.* 5.1.28-29). The Athenians wondered how exactly the king's relationship with the Spartans had progressed, and tensions grew over what would become of the city if there was a repeat of earlier food restrictions (*Lys.* 22.14). In Argos, there was renewed fear of another Spartan invasion, and the Spartans themselves had been suing for peace for five years, after calamitous defeats on sea and strain on their resources following the partnership between Athens and Persia (*Hell.* 5.1.29); with Agesilaus' ambitions curbed, and Lysander no longer alive to champion campaigns against the Great King, Sparta's aspirations waned.¹¹ Persia's position was not endangered. At this stage there were no moves which the Persians would have been perceived as overtly troubling. Athens had dispatched ships

⁹ E.g. Harrison, *Writing Ancient Persia*, 157n17.

¹⁰ Cf. G. T. Griffith, "Athens in the Fourth Century," in *Imperialism in the Ancient World*, ed. Peter Garnsey and C. Whittaker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 131.

¹¹ On the importance of Lysander for advocating foreign campaigns: David G. Rice, "Agesilaus, Agesipolis, and Spartan Politics, 386-379 B.C.," *Historia* 23, no. 2 (1974): 165.

throughout the Aegean, but had, as yet, not threatened Persian interests. The squadrons sent to Evagoras did not arrive, and Greek infighting ensured that even Persia's ostensibly hostile relations with Sparta resulted in the Lacedaemonians protecting Persian interests on Cyprus out of sheer bloody-mindedness (*Hell.* 4.8.24). The terms of the Peace responded to this situation.¹²

A list of participants may be reasonably assumed. The 372/1 rescript (*Hell.* 6.3.19) tells us that this was not unusual. The controversy surrounding how the Thebans were to swear in 387/6 may relate to a similar clause demanding the drawing up of a list (*Hell.* 5.1.32-34). Likewise, provisions on how a city came to be named in the list of participants (as in the agreements of the Second Athenian Confederacy: *RO* 22), and general procedural terms, one of which would prescribe the role of the Spartans specifically, can be inferred. Some method of administering oaths can also be safely assumed. All but one of these aspects concerned the Greek administration of the Peace, and had no influence on Persia. The exception is the definition of Sparta's role, to which we will shortly turn.

The most critical article of the King's Peace for Artaxerxes was possession of Asia, and it is the clause most clearly demarcated by Xenophon in the passage quoted above. All the cities of Asia would belong to Artaxerxes, in addition to Clazomenae and Cyprus. Athens retained possession of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros. Other Greek cities were to be autonomous. Artaxerxes thus settled affairs in Asia. The cities of Asia belonged to him as he believed they always had. But the evidence does not suggest that the Asiatic Greeks came under tighter control. His intention was to keep mainland Greeks at arm's length. Their interference was a perpetual source of consternation during the 390s, and frequently threatened the planning of any invasion of Egypt. The Peace provided a guarantee that Athens and Sparta would not attempt to interfere again. The Peace was introduced after the journey of Antalcidas to court, and the Persians operated with the Lacedaemonians in the Aegean when Antalcidas returned to the coast; Sparta was at present an ally of sorts. So the term was directed at the other power which could extend influence across the Aegean: Athens. But the Peace was not

¹² On its terms, I broadly follow Cawkwell, "King's Peace," 69-83. Cf. remarks of Clark, "The Date of IG II² 1604," 61.

a rebuke to the Athenians. Their retention of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros was an olive branch extended by Artaxerxes to his former partners. These were same cities which in the 392/1 negotiations were the primary cause of Athenian concern (Andoc. 3.12).¹³ Athenian policy seems to be directed towards, as Cawkwell puts it, "keeping one's own."¹⁴ By granting exceptions to the Athenians, the Peace palliated any sense that Sparta would be the primary beneficiary of the situation. Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros were symbolic gestures of parity in the articles of the Peace. Furthermore, the exception made for those islands also allowed Artaxerxes to claim to Clazomenae and Cyprus. There are clear reasons for Cyprus' inclusion. Evagoras enjoyed advertising his Hellenic heritage, and with this clause Artaxerxes precluded further intervention in Cyprus on Evagoras' behalf. The Persian's campaign to reclaim Cyprus would soon be under way, and the island was necessary for the Egyptian invasion. The inclusion of Clazomenae is equally significant. It serves as a key strategic accompaniment to Cyprus in the Peace,¹⁵ and provides protection for the harbour of Smyrna.¹⁶ Athens' own interest in the city also provides cause for the inclusion of Clazomenae; Athens' decision to avoid installing a garrison of her own proved to be a wise choice when Artaxerxes displayed his interest in the city.¹⁷

The terms of the Peace were, however, not laid in explicit enough words to prevent any party from taking advantage of its own unique interpretation.¹⁸ No party was perturbed that Sparta could swear on behalf of the perioikic cities of Laconia, but the idea that Thebes could extend that logic to apply to the cities of Boeotia she led was contested (*Hell.* 5.1.32¹⁹). Likewise, Artaxerxes was not bound by the oath - the cities of Asia Minor were to belong to him. This would not greatly affect the lot of the Asiatic Greeks, for the hands-off mode of Persian administration was less intrusive than the efforts made by Spartans and Athenians purporting to liberate the Greeks of the coast,

¹³ Cawkwell, *Greek Wars*, 175.

¹⁴ Cawkwell, "King's Peace," 73; cf. Sinclair, "King's Peace," 29-31.

¹⁵ Ruzicka, "Clazomenae," 104-08.

¹⁶ Gezgin-Izmir, "Defensive Systems," 182.

¹⁷ Griffith, "Athens in the Fourth Century," 132-33.

¹⁸ Vagueness also evident in the Second Athenian Confederacy's terms as well: Seager, "The King's Peace and the Second Athenian Confederacy," 169.

¹⁹ On which see Cawkwell, "King's Peace," 70n5.

and some Greek states reportedly became fonder of the Great King because of the Peace (Isoc. 4.175). The inscription showing Strouthas' arbitration of conflict between Miletus and Myus in the years preceding the Peace would also indicate that the Achaemenids sought to minimise strife in the area (RO 16).

Diodorus' statement that the cities of Greece had ejected their garrisons (15.5.1), as they were enjoying the terms of the truce, would indicate that there was some clause regarding garrisons. Xenophon also says that after the Peace armies and navies were disbanded (*Hell.* 5.1.35). The period before the Peace had been dominated by expansion and retention of cities abroad through the use of garrisons. It would serve Artaxerxes' interest to promote a clause which would ultimately weaken the strongest states in 387/6, and strengthen his own interests in Asia Minor by forcing some demobilisation. Such a clause would probably have been meaningless and unenforceable when it came to armies, since they could be assembled and disbanded quickly.²⁰ If any demobilisation clause did exist, it probably affected navies. Sinclair argues that the demobilisation of armies and navies, to which Xenophon refers in the passage cited above, was a practical consequence of the Peace, and not an article.²¹ But then why would Xenophon mention the demobilisation at all? Cawkwell is correct to think that the demobilisation clause existed, and that it explains Isocrates' reference to pirates controlling the sea after the King's Peace (4.115).²²

The demobilisation of forces also affected the fortification of cities. Evidence for the King's Peace decreeing the 'openness' of cities is present in the Piraeus Gates.²³ The walls and fortifications destroyed after the Peloponnesian War are known to have been reconstructed ca. 394,²⁴ but in 378 Sphodrias wished to attack the Piraeus because it had no gates (*Hell.* 5.4.20). The Gates were removed in accordance with the King's Peace. The ostensible reasons for Sparta's attack on Mantinea, where Sparta demanded

²⁰ A point on which both Cawkwell, "King's Peace," 74 and Sinclair, "King's Peace," 34 agree.

²¹ Sinclair, "King's Peace," 36.

²² Cawkwell, "King's Peace," 74.

²³ G. L. Cawkwell, "The Foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy," CQ 23, no. 1 (1973): 54; *contra* Sinclair, "King's Peace," 33-34; rebutted in Cawkwell, "King's Peace," 74-75.

²⁴ Diod. 14.85.2-3; Dem. 20.68, 72-74; *Hell.* 4.8.9-10; IG II² 1656-64; Philoch. F146.

that the walls be taken down and the population decentralised (Diod. 15.5),²⁵ also denote the existence of some article in the Peace for open cities. This was not a provision requiring destruction of all walls, but rather a vaguer reference instructing cities to permit other signatories' inspection (thus explaining why the Mantineans were ordered to destroy their walls – they refused to accede to Sparta's demands for openness²⁶). That being said, the practicalities (and specifics) of this clause are perplexing. While there is evidence enough to posit the existence of a clause demanding 'openness' with the gates and Mantinea, no one has yet explained how exactly such a clause would be constructed (nor is it attempted here).

The open cities provision would affect every city, but Athens was the direct target of both clauses. In the previous five years she had made definite moves under Thrasybulus and Agyrrhius to expand into the Aegean again. Concessions were made for old colonies – Lemnos, Imbros, Scyros – but the Peace needed to ensure limitations were imposed on the city's ability to continue along her current imperial route.

Isocrates famously describes the Great King as “protector of the peace” (4.175) and “master of the current state of affairs” (4.121). Xenophon also includes the threat of war against those who transgress the terms of the Peace in the decree spoken by Tiribazus (ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται, τούτοις ἐγὼ πολεμήσω μετὰ τῶν ταῦτα βουλομένων καὶ πεζῇ καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ χορήμασιν). So Artaxerxes seems to have sworn to the Peace alongside the Greeks. This is also suggested in epigraphic (RO 20) and literary evidence from Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Lys.* 12). But he was not a participant; he was guarantor and separate from the conditions of the Peace. On several occasions writers say that oaths were made to (πρός) the king (Arr. *An.* 2.1.4; Paus. 9.1.4; *Hell.* 7.1.40 in 367). Furthermore,

²⁵ See below, pp. 170-71.

²⁶ Cf. Clark, “The Date of IG II² 1604,” 64, arguing that the open cities were the result of a “clause prohibiting gates on harbour defenses in Greece,” but who is inclined to agree with Sinclair: “furthermore, as incredible as it seems that through slackness or poverty Athens simply neglected to complete her harbour defences during the Peace, the alternative, that mainland Greeks allowed the King to dictate that their ports were to be unguarded, is at least as implausible” (p. 65). Based on the Spartan demands when attacking Mantinea (discussed below), I believe the clauses pertaining to fortifications were more extensive than harbour defences.

Artaxerxes was not bound to leave Greek cities autonomous as the Greek signatories were. This denotes the status of the king as issuer and guarantor of the Peace, not co-signatory.²⁷ Artaxerxes' separation from such aspects is also demonstrated by the non-aggression clauses concerning Cyprus and Asia, which do not extend universally to Artaxerxes' empire. For example, Chabrias was permitted to fight against the king on behalf of the Egyptians, and when Pharnabazus requested his withdrawal, it was not in the name of the Peace, but rather that he was "estranging the king's favour from the Athenians" (Diod. 15.29.3-4).²⁸ Non-aggression was secured for those regions explicitly stated in the Peace. Thus, it did not include Egypt.²⁹ The exclusion of Egypt from the Peace was a result of pragmatism – Egypt could not be policed, but the forthcoming invasion of Cyprus could combat Greeks on the island.

Cawkwell utilises Isocrates' *Panegyricus* (128) to emphasise that Artaxerxes was envisaged as a military ally to support the Spartan administration of the Peace.³⁰ While technically correct, for our purposes Cawkwell's conclusion should be moderated. After returning from the court of the king with Tiribazus, Antalcidas immediately undertook joint military operations with the Achaemenids against the Athenians, in a move which would directly affect their later chances of obtaining a general peace, for Athens came to fear the situation the campaign produced (*Hell.* 5.1.29). But no other military partnership is evident in the sources. Nor is Artaxerxes ever required to enforce the Peace himself - the threat made in its declaration never manifested as military activity. Once peace was decreed, the Greeks administered it themselves. This is an important point to acknowledge. If Artaxerxes was genuinely interested in the Peace, he would be seen to have played an active role in its administration. The reality

²⁷ Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, 40n1 argues that Artaxerxes was only guarantor of the Peace for its initial conclusion. His involvement in the rescripts (375: Diod. 15.38.1; 366: see below, p. 280-82), and the references to Greeks trying to abide by their treaties with the king suggest that the Greeks and Artaxerxes himself saw the Persian king as a continual participant (Theopomp. F103.7: καὶ ὡς Ἀθηναίων ἢ πόλις ταῖς πρὸς βασιλέα συνθήκαις ἐπειρᾶτο ἐμμένειν; Dem. 15.9: 'μὴ λύοντα τὰς σπονδὰς τὰς πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα'). See also Cawkwell, "King's Peace," 77, arguing that the king was central to the Peace.

²⁸ Badian, "King's Peace," 42-43n36.

²⁹ *Contra* Stylianou, *Commentary*, 260, where Pharnabazus' protest "must have been based on the King's Peace."

³⁰ Cawkwell, "King's Peace," 77.

is that he was detached from the situation in Greece. While Isocrates may have thought the Persians and Sparta were in a perpetual military agreement, he was wrong. As pointed out above, their relationship was one of convenience, and closeness to the Spartans could be perceived as a fault at the Achaemenid court.³¹

Sparta's position in the Peace was that of *prostates*. Having returned from court after securing an alliance, the Spartans then dictated how other parties could swear to the Peace (namely the Thebans), and generally took all advantages possible to advance their own position. Irrespective of whether they were defined as *prostates* in the terms of the Peace, they acted as such.³² And they were not challenged in taking on the position. Diodorus relates that the Spartans, hungry for power, soon expanded their control over the Peloponnese, slowly incorporating the weaker, then the stronger cities of the region. Their policy reflects ambivalence towards their allies and advancement of their own aims above all else.³³ This, it seems, was often achieved within the technical boundaries of the Peace through fostering partisan political groups in the cities which eventually required Spartan involvement (Diod. 15.5.2).

Mantineia was the first significant city with which the Spartans engaged (Diod. 15.5). When Mantineia asked Athens for support, Athens refused. The reason given was that the Athenians were unwilling transgress the terms of the treaty. Critical to our understanding of the Peace is the Spartan demands when attacking Mantineia: "first of all, therefore, they [the Spartans] dispatched ambassadors to Mantineia, commanded them to destroy their walls and all of them to remove to their original five villages" (Diod. 15.5.4). Given the likely existence of a clause requiring open cities among the signatories, the first demand might be crucial in indicating how the Spartans managed to besiege the city while remaining within the bounds of the Peace: the argument provided by their ambassadors may have been that the walled city violated the requirement of the Peace for (at least partially) open cities. Athens was forced remove the Piraeus Gates, and so Mantineia should match the behaviour. Certainly the

³¹ Above, p. 163.

³² Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 370.

³³ R. E. Smith, "The Opposition to Agesilaus' Foreign Policy 394-371 B.C.," *Historia* 2, no. 3 (1954): 275.

reported denial of all wrongdoing (as well as Athens' reaction³⁴) indicates that some technicality was able to be applied to the city (Polyb. 4.27.6).

The demand to decentralise the villages also suggests that an openness clause was enforced here – the centralisation of the Mantinean villages within the city walls, in Sparta's eyes, demonstrated the Mantineans' unwillingness to be open.³⁵ The participation of other cities in the attack on Mantinea confirms that Sparta was here acting as administrator of the Peace. The Thebans may have been drawn into the fray (Paus. 9.13; Plut. *Pel.* 4), as well as Peloponnesian allies.³⁶ The events at Mantinea are evidence that Sparta was defined as an administrator of some sort in the clauses of the Peace (as is the lack of opposition³⁷): she was applying technicalities to police her interpretation, and called on allies for assistance. For all intents and purposes, however, it does not matter whether Sparta was listed as the *prostates* of the King's Peace – she behaved as such regardless.

Sparta's call for assistance from other signatories also suggests that there was some sanctions clause defining the procedure for responding to transgressors. It is clear from the decree read by Tiribazus, however, that *poleis* were not obliged to render assistance to victims of aggression or in responding to transgressors unless they wished to do so (*Hell.* 5.1.31).³⁸

In tracing Sparta's interventions, some indication of the Peace's true worth in Greek diplomacy may be found: the Peace is never called upon as grounds for a threat of action after Sparta's initial opportunistic moves against her neighbours, and nor is

³⁴ See also Seager, "The King's Peace and the Balance of Power," 41: Athens' reaction "need not of course be taken as a serious judgment on the moral or legal questions at stake, but simply as an indication that Athens was too weak to risk incurring Sparta's displeasure."

³⁵ Hornblower, *Greek World*, 204 has previously utilised this concentration of villages as the possible technical violation of the Peace. See also Peter Funke, "Sparta und die peloponnesische Staatenwelt zu beginn des 4. Jahrhunderts und der Diokismos von Mantinea," in *Xenophon and his World*, ed. C. J. Tuplin and Vincent Azoulay (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2004), 427-35 for Sparta's motivations.

³⁶ Thebes: cf. J. Buckler, "The Alleged Theban-Spartan Alliance of 386 BC," *Eranos* 78 (1980): 184-85; their involvement is dismissed as fiction by Cartledge, *Agésilaios*, 259. Peloponnesian: Cartledge, *Agésilaios*, 259; *contra* Harold M. Hack, "Thebes and the Spartan Hegemony, 386-382 B.C.," *AJPh* 99, no. 2 (1978): 217n21.

³⁷ Cawkwell, "King's Peace," 78.

³⁸ Stylianou, *Commentary*, 167.

Artaxerxes ever employed as a threat against antagonistic Greek states. The administration of the Peace has led to assertions of Sparta usurping the role reserved for Artaxerxes and arranging Greece in her interests.³⁹ While Agesilaus usurped the Great King's ostensible role, one must remember what exactly Artaxerxes sought to achieve with the Peace. While he was listed as guarantor, he had no vested interests in Greece; in 386, what did he care about Thebes swearing on behalf of the Boeotians? The Thebans had shown no imperial ambition detectable at his court. Sparta's decision played into Persia's hands. Sparta would expend her own resources and deconstruct the alliances on mainland Greece, further reducing opportunity for the Greeks to interfere where Artaxerxes was actually interested: Asia, Cyprus, and Egypt. To have Sparta serve as an aggressive and self-serving *prostates* of the Peace, official or otherwise, suited the Peace's purpose admirably. Sparta exploited the Peace to the detriment of the Greeks, not the Persians.⁴⁰ For her part, Sparta was not naïve. She still retained ties with the king of Egypt and anonymous dynasts in Asia (Isoc. 6.63, 73).

The Chronology of the 380s

Diodorus recounts that in 386 Artaxerxes made war upon Evagoras (15.2.1). But the war's chronology is far from certain. The best-founded chronology on the basis of current knowledge is:

Dates (ca.)	Events
391/0	Autophradates and Hecatomnus campaign against Evagoras.
391-387	Pharnabazus, Tithraustes and Abrocomas invade Egypt. Athens and Sparta interfere on Cyprus. Evagoras secures alliance with Acoris. Hecatomnus conspires with Evagoras.
387/6	The King's Peace.
386-384	Tiribazus and Orontes lead Persian force against Evagoras.

³⁹ Seager, "The King's Peace and the Balance of Power," 38: "Agesilaus ... was usurping for Sparta and himself the position of arbiter"; Stylianou, *Commentary*, 174: "there is enough to show that Sparta took full advantage of the provisions of the King's Peace to arrange Greece in her interests."

⁴⁰ Cf. Isoc. 12.160. See John Buckler and Hans Beck, *Central Greece and the Politics of Power in the Fourth Century BC* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 71-77 for more on Sparta's use of the Peace for her own ends.

	Glos required to put down mutiny when Evagoras cuts Persian supply lines.
384	Battle of Citium. Tiribazus receives 2000 talents to execute the land war.
383	Evagoras returns to Cyprus from Egypt. Orontes accuses Tiribazus of deception. Glos revolts.
383-381	Artaxerxes campaigns against Cadusians.
381	Evagoras comes to terms with Persians.
380	The trial of Tiribazus. Glos' revolt ends.

These date largely follow the chronology of Stylianou.⁴¹ The data, however, is in need of re-examination owing to the publication of new evidence and arguments by Van der Spek in 1998.⁴² Furthermore, Stylianou does not attempt to provide a cohesive picture of the empire's aims and actions during this decade. He deals only with facts as they pertain to Diodorus' narrative.

Although Diodorus and Theopompus agree that the Cypriot campaign began with Autophradates and Hecatomnus in the late 390s, they do not discuss the strategy employed. Evagoras had taken enough of the island at this point to prompt the petitioning of Artaxerxes by representatives of Amathus, Soli, and Citium. Diodorus would have it that Hecatomnus alone was appointed to lead the expedition (14.98.3-4); Theopompus identifies Hecatomnus as naval commander, and Autophradates as his land counterpart (F103.4). Given Artaxerxes' use of two commanders (Pharnabazus and Conon) in the 390s, and following the King's Peace (Tiribazus and Orontes), Theopompus' version appears consistent with contemporary policy and is therefore preferable. Artaxerxes may have also had qualms about giving a new satrap total control of a campaign (Hecatomnus later justified any doubts); it was surely better to trust an entrenched satrap of a loyal region (Lydia) and test Hecatomnus' worth.

The only supplementary data provided is that Hecatomnus was not fully committed to the cause. We do not know whether this treachery began early in his appointment, if it was prompted by any specific event, or how extensive it was.

⁴¹ Stylianou, *Commentary*, 152-53.

⁴² Van der Spek, "Chronology," 240-51.

Isocrates simply says that Hecatomnus was disaffected (ἀφέστηκεν) for a long time (4.162), but long-term rejection of the king's authority is difficult to reconcile with his recent promotion (that is, unless Isocrates referred to Hecatomnus' ideological disassociation from the king, which is more understandable owing to Hecatomnus' position as an indigenous dynast under the thumb of a foreign power). Diodorus provides the only details (15.2.3), and says that Evagoras received a strong force from Acoris, and money from Hecatomnus.

Hecatomnus' deception may be located either when Hecatomnus was admiral, or after his demotion from command. If Hecatomnus did secretly supply Evagoras while being admiral, it could explain why Autophradates' was unable to subdue the Cypriot. In this case, his disingenuousness can be further narrowed down to the same period as when Evagoras was sending ambassadors to Athens (Lys. 19.21-23), Athens was dispatching squadrons of ships to the Salaminian, and Evagoras first made contact with Acoris. This flurry of activity could have concealed Hecatomnus' own movements against the Persians, and the connection of Acoris and Hecatomnus' efforts in Diodorus' source would then be explained as an episode occurring at approximately the same time.

On the other hand, Diodorus refers to Hecatomnus' underhandedness after Orontes and Tiribazus were appointed to lead the expedition (under the year 386). Having made the comment in the midst of listing the other alliances Evagoras made, and after detailing the preparation for the invasion, Diodorus may be indicating that Hecatomnus' support of the Cypriot eventuated only after Hecatomnus was stripped of command and when Evagoras was in a very strong position. Given the immense problems Diodorus poses in this period, it is difficult to trust his chronology fully. Dating Hecatomnus' deception to when he was in command with Autophradates seems preferable because he would have had the best opportunity to make contact

with Evagoras while he was involved with the Cypriot mission, but the later date cannot be dismissed.⁴³

In 387/6 Tiribazus and Orontes were appointed to lead the renewed campaign against Evagoras (Diod. 15.2.2). Autophradates and Hecatomnus failed, and the second attack would carry greater force. The King's Peace was the diplomatic vanguard to the attack. Tiribazus would lead the naval contingent, and Orontes the army. The co-commanders were equal until Tiribazus' promotion to overall command after his journey to Artaxerxes post-the battle of Citium. The political stature of the two commanders gives a strong indication of the campaign's importance. Orontes was the king's son-in-law (*An.* 2.4.8; 3.4.13; Diod. 15.2.1). Tiribazus had been forgiven for his mistakes in the 390s and had excelled with the recent pro-Sparta changes in policy. He had campaigned successfully with Antalcidas, helped implement the King's Peace, and was now to recover a key island. He was well trusted within the administration (*An.* 4.4.4; *Art.* 10.1). The involvement of Tiribazus in the Aegean and the reading of the Peace serve as a *terminus post quem* for the second assault on Cyprus. Tiribazus' own son-in-law, Glos (son of Tamos) served as his subordinate.⁴⁴

Although the numbers allocated to the venture in Diodorus (300,000 men and 300 triremes: 15.2.1) are too large to be true, their relative size may reflect the perceived importance of the campaign.⁴⁵ A portion of the fleet was probably a remnant of Tiribazus' campaign with Antalcidas prior to the King's Peace. These forces were to respond to Evagoras at his peak. Evagoras had made an alliance with Acoris and received a strong force, was funded by Hecatomnus, and had received "not a few" troops from the king of the Arabs, certain others ill-disposed to the Persians, and others who were secretly and openly opposed to Persia (Diod. 15.2.3-4). Many troops

⁴³ E.g. the later date is accepted by H. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers, from the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 58. Stylianou, *Commentary*, 160 prefers the early date. Cf. Ruzicka, *Politics of a Persian Dynasty*, 26-29, who dismisses the claims of Hecatomnus' deception. Ruzicka admits that his rationale is highly speculative (p. 27).

⁴⁴ For various positions at the beginning of the campaign see Stylianou, *Commentary*, 155-57; R. A. Burn, "Persia and the Greeks," in *The Median and Achaemenian Periods*, ed. Ilya Gershevitch, *The Cambridge History of Iran 2* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 369.

⁴⁵ Applying the same logic as Whatley, "Reconstructing Marathon and Other Ancient Battles," 127 does to battles.

were dispatched to Evagoras by his allies, and these were to supplement six thousand of Evagoras' own soldiers. Evagoras also had a formidable fleet initially composed of seventy Cypriot and twenty Tyrian triremes.

Strategically, Evagoras was in control of nearly all of Cyprus and had caused Cilicia to revolt (Isoc. 9.62), in addition to capturing other locations in Phoenicia, notably the critical city of Tyre. These were strategic sites necessary for the reclamation of Egypt.⁴⁶ Acoris may have similarly extended his power in this period: at some point he established an alliance with the Pisidians (Theopomp. F103.6).⁴⁷ An Egyptian campaign north into Phoenicia may also be placed here, if the presence of a trophy base can be interpreted as evidence of Egyptian presence.⁴⁸

The campaign apparently began with the Persians securing a base of operations in Cilicia. We may infer this because Cilicia was the closest secure location from which to deploy troops, from Tiribazus' Cilician staters minted in Tarsus, Soli, Issus, and Mallus,⁴⁹ and the emphasis Diodorus places on Cilicia in his account (15.3). As he was situated on an island, and was in possession of a number of vessels suitable for piracy, Evagoras immediately set about attacking the Persian supply lines, hoping to cut off the land troops from their bases on the mainland. The tactic proved successful. Merchants became so fearful of making the journey to Cyprus that trade ceased (15.3.1). As there was a substantial Persian force on Cyprus dependent upon such merchants, unrest arose among the Persian force. Eventually, mutiny broke out. The discord was severe enough that the mercenaries employed by the Persians turned on their officers. It was, apparently, only with great difficulty that the Persian generals could put down the mutiny. Diodorus credits Glos with the primary role in these events (15.3.2-3; cf. Polyæn. 7.20, which may refer to this mutiny), and the entire

⁴⁶ On the importance of Gaza and the surrounding region: H. J. Katzenstein, "Gaza in the Persian Period," *Transeuphratène* 1 (1989): 77; P. Giroud, "Gaza à l'époque perse," in *Gaza méditerranéenne: Histoire et archéologie en Palestine*, ed. J.-B. Humbert (Paris: 2000), 45-46. On the importance of Tyre: Shrimpton, "Persian Strategy," 5-8. The king of the Arabs was himself an important key to any military campaign south of Judaea. See above, p. 3.

⁴⁷ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 85.

⁴⁸ See above, p. 149n218.

⁴⁹ Discussed in chapter four.

Persian fleet was evidently re-tasked with securing the supply lines and retrieving grain for the army.

The gravity of the mutiny and the effort needed to re-establish the supply line between Cyprus and the mainland challenges a 386 date for the battle of Citium.⁵⁰ A 386 date requires the starvation of the army, redeployment of the fleet, and battle at Citium in less than twelve months.⁵¹ As will be found below, it is more likely that these events fall over the course of several campaigning seasons between 386 and 384.

While the events were favouring Evagoras, Acoris provided more money, grain, and supplies. The resources were employed by Evagoras to bolster his navy – sixty new ships were outfitted, and another fifty were provided by the Egyptians, bringing the total Cypriot fleet to two hundred. Evagoras trained his naval forces vigorously for an attack on the Persians, and they eventually had their opportunity as the Persian fleet sailed past Citium.⁵² This surprise attack drew on his navy's experience in piracy and surprise attacks on merchant ships; Artaxerxes' fleet was routed. Glos soon recovered and returned to confront Evagoras. Evagoras was defeated and forced to flee to Egypt with ten triremes. His son, Pnytagoras, was left in charge (Diod. 15.3.6, 4.2). Following the victory, Persian land and sea forces gathered at Salamis and besieged the city. Tiribazus, after the victory at Citium, journeyed to Artaxerxes (Diod. 15.4.2). At court, he secured a further two thousand talents for the prosecution of the war.

The date of the battle of Citium is a contentious issue which traditionally is thought to have occurred in either 386 or 381. The history of the debate is examined in Shrimpton and Van der Spek's respective papers on the topic.⁵³ In 2014, the 381 date for the battle is untenable. Van der Spek, while reviewing a Babylonian tablet (Sachs-Hunger no. -440) has determined that 381 is the appropriate date for the end of the war on Cyprus. The tablet does not explicitly state as much, but it refers to the "king of Salamis, a famous city of Cyprus." Van der Spek notes that the event must have been

⁵⁰ The date preferred by Shrimpton, "Persian Strategy," 2 and Van der Spek, "Chronology," 247.

⁵¹ Noted by Tuplin, *Achaemenid Studies*, 10 and Stylianou, *Commentary*, 154.

⁵² See Stylianou, *Commentary*, 161 for a discussion of where the Persian fleet was and the status of Citium.

⁵³ Shrimpton, "Persian Strategy," 10-12 and Van der Spek, "Chronology," 244-47.

significant to have drawn the attention of the Babylonian astronomers (p. 244): that narrows the possibilities down to the two major events of the war involving Evagoras known from the literary sources. Thus, it is either the battle at Citium or the final capitulation of Evagoras. But placing the battle in 381 would require the dating of several events implausibly in a single year. The war is generally accepted to have started in 391 (p. 242), and lasted for nearly ten years (p. 243-44: Diod. 15.9.2; Isoc. 9.64).⁵⁴ But several events must be placed between the battle at Citium and the final capitulation, namely the accusations against and arrest of Tiribazus, a possible Cadusian campaign, and Tiribazus' receipt of two thousand talents after Citium for the execution of the war. These events cannot be compressed into such a short span of time. Therefore, Van der Spek is fair to link the Babylonian tablet and the end of the Cypriot war: Evagoras' capitulation can be confidently dated to 381.

Dating the battle of Citium to 386 is less convincing. Van der Spek bases his case for this date on three arguments: (1) Diodorus' chronology, (2) the compatibility of Isocrates' 'six years wasted' on Cyprus (4.140-41), (3) the chronology of Theopompus F103.⁵⁵ All three are debatable.

Overall, there are many troubling flaws in the 386 date, many of which Tuplin has expounded.⁵⁶ In particular, the compression of events between 387 and 386 is unlikely; it leaves us with a very similar situation to the acceptance of a 381 date for the battle. Diodorus' chronology for the Cypriot revolt is, at best, unsatisfactory. This is because he compresses a decade long war into two years of his history. Both Shrimpton and Van der Spek are aware of Diodorus' flaws, and reject his positioning of other events of the war.⁵⁷ But Van der Spek argues that 15.3 should be trusted chronologically because Diodorus does not subsume the entire war after the battle of Citium. For me, the events related at the start of the passage should have more bearing on the trustworthiness of the passage's chronology than the events at the end. The

⁵⁴ Tuplin, "Lysias XIX," 178-79.

⁵⁵ Van der Spek, "Chronology," 246-48.

⁵⁶ Tuplin, *Achaemenid Studies*, 9-15.

⁵⁷ Van der Spek, "Chronology," 243, rejecting Diodorus' placing of the revolt of Glos and the trial of Tiribazus; Shrimpton, "Persian Strategy," 2-3 similarly doubting the dating of Glos and Tiribazus' arrest.

entire naval campaign of Evagoras is compressed into 15.3. Evagoras waits for the Persian supply fleet, and sinks their ships. One assumes that this happened multiple times before the merchants realised the danger of travelling to Cyprus, and began to refuse the task. By the time the merchants were sunk, a large Persian force had been ferried to Cyprus. That force then consumed all of its supplies before turning on its officers. Having seen the severity of the mutiny, Glos then had to repurpose his fleet as a supply line to the island. Evagoras could also outfit sixty ships in this period, and send for fifty more ships from Acoris. Diodorus also implies that these Egyptian ships were received, for it brought the number of Cypriot ships to two hundred. Then Evagoras had time to train his fleet. Only then does he attack the Persians as they sail past Citium. This series of events is highly unlikely to have fitted into twelve months. I maintain that, if Diodorus is known to be faulty in this war, we should not trust his positioning of the sea battle.

Isocrates is also invoked as support for the 386 date.⁵⁸ Inferences about what event Isocrates refers to in 380 when he says the Persians wasted 'six years' on Cyprus (4.140-41) are questionable – Citium is a possibility for the event which he thought of as beginning the six wasted years, but so too is the King's Peace and the first stage of the Tiribazus/Orontes invasion of Cyprus (i.e. the second Persian attempt to pacify the island).

More weight is placed on the chronology of Theopompus F103 by Shrimpton and Van der Spek, but the details of this fragment are not without their own faults. Some emphasis is placed on, specifically, §5-8. According to Shrimpton (pp. 11-15), if one accepts the chronology of F103, the sea battle (i.e. Citium) took place between the reading of the terms of the King's Peace at Sardis, and the ratification of the terms at the official conference in Sparta; this chronology is endorsed by Van der Spek.⁵⁹ The chronology of this fragment is not satisfactory, and should not be trusted as a source of chronographic inference without good corroborating evidence. It is, in the end, an

⁵⁸ Shrimpton, "Persian Strategy," 11 (which he notes is equivocal); Van der Spek, "Chronology," 246.

⁵⁹ Van der Spek, "Chronology," 247-48.

epitome of the true article.⁶⁰ Tuplin has noted several serious difficulties with accepting Theopompus F103 as an ordered chronological progression.⁶¹ These range from the appearance of Acoris' alliance with the Pisidians in §13 in the midst of the 370s, while it must precede 380, to the focus of the epitome on Acoris. In addition to Tuplin's points, I emphasise the fault Shrimpton himself acknowledges: how could the Athenians have tried to abide by a treaty which was not yet in force (§7).⁶² In §6 the King's Peace is arbitrated; in §7 the Athenians attempt to abide by a treaty (referring to the Spartan acts against Mantinea in 385); in §8 the Peace of Antalcidas is instituted. There is a clear chronological aberration in F103 which renders it defunct as the basis for confirming the date of Citium. Stronger weight may be placed on Isocrates' six years, but we do not know whether he means the King's Peace or Citium or the second invasion of Cyprus. As a result, neither of the traditional dates for Citium are satisfactory.

Instead, it seems preferable to abandon Diodorus Siculus and Theopompus, and the 386 date, and in its place adopt a broader, but less troublesome date, ca. 384.⁶³ The six years reckoning - from Isocrates' six years frittered away - should then be measured from the King's Peace in 387/6 and the invasion of Cyprus which immediately followed, not from the battle of Citium. After all, Isocrates probably knew that Artaxerxes was most concerned about Egypt and Cyprus, and 387/6 is when Tiribazus focused on the island. As the initial manoeuvres of 390 were not considered to be anti-Persian at the time, the six years should not be reckoned from 391/0.⁶⁴ A ca.

⁶⁰ See, for example, George G. Cameron, "The Persian Satrapies and Related Matters," *JNES* 32, no. 1/2 (1973): 55.

⁶¹ Tuplin, *Achaemenid Studies*, 13-14.

⁶² R. D. Milns and J. R. Ellis, "Theopompus, Fragment 103 Jacoby," *PP* 21 (1966): 56-60; acknowledged by Shrimpton, "Persian Strategy," 12n19. Milns and Ellis argue that §7 in fact refers to the Athenian agreement with Chios in 384 (*RO* 20; pp. 57-58), but this has not gained traction in other modern studies. The δέ of this section should (it seems to me) be interpreted as connecting and contrasting the transgressions of the Spartans with the events of the preceding clause (the good behaviour of the Athenians). The Lacedaemonians are not recorded to have had any involvement with any Chian agreement in this period, and the two *poleis'* actions are attested concerning Mantinea.

⁶³ Stylianou, *Commentary*, 152-53.

⁶⁴ On Shrimpton's interpretation of the six years reckoning, see Tuplin, *Achaemenid Studies*, 12, which I follow here.

384 date also means that there is no difficulty retaining the events in Diodorus' narrative: before the battle there are several campaigning seasons for Evagoras' attack on the Persian supply lines to take effect, and after the battle there are several seasons for Tiribazus to journey to court, and Orontes' accusations to be sent to Artaxerxes.

Indeed, one wonders what exactly was happening on Cyprus in these six years wasted before Evagoras' eventual agreement with the Persians (we will turn to this question below). The gap in events is generally filled with an invasion of Egypt, and occasionally a Cadusian campaign.⁶⁵ However it seems most unlikely that three wars should have been fought in the same period willingly.⁶⁶ The Cypriot and Cadusian campaigns were forced upon the Persians (both Cypriots and Cadusians being rebellious and having a history of it); to have willingly invaded Egypt in the same period would overextend resources.

Van der Spek, for his part, considers a Cadusian campaign in the 380s most unlikely, and argues that only one took place, in 369.⁶⁷ This chronology would remove one obstacle presented to a 385 Egyptian campaign – one may more easily comprehend a willing entry into another theatre if the Cadusians were not a problem in this decade. But Van der Spek's arguments are not wholly convincing. While demonstrating that a campaign against the Cadusians did take place ca. 369, he makes the point that it is dangerous to propose a second campaign against the Cadusians when the sources know of only one. We should, by his understanding, take all literary references to campaigns against the Cadusians in the reign of Artaxerxes as references to a campaign ca. 369.⁶⁸ There are, however, some reasons to doubt that interpretation of the evidence. Here it is argued that a Cadusian campaign should be placed in the 380s owing to the chronological markers in the literary sources which cannot be

⁶⁵ E.g. Olmstead, *History*, 400-01; Cook, *Persian Empire*, 216-17; Van der Spek, "Chronology," 248; Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 652; Brosius, *Persians*, 28.

⁶⁶ Ronald Syme, "The Cadusii in History and in Fiction," *JHS* 108 (1988): 139 appears to have been similarly suspicious of the activities in the period, calling the war "a peculiar enterprise, as though Artaxerxes did not already have to confront sundry emergencies."

⁶⁷ Van der Spek, "Chronology," 249-53.

⁶⁸ Van der Spek, "Chronology," 249.

accommodated in a 360s date. The events of Plutarch *Art.* 24 should be placed in a second Cadusian campaign in the early 360s.⁶⁹

Significantly, all references to these Cadusian campaigns take place with contextual clues to give some indication of chronology. To ignore such evidence simply because there is no explicit reference to two campaigns is unsatisfactory. An isolated reference in itself is not objectionable: we would not know of any 380s Egyptian invasion if not for Isocrates, nor of Agesilaus' eastern campaigning if not for P (*Hell. Oxy.* 21-22). In Diodorus (15.8.5), Tiribazus was accused of treachery at some time in the 380s because Orontes was jealous of his position, while the war against Cyprus was ongoing. Artaxerxes trusted Orontes, and so brought Tiribazus to trial. Diodorus explicitly states that this trial took place after the Cadusian war, and Tiribazus was put under guard until that time. That date is difficult to accept if one campaign ca. 369 is demanded. Van der Spek nonetheless believes that a (minimum) ten year delay until trial is plausible: "in that case [i.e. only one Cadusian campaign – in 369] Tiribazus would have been acquitted only then, and this is not impossible. We hear nothing about this high official between 381 and the late 360s when he is at court, which may mean that he was kept in custody at Susa for several years, that he accompanied Artaxerxes to Cadusia and was restored to honour afterwards, as a reward for his services in this war."⁷⁰ A ten year delay seems unlikely – there would have been some point in a decade when the case could be heard, especially for a figure as highly ranked as Tiribazus. Likewise, the argument from silence is flawed – no mention is made in this period of innumerable other Persian officials (e.g. Abrocomas,⁷¹ Strouthas, Rhathines, and Ariaeus).

