

Challenges to nationhood in postcolonial states: The case of Pakistan

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Abstract


Popularly known as an Islamic state, Pakistan is a post-colonial state composed of diverse nations that have distinct languages and associate with different faiths.

In heterogenous states, political institutions play an important part in the forging of ethnic ties, as Weber would argue. Pakistan, however, has inherited a colonial legacy and has, thus, adopted a centralised state structure that exploited religion and language to maintain power over its citizens. While other states such as USA, India and Switzerland have managed diversity to the extent that national identity supersedes any other identity, the policy of internal colonialism in Pakistan encouraged communalism, separatism and secession. Even after having suffered the consequences of state centralisation in the case of Bangladesh, the state did not amend its policies to incorporate diversity. Rather, post-1971 Pakistan aggressively exercised control which has challenged the sense of national identity in Pakistan.

The aim of this thesis is to identify and explore the challenges to establishing a sense of unified national identity in Pakistan, which is essential for the state to operate in a coherent fashion. It is important to recognise the challenges that a post-colonial state encounters in creating a sense of nationhood for the security and the prosperity of the state.

Statement of Originality

This work has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the thesis itself.



Fatima Aftab

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Introduction

Pakistan is an economically unstable state that is familiar with terrorism, ethnic violence and religious extremism. It has weak democratic institutions and is governed by a strong Establishment.¹ Pakistani society suffers from frustrations related to underrepresentation as the institutions in Pakistan are relatively undemocratic.² These grievances erupted as early as in 1948 when the Bangla Language Movement was launched in a reaction to the dictatorial policies of Pakistani state, and led to the eventual break-up of Pakistan in 1971.³ Despite having suffered the consequences of being autocratic and adopting policies to exercise control over the people of Pakistan, the secessionist tendencies within the country have not been curtailed by the governing elite. This can be seen through the separatist movements that are gaining strength in Balochistan, South-Punjab and within Sindh.⁴ The state of Pakistan has adopted policies such as one-religion and one-language which is not illustrative of the culturally, linguistically and religiously diverse society.

When Jinnah, the man who modified 'the map of the world' and is 'credited' to have created Pakistan, laid out in detail the kind of country Pakistan was supposed to be in his speech on 11th August 1947, he did not describe the Pakistan of today.⁵ Pakistan's Legislative body was to be 'sovereign' with 'all the powers'.⁶ Pakistan was to be based on the principles of 'justice and complete impartiality' and 'equality of all citizens' with 'no discrimination based on color, caste or creed'.⁷ However, in the Pakistan of today, 'sovereignty belongs to Allah' with the principles of inequality and discrimination based on religion and culture institutionalised within the constitution.⁸

¹ Establishment includes the bureaucracy and the military, with greater power in the hands of the military.

² Will Kymlicka and Magda Opalski, *Can Liberal Pluralism Be Exported?: Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe* (OUP Oxford, 2002), 82.

³ Michael Edward Brown and Sumit Ganguly, *Fighting Words: Language Policy and Ethnic Relations in Asia* (Mit Press, 2003), 57.

⁴ Stephen Philip Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2004), 201-07. See also Michael DeNotto and Michael DeNotto, "Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations: Ethnic and National Groups around the World," *Reference Reviews* 31, no. 4 (2017): 368.

⁵ Stanley A Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan* (Oxford University Press, USA, 1984).

⁶ G. Allana, "Muhammad Ali Jinnah's First Presidential Address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (August 11, 1947)," University of Karachi, http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_jinnah_assembly_1947.html.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ "The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan," ed. National Assembly of Pakistan (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1973), 1.

This shift that is witnessed in the case of Pakistan, from the kind of state it was supposed to be to the kind of state it became, raises serious questions. What motivated the leadership of a country that was created because of the mobilisation of the marginalised nations in India, to adopt policies of alienating the society? How did the governing elite manage to move away from the democratic and representative ideology of the state and towards an autocratic state based on the idea of theocracy? This policy route has created issues in Pakistan at a subnational level and has resulted in the development of obstacles to forging a cohesive national identity. To address these problems, there is a need to understand why Pakistan took the policy-direction of internal colonialism while other states born out of the decolonisation process have been able to manage diversity and develop a national identity that supersedes ethnic, linguistic or religious identity.

To be able to answer these questions, it is essential to look at the historical development of the state of Pakistan: what led to its creation and how its policies developed after independence. There is also a need to explore the influence of the British Raj, their policies, and the implications of these policies to examine the possible inspiration of the governing elite of Pakistan. To do this effectively and to explain why Pakistan underwent a shift of identity, I have divided my thesis into three main chapters. In Chapter 1, I will assess the religious identity of Pakistan. To evaluate the significance of imposing one religion, I will explore the historical development of religious policy in Pakistan through the Constitutions and laws introduced and implemented during General Zia-ul-Haq's reign. Similarly, in Chapter 2 I will examine the relevance of the Urdu-identity of the linguistically diverse Pakistan through the provisions within the Constitutions. This chapter will also narrate the distinctiveness of other ethnic nations including Sindhi, Pakhtun, Baloch and Punjabi to question the motivations of the state to create a one-language identity of Pakistan. In the last chapter, I will answer the questions raised in Chapters 1 and 2 and look at why Pakistani state adopted the route of enforcing internal colonialism instead of managing the religious and linguistic diversity to establish a cohesive sense of national identity in Pakistan. Chapter 3 will shed light on the divisive boundaries and strong military structure inherited by the colonialists that compelled Pakistan to adopt the colonial legacy which led to the creation of Bangladesh and the rise of internal nationalist movements in Pakistan. Chapter 3 cements the idea that informs other parts of my thesis and gives it a theoretical perspective as I utilise Mill's concept of Representative government and the theory of Internal Colonialism as presented by Blauner and Hechter.

For this thesis, I will limit my discussion to the elements of religion and language as I believe that a state's religious and linguistic policy is the cornerstone of its identity and these elements were exploited by the state and challenged the national identity of Pakistan. At this stage, I will utilise secondary sources as extensive research has been conducted by scholars such as Tariq Rahman, Alyssa Ayres and Stephen P. Cohen. As primary sources, I will study the Constitutions of Pakistan and Acts passed that are relevant to my thesis.

Before I move on to the Chapters of my thesis, it is essential to go over the background of Pakistan and the influence of British Raj on the state politics as the imprints of British policies on religion and language are witnessed in Pakistan.

British Raj

The British came to India and replaced the Mughal Empire. They established the British-Indian bureaucracy, initially to collect 'revenue' and expanded to administer 'law and order, disaster relief and developmental projects'.⁹ Slowly, they gained control of India. They did not adopt a state-religion or a state language for India, but acted as 'tutors' to influence people and 'raise them to liberty'.¹⁰ The British, thus, through training along western lines, established an Empire powerful and influential enough that its remnants can be seen in the post-colonial state of Pakistan.

British Raj & Religion

The religious policies during British Raj were formulated and implemented to facilitate and legitimise colonial rule and to ensure that there were no feelings of revolt. Religion was

⁹ Cohen, 21.

¹⁰ Ibid., 22. See also Peter Van der Veer, *Imperial Encounters: Religion and Modernity in India and Britain* (Princeton University Press, 2001), 158.

exploited to exercise and maintain power of British imperialists, first by attempting to instil Christian values and second by creating a divide between Hindus and Muslims. In 1813, the 'restraints on Christian missionary' work were lifted and the British East India Company allowed the Christian missionary schools to operate in India.¹¹ This was a step to ensure that Indians upheld imperial ideology and so that it is easier to govern the subcontinent. As this meant that the Imperialists were attempting to convert the people of the subcontinent, they became conscious of their 'forms of worship' and 'morally sanctioned models of social behaviour'.¹² This not only aided in defining the standards of religious ideology within the groups, but also defined the out-groups. So, they not only became conscious of 'what it meant to be a Muslim, Hindu or Christian' but also became aware of what it meant not to be a Muslim, Hindu or Christian.¹³ Thus, we see that even as early as in the 1800s, the divisions between the people became apparent as they began defining the opposites.

British policies such as the formal suppression of suttee and religiously humiliating both Muslims and Hindus by introducing cartridges that were covered in beef and pork fat were viewed as interfering with both Hindu and Muslim ideals.¹⁴ Since British had been trying to forcefully convert Indians, this was viewed as a deliberate policy by the British, who had a history of disrespecting the religious values of the people of the subcontinent. Such interference with customs and religion was resented. The meddling of the British in religion inspired the Indians to politically organise themselves and revolt against the British and allow religious freedom.¹⁵

As the policy of converting Indians to Christianity led to the Indian Mutiny, Queen Victoria committed 'to administer its government for the benefit of all subjects' which put an end to

¹¹ Cameron Freeman, "Christianity in British Colonial India and the Crystallization of Modern Hindu Religious Identities," <http://cameronfreeman.com/socio-cultural/anthropology-religion-hindu-tradition/christianity-british-colonial-india-crystallization-modern-hindu-religious-identities/>.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid. See also Barbara Daly Metcalf, "Imagining Community: Polemical Debates in Colonial India," *Religious Controversy in British India: Dialogues in South Asian Languages* (1992): 229-40.

¹⁴ Suttee or Sati is a Hindu custom where a widow sacrificed herself, usually by burning, on the funeral pyre of her husband. It was banned in 1928 by Governor General William Bentinck. See Carl Cavanagh Hodge, *Encyclopedia of the Age of Imperialism, 1800-1914* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008). The new and efficient cartridges created controversy that led to the War of 1857. Cow is considered Holy in Hinduism and Pigs are *haram* (impermissible) in Islam. Some argue that it was lanolin and beeswax but since the British gave the order to tear the cartridges by hand, Indians realised that the British were not denying their claims.

¹⁵ Flora Annie Webster Steel, *India through the Ages: A Popular and Picturesque History of Hindustan* (G. Routledge & sons, limited, 1909). Indians created the *Dharma Sabha* (Society for Religion) as a rebuttal to the British interference in religion. The *Dharma Sabha* allowed Hindus to remain faithful to Hinduism. See also Brian K Pennington, "Constructing Colonial Dharma: A Chronicle of Emergent Hinduism, 1830-1831," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 69, no. 3 (2001): 580-81.

the British policies of trying to convert Indians in 1858.¹⁶ The proclamation stated that the British refused 'alike the Right and the Desire to impose (their) Convictions on any of (their) subjects'.¹⁷ Thus, the British were sensitive to the spirit of Indians and acted upon by allowing freedom of religion. Grants to Christian mission schools were cut despite the opposition of evangelicals like Herbert Edwards who bemoaned the fact that 'heathen customs' were being respected.¹⁸ The policy makers accepted the ground reality and shaped the policies such that the religion of their subjects was respected. Instead of aiming to convert the Indians, British introduced policies such as the separate electorates in the Morley-Minto reforms.¹⁹ In such policies, we see the attempt of British imperialism to create a divide within the society so that Muslims and Hindus do not come together to revolt against the Raj.

During colonial rule, British considered religion to be an important factor in governing India. Religion was used to legitimise British Raj and to make it easier for the colonialists to rule India. First, by converting Indians to Christianity and later, by creating a divide between Hindus and Muslims. The British had realised that by imposing their own religious views, or by not respecting the religions of the subjects, they would create an opposition that would lead to the fall of their Raj. In 1857, after the Battle of Independence, the British had realised that religious values were of utmost importance to the people of India.