Van der Spek notes the problems posed by Nepos (*Dat.* 1.2) for any attempt to date the Cadusian campaign to 369.⁷² Nepos stated that Datames first served under

⁶⁹ Van der Spek's reading of the tablet on which he bases the 369 campaign against the Cadusians is contested. Stolper, "Mesopotamia," 239 takes Razaundu (the location specified in the diary) to be the town/region against which the king warred, and distinct from Cadusia. See also Binder, *Kommentar*, 316-21. Waters, *Ancient Persia*, 190 follows Stolper's reading.

⁷⁰ Van der Spek, "Chronology," 249.

⁷¹ In literature; he may well feature on Xenophontos' *lekythos* ca. 380. St Petersburg, State Hermitage Museum P 1837.2.

⁷² Van der Spek, "Chronology," 249n10.

Artaxerxes as a palace guard, rose to prominence in the king's campaign against the Cadusians, and as a result was promoted to be satrap of Cilicia. This would mean Datames only became satrap in 369. Thus, he would rather improbably have become commander of the Egyptian expedition in the 370s with no record of a position of authority, superseding the experienced Tithraustes. There is a chronological sequence if a 380s Cadusian campaign is supposed, and a clear context: statements about Datames' involvement in the Cadusian campaign are not isolated facts, but are points in a sequence of events. The progression moves smoothly: begins career as guard – shows valour against the Cadusians – rewarded with governorship – captures Thuys – appointed to command for Egyptian campaign. Diodorus' account operates similarly – his references are all clearly located within the context of his narrative. He starts with the arrest of Tiribazus in the 380s (15.8.5), relates the revolt of Glos (15.9), returns to the trial of Tiribazus (after the war against the Cadusians: 15.10-11), then returns to the 380s in Greece with the Spartan siege of Mantinea (15.12). The account of the campaign in Plutarch's *Artaxerxes* 24 is also signalled. Plutarch opens with the 370s campaign against Egypt, which exacerbated Artaxerxes' alleged distrust of his commanders. As a result, he decided to make war against the Cadusians himself. Plutarch is oversimplifying the Persian relationship with the Cadusians here. They were troublesome subjects of the empire – they probably did not consider themselves part of the empire at all. So it was not simply that Artaxerxes distrusted his commanders that he decided to attack the Cadusians himself: the Cadusians were difficult and Achaemenid kings had a long tradition of campaigning personally against them.⁷³ *Art.* 24-25 is clearly, however, placed after the 370s.⁷⁴ The other source which may have bearing is Trogus (*Prol.* 10). Unfortunately, he is ambiguous, saying that after the war

⁷³ See below, p. 275.

⁷⁴ Cf. Binder, *Kommentar*, 320 discussion of *Art.* 24, which reaches the conclusion that there is only one Cadusian campaign, and it falls 385/4. Plutarch's account indicates clearly to me that there was some campaign after the second invasion of Egypt. If Van der Spek has interpreted Sachs-Hunger no. -369 correctly, it would support this conclusion. Tiribazus' apparent third fall from grace (after 392/1, in 380s after Orontes' accusations, and apparently in 360s prior to the second Cadusian campaign) is not difficult to explain. Tiribazus is characterised by his levity in the sources. *Art.* 5.4 and 27.5 could indicate that his fortunes at court frequently rose and fell because of his personality quirks.

with Evagoras, and preparations against Egypt, Artaxerxes was defeated by the Cadusii. The account can preclude neither a 380s nor a 360s campaign. On the basis of the above series of references made in the context of the 380s, the simplest solution is to accept that two Cadusian campaigns took place.

On the other hand, Nepos is unreliable as a chronographer.⁷⁵ Fortunately his contextual clues are corroborated by Diodorus. The similarities between Diodorus (15.10.1) and Plutarch (*Art.* 25.3) are more complicated.⁷⁶ They may indicate that Diodorus and Plutarch are relating the same episode: in both cases there is a court purge prior to the trial. In Diodorus it is related to corruption among the judges, in Plutarch it is a general purge of the top men as Artaxerxes lashed out after his failure to subdue the Cadusians. Unfortunately, Plutarch's summary is so brief that there are no specifics to compare between his account and Diodorus' version. The similarities have not been explicitly discussed elsewhere, and they are either passed over in silence,⁷⁷ or silently accepted as relating the same event.⁷⁸ Here it is suggested that they are separate events. Diodorus says that other judges (ἕτεροι δικάσται) who were believed to be corrupted were flayed alive (15.10.1). No number is provided. As the three elected for Tiribazus' trial sit on their skins, however, one suspects that it could not be many more than three. Plutarch says that Artaxerxes held his chief men in suspicion, and he put many to death because of anger, and more out of fear (ἐν ὑποψίαις εἶχε τοὺς πρώτους: καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ἀνήρει δι' ὀργήν: *Art.* 25.3). This sounds like a large number of men. Furthermore, later in the *Life of Artaxerxes* (29.4-6), Plutarch makes use of the standard δικάσται to refer to judges. In *Art.* 25.3, if he was relating the same episode as Diodorus in 15.10.1, one wonders why Plutarch would not have specified that judges were executed. Why amend his source to chief men - for dramatic effect? It is a highly contentious question, with no clear solution.

⁷⁵ Josef Geiger, *Cornelius Nepos and Ancient Political Biography* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1985), 110-12.

⁷⁶ On the historicity of the trial in Diodorus, see below, p. 189.

⁷⁷ E.g. Stylianou, *Commentary*, *ad locum*.

⁷⁸ Stevenson, *Persica*, 96. Binder, *Kommentar*, *ad locum* does not make reference to Diodorus 15.10.1.

Overall, although Nepos is not reliable as a chronological anchor for any scholarly debate, here it is contested that one should deny the plausibility of two Cadusian campaigns in the reign of Artaxerxes. Nepos' *Life of Datames* makes little sense without a 380s campaign, and the Cadusians were known to be troublesome, so it would not be unusual for it to have taken place. And Diodorus (15.8.5) clearly states that Tiribazus' trial was delayed by the Cadusian war, which supports Nepos in this instance. Fundamentally, the notion that Tiribazus' trial was delayed by ten years is disconcerting. The existence of a Cadusian campaign in the 380s is not inconsistent with any evidence, and it resolves most difficulties with the texts.

No details of this 380s campaign against the Cadusians survive. Nepos reports that there were significant losses among the Persians, and that Datames distinguished himself in the fight (1.2). Nothing else can be said with certainty. The revolt of Thuys also belongs at the end of the 380s (Nep. *Dat.* 2-3). It would coincide with the revolts Evagoras inspired in Phoenicia. It would not be surprising if other local dynasts took the same opportunities that were present in Tyre and Phoenicia to push for greater control of their regions. The fact that Datames and Thuys were cousins may also support the view that Artaxerxes sought a diplomatic solution to the revolt (Nep. *Dat.* 2.2-3).⁷⁹ At the same time, the greatest threat was likely posed by Glos, the son-in-law of Tiribazus. Tiribazus had been imprisoned after his lack of success following Citium, and following the accusations of Orontes. Glos rebelled out of fear that he too would be implicated in the charges. Glos' revolt will be detailed more fully below.

First, it is necessary to relate the charges against Tiribazus, the account of his trial preserved in Diodorus (15.8, 10), and the confirmation offered by Theopompus (F103.9).⁸⁰ Where the two accounts differ is in the instigator of communication with Artaxerxes: Diodorus has Orontes writing to the king to accuse Tiribazus; Theopompus says that Evagoras initiated contact. The latter account might plausibly

⁷⁹ J. Daniel Bing, "Datames and Mazaeus: The Iconography of Revolt and Restoration in Cilicia," *Historia* 47, no. 1 (1998): 47.

⁸⁰ See also discussion of judges in C. J. Tuplin, "The Administration of the Achaemenid Empire," in *Coinage and Administration in the Athenian and Persian Empires*, ed. Ian Carradice, BAR International Series 343 (Oxford: BAR, 1987), 119-20; Stylianou, *Commentary*, 187-88. On Orontes' accusations, generally, see Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 19-22.

be written off as Greek bias, but it has been proposed that the two accounts are not mutually exclusive. Osborne maintains that, though Diodorus does not suggest cooperation between Orontes and Evagoras, perhaps Orontes was not motivated purely out of self-interest (envy) and may have been manipulated by the Salaminian.⁸¹

Motives aside, the charges brought against Tiribazus are clear (Diod. 15.8.3). Orontes claimed that: (1) although Tiribazus could take Salamis, he was stalling, trying to come to some common cause with Evagoras; (2) Tiribazus was in negotiations with the Spartans; (3) Tiribazus sent to the Pythia, asking for information regarding his plans to revolt; (4) Tiribazus was converting the troops to his own cause. All charges were plausible and based on fact. Negotiations with Evagoras were protracted (Diod. 15.8.2-3); Tiribazus had a history with the Spartans (e.g. *Hell.* 5.1.25); he did not deny sending to the oracle at Delphi (Diod. 15.10.2); he could not deny having the loyalty of his soldiers unless he wished to suggest that they were disloyal. Given the order to detain Tiribazus and dispatch him to court for trial (Diod. 15.8.5), Orontes may have been involved personally in his arrest; the scenes presented in Plutarch and Polyaeus seem so theatrical that they may be treated with extreme scepticism (Plut. *Mor.* 168e; Polyaeus. 7.14).

The trial scene as presented by Diodorus is also theatrical to the extreme (15.10). The introduction to the trial reads as a Greek sadist's delight, thrilling in the intrigues of the barbarous Persian court, and would be more suited to the grotesque tortures subjected to the individuals of Plutarch's *Life of Artaxerxes* (esp. 14.5-17). Diodorus records the discovery of corruption among the Persian judges, who were then flayed alive and had their skins stretched onto judicial benches,⁸² thus forcing their successors to cast judgement while seated upon their forebears as an example of the punishment meted out to corrupt officials.

The court proceedings were straight-forward. The letters of Orontes were read out. Tiribazus gave evidence that the agreement he wanted with Evagoras was actually better than the one which was eventually obtained by Orontes. Greek witnesses were called to confirm that the Delphic oracle would not have answered a query

⁸¹ Osborne, "Orontes," 528-29.

⁸² Stylianou, *Commentary*, 109 thinks this is an "obvious" adaptation of Herodotus 5.25.

necessitating the death of another (i.e. Artaxerxes', necessary for Tiribazus to plot a revolt).⁸³ It was argued that Tiribazus was friends with the Spartans, but this was only for Artaxerxes' benefit. This charge is particularly interesting, as it suggests some modicum of independence in the extent of Tiribazus' support of the Spartans. It would likewise indicate that the Spartans and Persians were not as closely integrated as their position as *prostatai* of the King's Peace might indicate. Thus, the charges of Orontes were answered.

Ruzicka claims that the charges against Tiribazus' conjured fears and memories of Cyrus in Artaxerxes' mind.⁸⁴ The idea is symptomatic of the general tendency to attribute Artaxerxes' responses to fear, instead of assessing context.⁸⁵ Machinations to revolt are in themselves cause for investigation, from a king's point of view. Artaxerxes' reaction cannot be attributed to a fear of Cyrus, for every revolt was of critical importance for any monarch. Broadly, the charges argued that Tiribazus was planning revolt. Ancillary charges accused Tiribazus of enquiring at the oracle at Delphi, and being friendly with the Spartans. None were specifically related to Cyrus' revolt. Cyrus made no known approach to the oracle at Delphi. It is true that Cyrus had friendly relations with his generals,⁸⁶ but that relationship cannot be isolated to Cyrus. And Cyrus was friendly with the Spartans (e.g. Lysander: *Hell.* 2.1.14). But many Persians were. Pharnabazus' son was a guest-friend of Agesilaus (*Hell.* 4.1.39-40; *Plut. Ag.* 13.1-4), Ariobarzanes was guest-friend's with Antalcidas (*Hell.* 5.1.28), and Artaxerxes called Antalcidas his friend as well (*Art.* 22.3). Being a friend of the Spartans was not in itself a mark against one's character under Artaxerxes. Cyrus' revolt *may* have made Artaxerxes more receptive to charges of treachery (there is no evidence, however, which attests to that), but it goes beyond the evidence to suggest that Orontes specifically set out to evoke memories of Cyrus in Tiribazus' charges.

Tiribazus concluded his case with numerous examples of his good service to the king. Artaxerxes himself was present at the trial, but elected to refrain from passing

⁸³ Stylianou, *Commentary*, 187-88.

⁸⁴ Ruzicka, "Glos," 29.

⁸⁵ See comment made in introduction, above, p. 4n14.

⁸⁶ See, for example, the reference in Trundle, *Greek Mercenaries*, 76 to Cyrus' "web of *xenia*."

judgement himself, considering it fairer to have impartial judges make the decision. Perhaps this is another mark of his mindful nature and concern for justice which pervades our sources for his character (*Art.* 2.1, 29.4-7; *Diod.* 15.10). Darius I's tomb at Naqsh-e Rostam also emphasises the importance of justice in the presentation of an Achaemenid monarch,⁸⁷ so the behaviour was not unprecedented. If there is any truth to Diodorus' introduction (15.10.1), returning from his campaign against the Cadusians, Artaxerxes may have been faced with a minor crisis at court, with the discovery of corruption amongst the highest ranked judges. The trial of Tiribazus was evidently one of the earliest tests of his new judges since a public purging of untrustworthy officials.

Artaxerxes probed the judges individually. The first judge said that the charges were debatable, but the benefactions given by Tiribazus to the king were not contestable. The second said that the charges were true, but Tiribazus' benefactions exceeded his offences. The third didn't think the benefactions mattered, for Tiribazus had received rewards at the time of their action, but the charges were false. Thus, Tiribazus was found innocent and honoured once more. Orontes was condemned as a liar, expelled from Artaxerxes' list of friends (does Diodorus here refer to the register of the King's Benefactors?⁸⁸), and subjected to the utmost marks of denigration. He was possibly stripped of his satrapy of Armenia at this time; he does not appear again in

⁸⁷ Roland Grubb Kent, *Old Persian: Grammar, Texts, Lexicon*, American Oriental Series 33 (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1953), DNb 8d 21-24; Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 316-17.

⁸⁸ Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 302-04.

the sources until the 360s, where he is satrap of Mysia.⁸⁹ The decisions handed down by the Persian judges are conspicuously well rounded. Ruzicka has raised and dismissed the possibility that Diodorus may have transplanted contemporary first century Roman practices into his narrative.⁹⁰ The scene presented is comparable to the other examples which exist of Persian judiciaries (*An.* 1.6.4-10; *Hdt.* 3.14.5, 31.2-5).⁹¹ One can accept the general truth of the account. One should accept that, while it is streamlined and dramatized, we see the general truth in keeping with our knowledge of Persian courts.⁹² The trial itself is firmly dated to have been after the Cadusian campaign (*Diod.* 15.8.5). In the chronology presented here, the Cadusian war is placed ca. 383-81. The final agreement with Evagoras has also been securely dated, via the Babylonian astronomical diary discussed above, to between September 382 and April 381. As the comparison of Orontes and Tiribazus' agreements with Evagoras was a key

⁸⁹ H. Troxell, "Orontes, Satrap of Mysia," *SNR* 60 (1981): 27 speculates that it was perhaps with this denigration that Orontes was stripped of his Armenian satrapy and sent to Mysia. The move to Mysia is unlikely to have been instantaneous: see Michael J. Osborne, "The Satrapy of Mysia," *Grazer Beiträge* 3 (1975): 291-309. Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 177 has grave doubts about the plausibility of Diodorus on this charge; see the (convincing) rebuttal of Michael J. Osborne, *Naturalization in Athens*, 4 vols. (Brussel: Paleis der Academiën, 1981-83), 2: 67. I make no judgement here on the value of each hypothesis, only on the validity of dismissing Diodorus' account for this reported punishment. Orontes was punished for his errors; perhaps with the loss of his satrapy. See also the reasonable comment of Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 22: "Orontes had served Artaxerxes well in the past, receiving one of the king's daughters in marriage following his support of the crown in Cyrus' rebellion ... The King may have felt that in this matter dishonour, rather than death, was a more proper punishment to inflict on his previously loyal son-in-law who had not taken up arms against the King himself, but who had accused a fellow officer of treason."

⁹⁰ Ruzicka, "Glos," 38. Stevenson, *Persica*, 31-32 wonders whether Diodorus' account derives from Ctesias.

⁹¹ Cf. Stevenson, "Lies and Invention," 32, who doubts this episode's authenticity because of the parallels to other known accounts of Achaemenid justice. Though cf. Stevenson, *Persica*, 47-48 and Michael Whitby, "Review: Stevenson, *Persica*," *CR* 53, no. 1 (2003): 251: Stevenson recognises that her methodology is subjective, and not all patterns are false.

⁹² Stylianou, *Commentary*, 109: "we may accept the kernel of 15.10f. as factual"; Ruzicka, "Glos," 37-39 voices no doubts about the kernels of truth in the account.

part of the trial, it is clear that affairs on Cyprus were concluded prior. The trial itself, in this case, can reasonably be placed ca. 380.⁹³

On Cyprus, after the battle of Citium, the sources offer little specific information. As noted above, these years are frequently thought to include Artaxerxes' first major attempt to reclaim Egypt.⁹⁴ It seems unlikely that the king, being engaged by the Cadusians and the Cypriots, would have willingly engaged Egypt in a three year campaign, even if he was capable of the act.⁹⁵ Indeed, modern commentators have perhaps been too quick to fill 384-81 with Egyptian and Cadusian campaigns. There is ample evidence to suggest that the sack of Salamis was no easy task.

Evagoras, having fled to Egypt after Citium, returned to Cyprus with fewer forces than he had hoped.⁹⁶ Here he was forced to commence negotiations with Tiribazus (Diod. 15.8.1). Evagoras refused to move on his position: he wished to receive instructions from Artaxerxes as a king to a king, not a slave. There were few practical ramifications for the Persians; Evagoras would still be subject to Persia regardless of what he called himself. Nonetheless, the terms may have been significant in Evagoras' dynastic ambitions. If Diodorus' δοῦλος is to correspond to the Persian *bandaka*, it would have meant that Evagoras would relinquish his full autonomy and on his death his territory would revert to the king – thus preventing Evagoras' sons succeeding their father.⁹⁷ Tiribazus refused to compromise and the negotiations stagnated. Nonetheless, Orontes' charges that Tiribazus was in close contact with Evagoras may indicate that there remained steady contact between parties. Tiribazus was arrested soon after. Tiribazus apparently retained the loyalty of the army on

⁹³ On the agreement brokered, see below, p. 194. Van der Spek, "Chronology," 248. Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien*, 130-31 and Shrimpton, "Persian Strategy," 16 both date Tiribazus' removal from office and Orontes' peace settlement with Evagoras to 385/4 (i.e. Diodorus' date) and 383 respectively, arguing that it was not the final settlement, which came only several years later and which could not have involved Orontes. Neither, however, explains who was in charge after Orontes' removal.

⁹⁴ See above, p. 181n65.

⁹⁵ See above, pp. 148-50.

⁹⁶ Shrimpton, "Persian Strategy," 16 thinks this is because of the (impending?) Persian invasion of Egypt, but Tuplin, *Achaemenid Studies*, 10 is right to note that this would then require Acoris to have given Evagoras a substantial supply of ships immediately prior to an invasion, which seems unlikely.

⁹⁷ Stylianou, *Commentary*, 180-81.

Cyprus, although Orontes was the land commander. The soldiers were angry with Tiribazus' arrest and did not fight well, alarming Orontes (Diod. 15.9.1). Ruzicka is sceptical of the anger – notably on the point that the troops should have been more loyal to Tiribazus than the land commander.⁹⁸ If they were a Persian corps, they should have been loyal to Orontes. If they were mercenaries (which Ruzicka thinks is more likely: cf. Isoc. 4.135), the contingent should have been loyal to the money, not the identity of the commander. On the other hand, if Tiribazus' Baal/Figure in the winged disc staters were used to pay the mercenaries, they might have had a strong association between Tiribazus (whose name was on the coins) and their ongoing payment.⁹⁹ It was likely the loss of their paymaster that irked the soldiers (mercenary or otherwise – the Persians were notoriously poor paymasters), rather than the personality of Tiribazus. If Orontes had not secured the residual bullion from Tiribazus' treasury when he arrested Tiribazus, he could not pay the soldiers.¹⁰⁰ This seems the most likely cause of the reduced performance in the field. Regardless, Orontes' alarm at the soldiers' poor performance clearly indicates that affairs on Cyprus after Citium did not progress as smoothly as is often suggested by Isocrates' generalisation that the Persians wasted six years (4.141). Likewise, the loss of the fleet to Glos may have been a far more damaging blow than the Greek authors/orators are willing to admit (or than they were aware).

Glos revolted upon the arrest of Tiribazus, fearing indictment by association (Diod. 15.9.3).¹⁰¹ This was a critical issue for the Persians, and should not be underplayed. Glos had the loyalty of the navy, which proved instrumental in the early stages of the campaign, when Evagoras broke Persian supply lines. Glos was also

⁹⁸ Ruzicka, "Glos," 32.

⁹⁹ See below, pp. 212-13.

¹⁰⁰ See further Ruzicka, "Glos," 33. Therein it is speculated that Glos may have secured the remaining money, since Diodorus places great emphasis on his wealth.

¹⁰¹ It has been argued in the past that the revolt began after the end of the Cypriot war (~379): Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, Vol. 3, Part 1, 98-99; Olmstead, *History*, 401; Kienitz, *Die politische Geschichte Ägyptens*, 87-88; T. T. B. Ryder, "Spartan Relations with Persia after the King's Peace: A Strange Story in Diodorus 15.9," *CQ* 13, no. 1 (1963): 105-09. In light of more recent scholarship, however, the revolt should begin with the arrest of Tiribazus before the end of the war: Ruzicka, "Glos," 30-31; previously accepted by George Francis Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, 4 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949-1972), 1: 139; Cook, *Persian Empire*, 217.

wealthy and well connected (his father was Cyrus' associate, Tamos: Diod. 14.19.6).¹⁰² He was diplomatically proactive: an alliance with Acoris was secured at the outbreak of Glos' revolt, and messengers were sent to Sparta (Diod. 15.9.4). The founding of Leucaea in Ionia (by Tachos – Glos' son?¹⁰³) also confirms his contact with the Asiatic Greeks (Diod. 15.18.1).¹⁰⁴ Perhaps Glos sought to cause panic at court by allying himself with the Spartans,¹⁰⁵ but that might overstate his and the Spartans' importance to Artaxerxes. The Spartans would certainly have been receptive, as would fit their pursuit of glory in the 380s. In the midst of the ongoing tumult in Phoenicia and Cyprus, Glos was attempting to secure his position and further fan the flames of revolt. While Diodorus does not offer any detail on the actions of Glos, several moves may be inferred. Diodorus' claim that Glos had the loyalty of the fleet, the sudden bold resistance of Evagoras, and the poor performance of the Persians on Cyprus (Diod. 15.9.1) would suggest a correlation between Glos' revolt and the war on Cyprus. If Evagoras and Glos cooperated to repeat the earlier attacks on Persian supply lines, a dramatic reversal of fortunes for the Persians on Cyprus is easy to envisage. With an effective navy, Evagoras had earlier demonstrated that he could stave off the land forces and starve them out. Indeed, Ruzicka believes the reward of Tiribazus and the corresponding disgrace of Orontes after Tiribazus' trial was a targeted diplomatic move against Glos.¹⁰⁶ Artaxerxes was, by punishing Orontes so severely, sending a message to Glos that he did not think Tiribazus had committed an error, and so Glos could not be punished for complicity.

The archaeological record at Salamis also suggests that capturing the city while Glos ran amok with his navy and money would be difficult. While specific details on Evagoras' harbour defences remain elusive, it is clear that Isocrates was correct about the fortification of Salamis (9.47). Remnants of the city walls and harbour suggest an

¹⁰² Ruzicka, "Glos," 23-24.

¹⁰³ Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, Vol. 3, Part 1, 99.

¹⁰⁴ On Leucaea, see Stylianou, *Commentary*, 208.

¹⁰⁵ Ruzicka, "Glos," 35.

¹⁰⁶ Ruzicka, "Glos," 33, 39-40; Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 98.

extensive, integrated city-defence structure constructed in the Classical period.¹⁰⁷ While Raban here extrapolated from the limited evidence, postulating the existence of a closable military harbour and distinct commercial and military installations, it is generally agreed that Evagoras had defended the harbour well, with the appropriate ship-sheds and slips for his triremes also available.¹⁰⁸ The most recent survey also concludes that there is enough evidence to think Raban was correct.¹⁰⁹

The defensibility of Salamis is twice asserted by Diodorus. First, while revolting from Artaxerxes III Ochus, Salamis is shown to be a stronghold – it was the final Cypriot city to succumb (Diod. 16.46.1-4). The notion is confirmed in the report of the Athenians' siege of Salamis in 449, where the Persian garrison could easily ward off the besiegers while they were well supplied (Diod. 12.4). But, while the Athenians were masters of the sea, no supplies could come to the Persians, and so an agreement was reached. The situation was reversed for Evagoras, who could readily supply his city while Glos had disrupted Persian naval operations. With a highly defensible harbour, low Persian morale, an unknown portion of the navy subverted by Glos and working against the blockade of Salamis, it is less surprising that Evagoras and his city did not fall. Without a loyal navy there was no way to restrict Evagoras' receipt of supplies from the mainland.

That Glos was remembered well enough by the inhabitants of Soli indicates that he must have left some impression on Cyprus (as Clearchus of Soli *apud* Athen. 6.256c uses Glos to identify a period of time). The mainland itself was in revolt, and would remain so until the publication of Isocrates' *Panegyricus*.¹¹⁰ This is further supported by Glos' agreements with Sparta and Egypt, and leadership of the rebellions

¹⁰⁷ A. Raban, "The heritage of ancient harbour engineering in Cyprus and the Levant," in *Proceedings of the International Symposium Cyprus and the Sea*, ed. Vassos Karageorghis and D. Michaelides (Nicosia: University of Cyprus, 1995), 163-64.

¹⁰⁸ See Vassos Karageorghis, *Salamis in Cyprus: Homeric, Hellenistic and Roman* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1969), 167; N. C. Flemming, "Report of preliminary underwater investigations at Salamis, Cyprus," *Report of the Department of Antiquities, Cyprus* 1974 (1974): 163-74; E. Malcolm Davies, "The Problem of the Missing Harbour of Evagoras at Salamis, Cyprus: A Review of the Evidence and Pointers to a Solution," *IJNA* (2012): 1-10.

¹⁰⁹ Davies, "Missing Harbour," 9.

¹¹⁰ Tuplin, *Achaemenid Studies*, 11.

in Asia.¹¹¹ The establishment of a base at Leucaea – between Cyme and Clazomenae – at would similarly indicate that Glos' revolt upset the balance in Ionia (Diod. 15.18).

Thus, after the battle of Citium, Tiribazus entered protracted negotiations with Evagoras. These stagnated until Tiribazus was arrested on suspicion of treason. But the situation was not made easier when Orontes came to command the force on Cyprus. Glos revolted, with a sum of money and the fleet. If Glos used his navy against his former masters, the Persians on Cyprus could no longer be supplied. In addition, little could be achieved against the fortified harbour of Salamis without the fleet with which Glos absconded. This resulted in a reduction of military efficiency under Orontes. Glos then kindled further dissent in Ionia, and fostered new relationships with Sparta and Egypt. This was in addition to the aforementioned revolts in Cyprus. So Isocrates remained silent on the broader situation on Cyprus when he claimed that the Persian force wasted six years. Diodorus was equally delicate with his statement that only two years was actually spent fighting (15.9.2). While there may not have been continuous fighting, it was because the Persian force was either negotiating, or suffering from the revolt of Glos, not necessarily because of ineptitude at siege warfare.

An agreement was eventually reached with Evagoras sometime between September 382 and April 381 as Orontes became increasingly concerned with Evagoras' resurgence (Sachs-Hunger no. -440; Diod. 15.9.1-2). The agreement was not in favour of the Persians. While publicly Artaxerxes reconciled with Evagoras, privately relations cannot have been the same (Isoc. 3.33-34). The diplomatic language of the settlement reflected the Persians' lack of military success: Evagoras would pay tribute, but respond to Artaxerxes as king to a king. The tribute levied may have had a negative impact on the local economy and have been quite severe, for Nicocles was said to have had nothing in the treasury when he came to power (Isoc. 3.31, 45). Equally, his financial position may be explained by the enormous cost of the war to Evagoras. The combination of both factors left Nicocles' treasury in a bad state. For his

¹¹¹ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 95.

part, Glos was eventually murdered (Diod. 15.18). His death is placed under 383 by Diodorus, but is more correctly dated to 380/79.¹¹²

The possible solutions for the chronology of the 380s are thus convoluted and complex. With the conclusion of the King's Peace, Artaxerxes had finally secured his western borders against the Greeks.¹¹³ Yet, Spartan receptiveness to Persian dissidents clearly denotes the ambiguousness of the new relationship between Persia and Sparta. No Egyptian campaign should be placed in the latter half of the 380s. Furthermore, greater care should be taken before accepting Isocrates' judgements over Persian impotence when they frittered away six years on Cyprus. These final years of 'quiet' after the battle of Citium at Cyprus were fraught with activity. With Evagoras finally subdued, likely in an arrangement hurried by the threat of Glos and Acoris (as indicated by the deal made on the same terms which were initially proposed ca. 384), Cyprus was eventually secured and Evagoras prevented from (openly) fostering revolt amongst the mainland *poleis*. Artaxerxes then quickly renewed plans to assault Egypt, returning to Pharnabazus, his key strategist in the West for two decades now, to formulate a new plan of attack and rectify the mistakes made in the Persians' first fourth century invasion.

¹¹² Ruzicka, "Glos," 40n30.

¹¹³ Olmstead, *History*, 395: "Artaxerxes might well boast that *he* had succeeded where Darius and Xerxes had failed!" (his emphasis); Buckler, *Aegean Greece*, 179-80.

CHAPTER FOUR

Numismatic Expressions of Solidarity

Coinage in the Reign of Artaxerxes

Up to this point, the work presented has been macro in nature. It deals with political history and literature. This chapter will take a different approach, and consider the ways numismatic evidence can also contribute to this reassessment of Artaxerxes.

Artaxerxes' characterisation among classical sources has spread into the field of numismatics. While Artaxerxes is not so frequently subjected to generalisations, the enormous interest in the reign of his successor stands in contrast to the attention given to developments during his reign. Across two articles seeking to revitalise the reputation of Artaxerxes III Ochus, Mildenberg emphasises the economic recovery of the empire after Artaxerxes II.¹ Ochus introduced a new imperial series which reinforced the minting authority of the king (and by extension his imperial authority),²

¹ Leo Mildenberg, "Money Supply under Artaxerxes III Ochus," in *Studies in Greek Numismatics in Memory of Martin Jessop Price*, ed. Richard Ashton and Silvia Hurter (London: Spink, 1998), 279-81; Mildenberg, "Artaxerxes III Ochus," §4.5.

² Imperial authority: Margaret Cool Root, "From the Heart: Powerful Persianisms in the Art of the Western Empire," in *Asia Minor and Egypt: Old Cultures in a New Empire*, ed. Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Amélie Kuhrt, *Achaemenid History* 6 (Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, 1991), 16-17; Elspeth Dusinger, "King or God? Imperial Iconography and the 'Tiarate Head' Coins of Achaemenid Anatolia," in *Across the Anatolian Plateau: Readings in the Archaeology of Ancient Turkey*, ed. David C. Hopkins (Boston: American Schools of Oriental Research, 2003), 165-68; Dusinger, *Empire, Authority, and Autonomy*, 73. New imperial series: see Michael Alram, "The Coinage of the Persian Empire," in *The Oxford Handbook of Greek and Roman Coinage*, ed. William E. Metcalf (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 73-74.

produced owl tetradrachms for Egypt,³ and minted coins displaying a king in the pharaoh's headdress.⁴ But Artaxerxes' own reign also features fascinating changes in numismatics in the Achaemenid Empire. The following will showcase these via a series of case studies which illustrate the ways minting authorities engaged with the ideology of the central authority. In contrast to the traditional characterisation of Artaxerxes, the iconographic choices of local mints suggest that royal power between 404 and 358 was still felt strongly at the edges of the empire. This process begins with a survey of numismatic evidence from Artaxerxes' reign.

One of the clear facts of the reign is that, despite the absence of border expansion, it was not peaceful. There exists ample evidence for military operations which might have prompted the minting of coins:

Dates (ca.)	Military Events
401	Abrocomas sent to Egypt (?) (diverted). Cyrus the Younger's revolt.
399-395	Spartan invasions of Asia Minor.
397-394	Naval campaign under Conon and Pharnabazus, culminating in battle at Cnidus.
393	Pharnabazus installs garrison at Cythera, off the Peloponnese. Pharnabazus funds Corinthian allies' efforts against Sparta.
391-387	First Egyptian campaign.
387-381	Naval and land war against Evagoras I of Salamis.
384-381	First Cadusian campaign.
373-371	Second invasion of Egypt.
Post-371	Planning for third invasion under Datames; not launched.
369-360	Satraps' Revolt.
369	Second (only?) Cadusian campaign.
359/8	Datames (last of rebelling satraps) killed.

This table gives some indication of the extent of Artaxerxes' expenditure. It has not included those campaigns undertaken locally by his satraps against rebels – named (e.g. Thuys, Aspis) or unnamed (e.g. those incited by Evagoras in Phoenicia). Nor does

³ A. F. Shore, "The Demotic Inscription on a Coin of Artaxerxes," *NC* 14 (1974): 5-8; Mildenberg, "Money Supply under Artaxerxes III Ochus," 281-82.

⁴ Frank L. Kovacs, "Two Persian Pharaonic Portraits," *JNG* 50 (2000): 55-60.

it include wars undertaken privately by his satraps (e.g. Hecatomnus' war against the Coans⁵).

The known wars of Artaxerxes may be supplemented by express literary references to expenditure (after Maffre⁶):

Date (ca.)	Amount (talents)	Purpose	Issued by	Reference
407-05	500	War against Athens	Cyrus the Younger	<i>Hell.</i> 1.5.3.
398	500	Construction of a fleet	Pharnabazus	Diod. 14.39.1-4; <i>Oros. Hist.</i> 3.1.7.
395/4	220	Payment of mutinous mercenaries	Artaxerxes II/Tithraustes	Isoc. 4.142; <i>Hell. Oxy.</i> 19.3; Justin 6.2.12-3.
	700	Continuing war against Spartans	Tithraustes	<i>Hell. Oxy.</i> 19.3.
	50/30,000 or 10,000 "archers"	Timocrates' mission to Greece	Pharnabazus or Tithraustes	<i>Hell.</i> 3.5.1-2; <i>Hell. Oxy.</i> 7.2; Plut. <i>Ages.</i> 15.6, <i>Art.</i> 20.4.
393	?	Money for Corinthian allies and Athens	Pharnabazus	<i>Hell.</i> 4.8.8-9.
386	2000	War against Evagoras	Tiribazus	Diod. 15.4.2.

Further reasons for expenditure are found in the changing nature of military forces over Artaxerxes' reign.⁷ Mercenaries, for example, became increasingly important for Persian campaigns. The Ten Thousand represented a new trend in war: the professional, mercenary soldier, warranting regular pay. One reason for the peace of 375/4 was in order to free Greek mercenaries for employment in the next invasion of

⁵ See above, p. 143n194.

⁶ Maffre, "le Monnayage de Pharnabaze," 19.

⁷ Jeffrey Rop, *All the King's Greeks: Mercenaries, Poleis, and Empires in the Fourth Century BCE* (Pennsylvania State University: Doctoral Thesis, 2013), 2-12 summarises prevailing trends in modern scholarship regarding Persian use of mercenaries. His thesis argues against the idea that Greek mercenaries were employed because of their military superiority. Rather, Rop argues for a political function of Greek mercenaries in the Near East. Cf. M. Van de Mieroop, *A History of the Ancient Near East, ca. 3000-323 B.C.*, 2nd ed. (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2007), 290 which asserts that the value of Greek mercenaries is overstated by the Greek sources as part of their image of the decadent Persian Empire.

Egypt (Diod. 15.38.1). Greek mercenary generals and experts were also in demand. In Artaxerxes' reign one finds Conon fighting for Persia, Agesilaus for Egypt, Timotheus for Persia, Iphicrates for Persia, and Chabrias for Egypt. Tissaphernes employed Phalinus (*An.* 2.1.7), an expert in hoplite warfare; Datames employed a Greek by the name of Mandrocles as a lieutenant (*Nep. Dat.* 5.6);⁸ Ariobarzanes employed Philiscus as hyparch (*Dem.* 23.142).⁹ Finally, there was a rapid development in military technology. Iphicrates allegedly increased the length of spears, made use of linen armour, changed boots, and reduced the size of Greek shields.¹⁰ Datames is said to have reformed Persian armour as well with a metal arm guard; he may have even created the infamous *kardakes*.¹¹

At the same time, numismatic iconography undergoes great changes. In the late fifth century, the production of the imperial 'royal archer' sigloi declined:¹² comparatively few can be given a fourth century date.¹³ The circulation of coinage throughout the empire, gathering from hoard evidence, increased at this time as well. Most pre-420 hoards are found in Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt. After 420, seven hoards were discovered in Babylonia, Bactria, and beyond.¹⁴

The reduction in use of silver sigloi by western administrators may also be attributed to the increased production of local coinage under the satraps.¹⁵ Previously satraps in the West had relied on imperial or local emissions; in the late fifth century,

⁸ Hofstetter, *Die Griechen in Persien*, no. 208.

⁹ Hofstetter, *Die Griechen in Persien*, no. 259.

¹⁰ See below, pp. 255-56.

¹¹ Sekunda, "Life of Datames," 42.

¹² Ian Carradice, "The 'Regal' Coinage of the Persian Empire," in *Coinage and Administration in the Athenian and Persian Empires*, ed. Ian Carradice, BAR International Series 343 (Oxford: BAR, 1987), 92-93. This conclusion has been recently reviewed and upheld: C. J. Tuplin, "The Changing Pattern of Achaemenid Royal Coinage," in *Explaining Monetary and Financial Innovation*, ed. P. Bernholz and R. Vaubel, Financial and Monetary Policy Studies 39 (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014), 138.

¹³ Carradice, "'Regal' Coinage of the Persian Empire," 89.

¹⁴ Carradice, "'Regal' Coinage of the Persian Empire," 89. To those Carradice collates, one may add *CH* VIII.205, X.248.

¹⁵ See the brief survey and recent bibliography of Alram, "Coinage of the Persian Empire," 71-72; Jarosław Bodzek, "Achaemenid Asia Minor: Coins of the Satraps and of the Great King," in *The First International Congress of the Anatolian Monetary History and Numismatics - Proceedings*, ed. Kayhan Dörtlük, et al. (Istanbul: Suna & Inan Kiraç Research Institute on Mediterranean Civilization, 2015), 63-67.

however, they began to mint with their own types. Tissaphernes is commonly linked to some of the most famous examples of these series (though that correlation is not supported by any independent evidence).¹⁶

In light of the Satraps' Revolt of the 360s, it is possible to speculate a link between these changes as part of a general decline in the control and stability of the empire in the West, especially Asia Minor, which was host to the majority of these satrapal issues. But non-satrapal, local issues began to be expanded as well: throughout the Levant mints expand their repertoire of types. In the eastern provinces of the empire, locals had been producing their own coinage for some time,¹⁷ and from the beginning of the fourth century mints in Bactria, Kabul, and Gandhara continued to produce coinage under Achaemenid auspices.¹⁸ Thus, the increase of satrapal coinage should be seen in the context of a general increase in autonomy for minting authorities.