British Raj & Language

In addition to religion, the British used language as part of their policy of exercising control of India. Depending on the Governor General, the British policy on language varied from teaching Indians English to allowing them to use their vernacular language. However, both policies on language were aimed at ensuring the continuation of colonial rule. In India, when Hastings was the Governor General, British learnt the Indian vernaculars to control the

¹⁶ Indian Mutiny is also referred to as the Battle or War of Independence 1857. Here, it is referred to as Indian Mutiny since the British view is being presented.

¹⁷ Eugene Wason, "Copies of the Proclamation of the King, Emperor of India, to the Princes and Peoples of India, of the 2nd Day of November 1908, and the Proclamation of the Late Queen Victoria of the 1st Day of November 1858, to the Princes, Chief, and People of India.," ed. The House of Commons (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode Ltd., 1908).

¹⁸ Ibid. Read more in Peter James Marshall, *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 30. See also "The British Empire 1815-1914," <http://www.britishempire.me.uk/britishraj.html>.

¹⁹ As part of the separate electorate policy, Muslims would vote for Muslims and Hindus could only vote for Hindus.

natives more efficiently, and to win the loyalty of both Muslims and Hindus.²⁰ This may be viewed as an integrative policy of the British, however, Indians were spoken to in their own language so that they may never need to learn English. Without English, they could never rise to power positions and hence, the colonialists were able to create a class structure.

The policy recommendations of teaching Indians English to anglicise them were opposed as it was believed that this would strengthen the Indians and would give them ideas of revolting against the British, much like the French Revolution. However, by 1832, the pressure of modernity and upward social and economic mobility encouraged Western education in India and Bengali Hindus initiated attaining education in English. Muslims, who were still anti-British, opposed the learning of English, despite it being a requirement for high paying jobs.²¹ Therefore, English and the unwillingness of Muslims to learn the language created a divide in the society. As Hindus could rise to power with the use of English, Muslims felt that they were being discriminated against.²² Furthermore, in 1837, the British Governor General had passed a resolution replacing Persian, which was the language used for judicial and fiscal proceedings during Muslim rule, with the local languages in India.²³ Therefore, the British officially recognised and strengthened the groups that existed within the society. In 1853, Muslims agitated and were concerned that their identity was being attacked through the British policy of discouraging their indigenous studies.²⁴ Muslims saw the threat to their language as a threat to their identity which shows the symbolic significance of language.²⁵

By recognising the vernacular languages, the British had imposed a policy where the importance of learning English decreased. If Sindhi's could maintain their state in their own language, they did not need to learn English. Hence, even as rulers of Sindh, the Maharaja's remained subordinate to the British imperialists. Therefore, through their policies, the British established the distinct 'imagined communities' that were based on language as a symbol of

²⁰ Tariq Rahman, *Language and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 26-27.

²¹ Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, "Translation of the Report of the Members of the Select Committee for the Better Diffusion and Advancement of Learning among Muhammadans of India," *Malik (ed.)* 1989 (1872): 138-40. See also Rahman, 31.

²² Muslims had been ruling India and were unwilling to learn the language of the rulers who had replaced Mughals. Hindus, who had been ruled by the Mughals, wanted more power for themselves and so, were more open to creating an anglicised Indian elite. Thus, due to language, Muslims felt marginalised, as they had little social and economic power. They became the alienated class within the class structure created by the British.

²³ William Adam, "Third Report on the State of Education in Bengal," (Calcutta: G. H. Huttman, Bengal Military Orphan Press, 1838), 191-92. See also Rahman, 37.

²⁴ , 35.

²⁵ The language of the Muslims here that was being "attacked" by the British was Persian, not Urdu. British promoted Urdu in Punjab since 1849.

perceived identity and began to see themselves as nations.²⁶ In doing so, the colonialists mobilised the nations to revolt against the British and contributed to the Hindi-Urdu conflict and the creation of Pakistan, and later Bangladesh. Linguistic ethnicity provided the basis for political claims for the distinct homelands.²⁷

Going over the British policies of exploiting the elements of religion and language to exercise and maintain the imperial control over India, we cannot ignore that Pakistan inherited these colonial values. 'The tremendous influence of the past generations over the present has given the present generation of a society its particular character'.²⁸ Despite being created after the marginalised nations were mobilised against exploitation by the British and the potential alienation by the Hindus, the post-colonial state of Pakistan had learnt to control through the manipulation of religion and language, which has challenged the sense of nationhood in Pakistan and has led to the rise of subnational movements.

The Idea of Pakistan

Muslims saw British as outsiders that had replaced the Mughal Empire. The loss of Mughal Empire meant that Muslims had lost their representation in India, 'their language, their culture' and their identity.²⁹ With the British in power, 'the political, social and economic structure of India was reordered' and, especially after 1857, it 'gave Muslims little social space and no political power'.³⁰ Hindus, who had only experienced a shift of rulers, from the Mughals to the British, continued adopting the Western ideals and progressing in British India. Where the Muslims reminisced about the glory of the Mughal era and resisted colonial rule. Finally, when the British promoted democratic institutions for India, Muslims were given a minority status in accordance with the population.³¹ Muslims, thus, realised that in a united India, they would never be able to progress socially and politically. Thus, to protect their socio-economic interests, Muslim elites rose against the British and Hindu domination which led to the eventual creation of Pakistan.

²⁶ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983).

²⁷ Mohammad Waseem, "Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan: The Case of Mqm," *The Pakistan Development Review* (1996): 617.

²⁸ Graham Finlay, "John Stuart Mill on the Uses of Diversity," *Utilitas* 14, no. 2 (2002): 193.

²⁹ Akbar S Ahmed, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin* (Psychology Press, 1997), 43.

³⁰ Cohen, 23.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 24.

Religion & Language in Pakistan

Therefore, Pakistan, a haven for the economically, politically and socially marginalised Muslims of India, was not an Islamic state based on the idea of theocracy. It is a common perception that Pakistan was the first country to have been created in the name of religion.³² However, Islam was only attached to the idea of Pakistan by the fundamentalist Islamic political groups under Maududi after 1944 when he ceased to oppose Jinnah and Pakistan.³³ After Pakistan's creation, Jinnah denied the relevance of Pakistan being an Islamic state. For instance, when asked about the Islamic identity of Pakistan in terms of the popular slogan, *Pakistan ka matlab kya, la ilaha il Allah*, he claimed, 'Neither I nor Muslim League Working Committee ever passed a resolution – *Pakistan ka matlab kiya* – you may have used it to catch a few votes'.³⁴ Still, religion is of utmost importance in the Pakistan of today. In the years following Jinnah's death in 1948, the state took up the task of Islamising the non-theocratic and democratic state of Pakistan.

Moreover, the language of the people that were mobilised to gain independence from the British and the Hindus was Bengali, Sindhi, Pashto, Balochi and Urdu.³⁵ Urdu was defended in the Muslim provinces in the subcontinent before partition, but it did not gain significance in the provinces that were included in Pakistan in 1947. People who were demanding independence were a minority in the subcontinent and needed an anchor to hold on to and Urdu became that source of bond. The Urdu speaking community that migrated to Pakistan was only two percent of the population of the country, now known as the Muhajir community that resides mainly in Sindh.³⁶ Since diverse ethnic nations demanded the creation of Pakistan, the adoption of Urdu as the state language attracted opposition. Urdu had gained importance pre-partition as one of the identity markers of Pakistan but since it was to replace the ethnic languages, disagreement was attached to the policy.

³² Alyssa Ayres, *Speaking Like a State: Language and Nationalism in Pakistan* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4.

³³ Muqarrab Akbar, "Pakistan: An Islamic State or a State for Muslims? A Critical Appraisal of Islam's Role in Pakistan," *Pakistan Journal of Islamic Research Vol 15*, <http://www.bzu.edu.pk/PJIR/vol15/eng2.pdf> (2015): 28. Markus Daechsel, "Military Islamisation in Pakistan and the Spectre of Colonial Perceptions,"

Contemporary South Asia 6, no. 2 (1997): 144.

³⁴ The slogan is translated as 'What does Pakistan mean? There is no god but Allah!'. Yasser Latif Hamdani, *Jinnah: Myth and Reality* (Vanguard Books Ltd., 2012), 2.

³⁵ Among other languages including Persian and Hindi.

³⁶ Muhajir are the Urdu-speaking and politically powerful migrants from Uttar Pradesh that composed of two percent of the population of Pakistan in 1947. See also Tristan James Mabry, "In a Divided Pakistan, Not All Are Mourning Bhutto," *The Philadelphia Inquirer* 2007.

In these circumstances, since the identity of Pakistan is argued to come from two sources: religion and language, it is essential to look through history and examine why and how the policies relating to religion and language were amended. Without looking at the development of these policies, the motivations of the state to impose one-religion and one-language on the diverse society in Pakistan cannot be determined. Pakistan is not the only country that has had to deal with diversity in terms of religion and language.

As far as managing religious diversity is concerned, American government based its secular framework on John Locke's deliberation on religion and politics. In USA, it was recognised that in a diverse society the separation of religion from politics was better than imposing a state religion on people who associated with a different religion. 'The Great Awakenings' in late 18th and early 19th century that were 'Protestant Revivalist Movements' led to the creation of various 'sects and denominations' that split the society which made it difficult for the state to associate with one 'kind' of church.³⁷ If the state endorsed one church, that would have been considered the preferred or privileged religious group over others. This matter was dealt with sensitivity and thus, the First Amendment to the Constitution separated religion from state.³⁸ George Washington in 1793 declared that 'every person may here worship God according to the dictates of his own heart. In this enlightened Age and in this land of equal liberty it is our boast that a man's religious tenets will not forfeit the protection of the laws nor deprive him of the right of attaining and holding the highest Offices that are known to the United States'.³⁹

When it comes to management of linguistic diversity, India takes the lead instead of Pakistan. In India, English and Hindi, both, are state languages.⁴⁰ Hindi is representative of all Hindustanis and English serves as an international language. In addition to these two, the people living within the regions of India must learn the language of their state, and if they choose to migrate to another region within India that has a different language, they must learn the new state language. In this manner, the state instilled unity between the different 'cultural zones' within India that identified with different languages.⁴¹

³⁷ Abdullah Saeed, "Secularism, State Neutrality, and Islam," *The Oxford Handbook of Secularism* (2016): 191.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Joy Hakim, *Sourcebook and Index*, vol. 11 (History of US (Paperback), 2007), 93. See also F Forrester Church, *The Separation of Church and State: Writings on a Fundamental Freedom by America's Founders* (Beacon Press, 2004).

⁴⁰ David D Laitin, "Language Policy and Political Strategy in India," *Policy Sciences* 22, no. 3 (1989).

⁴¹ Francis Robinson, *Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces' Muslims, 1860-1923* (Cambridge University Press, 2007). See also Laitin, 422-23.

The case of USA and India raises further questions as to why, if other states have attempted to manage the multiplicity within their borders, Pakistan has failed to incorporate the principles around which it was created. With the diversity managing policies adopted in other states, national identity superseded ethnic, religious or cultural identity. It is necessary to carry out this study as Pakistan has lost a part of its territory, Bangladesh, in the past and has the potential to break-up if the state policies remain unchecked. Even after the secession of Bangladesh, the direction of state policy remained unchanged. Rather, the state adopted an even more aggressive approach to imposing a degree of uniformity in terms of religion and language in the diverse state of Pakistan.

Chapter 1: The Significance of Islam and Religious Policy Development in Pakistan

Pakistan is a religiously diverse state that is not only composed of Muslims and the People of the Book, but also Hindus, Kalasha, Parsis and Sikhs.⁴² Despite this, the new state of Pakistan formed around a predominantly Islamic identity with Islam as the religion of the state.

Pakistan was renamed the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1956 and Islamic principles were institutionalised within the Constitution. According to the Constitution (1956) an Islamic Council was to be made that ensured that all laws within the country were in accordance with the Quran and Sunnah. With the rhetoric of Islam, the state disregarded the diversity of the society. By adopting Islam as state religion, citizens of Pakistan that associated with other faiths were disadvantaged. Their economic, political and social rights were impacted which led to the rise of feelings of resentment towards the state. A state generally guards the interests of its citizens but in Pakistan, citizens were marginalised within their own country.

As Pakistan became an independent state in 1947, there exists a widely held view that Pakistan was a religious state, created for the Muslims and strictly based on Islamic law. However, this is a retrospective ideology, projecting back onto the past to explain what came later. Pakistan adopted a fundamentally religious ideology after Jinnah's death in 1948 who had viewed Pakistan as a state based on the values of 'democracy, equality, fraternity and liberty'.⁴³ Thus the non-theocratic state ideology of Pakistan based on the social values of Islam converted to a state based on purely Islamic ideology. This shift has contributed to the conflictual identities of the state. As I stated in the introduction of the thesis, I want to explore the challenges to nationhood in the post-colonial state of Pakistan and I seek to explain the motivations of the state to adopt the divisive and autocratic policies which have led to the rise of sub-nationalist movements. In this chapter, I am going to look at the shift of ideology and discuss the contradictory interpretations of Pakistan and Jinnah's views regarding the kind of state Pakistan was supposed to be and the type of state it became. Furthermore, I am going to look at the way Pakistan was Islamised and the role religion played to influence the post-colonial leaders of the state to adopt a religious identity. This

⁴² The People of the Book include Christians, Jews and Sabians.

Iftekhar H Malik, *Religious Minorities in Pakistan*, vol. 6 (Minority rights group international London, 2002), 3.

⁴³ Nitin Prasad, *Contemporary Pakistan: Political System, Military and Changing Scenario* (Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2016), 4.

will set the precedence for Chapter 3 in which I will evaluate the motivations of the state to understand why the legacy of Jinnah was appropriated by fundamentalist element and why the state was able to impose a theocratic model.

Ideology of Pakistan

Pakistan has traditionally been viewed as a religious state, created for the Muslims of the subcontinent. Scholars have adopted Instrumentalist views regarding Pakistan and interpret it as a state which came into being when the Muslim elites used the anti-Islam policies of the British to manipulate the Muslims of the sub-continent, and used Islam to establish a separate country.⁴⁴ Others, in accordance with Primordialist understandings of nationalism, suggest that the Muslims persuaded the Muslim elites to protect the Islamic ideology and to defend the Muslim community and culture.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, both view Pakistan as a state of Muslims for Muslims.⁴⁶ Thus, the popular belief has been that Pakistan was created for the Muslims of India so that they could practise their religion peacefully, without Hindus interfering. Anyone who has not familiarised themselves with the history of India believes that Pakistan Movement was a Movement of Islam and led to the creation of the first state based on religion. Contrary to this belief, according to IA Rahman, 'basing the national ideology of Pakistan on the foundations of Islam is a fiction'.⁴⁷

History reveals that Pakistan was not created as an Islamic state. Rather, it was a nationalist movement of diverse Muslim ethnic groups from different regions and social classes who were 'in pursuit of material objectives'.⁴⁸ Pakistan Movement had little to do with Islam, and more to do with the economic aspirations of the diverse ethnic groups, that happened to be Muslims, who wanted representation in the government to protect their rights. The demand for Pakistan, thus, came from the economically threatened group in India. Jinnah's Two

⁴⁴ Paul Brass, "Elite Groups, Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity among the Muslims of South Asia," in *Political Identity in South Asia*, ed. Malcom Yapp David Taylor (London: Curzon Press, 1979), 41.

⁴⁵ Francis Robinson, "Islam and Muslim Separatism," in *Political Identity in South Asia*, ed. Malcom Yapp David Taylor (London: Curzon Press, 1979), 104.

⁴⁶ Brass, 41. See also Robinson, 104.

⁴⁷ Adeel Khan, "Ethnicity, Islam and National Identity in Pakistan," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 22, no. s1 (1999): 176.

⁴⁸ Hamza Alavi, "Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology," in *State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan* (Springer, 1988), 67. See also "Ethnicity, Muslim Society, and the Pakistan Ideology," *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State* (1986).

Nation theory, which is traditionally considered in terms of Hindus and Muslims being two different nations who could not live together peacefully, was actually in terms of the 'weaker Muslim salariat vis-à-vis the dominant high caste Hindu salariat' groups.⁴⁹ Had it been an Islamic movement, to protect and uphold Islamic ideology, the religious groups in India would not have opposed Jinnah or the idea of Pakistan.⁵⁰

Source of Contradictions

Pakistan is often referred to as the first nation-state based on religion.⁵¹ Such importance given to the significance of Islamic identity has created issues for the modern-day state of Pakistan. This confusion, as Cohen argues, stems out of Jinnah's vagueness in expressing why he wanted and needed to create a new state and has put Pakistan in the situation that it is in today.⁵² Jinnah manipulated Muslim sentiments and used the slogan of Islam to politicise the people of the subcontinent which shaped the misconception that Pakistan was an Islamic state created for the Muslims. What is ignored, however, is Jinnah's view of Islam and Muslim identity. For Jinnah, Islamic values and lifestyle was more important than religious obligations. For him, Muslims protected the rights of their neighbours, friends, relatives. For him, Muslims did not discriminate based on colour, caste or creed. He viewed the social values of Islam as values that should be ingrained in all humans. Since Islam instructed that these values were essential, Jinnah found it easier to manipulate the Muslim sentiments and promote an Islamic identity to substantiate his demand for the diverse Muslim ethnic groups that wanted to protect their economic interests. Using the rhetoric of religion, only as a social order, provided the Pakistan Movement the strength to endure the resistance from the British and the Hindus. Thus, he did not create an Islamic homeland where the religion of the state would be Islam, or where five daily prayers would be compulsory, where temples or Churches would be shut down as Islam would be considered the only "appropriate" religion.

⁴⁹ C Christine Fair, *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War* (Oxford University Press, 2014), 67. 'Salariat' is the salary dependent working class of government servants. See also Alavi, "Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology," 70.

⁵⁰ Maulana Mazhar Ali Azhar, leader of Majlis-i-Ahrar referred to Jinnah as 'Kafir-i-Azam' (Greatest Sinner). Maulana Maududi, leader of Jamaat-i-Islami called Pakistan 'a fool's paradise' and a state of 'infidels'. Asghar Ali Engineer, "Pakistan: Religion, Politics and Society," *Economic and Political Weekly* (1996): 2800.

⁵¹ Ayres, 4.

⁵² Cohen, 29.

This was, unfortunately, the interpretation of the leaders of Pakistan following Jinnah, that affected the *Pakistaniat* of the new state.

Musharraf Zaidi states that any country in which people's 'dignity' and ability to practise religion and 'worship reasonably freely' is respected is an Islamic state.⁵³ This is the kind of state Jinnah had created in 1947: Islamic, limited to the social values prescribed in the religion. Zaidi claims that countries like Sweden and Switzerland have accommodated the differences between people and put 'individual human beings and their dignity at a pedestal which is an essential characteristic of an Islamic state'.⁵⁴ Western countries are generally non-Muslim majority states but they respect people's right to follow their own religion and protect their rights, and thus, even as secular states without the slogan of Islam they may in fact be more Islamic than the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Pre-partition, Jinnah described Pakistan as a secular, modern, democratic state but he did not use the term 'secular'. The word 'secular' has negative connotations as to most Muslims, it is synonymous to being 'antireligious'.⁵⁵ Therefore secular policies may be considered blasphemous. Pre-partition, to avoid resistance from Muslims within India who were not economically motivated to create Pakistan and to provide strength to the Pakistan Movement, Jinnah avoided the term 'secular' but claimed that Pakistan was not to become a 'theocratic' state.⁵⁶

To attach further importance to the demand of a new state, Jinnah spent years emphasising the differences between Hindus and Muslims. However, this was done mainly to highlight that Hinduism and Islam are philosophically distinct.⁵⁷ Jinnah viewed Hinduism and Islam 'as social orders more than religion, with distinct philosophies, culture and custom' and believed that if 'a numerical minority and majority continue to live together', it would 'lead to discontent and destruction of such a state'.⁵⁸ This does not mean that Jinnah favoured a state without any non-Muslim minority. He argued, in the same speech, that Hindus were working towards a Hindu-India and were ignoring the demands put forward by the Muslim League.⁵⁹ With their population thrice that of Muslims, and their ignorance of the rights of Muslims throughout the fight against the British meant that Hindus would not allow Muslims

⁵³ *What Is an Islamic State?*, podcast audio, Newshour Extra2017.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Saeed, 195.

⁵⁶ Rainer Grote and Tilmann Röder, *Constitutionalism in Islamic Countries: Between Upheaval and Continuity* (Oxford University Press, 2012), 176.

⁵⁷ Christophe Jaffrelot, "Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation," in *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation*, ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2002), 12.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Prasad, 5-12.

to flourish in Hindu-India. He did so by quoting the letter of a Hindu politician, Lala Rajpat Rai, in which he had expressed views like those of Jinnah. On the other hand, in a Muslim majority state, according to the social values of Islam, the rights of the minorities would be protected. The element of Islam in the creation of Pakistan was limited to social aspects. As, according to the social order of Islam, all living beings should be treated with respect and dignity and their rights should be protected regardless of their 'colour, caste or creed', Pakistan was created to respect the rights of all citizens that decided to become a part of it, and to ensure that everyone had access to authority and representation in the government, regardless of their religion or ethnicity.⁶⁰ To uphold this value, that citizens of Pakistan would be treated as citizens of Pakistan, Jinnah appointed Jogendra Nath Mandal, a Hindu, as the Minister of Labour and Law of Pakistan and Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, an Ahmadi as the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relation in the first cabinet on the basis of merit, regardless of their religious affiliations.⁶¹

Yet, after Jinnah's death in 1948, the leaders of Pakistan forged a religious identity for the new state. Pakistan was renamed the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1956. The 'two nation theory was given a historical foothold by converting it into an ideology of Islam' that became a guideline for Pakistan's development.⁶² Islamic identity became synonymous with an anti-Hindu identity and thus, essential for Pakistan's integrity and survival against Hindu-India. Islam was declared the religion of the state, implying that Pakistan was created based on religion, so that Muslims could practise their religion and follow Islamic principles. It became 'a tool for political expediency in the quest for higher empowerment'.⁶³ Jogendra Nath Mandal resigned in 1950 due to the anti-Hindu sentiments in Pakistan after Jinnah's death.⁶⁴ Anti-Ahmadi riots in 1953 led to the first partial military coup and they were officially declared non-Muslims in 1973.⁶⁵ The misinterpretation of Jinnah's Islamic values by the leaders of Pakistan after his death resulted in the 'hypocritical use of Islam' that 'plunged the country in an ideological wilderness that further widened the divisions and

⁶⁰ Swami Adiswarananda, *Vivekananda, World Teacher: His Teachings on the Spiritual Unity of Humankind* (SkyLight Paths Publishing, 2006), 120.

⁶¹ Ahmadi Muslim Community believes in the teachings of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and consider him to be the promised Messiah of Muslims. Ahmadis were officially declared non-Muslims in 1974, as part of the second amendment to the 1973 Constitution.

The first cabinet was chosen by Jinnah himself, and took its first oath on 15th August 1947.

⁶² Anand K Verma, *Reassessing Pakistan: Role of Two-Nation Theory* (Lancer Publishers, 2001), 14.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Jogendra Nath Mandal to My People, *Uprooted: A Saga of the Hindus of Eastern Bengal*, 1950.