Typically, these numismatic changes are considered in their local settings.¹⁹ Meadows asserts that the imagery developed throughout the Levant during this period appealed to the images of kingship present among the capitals of the Achaemenid Empire – to palace imagery.²⁰ In Asia Minor, and areas of strong Greek influence, where monumental art was distant and had little influence on the local

¹⁶ E.g. ANS 1967.152.462. E. S. G. Robinson, "Greek Coins Acquired by the British Museum, 1938-1948," *NC* 8 (1948): 48-56. Cf. Leo Mildenberg, "On the So-Called Satrapal Coinage," in *Mécanismes et innovations monétaires dans l'Anatolie achéménide*, ed. Olivier Casabonne (Paris: De Boccard, 2000), 12-13; Harrison, "Numismatic Problems," 308-09.

¹⁷ E.g. Curtis and Tallis, *Forgotten Empire*, cat. 381. See also M. K. Dhavalikar, "The Beginning of Coinage in India," *World Archaeology* 6, no. 3 (1975): 330-38; Osmund Bopearachchi, "La circulation et la production monétaires en Asie Centrale et dans l'Inde du Nord-Ouest (avant et après la conquête d'Alexandre)," *Indologica Taurinensia* 25 (1999): 67-73.

¹⁸ Alram, "Coinage of the Persian Empire," 70.

¹⁹ E.g. J. W. Betlyon, *The Coinage and Mints of Phoenicia: The Pre-Alexandrine Period* (Chico: Scholars Press, 1982), *passim*; A. Davesne, "La circulation monétaire en Cilicie à l'époque achéménide," *REA* 91 (1989): 157-68; Leo Mildenberg, "On the Money Circulation in Palestine from Artaxerxes II till Ptolemy I: Preliminary Studies of the Local Coinage in the Fifth Persian Satrapy. Part 5," *Transeuphratène* 7 (1994): 63-71; Georges Le Rider, "Le monnayage perse en Cilicie du IV^e siècle," *NAC* 26 (1997): 151-67; Y. Meshorer and S. Qedar, *Samaritan Coinage* (Jerusalem: Israel Numismatic Society, 1999), *passim*.

²⁰ Andrew R. Meadows, "The Administration of the Achaemenid Empire," in *Forgotten Empire: the World of Ancient Persia*, ed. John Curtis and Nigel Tallis (Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 207.

people, numismatic iconography followed their own traditions and interpretations. The question which naturally follows is, having been exposed to the same Greek images in trade with Egypt and the wider Mediterranean, why did mints in the Levant - regions also devoid of monumental Achaemenid art - appeal to Persian imagery with such frequency? Accordingly, there is reason to examine the inspirations for die-engravers, and the messages conveyed by coins minted during Artaxerxes' reign.

The Baal/Figure in the Winged Disc Staters of Tiribazus

The Baal/Figure in the winged disc staters of Tiribazus are fascinating examples of the ways a satrap would send imperial messages via iconography (Fig. 1). They are also significant for their demonstration of the ways Artaxerxes' royal authority was projected at the borders of the empire, where monumental art did not exist and could not exert influence. Produced in the 380s, these coins were minted in Cilicia. They were, then, minted in the context of revolt on Cyprus and Tiribazus' attempt to retake the island for Artaxerxes. The Hellenised figure in the winged disc appearing on the reverse (identified as Ahuramazda in numismatic sources), itself a highly politicised image (see below), thus appears in a politically charged setting. The following argues that this is no coincidence. The reverse type conveys the restoration of royal authority, and is closely associated with the imperial iconography of Achaemenid artwork in Susa and Persepolis.

While these coins are well known to scholarship, they have been subject only to general surveys.²¹ They have, in many respects, been underutilised. Mildenberg, for example, comments on the multilingualism of coins produced under Ochus, and on the scope of their iconography.²² If Ochus is to be applauded as a responsible king for his Egyptian issues, then Tiribazus warrants attention as the man who set the

²¹ C. M. Harrison, *Coins of the Persian Satraps* (University of Pennsylvania: Doctoral Thesis, 1982), 313-14; Herbert A. Cahn, "Le Monnayage des Satrapes: Iconographie et Signification," *REA* 91, no. 1-2 (1989): 104; Le Rider, "Le monnayage perse," 152-53, 156-57; Olivier Casabonne, *La Cilicie à l'époque achéménide* (Paris: De Boccard, 2004), 188-93; Jarosław Bodzek, *Ta satrapika nomismata: mennictwo satrapów w okresie panowania Achemenidów (ok. 550-331 a.C.)* (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2011), 90-95.

²² Mildenberg, "Money Supply under Artaxerxes III Ochus," 281-82.

precedent for Ochus to follow. Like Ochus, Tiribazus made use of familiar languages, iconography (Baal on the obverse), and weight standards (Persic, typical of the region). He also sent a powerful political message with the iconography of the reverse: the figure in the winged disc was tied strongly to the ethos of the Achaemenid monarchy. These series are, therefore, extremely important illustrations of the ways satraps would engage with the imperial ideology of Artaxerxes. In addition, the only die-study of the coins is restricted to those produced in Issus, and is marred by several errors.²³ No catalogue of examples exists. Thus, the following examination begins by providing the first catalogue and complete die-study of all known examples of the series.

Catalogue²⁴

*Obverse:*²⁵ Baal standing frontal, himation on his left shoulder and lower limbs, facing left. Left arm resting on a sceptre, capped with flower. His right hand is extended, bird over hand like Zeus/eagle. Border of dots. On left (in most examples), mint designation. On right, Aramaic *TRBZW* (e.g. Fig. 1).

Reverse: Winged disc with nude torso of bearded male, facing right. Wings extend horizontally from disc. Tail fans out below. Coiled tendrils extend symmetrically on either side. Head capped with head-dress; spherical ornaments on top. His left arm is crooked, holding lotus flower. His right hand is raised to head height, holding a wreath. The whole in incuse circle.

These silver series were minted in four Cilician mints: Issus, Mallus, Soli, and Tarsus. All of these mints are well known to numismatists, and all minted before and after Tiribazus' series were produced. Some coins do not carry a mint designation, so more mints may have been utilised for production. Most surviving examples are from Issus (29%) and Mallus (35%). The weight is typical of the Persian double-siglos, and in

²³ James C. Brindley, "Early Coinages Attributable to Issus," *NC* 133 (1993): 4-5 (group 4).

²⁴ Dies are shown below, pp. 333-39.

²⁵ I follow the obverse/reverse identification of Le Rider, "Le monnayage perse," 152n5.

keeping with the other satrapal issues of the fourth century minted in Cilicia.²⁶ Weights are consistent across all mints. At Issus the average weight is 10.45g, Mallus is 10.45g, Soli is 10.59g, and Tarsus is 10.29g.

Issus:

Coins from Issus generally feature a mint designation on the obverse in the left field. There are three variants: ΙΣΣΙΚ/ON; ΙΣΣΙΚΟ/Ν; ΙΣΣΕΩΝ. This mint designation is frequently broken by the outstretched left arm (e.g. Issus O1, O3). The reverse often features the mark AMI horizontally above the left wing. The meaning of this mark is unclear. It is unlike the other magistrate, mint, or counter marks used in Cilicia during this period.²⁷ It may be related to a local Persian official – AM appears on staters of Pharnabazus, minted at Tarsus, in the following years.²⁸ AMI also appears on coins attributed to Mallus (see further below).

Asterisks in the catalogue denote a coin which also occurs in Brindley's catalogue. As Brindley does not provide catalogue numbers, the following reprints his catalogue entry where it differs from the citation system employed here.²⁹ With the possible exception of cat. 9 and cat. 2, my analysis has confirmed Brindley's die identification.

#	Weight	Dies	Inscription	Reference
1	10.00	O1/R1	O: [ΙΣΣ]ΙΚ/ON R: AMI	Jameson, <i>Collection R. Jameson</i> , no. 1611; SNG v. Aulock 5602; SNG Levante-Cilicia 175.*
2	10.32	O1/R1	O: ΙΣΣΙΚ/ON R: AMI	Babelon, <i>Traité</i> 2, no. 579, pl. CVII.17; SNG Paris-Cilicia 416.*
3	10.73	O1/R1	O: [ΙΣΣ]ΙΚ/ON R: AMI	SNG Berry 1273.*
4	?	O1/R1	O: ΙΣΣΙΚ/ON	Sotheby's (1986) 79; CH VIII.165, pl.

²⁶ E.g. Robert A. Moysey, "The Silver Stater Issues of Pharnabazos and Datames from the Mint of Tarsus in Cilicia," *ANSMN* 31 (1986): 16; François de Callataÿ, "Les Monnayages Ciliciens due Premier Quart du IV^e s. av. J.-C.," in *Mécanismes et innovations monétaires dans l'Anatolie achéménide: numismatique et histoire*, ed. Olivier Casabonne (Paris: De Boccard, 2000), 98-101.

²⁷ See de Callataÿ, "Les Monnayages Ciliciens," 93-127.

²⁸ Moysey, "Issues of Pharnabazos and Datames," 10.

²⁹ Brindley made some errors in auction catalogue numbers and auction dates. They are noted.

			R: [A]MI	XXI.25.* = Brindley, Sotheby's Auct. 12.8.1986 no. 79. ³⁰
5	10.37	O1/R2	O: [ΙΣ]ΣΙΚ/[Ο]Ν R: AMI	NCirc 1989, no. 923; Hess-Divo 325 (2013) 231.*
6	10.52	O1/R2	O: [ΙΣ]ΣΙΚ/[Ο]Ν R: [A]MI	CNG 133 (2006) 91.
7	10.67	O1/R2	O: ΙΣΣΙΚ/ΟΝ R: AMI	CH VIII.165, pl. XXI.23; Baldwin's 34 (2003) 404.
8	10.47	O1/R3	O: ΙΣΣΙΚ/ΟΝ R: AMI	CH VIII.165, pl. XXI.26; Künker 174 (2010) 403.
9	10.23	O1/R3?	O: ΙΣΣΙΚ/ΟΝ R: [A] MI	Münz 66 (1989) 541.* = Brindley, Münz Zentrum Auct. 66, lot. 538. ³¹ R: Worn. Unique reverse die in Brindley.
10	10.68	O1/R4	O: [Ι]ΣΣΙΚ/ΟΝ R: AMI	SNG Levante-Cilicia 176; CH VIII.165, pl. XXI.24; CNG 64 (2003) 308; CNG 97 (2014) 257.*
11	10.34	O1?/R5?	R: AMI	Forrer and Weber, <i>The Weber Collection</i> , no. 7558. R: AMI attested by publication. See comment below, p. 207.
12	10.30	O2/R5	O: [Ι]ΣΣΙΚ/[Ο]Ν R: AMI	BMC Cilicia p. 90, no. 3; Babelon, <i>Traité</i> 2, no. 579, autres ex; Curtis and Tallis, <i>Forgotten Empire</i> , cat. 348* O: Almost indistinguishable from O1; the difference lies in the position of the second Σ in relation to the crooked knee.
13	10.56	O2/R5	O: [Ι]ΣΣΙ[Κ]/[Ο] Ν R: [A]MI	Lanz 125 (2005) 426. O: Very worn.
14	10.65	O2/R6	O: ΙΣΣΙΚ/ΟΝ	Peus 330 (1991) 155.* R: AMI possibly removed; surface polished in this area. ³²
15	10.42	O3/R3	O: ΙΣΣΙΚΟ/Ν R: AMI	CNG 200 (2008) 63.

³⁰ The auction date is actually 20-May-1986.

³¹ The correct lot number is 541.

³² Brindley, "Early Coinages Attributable to Issus," 4n10.

16	10.48	O3/R4	O: [ΙΣ]ΣΙΚΟ/Ν R: AMI	<i>NCirc</i> 1992, no. 6490; <i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.1* = Brindley, Spink 3.4.1992 stock, group b? There is a 0.01 difference in weight between Brindley and <i>NCirc</i> catalogue. Furthermore, there are no other Spink sales of Issus examples in 1992. On this basis it seems likely they are the same coin.
17	9.91	O3/R4?	O: [ΙΣΣΙ]ΚΟ/Ν	SNG Tübingen 4542. Very Worn.
18	10.05	O3/R7	O: ΙΣΣΙΚΟ/Ν	Kraay, <i>Archaic and Classical Greek Coins</i> , no. 1030; SNG Ashmolean-Cilicia 1726.* Cut.
19	10.44	O3/R7	O: ΙΣΣΙΚΟ/Ν	SNG v. Aulock 5601; Leu 91 (2004) 179.*
20	10.50	O3/R7	O: [Ι]ΣΣΙΚΟ/Ν	BM 1985,1114.3; <i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.3.*
21	10.43	O4/R7	O: ΙΣΣΕΩΝ	Lanz 54 (1990) 238; Künker 143 (2008) 233.*
22	10.54	O4/R3	O: ΙΣΣΕΩΝ R: AMI	BM 1985,1114.4; <i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.4.* O: Worn.
23	10.48	O4?/R3	[Α]ΜΙ	ANS 1944.100.54081. O: Very worn. Die number based on arm position.
24	10.61	O4/R4	O: ΙΣΣΕΩΝ R: AMI	SNG Levante-Cilicia 177; CNG Mail Bid 66 (2004) 538; <i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.2.*
25	?	O4?/R4?	R: AMI	<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.6.
26	10.40	?		Babelon, <i>Traité</i> 2, no. 579, autres ex. Unable to locate.
27	10.65	?	O: ΙΣΣΙΚ/ΟΝ R: AMI	Brindley, Spink (3.4.1992) stock.* Unable to locate; Brindley has O1/R1.
28	10.63	?	O: ΙΣΣΙΚ/ΟΝ R: AMI	NFA 38 (1990) 59.* Unable to locate catalogue; Brindley has O2 and unique reverse.
29	10.51	?	O: ΙΣΣΙΚΟ/Ν	NFA 36 (1989) 32.* Unable to locate catalogue; Brindley has O3/R7.
30	10.60	?	O: ΙΣΣΙΚΟ/Ν	Lanz 34 (1985) 274.* Unable to locate catalogue; Brindley has O3/R4.

Mallus:

Coins from this mint carry inscriptions MAP or MAA in the left field of the obverse. Several coins contain an A with circle on the point (Mallus R1) above the left wing on the reverse.

Remarkably, several coins attributed to Mallus show traces of the AMI inscription, typical of Issus, on the reverse above the left wing, erased from the die but still visible (Mallus R2). Many of these marks are indistinguishable via photography, so the following has trusted the accuracy of the sources which attest to them.³³ The obverses of these examples (cat. 37-42) all clearly bear an inscription denoting Mallus as their mint. The attempted erasure of the AMI from coins produced at Mallus suggests that the die was moved from Issus to Mallus. This is supported by the relative proportion of coins bearing the AMI: it appears on 73% of examples from Issus, and only 17% of examples from Mallus. Mallus R2 does not match any extant die from Issus. It is, therefore, possible that Mallus R2 was produced at Mallus under the auspices of an authority which utilised the AMI mark. When that authority departed, the mint may have attempted to remove the mark from their dies. Perhaps there is a link between the AMI on Mallus R2 and the A with circle on Mallus R1.

The presence of AMI on coins of Mallus raises questions about cat. 11, which is attributed to Issus on the basis of the AMI. There is no evidence of mint designation on the photograph, nor is one attested by the publication description. Cat. 11 appears comparable only to cat. 38 and cat. 39 - both clearly from Mallus - but the wear on cat. 11 is bad enough to make any identification uncertain. If indeed cat. 11 and cat. 38 share their reverse die, it is preferable to recognise cat. 11 as a coin of Mallus, owing to the clear mint designation on cat. 38. As I have not examined cat. 11 personally, I have left the coin in the Issus catalogue.

#	Weight	Dies	Inscription	Reference
31	10.57	O1/R1	O: MAA R: A	Peus 407 (2012) 855.
32	10.65	O1/R1	O: MAA R: A	CH VIII.165, pl. XXII.10; Gorny 200 (2011) 1980.

³³ Forrer and Weber, *The Weber Collection*, no. 7558; Brindley, "Early Coinages Attributable to Issus," 4n10; SNG Paris-Cilicia 390; SNG Levante-Cilicia 148; SNG v. Aulock 5713.

33	10.74	O1/R1	O: MAA R: A	BM 1985,1114.2; <i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.13?
34	10.52	O1/R1	O: MAA R: A	<i>SNG</i> Ashmolean-Cilicia 1737.
35	?	O1/R1	O: [M]AA R: A	<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.11.
36	?	O1/R1	O: [M]AA R: A	<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.12.
37	10.46	O1/R2	O : MAA R : AMI	<i>SNG</i> Levante-Cilicia 148; <i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.7; CNG Triton 7 (2004) 295; Peus 388 (2006) 197. ³⁴ R: AMI visible on CNG photograph.
38	10.50	O1/R2	O: MAA R: AMI	<i>SNG</i> v. Aulock 5713; BM 1979,0101.972.
39	10.25	O1/R2	O: MAA R: AMI	<i>SNG</i> Paris-Cilicia 390.
40	10.174	O1/R2	O: MAA R: AMI	BM 1896,0601.98. R: AMI visible on BM Website photograph.
41	?	O1/R2	O: MAA R: AMI?	<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.8.
42	?	O1?/R2 ?	O: MAA? R: AMI?	<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.9. O: Inscription very worn. R: Wings match cat. 41, but AMI not visible on photograph.
43	10.59	O1/R3	O: MAA	Künker 216 (2012) 475.
44	10.70	O1/R3?	O: MAA	<i>SNG</i> Copenhagen-Cilicia 165.
45	?	O1/R3	O: [M]AA	<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.5.
46	?	O1/R3	O: MAA	<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.14.
47	?	O1?/R3	O: ?	<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.15.
48	?	O1/R3	O: MAA	<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.17.
49	?	O1/R3	O: MAA	<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.19.
50	?	O1/R3	O: MAA	<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.20.
51	?	O1/R3	O: MAA	<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.21.
52	10.59	O1/R4	O: [M]AA	Leu 25 (1980) 174; Sotheby's Nelson Bunker Hunt (1996) 566.
53	10.59	O2/R1	O: MAP R: A	Elsen 99 (2009) 1275.
54	10.36	O2/R3	O: [M]AP	Macdonald, <i>Hunterian Collection</i> , p. 537, no. 5; Babelon, <i>Traité</i> 2, no. 580, autres ex.
55	10.61	O2/R5	O : MAP	<i>SNG</i> Levante-Cilicia 147. R: Deep cut.

³⁴ Peus catalogue erroneously lists "SNG CH 148" as this coin.

56	10.53	O2/R5	O: MAP	Künker 94 (2004) 1342.
57	10.46	O2/R5	O: MAP	BM 1985,1114.1; <i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.24; Curtis and Tallis, <i>Forgotten Empire</i> , cat. 349. Fig. 1
58	10.60	O2/R5	O: MAP	<i>NCirc</i> 1986, no. 1698; <i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.23?
59	?	O2?/R5	O: MA[?]	<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.22. O: Final letter of inscription illegible.
60	10.30	O3/R3	O: [M]AP	ANS 1944.100.54100. O: O3 differs from O2 in the mark above the A; the angular P; the slant on the Aramaic T.
61	10.34	O3/R5	O: MAP	Hirsch 256 (2008) 320.
62	10.41	O3/R5	O: MAP	CNG Mail Bid 58 (2001) 670. R: Cut over central disc.
63	?	O3?/R5	O: MAP	<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXIII.1.
64	10.41	O4/R6	O: MAP	Babelon, <i>Traité</i> 2, no. 580, pl. CVII.18; <i>SNG</i> Paris-Cilicia 389.
65	10.27	O4/R6	O: MAP	CNG Mail Bid 60 (2002) 866.
66	10.33	O4/R6	O: MAP	Nelson, <i>Numismatic Art of Persia</i> , no. 40.
67	9.74	O4/R6	O: MAP	Brett, <i>Museum of Fine Arts, Boston</i> , no. 2119.

Soli:

The dies of *Soli* show no magistrate's mark. In the left field of the obverse is ΣΟ.

#	Weight	Dies	Inscription	Reference
68	10.70	O1/R1	O: ΣΟ	Auctiones AG 15 (1985) 172; Hess-Divo 321 (2012) 181.
69	10.54	O1/R1	O: ΣΟ	<i>SNG</i> Levante-Cilicia 49.
70	?	O1/R1	O: ΣΟ	<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXIII.3.
71	10.30	O1/R1?	O: ΣΟ	<i>BMC</i> Cilicia p. 148, no. 26; Babelon, <i>Traité</i> 2, no. 581, Pl. CVII.19; Curtis and Tallis, <i>Forgotten Empire</i> , cat. 350.
72	10.34	O1/R2	O: [Σ]Ο	M&M Basel List 499 (1987) 38; CNG 90 (2004) 5. R: Die almost identical to R1; difference lies in the arm with lotus, which is slightly raised in R1, and almost horizontal in R2.

73	10.95	O1/R2	O: ΣO	Newell, "A Cilician Find," p. 17, no. 73.
74	?	O1/R2	O: ΣO	<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXIII.2.
75	?	O1/R2	O: ΣO	<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXIII.4.
76	10.73	O1/R3	O: ΣO	Baldwin's The New York Sale XXVII (2012) 594. ³⁵
77	10.59	?	O: ΣO	Newell, "A Cilician Find," p. 17, no. 74. No photo. O: One Cut R: Three Cuts.
78	-	?	O: ΣO	<i>NCirc</i> 1990, no. 2340. No photo.

Tarsus:

Coins originating in Tarsus are denominated by the T or TEP (upwards) in the left field of the obverse.

#	Weight	Dies	Inscription	Reference
79	10.52	O1/R1	O: TEP	SNG Levante Supp. 1, 16; CNG Mail Bid 66 (2004) 601. R: Cut above left wing. Distinctive lotus flower.
80	10.14	O1/R1	O: TEP	Peus 407 (2012) 856.
81	10.37	O1/R1	O: TEP	SNG Lockett 3047.
82	10.34	O1/R2	O: TEP	Baldwin's 34 (2003) 233. R: Cut beneath tail.
83	10.43	O2/R3	O: T	SNG Levante-Cilicia 62; CNG Mail Bid 66 (2004) 600. O: Worn.
84	10.09	O2/R3	O: T	<i>BMC</i> Cilicia p. 164, no. 12; Babelon, <i>Traité</i> 2, no. 582, Pl. CVII.20; Curtis and Tallis, <i>Forgotten Empire</i> , cat. 351.
85	10.13	O2?/R3 ?	O: T?	Hauck & Aufhäuser 20 (2007) 178.

Mint Unknown:

The mint(s) of these coins is not indicated. The absence renders differentiation of dies difficult because the figure of Baal is similar in many examples, and worn. In

³⁵ "Purchased from Spink & Son Ltd., London, 1990" = *NCirc* 1990, no. 2340 = cat. 78?

many cases they are so badly worn that a die study is not possible. The dies grouped together here are highly uncertain, and have been divided into two groups: those which share dies, and those with unique dies.

Die Linked:

#	Weight	Dies	Inscription	Reference
86	10.63	O1/R1		Babelon, <i>Traité</i> 2, no. 575, Pl. CVII.13; <i>SNP</i> Paris-Cilicia 417.
87	10.44	O1/R1		<i>NCirc</i> 1990, no. 4124.
88	10.28	O1/R2		Elsen 111 (2011) 178.
89	10.35	O1/R2		CNG 64 (2003) 169.
90	10.56	O1/R3		Baldwin's 34 (2003) 384.
91	10.26	O1/R3		Lanz 32 (1985) 285; Hirsch 275 (2011) 3955.
92	?	O1?/R3?		<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXIII.5. O: Mint designation lost with wear?
93	?	O2?/R4		<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXIII.6. O: outstretched arm appears closer to horizontal than O1.

No Die Continuity:

94	10.49			Babelon, <i>Traité</i> 2, no. 575, pl. CVII.12; <i>SNP</i> Paris-Cilicia 233. O: Mint designation possibly off flan. R: Test cut above left wing.
95	11.00			ANS 1977.158.526. O: Worn. Faint mint designation at knee height? [Σ]O?
96	9.93			Gorny 212 (2013) 2183. Worn. O: Mint designation erased?
97	10.52		O: [M]AA?	M&M GmbH 34 (2011) 123.
98	?		O: MAA?	<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.16.
99	10.02			Lanz 135 (2007) 351.
100	?			<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXII.18. O: Mint designation lost with wear? R: Similar to R1, but arm over right wing slightly higher.
101	?		R: AMI	<i>CH</i> VIII.165, pl. XXIII.7. O: Mint designation lost with wear? R: Issus R6?
102	9.97			BM 1894,0506.2445. Worn. O: Mint designation off flan? Only top two-thirds of figure visible.

				R: Bottom quarter of figure off flan.
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Date

Hoards are of little use for dating the series. Casabonne noted that examples have been found in *IGCH* 1259, *CH* VI.11, *CH* VIII.91, and *CH* VIII.165.³⁶ Only one other hoard containing these coins has been catalogued in publications: *CH* IX.584. Burial dates are not absolute. However, all but one (*CH* VIII.165) were buried in the first half of the fourth century. Furthermore, the burial date of *CH*. VIII.91 ca. 380 provides an ante-date which is consistent with known historical events.³⁷ The Aramaic legend *TRBZW* should refer to Tiribazus.³⁸ It is well known that he commanded an expedition against Cyprus during the 380s, which necessitated heavy expenditure and the involvement of Cilicia (see below). Tiribazus did not hold command over Cilicia at any other time. Before 386, he was also satrap in Sardis (Diod. 14.85.4; *Hell.* 4.8.12), but he would have been unlikely to produce coins in Cilicia during that command. These issues, therefore, should be linked to the 380s and the Persian campaign against Cyprus.

The association between Cilicia and the Cypriot revolt is further explained by strategic considerations (the historical context has been detailed above³⁹). Evagoras had manufactured revolt on one of the primary staging areas for any Persian counter-assault on Cyprus: Phoenicia (Diod. 15.3; Isoc. 4.161-62).⁴⁰ Tyre was joined in that affair. Cilicia was, as a result, the best alternative location to marshal forces for the campaign against Cyprus, and had a long standing tradition as a naval centre for the Achaemenids.⁴¹ Our logical inferences on the value of Cilicia are supported by the role

³⁶ Casabonne, *La Cilicie*, 188-89.

³⁷ Ed Levante, "Le "tresor de Nagidos", in *Trésors et circulation monétaire en Anatolie antique*, ed. Michel Amandry and Georges Le Rider (Paris: Bibliothèque nationale de France, 1994), 8.

³⁸ See below, p. 215.

³⁹ See above, pp. 173-77, 190-92. P. Meloni, "Tiribazo satrape di Sardi," *Athenaeum* 28 (1950): 292-309 provides the fullest reckoning, but is in need of update. See also Debord, *L'Asie mineure*, 336-37nn247-53; Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 321-24.

⁴⁰ Tuplin, *Achaemenid Studies*, 11.

⁴¹ Wallinga, "Naval Installations in Cilicia Pedias," 276-81.

the region plays in the history of the campaign. Diodorus places great emphasis on Cilicia as the supply base for the Persian expeditionary force (15.3): having secured the supply lines, a great abundance of grain and food is brought from Cilicia specifically. The position of Cilicia as a staging post for the invasion must have had a great influence on the local economy. But Evagoras exacerbated the situation: piracy against the Persian supply lines cut off supplies. The situation necessitated the repurposing of the fleet under Glos to re-establish supply lines and counter Evagoras' piratical campaign. After the battle of Citium and the establishment of Persian naval supremacy, supply lines were reopened and the army frequently provisioned. Tiribazus at this time journeyed to court (via Cilicia) and received two thousand talents for the execution of the war (Diod. 15.4.2). Tiribazus' staters should be placed in the context of the reestablishment of supply lines and the expansion of the land war on Cyprus. While the hoard evidence is imprecise, the literary evidence should be considered complementary for the dating of the series.⁴² While Diodorus' reference to two thousand talents is probably too convenient to link to the production of Tiribazus' coins, the broader context – the use of Cilicia as a base for supplies, and the need to fund soldiers,⁴³ sailors, and tradesmen ferrying supplies between Cyprus and Cilicia provides an appropriate context for Tiribazus to have issued these coins. The movement of dies between Issus and Mallus – denoted by the AMI on coins of both cities – also suggests that production was extensive. Thus, a relative chronology is established via the literary evidence. Diodorus is not, however, reliable for the identification of a specific date of production.

For an absolute chronology, Van der Spek provides the *terminus ante quem*: 381.⁴⁴ The chronology for the remainder of the decade has been discussed in depth in chapter three. If Citium is accepted to have taken place ca. 384, the production of these

⁴² Harrison, "Numismatic Problems," 306 has previously noted how complementary the literary and numismatic records are in this instance. Harrison, *Coins of the Persian Satraps*, 304-15 also provides an in depth survey of the historical context, from a numismatic point of view, but is now outdated owing to current consensus that the final agreement with Evagoras was reached in 381, with Citium generally placed 386: Van der Spek, "Chronology," 240-51.

⁴³ The mercenaries are said to have mutinied when Evagoras' piratical campaign was most effective: Diod. 15.3.2-3.

⁴⁴ Van der Spek, "Chronology," 251.

coins took place between 384 and 381. As the series clearly show that Tiribazus was the authority which ordered production, we also know that he must have been present in the region when the bullion was first provided to the mints in Cilicia. On this basis, the coins would have been minted prior to his arrest ca. 382.

Interpretation

Obverse:

The image of Baal, with sceptre, himation, and bird over his outstretched hand, was consistent with other series minted in the region during this period. For example, Baal is positioned in the same manner on coins featuring Herakles with lion pelt and club on the reverse (Fig. 2).⁴⁵ The iconography continued with the well-known series of Pharnabazus minted in Cilicia, featuring a seated Baal and a helmeted male head (Fig. 3). Mazaëus would also include the seated Baal on his coins, but added an Aramaic inscription naming the deity (Fig. 4).

The seated god is similarly reminiscent of Alexander's tetradrachms featuring a seated Zeus with an outstretched hand and eagle (Fig. 5). Baal and Zeus are both chief deities in their respective spheres of influence, and were often equated in antiquity.⁴⁶ Later Samarian issues also depicted Zeus in a form inspired by Cilician depictions of the seated Baal.⁴⁷ It comes as no surprise that their imagery is shared. Indeed, the inspirations for the image are complex and a question of some debate.⁴⁸ Baal's numismatic depictions could be readily associated with Zeus by any Greek tradesman encountering the coin, and was familiar to local Cilicians, Phoenicians,

⁴⁵ Examples from Issus are catalogued in Brindley, "Early Coinages Attributable to Issus," Group 3. Cf. Harrison, *Coins of the Persian Satraps*, 208-09 noting parallels between the reverses of the Baal/Herakles and Baal/Figure in the winged disc series. While some similarities exist in the direction Baal faces and his left arm position, Tiribazus' series found no other inspiration in prior issues of Issus.

⁴⁶ Herbert Niehr, "Baal," in *Brill's New Pauly [Online]*, ed. Hubert Cancik and Helmuth Schneider (Leiden: Brill, 2006), s.v. Baal.

⁴⁷ Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, 29 and no. 40.

⁴⁸ Orestes H. Zervos, "The Earliest Coins of Alexander the Great. 1. Notes on a Book by Gerhard Kleiner," *NC* 12 (1982): 166-79; M. Jessop Price, "The Earliest Coins of Alexander the Great. 2. Alexander's Reform of the Macedonian Regal Coinage," *NC* 12 (1982): 180-90.

Syrians, and any other serviceman who might be paid with money issued from these series. One cannot preclude the possibility that the figure depicted is intended to be Zeus,⁴⁹ but the explicit identification of Baal on Mazaeus' coins, with very similar imagery and produced in the same mints as Tiribazus' series, indicates that the obverse shows Baal. In the case of Mazaeus' coins, Bing suggests that Baal was used as a local manifestation of Ahuramazda.⁵⁰ The same logic should not be applied to Tiribazus' coins. The reverse of Tiribazus' series adapts existing eastern imagery. There was little need for the die-engravers to attempt to manufacture a link between Baal and Ahuramazda with the obverse of these coins.⁵¹

The Aramaic inscription is clear in many examples, and easily interpreted. The Aramaic spells out *TRBZW*. Onomastic advances have strengthened the association with the Tiribazus of literary history. In Old Persian, the name is **Tiribāzu*:- "arm of Tirya" (god of writing); in Aramaic, *Trybzw*; in Babylonian, *Ti-ri-ba-za*-.⁵² All forms of the name are consistent with the inscription preserved in these series.

On one hand, the coins are typical of satrapal issues in Asia Minor. On the other hand, their bilingualism is noteworthy – other satrapal issues of the fourth century in Asia Minor do not use multiple languages for their inscriptions. Nor do local Cilician issues. One might compare Pharnabazus' Samarian issues in the 370s (fractional bronzes), which contain Pharnabazus' name in Greek on the obverse, while the mint on the reverse is Aramaic (typical of the region).⁵³ Subsequent Cilician issues of Pharnabazus, Datames, and Mazaeus abandon Greek mint designation in favour of a broader Aramaic inscription for 'Cilicia,' or bear none at all.⁵⁴ Tiribazus' coins serve as an example of cosmopolitan design among Cilician mints operating for the

⁴⁹ Colin M. Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 281; Le Rider, "Le monnayage perse," 152.

⁵⁰ Bing, "Datames and Mazaeus," 66.

⁵¹ Cf. other possible representations of Ahuramazda on coins: Michael Shenkar, "The Coin of the »God on the Winged Wheel«, " *Boreas* 30/31 (2007/2008): 13-23; Bing, "Datames and Mazaeus," 71-72 makes the same connection.

⁵² Tavernier, *Iranica*, 543. §4.2.1707 compiles onomastic data, and previous study.

⁵³ Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, nos. 1-2; Bodzek, "Pharnabazus Once Again," §3.

⁵⁴ E.g. BM 1979,0101.995 = SNG v. Aulock 5928. See A. Lemaire, "Remarques à propos du monnayage cilicien d'époque perse et de ses légendes araméennes," *REA* 91 (1989): 142-44.

Achaemenid satraps. In this way, both Hellenic and Persian recipients of these series would have recognised their origin and value.

When considered in conjunction with the eastern imagery of the reverse, the appeal of the obverse type to local traditions reflects its geographical context. The die-engraver did not abandon all ties to previous numismatic artistry on both sides of the coin. Instead, he made use of existing traditions to ensure that the currency would be acceptable.

Reverse:

Before commenting on the iconography, a terminological note is necessary. The identification of the figure in the winged disc as Ahuramazda is contested. Shahbazi publicised an alternative identification of the figure as the king's *farnah* – “god given fortune symbolized.”⁵⁵ This was raised against the background of his argument that the image could not represent Ahuramazda or the *fravashi* of the king– “a sort of duplicate of the soul and the guardian angel.”⁵⁶ Shahbazi did not convince everyone of his argument,⁵⁷ but scholarship has not rejected the hypothesis. It is recognised as an alternative interpretation, and has more recently featured in Wiesehöfer's discussion of Tarkumuwa's emissions in the 370s.⁵⁸ As a result, current scholarship does not refer to

⁵⁵ A. Shapur Shahbazi, "An Achaemenid Symbol, II: *Farnah* ('God given fortune symbolized')," *AMIran* 13 (1980): 119-47.

⁵⁶ A. Shapur Shahbazi, "An Achaemenid Symbol, I: A Farewell to 'Frahvar' and 'Ahuramazda'," *AMIran* 7 (1974): 135.

⁵⁷ Margaret Cool Root, *The King and Kingship in Achaemenid Art: Essays on the Creation of an Iconography of Empire* (Leiden: Brill, 1979), 169-71 provides early discussion of the competing theories of Ahuramazda versus the king's *fravashi*; P. Lecoq, "Un problème de religion achéménide: Ahura Mazda ou Xvarnah?," *Acta Iranica* 23 (1984): 301-26 provides an extensive study. Amélie Kuhrt, "Achaemenid Images of Royalty and Empire," in *Concepts of Kingship in Antiquity*, ed. G. B. Lanfranchi and R. Rollinger (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2010), 92n39 reasserts that the identification with Ahuramazda is most common, but also that there is no certainty.

⁵⁸ Josef Wiesehöfer, "Tarkumuwa und das Farnah," in *A Persian Perspective: Essays in Memory of Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg*, ed. Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg, Amélie Kuhrt, and Wouter Henkelman, *Achaemenid History* 13 (Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, 2003), 173-87. R. Boucharlat, "Southwestern Iran in the Achaemenid Period," in *The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Iran*, ed. Daniel T. Potts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 517 also finds Shabazi's theory most plausible.

the image as 'Ahuramazda,' but adopts a neutral terminology.⁵⁹ That trend is followed here through reference to the image as the figure in the winged disc.

The winged disc, conjoined to the human figure or not, was a popular motif in a number of contexts and closely related to royal power in the Achaemenid period.⁶⁰ Darius I's most famous use of the winged disc – on the inscription at Behistun (Fig. 6) – is an example which immediately springs to mind.⁶¹ The winged disc was a rare occurrence on seals of Darius I's reign, but would become more popular later.⁶² Seals from the imperial heartland (Persepolis, Susa, Ecbatana, etc.) exhibiting the winged disc – with and without human figure – are well known (e.g. Figs. 7-8).⁶³ Similarly, gem stones engraved with the winged disc are common.⁶⁴ The winged disc with human figure, however, was not commonly copied by Greeks. Rather, wings were added to a deity, who then carried the disc.⁶⁵ On heartland architecture the image with human figure is popular, and is included in relief panels and above entrance ways.⁶⁶ The winged disc on coins is somewhat rarer. The winged disc, without human figure, appears on several Samarian coins of a later date than Tiribazus' emission (e.g. Fig. 9), and on a series of Mazaeus (e.g. Fig. 10). Tiribazus' series are the earliest uses of the winged disc in coins from Asia Minor.

⁵⁹ See, for example, Mark B. Garrison, "By the Favor of Auramazda: Kingship and the Divine in the Early Achaemenid Period," in *More than Men, Less than Gods: Studies on Royal Cult and Imperial Worship*, ed. P. P. Iossif, A. S. Chankowski, and C. C. Lorber, *Studia Hellenistica* 51 (Leuven: Peeters, 2011), 36n74, discussing his own terminology, and 47n109 citing modern analysis. Shahbazi, "An Achaemenid Symbol, I," 135n1 explains his preference for "winged circle," but "winged disc" remains most common.

⁶⁰ Sabrina Sonia Maras, *Iconography, Identity and Inclusion: The Winged Disk and Royal Power during the Reign of Darius the Great* (University of California, Berkeley: Doctoral Thesis, 2009), *passim*.

⁶¹ Root, *King and Kingship in Achaemenid Art*, pl. 8; see data in Kuhrt, *Persian Empire*, §5.A.1.

⁶² Garrison, "By the Favor of Auramazda," 48-49.

⁶³ See examples in Erich F. Schmidt, *Persepolis II: Contents of the Treasury and Other Discoveries* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pls. 2-8; John Boardman, *Persia and the West: An Archaeological Investigation of the Genesis of Achaemenid Art* (New York: Thames and Hudson, 2000), 160-63.

⁶⁴ E.g. John Boardman, *Greek Gems and Finger Rings: Early Bronze Age to Late Classical* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1970), pls. 461, 831, 833, 836.

⁶⁵ Boardman, *Greek Gems*, 143; cf. Shenkar, "The Coin of the »God on the Winged Wheel«, " 13-23 (on this coin, see also literature below, p. 228n112).