⁶⁵ "The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan," 155.

ruptures in the polity of an already confused nation'.⁶⁶ What motivated the state officials to let go of Jinnah's non-theocratic Pakistan and develop a strict religious identity of the new state after his death? And, how did it impact the sense of national unity in Pakistan? Before these questions are answered, it would be fair to look at how the religious policy was developed in Pakistan and gradually moved further away from the ideology of a non-theocratic state of Jinnah after 1948.

Religious Policy Development in Pakistan

The demand for Pakistan came from an economically threatened section of Muslims that occupied a part of India. 'Pakistani nationalism would argue that both British and Hindu domination had kept Indian Muslims a backward community and denied them avenues to economic, political and cultural uplifting and well-being'.⁶⁷ The Jamaat-i-Islami distanced itself from Jinnah's Pakistan Movement as it did not support a non-theocratic dream.⁶⁸ Jinnah's two nation theory, which suggested Hindus and Muslims were two distinct nations and could not live together peacefully, did not have religious overtones.⁶⁹ It proposed that if Hindus and Muslims continued to live together, Muslims would not be able to advance economically and politically as Hindus were in a numerical majority and would dominate the Muslims once the British left India.

Yet, after Jinnah's death in 1948, Pakistan came to be governed by a series of dictatorial regimes that considered religion to be a matter of the state. The adoption of Islam as the religion of the state led to people distancing themselves from the Pakistani identity. If Pakistani identity was synonymous with Islamic identity, non-Muslims could not relate with the Pakistani identity. In the attempt to create a homogenised and uniform state, the state of Pakistan facilitated the creation of boundaries within the people of Pakistan. This policy led to people defining not only who they were, but also what they were not. To construct

⁶⁶ Khan, 177.

⁶⁷ Daechsel, 149.

⁶⁸ Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) is a social conservative and Islamist political party.

⁶⁹ Hindus and Muslims are adherents of two different faiths but the Two-Nation theory referred to the notion that Hindus and Muslims were philosophically distinct and had different social customs and traditions. For instance, as Hindus believed in the caste system and hierarchical organisation of the society, Muslims would not be able to flourish in United India.

themselves, they had to construct the opposite.⁷⁰ This was in line with the effect of the work of Christian missionaries in India during British Raj, as outlined in the Introduction.⁷¹ One would think that the demand of freedom from oppression would create a state where the laws were different from that of the preceding state but this was not true in the case of Pakistan.

Objectives Resolution 1949

The shift towards a theocratic state of Pakistan began in 1949 when the Objectives Resolution was adopted as the foundation of constitutional developments in Pakistan.⁷² It was the first constitutional document of Pakistan and called for the merging of religion with politics. The non-Muslims, as well as those who understood that the Pakistan Movement was not an Islamic Movement, did not support the document and demanded amendments. Despite resistance from the non-Muslim members of the constituent assembly who feared that by merging state politics with religion, extremism would rise and Pakistan may become a theocratic state, the Objectives Resolution was included in the preamble of the first and second constitution of Pakistan (1956 and 1962) and a part of the final constitution (1973). From laying the groundwork, to being a part of the preamble and finally an article of the constitution, the Objectives Resolution alone shows the gradual yet aggressive inclusion of Islam by the state, despite opposition.

Constitution of Pakistan 1956 & 1962

The 1956 constitution of Pakistan viewed Pakistan as a state based on the 'Islamic principles of social justice' but it was a step towards the Islamisation of Pakistan.⁷³ The constitution, in Article 18, allowed citizens to have 'freedom to profess religion and manage religious

⁷⁰ Freeman. See also Metcalf, 235-39.

⁷¹ Freeman.

⁷² The Objectives Resolution was first presented in the Parliament in 1949. It stated the sovereignty belonged to Allah who, in turn, had given authority to the state of Pakistan. Thus, the state can only operate according to the limits prescribed in the Quran and Pakistan would be governed according to the principles of Islam. The majority voted against the document and the amendments proposed by the minority members were rejected and the Resolution was adopted.

⁷³ "The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1956)," ed. The Department Of Advertising Films And Publications Government Of Pakistan (1956), 2.

institutions and (b) every religious denomination and every sect (had) the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions'.⁷⁴ In Article 13, participation in religious ceremonies or to receive religious instruction other than in your own religion, or denomination, was not required.⁷⁵ Moreover, the constitution allowed alcohol consumption for non-Muslims.⁷⁶ While the constitution recognized the non-Muslims and the denominations within Islam, it called for the creation of an Islamic Council that would ensure that all laws in Pakistan were in conjunction with the teachings of Quran and Sunnah without impacting the personal laws of non-Muslims.⁷⁷ As all laws were to be according to the Quran and Sunnah, the limit advocated by Jinnah, of promoting the adoption of social values of Islam, was extended and every citizen of Pakistan, regardless of their religion had to follow the teachings of Quran and Sunnah. As far as Muslim sects within Pakistan were concerned, the teachings of the Quran and Sunnah were to be in accordance with the interpretation by each sect.⁷⁸ But, what about the non-Muslims? Why was Islam being thrust upon them? Moreover, the President of Pakistan had to be a Muslim.⁷⁹ This article was discriminatory towards the non-Muslims and was inconsistent with Jinnah's Pakistan who chose a Hindu on merit in the first cabinet in 1947.

The constitution was abrogated and never implemented. The issue of 'powerful bureaucratic military framework' took its toll, which is common in post-colonial states that inherit the 'overdeveloped apparatus' and 'institutionalised practices' of the colonial state.⁸⁰ In 1962, a new Constitution was formulated under military leader Ayub Khan. In this, the 'Objectives Resolution' remained a part of the preamble of the Constitution. While the Islamic Principles in the 1956 Constitution recognised the rights of non-Muslims and Muslims of different sects, the 1962 constitution only referred to the Quran and Sunnah. This raised the question of which interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah was to be followed. Both Constitutions had Islamic provisions that favoured Muslims and marginalised non-Muslims but the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan was a step further in terms of alienating the citizens of Pakistan as it

⁷⁴ Ibid., 14.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 11.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 19.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 143-44.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 145.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 21.

⁸⁰ Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies Pakistan and Bangladesh," *New Left Review*, no. 74 (1972).

not only ignored the rights of the non-Muslims but also of the sects and denominations within Islam.

Constitution of Pakistan 1973

In the final Constitution of Pakistan, Islam was declared the state religion and the Objectives Resolution was made a part of the constitution under Article 2(A).⁸¹ In Article 31 (2-a) teaching of the Quran and Islamiat was made compulsory, with no mention of how non-Muslims are going to be treated according to this law.⁸² How were they going to read the Quran? What sectarian view of Islamiat is going to be taught in schools? Moreover, the Islamic Council was to be established, as in the first constitution.⁸³ There were no provisions, however, as to how this was to effect non-Muslims and different sects within Islam. In this manner, the constitution ignored that the society was composed of different ethnic nations that had varying religious views. It failed to recognise all citizens of Pakistan, instilling in them a feeling of no representation. It became a Muslim country, only for the Muslims. In Article 227, all laws were to be according to Quran and Sunnah. This article was only amended in 1980 to add an explanation that Quran and Sunnah would be interpreted according to the Muslim sect's interpretation.⁸⁴ The Constitution was based on the idea that Islamic ideology is the basis of the creation of Pakistan. Hence, the constitution was heavily influenced with strict Islamic principles.

Pakistan under Zia-ul-Haq 1978-1988

When mentioning the Islamisation of Pakistan, the regime of General Zia-ul-Haq cannot be ignored. Zia belonged to the Jamaat-i-Islami, a fundamentalist Islamic group. When he came into power he suspended the constitution with the intention of making Pakistan an Islamic society. According to Zia, Pakistan was not Islamic enough. He believed Pakistan was 'achieved in the name of Islam and so Islam alone could provide basis to run the

⁸¹ "The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan," 173-74.

⁸² Islamiat is Islamic religious studies. Ibid., 17.

⁸³ Ibid., 130-32.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 130.

government'.⁸⁵ His process of Islamisation contained laws such as learning of Arabic, covering of the head by women, blasphemy law, removal of un-Islamic material from textbooks, compulsory deduction of Zakaat and so on.⁸⁶ The laws introduced by Zia led to the country experiencing the worst form of religious bigotry. Zia's Ordinance for the sanctity of Ramzan meant that eating and drinking in public during the month of Ramzan could lead to imprisonment. This ordinance did not only take away the rights of religious minorities in Pakistan, but also the rights of Muslims who may not be fasting.⁸⁷ The fasting times of Shias and Sunnis are different and the ordinance did not take sectarian differences into account. If it was following Sunni timings, the Shias could have felt unrepresented as the state did not consider *their* "emotions" enough to restrict others to eat or drink. Moreover, this law did not only restrict Muslims but also non-Muslims.⁸⁸ Such policies were introduced and implemented to 'serve the country' but instead led to the division of the society.⁸⁹

These developments in the constitutions of Pakistan, as well as laws introduced by the governing authorities depict the shift from the non-theocratic state idea of Jinnah to a state based on Islamic fundamentalism. Since Islamic Council was given constitutional recognition and authority, the Maulvis within Pakistan were also given a degree of power.⁹⁰ With Maulvis working towards creating an Islamic society to facilitate the Muslims, it was impossible to move toward the non-theocratic Pakistan of Jinnah. In these circumstances, it was inappropriate to apply the Lockean concept of separation of church and state and religious freedom to Pakistan. The laws introduced in Pakistan show the different faces of political Islam, not the social and cultural Islam that was attached to the demand for Pakistan to strengthen the Pakistan Movement. The 'hypocritical use of Islam' by the leaders of Pakistan created a divide within the society and the people of Pakistan associated themselves with their religious identity instead of the Pakistani identity as religious identity superseded state identity.⁹¹ With the state siding with Islam, it officially declared that it was not representative of other religions. Islam became the officially preferred religion of the state. Rather than using its resources to build a sense of national cohesiveness in a new state, the

⁸⁵ Akbar, 31.

⁸⁶ The Blasphemy Law in Pakistan prohibits blasphemy, with legal consequences ranging from a fine to death, depending on the severity of the "crime". Zakaat is alms-giving or tax on your wealth.

⁸⁷ Quran allows Muslims to forego a fast in certain circumstances, i.e., illness, if travelling to a different time zone,...

⁸⁸ Non-Muslims are not instructed to observe fasts according to Islam.

⁸⁹ Akbar, 31.

⁹⁰ Maulvis are Muslim religious scholars.

⁹¹ Khan, 177.

state of Pakistan created further divisions in the society based on religion. They misunderstood that Islam was the uniting and driving force in the creation of Pakistan. It did provide strength to the Pakistan Movement but it was not the strict Islamic principles that united the people who moved to (or stayed in) Pakistan, rather the social and cultural aspect of Islam that united everyone regardless of their colour, caste or creed.

This discussion raises the question as to why the state of Pakistan did not manage the religious diversity within the society and imposed one religion on the state. Other states such as USA have managed religious diversity by prioritising national identity over religious identity. This has aided in the ‘nation building project’ of religiously diverse states.⁹² What, then, influenced the officials to impose a degree of uniformity in a religiously diverse state of Pakistan? This can be attributed to the colonial heritage of Pakistan. The leaders of Pakistan were familiar with imperialist policies and so, adopted the route of internal colonialism. The exploitative methods of the British to control the people and maximise and retain power influenced the Pakistani state to manipulate religion and discourage the growth of democratic institutions. These ideas will be explored in Chapter 3 of the thesis.

Conclusion

The foundations of Pakistan as a neutral, modern democratic state were ignored by the officials that governed the state and Pakistan was forged a religious identity soon after its birth. Jinnah created Pakistan as a non-theocratic state influenced by the social values of Islam but we witnessed a shift in ideology after Jinnah’s death as the state officials adopted strict Islamic principles. Constitutional recognition to the Islamic Council in each constitution showed that the leaders of Pakistan were unwilling to let go of the religious identity of the state and making Pakistan a truly Islamic state. The inspiration behind emphasising a religious identity of Pakistan had little to do with the leaders being ‘good Muslims’. They were influenced by the policies of their colonial masters and wanted to exercise power, which will be explored further in Chapter 3 of the thesis. By giving importance to religion and religious values, the state had to forego forging a sense of national identity in the citizens of Pakistan. Since there was a dearth of religious freedom, tolerance amongst citizens was at a

⁹² Saeed, 192.

minimum. A neutral state may have been able to instill *Pakistaniat* but the colonial legacy of Pakistan influenced leaders to exploit religion for their own benefit.⁹³ Pakistan not only lacked neutrality in terms of religion but also in terms of language as the state chose to impose one language on the linguistically diverse state without assessing the impact of such a policy on ethnic nationalism. Language, too, became an element of internal colonialism which will be discussed in the following chapters.

⁹³ Ibid., 196.

Chapter 2: The Significance of Urdu and Language Policy Development in Pakistan

Pakistan is an ethnically and linguistically diverse state. Punjabi, Sindhi, Kashmiri, Chitrali, Potohari, Siraiki are only some of the sixty-five indigenous languages that are spoken in Pakistan.⁹⁴ Despite this, the state chose Urdu to be the national language of Pakistan. By becoming a single language state, Pakistan disregarded the linguistic and ethnic diversity of the nations within the country. The regions that made up Pakistan were forced to give up their linguistic identity and adopt a Pakistani identity as their existing identity was considered anti-Pakistan. The citizens that identified with languages other than Urdu felt disadvantaged. Much like the one-religion policy of the state, the one-language policy of Pakistan led to resentment within the citizens as it impacted their economic, social and political rights. People who were fluent in other languages were marginalised at the hands of the state as Urdu-speaking were given a privilege.

When it comes to literature on language and nationalism, two theoretical principles, Primordialism and Instrumentalism, have been dominant. The primordialist view is obsolete as with globalisation, the nature of the language community cannot be fixed overtime.⁹⁵ However, in the case of Pakistan, cultural and national forms were constructed by attaching relevance to Urdu, as a policy of 'state-instituted primordialism'.⁹⁶ The state elites presented the attachment to Urdu as age-old and constructed it as a symbol for psychological, social and economic aspirations, in an attempt give to it a primordial identity.⁹⁷ Urdu and its script, thus became an important aspect of the political struggle as a type of constructed primordialism. Instrumentalists argue that the state elites manipulate symbols, such as language and religion, to gain political strength and to consolidate power. For this exploitation to work, significant importance was attached to Urdu before partition, to satisfy the nationalist aspirations of the 'economically threatened Muslim salariat vis a vis Hindu salariat' and to gratify the instrumentalist aspirations of the ruling elite.⁹⁸ It should be noted that the instrumentalist

⁹⁴ M Paul Lewis and F Gary, "Simons, and Charles D. Fennig (Eds.). 2013. *Ethnologue: Languages of the World*, Dallas, Texas: Sil International," *Online version: <http://www.ethnologue.com>* (2013).

⁹⁵ Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution. In-Geertz, C.(Ed.) *Old Societies and New States*," (New York: Free Press, 1963).

⁹⁶ Ayres, 11.

⁹⁷ Ronald Grigor Suny, "Constructing Primordialism: Old Histories for New Nations," *The Journal of Modern History* 73, no. 4 (2001).

⁹⁸ Alavi, "Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology," 70.

view is not incompatible with constructed primordialism as language was used as an instrument of perpetuation of power. This idea will be explored in the next chapter. Independence could only be achieved by establishing symbolic unity and an anti-Hindu identity but, after independence in 1947, the significance attached to Urdu carried little weight.⁹⁹

In the case of Pakistan, little attention has been given to the development of language policy. The state elites assumed that the relevance of Urdu pre-partition continued post-partition and so, Urdu was supreme and could replace the ethnic identity of the citizens of Pakistan. Since ethnic nationalism increases if elements of identity such as language are threatened, the policy actions of the state of Pakistan raises questions such as why did the state not adopt an alternate route to manage the multilingualism within the state. Before this question is answered in Chapter 3, we need to first look at the background of the nations that made up Pakistan. In this chapter, I will examine the nations that became a part of Pakistan and had enjoyed relative autonomy under the British to determine the shift in significance attached to Urdu and its relevance pre- and post-partition. I will also look at how the language policy developed in Pakistan to substantiate how language was used by the state and challenged the national identity of Pakistan, before I can move on to analyse the aspirations of the post-colonial leaders in making Pakistan a one-language state in Chapter 3.

Pakistan, Nations & Language

While the official stance of the state is that Pakistan is a nation-state with one nation bonded on the basis of Urdu and Islam, ethno-nationalists such as Gankovsky argue that Pakistan is a state that has four major nationalities: Punjabi, Pakhtun, Baloch and Sindhi, with distinct culture and language.¹⁰⁰ What is consistent in both arguments, of the state and of Gankovsky, is the importance given to language. It is a symbol of perceived identity and its use is considered ‘paramount in the creation of modern nations’.¹⁰¹ For Anderson, language is an element in national imaginings and so, common languages were key elements for defining nations.¹⁰² For Smith, linguistic boundary and sharing of a vernacular language acted as an

⁹⁹ Suny.

¹⁰⁰ Siraiki was added to this list in 1960’s.

¹⁰¹ Anderson, 44.

¹⁰² Ibid.

ethnic core and provided a base for modern nationalism.¹⁰³ Also, national culture is substantiated by a national language, that is not representative of one part of the community, but the language should be such that everyone identifies with it.¹⁰⁴

Before I look at the significance of Urdu pre- and post-partition, and the development of language policy in Pakistan, it is essential to first explore the nations that became a part of Pakistan. During British rule, these nations were given the right to maintain their identity by respecting and recognising their vernacular languages. This was an attempt to facilitate and legitimise colonial rule. After the creation of Pakistan, taking away that right was unacceptable to these nations. They were already mobilised against the British and wanted to rid themselves of any type of domination.

Sindhi

Sindhi enjoyed regional hegemony throughout British rule, so they had already tasted power. In 1936, the Sindhi Language Movement led to the separation of Sindh from Bombay Presidency and, thus, it became administratively independent.¹⁰⁵ Clearly, Sindhi literature was extensive and their linguistic identity had enough force to drive political aims even during British Raj. After partition, the demographics of Sindh changed most drastically as more than sixty percent Hindus from Sindh fled to India and the Muhajir community from Uttar Pradesh migrated to Karachi with 57.55 percent of the population of Karachi being that of Muhajir in 1951.¹⁰⁶ In addition to this, when Urdu became the national language and officially replaced the Sindhi language, Sindhis found themselves at a disadvantage compared to the Muhajirs. Urdu was the mother tongue of Muhajirs and Sindhis had to learn the language of the immigrants if they wanted administrative powers. Sindhi was given a subservient status compared to Urdu as the Muhajir did not have any reason to learn Sindhi, but the latter had to adopt the language of the former for basic employment. In the case of Sindh, we witness that the economic and political subjugation of Sindhis and cultural insensitivity at the hands of the state generated Sindhi ethnic mobilization.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ P Eisenlohr, "Linguistic Ethnonationalism," (2006): 187. See also Anthony D Smith, "The Origins of Nations," *Ethnic and racial studies* 12, no. 3 (1989): 340-67.

¹⁰⁴ Eisenlohr, 187. See also Smith, 340-67.

¹⁰⁵ Brown and Ganguly, 63. See also Ayres, 49.

¹⁰⁶ , 50.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 48-55.

Pakhtun

During British Raj, a portion of KPK was a part of Punjab.¹⁰⁸ In 1929, Pashto became the identity marker of the anti-British and anti-government movement launched by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan.¹⁰⁹ Khan understood the significance of language and its relationship with nation formation and so, promoted Pashto to support the irredentist claims. It was only in 1932 that KPK (NWFP at the time) became a separate province. In 1938, Pashto was promoted to be the medium of instruction in Pashto speaking areas, and it was taught in schools as an additional subject. Even as late as in June 1947, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was advocating the creation of Pakhtunistan, a land for the Pakhtun nation where their ethnic identity would be protected. NWFP only became a part of Pakistan on the premise that Pakistan would be a loose confederation.¹¹⁰ Thus, history reveals that the Pakhtun wanted recognition of their ethnic distinction as well as administrative powers. The Pakistani government officials ignored the desires of Pakhtun citizens and adopted dictatorial policies to the extent that all matters related to the development of Pashto were monitored by the police.¹¹¹ Naturally, the Pakhtun, especially supporters of Ghaffar Khan and his son Wali Khan gave primacy to their Pakhtun identity over Pakistani or Muslim identity.¹¹² With the state replacing the existing identity of the Pakhtun, the nation started retaliating against the identity being imposed on them.

Baloch

The Baloch advocated autonomy and independence even during the British Raj. They viewed the British East India Company as rulers that used force to establish rule and exploited the differences between people of the sub-continent to validate their authority. The Baloch resistance against the British was unorganized and ‘sporadic but persistent’.¹¹³ They resisted

¹⁰⁸ The Durand Line separates the Pakhtun in Afghanistan from the Pakhtun in Pakistan. The Pakhtun nation lives in the KPK province, formerly known as NWFP.

¹⁰⁹ The anti-British, anti-government and pro-Congress Movement was launched by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan in 1929. It was called the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement. They were the supporters of Afghan irredentist claims: the demand for Pakhtunistan. Abdul Ghaffar Khan and KB Narang, *My Life and Struggle: Autobiography of Badshah Khan* (Hind Pocket Books, 1969), 96.

¹¹⁰ Tariq Rahman, "The Pashto Language and Identity-Formation in Pakistan," *Contemporary South Asia* 4, no. 2 (1995): 11.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 161.

¹¹² Ibid., 164.

¹¹³ Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur, "Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin, Rise and Future," (2016), <https://www.thebnm.org/single-post/2016/10/08/Baloch-Nationalism-its-origin-rise-and-future>.

British domination militarily, by fighting battles, and politically, by launching movements demanding an independent Balochistan. Despite restrictions placed by the British, the Baloch political struggles did not diminish. Even Jinnah, as a lawyer, represented the Baloch efforts for independence at legal forums. The strength and determination of the Baloch was commendable. This led to the 'Standstill Agreement' signed between Pakistan, Britain and Balochistan that recognised the sovereign status of Balochistan.¹¹⁴ Thus, Balochistan was declared independent on 11th August 1947, three days before Pakistan became an independent state, with no intention to accede. The Baloch upheld their cultural disposition and made Balochi their national language. Their independence was based on their ethnic distinctiveness. The Baloch were never a part of the British Empire, nor India, and had no intention to merge with Pakistan, except having friendly relations with it as a neighbouring state. However, in March 1948, a fraudulent and forced accession merged Baloch state with Pakistan and marked the end of three hundred years of independent and semi-independent Baloch state.¹¹⁵ This day is still observed as 'Black Day', and remembered as an 'unnecessary tragedy' that marked the downfall of Baloch culture and history. It is evident that nationalism in the Baloch tribal setup existed since before partition as they worshipped independence and autonomy. In these circumstances, the centralised state system of Pakistan aggravated the emotions of the Baloch who launched a guerrilla war against the state.¹¹⁶ For the Baloch, Pakistani state had replaced the British domination while they sought independence.