⁶⁶ Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 219-20, figs. 21-23; Kuhrt, *Persian Empire*, 496, 504, 536, figs. 11.11, 16, 29.

The key element for discussion here is the human figure on the winged disc. Regardless of one's interpretation of who he represents, he is intimately tied to the kingship.⁶⁷ He frequently hovers above royal figures in seals and reliefs, and is associated closely with the concept of passing power and authority to the king.⁶⁸ The presence of the winged disc with human figure on Tiribazus' coins, as the local manifestation of central authority, and in this political context (a revolt against the king's authority), is significant. Moreover, Tiribazus' artistic interpretation of the figure is extremely similar to those representations which feature in monumental artwork at the capitals of the Achaemenid Empire – far more so than other Samarian interpretations which carry four wings (Fig. 11).⁶⁹ While the style of Tiribazus' coins reflects some freedom afforded to the die-engraver,⁷⁰ the similarity of the figure's wings to examples from Achaemenid palaces suggest that the engravers received guidance from an individual familiar with Achaemenid versions of the design. Conversely, it may be interpreted as a reflection of the growing cross-cultural contact between artisans of the East and West during the fourth century.⁷¹

In the uses of the image in Persia, the feathered wings are often flat across the top, with an almost-rectangular presentation when taken in total (e.g. Figs. 6-7). These are comparable to the uses of the image by the Achaemenids' predecessors, for example the Assyrians (Fig. 12). Even among artwork of the Persian capitals there are variations, however, and at Persepolis the wings of the disc appear with a slight curve across the top, and pointed tips, somewhat closer to an Egyptian style.⁷² The figure on

⁶⁷ Shahbazi, "An Achaemenid Symbol, II," 121-22; P. Jamzadeh, "The Winged Ring with Human Bust in Achaemenid Art as a Dynastic Symbol," *IA* 17 (1982): 96-98; Maras, *Iconography, Identity and Inclusion*, 52-57; Mark B. Garrison, "Royal Achaemenid Iconography," in *The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Iran*, ed. Daniel T. Potts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 574-76.

⁶⁸ Root, *King and Kingship in Achaemenid Art*, 211-12.

⁶⁹ E.g. Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, 51-52, nos. 84, 100 (Fig. 11), 124. Cf., for example, Root, *King and Kingship in Achaemenid Art*, 300-01, pls. 1, 41a, 72a; Margaret Cool Root, "The Cylinder Seal from Pasargadae: Of Wings and Wheels, Date and Fate," *IA* 34 (1999): fig. 1. On Fig. 11 here, see further below, pp. 232-39.

⁷⁰ Harrison, "Numismatic Problems," 309.

⁷¹ Chester G. Starr, "Greeks and Persians in the Fourth Century B.C. A Study in Cultural Contacts before Alexander (Part 2)," *IA* 12 (1977): 100-01, 108.

⁷² Root, *King and Kingship in Achaemenid Art*, 214-15.

the disc is robed in Achaemenid examples, and wears a squared beard typical of the region.

Some immediate stylistic differences may be noted between images originating in the Achaemenid heartland and Tiribazus' version. Considered as a whole, the manipulation of the image on Tiribazus' coins reflects Hellenisation. It reflects imagery common on coins of Asia Minor and the Greek world, in the same way that the image of Baal on the obverse adopts a familiar pose and the Greek himation. The primary points of distinction between Tiribazus' coins and other Achaemenid depictions of the figure in the winged disc are outlined below.

The presentation of the wings:

The variances between Persian and other Near Eastern depictions of the winged disc have been delineated above. It is noteworthy then that the coins of Tiribazus appear to follow both Persian and Egyptian styles of presentation (compare, for example, Mallus R5, R6; Tarsus R1, R2). The wings, even at the same mint, can be very 'Assyrian' in nature (short and broad: Issus R2, R3), or be long and thin (Issus R5, R7), or curved and pointed (Issus R4, R6). Cilicia must have been a melting pot of cultures at this time; perhaps the engravers were exposed to a variety of images, or were instructed by officials from particular parts of the empire, used to seeing a particular style. As the evidence stands, the differences remain points of intrigue.

The winged disc in isolation:

The figure in the winged disc does not hover above another human or animal in Tiribazus' series. By contrast, the issues of Mazaeus always show an animal or human over which the disc hovers. The association with humans and animals mimics the presentation of the winged disc in royal art. Shahbazi cites these series of Tiribazus as one of two examples he knows which do not adhere to the pattern of placing the winged disc above a human or animal.⁷³

⁷³ Shahbazi, "An Achaemenid Symbol, I," 136.

The nudity of the male torso:

This is perhaps the most curious difference between Persian depictions of the human figure and Tiribazus' series. All Achaemenid representations of the figure in the winged disc feature a clothed male,⁷⁴ and a classicist will recall Herodotus' claim that the Lydians and most Easterners reviled nudity in all forms (Hdt. 1.10; cf. Assyrian depictions of Assur as archer). The nudity is the clearest sign of the image's Hellenisation. Furthermore, the figure sports a Greek-style pointed beard as opposed to the square beard which often features on royal images originating in the East.⁷⁵

The wreath:

One distinctly Greek aspect of the imagery is the wreath held over the figure's crown. It seems that only one example of the wreath from art in the Achaemenid heartland is known: on a fragmentary item in the Louvre.⁷⁶ It seems that there are three clear possibilities for interpretation.

(1) In the Greek world, wreaths are commonly associated with victory in athletic competitions, especially the Olympic Games, held in honour of Zeus. Perhaps, in the context of revolt on Cyprus, the die engraver was manufacturing a link between the wreath and martial victory. If the coins were minted after the victory at Citium, perhaps the coins celebrated that battle. In that case, the wreath may appeal to Citium in a similar manner to Athena's adoption of the wreath after the victory at Marathon in Attic coinage.⁷⁷ Unfortunately such hypothesising has little corroborating evidence on which to draw. The issue is that, in the fourth century, wreaths were more commonly associated with athletic and poetic victory; the martial connotations are primarily

⁷⁴ Harrison, "Numismatic Problems," 309.

⁷⁵ Shahbazi, "An Achaemenid Symbol, II," 143n133.

⁷⁶ Prudence Oliver Harper, Joan Aruz, and Françoise Tallon, eds., *The Royal City of Susa: Ancient Near Eastern Treasures in the Louvre* (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1992), no. 166.

⁷⁷ That is, if the leaves on Athena's helmet should be considered a wreath: Chester G. Starr, *Athenian Coinage, 480-449 B.C.* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970), 8-9.

Roman.⁷⁸ Given the possible Olympic connotations, the wreath may even draw a link between Zeus and Ahuramazda, who were equated in this period.⁷⁹ One might then consider the tale of Artaxerxes and Antalcidas, where the king took a wreath of flowers, dipped them in perfume and sent it as a gift to the Spartan (Plut. *Art.* 22.1; *Pel.* 30.4). Perhaps such a wreath had other connotations for the Achaemenids of which we are unaware. Connotations of victory have their appeal from a Hellenocentric standpoint, but it is difficult to substantiate such hypotheses.

(2) Brindley posited that the wreath is a Hellenised form of the spiked ring of authority present on Samarian coins.⁸⁰ This is unlikely. The lotus, tendrils, and human figure of the reverse type are drawn from images in Achaemenid art, not other numismatic traditions. The Samarian issues themselves take inspiration from the same sources; they are drawing upon Persian iconography. In this case, it is preferable to identify the reverse with Achaemenid imagery directly, rather than Achaemenid iconography *apud* Samarian.

(3) While Brindley's Samarian link is not convincing, his suggestion may help to identify the purpose of the wreath. If Brindley was correct in considering the wreath an adaptation of an eastern image, it would refer to the ring which frequently appears in Persia (e.g. Fig. 13).⁸¹ When compared to the Samarian coins to which Brindley refers, the true root of the inspiration is clear. The pose of the torso and the hands (with ring) are almost identical. Given the prevalence of the figure in the winged disc on Achaemenid seals, it is not difficult to imagine a die engraver being shown an example of the image by an official to serve as a basis for the coin die.

When the figure in the winged disc faces a human in Achaemenid art, it conveys a sense of investiture of power. The wreath carries the same connotations in

⁷⁸ *OCD*³ s.v. crowns and wreaths.

⁷⁹ E.g. Xen. *Cyr.* 3.3.21; Arr. *An.* 4.20.3. The Droaphernes inscription should no longer be adduced on this point: L. S. Fried, *The Priest and the Great King: Temple-Palace Relations in the Persian Empire* (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2004), 129-37. On the equation of Zeus and Ahuramazda: de Jong, *Traditions of the Magi: Zoroastrianism in Greek and Latin Literature*, 29-34, esp. 31-32.

⁸⁰ Brindley, "Early Coinages Attributable to Issus," 5; e.g. Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, no. 100.

⁸¹ Further examples: Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 219-20, figs. 21-23.

this Hellenised form. Viewing the two sides of the coin as a single object, rather than as two independent images, may also be beneficial for our understanding. Baal and the human figure face towards each other when viewing the coin, Baal's outstretched hand further emphasises this idea of investiture by reaching out towards the figure on the reverse, in a manner similar to the hand positions of the king in Achaemenid audience reliefs.

To any Greek recipients of the coins, however, the wreath could still convey some sense of victory as outlined in the first interpretation; the meanings are not mutually exclusive.

The wreath is then balanced by the hand on the right holding a lotus flower, which is a common motif in Persia. Various court scenes show the king in audience with his subjects, holding a lotus flower, with his crown prince behind, also holding a lotus.⁸²

The meanings of the iconography are manifest. The question is whether the image would be recognisable to the people of Cilicia or the direct recipients of the silver – mercenaries and soldiers. Determining an individual's response to art is always difficult. But Anatolia produced many examples of art styled in the manner of the Achaemenid heartland.⁸³ And the figure in the winged disc would be recognisable to people familiar with the Achaemenid administration - seals from Dascylium, for example, display the winged disc.⁸⁴ But the winged disc is not found on any extant monumental art in Asia Minor. Thus, it is difficult to know whether this image would be recognisable to a local merchant or soldier. Undoubtedly, the Hellenised aspects of the iconography were to make the image more accessible to Hellenic recipients.⁸⁵ As Harrison notes, clearly some leeway was granted to the die engraver to create this piece.⁸⁶ The presence of the winged disc on seals, small items, and on coins in

⁸² See Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 217-18.

⁸³ See the survey in Dusiñberre, *Aspects of Empire in Achaemenid Sardis*, 86-90.

⁸⁴ E.g. Deniz Kaptan, ed. *The Daskyleion Bullae: Seal Images from the Western Achaemenid Empire*, 2 vols., Achaemenid History 12 (Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, 2002), no. 4.

⁸⁵ Comparable to Ochus' Pharaonic portraits issued after the reclamation of Egypt? Kovacs, "Two Persian Pharaonic Portraits," fig. 3.

⁸⁶ Harrison, "Numismatic Problems," 309.

succeeding decades means that we should not assume that the die engraver or the public were unaware of the figure.⁸⁷ On one interpretation, we might see the Hellenisation as an Achaemenid method of 'co-opting' local traditions in order to demonstrate the extent of Achaemenids control.⁸⁸ It is difficult to gauge, however, whether the recipients of the coins would understand the connotations of the image.⁸⁹

Significance

However one interprets the figure in the winged disc (Ahuramazda, the king's *farnah*, or the king's *fravashi*), the type on these coins represented royal endorsement and authority.⁹⁰ The local die-engraver adapted the subject matter, adding a Hellenic notion of victory via the wreath above the nude figure's head.

In the context of revolt, the symbol conveyed the message that the king was restoring natural order. Achaemenid monarchs exalt the suppression of revolt and disorder in their royal inscriptions.⁹¹ As Tiribazus minted during the revolt of Cyprus, and in all likelihood produced his coins to fund the Persian campaign against Evagoras, the image suggested royal endorsement. If Isocrates is telling the truth about Evagorean-incited revolt in Cilicia in the 380s (9.62; cf. 4.161), Tiribazus had even more cause to utilise an image representing royal authority. As the coins circulated in Cilicia, they would help broadcast the administration's message of imperial order. If the figure in the winged disc is taken to represent Ahuramazda, the context becomes even more significant. Ahuramazda is frequently invoked in kingship inscriptions to combat forces of the Lie, and called upon to protect the land and the people from enemies.⁹² Furthermore, the use of types which echo the iconography of the royal authority

⁸⁷ See generally Boardman, *Persia and the West*, 204-06; the winged disc is also found on fifth century Cypriot coins, e.g. *BMC Cyprus* p. 17, no. 38; BM 1872,709.265.

⁸⁸ Root, "From the Heart," 5.

⁸⁹ Cf. Jamzadeh, "The Winged Ring," 96, which states that the winged ring was "recognizable by all."

⁹⁰ Shahbazi, "An Achaemenid Symbol, II," 143-44; Casabonne, *La Cilicie*, 189. See also above, p. 218n67.

⁹¹ E.g. Darius' Behistun inscription: Kuhrt, *Persian Empire*, §5.A.1.

⁹² P. O. Skjærvø, "Avesta and Zoroastrianism under the Achaemenids and early Sasanians," in *The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Iran*, ed. Daniel T. Potts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 554-55.

suggested the extension of Artaxerxes' own power on the periphery of the empire. Clearly Tiribazus wanted to evoke Artaxerxes himself with the motif on the reverse. The fact that the image was only used for these series of Tiribazus also suggests that it was implemented by his own volition; subsequent satraps in Cilicia minted with imagery unrelated to the king (e.g. Pharnabazus).

At this point we should consider a statement by Root, made in the context of Greco-Persian artistic inspirations and the evidence of Achaemenid seals:

*"The elaborate official programme of Achaemenid imperial art, which has been shown to have been deeply informed by antique Near Eastern formulae can now be seen (thanks not least to Parnaka) as part of a broadly based system of social relationships to the artistic environment. The programmatic entrenchment of the official art of Persepolis in heavily connotated, antique imagery is not merely a superficial gloss with which the participants in the environment would have had no real resonance... The people who were insiders within its social embrace were people who had an integrated aesthetic and social rapport with the official programme of Achaemenid monumental art... In short, I think there are ways of approaching the problem of Persian impact on the western reaches of the empire that suggest subtly nuanced but very assertive presence and cultural interaction."*⁹³

This sentiment is crucial to understanding the iconography on the coins of Tiribazus. With these issues, minted in the reign of a monarch often viewed as weak and impotent (under whom the use of royal imagery in coins allegedly declined⁹⁴), there is one of the most explicit expressions of royal authority in extant art found in the West. It stands in stark contrast to the generalisations which arose from Greek and Latin texts. The configuration of the figure in the winged disc reflects the complex artistic relationship between East and West, but the meaning of the symbol remains clear. In deciding on these types, Tiribazus expressed a need to assert royal authority, and to make the assertion of power explicit. These coins were tangible representations of Artaxerxes' influence over the West.

⁹³ Root, "From the Heart," 22.

⁹⁴ Meadows, "Administration," 188.

Numismatic Iconography and Egyptian Independence

The effects of Egyptian independence on the western Achaemenid Empire have been most clearly expounded in a number of archaeological studies co-authored by Fantalkin and Tal. In 2006, they proposed redating Lachish Level I to the fourth century, and not ca. 450.⁹⁵ In summary, they argued that Lachish was turned into a sizeable administrative centre following the Egyptian break from the empire. The change was placed within the context of other construction throughout this region, and further framed as a result of the satrapy morphing from a secure province into a frontier province, facing possible Egyptian incursions. Many sites were argued to have been fortified or expanded during this period,⁹⁶ which suggests that the region was under pressure to adapt. The hypothesis was then expanded in a 2012 paper.⁹⁷ It included a brief discussion of numismatic changes (pp. 148-51), stamp impressions (pp. 151-53),⁹⁸ and the canonization of the Pentateuch (pp. 169-80). The result is a convincing argument that the Achaemenid authority strengthened its control of the region in the face of Egyptian aggression, and oversaw the fortification of the district. Elsewhere, there is complementary evidence which suggests that the region's newfound importance as a frontier of the Achaemenid Empire caused its administration to be renovated.⁹⁹ This consolidation was coupled with a reinstallation of garrisons after the troubles during the 380s.¹⁰⁰ Considered in sum, it is clear that the

⁹⁵ Fantalkin and Tal, "Redating Lachish Level I," 167-98.

⁹⁶ Fantalkin and Tal, "Redating Lachish Level I," 181-86 and fig. 6.

⁹⁷ Fantalkin and Tal, "Judah and its Neighbors," 133-96.

⁹⁸ See also O. Lipschits and D. Vanderhooft, "Yehud Stamp Impressions in the Fourth Century B.C.E.: A Time of Administrative Consolidation," in *Judah and the Judeans in the Fourth Century B.C.E.*, ed. O. Lipschits, Gary N. Knoppers, and Rainer Albertz (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2007), 75-94; O. Lipschits and D. Vanderhooft, "Continuity and Change in the Persian Period Judahite Stamped Jar Administration," in *A "Religious Revolution" in Yehud?: The Material Culture of the Persian Period as a Test Case*, ed. Christian Frevel, Katharina Pyschny, and Izak Cornelius (Fribourg: Academic Press, 2014), 43-66.

⁹⁹ J. W. Betlyon, "Egypt and Phoenicia in the Persian Period: Partners in Trade and Rebellion," in *Egypt, Israel, and the Ancient Mediterranean World: Studies in Honor of Donald B. Redford*, ed. Gary N. Knoppers and A. Hirsch, *Probleme der Ägyptologie* 20 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 468.

¹⁰⁰ Ephraim Stern, *The Material Culture of the Land of the Bible in the Persian Period 538-332 B.C.* (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1982), 253-55.

prioritisation of Egypt, and the continual presence of invasion forces mustering in Phoenicia, resulted in Achaemenid influence being felt much more profoundly.

The effects of Egyptian independence were also felt in the local economy. Many studies acknowledge the influence Achaemenid military presence had on the production of coinage.¹⁰¹ The earliest coins of Samaria were produced as a result of Pharnabazus' activity while preparing for his 370s invasion of Egypt (denoted by coins bearing his name in Greek).¹⁰² Philistian coinage also moved from Athenian styled imitations in the fifth century, towards a larger repertoire of types in the fourth century.¹⁰³ While Fantalkin and Tal briefly considered the numismatic impact of their proposed changes, their discussion was limited to coins which show the head of the Great King. Other discussions are also limited to the presentation of the Great King,¹⁰⁴ or do not consider the political context.¹⁰⁵

The following section continues to use numismatics as a microcosm of the relationship between periphery and centre. In relation to Philistian coinage, three

¹⁰¹ Katzenstein, "Gaza in the Persian Period," 77; Oren Tal, "Some Remarks on the Coastal Plain of Palestine under Achaemenid Rule - An Archaeological Synopsis," in *L'archéologie de l'empire achéménide*, ed. Pierre Briant and Rémy Bouchardat, Persika 6 (Paris: De Boccard, 2005), table 1 Haim Gitler and Oren Tal, *The Coinage of Philistia of the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC: A Study of the Earliest Coins of Palestine*, Collezioni Numismatiche 6 (New York: Amphora Books, 2006), 41, 64, 211.

¹⁰² Meshorer and Qedar, *Samaritan Coinage*, nos. 1-2. On the chronology of Samaritan coins, see Y. Meshorer and S. Qedar, *The Coinage of Samaria in the Fourth Century BCE* (Jerusalem: Numismatic Fine Arts International, 1991), 65-67; Christoph Uehlinger, "'Powerful Persianisms' in Glyptic Iconography of Persian Period Palestine," in *The Crisis of Israelite Religion: Transformation of Religious Tradition in Exilic & Post-Exilic Times*, ed. B. Becking and M.C.A. Korpel (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 178-79. On the Samaria hoard, see also Josette Elayi and A. G. Elayi, *Trésors de monnaies phéniciennes et circulation monétaire: Ve-IVe siècles avant J.-C.* (Paris: Gabalda, 1993), 230 (dating its burial to ca. 355).

¹⁰³ Gitler and Tal, *Coinage of Philistia*, 63-68; cf. Oren Tal, "Coin Denominations and Weight Standards in Fourth-Century BCE Palestine," *INR* 2 (2007): 17-28. On the paucity of evidence from controlled excavations: Donald T. Ariel, "The Coins from Surveys and Excavations of Caves in the Northern Judean Desert," *Atiqot* 41, no. 2 (2002): 287-88.

¹⁰⁴ Haim Gitler, "Identities of the Indigenous Coinages of Palestine under Achaemenid Rule: The Dissemination of the Image of the Great King," in *More than Men, Less than Gods: Studies on Royal Cult and Imperial Worship*, ed. P. P. Iossif, A. S. Chankowski, and C. C. Lorber, *Studia Hellenistica* 51 (Leuven: Peeters, 2011), 105-19; Patrick Wyssmann, "König oder Gott? Der Thronende auf den Münzen des perserzeitlichen Samaria," in *Macht des Geldes - Macht der Bilder*, ed. Anne Lykke (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2013), 25-44.

¹⁰⁵ Haim Gitler, "Achaemenid Motifs in the Coinage of Ashdod, Ascalon and Gaza from the Fourth Century B.C.," *Transeuphratène* 20 (2000): 79-87.

comments are made on Achaemenid influenced coin types. For Samarian coinage, the above discussion of the winged disc in numismatics is expanded via scrutiny of the inspiration for coin types showing the figure in the winged disc. In the final section, in light of Fantalkin and Tal's revised chronology, the importance of the choices of coin types in relation to the politico-military situation is emphasised.

Four Comments on Achaemenid Motifs in Philistian Coins

Among the range of iconographic motifs during the fourth century, Gitler has discussed those featuring the 'Achaemenid king,'¹⁰⁶ janiform heads, protome horses, and Oriental heads.¹⁰⁷ The following adds to his research by providing commentary on Achaemenid iconography present in examples showing turreted city walls, riders, and Bes. The significance is explored in the final section of this chapter.

Turreted city walls:

This group of coins shows an Athenian styled head on the obverse, and turreted city walls on the reverse (Fig. 14).¹⁰⁸ Gitler and Tal attribute these series to Gaza, on the basis of that city's exposure to the Persian forces mustered for the invasion of Egypt.¹⁰⁹ They also argue that the walls appeal to the presence of fortifications on Achaemenid Immortals in Babylon and Susa (Fig. 15). While the similarities are manifest, and it makes for an attractive thesis when discussing Achaemenid influence, in this case it is preferable to look for inspiration closer to Gaza. In Sidon, the motif was used in the late fifth century – there are several turreted walls, but also the addition of a Sidonian galley, and two lions facing opposite directions in the bottom field (Fig. 16).¹¹⁰ It is more likely that the die engravers in Philistia drew inspiration from the coinage known to circulate in the region. This would be consistent with their earlier imitation of Athena, and their use of Cilician imagery:

¹⁰⁶ On designating the figure as generically royal, rather than the Achaemenid king: Root, *King and Kingship in Achaemenid Art*, 303-08; cf. Boardman, *Persia and the West*, 148-49.

¹⁰⁷ Gitler, "Achaemenid Motifs," 79-87; Gitler, "Identities of the Indigenous Coinages," 105-19.

¹⁰⁸ Gitler and Tal, *Coinage of Philistia*, group XV.

¹⁰⁹ Gitler and Tal, *Coinage of Philistia*, 211-12.

¹¹⁰ E.g. Elayi and Elayi, *Trésors de monnaies phéniciennes*, 294; trésor 75, nos. 7-9; pl. 37, nos. 17-25.

Cilician forebears:

When not employing Athena on the obverse in conjunction with walls on the reverse, the die-engravers presented Oriental heads, or rider and horse, or a janiform head.¹¹¹ The reverse with the fortifications varied in its additions to the city walls – in some an owl would be added or a lion. The Oriental female head adopted in group XV.2D (Fig. 17) bears similarity to the Aphrodite/Satrap head series minted in Cilicia in approximately the same time period. The hair is gathered at the nape of the neck, she wears a necklace, and a headband is present at the hairline of the forehead (see, for example, ANS 1944.100.54102 (Fig. 18); *SNG Levante-Cilicia* 150). This Philistian type probably derived from its Cilician forebear.

Cilician influence is not unusual in the coins of Philistia or Samaria. A unique drachm in the British Museum – the god on the winged wheel – has been subject to extensive discussion.¹¹² The aspect most intriguing to scholars is the type of the reverse. Shenkar has recently argued that the die-engraver sought to meld the imagery of Ahuramazda and Zeus as the most significant deities of Greek and Zoroastrian religion.¹¹³ What is particularly interesting when considering the spread of iconography in various coin types is the similarities of the obverse of the BM drachm with the Cilician Baal/warrior head series of Pharnabazus and Tarkumuwa (Fig. 3). While the Philistian helmeted warrior has a local style, his appearance generally follows his Cilician antecedents. The differences lie in the style of helmet depicted – it is a Phrygian helmet in the Cilician series, and a Corinthian helmet in the Philistian drachm. As the Phrygian helmet would otherwise cover the face, it has been tilted to the back of the warrior's head. These Cilician inspirations are further evidenced by Samaritan imitations of the helmeted warrior and Arethusa head – clearly Cilician pieces were circulating in the region at the time the BM drachm was minted.¹¹⁴ Owing

¹¹¹ Gitler and Tal, *Coinage of Philistia*, group XV.2-4.

¹¹² Most recently: Shenkar, "The Coin of the »God on the Winged Wheel«,” 13-23. See also Leo Mildenberg, "Yehud: A Preliminary Study of the Provincial Coinage of Judaea," in *Greek Numismatics and Archaeology: Essays in Honor of Margaret Thompson*, ed. Otto Mørkholm and Nancy Waggoner (Wetteren: NR, 1979), 183-86; Y. Meshorer, *A Treasury of Jewish Coins from the Persian Period to Bar Kokhba* (Jerusalem: Yad ben-Zvi Press, 2001), 2-6.

¹¹³ Shenkar, "The Coin of the »God on the Winged Wheel«,” 23.

¹¹⁴ Meshorer and Qedar, *Samaritan Coinage*, nos. 73, 80.

to the many other inspirations offered by the Achaemenids to Samarian mints, it is preferable to infer that Samarian obols imitating the warrior/Arethusa head staters copied Cilician designs, rather than the original Sicilian examples. As the BM drachm was probably minted between 380 and 360 BC,¹¹⁵ the Cilician inspiration is further evidence of the spread of Cilician series throughout the Levant, and might even be linked to the preparations for the invasion of Egypt by Pharnabazus in the 370s, when he travelled between both regions. Its use reflects the influence of the iconography used by Achaemenid administrators and the perceived value of their coin types.

Bes:

The series featuring Bes on the reverse have a number of connotations which appear to reflect Achaemenid ideology and influence. Bes was originally an Egyptian guardian against evil spirits and misfortune.¹¹⁶ By the fourth century, he is not only found on the coins of Philistia,¹¹⁷ he had also appeared in Achaemenid art.¹¹⁸ Thus, it is indeterminable whether Bes, in these Philistian series, is appearing as a result of Egyptian or Achaemenid influence. His presentation on these Philistian series does, however, appear to follow poses held by the Achaemenid royal figure on seals. Comparable series are those where Bes stands alongside a lion (Fig. 19), and those where he stands between two lions, holding them by the tails (Fig. 20). In Samarian coinage and Achaemenid seals it is the royal figure that is shown with a knife, and lion in a near identical position, or holding ibexes (Figs. 21-23).¹¹⁹ Bes' apotropaic role is worth consideration in regards to its possible relationship to the Achaemenids and the political context. In light of Fantalkin and Tal's argument for the canonization of the Pentateuch in the same period,¹²⁰ and their argument that local religious feeling identified with the stability offered by the Achaemenid Empire, the choice of Bes may

¹¹⁵ Shenkar, "The Coin of the »God on the Winged Wheel«, " 21, cf. p. 21n72.

¹¹⁶ Alexandra von Lieven, "Bes [2]," in *Brill's New Pauly [Online]*, ed. Hubert Cancik and Helmuth Schneider (Leiden: Brill, 2006), s.v. Bes.

¹¹⁷ L. Mildenberg, "Bes on Philisto-Arabian Coins," *Transeuphratène* 9 (1995): 63-66.

¹¹⁸ See K. Abdi, "Bes in the Achaemenid Empire," *Ars Orientalis* 29 (1999): 113-40; Boardman, *Persia and the West*, 165.

¹¹⁹ See also Stephen N. Gerson, "Fractional Coins of Judea and Samaria in the Fourth Century BCE," *Near Eastern Archaeology* 64, no. 3 (2001): 109-10.

¹²⁰ Fantalkin and Tal, "Judah and its Neighbors," 169-80.

be multifaceted. Bes, as a guardian against negative forces, complements Achaemenid religious belief in the power of order over chaos:¹²¹ Mithra has been specifically argued to be paralleled by Bes.¹²² Ahuramazda, as the greatest god of the Achaemenid religion, also attained primacy with his own triumph over the Lie which brought order to the universe. Furthermore, the identical poses adopted by Bes and the heroic figure present throughout Achaemenid artwork may be intended to further this notion of royal power and authority.¹²³ The adoption of 'Artaxerxes' as a regnal name reinforces the ostensible Persian preoccupation with order in the reigns of Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III Ochus, as it carries the meaning of one who rules through truth/order/justice.¹²⁴

Thus, the ideology surrounding Bes may complement what we already know of Achaemenid imperial ideology. Other Philistia inspiration by Achaemenid imagery, in addition to the region's willingness to adapt types from other areas, suggests that the cross over in meaning and depiction was not accidental. Bes' function aligned well with the role the Achaemenids saw for themselves in controlling their empire. The Achaemenids believed in stability and order, and Bes here represents a local deity whose role was also to combat chaos. Given the political climate and the disorder which ensued following numerous revolts and Egyptian incursions, the logic behind propagating such imagery is related to reinforcing the ideology associated with the figure.

Riders:

The use of riders on the reverse - frequently with the Oriental head on the obverse - is also interesting for its prevalence through surrounding regions.¹²⁵ The clearest similarities are between Samarian and Philistia examples (Figs. 24-25).¹²⁶

¹²¹ See summary of Skjærvø, "Achaemenid Religion," 177-79.

¹²² Simonetta Graziani, "Su un'interpretazione achemenide di Bes," *AION* 38 (1978): 53-61; Abdi, "Bes in the Achaemenid Empire," 121.

¹²³ Mark B. Garrison and Margaret Cool Root, *Seals on the Persepolis Fortification Tablets, Volume 1: Images of Heroic Encounter*, Oriental Institute Publications 117 (Chicago: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, 2001), 53-60.

¹²⁴ See above, p. 27 and n35.

¹²⁵ Gitler and Tal, *Coinage of Philistia*, group XXV.

¹²⁶ Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, nos. 15, 40, 123-25, 197.

These series are nearly identical in presentation – rider, headdress, horse position, and arm position are related – and only the borders differ (square in Philistia, round in Samaria). The rider and horse motif extends north into Cilicia as well.¹²⁷ The headdress on the rider in all cases permits identification with Persian satraps and the Achaemenid administration more broadly. The motif has also been argued to relate to Achaemenid hunting practices in Samarian examples.¹²⁸ Owing to the propagation of the image throughout numerous regions in the western empire, it would be plausible, if the interpretation of the image as “hunting in *paradeisoi*” is correct, to extend the logic to encompass those examples originating in Philistia. Elsewhere, again in Samarian contexts, the links to Achaemenid satrapal iconography and the ethos of the local aristocracy have been explored.¹²⁹ Gitler makes similar comments regarding the indigenous aristocracy and their minting choices in a Palestinian context.¹³⁰ Philistian mints do not adopt the use of an oriental figure exclusively when employing a rider type; other riders are present with no connection to satrapal administration or the iconography of the empire specifically.¹³¹ This suggests that it was not necessarily a political message being dispersed via the iconography in Philistia, but was rather a familiar type adapted for the local economy. Nonetheless, the use of a rider with a crown, often interpreted as the king of Persia,¹³² disperses a message of royal authority.

¹²⁷ E.g. de Callataÿ, “Les Monnayages Ciliciens,” pl. 22.1-6.

¹²⁸ Jarosław Bodzek, “Remarks on the Iconography of Samarian Coinage. Hunting in *Paradeisos*?,” *INR* 2 (2007): 35-45.

¹²⁹ Jarosław Bodzek, “Cavalier vainqueur de Samarie. Remarques sur l’iconographie des monnaies de Samarie,” *Polish Journal of Biblical Research* 1, no. 1 (2000): 109-16; Jarosław Bodzek, “A Note on a Samarian Coin-Type,” *INR* 3 (2008): 3-12.

¹³⁰ Gitler, “Identities of the Indigenous Coinages,” 105-19.

¹³¹ Gitler and Tal, *Coinage of Philistia*, group XIII.16, XV.3, XXV.5.

¹³² See, for example, Gitler, “Identities of the Indigenous Coinages,” 109-10.

The Figure in the Winged Disc in Samaria¹³³

The Achaemenid influence in Samaria is reflected strongly in numismatic iconography, and has been examined in greater depth than in Philistian examples. The mint of Samaria has become the centre of extensive research on 'iconographic precedents.'¹³⁴ The earliest coins of Samaria, bearing Pharnabazus' name,¹³⁵ provide an explicit connection between the Achaemenid response to Egypt and the numismatic choices of the local mints. The following focuses on two varieties of Samarian coinage which are yet to receive discussion.

In many cases, the identification of iconographic precedents in Samarian coinage is straight forward. Tiarate heads were popular.¹³⁶ They bear the influence of Cilician examples showing satraps' heads (e.g. *BMC Cilicia* p. 100, no. 9, pl. XVII.9).¹³⁷ The Achaemenid royal figure was also prevalent.¹³⁸ He was shown riding a horse, engaging with real and mythical beasts (e.g. Fig. 23), seated on a throne (e.g. Fig. 25), or in adaptations of the traditional running archer (Fig. 26).¹³⁹ The royal hero was

¹³³ A revised version of this section has been accepted for publication as John Shannahan, "Samaritan Depictions of the Figure in the Winged Disc," *Notae Numismatacae – Zapiski Numizmatyczne* (forthcoming). I also wish to thank Prof. M. Garrison for his correspondence on this topic, and for sending me an article by Prof. B. Jacobs on the topic, which contained many valuable bibliographic references: Bruno Jacobs, "Ahuramazdā," in *Iconography of Deities and Demons in the Biblical World. Part I: Pre-Hellenistic Periods*, ed. Christoph Uehlinger and F. Graf (Leiden: Brill, Forthcoming), *passim*.

¹³⁴ Bodzek, "Note on a Samaritan Coin-Type," 3.

¹³⁵ See above, p. 226n102.

¹³⁶ E.g. Meshorer and Qedar, *Samaritan Coinage*, nos. 71-72.

¹³⁷ On the possible significance of these tiarate heads and their diadems, see J. Zahle, "Persian Satraps and Lycian Dynasts. The Evidence of the Diadems," in *Proceedings of the 9th International Congress of Numismatics*, ed. T. Hackens and R. Weiller (Louvain-la-Neuve: Association internationale des numismates professionnels, 1982), 101-12; Dusinger, "King or God?," 157-71. On tiarate heads in Samaritan coinage, see Jarosław Bodzek, "Tiarate Heads on Samaritan Coins," *INR* 6 (2011): 3-19.

¹³⁸ Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 714-16; Wyssmann, "König oder Gott?," 25-44. On designating the figure as generically royal, rather than the Achaemenid king: Root, *King and Kingship in Achaemenid Art*, 303-08; cf. Boardman, *Persia and the West*, 148-49.

¹³⁹ On horse: e.g. Meshorer and Qedar, *Samaritan Coinage*, nos. 15, 74. See Bodzek, "Cavalier vainqueur de Samarie," 109-16; Bodzek, "Iconography of Samaritan Coinage," 35-45. Engaging with beasts: e.g. Meshorer and Qedar, *Samaritan Coinage*, nos. 20, 22, 35, 55-56. On throne: e.g. Meshorer and Qedar, *Samaritan Coinage*, nos. 40, 47.

frequently shown battling animals in monumental and glyptic Achaemenid art.¹⁴⁰ Sidonian die-engravers, known to have created prototypes exploited by the Samaritans, also showed this motif.¹⁴¹ The king's positioning on a throne in Samarian coinage mimics Achaemenid court scenes where he was presented in the same pose.¹⁴² These types also evoked earlier uses of the motif – with Baal/Zeus – but created a closer link to the Achaemenids with the headdresses added to the figures.¹⁴³ The use of the running archer similarly adhered to the obverse type of Persian darics and sigloi.

The Achaemenid prototypes for the images found in Samarian coinage were ideologically significant. In an Achaemenid context, the depiction of a royal individual in a heroic position glorified the position of the king and asserted his authority.¹⁴⁴ The same messages were propagated by Samarian adaptations of the iconography. The use of the running archer, while taking advantage of the association with a reliable currency, also carried the connotations of the original type by dispersing an imperial message.¹⁴⁵

Samarian die-engravers, however, were not restricted to pastiches of Achaemenid art. Their mimicry was centred on images already popular in coinage circulating in the local economy. Thus we can also detect the influences of types from Athenian, Cilician, Phoenician, Sidonian, and satrapal coins.¹⁴⁶ The easy identification of prototypes has led to the characterisation of Samaria's numismatic artistry as "prolifically derivative."¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁰ E.g. monumental: Root, *King and Kingship in Achaemenid Art*, pls. 28a-b; Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 224, fig. 24. Glyptic: Boardman, *Persia and the West*, figs. 4.19, 5.1-2; Garrison and Root, *Seals on the Persepolis Fortification Tablets, Volume 1*, *passim*.

¹⁴¹ See Meshorer and Qedar, *The Coinage of Samaria*, 23.

¹⁴² E.g. Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, figs. 20-22.

¹⁴³ See above, pp. 202-25.

¹⁴⁴ See Garrison and Root, *Seals on the Persepolis Fortification Tablets, Volume 1*, 53-60.

¹⁴⁵ Dusinger, "King or God?," 165-68; Bodzek, "Achaemenid Asia Minor: Coins of the Satraps and of the Great King," 61.

¹⁴⁶ Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, 32. For Sidonian coinage, see for example Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, nos. 55-56, 74. On the influence of satrapal coins, see Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, 46-47. The precise chronology of Samarian coinage has not been established, so it is inference that the Samarian types follow Cilician, Sidonian, and satrapal coins. Samarian coins certainly post-date the Athenian and Phoenician types.

¹⁴⁷ Tuplin, "Changing Pattern," 155.

There remains, however, one motif which is famously complex in its Achaemenid context, and which was displayed by the Samaritans in an equally intricate manner: the figure in the winged disc. Neither numismatists nor art historians have discussed its Samaritan presentation in depth. Yet the composition of this figure on Samaritan coins is fascinating. The depiction of the figure with four wings (as opposed to two), and representation of his torso extending directly into feathers (instead of terminating in a disc), was rare in Achaemenid contexts. The composition suggests that the die-engravers were inspired by small artistic pieces. No numismatic depictions of the figure in the winged disc are comparable to the Samaritan examples under discussion here, and in this way the Samaritan types are different to most Achaemenid-influenced coinage.

THE TYPES

TYPE 1

AR. *Obv.* Persian king seated on throne to r., wearing kidaris and kandys, holding sceptre in l. hand and smelling flower in r. hand; to l. Aramaic ŠN. *Rev.* Crowned and bearded four-winged deity with bird's tail, to r.; holding flower in r. hand and three-pointed ring in l. hand; to l. Aramaic MZ. Obols.

- a) 0.87g Coll. ANS, AR 1969, p.10, Pl. 1:4 in Meshorer and Qedar, *The Coinage of Samaria*, no. 21.
- b) 0.78g Ashmolean Museum, Robinson (1970), ex Bank Leu, ex Nablus Hoard; Coll. Ox. 2 in Meshorer and Qedar, *The Coinage of Samaria*, no. 21; Meshorer and Qedar, *Samaritan Coinage*, no. 100.