Punjabi

Punjabi nationalism is a consequence of a potential identity crisis and a 'cry for recognition'.¹¹⁷ Punjabi Language Movement is incomprehensible to some as Punjab is considered the dominant province, which promoted Urdu as part of the one-language policy.¹¹⁸ Sindhi, Pashto and Baloch language movement rose against the dominant Punjabi elite that vested power in their own hands. As part of the British policy, Punjabis had been learning Urdu since 1849. The colonial policy of granting Urdu a special status continued

¹¹⁴ Naseer Dashti, *The Baloch and Balochistan: A Historical Account from the Beginning to the Fall of the Baloch State* (Trafford Publishing, 2012), 329-31.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 333-40.

¹¹⁶ Adeel Khan, "Baloch Ethnic Nationalism in Pakistan: From Guerrilla War to Nowhere?," *Asian ethnicity* 4, no. 2 (2003): 281.

¹¹⁷ Pierre Bourdieu and John B Thompson, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Harvard University Press, 1991).

See also Ayres, 69.

¹¹⁸ Rahman, 191.

post-partition. In this manner, the Punjabi elite managed to develop constraints for other nations. Other regions such as Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP used and promoted their regional languages during British rule and so, were marginalised at the hands of Punjabis who chose Urdu as the national language of the state.

This shows that the nations that made up Pakistan were relatively autonomous during the colonial rule. They had risen against the British and the potential domination by the Hindus. However, in Pakistan, they were alienated and marginalized by the elite that controlled the country. As Urdu was given a national language status, their language was left unrecognized, they were denied the right to power, access to better employment and other social and political opportunities in their own state. This domination and policy of internal colonialism was institutionalized within the constitution as the language policy of Pakistan developed. Before I move onto the development of language policy in Pakistan, it is only fair to examine how the significance attached to Urdu underwent a shift in Pakistan.

Shift in attachment to Urdu

Pakistani identity came from two sources: religion and language. So, Islam and Urdu became symbolic representatives of Pakistan. Prior to the creation of Pakistan Urdu was considered a symbol of Pakistan's legitimacy with a 'national cultural heritage'.¹¹⁹ Urdu facilitated Muslims as it allowed them 'access to domains of authority'.¹²⁰ With Urdu, Muslim elites 'could maintain their cultural elitism'.¹²¹ It was a symbol of 'psychological, social and economic aspirations'.¹²² For the non-Urdu speaking elite, Urdu served instrumentalist aspirations. 'After Islam, it was the only identity marker which could transcend ethnic and local loyalties' and unite people as one nation.¹²³ As its script is similar to Arabic, it was linked to Islam and considered a representative of the Pakistani identity. In addition to this, its script was different from that of Hindi and so it also substantiated the anti-Hindu identity of Pakistan.

¹¹⁹ *Language, Ideology and Power: Language-Learning among the Muslims of Pakistan and North India* (Orient Longman Private Limited, 2008), 262-87. See also Ayres, 68.

¹²⁰ Rahman, 77.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid., 77-78.

Soon after independence Jinnah declared Urdu to be the national language of Pakistan. He stated in Dacca that ‘the State language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language. Anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan. Without one State language, no nation can remain tied solidly together and function.’¹²⁴ A Gujrati delivered a speech in English in a land of Bengalis promoting Urdu. In saying so, Jinnah misjudged that Pakistan was not a nation-state but a state composed of two wings with different ethnic-nations, that had distinct languages, living within its borders. These nations, to ‘remain tied solidly and function’ had to have their own language respected and recognised, as it was recognised pre-partition. East-Pakistan had its love for Bengali, Sindh considered Sindhi as a source of pride, Baloch and Pakhtun associated with Balochi and Pashto respectively, and Punjab with Punjabi. Even before partition, these nations did not only identify with Urdu but also with their own ethnic languages. In 1943, the annual gathering in Karachi noted the cultural diversity of the regions where presentations were made in Urdu as well as in Sindhi and Pashto poetry demanding the creation of Pakistan.¹²⁵ The nations that became a part of Pakistan supported the creation of Pakistan where they would be able to maintain their ethnic and linguistic identity.

After Pakistan became independent, the state assumed that unless a uniform linguistic policy was implemented, ethnic conflict would rise which would weaken the new, artificially created state. What the state did not comprehend was that if a language is threatened, it would lead to linguistic ethno-nationalism.¹²⁶ By imposing a language, the state restricted social mobility and created linguistic barriers in state institutions, as DeVotta analysed for Sri Lanka.¹²⁷ DeVotta argued that the Sinhalese linguistic nationalism and the ethnocracy that followed led to the Tamil mobilisation and ethnic conflict for a separate state. This aspect, or policy outcome, was overlooked by the state of Pakistan.

After partition, even though the territory of Pakistan was composed of different regions that had their own developed and civilized language, Pakistan officially became a ‘one language state’ on the premise that language legitimises national culture and Urdu reinforced and

¹²⁴ M.A. Jinnah and W. Ahmad, *The Nation's Voice: Launching the State and the End of the Journey*, vol. VII (Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 2003).

¹²⁵ Ayres, 27.

¹²⁶ David D.Laitin, "Language Conflict and Violence: The Straw That Strengthens the Camel's Back," in *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War*, ed. Daniel Druckman and Paul C. Stern (Washington D.C.: National Academies Press, 2000).

¹²⁷ Neil DeVotta, *Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka* (Stanford University Press, 2004).

strengthened Pakistan's Islamic (or, anti-Hindu) identity. The state of Pakistan was unwilling to accept any identity other than the Pakistani identity. As far as language is concerned, if it was not Urdu, it was not Pakistani and, moreover, could have remnants of the Hindu identity which was intolerable. According to the state, Bengali was similar to the Hindi script and the other languages were just not Urdu or, synonymously, Pakistani enough to be promoted.¹²⁸ This was enough for the state to disregard the value of the ethnic identity of the citizens of Pakistan. The different nations in Pakistan including, Sindhi, Balochi, Pashto and Punjabi speaking communities had Urdu, that is representative of less than eight percent of the population, as their national language.¹²⁹

Since Pakistan was a demand of the economically threatened 'Muslim salariat' in relation to the 'Hindu salariat', the policy of imposing a "foreign" language on nations that had relished recognition of their cultural and linguistic, hence ethnic, identity during the colonial period did not make sense. Indians had raised their voice against domination to create Pakistan but in the new state, power was exercised on the citizens in a manner that marginalized the nations. The regions that had acquired autonomy during the colonial period, including Sindh, N.W.F.P (now KPK) and Balochistan were stripped off of their powers in the new state, not by the Hindus, but by Muslim leaders who were familiar with the social values of Islam.¹³⁰ The regions that were relatively independent under the British had demanded a separate state to avoid domination by the 'philosophically opposite' and numerically stronger Hindus who would not have allowed the economically threatened Muslims to acquire power in political and social avenues within India. However, by forcing the regions in Pakistan to give up their linguistic identity and to adopt a Pakistani identity as their existing identity was considered anti-Pakistan, the post-colonial leaders acted in the dominating and alienating manner that the nations had risen against. These nations experienced a shift, from being able to control to being controlled. The imposition of one language, and the inability to identify with one's own language created a clash, that damaged the sense of national cohesiveness in Pakistan.

¹²⁸ Ayres, 55.

¹²⁹ Tariq Rahman, "Language Policy, Multilingualism and Language Vitality in Pakistan," *Trends in linguistics studies and monographs* 175 (2006): 73.

¹³⁰ This shift has been discussed under 'Pakistan, Nations & Language'. Laws such as the West Pakistan Act 1955 institutionalised the stripping of powers of these nations.

Pakistan's Language Policy Development

West Pakistan Act 1955 & Constitution of Pakistan 1956

Until 1956, neither Urdu nor Bengali, or any other regional languages received constitutional recognition. The first official blow to the regions within the Pakistan of today was the West Pakistan Act 1955. This Act stripped the ethnic regions of their identity, or even existence, as Pakistan was divided into two regions: West-Pakistan as One-Unit and East-Pakistan.¹³¹ There could not be a Punjabi, Sindhi, Baloch, Pakhtun; only East-Pakistani and West-Pakistani. A year later, the Article 214 of the first constitution of Pakistan (1956) declared both Urdu and Bengali as the state languages of Pakistan, with English to be used for official purposes for a period of twenty years till it was phased out.¹³² Furthermore, although the constitution stated in Article 19 that citizens having a 'distinct language and culture shall have the right to preserve' it, these distinct citizens were left unnamed.¹³³ This policy was directed at making Pakistan a bilingual state as protests had already been registered against the one language policy of the state by Bengali students, who were the majority ethnic nation in Pakistan. This (bilingual state) policy was not like the Canadian Policy as outlined in the Official Languages Act 1969.¹³⁴ In Canada, both English and French became official languages and so, documents were produced in both languages, for people fluent in English or French. In Pakistan, Urdu and Bengali became national languages. Majority of the East-Pakistanis were not familiar with Urdu and West-Pakistanis had never learnt Bengali. The state did not have enough resources to ensure that all citizens were well versed in both languages. Or, what was to be the common language between both provinces? With this constitution, the ethnic nations that existed in Pakistan were stripped off of their identity. Sindhi had enjoyed regional hegemony during the British era and had separated from the Bombay Presidency through national consciousness organized on the basis of language which shows that the regions that made up Pakistan had achieved and experienced autonomy and

¹³¹ "The Establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955," ed. Constitutional Assembly of Pakistan (Gazette, Extraordinary, 1955).

¹³² "The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1956)," 152.

¹³³ Ibid., 14.

¹³⁴ Paul Laurendeau, "Official Languages Act 1969," in *The Canadian Encyclopedia* (Historica Foundation, 2006).

had the desire to become independent to remain powerful.¹³⁵ Yet, they were denied recognition in the constitution.

Constitution of Pakistan 1962 & 1973

Although the first constitution was abrogated in 1958 and was not implemented, the policy on language remained unchanged in the new Constitution (1962). The language issue was disregarded and thus, the state ignored the ethnic nations. Such actions direct, or feed, secessionist tendencies. The nations within West-Pakistan were denied the right to grant administrative status to their ethnic languages. Their voices were suppressed through the argument that their linguistic identity was anti-Pakistan. After the break-up of Pakistan in 1971, the new Constitution (1973) recognized Urdu as the national language with English to be used for a period of fifteen years till it was phased out. Moreover, the provincial assemblies could teach and promote the provincial languages in addition to the national language.¹³⁶ With this article, it was the first time in twenty-six years that the ethnic regions, though they remained unnamed, were free to endorse their provincial language in addition to Urdu. However, it should also be noted that by this time, there was a lack of availability of suitable reading material in regional languages which posed difficulty for a multilingual society, as was identified in the 1992 Education Policy.¹³⁷

For the state of Pakistan, Urdu served the purpose of creating a unified Pakistani identity. It also served the political purpose of resisting any ethnicity that could break away the federation.¹³⁸ However the linguistic policy development in Pakistan shows that the sense of cultural distinctiveness within nations arose because of the policy decisions made by the government that promoted uniformity. Pakistan is not the only state that has had to deal with linguistic diversity. Other states have effectively managed multilingualism and used it to develop a coherent national identity. Pakistan, however, chose to adopt a different policy option, that of a unilingual state, and met with the problems that were overcome in states where national language was above ethnic identity. What interests us here is why Pakistani

¹³⁵ Tariq Rahman, "Language and Ethnicity in Pakistan," *Asian Survey* 37, no. 9 (1997): 836-37. See also Ayres, 49-50.

¹³⁶ "The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan," 148, Article 251 (3).

¹³⁷ Kaiser Bengali, *History of Educational Policy Making and Planning in Pakistan* (Sustainable Development Policy Institute Islamabad, 1999), 21.

¹³⁸ Tariq Rahman, "Language Policy, Multilingualism and Language Vitality in Pakistan," in *Lesser-Known Languages of South Asia: Status and Policies, Case Studies and Applications of Information Technology*, ed. Anju Saxena and Lars Borin (Walter de Gruyter, 2006), 74.

leadership chose the route towards monolingualism rather than the alternative options adopted by countries such as India. These reasons will be explored further in Chapter 3 of the thesis.

Conclusion

The state of Pakistan disregarded that the demand for Pakistan came from the economically threatened Muslim 'salarial' in relation to the Hindu 'salarial' in India.¹³⁹ It was a demand against domination. As Hindi-Urdu controversy became an important part of this power struggle, the element of language and the significance of its symbolic identity in 'cultural zones' of Pakistan could not have been ignored.¹⁴⁰ By advocating the importance of Urdu, and replacing the ethnic languages with the language of the elite, the state of Pakistan adopted a policy of internal colonialism and mobilised the society in the same manner that the British and Hindus had mobilised the Muslim 'salarial'.¹⁴¹ The regions within Pakistan had experienced relative autonomy under the British. Despite this, they had demanded freedom from domination so that they could exclusively exercise power. However, the state of Pakistan implemented laws such as the West Pakistan Act, that attempted to erase the existence of the 'cultural zones' in Pakistan. Such policies, in addition to the implementation of the language of the elite were a part of the policies of internal colonialism which will be discussed further in the next chapter.

¹³⁹ Alavi, "Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology," 70.

¹⁴⁰ Robinson, 422-23.

¹⁴¹ Alavi, "Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology," 70.

Chapter 3: The Significance of ‘Internal Colonialism’ in Pakistan

Pakistan is a religiously and linguistically diverse state but the state has imposed a degree of uniformity that has mobilised the people of Pakistan and has led to the rise of ethnic nationalism and communalism within the state. The state policies of imposing Islam and Urdu on people who associate with a different faith and belong to a different linguistic community has led to a weak sense of Pakistani nationalism. I have outlined the development of Pakistan’s religious and language policy in Chapters 1 and 2 respectively, which shows the imposition of one-religion and one-language on the heterogenous society in Pakistan. However, as other states such as USA and India have managed the multiplicity within their borders to the extent that national identity supersedes ethnic or religious identity, it is important to explore why Pakistan adopted policies that encouraged the development of internal colonies and how this has challenged the sense of nationhood in Pakistan.

In this chapter, I will highlight the theory of Internal Colonialism as well as the Diffusion Model for national development. I will discuss why the diffusion of the diverse nations and religious communities, that was hoped pre-partition, could not be achieved by considering the situation post-partition and the colonial heritage of Pakistan. After highlighting the inappropriateness of the diffusion model in the state, I will discuss how the policy of internal colonialism takes form in Pakistan and leads to the rise of grievances within the society that impact the national identity. As these models are applied to the case of Pakistan, in terms of religion and language, the idea of why Pakistan experienced a shift in its ideology and adopted an alternate policy route are explored. I will also look at the one successful internal nationalism: the case of Bangladesh.

Diffusion Model for National Development and Internal Colonialism

While classical colonialism is concerned with the control of a society by foreign rulers, internal colonialism refers to the exploitative control of weak groups within a country by a

dominating group.¹⁴² Internal colonialism, common in post-colonial societies, is the 'exploitation' through capitalism and/or institutional 'domination', both politically and culturally of 'certain culturally distinct populations residing in sovereign societies'.¹⁴³ It is concerned with the structural political and economic inequalities between regions within a state. It is 'based on features of subordination and oppression' that creates a 'system of inequality'.¹⁴⁴ In colonial states, a foreign power exploits the numerically greater colony economically and politically, by keeping power in its own hands and 'amassing profits for' itself.¹⁴⁵ They do so by dividing the subjects and denying 'people full participation in economic, political and social privileges'.¹⁴⁶ In the same manner, the British gradually enforced their rule in India, first by destroying 'indigenous values', second by managing 'the lives of the colonised through a group of intermediaries who represented them' and third by treating the colonised as inferior to themselves.¹⁴⁷ In internal colonialism, conventional colonial policies are implemented by the dominant group on the weaker group within the society.¹⁴⁸

Hechter developed the idea of cultural division in labor and stated that 'when cultural differences are superimposed upon economic inequalities... the chances for successful political integration of the peripheral collectivity into the national society are minimised'.¹⁴⁹ This idea takes form in 'conflicts involving' both 'religion and language' in the 'national development' in Pakistan.¹⁵⁰ The diffusion model of national development asserts that an important prerequisite to national development is that there is regular interaction between the dominant cultural group and the subordinate cultural group.¹⁵¹ Hechter calls these groups the core and the peripheral. This interaction may possibly lead to acculturation and thus, national development. However, as cultural integration may not always occur, the peripheral groups may become an internal colony as they develop an exploitative relation with the core.¹⁵² In

¹⁴² Robert Blauner, "Internal Colonialism and Ghetto Revolt," *Social problems* 16, no. 4 (1969).

¹⁴³ RJ Das and S Chilvers, "Colonialism, Internal," (2009): 189.

¹⁴⁴ Charles Pinderhughes, "Toward a New Theory of Internal Colonialism," *Socialism and Democracy* 25, no. 1 (2011): 236.

¹⁴⁵ Mitra Das, "Internal Colonialism and the Movement for Bangladesh," *Contributions to Asian studies* 12 (1978): 94.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 95.

¹⁴⁸ 'Weaker group' is weak in terms of power, not in terms of the number of people that form the group.

¹⁴⁹ Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), 43.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 15.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 24.

¹⁵² Ibid., 32.

Pakistan, the 'use of state power by one section of the society (Punjabi-Muslim elite) imposed unfavourable rates of exchange upon other' ethnic-religious groups in Pakistan.¹⁵³ Hechter, thus, is of the view that the diffusion model may not necessarily lead to national development as acculturation does not always occur. Therefore, for national development, it is necessary to strengthen the political power of the peripheral group or else, internal colonies are created.

These models could be applied to assess why Pakistani state could not incorporate diversity and resist the challenges to nationhood that have led to the rise of separatist movements in Pakistan. As a key to the discussion that follows in this chapter, the 'core' refers to the ruling elite. This group is composed of the Muslim-Urdu speaking-Punjabi elite, mostly the Military Establishment that ruled Pakistan. The peripheral groups are composed of the marginalised sections of the society including Bengalis, Sindhis, Baloch, Pakhtun as well as the non-Muslim and "unpopular" denominations in Islam in Pakistan.¹⁵⁴ To see why the policy of internal colonialism was adopted, it is only fair to discuss why the Diffusion Model of National Development was not implemented in Pakistan.

Diffusion Model for National Development & Pakistan

Unfortunately, as had been hoped by Jinnah, the diffusion model of national development was not implemented in Pakistan and so, the state adopted the policy of internal colonialism. In this section, I will explore the inherent difficulties that led to the 'malintegration' of the society, rendering it inappropriate to implement the diffusion model that may have led to a balanced sense of national identity in Pakistan.¹⁵⁵ These include the issue of divisive boundaries and strong military-bureaucracy, as part of the colonial heritage. This will also show why Pakistan adopted the policy route that it did and failed to incorporate diversity, unlike other states including India and USA.

¹⁵³ Robert J Hind, "The Internal Colonial Concept," *Comparative studies in society and history* 26, no. 3 (1984): 545.

¹⁵⁴ These denominations include Ahmadis, Qaddianis, Shias, Sunnis, among others. They are referred to here as 'unpopular' because even though the state is composed of majority Sunni-Muslim population, a Shia leader may facilitate the Shia-Muslim population, making the respective denomination the 'core'.

¹⁵⁵ Hechter, 27.

As a post-colonial state, the identity of Pakistan did not emerge ‘after-colonialism’ when it became an independent state in 1947.¹⁵⁶ Important elements of ‘*Pakistaniat*’ emerged before that. The colonial policies have impacted the national identity of the country and are still apparent in Pakistan. As has been highlighted in the Introduction and the preceding chapters, as a postcolonial state, Pakistan’s identity did ‘not start from scratch’.¹⁵⁷ Years of colonial rule had left an impact on the Indians who later became the leaders of Pakistan. Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, is often described as a westernised individual.¹⁵⁸ Ayub Khan, who abrogated the first constitution of Pakistan and came into power in 1958, had served in the British Indian Army prior to the creation of Pakistan. He was a citizen of the British Indian Empire for more than half of his life and had assisted the British in three major battles, compared to one for Pakistan in 1965. Yahya Khan who succeeded Ayub Khan too, had served the British Army since 1939. Zia ul-Haq, who aggressively Islamised Pakistan served the British Indian Army during the last crucial years to independence after 1943. These rulers of Pakistan had served the British and were familiar with and influenced by the divisive, dominating and exploitative policies of the British that had allowed them to remain in power for over a hundred years.

With decolonisation and the creation of Pakistan, the rule of the foreign imperialist ended, but their influence remained. Pakistan inherited the powerful bureaucratic military structure of the British, and the subordination of government and so, in a way, the foreign imperialists created the post-colonial state of Pakistan.¹⁵⁹ Since Pakistan was a new state, the government had to control the resources and means of production to ensure progress but the state was not strong enough to handle the developmental tasks.¹⁶⁰ The military filled this political vacuum and, thus, validated its authority. Much like the British who came to collect revenue in India and expanded their efforts to governing India, Pakistan’s Military gained legitimacy when it controlled the issues of the new-born state and attained enough acceptability to control the foreign policy and domestic governance operations in Pakistan. In the case of institution building, the state thus ‘failed to transform the colonial content of political institutions which rendered the institutions dysfunctional’.¹⁶¹ In the first twenty-three years after 1947, Pakistan

¹⁵⁶ C McEwan, "Postcolonialism/Postcolonial Geographies," (2009): 328.

¹⁵⁷ Ronald Grigor Suny, "Nationalism, Nation Making, & the Postcolonial States of Asia, Africa, & Eurasia," *After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States* (2006): 294.

¹⁵⁸ Bina Shah, "Literature: The Antidote to the Pakistani Identity Crisis," (SAGE Publications Sage UK: London, England, 2014), 6-7.

¹⁵⁹ Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies Pakistan and Bangladesh," 61.