Figs. 11, 27

- c) 0.75g ANS 2010.77.42; Meshorer, Bijovsky, and Fischer-Bossert, *Coins of the Holy Land*, 208, no. 42.
- d) 0.74g Sternberg 22 (1989) 144 in Meshorer and Qedar, *The Coinage of Samaria*, no. 21.
- e) 0.72g ANS 2010.77.41; Leu 38 (1986) 158 in Meshorer and Qedar, *The Coinage of Samaria*, no. 21; Meshorer, Bijovsky, and Fischer-Bossert, *Coins of the Holy Land*, 208, no. 41.

- f) 0.71g Coll. *Copenhagen* in Meshorer and Qedar, *The Coinage of Samaria*, no. 21.
- g) 0.69g Spink 60 (1987) in Meshorer and Qedar, *The Coinage of Samaria*, no. 21.
- h) 0.66g CNG Triton XVIII (2015) 212; Heritage Signature Sale (2012) 20067.
- i) 0.66g Coll. *P1* 958 in Meshorer and Qedar, *The Coinage of Samaria*, no. 21.
- j) 0.64g BnF 1970.737; Coll. *Paris* 737 in Meshorer and Qedar, *The Coinage of Samaria*, no. 21.
- k) 0.64g Coll. *P5* in Meshorer and Qedar, *The Coinage of Samaria*, no. 21.

AR. *Obv.* Forepart of crouching lion r., head facing. *Rev.* Crowned and bearded four-winged deity with bird's tail, to r.; holding flower in r. hand and three-pointed ring in l. hand. Hemiobols.

- l) 0.33g Ashmolean Museum, Robinson (1970), ex Bank Leu, ex Nablus Hoard; Meshorer and Qedar, *The Coinage of Samaria*, no. 14; Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, no. 84.

Figs. 28-29

- m) 0.28g ANS 2010.77.149; Meshorer, Bijovsky, and Fischer-Bossert, *Coins of the Holy Land*, 216, no. 149.
- n) 0.24g CNG 90 (2012) 713.
- o) 0.19g Ronen, "Twenty Unrecorded Samaritan Coins," no. 5.
- p) 0.17g CNG e-auction 141 (2006) 91.
- q) 0.17g ANS 2010.77.150; Meshorer, Bijovsky, and Fischer-Bossert, *Coins of the Holy Land*, 216, no. 150.

TYPE 2

AR. *Obv.* Crowned and bearded four-winged deity l. The figure's torso ends in a disc, the top of which is obscured. Feathers extend beneath the disc. Two tendrils extend diagonally below the disc and curl at the tips. Whole in dotted square border. *Rev.* Rider on horse galloping l., underneath, uncertain figure. Obols.

- a) 0.72g CNG Mail Bid 82 (2009) 731.

b) 0.61g Meshorer and Qedar, *Samaritan Coinage*, no. 124.

AR. *Obv.* Unidentified object (four-winged uraeus?); dotted square border. *Rev.* Crowned and bearded four-winged deity r. The figure's torso ends in a disc, the top of which is obscured. Feathers extend beneath the disc. Whole in dotted square border. Hemiobol.

c) 0.19g ANS 2010.77.148; Meshorer, Bijovsky, and Fischer-Bossert, *Coins of the Holy Land*, 216, no. 148.

The figure in the winged disc appears on two types from Samaritan coinage. They were limited in production in comparison to imitations of Athena or images of the royal figure in heroic positions.¹⁴⁸ Type 1 always appears on the reverse (Figs. 11, 27-29). It shows a male figure with four wings extending diagonally from his torso. The wings are not symmetrical. In place of his legs are feathers extending downwards. The figure is bearded in a manner typical of Samaritan coinage.¹⁴⁹ He wears a three-pointed headdress. In his right hand, raised towards his chin, is a flower. In his left hand, held horizontally, is a ring with three points extending outwards to the right. Type 2 is slightly different in its composition (Figs. 30-31). There, the feathered tail does not extend directly from the torso, for the torso terminates in a disc. Instead, the feathers extend from the bottom of the disc. Two curved tendrils also extend below the disc, making a total of seven extensions from the human figure.

The composition of Types 1 and 2 is significant when determining their iconographic precedents. As mentioned in the introduction, even though crudely drawn, the prototypes for many Samaritan coins are clear. The die-engravers could replicate Athenian imitations, the Arethusa/warrior head coins of Pharnabazus and

¹⁴⁸ See below. Cf. Meshorer and Qedar, *Samaritan Coinage*, nos. 13 (and data in Meshorer and Qedar, *The Coinage of Samaria*, no. 36), IC2.

¹⁴⁹ Compare to Meshorer and Qedar, *Samaritan Coinage*, nos. 4-7, 13-16, 20-23, et cetera.

Tarkumuwa/Datames, and Cilician depictions of the standing Baal proficiently.¹⁵⁰ Types showing the Achaemenid royal figure in combat also followed standard Achaemenid composition in pose, clothing, and weaponry.¹⁵¹ Surprisingly, given their unusual style (to which we will shortly turn), only cursory attempts have been made to identify the inspiration for Types 1 and 2. These have focused on comparisons to the reverse of Tiribazus' Cilician staters.¹⁵² Generally, commentators have been satisfied with identifying the figure in Types 1 and 2 as Ahuramazda or some variety of winged deity.¹⁵³ There are, however, a number of differences between the types under discussion here and the typical Achaemenid portrayal of the figure in the winged disc. The differences are such that these types cannot be considered to have derived from a coin or a monumental relief.

There are two primary differences between these Samarian types and the typical Achaemenid portrayal of the figure in the winged disc (compare Figs. 6-8, 13, 27-31). The first is the number of wings. In Achaemenid reliefs, the winged disc is shown with two wings extending horizontally (Fig. 13). Types 1 and 2 here have four wings. This immediately precludes any comparison to the Cilician staters of Tiribazus (e.g. Fig. 1), whose depiction of the winged disc is in keeping with standard Achaemenid versions (though the Hellenised figure on Tiribazus' staters is unique). Four wings are seen in some Achaemenid seals.¹⁵⁴ They still, however, differ in key

¹⁵⁰ Athenian imitations: Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, 40-41, e.g. nos. 57-59, 212-17. Arethusa: Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, 38, e.g. nos. 73, 80-81. Standing Baal: Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, 55, e.g. nos. 117-20. Generally, on Samarian imitations and adaptations, see Patrick Wyssmann, "The Coinage Imagery of Samaria and Judah in the Late Persian Period," in *A "Religious Revolution" in Yehud? The Material Culture of the Persian Period as a Test Case*, ed. Christian Frevel, Katharina Pyschny, and Izak Cornelius (Fribourg: Academic Press, 2014), §2.

¹⁵¹ Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, 43-46.

¹⁵² Meshorer and Qedar, *The Coinage of Samaria*, 28-29; Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, 52; Y. Meshorer, G. Bijovsky, and Wolfgang Fischer-Bossert, *Coins of the Holy Land: The Abraham and Marian Sofaer Collection at the American Numismatic Society and the Israel Museum, Volume 1* (New York: American Numismatic Society, 2013), 216, no. 148; Bodzek, *Ta satrapika nomismata*, 279.

¹⁵³ E.g. Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, 51-52; Boardman, *Persia and the West*, fig. 5.55; Curtis and Tallis, *Forgotten Empire*, cat. 362.

¹⁵⁴ E.g. figures in Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, 51-52 (which appears to be Boardman, *Persia and the West*, fig. 5.18 = BM 89352); Edith Porada, ed. *Corpus of Ancient Near Eastern Seals*

details. The lower pair of wings, in seals showing the four-winged figure, is most frequently horizontal. Neither Type 1 nor Type 2 has horizontal wings. An exception to this trend is a seal held in Berlin.¹⁵⁵ It is interesting for its depiction of two winged discs, one with a human figure and one without. The figure in the winged disc, in this seal, is similar to Type 2. In both examples the human torso terminates in a disc with the top obscured, and four wings extend diagonally.

The second clear difference is the absence of the central disc from Type 1. In Type 1, the torso of the figure extends directly into a tail of feathers. In all monumental Achaemenid versions of the figure in the winged disc, the torso of the figure ends at the winged disc, from which feathers extend. On the other hand, among the corpus of Achaemenid seal impressions, the central disc is often obscure.¹⁵⁶ But such seals are often remarkable for their own oddities. In one example, the seal is unusual for its depiction of the figure in an Assyrian garment.¹⁵⁷ Indeed, a comparison of Type 1 to Assyrian depictions of Assur as archer reveals that the replacement of the legs with feathers is in keeping with Assyrian versions of the motif.¹⁵⁸ On another seal, the head of the figure is enlarged so as to be larger than the rest of the torso.¹⁵⁹ Another Achaemenid seal which shows no central disc is so peculiar that it warranted dedicated discussion by Root.¹⁶⁰ The composition of Type 1 is not commonplace. The absence of the central disc may suggest that the die-engraver was inspired by a seal like those outlined above.

In addition to these major differences, there were two minor adaptations made for Samarian coinage. The first was the presentation of the figure in the winged disc in isolation. In Achaemenid art, he hovers above humans or animals. Alongside the

in North American Collections. Volume 1 – The Collection of the Pierpont Morgan Library (New York: Pantheon Books, 1948), no. 831; Root, "Cylinder Seal from Pasargadae," 157-90.

¹⁵⁵ Bruno Jacobs, "Der Sonnengott im Pantheon der Achämeniden," in *La Religion iranienne à l'époque achéménide: actes du colloque de Liège, 11 décembre 1987*, ed. Jean Kellens, *Suppléments à Iranica antiqua* 5 (Gent: Brill, 1991), fig. 3.

¹⁵⁶ Garrison and Root, *Seals on the Persepolis Fortification Tablets, Volume 1*, 69. See, for example, nos. 4, 29, and pl. 248a-e.

¹⁵⁷ Garrison and Root, *Seals on the Persepolis Fortification Tablets, Volume 1*, no. 45.

¹⁵⁸ E.g. BM 124551.

¹⁵⁹ Garrison and Root, *Seals on the Persepolis Fortification Tablets, Volume 1*, no. 58.

¹⁶⁰ Root, "Cylinder Seal from Pasargadae," fig. 1.

staters of Tiribazus, these Samarian types can be considered part of a handful of examples where he is alone.¹⁶¹ The hands of the figure are also unlike Achaemenid art. In reliefs, he will frequently appear with a ring similar to that in Types 1 and 2. He may also appear with a lotus flower. The figure in the winged disc, however, is not presented holding both objects at the same time in Achaemenid art.

Thus there were several changes made by the Samaritans to the Achaemenid motif which render Types 1 and 2 noteworthy. The image clearly did not derive from any numismatic prototype, nor from any monumental depiction. While Type 2 is comparable to one seal impression, Type 1 remains an enigma. The evidence offered by dress ornaments, however, may hold the answer to the question of iconographic precedents.

Comparatively little of Achaemenid dress is known. Yet the similarities between Types 1 and 2 and surviving Achaemenid jewellery are impossible to ignore. Four examples reveal the depths of the likeness. The first is a group of four-winged pendants found in the Caucasus (Sairkhe).¹⁶² The lower pair of wings is almost horizontal, but the wings are splayed in a fashion reminiscent of Types 1 and 2 here. These pendants are comparable to another example: a clothing appliqué found in a grave at Sardis.¹⁶³ It is remarkable for its depiction of the figure with a tail extending like a fifth wing below him, and curving at the tip to the right. The third example is a clothing plaque from the Oxus treasure (Fig. 32).¹⁶⁴ It bears closest resemblance to Type 1. The four wings extend identically, and the figure is turned to the left, holding a lotus flower in his left hand (the right hand appears empty). The torso terminates in a central disc, like Type 2. The final example is a pair of earrings, one of which is in the Norbert Schimmel Collection, while the other is held by the Boston Museum of Fine Arts (Fig. 33).¹⁶⁵ The figure faces left in one earring and right in the other, the lower pair of wings is almost horizontal, and the central disc is presented in the same manner

¹⁶¹ Shahbazi, "An Achaemenid Symbol, I," 136.

¹⁶² Florian Knauss, "Ancient Persia and the Caucasus," *IA* 41 (2006): fig. 14.

¹⁶³ Shahbazi, "An Achaemenid Symbol, II," fig. 1.

¹⁶⁴ Curtis and Tallis, *Forgotten Empire*, cat. 188; BM 123936.

¹⁶⁵ O. W. Muscarella, *Ancient Art: The Norbert Schimmel Collection* (Mainz: P. von Zabern, 1974), no. 156; A.B. Tilia, *Studies and Restorations at Persepolis and Other Sites of Fars* (Rome: IsMEO, 1978), pl. C 1; MFAB accession number: 1971.256.

as that in Type 2. Differences emerge in the length of the torso visible, and in the absence of tendrils from the jewellery pieces. Overall, these final two examples are the most comparable to Types 1 and 2.

As strange as it may seem, the iconographic precedents for these types must have been styled in a fashion similar to these Achaemenid ornaments. The angle of the wings is especially significant. Only the Berlin seal shows wings like Types 1 and 2.¹⁶⁶ But all of the aforementioned clothing ornaments present their wings angled downwards. Their presentation of the central disc is also identical to Type 2. If the clothing plaque from the Oxus treasure had its central disc removed, it would be almost identical to Type 1. Undoubtedly Types 1 and 2 bear more similarity to these devices than to standard monumental or glyptic Achaemenid art. Nonetheless, the inspiration for Type 1 is difficult to identify. No example of Achaemenid art known to the author carries all of the same characteristics. The absence of the central disc is a clear mark of distinction from other four-winged versions of the motif. On the other hand, Type 2 resembles a number of dress ornaments, and carries several features also found on the seal in Berlin. Its iconographic precedent was styled in the same way. In any case, given the rarity of these portrayals in Achaemenid art, Types 1 and 2 must be considered noteworthy. These coins displayed a powerful image, closely related to the Achaemenid kingship. In the context of the political upheaval in Samaria at the time they were minted, they conveyed a sense of the central authority's control over the region. The Achaemenid motif was recreated in its numismatic form with the highest levels of intricacy, and these types should be considered alongside those which feature cuneiform text as important examples of the adaptations made by Samarian die-engravers.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁶ I.e. Jacobs, "Der Sonnengott im Pantheon der Achämeniden," fig. 3.

¹⁶⁷ A. Lemaire and F. Joannès, "Premières monnaies avec signes cunéiformes: Samarie, IVème s.av.n.è.," *NABU* 1994, no. 4 (1994): 84-86.

The Pertinence of the Political Situation

Accordingly, there are a variety of additions to be made to the corpus of coins perceived as 'Achaemenid influenced' in Philistia, while the Achaemenid influence is much more nuanced in Samarian mints than has previously been considered. Given the political situation in which these coins were minted, the motifs become particularly enlightening as representations of the message minting authorities wished to propagate. While permission to mint one's own coinage in this region is considered synonymous with semi-autonomy,¹⁶⁸ unlike their Cilician counterparts (with the notable exception of Tiribazus), Philistia persisted with imagery influenced by their Persian overlords. Considered in total, it appears to reflect closeness to the Achaemenid imperial mindset which extends into numerous facets of the imperial ideology. Local mints in the Levant repeatedly expressed their engagement with the empire. Gitler believes that the presence of the Great King on these coins was a show of loyalty by the indigenous aristocracy towards the Achaemenid Empire, and may imply some form of divinization of the king.¹⁶⁹ It is hard to accept that conclusion completely, as the revolts in Phoenicia during the reign of Ochus suggests that any loyalty was fleeting (Diod. 16.40-46). Instead, the choices may reflect the continual military and administrative presence of the Achaemenids.

Cilicia, by way of contrast, shows the advantages of considering historical context in order to explain the reasons for adopting certain images. Like Samaria and Philistia, minting only began in Cilicia after the Achaemenids were in power. Cilicia also drew on Achaemenid inspiration for a number of types. Among coins struck at Mallus, the Persian running archer is shown on obverse and reverse in series at the end of the fifth and beginning of the fourth centuries.¹⁷⁰ Among those coins struck at Tarsus, riders are frequently shown with eastern headdresses as riders,¹⁷¹ and the running archer may be channelled in the presentation of an archer in an identical

¹⁶⁸ Gitler and Tal, *Coinage of Philistia*, 67.

¹⁶⁹ Gitler, "Identities of the Indigenous Coinages," 113.

¹⁷⁰ E.g. *BMC Cilicia* p. 99, no. 23; de Callataÿ, "Les Monnayages Ciliciens," pl. 14, nos. 1-4.

¹⁷¹ *BMC Cilicia* pp. 162-63, nos. 1-9.

pose.¹⁷² The adaptation of Achaemenid iconography helped disperse the same imperial message as the original darics and sigloi.¹⁷³

The most drastic changes in Cilician coin iconography occurred in relation to known historical events. Prior to fourth century satrapal intervention, at Mallus, winged deities carrying discs and swans were common motifs,¹⁷⁴ similar to the winged figures from neighbouring Caria.¹⁷⁵ At Issus, the mint frequently utilised depictions of Herakles.¹⁷⁶ When Tiribazus demanded it, city-specific iconography was abandoned in favour of types which were consistent across all Cilician mints.

These series were followed by others which bear signs of Achaemenid influence. Primary among these are the Aphrodite/satrap head series and the Herakles/satrap head series. The primary link to historical events was the legend TEIPIBAZOY on a unique stater featuring Herakles and the satrap head, but that is in a barbarized style.¹⁷⁷ Debord and Casabonne trust Babelon's claim that there existed another, unpublished version in a better style, and maintain the attribution of these series to Tiribazus.¹⁷⁸ In any case, the use of the satrap's head on the reverse denotes some relation to the Achaemenids. The most recent treatment of these series argues that they were minted while Orontes and Tiribazus were in joint command against Cyprus.¹⁷⁹ Even in those studies which reject the association with Tiribazus, they are placed ca. 370, and so retain their significance for the current discussion.¹⁸⁰ If minted during the presence of either Tiribazus and Orontes, or Pharnabazus and Tarkumuwa, these coins reflect the influence of Achaemenid administrators on what would be minted in Cilicia. Even if satraps were not ordering a specific type attributable to them via their own name as the inscription, the choice of types would acknowledge their

¹⁷² BMC Cilicia p. 163, no. 10.

¹⁷³ Dusinger, "King or God?," 165-68; Dusinger, *Empire, Authority, and Autonomy*, 73.

¹⁷⁴ James C. Brindley, "Baetyls and the Early Coinage of Mallus," *NCirc* 104, no. 7 (1996): 331-32.

¹⁷⁵ H. Troxell, "Winged Carians," in *Greek Numismatics and Archaeology: Essays in Honor of Margaret Thompson*, ed. Otto Mørholm and Nancy Waggoner (Wetteren: NR, 1979), 257-68.

¹⁷⁶ Brindley, "Early Coinages Attributable to Issus," groups 2-3.

¹⁷⁷ See BMC Cilicia p. cxxii, n. 5 – the only other coin of this type known, in the Montagu collection, has been deemed false. See also data compiled in Bodzek, *Ta satrapika nomismata*, 92n509.

¹⁷⁸ Babelon, *Traité* 2, 383; Debord, *L'Asie mineure*, 336-37; Casabonne, *La Cilicie*, 192.

¹⁷⁹ Casabonne, *La Cilicie*, 193.

¹⁸⁰ E.g. Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins*, 284.

presence. If Fantalkin and Tal are correct in their understanding of the situation in the Levant during Egyptian independence, the same influence may be reflected in Levantine numismatic motifs.

Thus, when exploring the range of types in Samaria and Philistia, we are better informed about *why* the local authorities should express themselves through Achaemenid iconography. We should not obsess over the presence of soldiers in the region as the agents which prompted these changes in coinage.¹⁸¹ It appears that the reasons were more complex. At a time when the southern Levant had become a frontier against an aggressive, independent Egypt, the Persians displayed renewed administrative and military interest in the area. It permeated all levels of society. Fortifications were built and control tightened throughout the satrapy. While the mints retained their semi-autonomous status, they recognised the heavy presence of the Achaemenids through iconography that appealed directly to the Achaemenid ideology. The absence of large denominations of Samarian coins would suggest that the satraps themselves weren't commissioning these coins with large sums of bullion – elsewhere satraps prefer to operate with the double siglos for silver coinage.¹⁸² Perhaps this inference can be taken a step further, and be taken to indicate that the Samarian mints willingly adopted Persia imagery. The similar changes which occurred in Cilicia, for which we have a better understanding of local history (though still incomplete), further allow us to see that the continual presence of Persian armies and administrators, and the necessary establishment of control which followed such presence, would result in the expression of Achaemenid ideology in coins. Fundamentally, the Persian administration would look favourably upon local attempts to integrate themselves: the Persian king had an interest in Persianisation as a

¹⁸¹ See above, pp. 225-26nn100-01. Cf. C. J. Tuplin, "The Limits of Persianization: Some Reflections on Cultural Links in the Persian Empire," in *Cultural Identity in the Ancient Mediterranean*, ed. Erich S. Gruen (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2011), 167-68 on the dangers of attributing Persianization to regions solely on the basis of our idea that soldiers inhabited the region.

¹⁸² For denominations of the Samaria hoard see Meshorer and Qedar, *The Coinage of Samaria*, 69. They are obols, hemiobols, or quarter obols.

reflection of his influence over the local elite.¹⁸³ While the Persian armies marshalled for Egypt in Samaria and Philistia, the local elite certainly seem to have done so for Artaxerxes and Ochus.

¹⁸³ Maria Brosius, "Keeping Up with the Persians: Between Cultural identity and Persianization in the Achaemenid Period," in *Cultural Identity in the Ancient Mediterranean*, ed. Erich S. Gruen (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2011), 145.

CHAPTER FIVE

379-370: Egypt

Planning for the Second Invasion of Egypt

The Egyptian invasion of the 370s, more than any other, demonstrated how military operations had changed since the Peloponnesian War and the march of the Ten Thousand. Greek mercenaries were now the foundation of any powerful military force in the eastern Mediterranean. While preparing the invasion, according to Diodorus (15.38.1), Pharnabazus needed to recruit sufficient Greek mercenaries to combat the extensive defensive network created by Nectanebo. Thus, stability in Greece, freeing professional soldiers for recruitment, was a useful precursor for the invasion. In this section, the focus is primarily on the diplomatic vanguard to the invasion – the renewal of common peace in 375/4 – and the selection of commanders for the expedition.

Modern scholarship tends to understand the renewal of common peace from this perspective of mercenary procurement.¹ This stems from the above reference of Diodorus. It is underscored by the role of Iphicrates in the expedition as Diodorus relates it. But more can be noted on the circumstances which contributed to the agreement renewed in 375/4. Furthermore, while this is the first explicit acknowledgement in the sources of Artaxerxes' motives for peace (stability, permitting easier assemblage of forces), Artaxerxes at this time merely continued the pattern of behaviour which began early in his reign. He frequently promoted stability via diplomacy prior to military action.

¹ E.g. Hornblower, *Greek World*, 216; Victor Parker, "Ephorus and Xenophon on Greece in the Years 375-372 B.C.," *Klio* 83, no. 2 (2001): 363; Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 102. Also, on 368: Buckler, *Aegean Greece*, 315.

Given the role ultimately played by Greek mercenaries in the Egyptian campaign, it is unsurprising that Artaxerxes would monitor the status of the King's Peace. The creation of the Second Athenian Confederacy in 377 must have been disconcerting. Athenian imperialism had ostensibly been checked by the King's Peace. The Spartan administration of the Peace had neatly mitigated any unwelcome accumulation of power by a party likely to interfere in Artaxerxes' affairs. The status quo before 377 suited Sparta well. Diodorus presents the Spartans as nascent at the start of the 370s, with their continued friendship highly desirable to the Great King (Diod. 15.23.4-5).² The return of an Athenian-led league recalled the conflict of the fifth century.

The decree of Aristoteles in 377 outlined the charter of the new confederacy of Greek states (RO 22).³ Notably, the Athenians were at pains to avoid offending Persia; the decree suggested an Athenian reluctance to convey the impression of a revival of the organisation which supported their fifth century *arche*. Any state not belonging to the Great King on the mainland or on the islands of the Aegean was permitted to join the confederacy (l. 18). Equally, the members were to be free and autonomous (l. 20), aligning with the sentiments of the King's Peace. Finally, members would not pay tribute, nor receive a garrison, nor receive a governor (ll. 21-23); the agreement with Athens would be made on the same terms as the Chians, Thebans, and other Athenian allies (ll. 24-25). Each of these points responds to the King's Peace. While it is generally recognised that the influence of the 387/6 agreement is difficult to quantify, Cargill emphasises that the decree of Aristoteles "reveals Athens' intent to set its league within the context of that peace. But this basic fact is *all* the stone tells us."⁴ Ruminations on the relation of the Persian king to Aristoteles' decree must also be placed in the context of the decree's emphasis on avoiding the mistakes of the fifth century Athenian hegemony. Cleruchies would not be installed, nor tribute demanded

² H. D. Westlake, "Agesilaus in Diodorus," *GRBS* 27, no. 3 (1986): 268.

³ See generally Cargill, *The Second Athenian League*, 14-47. On the date, see also Cawkwell, "Second Athenian Confederacy," 56-60.

⁴ His emphasis. Cargill, *The Second Athenian League*, 31.

(though by 373 “contributions” were expected⁵). All told, the terms were required to address a number of issues.

Fundamentally, however, the formation of the confederacy must be seen as a response to Spartan application of the King’s Peace. The Lacedaemonians acted as administrators of the Peace, and used their position to leverage further influence over Greece. Their handling of the Peace has led to the bluntest assessment by Robin Seager, declaring that its influence was “intermittent and superficial.”⁶ As argued in chapter three, the manipulation of the King’s Peace by the Spartans was not necessarily inconsistent with the desires of Artaxerxes that we can infer. The Second Athenian Confederacy, however, was the end result of almost a decade of Spartan exploitation. The association of Thebes and Athens, alluded to in the decree of Aristoteles (Il. 24-25), is also consistent with the Thebans’ hostility towards the Spartans, who refused to permit them to swear on behalf of Boeotian cities. Thebes and Athens joined forces to limit the effective hegemony of the Spartans. On this basis, Hamilton has argued that “the Decree itself does not establish the principles of the new Confederacy, but it seeks to emphasize them for purposes of propaganda in order to influence the Greek states to challenge Spartan control and to join the alliance.”⁷ Further to these assessments, there also remain questions of whether, ultimately, this confederacy was intended to re-establish Athenian imperialism. Worthington’s assessment of fourth century rhetoric has affirmed – for him – that public figures pushed for the Athenian *demos* to consider itself rightful *hegemon* of Greece. This mood, Worthington concedes, opposes the views of Ober and Cargill: neither considers the Second Athenian Confederacy to

⁵ Theopomp. F98; P. J. Rhodes and R. Osborne, eds., *Greek Historical Inscriptions, 404-323 BC* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 101.

⁶ Seager, “The King’s Peace and the Balance of Power,” 63. On the interpretation of the Peace for Greek freedom and autonomy, see most recently Dmitriev, *The Greek Slogan of Freedom*, 37-49, 351-52.

⁷ Hamilton, “Isocrates, IG ii 2 43,” 100. See also Rhodes and Osborne, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 100.

have been an imperialist endeavour.⁸ But its relationship to Artaxerxes is worth exploring.

As always, the concept of “keeping one’s own”⁹ was of primary concern. Athens’ decision to placate Persia by acknowledging the king’s sovereignty over the territory he controlled in Asia was conciliatory. Moreover, the fact that Athens obeyed the demand for Chabrias’ recall from Egypt ca. 380 mitigates arguments for the growing imperialism of Athens in this period (Diod. 15.29.3-4). Not only did Athens withdraw Chabrias, but the Athenians acquiesced to the request for the assignment of Iphicrates to the Persian army. As noted above, the terms under which Pharnabazus demanded Chabrias’ recall are crucial: they did not appear to be based on the King’s Peace.¹⁰ So Athens’ acquiescence may reflect the city’s perception that she could turn affairs to her own advantage by working with Persia again.¹¹ While Athens’ aspirations for the conquest of Greece had been long abandoned, the military revolution of the fourth century was leading to a prevalent role for Greek soldiers in Persian affairs that she might exploit.¹² Artaxerxes cannot have been ignorant of Greek self-interest. Equally, he should not have been perturbed by affairs as they stood in 377. The creation of the Second Athenian Confederacy was a signal, but in practice changed nothing for him. The accommodations made for the Persians in the confederacy’s terms reflected the league’s local aspirations. This was not a problem for Persians who were more concerned about direct interference in military spheres. The King’s Peace continued to foster internal strife. Nearly a decade after its implementation, the Spartan interpretation of the Peace continued to limit Greek military action to Greece

⁸ Ian Worthington, “History and Oratorical Exploitation,” in *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action*, ed. Ian Worthington (London; New York: Routledge, 1994), 113; Griffith, “Athens in the Fourth Century,” 127-44; cf. Cargill, *The Second Athenian League*, *passim*; Ober, “Public Opinion and the Role of Sea Power,” 26-31, esp. 28.

⁹ Cawkwell, “King’s Peace,” 73.

¹⁰ See above, p. 169.

¹¹ Hamilton, “Isocrates, IG ii² 43,” 98.

¹² See, for example, the background provided by Trundle, *Greek Mercenaries*, 5-7. See also above, p. 199n7.

and the northern Aegean.¹³ When the troubles extended to the East, they were predominantly coastal activities in the Hellespont – well away from marshalling/construction areas for Egyptian operations.¹⁴

Despite the stated outlook of the confederacy, the Persians would be concerned about the events of 376 and 375. Shortly earlier, Cleombrotus and Agesilaus failed to make inroads against the Thebes and Athens in Boeotia (Diod. 15.32-34; *Hell.* 5.4). Chabrias was then victor at the sea battle of Naxos. This was followed by another Athenian victory at Alyzia, and the routing of two Spartan detachments at Tegyra by the Theban Sacred Band.¹⁵ The defeats at sea limited any threat Sparta could pose for the confederacy's island members, and those on land foreshadowed the eventual end of Spartan hoplite dominance at Leuctra in 371. Without knowing the ultimate ramifications of the loss at Tegyra, the Lacedaemonians were already confronted with the fact that their hoplites were no longer the best. The victories at sea were particularly advantageous for the Second Athenian Confederacy, as they won over the Cyclades and Corcyra.¹⁶ Chabrias' subsequent movement into the Hellespont may have concerned the Persians. If the confederacy's intentions were to create an empire, the Lacedaemonians would be unable to stop it. A Persian administrator might believe that it would require intervention from an Achaemenid force.

The Hellespont and Black Sea were of utmost importance to Athens in order to maintain her grain supply. Their security would be threatened if Athens came into conflict with Artaxerxes.¹⁷ The association of Chabrias and Ariobarzanes, established in this northern campaign, may take on a more sinister tone when viewed in light of Ariobarzanes' activity in the 360s. Philiscus' support of Chabrias gained him mention on the statue base erected for the Athenian in the *agora*, but should not be seen to

¹³ Buckler, *Aegean Greece*, 187 notes how Spartan policy changed to a domestic focus with the Peace. In the following pages Buckler outlines the ways Sparta preoccupied Greece with her imperialism.

¹⁴ See, for example, Hornblower, *Greek World*, 209.

¹⁵ Naxos and Alyzia: Diod. 15.34-35; *Hell.* 5.4.60-65. Tegyra: Diod. 15.37; Plut. *Pelop.* 16.

¹⁶ Dem. 20.77; Hornblower, *Greek World*, 215.

¹⁷ Phillip Harding, "Athenian Defensive Strategy in the Fourth Century," *Phoenix* 42, no. 1 (1988): 67n21.

reflect Ariobarzanes' later ambitions.¹⁸ Satraps were permitted to operate with certain autonomy, and their capacity for forming their own alliances and friendships is well known. The relationship with Chabrias did not threaten any of the king's possessions, but extended Athenian influence aggressively.

In light of this political situation, it is reasonable to conclude that Diodorus simplifies affairs in stating that Artaxerxes, "intending to make war on the Egyptians and being busily engaged in organising a considerable mercenary army, decided to effect a settlement of the wars going on in Greece. For by this means he particularly hoped that the Greeks, once released from their domestic wars, would be more ready to accept mercenary service" (15.38.1). Mercenaries undoubtedly played a part, and the invasion of Egypt which followed almost immediately supports this assessment. Conversely, the potential for interruption to Persian affairs, not dissimilar to the 390s, must have contributed to Persian reassessment of the situation in the Aegean.

The reaffirmation of general peace in 375/4 indicates three things.¹⁹ (1) The Peace of 387/6 was no longer effective. (2) The Peace of 387/6 must have achieved tangible results or offered benefit in the eyes of Artaxerxes to warrant continued interest in its application. (3) Artaxerxes retained a reputation sufficiently valued by the Greeks for them to respect (at least nominally) his interests and policies. The final point is also reflected in the charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy, which sought to circumvent the Peace, yet maintain technical adherence to its terms so as not to arouse suspicion from Persia.

Xenophon would have his audience believe that the 375/4 treaty was issued at the behest of Athens, and affected only his home city and Sparta (*Hell.* 6.2.1). His failure to recognise the role of others has led to his dismissal as a reliable source on the matter, and raised questions about his value for the period.²⁰ Scholars have, therefore,

¹⁸ Anne Pippin Burnett and Colin N. Edmonson, "The Chabrias Monument in the Athenian Agora," *Hesperia* 30, no. 1 (1961): 85.

¹⁹ On the date, see G. L. Cawkwell, "Notes on the Peace of 375/4," *Historia* 12, no. 1 (1963): §2; J. Buckler, "Dating the Peace of 375/4 B.C.," *GRBS* 12, no. 3 (1971): 353-61. Cf. Parker, "Ephorus and Xenophon," 363-66.

²⁰ See the summary of Parker, "Ephorus and Xenophon," 368. Cf. Gray, "The Years 375 to 371," 306-26.

turned to Diodorus and Philochorus, *apud* Didymus (Philoch. F151), in order to reconstruct the renewal of the King's Peace.²¹

Substantially the terms of the agreement appear to remain the same as the King's Peace, with the most important features continuing to be autonomy, and a renewed, specific emphasis on freedom from garrisons for all supporters. Athens and Sparta were now to share the position of guardians of the peace, one over the sea, the other over the land (Diod. 15.38.4). This clause in particular emphasises the balance of power in Greek affairs. Neither state was dominant, but affairs had shifted far from Sparta's position of supremacy granted by the Peace of 387/6.

Isocrates would later eulogise its benefits to Athens (Isoc. 15.109-10). The securing of general peace was celebrated with an altar to Eirene in Athens, where yearly dedications would take place in its honour (Philoch. F151).²² Artaxerxes swore to the common peace in the same way that he swore to that of 387/6. Persia would abide by the terms, but they, in reality, barely touched on Artaxerxes' affairs – the renewal of peace in 375/4 was intended to be advantageous to Artaxerxes' ambitions, and should not be construed as a reflection of Persian desire to reduce conflict between Greeks.

The agreement of 375/4 was another diplomatic move to facilitate the Egyptian campaign and preclude Greek ambitions from interfering in its execution.²³ Planning for the expedition began no later than 380/79. At this date Pharnabazus had Chabrias recalled from Egypt (Diod. 15.29.2; Nep. *Chab.* 3; Theopomp. F105); Chabrias was in mainland Greece again, defending the frontier, in the following year (*Hell.* 5.4.14). It is reasonable to infer that Pharnabazus was appointed just before 380/79. This coincided with Evagoras' capitulation on Cyprus. Pharnabazus' first step was to remove the Greek military influence in Egypt.

²¹ See A. G. Roos, "The Peace of Sparta of 374 B.C.," *Mnemosyne* 2, no. 4 (1949): 265-85; Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, 58-63, app. 2; Cawkwell, "Peace of 375/4," 84-95; A. Andrewes, "Diodoros and Ephoros: One Source of Misunderstanding," in *The Craft of the Ancient Historian: Essays in Honor of Chester G. Starr*, ed. Chester G. Starr, John W. Eadie, and Josiah Ober (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985), 191-95; Stylianiou, *Commentary*, 320-29; Parker, "Ephorus and Xenophon," 363-67; *FGrHist* commentary on Philoch. F151.

²² See notes in *FGrHist*.

²³ Ruzicka, "Athens and the Politics," 65-66.

The invasion under Pharnabazus would not be launched until 374/3. Its protracted preparation probably resulted from the need to rectify the mistakes of the previous mission. Pharnabazus was an unsurprising choice for commander in chief, and he was allegedly supported in the enterprise by Tithraustes (Nep. *Dat.* 3.5). This passage of Nepos may be somewhat dubious, however, given that Datames silently superseded Tithraustes when Pharnabazus was recalled. Nepos may have conflated the commanders of the first and second expeditions: he is the only source to associate Tithraustes with the 370s expedition.

During the 390s Pharnabazus was the right hand of the king, and excelled during his campaigns across the Aegean; he proved himself to be a master diplomat in his interactions with the Greeks. He was rewarded for this success with marriage to Apame, the king's daughter, and his new position in the royal family must have lent weight to his claim for authority. Furthermore, Pharnabazus played an important role in the 380s attempt to reclaim Egypt; his experience would be valuable in strategizing.

On the other hand, we know of few other experienced generals to whom Artaxerxes could grant command. Tissaphernes was dead. Abrocomas disappears from the sources after the failed expedition of the 380s. The revelation of Orontes' petty political machinations against his co-commander on Cyprus led to his disgrace. Tiribazus may still have been in disgrace and awaiting trial; he had failed to establish himself as a legitimate military leader after his failure to capture Salamis. Knowledge of the extensive fortifications constructed by the Egyptians to inhibit Persian progress across the Nile and beyond would have made Artaxerxes acutely aware of the need for a general who could cope with successive sieges.²⁴ Had any word of Hecatomnus' double-dealing on Cyprus reached the king, he would have been immediately ruled ineligible for large command. In any case his death and the accession of Mausolus in 377 (Diod. 16.36.2 says Mausolus ruled for twenty-four years, and died in 353²⁵) would render any disruption to the satrapy of Caria by extended military command undesirable. Glos had revolted rather than be implicated in treason. No doubt there were many capable, unknown, 'dukes' like Rhathines who had performed exemplarily

²⁴ See below, pp. 257-58.

²⁵ Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 38; Ruzicka, *Politics of a Persian Dynasty*, 33.

in dealing with various local issues, but their appointment would necessitate the supersession of Pharnabazus. Xenophon's account of the meeting between Pharnabazus and Agesilaus in the 390s indicates that Pharnabazus would fight vigorously for his right to lead if he were overlooked.

Four other alternatives to Pharnabazus are known. Ariaeus is the first. Having been reconciled with Artaxerxes after the revolt of Cyrus, Ariaeus was later entrusted with a role in the execution of Tissaphernes. If one accepts the conjecture of Sekunda,²⁶ one may find another reason for Ariaeus' ineligibility. Sekunda suggests that Tithraustes and Ariaeus were engaged in a feudal relationship and politically entwined (i.e. Tithraustes was in effect Ariaeus' liege lord, and Ariaeus Tithraustes' liege man). So the decline of the former after the failure of the first invasion of Egypt may well have enveloped Ariaeus and reduced his political clout to such an extent as to preclude his consideration. Or, if Tithraustes was involved in this second expedition, perhaps Ariaeus was already serving on his patron's staff. Regardless, Pharnabazus' new royal connection would place him above Ariaeus in the state order. The second option was Strouthas, who acquitted himself well in dealing with Thibron in the late 390s. Like the fourth option – Ariobarzanes – Strouthas was placed below Pharnabazus in the court hierarchy. Neither could be reasonably considered without publicly rebuking Artaxerxes' son-in-law. From a modern viewpoint, there was no logical or discernable need for Artaxerxes to replace Pharnabazus

The final candidate for leadership was Artaxerxes himself. Artaxerxes was no stranger to military command. He was general at Cunaxa, and Plutarch is highly complementary of his behaviour during the second Cadusian campaign.²⁷ Nor would his decision to avoid command be caused by more pressing campaigns in the empire; there is no record of any other military activity warranting the king's intervention in this decade. Isocrates would have us think the Egyptians greatly feared a personal campaign by the king (5.101). An ancient Greek would be able to supply Artaxerxes' reasoning easily: Artaxerxes did not lead the campaign because he was a coward. Although modern scholars cannot rely on stereotypes, Artaxerxes' reluctance to take

²⁶ Sekunda, "Achaemenid Settlement," 113.

²⁷ See below, p. 275.

on a true imperial campaign (rather than a limited expedition within the limits of his own territory, as with the Cadusians) is difficult to consider as anything less than a stain upon the character of his reign, if he is to be measured by such exploits. Certainly, this charge cannot be confined to Artaxerxes: no Persian king is recorded to have attempted to expand the borders of the empire since Xerxes I in 479. One could equally point to Artaxerxes' regnal name as an indication of his imperial mindset. By taking on the name of Artaxerxes I, he laid out his ostensible ambition for a stable and lengthy reign. He consciously avoided associations with the expansionist kings like Cyrus II or Cambyses II. Indeed, the absence of imperial expansion throughout the reign of Artaxerxes could easily be associated with general stagnation and decline of the Achaemenid Empire. A hallmark of a vigorous empire is the extension of borders and military success. As a military leader with some experience, Artaxerxes was a viable option to lead the latest campaign against the Egyptians. Artaxerxes III Ochus made his first move against Egypt during his father's reign, and later led his own campaigns as king.²⁸ The blame Pharnabazus heaps on his king when the expedition is delayed indicates that Artaxerxes was overseeing preparations closely (Diod. 15.41.2). It is difficult to see through the Greek bias and determine whether his interventions were in fact necessary or arbitrary. To sum up, the only other plausible alternative for command was Artaxerxes.²⁹ But, for whatever reason, he did not accept the challenge.

Having requested the recall of Chabrias, Pharnabazus also asked for Iphicrates to join the Persian army (Diod. 15.29.4). Iphicrates was duly transferred. He was given command of the Greek mercenaries recruited for the mission (Diod. 15.41.3). His role required close interaction with Pharnabazus, and their relationship became increasingly tense as the mission progressed. Iphicrates, Ruzicka has argued in his reinterpretation of Polyaeus (3.9.63),³⁰ brought meticulous training programs to the army, particularly the Greek contingent. The force was drilled in shore assaults in conjunction with the fleet arranged for the invasion. Such training helps account for

²⁸ Isoc. 5.101; Syncellus, p. 487; Trog. *Prol.* 10; Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 270n1, chaps. 15-18.

²⁹ See also brief consideration in Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 101.

³⁰ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 106-09; cf. Stylianou, *Commentary*, 339-40 for the traditional interpretation of Polyaeus' report.

the lengthy preparation time for the expedition. Ruzicka's conjecture is plausible and logical. Pharnabazus' (and therefore Iphicrates') presence in the region may be further discerned in the production in Samaria of fractional bronze coinage in Pharnabazus' name.³¹

Tithraustes and Datames were the two Persian commanders who rounded out the Persian triumvirate in control of the invasion, according to Nepos (*Nep. Dat.* 3.5). No other source attests the role of Tithraustes and, as noted above, Nepos may have been mistaken. Little else can be added to the above discussion (without undue speculation). Tithraustes would have been a reasonable choice to assist, given his prior experience, but it would appear that he was superseded by Pharnabazus and was not long or prominently involved in the affair. Datames was an outstanding figure in the 370s and 360s. Having risen to prominence in the first Cadusian campaign of Artaxerxes, he then proved his value in arresting the progress of the rebellious Thuys. His reward was to be appointed to command alongside Pharnabazus and Tithraustes. Sekunda, based upon the evidence of Nepos, has suggested that Datames was also satrap of Cappadocia since the 380s.³² This would help to explain why the heretofore unknown man should have such an accelerated rise in the Achaemenid court. It is difficult to precisely identify when Datames was promoted to assist Pharnabazus. Sekunda bases his chronology, which he admits is tendentious, on the assumption that Nepos rendered his account in some order. He suggests that Datames was promoted to command quite early in the planning stages.³³ Sometime during these planning stages, Datames was required to stop Aspis, a local dynast who was stealing royal property which was being sent through Cataonia (between Cilicia and Cappadocia). Given Datames' familiarity with the region through his father, he was a likely candidate to address the problem (*Nep. Dat.* 4.1).³⁴ Like Iphicrates (*Diod.* 15.44; cf. *Nep. Iphic.* 1.3-4),³⁵ Datames is credited with introducing military reforms which were associated with

³¹ Meshorer and Qedar, *Samaritan Coinage*, nos. 1-2; Bodzek, "Pharnabazus Once Again," §3.

³² Sekunda, "Life of Datames," 44; cf. Weiskopf, *Achaemenid Systems*, 197-220.

³³ Sekunda, "Life of Datames," 51.

³⁴ Sekunda, "Life of Datames," 43; Bing, "Datames and Mazaeus," 48; Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 125, 262n14.

³⁵ See Stylianou, *Commentary*, *ad locum*.

the invasion of Egypt. While Iphicrates modified Greek armour, Datames is said to have played a role in the development of new Persian armour.³⁶ The *cheir* was designed to protect the arm, and its implementation is plausibly located by Sekunda in the period of preparation for the invasion (372-68, when Datames was in full command). Datames' association with such innovations is testament to his portrayal as a keen military mind.

Having accepted that the debate surrounding the TRKMW inscribed coins has settled in favour of someone besides Datames, Ruzicka argued that Tarkumuwa had a key role planning the invasion as a commander of a new Cilician guard fleet.³⁷ This conjecture fits in with Ruzicka's other suggestions concerning the training program of Iphicrates on the Phoenician coast and the future role ships would have in the invasion itself. Ruzicka's arguments are plausible, but must remain conjecture, for there exists no corroborating evidence for the role of Tarkumuwa in the 370s. The coins themselves, regardless of epigraphic interpretation, are part of three issues which may be associated with Pharnabazus' command.³⁸ The extent of satrapal coin production in the Levant underlines the extraordinary resources dedicated to the preparation for invasion.

While the Persians undertook their own preparations, Nectanebo I embarked on his own initiatives to repel the eventual invaders. One of the first was the recruitment of Chabrias. As Nectanebo took the throne in 380, Acoris was probably the

³⁶ Sekunda, "Life of Datames," 42. Sekunda here also speculates that Persian *kardakes* were also instituted by Datames in this period; cf. the response of Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 1037.

³⁷ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 103-04. On the coins see Harrison, *Coins of the Persian Satraps*, 321-36; Moysey, "Issues of Pharnabazos and Datames," 7-61; Lemaire, "Remarques à propos du monnayage cilicien," 141-56; A. Lemaire, "Recherches d'Épigraphie Araméenne en Asie Mineure et en Égypte et le Probleme de L'Acculturation," in *Asia Minor and Egypt: Old Cultures in a New Empire*, ed. Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Amélie Kuhrt, Achaemenid History 6 (Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, 1991), 203-05; Bing, "Datames and Mazaeus," 59n55; Olivier Casabonne, "De Tarse à Mazaka et de Tarkumuwa à Datâmes: D'une Cilicie à l'autre?," in *La Cilicie. Espaces et pouvoirs locaux (2e millénaire av. J.-C. – 4e siècle ap. J.-C.)*, ed. É. Jean, A.M. Dinçol, and S. Durugönül, Varia Anatolica 13 (Istanbul: Institut français d'études anatoliennes d'Istanbul, 2001), 243-64; Wiesehöfer, "Tarkumuwa und das Farnah," 173-87; Alram, "Coinage of the Persian Empire," 76-77. On the role of Cilicia generally in the Achaemenid naval strategies: Wallinga, "Naval Installations in Cilicia Pedias," 276-81.

³⁸ See the table in Moysey, "Issues of Pharnabazos and Datames," 16; cf. reassessment in de Callataÿ, "Les Monnayages Ciliciens," 93-127.

instigator of the recruitment. Nonetheless, some have argued for a very close relationship between Nectanebo and Chabrias.³⁹ Strabo refers to a village of Chabrias near Lake Mareotis (17.803; 18.679); Strabo (16.760) and Pliny (*NH* 5.68) note walls on the road to Pelusium. The references suggest that Chabrias constructed extensive defensive works while in Egypt. Ruzicka also notes the presence of a village of Nicias which may be associated with the efforts of Chabrias in Egypt.⁴⁰

In addition to these brief references to Chabrias' building projects, Diodorus provides us with information about Egyptian defensive projects. He reports that the Persian planning and march were so lengthy that Nectanebo had completed all preparations before the invading army reached Egypt, and that all approaches by sea and land had been blocked (15.41.4-42.1). Diodorus adds that a city with towers had been established on the banks of the Nile, with a bridge commanding its entrance. The fortification of the Pelusiac mouth, as the first encountered by an army from the East, supplements the above references to Chabrian developments. Channels were also dug in order to inhibit all approaches, and the lowlands were inundated (15.42.3). Such defensive works had a long history in Egypt, and modern archaeological surveys have found similar evidence of defensive canals dug in the Middle Kingdom and earlier.⁴¹ It is impossible to determine exactly where these channels or inundations were located. Nonetheless, Pharnabazus' staff's reaction to seeing the defences on his initial approach suggests that it took place at the Pelusiac mouth (Diod. 14.42.4).⁴²

Diodorus also makes it clear that the Egyptians responded tenaciously to the first Persian attacks – rushing out of their stronghold with cavalry and infantry in the first battle (15.42.4-5) – and had prepared a varied force to address Persian strengths. It can be no coincidence that the Persian army was strongest with its cavalry, and

³⁹ K. P. Kuhlmann, "Ptolemais - Queen of Nectanebo I. Notes on the Inscription of an Unknown Princess of the XXXth Dynasty," *MDAI(K)* 37 (1981): 267-79.

⁴⁰ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 100. On the village of Chabrias, see also Nikos Litinas, "Remarks on Two Cities of the Delta," *APF* 45, no. 2 (1999): 191, suggesting that Chabrias could be a "phonological equivalent" of an Egyptian pharaoh.

⁴¹ E.g. Eliezer D. Oren, "Migdol: A New Fortress on the Edge of the Eastern Nile Delta," *BASO*, no. 256 (1984): 9-10.

⁴² Jean-Yves Carrez-Maratray, *Péluse et l'angle oriental du delta égyptien aux époques grecque, romaine et byzantine* (Paris: Diff. Impr. nationale, 1999), 337-39, 367-68.

Diodorus specifically mentions Egyptian employment of horsemen, and how Egyptian countermeasures would affect an approach by cavalry (15.42.3). The initial absence of any defensive measures at the stronghold of Memphis would also indicate that Nectanebo ordered as many of his troops to the northern delta to stave off the invasion as possible (15.43.1).

The wall and village of Chabrias, situated at the extremes of the eastmost points of the Nile, were considered to be "les clefs de l'Égypte."⁴³ Pelusium, at this time, sat on the coast of Egypt, and was thus the northernmost point of defence against any invaders. The fortification of routes to this city is unsurprising. The fortress city was important as a stronghold against land forces attempting to cross from the Levant into Egypt, and was part of the broader network put in place by the pharaoh, as well as the first line of defence for marshalling the Egyptian opposition to the Achaemenid navy sailing along the coast from Phoenicia.⁴⁴ In Herodotus, all of Egypt falls quickly after the Pelusiac mouth and Memphis are overrun (3.11-13). The city would continue to be important to the Hellenistic age and beyond (Livy 45.11.4-5).

Thus, the invasion was organised. Both Persians and Egyptians marshalled their resources, and the literary sources subsequently provide the first detailed account of an Egyptian invasion under Artaxerxes. Despite the brief references to the broader situation in the Achaemenid Empire during the first half of the 370s, we can infer that the rescript in 375/4 responded to an issue larger than the recruitment of mercenaries. The formation of the Second Athenian Confederacy in itself was not a threat to Artaxerxes, but the rapid accumulation of Theban and Athenian power in the years which followed evidently prompted action. When the situation settled after his diplomatic interference, the forces gathered for Egypt were committed to the attack.

⁴³ Mallet, *Les rapports des Grecs avec l'Égypte*, 96-97.

⁴⁴ Jean-Daniel Stanley, Maria Pia Bernasconi, and Thomas F. Jorstad, "Pelusium, an Ancient Port Fortress on Egypt's Nile Delta Coast: Its Evolving Environmental Setting from Foundation to Demise," *Journal of Coastal Research* 24, no. 2 (2008): 451-62 on the position of the city in this period; also Carrez-Maratray, *Péluse, passim*.

Pharnabazus' Invasion of Egypt and Aftermath

The campaign itself was launched in 374/3 (Diod. 15.42-43); this has been narrowed down to March/ early April 373.⁴⁵ Despite their preparations, the Persians were surprised when they came across the Pelusiac mouth fortified so heavily. The initial plan to push quickly through Pelusium was abandoned. It was resolved that the force should use its ships to attack another mouth. The Mendesian mouth was selected for its beach, and three thousand horse and infantry were landed, and later reinforced, by the fleet. Iphicrates' mercenaries are credited with sacking the city itself. Discord set in after Iphicrates and Pharnabazus disagreed on the next course of action. It is reasonable to think that this tension might have been raised by the abandonment of the original plan, and the immediate undertaking of an entirely new strategy. Iphicrates argued that the city of Memphis, which he knew to be undefended, should be immediately assaulted. Pharnabazus was suspicious of Iphicrates' motives, and so delayed. Perhaps there were more considerations than simple suspicion, but Diodorus records no other information. Ruzicka believes that only a small portion of the initial force had actually landed at the Mendesian mouth, with the rest remaining east of the Pelusiac mouth.⁴⁶ If Pharnabazus' contingent was relatively small, that might explain Pharnabazus' unwillingness to divide his force. Diodorus goes to great lengths to outline the enormous investment in the fleet by Pharnabazus – three hundred triremes and two hundred thirty-oar ships (Diod. 15.41.4). Admittedly, the land force was expected to march from Acre, and so the fleet did not necessarily have the capacity to ferry all the soldiers. If Diodorus can be trusted to relay accurately the relative magnitude of the fleet, one might doubt that Pharnabazus should be so willing to leave a large part of his force east of Pelusium. If Pharnabazus did leave most of his troops in the East, it justifies his trepidation at the plan to march inland. He would want to wait and allow the bulk of his force to be transported to the newly acquired beachhead, and thus prevent the landing force being cut off when the Egyptians arrived at the scene.

⁴⁵ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 114.

⁴⁶ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 115.

Iphicrates' suggestion, strategically, was sound, and based upon successful precedents: Cambyses had crippled the Egyptian defence by taking Pelusium first, and following it up with Memphis.⁴⁷

The Persian delay allowed the Egyptians to regroup. They set about a stream of harassing engagements. The Achaemenid generals were at loggerheads. When the Etesian winds set in and the Nile began to flood, it signalled the end of the campaign – the army withdrew to Asia. Iphicrates, fearing that he would be imprisoned like Conon, fled at the first opportunity. Pharnabazus sent diplomats to Athens, arguing that Iphicrates was at fault for the failure of the expedition. The Athenians disagreed (Diod. 14.43). Thus, the long awaited expedition came to an end. Ruzicka is right to note at this point that this was not an abandonment of the entire campaign – the campaign of the 380s had been permitted to continue for three years; it is inconceivable that this expedition should be cancelled after one.⁴⁸

It is highly likely that while Pharnabazus' ambassadors were in Athens, they set about recruiting a replacement for Iphicrates. The departure of Timotheus, Conon's son, from Athens in 373/2 to the service of Artaxerxes fits the context ([Dem.] 49.25, 30). Having had previous contact with Pharnabazus via his father, and having served the Athenian navy well in the 370s, Timotheus was a particularly good recruit for the Persians. It might be conjectured plausibly that this was the point at which Datames became closely involved in the command of the expedition (Nep. *Dat.* 3).⁴⁹ The promotion of Datames would also help explain the dismissal of Timotheus from service before any expedition was launched. Datames had no need of him. He had his own Greek general: Mandrocles of Magnesia (Nep. *Dat.* 5.6).

One must correlate this administrative reorganisation to the rescripts of the King's Peace implemented in 372/1. As with the agreement of 375, in 372/1 Artaxerxes had his own reasons for desiring peace on the Greek mainland. Xenophon is silent on the matter, which has led to a denial of the role of Artaxerxes in the affairs, but this has

⁴⁷ Carrez-Maratray, *Péluse*, 365-66.

⁴⁸ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 119.

⁴⁹ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 123, cf. 261n4.

been proven incorrect.⁵⁰ There were two conferences in quick succession. The first, at Sparta, is related by Diodorus (15.50), Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Lys.* 12), and Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.3.3, 19). In Diodorus, Artaxerxes sent ambassadors in order to settle the turmoil in Greece. The Greeks gladly accepted the proposal. Diodorus does not provide motives for Artaxerxes as he does in the 375 iteration (15.38.1). This has been used as justification for thinking Artaxerxes had no role in the agreement, for he had no interest (allegedly).⁵¹ Diodorus' silence does not preclude a reasoned inference. Here Artaxerxes' involvement in the 372-71 renewals is interpreted as a repetition of his plan in 375. He set about stabilising conflict before committing his forces to another invasion of Egypt. With the return of the Persian army from Egypt, there would undoubtedly be renewed interest in the recruitment of Greek mercenaries. If Pharnabazus managed to retain a sizeable portion of his mercenaries after Iphicrates' departure, there would be no need for a great recruiting drive. Yet, given the radical changes in leadership, it would not be surprising if the mercenaries left for better opportunities on the mainland.

The political climate demanded care. Athens and Sparta were no longer the primary points of power. Thebes had, coinciding with the rise of the Second Athenian Confederacy, cemented its pivotal role with the reinstitution of the Boeotian Confederacy.⁵² Theban support of Athens prevented the Spartans from extending their influence on land over the Attic hinterland as they had in the Deceleian War. A united Athens and Thebes complemented the largely maritime Athenian Confederacy and the land focused Boeotian Confederacy. Artaxerxes, then, needed to consider a third player in Greek politics; diplomacy in the late 370s was no longer so easily summarised as pro- and anti- Spartan.

Negotiations for the treaty reached an impasse. Thebes wanted to swear for the Boeotians; Agesilaus refused to permit it. Thebes left the conference and was struck from the treaty. For Artaxerxes, this had few practical ramifications. Persia's interest in

⁵⁰ See Stylianou, *Commentary*, 382-86. Cf. traditional view in Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, 127-30; Jehne, *Koine Eirene*, 66-67.

⁵¹ E.g. Jehne, *Koine Eirene*, 66.

⁵² John Buckler, *The Theban Hegemony, 371-362 BC* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 15-33; Buckler, *Aegean Greece*, chap. 8.

peace was purely self-serving. The need to confirm the agreement for a second time, only three years after its last iteration, speaks of its waning significance.

The battle which followed at Leuctra after the conference at Sparta, between Sparta and Thebes, signalled the breadth of the change on Greece.⁵³ Shortly after the battle at Leuctra (twenty days?⁵⁴), Athens convened another congress (*Hell.* 6.5.1). That should be understood as evidence of the uproar Sparta's defeat caused:⁵⁵ the battle was surprising enough that the rest of Greece felt the need to reaffirm the situation. At this second conference, common peace was reiterated. But there is no mention of Sparta or Thebes in Xenophon's account.

Sparta lost much of its relevance with the loss of its military dominance. Plutarch's *Life of Artaxerxes* and *Life of Pelopidas* show the political fallout which followed at the Persian court in 367.⁵⁶ Despite Antalcidas previously having courted the graces of the king, when he no longer served any purpose to the Achaemenids, he was humiliated and degraded (*Art.* 22).⁵⁷ The passage is one of the clearest insights into the political game Artaxerxes played. It reflects decades of policy making with the Greeks. His displays of friendship were adopted while the relationship with Antalcidas was advantageous. That Artaxerxes was a politically aware and dextrous man cannot be doubted.⁵⁸ The arrival of the Thebans Pelopidas and Ismenias at the Persian court after their accession to Greek military supremacy also denotes the continued role Artaxerxes could play in the affairs of the Hellenes (*Plut. Art.* 22; *Pel.* 30). At the very least, it reveals that some lip service was required by the new military leaders. There was some role envisioned for the Persians in Greek affairs yet.

⁵³ See sources and data compiled in Stylianou, *Commentary*, 386-407.

⁵⁴ Cawkwell, *Greek Wars*, 185; cf. Stylianou, *Commentary*, 386.

⁵⁵ Cf. Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 382, where it is stated that it took over a year for Sparta's enemies to recognise the significance.

⁵⁶ On the date, see Binder, *Kommentar*, 294, 303-04.

⁵⁷ J. Buckler, "Plutarch and the Fate of Antalkidas," *GRBS* 18, no. 2 (1977): 141-42 rejects the 368/7 date for the death of Antalcidas. He argues that Antalcidas would not have been sent to court by the Spartans. This is because of his guest-friendship with Ariobarzanes, who was a rebel in 368/7 by Buckler's chronology. Below, pp. 282-84, I argue that Ariobarzanes rebelled after the peace conference of 368/7 (he lost his position when his Spartan connections were no longer a political asset, and Artabazus was dispatched to take his place). On this basis, I accept that Antalcidas was present at the 368/7 negotiations.

⁵⁸ See my conclusion, below.

Artaxerxes managed his relationship by diplomacy and tact, rather than through brute force, and his claimed role in the rescripts of his peace in this decade attest to that authority as arbiter.⁵⁹ The Greeks still responded to his demands, and he exploited that in order to facilitate the attainment of his goals.

Of passing interest to Artaxerxes was the rise of Jason of Pherae. His hegemony, beginning in the early 370s and ending with his assassination in 370 (*Hell.* 6.4.31-32), extended over Thessaly. The region was of particular concern for Ariobarzanes, ruling Dascylium, as control of Thessaly would afford easy passage onto Asia Minor. Three sources are pertinent: Valerius Maximus (9.10), Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.1.12), and Isocrates (5.119-20). They suggest that Jason planned a campaign to conquer the Achaemenid Empire. Regardless of his actual ability to do so,⁶⁰ the references in contemporary sources indicate that the idea was circulating.

In 371 Jason's power had peaked. The Spartans had been defeated at Leuctra; Athens remained focused on its naval confederacy; Thebes was itself peaking in influence alongside Jason. Jason's efforts to remain a legitimate power (in that he avoided being perceived as a tyrant⁶¹) while bringing Thessaly under his influence further cemented his role in Greek politics (*Hell.* 6.4.28). Affairs in Greece, by the end of the 370s, were stabilising in a manner not seen since 387/6 and the first King's Peace. The difference in 371 was that the common peace was not accepted by Jason or the Thebans.

Thebes and Jason affected Artaxerxes' usual tactics of foreshadowing military activity with diplomatic intervention amongst the Greeks. Artaxerxes focused on dividing the Greeks for his own ends – to prevent further invasions; to facilitate the

⁵⁹ Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 656.

⁶⁰ Slawomir Sprawski, *Jason of Pherae: A Study on History of Thessaly in Years 431-370 BC*, Electrum: Studies in Ancient History 3 (Cracow: Jagiellonian University Press, 1999), 118, 127-32 concludes that Jason's aims were in fact more limited – Thessalian hegemony and a unified Greece are more credible aims. Tuplin, *Failings*, 209 (cf. pp. 117-21 and 180n8) similarly says that his plans should not be exaggerated.

⁶¹ Slawomir Sprawski, "Were Lycophron and Jason Tyrants of Pherae? Xenophon on a History of Thessaly," in *Xenophon and his World*, ed. C. J. Tuplin and Vincent Azoulay (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2004), 448-51. On Greek fear of Jason becoming their tyrant: Michael A. Flower, "Alexander the Great and Panhellenism," in *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*, ed. E. J. Baynham and A. B. Bosworth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 100.

recruitment of mercenaries; to change their attentions; to reinforce his influence over Asiatic Greek *poleis*. The change in power to Thebes and the growth of Jason's Thessalian hegemony represented a threat to this successful policy. Neither Athens nor Sparta retained enough strength to influence the wider Greek world. That power now fell to Thebes, and to a lesser extent Jason. Neither had a history of cooperation with Artaxerxes.

Importantly, Jason had amassed power through employment of mercenaries, effective military training, and tactical nous. He was one of the most powerful military powers of the time in terms of skill and field numbers (*Hell.* 6.1.8, 19).⁶² The force he wielded was comparable to that of Agesilaus and Cyrus the Younger (*Hell.* 6.1.12). Furthermore, Jason's abilities were not confined to infantry. He is credited with an excellent cavalry force, and revolutionary methods of their employment (*Ael. Tact.* 18.2; *Ascl.* 7.2).⁶³ This overlapped with his revolution in cavalry armour (*Pollux* 1.134).⁶⁴ For the Persians, who generally relied on superior cavalry to counter the heavy Greek infantry, this was a dangerous possibility. No Greek had yet marched to Asia Minor with such a cavalry force.

Jason was tenacious, had a powerful army, located his powerbase within a region capable of crossing to Asia Minor via the Hellespont, reportedly desired war with Persia, and employed cavalry to mitigate any cavalry advantage the Persians might have relied upon in the event of his invasion. The news of his assassination would have been met with some relief among the Achaemenids of northern Asia Minor, who would have borne the brunt of any invasion that was launched.

Overall, we find little information emanating from the court of Artaxerxes during the 370s. In this period we are similarly faced with an increasing reliance on Diodorus to provide information, as Xenophon focuses on the turmoil that was shaking Greece. Artaxerxes briefly showed his hand by sending ambassadors to facilitate the renewal of the King's Peace, but the new agreements did not endure. The

⁶² Sprawski, *Jason of Pherae*, 103-15.

⁶³ See outline in N. Sekunda, "Military Forces: A. Land Forces," in *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare*, ed. Philip A. Sabin, H. van Wees, and Michael Whitby (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 272-73.

⁶⁴ Sprawski, *Jason of Pherae*, 110-11.

battle at Leuctra changed the situation markedly. The confusion it caused was clearly indicated by the conference at Athens organised almost immediately after the battle. The Thebans were the new leaders in Greece, and at the beginning of the 360s they would officially claim that status by propositioning Artaxerxes personally. By that time, there were disturbing signs from Asia Minor that revolt was set to break out.

CHAPTER SIX

The End of the Reign

Destabilisation in the West

The following reconstruction of the Satraps' Revolt comprises three discussions: (1) the nature of the evidence. (2) A summary of the current analyses. (3) A reconciliation of the two primary viewpoints in a new reconstruction. The third point will begin by framing the rebellious parties in terms of their interests. This chapter proffers that reconceptualising events in terms of the interests of the parties reduces the conflict between macro (widespread, coordinated revolt) and micro (local instability) interpretations of the situation.

The Nature of the Evidence

There have been few major additions to the sources for the Revolt in the last two and a half decades.¹ The primary sources have remained constant, and Diodorus 15.90-92 provides the most detailed summary. He condenses the entire affair into the year 362/1 (Diod. 15.90.1-2). He first outlines the Greek involvement: Greek mercenaries were procured by Tachos. Artaxerxes soon began making preparations for quelling the unrest (15.90.2). We are then information that the satraps had agreed to a common cause. Indeed, according to Diodorus, practically all of the coastal people were involved (σχεδὸν πάντες οἱ παραθαλάσσιοι: 15.90.4). The revolt was so extensive that half the king's revenue was cut off. Ultimately, Orontes (leader of the rebels) betrayed the cause, resulting in the collapse of a large section of the rebellion. Datames was eventually betrayed. Rheomithres returned from Egypt with supplies,

¹ See the survey of Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 656-59.

but was also duplicitous. Tachos enlisted the help of Chabrias and Agesilaus in his campaign, but dissent in Egypt resulted in the Egyptian king turning first to another dynast – Strato of Sidon – then to Artaxerxes for assistance.

Diodorus' brevity means that his account alone is insufficient for reconstruction of the Revolt. To have all of these events isolated to a single year is immediately dubious, and conflicts with the allusions present in other texts.² To Diodorus' account, one may add the brief references of Pompeius Trogus (*Prol.* 10) and Polyaeus (across several *Stratagems*). Both are abbreviated and challenging sources. Fourth century orators offer some information (e.g. Isoc. 14.111), and scattered references amongst other literary sources are also available (e.g. Xen. *Ag.* 2.26-27). Finally, there is Nepos. The *Life of Datames* is an abridged tale, designed to extol the subject's virtues. Like Plutarch, Nepos is not overly concerned with chronology. Sporadic numismatic evidence supplements what is known from literature.³

Summary of Current Analyses

Prior to 1989, the Satraps' Revolt was conceived as a serious threat to the Persian Empire. The publication of Weiskopf's *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"* challenged the *status quo*. His thesis, broadly, was that "instead of a single, well-organized threat there existed a number of theatres of local instability, some related, but none serious enough to threaten Artaxerxes himself."⁴ Diodorus (Weiskopf argued) misrepresents the revolt when he creates an image of a vast conspiracy against the king and his power. The hypothesis challenged a number of long held beliefs, and prompted the strongest replies from Hornblower and Moysey. Two criticisms in particular stand out: Hornblower rightly notes that Weiskopf failed to explain why exactly one should ignore Diodorus.⁵ Moysey correctly takes umbrage at Weiskopf's

² Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 658.

³ E.g. Moysey, "Issues of Pharnabazos and Datames," 7-61; Moysey, "Observations," 107-39; Bing, "Datames and Mazaeus," 41-76; Antony G. Keen, *Dynastic Lycia: A Political History of the Lycians and their Relations with Foreign Powers, c. 545-362 B.C.* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 148-70.

⁴ Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 10.

⁵ Hornblower, "The Great Satraps' Revolt," 363.

denial of the evidence connecting Tachos to the Revolt.⁶ The interpretations have competed for the past twenty-five years.

Reconciliation

The reconstruction presented here lies somewhere in between these two models. The benefit of interpreting the Revolt between the two extreme views is that no evidence must be dismissed without good reason (as Weiskopf must do with Diodorus), but nor does it require creating coordination between participants whose involvement with other rebels was evidently limited (as Hornblower must do with Mausolus). For example, Mausolus probably did court the rebels at some point – he was in contact with Agesilaus and Tachos (Xen. *Ages.* 2.27), and features in Diodorus' list of rebels (which we have no basis for rejecting). On the other hand, Arlissis' breach of trust cannot serve as confirmation of Mausolus' participation: we do not know the details of Arlissis' claims (RO 54).⁷ Nor can we be sure that Mausolus actively waged war against the king. It is preferable to note that Mausolus was in contact with key rebels, and was smart enough to avoid overt shows of loyalty or disloyalty towards the king while the Revolt was active. There was also contact between rebels strong enough to permit the provision of supplies to different parties: Orontes gathered together a large amount of funds and mercenaries as leader of the rebelling peoples, and Rheomithres received money from Tachos. Additionally, the timing of conflicts involving Pericles of Limyra against individuals with Iranian names,⁸ and the king's army recorded in Babylonian diaries are probably too closely placed alongside the western satrapal revolts to be coincidence.⁹ Indeed, the new Babylonian evidence is yet to be fully explored in relation to the broader history of the revolt.¹⁰ By negotiating the

⁶ Moysey, "Diodorus, the Satraps," 115.

⁷ *Contra* the tentative conjecture of Ruzicka, *Politics of a Persian Dynasty*, 62. See Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 669.

⁸ Keen, *Dynastic Lycia*, 161-70; cf. Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 181-82.

⁹ On the movement of the king's army in 363-62: H. Hunger and R. Van der Spek, "An Astronomical Diary Concerning Artaxerxes II (year 42 = 363-2 BC): Military Operations in Babylonia," *Arta* 2006.002 (2006): 1-16. Discussed further below, pp. 292-93.

¹⁰ E.g. that introduced above, p. 259n9 and by Van der Spek, "Chronology," 252-56.

evidence in this manner, the extant sources can be read with greater coherence than previously has been thought.

In the interests of conceptual clarity, and in order to avoid prejudging the question of whether the satraps collaborated with one another, it is beneficial to divide the rebels into three groups on the basis of what prompted their revolts.¹¹ The first group are disgruntled satraps, dissatisfied with their treatment by the central authority – Ariobarzanes and Orontes. The second comprises local dynasts – Mausolus, Pericles, Tachos. The individuals of this group were native to their fields of influence, and saw the Persians as foreign overlords. Their mission was to increase prestige – a satisfactory outcome would be the exclusion of Persians from their local affairs. The third and final division is the independent party – Datames. Datames was evidently forced to rebel. Such distinctions made no difference to Artaxerxes – all were disobedient – but understanding the situation in each case helps discern the extent of their cooperation and ambition.

In the first group, Ariobarzanes was satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. Having succeeded Pharnabazus when he went to marry Apame (*Hell.* 5.1.28), Ariobarzanes is generally viewed as having been brother or uncle to Artabazus.¹² Although the situation is complex, it is fair to conjecture that politics played a role in Ariobarzanes' revolt. These factors will be explored below. The most likely situation was that Artaxerxes replaced Ariobarzanes with Artabazus when Spartan ties were no longer a political asset – that is, after the Thebans were identified as the king's primary allies in Greece.¹³ Ariobarzanes rejected the substitution and so rebelled. What he sought to do after rebelling is difficult to determine. He made no offensive moves as Datames did. Judging by the record of his actions, Ariobarzanes' aspirations were limited to remaining in command of his satrapy.

¹¹ For definitions of 'revolt' and 'rebellion' in this context, see Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 17-18; Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 661.

¹² Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 173n20; Sekunda, "Life of Datames," 47n70 (cf. sources cited therein); Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 27 (cf. Hornblower, "The Great Satraps' Revolt," 365; Moysey, "Diodorus, the Satraps," 117); Stylianou, *Commentary*, 527; Debord, *L'Asie mineure*, 97-99.

¹³ Discussed below, pp. 282-84.

Orontes had a tumultuous career. At the turn of the century, Orontes was married into the royal family (*An.* 2.4.8). By the end of the 380s, his gamble in court politics had resulted in his expulsion from the list of the king's friends (Diod. 15.8-11).¹⁴ After a period of silence, our sources reintroduce Orontes in the Satraps' Revolt (Diod. 15.90-91), where he is 'Satrap of Mysia.'¹⁵ Orontes' exact position is important when considering why he was selected as leader of the rebelling peoples (οἱ δ' ἀφεστηκότες τοῦ βασιλείως: Diod. 15.91.1. i.e. not just 'satraps.'). The view accepted here is that Orontes was, as a sub-satrap ruling Mysia, subordinate to the satrap of Sardis. Regardless of his official role, Orontes was a son-in-law of the king. For any Persian rebel aspiring to gain independence from the central authority, or perhaps even overthrow the monarchy, a royal connection was invaluable to legitimise oneself among the old nobility.¹⁶ Ariaeus would not take command of the Cyreans in order to challenge for the throne, for he knew other nobles of higher birth would not tolerate his rule (*An.* 2.2.1), and Alexander married Stateira (Barsine) and Parysatis (Arr. *Anab.* 7.4; Plut. *Alex.* 70) in order to further ingratiate himself with the Persians.¹⁷ Orontes was a powerful figurehead around whom the rebels could rally. His denigration by Artaxerxes in the 380s must have played a role in his decision to rebel. No doubt he sought to restore some lost prestige. If Orontes was a leader of the rebels, he may have eventually had plans to attack the royal authority directly. No long term plans of the rebels (or any individual) are discernable in the sources. The silence makes one wonder if prestige and a desire for further power was the sole motive. Orontes eventually came to an agreement with the king in order to secure more land for himself (Diod. 15.91.1). The rebels seem to have taken advantage of the current state of affairs in the Achaemenid Empire in order to better their situations, rather than to have targeted the destruction of the empire. Both Ariobarzanes and Orontes evidently had

¹⁴ See Osborne, "Orontes," 517-22.

¹⁵ See, in particular, Osborne, "The Satrapy of Mysia," 291-309; cf. Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 177-78 and the response of Osborne, *Naturalization in Athens*, 2: 61-81 (esp. 67-72). See also comment in Troxell, "Orontes, Satrap of Mysia," 98; Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 69-79; Ruzicka, *Politics of a Persian Dynasty*, 67.

¹⁶ Stylianou, *Commentary*, 532-33.

¹⁷ In addition to other methods, e.g. adopting mixed dress (Arr. 7.8) and incorporating Persians into the army (Arr. 7.6).

very personal reasons for revolting.¹⁸ From this viewpoint, it is not surprising that Orontes was quick to abandon the cause when survival became his primary motive.

The second category, local dynasts, had different reasons for revolting. Mausolus' participation in the Revolt was questioned by Weiskopf, but Hornblower responded compellingly – he did participate, but survivalism may have dictated that he switch sides, rather than any deepset desire to disrupt the king's authority – his satrapy was beset by the rebels.¹⁹ Mausolus could not afford to offend the rebels once it became clear that Autophradates could not quickly settle affairs. His contact with Tachos and Agesilaus, and withdrawal from the Hellespont without any consternation at Agesilaus' behest confirm that Mausolus flirted with treason (Xen. *Ages.* 2.27-30). As an indigenous local dynast, Mausolus might hope to emulate the Paphlagonians, and maintain a quasi-independence from the king.²⁰ But Mausolus' failure to promote the royal cause across Anatolia cannot be taken to indicate that Mausolus was actively attempting to destroy the king's power.

Pericles came to prominence in Lycia in the 370s, and rose again as a rebel. Like Mausolus, Pericles was a pragmatic opportunist. Keen, in his analysis, determines that Pericles wanted independent control of his own region (in the sense of a satrap), distinct from the rulers of Xanthos. If the Persians had been receptive to such a plan, Keen thinks Pericles would not have joined the revolt.²¹ The plan was much easier to demand than actually to implement: accepting Pericles' terms (not that there is any evidence that they were stated to the king or a representative of his) would upset the other powers in Lycia. In the context of Anatolia's broad instability at the time of Pericles' revolt, it is preferable to avoid any suggestion of terms put to the Persians, and accept that Pericles took advantage of the current political situation to embark on a campaign for his own status. Unlike Ariobarzanes and Orontes, Pericles' ambitions were never concerned with Artaxerxes personally.

¹⁸ As Stevenson, *Persica*, 107 also concludes. I, however, maintain a distinction between Ariobarzanes and Orontes, and Datames

¹⁹ Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 65-67; cf. Hornblower, "The Great Satraps' Revolt," 365 and Moysey, "Diodorus, the Satraps," 119.

²⁰ Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 642-43. Cf. Peri Johnson, *Landscapes of Achaemenid Paphlagonia* (University of Pennsylvania: Doctoral Thesis, 2010), 133-35, 141-48.

²¹ Keen, *Dynastic Lycia*, 161.

It is a severe understatement to call Tachos a 'local dynast' (he was a thirtieth-dynasty pharaoh), but he was concerned with his home country. He needed to secure Egypt's prolonged independence. Upon the death of his father, Nectanebo, Tachos' plans and ambitions matured.²² Not only did Tachos defend his territory, but he expanded northwards with the growth of the Satraps' Revolt. Militarily, it appears that he was the strongest and boldest of those involved in the revolt – furnishing Rheomithres with ships and money, employing Chabrias and Agesilaus, and participating in diplomatic missions. The evidence links him to several regions: Syria (where he campaigned), the Hellespont (where his agents appear), Caria (via Mausolus, who escorted his envoys from the Hellespont), Aeolis (where Rheomithres returned with his Egyptian supplies), Athens (through recruiting Chabrias), and Sparta (through employing Agesilaus, who also had ties to Mausolus).

Datames showed little desire to cooperate with the other rebels. He remained loyal until he received word that his success had made him a target of intrigue (Nep. *Dat.* 5). Fundamentally, the story adheres closely to the Orientalist image of the Persians: Datames is a deserving man, justly favoured by the king. His exploits, however, earned jealousy from the courtiers, who then conspired against him. Pandantes, keeper of the royal treasure and a friend of Datames, gave him details of the plot. And, even though he was held in high favour by the king, Datames still feared the influence of those who had the king's ear, and so went off to Cappadocia. Intrigue; jealousy; a king blinded by his courtiers: the story is a stereotype. And yet, other evidence implies some truth in the matter. Datames' rebellion began before and ended after the Satraps' Revolt; the betrayals which collapsed one portion of the Revolt failed to reduce him. There is little evidence of cooperation between Datames and the other rebels. He came to a secret agreement with Ariobarzanes, but never joined any military campaign with him. He was not party to the betrayals of Orontes or Rheomithres. That is not to say that his position in the Revolt was not conducive to other rebelling parties. The land he occupied in Cappadocia inhibited the march of royal armies from the centre of the empire to Anatolia. But Datames appears to have

²² Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 138, 141.

been a distinct party in the rebellion;²³ that fact may be further inferred from his exclusion in the list of rebels in Diodorus (14.90; cf. Trogus *Prol.* 10).

Having thus grouped the rebels, we may now turn to a brief reconstruction of the 360s. Datames' revolt was among the earliest. The basic details have been outlined above. Upon his revolt, Datames fled to Cappadocia, and took possession of neighbouring Paphlagonia. He concealed his desertion from Artaxerxes (Nep. *Dat.* 5), and secured a secret agreement with Ariobarzanes. The agreement with Ariobarzanes probably took place in 368 or in 367 – after Ariobarzanes was tarnished by his association with the out-of-favour Spartans. Although Nepos provides no explicit chronological marker, the fact that Datames was still able to conceal his rebellion, and the need for secrecy on Ariobarzanes' part, suggests that neither were thought to be in revolt when the agreement was made. Thus, it took place at the beginning of the Revolt. At approximately this time, if one accepts the reading of the Aramaic as a rendering of Datames' Cilician name, Datames altered his standard mint emissions. He now incorporated the type showing Ana/Anu, Mesopotamian god, with arm outstretched before Datames himself.²⁴ This has been interpreted by Moysey and Bing as a sign of his revolt – the representation of Ana was a propagandistic appeal to the Mesopotamian god indicating a desire for the satrap represented (Datames) to liberate his homeland.²⁵ However, the nature of these coins is subject to one's interpretation of the Aramaic legend.²⁶ If Moysey is correct in his interpretation, the numismatic evidence provides a fascinating insight into the process of the revolt. If not, the iconography might, nevertheless, cast light on Cilicia's politics. Datames is known to have moved through Cilicia to combat Thuys (Nep. *Dat.* 2), and later went past Cilicia into Cappadocia (Nep. *Dat.* 5). So Tarkumuwa must have been aware of his presence and activities over the last five years. In this case, the message of these coins might be

²³ Weiskopf, *Achaemenid Systems*, 424; Debord, *L'Asie mineure*, 365n490; Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 132, 265n31.

²⁴ E.g. BM 1979,0101.1004 = SNG v. Aulock 5950.

²⁵ Moysey, "Observations," 109-10; Bing, "Datames and Mazaeus," 56-73; cf. Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 667.

²⁶ See above, p. 256n37.

reversed: perhaps Tarkumuwa was attempting to signify that he was the true authority in the region in the face of the unrest which extended over Anatolia.

Van der Spek's efforts in applying the Babylonian astronomical diaries to the wars of Artaxerxes have revealed conclusively that there was a campaign led by the king himself in 369.²⁷ The campaign of the diaries is probably the Cadusian campaign referred to by Plutarch (*Art.* 24) and Pompeius Trogus (*Prol.* 10).²⁸

The diary discussed by Van der Spek identifies March-April 369 as the period when troops were mustered for the campaign. Plutarch supplies the only extant narrative treatment.²⁹ After the discord between Pharnabazus and Iphicrates, Artaxerxes decided to lead the expedition himself. The desire to lead another successful campaign after Cunaxa may have also played on Artaxerxes' mind, perhaps exacerbated by the recent failures in Egypt. The Cadusians' reputation for war continued well after the Achaemenid Empire had fallen,³⁰ and Plutarch himself calls them warlike (*Art.* 24.2). Cadusia, by all accounts, was never fully integrated into the empire: Achaemenid kings regularly embarked on campaigns in the region. The Cadusians were rebellious in the time of Cyrus the Great (Ctes. F8d.11-12), Darius II reportedly died while on campaign against them (*Hell.* 2.1.13), and Ochus made war on them soon after taking the throne (Diod. 17.6.1; Justin 10.3.2-4).

Plutarch's narrative of this 360s war in Cadusia portrays a harsh campaign. Tiribazus salvages proceedings when the outlook is bleak. After consulting with Artaxerxes, he and his son addressed the two Cadusian kings separately, drawing them into a ruse whereby both came to terms with Artaxerxes. On the retreat Artaxerxes was complimented for his actions. He weathered the march at the head of his army, with quiver and shield, abandoned his horse, and permitted his paradises to be destroyed for the benefit of the army. These displays did not go unnoticed by the soldiers (*Art.* 24.6-25.2). Artaxerxes' efforts (if true) no doubt appealed to Plutarch thanks to the typical contrasts against other Persian kings he would recall: Xerxes

²⁷ Van der Spek, "Chronology," 252-53.

²⁸ See above, pp. 181-85.

²⁹ For source analysis, see Binder, *Kommentar*, *ad locum*.

³⁰ Syme, "Cadusii," esp. 138-40. Also on the Cadusians in the Achaemenid Empire: Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 732-33.

watching the battle at Salamis or Darius III fleeing at Issus or Gaugamela. The image of Artaxerxes struggling together with his soldiers fits the positive anecdotes Plutarch includes earlier in his *Life* – of a generous Artaxerxes elevating his brothers at the banquet table, affably permitting Tiribazus to wear his robe, and his genial wife Stateira, whose presence would gladden Persian hearts (*Art.* 5). Indeed, this image is in keeping with the leader Polyaeus presents, where he says that Ochus, upon succeeding Artaxerxes, knew he could not immediately have the same respect at court as his father did (7.17.1). Clearly Artaxerxes had some strength of character to maintain control of court for fifty years, and perhaps these anecdotes cast light. The positivity in Plutarch does not last long, however, and we are told that the court suffered another purging of high officials on Artaxerxes' return from the campaign (*Art.* 25.3). The eradication, Plutarch is keen to emphasise, was out of suspicion of the chief men.

Datames left the king's service in the context of these events. The fallout from the expedition would also demonstrate the prudence of Datames' furtiveness (*Nep. Dat.* 5.6) – he might prolong his survival if he maintained a low profile. Sometime between the beginning of his revolt and 367, Datames had ranged north to Sinope. His presence there is reflected in a series of Greek coins featuring his name.³¹ It is possible that his sieges against Sinope were undertaken while still nominally under the king's command: while besieging Sinope, Datames received a letter from the king, towards which he made obeisance (*Polyaen.* 7.21.5).³² Conversely, the king's message may have been sent as part of Artaxerxes' attempts to negotiate with Datames.³³ Perhaps in this period we should also place the campaign of Datames' son, Arsidaeus, against the Pisidians (*Nep. Dat.* 6.1). Sekunda believes it should be placed around the time of Datames' treaty with Ariobarzanes and his campaign into Paphlagonia.³⁴ Sekunda is, however, at pains to note the tenuousness of these dates. It is a point which must be reiterated here: there is no way to fix these events to a conclusive chronology.

³¹ E.g. BM 1872,0709.139 = Curtis and Tallis, *Forgotten Empire*, cat. 367.

³² Sekunda, "Life of Datames," 46. See that page and following for detailed reckoning of the chronology of Datames' interactions with Sinope and movements along the Black Sea coast.

³³ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 128.

³⁴ Sekunda, "Life of Datames," 47-48.

In Polyaeus 7.21.3 there is an account of a war Datames waged across the Euphrates, on Artaxerxes himself. While this passage has previously been dated in the final stages of the Satraps' Revolt, the dating of Weiskopf is preferred here.³⁵ It is highly likely that the move into the Euphrates was a precision offensive to force the royal response onto the back foot.³⁶ The lack of provisions suggests that the royal army was hastily organised, and reinforces the impression that Datames conducted a quick strike. It is shortly before this point that we should place the report that Datames' son Sysinas informed Artaxerxes of Datames' defection (*Dat.* 7). In this chronology, Datames knew of his son's betrayal, and so made an aggressive manoeuvre across the Euphrates, which ultimately was beaten back.

Van der Spek argues that a diary referring to the soldiers of the king fighting in the mountains of Mesopotamia in fact refers to the above stratagem in Polyaeus.³⁷ The tablet in question is dated between May and June 367, which fits conveniently with Weiskopf's date.³⁸ The major point of difference is that Polyaeus claims the king himself fought against Datames, while in the tablet it is only the troops of the king. Van der Spek proposes that Polyaeus' account is false, supplementing the assertion with Diodorus, who implies that Artaxerxes remained in Susa through the Revolt (15.92.5). The idea that Artaxerxes remained at Susa is inferential and unconvincing.³⁹ Instead, Polyaeus' report is more likely to be his own inference that the king's troops were led by the king. With the exception of this Susa point, Van der Spek's association is accepted here, but it is uncertain at best.⁴⁰ Should the association between the Babylonian diary and Polyaeus be rejected, there remains concrete evidence that the king's soldiers were operational in Babylonia and fighting against soldiers around

³⁵ Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 58-59. Cf. Moysey, "Diodorus, the Satraps," 117-18.

³⁶ Or to inspire fear of a repeat of Cyrus the Younger?: Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 130. Cf. above, p. 4n14.

³⁷ Van der Spek, "Chronology," 253-55.

³⁸ See above, p. 277n35. Cf. Briant, *Bulletin d'Histoire Achéménide II*, 94n176.

³⁹ Van der Spek, "Chronology," 255 cites Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 58-59: "as Weiskopf pointed out, Artaxerxes remained at Susa in this period (Diod. 15.92.5)." This passage of Diodorus merely states that Tachos went to the king by way of Arabia. It does not provide any idea of how long Artaxerxes was in Susa, nor that Tachos went to Susa itself.

⁴⁰ Briant, *Bulletin d'Histoire Achéménide II*, 93-94.

Mesopotamia in 367. The involvement of Artaxerxes' grandson, the extension of conflict across the Euphrates, and a response by the king sizeable enough to warrant inclusion in a Babylonian text suggest that the king dedicated substantial resources to fighting instability.

Datames was not the only rebel ca. 367: there was also Pericles of Limyra.⁴¹ Keen argues for the Iranian origins of Arttumpara (whom Pericles fought),⁴² and makes the case for his arrival as a signal to Pericles that his desires would not be accepted by the Persian administration. It seems that Pericles' struggle remained local, for when he is briefly mentioned by our sources, it is in association with local campaigns, rather than tied to the broader revolts (Theopomp. F103.17; Polyæn. 5.42). Yet Lycia as a whole is linked by Diodorus with the broader satrapal revolt (15.90.3). It is difficult to determine the right answer. There is no explicit connection between Pericles and the broader revolt undertaken as exists for Tachos, Mausolus, Ariobarzanes, Orontes, and Rheomithres. Nor is there evidence for any large action taken against Pericles (at least, not by any figures who attracted the attention of the Greek historians). Pericles' fate is also uncertain. At the very least, it is clear that his independence remained short lived.

At the beginning of Datames' revolt, it will be remembered, a secret agreement was made between Ariobarzanes and Datames. A friend of the Spartans (*Hell.* 5.1.28), Ariobarzanes was a sound replacement for the continuation of Persia's policy in the 380s. Evidently, by the 360s Ariobarzanes had a new problem: Artabazus, grandson of the king and son of Pharnabazus. In light of Ariobarzanes' later revolt, his actions in 368/7 are brought into the spotlight. In this year a Greek by the name of Philiscus was dispatched to Delphi.⁴³ Does this mission constitute evidence that Ariobarzanes

⁴¹ Keen, *Dynastic Lycia*, 148-170. See collection of sources in Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 995-97.

⁴² Keen, *Dynastic Lycia*, 149-50. The likely Iranian origin of Pericles' enemies, to me, is the strongest evidence for accepting that Pericles was in revolt in the 360s, and it was not a local struggle (*contra* Weiskopf, *Achaemenid Systems*, 286-91). But, as Briant noted (he did not accept the argument as it was presented in Antony G. Keen, *A Political History of Lycia and its Relations with Foreign Power, 545-300 B.C.* (University of Manchester: Doctoral Thesis, 1992), chap. 7), it is no certainty.

⁴³ Stylianou, *Commentary*, 446-55 discusses the date of the conference. Possibly Philiscus was accompanied by a certain Diomedon: see Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 35n63.

foresaw the need to contest his satrapy with violence, and so made preparations for the eventuality?⁴⁴

At Delphi, Philiscus called the Thebans, their allies, and the Lacedaemonians together in order to negotiate peace. While Diodorus says that the king sent Philiscus (15.70.2), Xenophon's version (*Hell.* 7.1.27), where Ariobarzanes is the instigator, is preferable.⁴⁵ Diodorus should not be trusted in this case, as he fails to mention the conference at Artaxerxes' court in 367/6.⁴⁶ He also fails to clearly define the final agreement read in Greece.⁴⁷ This suggests that he has conflated events. Furthermore, the absence of discernable necessity in the approach to Greece appears significant.⁴⁸ Previously, Achaemenid manipulation of affairs in Greece had been directly related to perceivable circumstances in Persia. Timocrates was sent while Sparta was in Asia Minor, the King's Peace was issued while Artaxerxes dealt with Cyprus and Egypt, and the ambassadors sent in 375/4 and 372/1 coincided with the 370s campaign against Egypt. In 368/7, there does not seem to be any reason for Artaxerxes to send Philiscus. One possibility is that he was sent to enact diplomatic preventative measures before Datames launched his invasion of Egypt (*Nep. Dat.* 3). But there is no hint of this in the evidence – if the Greeks were able to perceive and record Artaxerxes' intentions in earlier diplomatic missions (*Diod.* 15.38.1; *Justin* 6.2), one suspects that they would have done so here were Philiscus actually sent by the king. In addition, when Artaxerxes' motives are not explicitly acknowledged, they are inferable (e.g. *Diod.* 15.50.1 and the invasion of Egypt). This is not the case with Philiscus' mission.

So, while Philiscus probably did claim to speak for the king in order to convene the delegates at Delphi,⁴⁹ Artaxerxes did not issue any decree. The Delphi conference was more informal than those prior and Ariobarzanes was its instigator. In Diodorus

⁴⁴ Hypothesised by Hornblower, *Greek World*, 229; Buckler, *Aegean Greece*, 317.

⁴⁵ There is no consensus on who sent Philiscus. Generally, the two accounts are conflated – i.e. Artaxerxes orders Ariobarzanes to send an envoy, who sends Philiscus: Olmstead, *History*, 409; Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, 79-80, 134-35; Buckler, *Aegean Greece*, 315; Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 125.

⁴⁶ Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 35n62.

⁴⁷ Robert A. Moysey, *Greek Relations with the Persian Satraps, 371-343 BC* (Princeton University: Doctoral Thesis, 1975), 77-78

⁴⁸ Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 36.

⁴⁹ Stylianou, *Commentary*, 461.

(15.70.2), the conference failed not because of Messene (as Xenophon claims), but rather because the Thebans had brought all Boeotians together in one confederation. Stylianou supposes that this final discrepancy can be accommodated with the vexed autonomy clause: Sparta didn't expect the Boeotian Confederacy to disband, but used the autonomy clause as a ploy in its effort to reclaim Messenia.⁵⁰ Neither the Thebans nor the Spartans would compromise on their positions. After the conference, Philiscus recruited two thousand mercenaries, who were left for the Lacedaemonians (*Hell.* 7.1.27; *Diod.* 15.70.2). Thus Ariobarzanes signalled his factional support. The purpose of his activity was to return politics in Greece to the 380s arrangement, when Sparta was *hegemon*. Ariobarzanes would have benefitted through an extension of his influence over the Greeks who would come into contact with his satrapy while obtaining grain from the Black Sea.

In response to the support of Sparta, the Thebans sent a mission under Pelopidas to the king's court (*Hell.* 7.1.33-40; *Plut. Art.* 22.4-6, *Pel.* 30).⁵¹ The embassy contained ambassadors from the Thebans, Eleans, Arcadians, and Argives. When the Athenians heard of the Boeotian mission, Timagoras and Leon were sent. Euthycles the Lacedaemonian was already at the king's court. In the exchange which followed,⁵² Artaxerxes issued peace in favour of the Thebans. He decreed that Messene should remain independent, Athens should draw up her ships, and all cities should make war against any city which refused the terms. The agreement, as it appears in Xenophon, was rejected and abandoned. And yet, in 366 Timotheus was instructed not to break the treaty with the king (*Dem.* 15.9), Amphipolis was handed back to the Athenians

⁵⁰ Stylianou, *Commentary*, *ad locum*.

⁵¹ Also on this conference: C. J. Tuplin, "Xenophon and Achaemenid Courts," in *Der Achämenidenhof | The Achaemenid Court*, ed. Bruno Jacobs and Robert Rollinger (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010), 194-97; Cawkwell, *Greek Wars*, 187-88, 292-97; Dmitriev, *The Greek Slogan of Freedom*, app. 3. For a survey of evidence, see Stylianou, *Commentary*, 485-89. Moysey, *Greek Relations with the Persian Satraps*, 77-78 has the most logical reconciliation of the sources through the suggestion that Diodorus conflated the conference at the Achaemenid court and the meeting in 366. This conference is often said to have occurred at Susa (e.g. Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 35n62; Buckler, *Aegean Greece*, 328; Cawkwell, *Greek Wars*, 292). Tuplin, "Xenophon and Achaemenid Courts," 195 notes that no source actually provides a location for the conference.

⁵² The conference proceedings are discussed further below, pp. 304-06.

(Dem. 19.137),⁵³ and a common peace was agreed (Diod. 15.76.3). Some agreement was secured.⁵⁴ Cawkwell has correctly argued that the rescript read in Thebes was itself revised after the congress at Artaxerxes' court, largely owing to the inability of the Persians to affect change as they might have earlier in Artaxerxes' reign.⁵⁵ Whatever the case, final product was no longer effective: Corinth and Thebes created a separate agreement shortly after (*Hell.* 7.4.6), which would not have been necessary if the 366 peace held weight.

The peace of 366 illustrates a number of points. First and foremost, Artaxerxes and Persia remained influential in Greek political affairs. While the transience of treaties handed down by Artaxerxes may be fairly criticised,⁵⁶ the Greeks themselves undoubtedly saw some value in courting the king's favour. Furthermore, in the twenty years since the first King's Peace, the terms had changed little. The independence clause remained important. As per the original, the terms applied only to the weakest signatories. The demand for Athens to draw up her ships may relate to the demobilisation clause implied in the King's Peace – the Thebans may have revived it when they initially made requests before Artaxerxes, but it was not a feature of the final treaty.⁵⁷ The clause demanding action should any state refuse to comply remains critical for our understanding of Persia's role too: Artaxerxes still did not want to enforce any provisions with his own hand or at his own expense. The most important outcome of the episode when considering Persia is Artaxerxes' support for Theban hegemony over Greece. For the first time Artaxerxes had overtly supported a power other than Athens or Sparta. The decision shows the delicate balance of power during the 360s.

There are several conceivable reasons for Artaxerxes to have supported Thebes. The first is pragmatism: Artaxerxes chose the strongest candidate. But the situation was complex. Athens was incensed by Artaxerxes' decision (*Hell.* 7.1.37-38; *Plut. Pel.*

⁵³ Cf. Buckler, *Aegean Greece*, 330n38.

⁵⁴ Cf. Jehne, *Koine Eirene*, 85-90.

⁵⁵ Cawkwell, *Greek Wars*, 187-88.

⁵⁶ G. L. Cawkwell, "The Common Peace of 366/5 B.C.," *CQ* 11 (1961): 86; Buckler, *Aegean Greece*, 332.

⁵⁷ See above, p. 281n55.

30.6-7).⁵⁸ And Thebes' superiority was not great enough that Athens could be denigrated unnecessarily. Hence, the alteration of terms regarding demobilisation and Amphipolis (*Hell.* 7.1.36; *Dem.* 19.137). Thebes confirmed the prudence of this modification through her inability to curb Athenian and Spartan involvement in Achaemenid affairs in the 360s. Ultimately, Persia relaxed the terms to avoid conflict she could not afford, but did not weaken her own position, nor anger her new champion on the mainland. Both Athens and Thebes were placated, and Thebes retained the authority to police the agreement. Nor would the change of terms have been the first time Artaxerxes righted a perceived misstep in foreign policy. The episode with Tiribazus in 392/1 is a direct parallel. Again, that affair involved the Spartans.

The decision might also have been a rebuke: publicly making a royal choice of Greek ally as a means to isolate Ariobarzanes, who had an old friendship with Sparta.⁵⁹ Artaxerxes, by supporting Thebes, restricted Ariobarzanes' influence with the Greeks. Artabazus should be considered a parallel for Strouthas in this situation. The chronology is frustratingly uncertain for the period, but it seems that Artabazus, who had a claim to Ariobarzanes' satrapy, was dispatched around the time of this conference (by 366 Autophradates was engaged with Ariobarzanes - *Xen. Ages.* 2.26; *Dem.* 15.9; 23.141-43 - and Ruzicka convincingly argues that Autophradates and Artabazus operated in tandem in the revolt⁶⁰). Here Ariobarzanes' explicit support of the Spartans is considered to be a cause of his decline, as similar mistakes did with Tiribazus in the 390s. In order to advance the argument, the following will outline several key points.

Weiskopf conjectures that the reason for Ariobarzanes' censure was rivalry between Autophradates and Ariobarzanes: Autophradates conjured an image of Cyrus the Younger in the mind of Artaxerxes, and so secured the king's favour in the rivalry

⁵⁸ Possibly Athens at this time erased mention of the King's Peace in the decree of Aristoteles (*RO* 22): Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, 81n9.

⁵⁹ Ruzicka, "Athens and the Politics," 68.

⁶⁰ See below, p. 285n70.

by having Ariobarzanes declared a rebel.⁶¹ Artaxerxes showed himself susceptible to such political accusations in his treatment of Tiribazus in the 380s, and Datames' flight may confirm the tendency. The role of Autophradates in the declaration of Ariobarzanes as rebel, however, is conjecture which is not convincing. Artaxerxes may have been susceptible to accusations, but he was not duped by Arlissis' plot (RO 54), and there is no evidence to suggest that Autophradates said anything against Ariobarzanes. While Weiskopf's thesis of localised revolt broadly has appeal, in this instance it is untenable because it leaves too much of the data unexplained. To accept that everything revolved around court intrigue without evidence adheres too closely to the flawed image of our Greek sources.

Crucially, there is no explicit evidence attesting to the reasons for Ariobarzanes' revolt. Ariobarzanes' representative, Philiscus, is known to have organised a conference for peace in Greece, then assisted in the recruitment of mercenaries for Sparta. The satraps of Lydia and Hellespontine Phrygia are also known to have been embroiled in a long-running rivalry.⁶² Ariobarzanes came to power in Hellespontine Phrygia ca. 388, with known ties to the Spartans (*Hell.* 5.1.28). There was some familial tension in the satrapy after Pharnabazus' departure, and one of his sons was exiled as a result (*Hell.* 4.1.39-40; *Plut. Ages.* 13.2) – Ariobarzanes is frequently conjectured to have been the instigator.⁶³ Artabazus was Pharnabazus' son by Apame. He was therefore born around the time Ariobarzanes came to power (for Pharnabazus left his satrapy to marry), and was of royal blood.⁶⁴ Ariobarzanes came to a secret agreement with Datames at one point (ca. 367), and withstood campaigns by Autophradates and Mausolus (*Xen. Ages.* 2.26-27). Other evidence includes both Autophradates and Mausolus among the rebels (*Diod.* 15.90.3). Ariobarzanes made no recorded offensives. Furthermore, Ariobarzanes slowly lost control of his satrapy: Philiscus was murdered by tyrant haters (*Dem.* 23.142-43), and the satrap was brought down by his own son.

⁶¹ Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 37-44. See above, p. 4n14.

⁶² See, for example, Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 41-44.

⁶³ See Bresson, "Un 'Athénien' à Sparte," 46 and n73.

⁶⁴ See Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 54-57.

It is with the above facts that the reasons for Ariobarzanes' revolt must be determined. Several inferences may be drawn: Artaxerxes frequently made use of a two-commander system of leadership, with one leading naval and the other land forces. It is then reasonable to infer that Autophradates and Mausolus were operating in tandem against Ariobarzanes, at the behest of Artaxerxes. In addition, Artaxerxes' policies became pro-Theban at approximately the same time as Ariobarzanes suffered assaults by Autophradates and Mausolus (sometime between 366 and 364/3, when Egyptian envoys – presumably those from Xen. *Ages.* 2.27 – were received in Athens⁶⁵). Given Ariobarzanes' pro-Spartan tendencies, most recently displayed via Philiscus when buying mercenaries for Sparta, it is plausible to think Artaxerxes had voiced displeasure with Ariobarzanes' actions. There is also the precedent of Tissaphernes and Tiribazus, whose policies in the 390s were disliked at court, and who were removed from office and replaced by others who would support the king's point of view. Artabazus also appeared in the West in the 360s. It seems unlikely that this man, so well positioned to replace Ariobarzanes, should by coincidence appear in Anatolia when Ariobarzanes' loyalty had lapsed.

On the basis of the precedents set earlier in Artaxerxes' reign, and the absence of evidence for court intrigue in the declaration of Ariobarzanes as rebel, it seems that Artaxerxes simply became dissatisfied with Ariobarzanes' allegiances and began the process for his replacement.⁶⁶ Artabazus was coming of age, and was a member of the royal family.⁶⁷ He was installed as satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia.⁶⁸ These factors, and indeed Ariobarzanes' perception of how events would unfold, all undoubtedly played a role. Ariobarzanes refused to lose his satrapy, and became a rebel. There is no need

⁶⁵ IG II² 119; Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 136.

⁶⁶ See also Stylianou, *Commentary*, 527-28.

⁶⁷ Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 54-57; Moysey, "Diodorus, the Satraps," 117.

⁶⁸ Sekunda, "Life of Datames," 47 is right to note that there is no explicit testimony of Artabazus' position after Ariobarzanes. But Artabazus is known to have lingered in the region until the 350s and become entangled with Autophradates (Dem. 23.154-57; Diod. 16.52), which suggests that he had some position after the revolt. Given his previous relationship with Dascylium, it is preferable to see him as satrap there. See Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 57n104.

to assume court intrigue played a role in bringing down Ariobarzanes.⁶⁹ As with the rejection of the peace in 392/1, Artaxerxes had good cause to remove Ariobarzanes on the grounds of current affairs.

Thus, we return to the reconstruction of the 360s and the point at which Ariobarzanes made a secret arrangement with Datames. Ruzicka plausibly contends that Autophradates made use of the existing forces at Acre, aimed at Egypt, to respond to the threat of Datames first.⁷⁰ This took place after Datames' initial series of engagements across the Euphrates. Ruzicka also argues that the campaigns of Artabazus (Diod. 15.92.2-7) and Autophradates (Nep. *Dat.* 7-8) should be amalgamated, owing to their similarities.⁷¹ The hypothesis is accepted here, and dated 367/6.

Autophradates failed to subdue Datames and negotiated a peace with him (Nep. *Dat.* 8.5).⁷² Limiting the hostility of Datames was also an economic act. Diodorus asserts that half the revenues of the king were cut by the revolt at its most extensive (15.90.4). The figure does not have to be trusted, but it is likely that Datames could affect revenue streams. Less than five years previously, Datames had been required to solve the problem posed by Aspis, who "carried off what was being brought to the king" (Nep. *Dat.* 4.3). Now that Datames was again in the region, it was an enormous risk to presume he would fail to take control of vital infrastructure. Appeasing him might reduce the difficulty in transporting men, supplies, and gold in response to the other rebels in Anatolia.

Reconciliation with Datames permitted Autophradates to address Ariobarzanes. Xenophon (*Ages.* 2.26-27) places Autophradates, Mausolus, and Cotys in

⁶⁹ If intrigue did play a role, the hypothesis of Sekunda, "Life of Datames," 51 is most appealing: that the entire faction of Pharnabazus was brought down after Pharnabazus' decline. That idea, however, fails to explain why Artabazus should have been sent West: if Pharnabazus (son-in-law of the king) was under attack at court, we should not presume that the grandson of the king could escape it.

⁷⁰ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 130-31. Cf. Sekunda, "Life of Datames," 50; Moysey, *Greek Relations with the Persian Satraps*, 104; Stylianou, *Commentary*, 541, placing the campaign of Artabazus ca. 362.

⁷¹ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 128-29.

⁷² Autophradates' force might have been weakened by the desertion of soldiers who operated near their homeland: Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 131.

a series of sieges through the Hellespont. Mausolus' ostensible loyalty is confirmed by an inscription passed in 367/6,⁷³ but his own dalliance with the rebels may be foreshadowed by his recruitment of mercenaries at this time.⁷⁴ Conversely, the mercenaries could have been recruited only to defend his territory. The references to the assaults are brief. Autophradates laid siege to Ariobarzanes at Assos. Cotys besieged Sestos. Mausolus, naval commander with one hundred vessels,⁷⁵ was involved at both cities. Agesilaus was dispatched as emissary, and his presence secured the departure of Autophradates and Cotys. The end of the sieges should be placed between 366 and 364/3.⁷⁶ The final sentences of Xenophon's account of these sieges hint at Mausolus' receptivity to anti-Persian elements. When Mausolus was persuaded to leave, he and Tachos sent Agesilaus home with a magnificent escort. This should be interpreted as evidence of Mausolus' ability to avoid committing to any party irreversibly.⁷⁷

The transfer of Persian support to Thebes soon had consequences. Without the support of the king, and with the original proclamation further reducing Athenian power, Athens knew it would need to look elsewhere for support (*Hell.* 7.1.37). Nor could Sparta rely on assistance from Ariobarzanes after he became estranged from Artaxerxes. Discontent with Thebes' position and general unwillingness to support the peace Thebes proposed further permitted Athens to extend herself.⁷⁸ Timotheus was probably dispatched to the eastern Aegean at this time.⁷⁹ He commanded eight thousand light troops and thirty triremes (*Isoc.* 15.111), and in 366 and 365 expelled a Persian garrison, then besieged Samos (*Dem.* 15.9).⁸⁰ Isocrates tells us why Persia would intervene on the island: it was strategically vital (15.108) and well positioned to reduce the influence of mainland Greeks in Asia. One of the curious details about

⁷³ Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 170.

⁷⁴ Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 173.

⁷⁵ See also Ruzicka, *Politics of a Persian Dynasty*, 65.

⁷⁶ See above, p. 284n65.

⁷⁷ Buckler, *Aegean Greece*, 366n14.

⁷⁸ Moysey, *Greek Relations with the Persian Satraps*, 79.

⁷⁹ Hornblower, *Greek World*, 230.

⁸⁰ Buckler, *Aegean Greece*, 352n2. See also Moysey, "Observations," 130; Ruzicka, *Politics of a Persian Dynasty*, 184n28: the association of Mausolus with the garrison (Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 198) is unverifiable.

Timotheus' appointment is the reported condition that he not violate the peace with the king (Dem. 15.9). The instruction, in addition to the limited funds awarded to the venture (Isoc. 15.111), suggests that the Athenians did not wish to present themselves as categorically for or against the rebels. Sparta's own involvement in the Revolt is found through the presence of Agesilaus in the Hellespont, where he negotiates the withdrawal of Autophradates, Mausolus, and Cotys.

Despite Timotheus' instructions, he does appear to have interacted with Erythrae in his campaign (IG II² 108); there were, however, no major acts of aggression towards Asia. Nepos and Isocrates are in contradiction regarding Timotheus' next move. Nepos would have it that Timotheus was involved in the moves made by Autophradates, Cotys, and Mausolus against Sestos and Crithote (*Tim.* 1.3) – Timotheus assisted Ariobarzanes and was rewarded with the cities, while Agesilaus received money. Isocrates indicates that Timotheus simply captured the cities, and makes no mention of Ariobarzanes (Isoc. 15.112). Moysey's rationale – that Isocrates as a contemporary should be more trustworthy – is preferable.⁸¹ In this same period (365-64) Timotheus also intervened in Cyzicus.⁸² The series of sieges in the Hellespont and Timotheus' actions were complicated by Thebes' response to Athens. Epameinondas operated in the Hellespont during 364 and secured the withdrawal of Byzantium from Athens' allies (Diod. 15.79.1). Timotheus was, then, securing the region vital for Athens' grain supply. He soon made his way back to northern Greece to address the Thebans there. The treatment of Sestos, Crithote, and Cyzicus is indicative of the deterioration of Ariobarzanes' position.⁸³ The erosion is further illustrated by the assassination of Ariobarzanes' agent, Philiscus, in Lampsacus by tyrant haters in the same period (Dem. 23.142-43).

It may be desirable to place another of Polyaeus' stratagems at this point, in which Mausolus extorted his regional allies (7.23.1). In the ruse, Mausolus pleaded that the king was depriving him of his office in order to elicit assistance from his duped friends and allies. While the anecdote contains no chronological markers, it may be

⁸¹ Moysey, *Greek Relations with the Persian Satraps*, 82-83.

⁸² For the chronology see Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 52n93.

⁸³ Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 52.

logically placed after Mausolus' campaigns against Ariobarzanes 365 and his escort of the Egyptians. After Mausolus departed from the sieges in the Chersonese, Artaxerxes may have been demanding a sign of his loyalty, which Mausolus funded with his claim of persecution.

Mausolus' role in the revolt is difficult to discern. Polyaeus reports a number of engagements focusing on Ephesus, concerning Mausolus and Autophradates (7.23.2, 27.2). Following Weiskopf, it seems likely that Autophradates and Mausolus fought together at Ephesus, Pygela, and Heraclea-at-Latmus, policing Herophytus of Ephesus.⁸⁴ No explicit mention is made of any military act by Mausolus against the king during the Revolt. What can be inferred is his control of ports for the Aegean. This becomes particularly significant when considering the Egyptian campaign in 362/1, where Tachos eventually came to incite Syria and Phoenicia to revolt, and enforced his will with a sizeable fleet of his own (Diod. 15.92). Mausolus' influence over the ship building districts in the southern sections of his satrapy must have made him an important part of the puzzle; he could restrict Achaemenid responses to Tachos by sea and assist in the disruption of communication between centre and periphery if he was not loyal.

Autophradates, having in the last five years made war on Datames, Ariobarzanes, and Orontes, was beset by dissidents. He evidently defeated Orontes' earliest efforts, but was pressured when Orontes entrenched himself on Mt. Tmolus and began raiding Sardis (Polyaen. 7.14.2). Orontes himself was present at least as far south as Cyme during the Revolt (Polyaen. 7.14.3).⁸⁵ If Orontes concealed his plans effectively, the distracted Autophradates would have few immediate means of repelling a surprise offensive. There is no evidence for any decisive engagement.

Autophradates himself soon was embroiled in the revolt. Diodorus identified him as a participant, but he was loyal until at least 365, fighting against Orontes and Ariobarzanes, while coordinating his action with Mausolus. Ruzicka conjectures that

⁸⁴ Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 67-68.

⁸⁵ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 139 uses this stratagem to hypothesise the existence of an Ionia-Egypt-Sparta coalition. Ruzicka connects Orontes to Ionia via this strategy, then the Ionians to Egypt, and Sparta to Egyptian plans to support Tachos' future campaign (Xen. *Ages*. 2.28-29). The correlation is – by Ruzicka's own admission – speculative, but not impossible.

Mausolus may have been left stranded by the revolt of Autophradates; Mausolus then joined the revolt as he was beset by rebels and made the decision out of survivalism.⁸⁶ Given Mausolus' relationship with Agesilaus, and the necessary contact with the Egyptians in order to coordinate the escort to Sparta, it seems equally likely that Autophradates was the man left isolated. Mausolus quickly left the sieges in the Hellespont, and escorted the Spartan leader, working against the royal cause, home, with an Egyptian contingent. These facts more likely indicate that Mausolus was by this point harbouring desire to revolt. So, if Ruzicka's logic is sound, Autophradates was isolated amongst the rebellious satraps and only joined the cause out of necessity. The evidence is not clear enough to argue categorically for either case. More recently, Ruzicka has speculated that Autophradates intentionally performed poorly when fighting the rebels in order to survive the conflict.⁸⁷ Again, there is no evidence to support this.

Whatever happened, Autophradates is listed among the rebels. Like Mausolus, we know little of his activity while rebelling. Perhaps he and Mausolus' stratagems against Ephesus should be located after his decision to revolt – there was nothing precluding their cooperation while they fought on the same side. The sources remain vague. One clear example of his position is preserved in Demosthenes (23.154), who records that Autophradates imprisoned Artabazus. This act supports Ruzicka's conflation of the Autophradates and Artabazus' campaigns against Darius.⁸⁸ If Artabazus was closely linked with Autophradates, he could have been easily captured when Autophradates revolted. The imprisonment should fall in 362, as can be inferred from corroborating data in Demosthenes' speech regarding Charidemus' activities.⁸⁹

Thus far, there was no military operation undertaken by the Egyptians.⁹⁰ Tachos had already made contact with Agesilaus in 364/3 when Tachos and Mausolus oversaw his return from the Hellespont to Sparta. Sometime in late 363 Tachos recruited Chabrias to further his cause, building towards a campaign against the

⁸⁶ Ruzicka, *Politics of a Persian Dynasty*, 77.

⁸⁷ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 133.

⁸⁸ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 128-290

⁸⁹ Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 179n74.

⁹⁰ Owing to Nectanebo's conservatism?: Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 141-42.

Persians. Chabrias was to serve Tachos as a private citizen; Athens made sure of this. Athens had issued explicit command to Timotheus not to disturb the peace with the king, and did not want Chabrias to upset state affairs either. Having served Egypt briefly at the end of the 380s prior to his recall, Chabrias had a history with Egypt which he would now extend (Nep. *Chab.* 2.3; Plut. *Ages.* 37.5; Polyae. 3.11.7). Chabrias oversaw the construction of a new fleet and the training of the Egyptian seamen. Agesilaus would join the Egyptian force sometime after the battle at Mantinea in 362, and take command of the Greek mercenary force (Plut. *Ages.* 37.1-2; cf. Xen. *Ages.* 2.28-30).

Meanwhile, the satraps in western Asia sought to develop their relationship with the mainland Greeks. Orontes probably had a guiding hand in sending envoys to Athens, and the effort is preserved in the famous 'Reply to the Satraps' decree from 362/1 (*IG* II² 207).⁹¹ In this inscription Athens reaffirms her position regarding the satraps and Artaxerxes. Essentially, Athens did not wish to aggravate either side. We have no detailed knowledge of the satraps' request to Athens. Given the Athenians' delicate treatment of the revolt through Timotheus and Chabrias, it probably focused on providing support beyond the coast of Asia Minor.

In 361 the revolt broke into an open and coordinated affair. Tachos at this time had moved into Phoenicia and Syria (Diod. 15.92.4). Cities in the region were besieged. Considering the recent archaeological investigations of Fantalkin and Tal, dating numerous fortifications in southern Judah to the reign of Artaxerxes and the independence of Egypt (discussed in chapter four), it should be unsurprising that Tachos would attempt to circumvent these new border protections with his fleet by targeting further north. It would be preferable to target those with a history of dissent – the spread of Evagoras' revolt in the 380s to Phoenicia made it a suitable candidate. The command of his fleet by Chabrias and the attestation of Egyptian presence in Phoenicia by Diodorus likely reflect a plan to instigate revolt across the ship-building and army-marshalling districts of the region, further precluding any muster of an

⁹¹ On the date see, primarily: Michael J. Osborne, "Athens and Orontes," *ABSA* 66 (1971): 297-321; Robert A. Moysey, "IG II² 207 and the Great Satraps' Revolt," *ZPE* 69 (1987): 93-100. I accept Osborne's date.

Achaemenid invasion force. Pseudo-Aristotle claims that Chabrias did not even require all the ships he had equipped – this gives some indication of the Egyptian success at limiting Achaemenid naval response (*Oec.* 2.37). The explicit link between the western satraps and Egypt is via Rheomithres' mission to receive funds and supplies at approximately this time. Rheomithres sailed to Egypt and received five hundred talents of silver and fifty warships (Diod. 15.92.1). All told, the evidence suggests that a coordinated campaign was being orchestrated.

Unfortunately, all details are reconstructed on inference. Tachos appears to be a primary figure at this stage, but there is no explicit evidence of the rebelling satraps' desire to campaign directly against the king.⁹² Rheomithres, however, was merely the first of many rebels to betray the cause. Upon receipt of funds from Egypt, he gathered his allies, arrested them, and sent them to the king. In this way Rheomithres made his peace. No motive is provided, but opportunism and self-preservation are readily applicable.

Orontes first arrested his benefactors, and then delivered many cities and soldiers to the king (Diod. 15.91.1). The similarities between this story and that of Rheomithres permit the inference that the two acted in tandem. The rebels probably intended to continue paying these mercenaries with the funding Rheomithres procured. Yet again, we have no known motives for Orontes' betrayal. Diodorus attributes to Orontes a desire for taking the entire coastal region as his satrapy. The aim is understandable. There is no evidence that Orontes actually received such rewards. Such an act of treachery by Orontes may indicate that he did not foresee the rebels succeeding in retaining their independence from the king. The conjecture may be supported by consideration of the timing of the betrayals.

First, money may have been increasingly difficult to procure at this stage of the revolt. Ariobarzanes had probably fallen by this time, reducing revenue streams from his satrapy and increasing focus on Orontes and the remaining rebels. Orontes had reportedly collected funds to supply one year of a campaign (Diod. 15.91.1). That money was apparently not enough, for Rheomithres received five hundred talents

⁹² Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 178-79 is right to reject the association of Orontes' coins with an attempt to take the throne.

from Tachos at approximately the same time (Diod. 15.92.1). Diodorus separates the betrayals, but it is difficult to see Orontes and Rheomithres operating independently. Orontes was allegedly satrap of Mysia, and was certainly influential around the coastal cities west of his home (at least as far down as Cyme: Polyae. 7.14.3), while Rheomithres, returning from Egypt, came to Leucaea. Whatever their relationship, the money Tachos supplied cannot be doubted to have been important to the rebelling satraps. Furthermore, Tachos himself seems to have had some concerns about the trustworthiness of the satraps – he demanded hostages as a guarantee for his provisions (Xen. *Cyr.* 8.8.4).

In addition to the financial issues which must have concerned the rebels, a Babylonian tablet also inform us of the movement of a royal force.⁹³ The diary reports that, in November 363, unknown people took the city of Sippar on the Euphrates. Later, the son of the king defended the city, and troops of the king arrived to do battle. The tablet is worn and there are many uncertainties: we do not know the specific historical context (there is no explicit link to the Satraps' Revolt, so it is not necessarily rebellious peoples related to Orontes et al.⁹⁴); we do not know who the son of the king was; we do not know the origin of the enemies. On the other hand, we do know that the issue was serious enough to warrant a response by a royal, and large enough to warrant comment by the Babylonian chronicler. The question, when considering the timing and the treachery of Orontes and Rheomithres, is whether news of the royal army on the Euphrates reached Anatolia, and whether it would concern the rebels. It was a political calculation for each one. They all knew that in the end the king would have to respond on the field of battle. Therefore, the mere existence of an army wouldn't have shocked them. But 'how far can I trust the other satraps?' must always have been a relevant question. The timing of the collapse of the revolt through betrayal, and the campaign of a king's son near the Euphrates seems too closely aligned to be unrelated. The movement of a royal army may have incited fear in the rebels that a large response was forthcoming from Artaxerxes. There is also an alleged campaign launched by Ochus against Egypt (Syncellus, p. 426, 20). It should be placed

⁹³ Hunger and Van der Spek, "An Astronomical Diary," 3-7.

⁹⁴ Hunger and Van der Spek, "An Astronomical Diary," 11-12.

ca. 360 as it neatly explains why Ochus concealed the death of his father (Polyaen. 7.17) – he was not at court when Artaxerxes died, and so needed to return to the capital in order to secure his accession.⁹⁵ When did planning for this expedition start? Was it also intended to address the rebels in Anatolia? The previous two expeditions against Egypt took a long time to prepare (in the 380s and in the 370s), and it apparently took Artaxerxes a long time to muster troops in order to repel Cyrus in 401. Did the army referenced in the above Babylonian diary also comprise a component of the expedition Ochus launched? It would not be surprising if this were the case. Clearly Artaxerxes ordered some kind of mobilisation, be it directed against Egypt, rebels on the Euphrates, or rebels in Asia Minor (Diod. 15.90.2). The betrayals of Orontes and Rheomithres did not occur in isolation from the overall situation, and some of the contributing circumstances may be inferred through the above sources. If Rheomithres did betray the cause independently of Orontes (the timing is uncertain, so it may also be vice versa), there is further cause to believe that these betrayals were a result of the perceived weakness of the satraps' positions.

At this time Tachos had launched his campaign and was active in Phoenicia and Syria, with his ships impeding naval action by the Achaemenids and any approach on Egypt. Whatever plans he had, they came to naught when revolt stirred in his own homeland.⁹⁶ Certainly the general campaign of destruction in Syria and Phoenicia to which Diodorus refers did not eventuate (15.92.4).⁹⁷ By this time Artaxerxes had dispatched his son to lead an army westwards – no doubt Ochus was one of his only trustworthy men. This may be the army to which Diodorus refers in 15.90.2. The collapse of the Satraps' Revolt through betrayal was compounded by the revolt in Egypt against Tachos. Nectanebo and Tjahapimau had divided the force campaigning in Syria and Phoenicia, rendering any unified response to the Achaemenids impossible. Tachos also lost the support of Agesilaus, who returned to Egypt (15.92.3). Artaxerxes attempted to subvert Agesilaus at this time through an

⁹⁵ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 151-53.

⁹⁶ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 145-47 attempts to reconstruct his aims and acts in this campaign.

⁹⁷ L. L. Grabbe, "Relating Excavations to History in Fourth-Century Palestine," in *Judah and the Judeans in the Fourth Century B.C.E.*, ed. O. Lipschits, Gary N. Knoppers, and Rainer Albertz (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2007), 129.

offer of friendship (Xen. *Ages.* 8.3-5; Plut. *Ages.* 23.6, *Mor.* 213d). While Xenophon says that Agesilaus rejected the advance, the Spartan did no discernable harm to Artaxerxes afterwards, which is especially strange considering he was to lead soldiers against Persia with Tachos before his change of heart (though cf. the justifications in Plut. *Ages.* 37.4, and one cannot forget that Agesilaus would die soon).⁹⁸ The same overtures were made to Chabrias (Plut. *Ages.* 37.3), while demands were made to Athens to recall him (Nep. *Chab.* 3.1). Tachos had failed, and fled to Strato of Sidon for help (Xen. *Ages.* 2.30). Eventually, out of desperation, Tachos adopted the position of a suppliant before Artaxerxes, who granted mercy and appointed him head of a new Egyptian expedition. The logic is clear. If the rebellion in Egypt could be put down, Tachos would have the connections necessary to restore order more effectively than any foreign satrap, and his newfound loyalty to Artaxerxes would hopefully not be forgotten.

Tachos probably journeyed back to Egypt with Ochus on the final Egyptian invasion of Artaxerxes' reign, and Ochus likely cleared out any remaining hostility in Syria and Phoenicia while making his march. Artaxerxes would die within the next two years. The march to the western empire then served a dual purpose. Ochus could expand his military experience, finally end the Satraps' Revolt (though internal strife had determined that the revolt was collapsing anyway), and he could clear out any remaining hostile forces lingering from the Egyptian expedition in Syria and Phoenicia, while establishing his own ties and impressions about the region to employ during his own reign.

Of the other players in the revolt, little is known. Whatever Mausolus' intentions or participation in the Revolt, by 361/0 his former seat of Mylasa was dating by Artaxerxes' regnal year, which indicates ostensible loyalty.⁹⁹ Autophradates similarly arranged to come to terms with the king. Artabazus would have given Autophradates good leverage in his negotiations. Ariobarzanes had been brought down ca. 363. The sources preserve a tradition that Ariobarzanes' son, Mithridates,

⁹⁸ Especially since Agesilaus, after the snub in the 368/7 conference, became a "Persian-hater" (Xen. *Ages.* 7.7): see Cawkwell, "Agesilaus and Sparta," 71.

⁹⁹ Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 181.

betrayed him.¹⁰⁰ Given the earlier murder of Ariobarzanes' agent, Philiscus, Weiskopf's portrait of internal collapse of the satrapy is fitting.¹⁰¹ Mithridates then had a hand in the fall of the last independent satrap, Datames (Nep. *Dat.* 10-11). Having allegedly promised Artaxerxes to bring down Datames if he were permitted to act with impunity, Mithridates befriended Datames on the pretext that he wished to continue the war against the king, then betrayed him. Even in these tales, however, Datames is not presented as an offensive campaigner – he defended himself vigorously against those who attacked him, but does not seem to have attempted to extend revolt after his opening moves against the Euphrates. Thus the Satraps' revolt came to an end in 360/59.

Court Intrigue and the End of Artaxerxes' Reign

While the Satraps' Revolt grew in the West, at court we are told of a general decline in the power of Artaxerxes. The last chapters of Plutarch's *Life of Artaxerxes* are a stereotypically Orientalist account of court intrigue and decline which fail to inspire trust in their accuracy. In this section the end of Artaxerxes' life as it is presented in Plutarch is briefly traced.¹⁰²

Plutarch's account of the court struggle begins in chapter 26, where it is related that Artaxerxes perceived rivalries forming amongst his sons, along with officials at court. Thus, he named Darius his successor. Darius was fifty at this time. Following the dating of Artaxerxes' marriage to Stateira outlined above, and the presumption that a child was born soon after 415, Darius would have been fifty ca. 365.¹⁰³ This seems appropriate for the timing of the affairs which follow and befitting the other events of which we are aware in the 360s. Given the history of succession in the Achaemenid

¹⁰⁰ Val. Max. 9.11 *ext.*; Xen. *Cyr.* 8.8.4; Harpocration s.v. *Ariobarzanes*.

¹⁰¹ Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 50-51.

¹⁰² Binder, *Kommentar, ad locum* provides source analysis of these final chapters of Plutarch's *Life*.

¹⁰³ Cf. Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 1002. See above, p. 18n15.

Empire, and Artaxerxes' own reputation for having numerous sons (115 in Justin 10.1.1, 5),¹⁰⁴ the need to designate an heir was paramount.

Plutarch sets up the rivalry between Ochus and Darius in the same terms as Artaxerxes and Cyrus. Both Ochus and Cyrus were the younger sons, spurned as the eldest was designated successor (*Art.* 2.2, 26.1-2). Cyrus turned to his mother, Parysatis, for help in winning over the king (*Art.* 2.2-3); Ochus turned to Atossa, wife of the king (*Art.* 26.2: a position and title rather than a wife as a modern Westerner would understand it¹⁰⁵). Cyrus was restless and impetuous (*Art.* 2.1: ὁ μὲν οὖν Κῦρος ἔντονόν τι καὶ σφοδρὸν εὐθὺς ἐκ πρώτης ἡλικίας εἶχεν). Ochus was passionate, with a violent disposition (*Art.* 26.1: ὁ δὲ νεώτατος Ὀχος ὀξύς ὢν καὶ βίαιος εἶχε). The similarities should raise suspicion. The context should do the same. After all, Plutarch was not a historian: he was writing a moral biography. The decline of Artaxerxes, mirroring the decline of Darius II and the growing rivalry of Cyrus and Artaxerxes in 404, creates a sense of symmetry in the *Life*. As at the beginning of the *Life*, where Artaxerxes' character is overwhelmed by Stateira and Parysatis, and Cyrus becomes the focus of the story,¹⁰⁶ from chapter 26 Artaxerxes is overtaken by stories of Atossa and Aspasia, and the new figure of Ochus takes charge of proceedings as a new Cyrus. Without any comparable sources, solutions are limited. The initial characterisations appear to fit Plutarch's literary aims more than they reflect reality.

Plutarch's poetic license is evident in the alliance of Tiribazus and Darius. In §§27-28 the reader is presented with the image of Tiribazus whispering in the ear of Darius, making him suspicious of Ochus and his father. Tiribazus turned against Artaxerxes because the king took Atossa for himself. It is a neat parallel to Darius, who was also deprived of a woman by the king. If there is any truth to that claim, the broken promise would be more appropriate ca. 387, when Pharnabazus is married to Apame – it is implied to have occurred around the same time via the close correlation

¹⁰⁴ See Binder, *Kommentar*, 335.

¹⁰⁵ Bigwood, "Incestuous Marriage," 326 contains the fullest discussion; See also Wiesehöfer, *Ancient Persia*, 84-85; Brosius, *Women in Ancient Persia*, 186-88.

¹⁰⁶ Judith Mossman, "A Life Unparalleled: Artaxerxes," in *Plutarch's Lives: Parallelism and Purpose*, ed. Noreen Humble (Oxford: Classical Press of Wales, 2010), 150.

in Plutarch (*Art.* 27.4).¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, the role of Parysatis in this relationship with Atossa should also place it earlier in Artaxerxes' reign rather than later (*Art.* 23.1-3) – our last reference to Parysatis is in 395,¹⁰⁸ and it is difficult to believe she would have lived beyond 380. The thought that this disparagement drove Tiribazus for twenty years, through promotion, punishment, and reward at the hands of the king, is too simplistic to be accurate. No doubt the incident (if true) would linger in the memory of Tiribazus, but, as an explanation for his behaviour in 365 and following, it is wanting. It makes more sense to consider the alliance of Darius and Tiribazus part of the court machinations which stirred as Artaxerxes' death became imminent and his hold on the empire slipped. The entire scenario is worthy of suspicion.¹⁰⁹ No doubt rivalries formed in this period, and Ochus overcame his brother Darius to take the throne. But the motivations ascribed by Plutarch in §§26-27 are dubious.

§29 is an example of Plutarch's vivid storytelling. Darius and Tiribazus resolved to assassinate the king in his bedchamber. Artaxerxes caught wind of the plot, and retreated into a panic room, having identified the assailants. Tiribazus fought bravely against the king's guards attempting to arrest him, and fell to a long range spear thrust. Tiribazus ends the *Life* as he began. He was favourite character of Plutarch. Tiribazus is the only sympathetic figure in these final sections, and dies honourably in combat, defeating many of his foes, before being felled by a long range strike – not in single combat, but by a weakling who would not enter into close combat with Tiribazus (or so Plutarch would have his audience believe). None of the story is compelling from an historical standpoint. The similarities to Plutarch's *Life of Alcibiades* (39.3) are manifest: both Alcibiades and Tiribazus fall bravely without their enemies having the courage to fight them hand to hand.

Darius and his family were executed. Plutarch preserves two versions, but both could have been altered for dramatic effect. In the first, the executioner nobly refuses to execute a king. In the second, Artaxerxes himself used a sword to kill his son. He

¹⁰⁷ Bigwood, "Incestuous Marriage," 327.

¹⁰⁸ See above, p. 81.

¹⁰⁹ Bigwood, "Incestuous Marriage," 327. On this page, Bigwood is also correct to doubt that Ochus and Atossa had relations while Artaxerxes was alive (*Art.* 26.2).

effectively casts himself as the representative of Ahuramazda on earth, taking action against the Lie. The second tale is suspiciously close in tone to falsified accounts of Artaxerxes' behaviour at Cunaxa (*Art.* 12.3-4) and the inspiring speeches of his compatriots (*Art.* 10.1-2) – it is likely later construction. Equally, however, Plutarch's noble barbarian who refuses to execute a royal (requiring Artaxerxes to perform the act himself!) in the first version is highly moralistic in tone. Neither is satisfying for determining the true events. One may even doubt whether Darius was executed for treachery at all, and whether Tiribazus had a hand in proceedings. Perhaps both were killed through the rivalry with Ochus, who then manufactured tales of their misbehaviour to legitimise himself. The same is generally considered to have occurred with Cyrus and the assassination plot preserved at the beginning of the *Life of Artaxerxes*.¹¹⁰ Darius had an obvious political enemy in Ochus. Tiribazus was probably not without enemies either, and his alliance with Darius could have easily attracted unwanted attention. It is known that Orontes, his rival in the 380s, survived the Satraps' Revolt and persisted until the end of the 360s.¹¹¹ Did Orontes' political allies at court orchestrate Tiribazus' demise? Or did Orontes only reconcile himself with Artaxerxes after he learned of Tiribazus' demise and was assured that Tiribazus could not inhibit his aims any longer?¹¹²

The death of Darius left Ochus with two other brothers with whom to contend: Ariaspes and Arsames (*Art.* 30). Arsames was not born of the king's wife, but the accession of Darius II demonstrated that would not preclude an ambitious man from contending for the throne. Similar accusations of illegitimacy may have been levelled in Cyrus and Artaxerxes' succession struggle,¹¹³ so it may also indicate that Arsames was subject to similar accusations. Ariaspes was an even greater threat. The story which follows the death of Darius, outlining the rise of Ochus, is again suspicious for its symmetry. Each rival brother experiences a different of Ochus' character. Arsames

¹¹⁰ Binder, *Kommentar*, 113. See above, p. 28.

¹¹¹ Osborne, "Orontes," 551. Cf. Hornblower, *Mausolus*, 178.

¹¹² See also Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 132 where Orontes' defection is speculated to have concerned the relationship between Orontes and Darius, and Moysey, "Plutarch, Nepos and the Satrapal Revolt," 158-68 where the links between the outbreak of the Satraps' Revolt and the court struggles preserved at the end of Plutarch's *Life* are explored.

¹¹³ Lenfant, "La 'décadence' du Grand Roi," 413-14. See above, p. 16n9.

is killed by outright violence; Ariaspes driven to suicide by Ochus' manipulative cunning. What is interesting in these accounts, and one of the more believable aspects, is the presence of a son of Tiribazus as the man to assassinate Arsames. His role affirms the factional divisions, which apparently split the family of Tiribazus as well. It also indicates that Ochus secured the loyalty of the remainder of Tiribazus' clan after his death. If the treatment of Darius and Terituchmes are true reflections of the Persian justice system,¹¹⁴ where entire families are eradicated for disloyalty, perhaps Ochus saved some of Tiribazus' family and so won their support. The entire affair is conjectural and difficult for the modern historian to draw valid conclusions. The final result is confirmed by the man who would succeed Artaxerxes: Ochus, regardless of the details, won the succession struggle.¹¹⁵

At the end of Plutarch's *Life Artaxerxes* is a lonely figure.¹¹⁶ Plutarch links his death directly to the toll taken by the struggle for succession. The concealment of Artaxerxes' death by Ochus, reportedly for ten months (Polyaen. 7.17), suggests that Artaxerxes died while Ochus was away from court and marching against Egypt.¹¹⁷ In light of the Satraps' Revolt and the struggle for the throne, Ochus probably did not want to divulge any signs of instability or weakness while he was absent. There may also have been, as a result of Ochus' absence from court, a need to delay the ceremonial investiture of the new king.¹¹⁸ Whatever the reasons, Artaxerxes II died, and his son became Artaxerxes III Ochus, king of Persia. This took place between 25th November 359 (the last Babylonian diary to refer to Artaxerxes II is dated here) and 10th March 358 (the date of the first diary referring to Artaxerxes III).¹¹⁹ While Plutarch's *Life* is unparalleled, and we miss his final judgement, there may be a hint of

¹¹⁴ Terituchmes: see above, pp. 21-22.

¹¹⁵ If Plutarch's account of the succession struggle is to be accepted, it would also mean that Root, *King and Kingship in Achaemenid Art*, 91 is mistaken in adding that Artaxerxes II is a possible exception to the rule that Achaemenid kings after Darius failed to ensure succession through nomination of a crown prince: Darius (i.e. Artaxerxes' nominated successor) was dispatched by his rivals.

¹¹⁶ On the portrait (including general comment on last several sections of Plutarch's *Life*): Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 997.

¹¹⁷ See above, p. 293.

¹¹⁸ Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West*, 153.

¹¹⁹ Richard A. Parker and Waldo Herman Dubberstein, *Babylonian chronology 626 B.C.-A.D. 75* (Providence: Brown University Press, 1956), 19; Depuydt, *Updates to Achaemenid Chronology*, 37.

Plutarch's empathy for Artaxerxes in his final condemnation of Ochus (*Art.* 30.9). Perhaps the parallel between Ochus and Cyrus at the end of Plutarch's *Life* was his attempt to show that Cyrus the Younger would not have been a great king. Artaxerxes was entombed at Persepolis,¹²⁰ as were his fellow Achaemenid kings. His grand tomb makes no allusion to Anahita or Mithra; it does not betray his apparently progressive religious attitude,¹²¹ and is in keeping with the style of his forebears.

¹²⁰ Schmidt, *Persepolis III: The Royal Tombs and Other Monuments*, 99-102.

¹²¹ See survey in Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 676-80.

CONCLUSION

Artaxerxes the Diplomat

When discussing the end of the Satraps' Revolt, the above referred to the overtures made to Chabrias and Agesilaus in order to dissuade them from taking action against Persia with Tachos.¹ The effort was the final attempt by Artaxerxes to resolve his problems diplomatically. The following will review this aspect of the reign as a concluding argument: Artaxerxes was a diplomat.

First, it is beneficial to make some general remarks on current interpretations of the Achaemenid bureaucracy and the relationship of the Achaemenid king to the day to day ordering of the empire. Modern understanding is in some ways contradictory. On the one hand, satraps were granted a high degree of autonomy in deciding their courses of action. Examples include Alcibiades' strategy (proposed to Tissaphernes), the rivalry which is argued to have dictated behaviour in the early 390s,² and possibly even Weiskopf's thesis for the Satraps' Revolt, which he argues was founded largely upon local rivalries.³ Autonomy is also addressed in more general works.⁴ One might even suspect the depth of the king's separation from the day to day operation of the empire in the Achaemenid court. There, he was enveloped by ceremony and pomp.⁵

¹ Above, pp. 293-94.

² Hyland, "Pharnabazos, Cyrus' Rebellion," 1-27.

³ Weiskopf, *The So-Called "Great Satraps' Revolt"*, 41-43.

⁴ E.g. Cook, *Persian Empire*, 81-85, 132; Brosius, *Persians*, 48; Waters, *Ancient Persia*, 100-03.

⁵ Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 299-301; Llewellyn-Jones, *King and Court in Ancient Persia*, chap. 2.

He had an entourage of thousands.⁶ In the visual image of the empire this impression is further highlighted through his elevation above others.⁷

On the other hand, the bureaucracy of the empire is considered to have permeated all levels,⁸ and is prominently reflected in the archives of Persepolis (the *PFT* and *PTT*). Recent studies have noted directives for acts which seem relatively insignificant in the scheme of the empire: boat repair, for example.⁹ An infamous comment from the reign of Artaxerxes underscores the notion: Pharnabazus claims that he is the master of his words, but the king is master of his actions (Diod. 15.41.2). Artaxerxes' management is unlikely to have been in reality as stringent as Diodorus presents (his purpose was to highlight the progress stymied by Persian maladministration), but Artaxerxes does appear to have taken a role in the direction of his empire. A great deal of literary evidence for the involvement of Achaemenid monarchs in the operation of the empire derives from Artaxerxes' reign. While he was not militarily effective (e.g. failures in Egypt, a lengthy campaign on Cyprus), Artaxerxes affected cohesive foreign policy which produced tangible results in his favour when dealing with the Greeks.¹⁰

The first point at which Artaxerxes is detected to have exerted his influence over policy decisions is in the acceptance of Pharnabazus' plan to construct a navy to combat Sparta ca. 397. In the operations which followed, Artaxerxes clearly showed his hand: Tissaphernes was removed, ships were commissioned across Cyprus, and

⁶ Maria Brosius, "Court and Court Ceremonies in Achaemenid Persia," in *The Court and Court Society in Ancient Monarchies*, ed. A. Spawforth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 45-46.

⁷ Lindsay Allen, "Le roi imaginaire: an Audience with the Achaemenid King," in *Imaginary Kings: Royal Images in the Ancient Near East, Greece and Rome*, ed. Olivier Hekster and Richard Fowler, *Oriens et Occidens* 11 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2005), 39-62.

⁸ See, for example, introductory points of Tuplin, "Administration of the Achaemenid Empire," 109-13; P. Frei, "Persian Imperial Authorization: A Summary," in *Persia and Torah: The Theory of Imperial Authorization of the Pentateuch*, ed. James W. Watts (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2001), 39-40; Vadim S. Jigoulov, "Administration of Achaemenid Phoenicia: A Case for Managed Autonomy," in *Exile and Restoration Revisited: Essays on the Babylonian and Persian Periods in Memory of Peter R. Ackroyd*, ed. Peter R. Ackroyd, et al. (London: T & T Clark, 2009), 138-51.

⁹ Matt Waters, "Applied Royal Directive: Pisouthnes and Samos," in *Der Achämenidenhof | The Achaemenid Court*, ed. Bruno Jacobs and Robert Rollinger (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010), 820.

¹⁰ Starr, "Greeks and Persians (Part 2)," 105 broadly recognises this fact.

Tithraustes was sent to the coast with large sums of money. Conon may or may not have journeyed to Artaxerxes himself (at the very least he called for action in letters to the king: Justin 6.2.12-13).¹¹ In the years which followed, the long walls' reconstruction was funded, as were mercenaries, and a fleet was constructed especially for the Athenians to represent Persian interests against Sparta. The Spartans ceased their raiding in Asia Minor and returned to Greece. Athens did not attempt to intrude into the Achaemenid sphere of influence over the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, Spartan garrisons were ejected from the islands and the coast of Asia Minor. It was an unmitigated success.

The plan was upset by the decision making of Tiribazus.¹² He had reasons for acting the way he did, but it was clearly contrary to the interests of his king. Again Artaxerxes handed down his judgement. Tiribazus was replaced by pro-Athenian Strouthas. But the damage was done. Too much autonomy had ruined whatever plans Artaxerxes may have had for prolonging his partnership with Athens. From these events it is apparent that Artaxerxes had a plan when organising the West, and he reaffirmed the order of affairs.

Artaxerxes next showed his hand in the King's Peace in 387/6. The sources are silent on the decision making process. We hear only of the result: Artaxerxes imposed peace on the Greeks. He retained possession of Asia; Sparta would guard the Peace; any who did not comply would be attacked by all others. The Peace was effective for a decade, ended Spartan involvement in Anatolia, and impeded Athenian imperialism. Its success cannot be denied. A crucial difference to the 392/1 failure was that, in this second attempt, Antalcidas went to the king himself. Artaxerxes' involvement may be further discerned via the administrative manoeuvring which followed the agreement with the Spartans. Both Tiribazus and Ariobarzanes afterwards dispatched vessels to support a naval operation headed by Antalcidas. While Ariobarzanes' support may be attributed to his guest-friendship with Antalcidas, the concurrent effort of Tiribazus implies coordination from above. Afterwards, Tiribazus summoned the Greeks to receive the decree of the king. At this juncture he revealed the king's seal, and read

¹¹ See above, pp. 121-22.

¹² See above, pp. 131-33.

from a script (*Hell.* 5.1.30). The seal explicitly attests to Artaxerxes' interest in the matter and the fact that authorisation has come from the highest circles in the empire. The presence of the seal is also remarkable among literary sources, and carries especial weight owing to Xenophon's position as contemporary (which presumably gave him access to accurate information in this regard). The present author knows of only four other literary references to the Achaemenid king's seal. The first is in Thucydides, and reads similarly to the above case of the King's Peace (Thuc. 1.129). The second is in the book of Esther (3:12, 8). The third is *Hell.* 1.4.3, where a seal is shown on the document confirming Cyrus the Younger's position as *karanos* in the West. The fourth reference is in the midst of the 368/7 peace negotiations (*Hell.* 7.1.39). Artaxerxes' office was directing policy in the West. Furthermore, the decisions were sound, well informed, and effective.

The conference of 368/7 affords some of the best insight into the practicalities of securing an agreement with the Persian king. Artaxerxes was convinced to support the Thebans as new guardians of the peace. But the process by which Pelopidas secured the king's interest is illustrative (and it was Artaxerxes personally, for his participation is earmarked by events which occurred "in the king's hearing": *Hell.* 7.1.37). The Thebans were required to state their claims to ascendancy: they had fought on the king's side at Plataea, they'd never undertaken a campaign against the king, and they refused to permit Agesilaus' sacrifice at Aulis. Most recently (and relevantly), they had defeated the Spartans at Leuctra. Thus the Theban case for supremacy was made. Then they diminished the Argives and Arcadians by noting their losses to Sparta when Thebes was not present. The claims were then seconded by an independent party – the Athenian Timagoras. The process bears comparison to Tiribazus' trial, where he must also extoll his services to the king and validate his claims through an independent Greek (Diod. 15.10). Here the ceremony which surrounds the king in his court is established.

The events which followed serve to underscore Artaxerxes' position in the congress. Having accepted the justifications of the Thebans, Artaxerxes asked for and received the terms the Thebans desire. In Xenophon's account, there is no break between public and private audiences with the king, but something occurred behind

closed doors at this point. Xenophon relates the terms requested by the Thebans, and then says “when these things had been written and read to the ambassadors” (*Hell.* 7.1.37). Xenophon is therefore condensing a number of meetings into one episode: the terms were made official by their transcription into writing, and Artaxerxes was present for the final decree. When the Athenians complained about their status, the king again had the terms produced, and told the Athenians to make their case if they were not satisfied. The statement that the terms were produced again implies that several other representations had been made before the king in order to convince him of certain points of view.¹³ In the 368/7 conference, there is clearly a sophisticated method for diplomacy which hints at repeated meetings, public and private, the transcription of terms for codification, and modification of clauses in order to secure a satisfactory result.¹⁴

In the 368/7 conference there are also illustrative tales of Artaxerxes’ method of using his friendships to his advantage. There are a number of other examples in the reign of Artaxerxes of other individuals making use of ritualised friendship: Cyrus the Younger had a myriad of friends who entered his employment; Pharnabazus’ son became guest-friends with Agesilaus; Antalcidas was a friend of Artaxerxes; Ariobarzanes was also friends with Antalcidas; Artaxerxes attempted to use friendship to dissuade Agesilaus and Chabrias from campaigning with Tachos. In his ritualised friendships, Artaxerxes was an exemplar of the giving king archetype.¹⁵ Antalcidas is said to have received a wreath of flowers dipped in ointment from Artaxerxes while he was in favour (*Plut. Art.* 22.1, *Pel.* 30.4). Pelopidas also received the customary gifts (*Plut. Pel.* 30.5), and several others from the conference in 368/7 appear to have been

¹³ Tuplin, “Xenophon and Achaemenid Courts,” 195.

¹⁴ Allen, “Letter as Object,” 32 has recently reasserted the significance of the act of reading a document while exploring the role of letters in the Achaemenid Empire. The examples from the reign of Artaxerxes are absent from Allen’s discussion, but are valuable contributions to the ideas presented in her work.

¹⁵ Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 302-19.

denigrated for their acceptance of gifts (Plut. *Pel.* 30.6-7).¹⁶ Although these stories are isolated to Plutarch, Xenophon also alludes to the riches experienced in this conference (*Hell.* 7.1.38). So too does he report that Agesilaus was offered gifts in Artaxerxes' attempts to secure his friendship (Xen. *Ages.* 8.5). The stories of the men who killed Cyrus at Cunaxa show that Artaxerxes' reputation for gift-giving extended throughout his life (*Art.* 14-15). The most extraordinary example of this is the tale in Plutarch to the effect that Artaxerxes rewarded the simple gift of water by a peasant with a goblet and a thousand darics (*Art.* 5.1; Ael. *VH* 1.32 is the same story, with the addition of a robe among the gifts). Aelian delights in the other stories which followed Artaxerxes and his apparent reputation for generosity (*VH* 1.33-34). Indeed, the witticism preserved by Plutarch regarding Eucleidas the Spartan suggests that the relationships Artaxerxes cultivated went beyond what was strictly required for protocol (*Art.* 5.1). Eucleidas would say outrageous things to the king, but Artaxerxes issued his replies benignly, and the reported frequency of the Spartan's comments would suggest he had spent enough time at court for his comments to be considered to come often. The above reports, in addition to the appearance of the king's seal in the West, speaks of Artaxerxes' engagement with the periphery of his empire, and his active participation in its management, which defies the portrait of the man as isolated and withdrawn from the decline of his empire.

The second chapter noted that a fragment of Deinon has had undue influence over modern explanations of Artaxerxes' decisions.¹⁷ In Plutarch, Deinon is recorded as saying that Artaxerxes reviled the Lacedaemonians above all others (*Art.* 22.1). Like Pharnabazus' claim of Artaxerxes' interference, there may be a kernel of truth to the claim, but it is certainly exaggerated. It should not satisfy inquiry into Artaxerxes' decision making process. Plutarch himself repeatedly challenges Deinon's claim through references to Artaxerxes' relationship with Antalcidas, his wry and lenient

¹⁶ Timagoras might be added to this list of recipients of the king's favours (*Art.* 22.5-6; Dem. 19.137; *Hell.* 7.1.38), but it would appear that he was being bribed, rather than engaging in the gift exchange – the forty talents in Demosthenes goes beyond the norm outlined in Ael. *VH.* 1.22 (on which, see Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 307). The difference between bribe and gift, in relation to the expectation of reciprocity is probably negligible (noted by Briant, *Cyrus to Alexander*, 669).

¹⁷ See above, p. 89n11.

responses to Eucleidas, and his pro-Spartan policies. Artaxerxes' extension of *xenia* to Agesilaus also contradicts the notion. These acts may not have been the product of true feelings of friendship, but they certainly contradict the use of *Art.* 22.1 in modern scholarship: it has been unreasonably exploited to justify Artaxerxes' decisions.

After the 368/7 conference, Artaxerxes' deftness is witnessed in the eventual agreement reached in Greece. The Thebans do not carry the document, though they are the instigators and primary beneficiaries. Rather, a Persian is sent from the king. Again Xenophon makes a point of the display of the king's seal (*Hell.* 7.1.39). But, as seen in the preceding sections, by 366 Artaxerxes did not have the capacity to enforce the provisions of the agreement. Subsequent events underscored the inability of Thebes (or any one power at this time) to police it in Achaemenid favour as Sparta had done in the 380s. The revisions made after the initial agreement with Thebes in 368/7 again reflect the nuance of Artaxerxes' leadership and his ability to adapt to the situations he faced.

While the Greek and Roman authors could not overcome their bias, they could still recognise the intricacies of Artaxerxes' leadership. They called him Mnemon – mindful (*Art.* 1). But it wasn't just a name: Plutarch tried repeatedly to characterise Artaxerxes in terms of his mindful nature, which served as a contrast against his Orientalist traits (*Art.* 2, 4.3-4, 5, 22, 26.6). And the Persians who followed Artaxerxes also considered him to be a paragon for their later empires.¹⁸ So it is perplexing that this king, for whom we have such a wealth of information, has continued to be tarred by simplistic portraits.

Throughout the above work I have pointed out the gaps in our knowledge of Artaxerxes' policies and approaches to his empire. These gaps have often been filled with a superficial characterisation of the man and his reign as a low water point in the history of the Achaemenid Empire. Too often the Satraps' Revolt in the 360s is taken to be indicative of the entire reign, and the successes of the man are ignored or measured in terms of their effect on the Greek world. I suggest that the man and his reign, if they must be assessed, should not be viewed in terms of military conquest, but in his

¹⁸ Arjomand, "Artaxerxes, Ardašīr, and Bahman," 245-48.

capacity as a negotiator and diplomat, focused on securing his own empire from interference.

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Dies

Issus¹



O1



O2



O3



O4

¹ Images have been enlarged, and are not to scale.

Issus Cont.



R1



R2



R3



R4



R5



R6



R7

Mallus



O1



O2



O3



O4

Mallus Cont.



R1



R2



R3



R4



R5



R6

Soli



O1



R1



R2



R3

Tarsus



O1



O2



R1



R2



R3

Unknown



O1



O2?



R1



R2



R3



R4

Figures



Figure 1 Baal/Figure in the winged disc stater of Tiribazus
BM 1985,1114.1 (© Trustees of the British Museum)



Figure 2 Baal/Herakles stater
Peus 399 (2009) 184



Figure 3 Baal/Warrior head stater of Pharnabazus
BM 1979,0101.995 (© Trustees of the British Museum)



Figure 4 Baal/Lion attacking stag gold coin of Mazaeus
BM 1937,0606.18 (© Trustees of the British Museum)



Figure 5 Herakles/Zeus tetradrachm of Alexander
BM 1913,0518.2 (© Trustees of the British Museum)



Figure 6 Darius' inscription at Behistun

WikiCommons



Figure 7 The Darius Seal

BM 89132 || BM 1835,0630.1 (© Trustees of the British Museum)



UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, 1980.
THIS TABLET WITH A WINGED DISC
FROM THE LATE ASSYRIAN PERIOD
FOUND AT NINEveh, 1845. IN THE
MUSEUM OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.
E9

Figure 8 Clay tablet with winged disc

University of Chicago, Oriental Institute, P 57464



Figure 9 Bes/Horned animal obol
Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, no. 157



Figure 10 Baal/Lion and winged disc obol of Mazaëus
BM 2003,1107.3 (© Trustees of the British Museum)



Figure 11 Line drawing of King/Figure in the winged disc obol
Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, no. 100



Figure 12 Assur as archer from relief of Ashurnasirpal II
BM 124551 || 1849,1222.12 (© Trustees of the British Museum)



Figure 13 Figure in the winged disc from Persepolis
Photograph: A/Prof. J. Alvarez-Mon



Figure 14 Philistian Athena/City walls tetradrachm
Gitler and Tal, *Coinage of Philistia*, pl. LXIV, XV.1Ta




Figure 15 Drawing of Achaemenid Immortal at Susa
Gitler and Tal, *Coinage of Philistia*, fig. 4.8



Figure 16 Sidonian City walls/King of Persia double shekel
ANS 1997.9.197



Figure 17 Philistian Oriental female head/City walls drachm
Gitler and Tal, *Coinage of Philistia*, pl. LXV, XV.2Da



Figure 18 Obverse of Cilician Aphrodite/Satrap head stater
ANS 1944.100.54102



Figure 19 Reverse of Philistian Oriental head/Bes drachm

Gitler and Tal, *Coinage of Philistia*, pl. LXXVI, XVIII.5Db



Figure 20 Reverse of Philistian Oriental head/Bes drachm

Gitler and Tal, *Coinage of Philistia*, pl. LXXVI, XVIII.7Da




Figure 21 Drawing of seal impression

Kaptan, *The Daskyleion Bullae*, no. 3



Figure 22 Drawing of Achaemenid seal

Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, 45



Figure 23 Drawing of Samarian obol

Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, no. 7



Figure 24 Philistian Oriental head/Rider drachm

Gitler and Tal, *Coinage of Philistia*, pl. XCIV, XXV.2Da



Figure 25 Drawing of Samarian King/Rider obol

Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, no. 40



Figure 26 Drawing of Samarian Lion/Persian king hemiobol

Meshorer and Qedar, *Samarian Coinage*, no. 101



Figure 27 King/figure in the winged disc obol: Type 1 (b)
 Ashmolean Museum, Robinson (1970), ex Bank Leu, ex Nablus Hoard



Figure 28 Lion/figure in the winged disc hemiobol: Type 1 (l)
 Ashmolean Museum, Robinson (1970), ex Bank Leu, ex Nablus Hoard




Figure 29 Drawing of Lion/Figure in the winged disc hemiobol: Type 1 (l)
Meshorer and Qedar, *Samaritan Coinage*, no. 84



Figure 30 Figure in the winged disc/Rider obol: Type 2 (a)
CNG Mail Bid 82 (2009) 731



Figure 31 Drawing of Figure in the winged disc/Rider obol: Type 2 (a)
Meshorer and Qedar, *Samaritan Coinage*, no. 124



Figure 32 Clothing plaque from Oxus Treasure
BM 123936 (© Trustees of the British Museum)



Figure 33 Achaemenid earring
MFAB 1971.256 (© 2015 Museum of Fine Arts, Boston)