¹⁶⁰ V Biju Kumar, "Postcolonial State: An Overview," *The Indian Journal of Political Science* (2005): 939.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 936.

did not have an elected government that represented its people.¹⁶² After that, Pakistan had open military rule, or authoritarian rule disguised in the form of democratically elected government where the supremacy of the military was not observable but was real. Constitutions were abrogated, or suspended on the command of military rulers.¹⁶³ No Prime Minister of Pakistan has managed to sustain his tenure. Thus, in the seventy years since Pakistan has been independent, the state has not been representative of its people. The army and the bureaucracy had prime importance during colonial rule, and they have argued and portrayed that they have inherited this status as part of the colonial heritage.¹⁶⁴

With years of interactions, Pakistanis had adopted the British way of life, and so it was difficult to disassociate with the colonial mind-set.¹⁶⁵ So, ‘much of what was to become Pakistan, a tradition of bureaucratic authoritarianism, along with the upholding of traditional elites, was deeply rooted by the time of British departure’.¹⁶⁶ In addition to the colonial legacy of imperialist trained leadership and strong military, Pakistan inherited divisive boundaries from the British. Pakistan was composed of ethnic nations that had been divided along geographical lines by the British. These nations had their own distinct language, food and customs and had to be amalgamated effectively to form a cohesive national identity. The British controlled these Indian states through the Machiavellian divide and rule policy and thus, these regions were treated as separate, distinct national communities. As mentioned in Chapter 2, these nations were used to having a degree of autonomy in their own state, without interference from other regional communities. The British divide and rule policy, thus, ‘bolstered patriarchy, caste, and tribal identity’ that Pakistan had to deal with post 1947.¹⁶⁷ These nations were ‘artificially tied together’ and there existed a ‘desire’ for ‘free institutions’.¹⁶⁸ In these circumstances, the government gains more by dividing the society so that the nations may never be able to gather enough strength to rise to power.¹⁶⁹ Thus, due to

¹⁶² Muhammad Waseem, "The Dialectic between Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy," in *Pakistan Nationalism without a Nation*, ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2002), 269.

¹⁶³ The 1956 constitution was abrogated in 1958 by Ayub Khan who introduced the second constitution in 1962. Zia-ul-Haq suspended the 1973 Constitution to Islamise Pakistan.

¹⁶⁴ Daechsel, 152. See also Ayesha Jalal, "The State of Martial Rule," (Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1990).

¹⁶⁵ Mill had analysed that it is impossible for the human mind to disassociate from what it has learnt and ‘cultivate habits of thought’ according to the new circumstances. See Finlay, 196.

¹⁶⁶ Ian Talbot, "India and Pakistan," in *Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal*, ed. Paul Brass (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 31.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 28.

¹⁶⁸ John Stuart Mill, *Representative Government*, (Australia: University of Adelaide), https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/mill/john_stuart/m645r/index.html. e-book. 16.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

the settings inherited from the colonial masters, Pakistan was unable to implement policies that were dissimilar to the policies of the British to establish control.

With the military in power after partition, it had no interest in facilitating acculturation, a prerequisite for national development. The ruling elite had little interest in maintaining peace within the society that had raised their voices against lack of representation and free and fair institutions in India.¹⁷⁰ In Pakistan, Punjabi-Muslims were in power and they governed all nations. National development, even in these circumstances, could have been achieved in Pakistan as the nationalities in Pakistan were divided along geographical lines. So, the separation of governance and establishment of a federal system for the good of the society was not impossible.¹⁷¹ Sindhi's could govern Sindh and Bengali's could govern Bengal. Provided that the peripheral groups gained the strength that they had hoped for, the sense of nationhood in Pakistan could have been reinforced. But, the interests of the post-colonial masters lay in establishing their own control. The military understood that nations in Pakistan were united pre-partition against domination and their demands for freedom had been fulfilled.¹⁷² If these nations, already mobilised against authority and oppression, remained united they would have the power to overthrow the elite in Pakistan. Therefore, the military that was trained according to the divisive policies of the British, realised that it could gain more by dividing the society to the extent that the distinct nations may never be able to gather enough strength to rise to power.¹⁷³ The military had already legitimised its power and significance by reinforcing that India was the worst enemy to Pakistan's identity and integrity, and it was right across the border. By resisting acculturation and institutionalising constraints through religious and language policies that hindered national development, the military ensured they remain the most powerful institution in Pakistan. Thus, the military (or the core, as Hechter would call it) had little interest in allowing acculturation.¹⁷⁴ As Cohen suggests, the interests of the Establishment were not 'pro sustenance' of Pakistan.¹⁷⁵ Muhammad Waseem, too, believes that because of military rule, the national and public

¹⁷⁰ This has been outlined in detail in chapter 2. The nations that became a part of Pakistan wanted to become independent states.

¹⁷¹ Mill.

¹⁷² Ibid., 16.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Hechter, 38-39.

¹⁷⁵ Cohen, 93.

opinion could not be heard and the ‘democratic governments’ could not take any positive steps because the military establishments did not trust them.¹⁷⁶

In these circumstances, the diffusion model for national development could not be implemented as was hoped pre-partition. With the military in power, the nations could not be fused together and so, Pakistan’s ideology and politics experienced a shift, from being integrative based on the principles of equality and freedom, to being autocratic based on theocracy. Consequently, the historical development of Pakistan’s policies, especially those concerning religion and language as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, took a different turn and challenged the sense of nationhood in Pakistan. The elite that pushed forward the idea of a separate state where the marginalised population in India was to be free from any discrimination, ‘embraced a set of policies that included a foreign policy based on perceived insecurity vis-à-vis India that sought security through Islamic unity’, policy of granting supreme powers to the bureaucracy and later to the army as they gained legitimacy by controlling unrest within the country, ‘a policy concerning Islam as the ultimate source of legitimacy’ and a language policy that represented the ‘perceived domination’ of the ruling elite through Urdu.¹⁷⁷

Internal Colonialism & Pakistan

With such policies adopted by the state, it may be argued that Hechter’s ideas of internal colonialism take form in Pakistan. Internal colonialism was facilitated as one culturally and ethnically distinct group was in power.¹⁷⁸ The Urdu speaking-Muslim elite, mostly Punjabis, controlled Pakistan. The elite dominated the religiously, ethnically and linguistically diverse nations politically and ideologically, in line with the practices of their colonial masters. As has been discussed in the preceding chapters, the state of Pakistan imposed ‘social control’ of the diverse yet marginalised society which encouraged ‘resistance’.¹⁷⁹ Intervening in religious and linguistic matters stimulated cultural resistance and resentment against the state and led to the rise of separatist movements. The nations, as discussed in detail in Chapter 2,

¹⁷⁶ Waseem, 265.

¹⁷⁷ "Ethnic and Islamic Militancy in Pakistan," in *Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal*, ed. Paul Brass (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 234, 76.

¹⁷⁸ Das and Chilvers, 190.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 192.

had a desire for freedom from oppression in the society before partition. Thus, the ‘era of aspiration to free government arrived before’ the nations had fused together as people had raised their voice against the British and, eventually, the Hindus to create Pakistan.¹⁸⁰ In these circumstances, as one ethnic-religious group came to govern Pakistan, tensions were created between the core and the peripheral groups. The core controlled Pakistan and had access to power positions. They were unwilling to share this power with other ethnic groups in the country, including Bengali, Sindhi, Baloch and Pakhtun, which Hechter would refer to as the peripheral groups. Thus, soon after partition, acculturation could not occur since the unjust and discriminatory policies of the core did not allow it.¹⁸¹ The Punjabi-Urdu speaking-Muslim elite institutionalised policies that marginalised the peripheral groups to the extent that led to the ‘politics of stable unrepresentation’, where the peripheral groups had no say.¹⁸² Overtime, thus, the core created such frustrations within the peripheral groups that they became internal colonies and demanded independence.¹⁸³ One successful case of secession that called for special rights and resulted in the breakup of Pakistan is that of Bangladesh.

Since the army and bureaucracy are supreme, they have not allowed a strong democratic party system to emerge that is representative of the citizens of Pakistan. The democratic governments that have come into power were merely puppets of the military bureaucracy, and their power has been taken away if the army felt that the civilian governance was gaining popularity and legitimacy.¹⁸⁴ The politicians, who understood that all matters were to be decided by the military bureaucracy, had no job but to determine how to remain in power. As Markus has pointed out, this could be done in two ways much like the colonial times: establish legitimacy of their power and minimise opposition.¹⁸⁵ This is how the manipulation of religion and language became relevant. Both Islam and Urdu facilitated the elite in legitimising their rule.

‘Islam’ and ‘Urdu’ served multiple purposes in Pakistan: reinforced the anti-India identity of Pakistan and legitimised the authority of the establishment. Haqqani pointed that military officers, bureaucracy and the politicians used Islam in the developmental years of Pakistan to ‘exacerbate the antagonism between Hindus and Muslims’ so that ‘Islamic-Pakistan’ could

¹⁸⁰ This has been outlined in detail in Chapter 2. The nations that became a part of Pakistan wanted to become independent states. Mill.

¹⁸¹ Hechter, 38-39.

¹⁸² Ibid., 40.

¹⁸³ Ibid., 39.

¹⁸⁴ Daechsel, 152-53.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 153.

resist against 'Hindu-India'.¹⁸⁶ Since the traditional interpretation of Jinnah's Two-Nation Theory became extraneous after Pakistan came into existence, the leadership considered it essential to reinforce an anti-Hindu identity of Pakistan to emphasise the relevance of Pakistan. As one of the ways that anti-Hindu identity could be underpinned was focusing on establishing an Islamic identity of Pakistan, the state considered it its duty to govern Pakistan according to Islamic principles and move towards a theocratic state. This served the Establishment in Pakistan. With an anti-Hindu identity, the demand of Pakistan remained relevant. Also, by reinforcing that India was the worst enemy to Pakistan's identity and integrity, and it was right across the border, the military legitimised its power and significance. It overestimated that by utilising Islamic principles and adopting Islam as the state religion the people who associated with other religions would feel represented. But, at the same time, by establishing the need to resist India, the military served its own interests as it ensured that a strong military would become relevant for Pakistan for all time to come. Also, one of the justifications of choosing Urdu was that it reinforced the anti-Hindu identity of Pakistan. Since Urdu was based on Arabic script, it was different from Hindi. It was argued that Urdu was anti-Hindu and *hence* was the only language that could represent Pakistan and any language that was not Urdu was anti-Pakistan. This reasoning also strengthened the idea of India being the ultimate enemy of Pakistan and its identity, hence indirectly defended the absolute power of the military.

With language restrictions, the elite hierarchy was maintained. Religious symbols and references helped legitimise the power of the ruling elite as well as minimise opposition since who was to speak against someone who promoted religious ideology? To understand the resistance of the peripheral groups let us look at how the policies that were developed by the elite, as outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, of imposing Islam and Urdu facilitated the frustrations related to differences of social organisation in Pakistan.

Exploitation of Islam challenged national development

By imposing Islam, the post-colonial state of Pakistan acted much like the colonialists and disregarded the incorporation of religious diversity. In India, the British had the 'exclusive

¹⁸⁶ Husain Haqqani, "The Role of Islam in Pakistan's Future," *The Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 1 (2004): 89.

right to make decisions’ and the Indians had to play by their rules.¹⁸⁷ Similarly, following the strategies of the imperial predecessors, the leaders in Pakistan made and amended law according to their own will, to retain power. Religion was used as a ‘strategy to exercise power’ and to maintain it by resisting opposition.¹⁸⁸ The Islamisation of Pakistan was, thus, the outcome of power politics.¹⁸⁹ Religious sentiments of the majority population of Pakistan were manipulated to keep the military regime in power. The ruling elite understood that religious policies appeal to people as if a policy is not religious, it is anti-religion, and thus, may be deemed blasphemous by the common people. ‘Secularism’ or secular policies may have been perceived as anti-religion.¹⁹⁰ All exploited this knowledge, even ‘liberal-socialist’ Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and ‘developmentalist’ Ayub Khan. By adopting the rhetoric of Islam, the leaders minimised opposition, legitimised their rule and maintained power since Islam was the religion of the majority. If something was being done in the name of Islam, and someone was trying to facilitate Islamic law, would it not have been blasphemous to object to it?

With the Muslim elite in power, the religious bias was in place and the Muslim leadership had little interest in working for the ‘others’. They could constrain other religious groups from attaining power and so, made laws that divided the society. These laws have been outlined in Chapter 1. For example, how could non-Muslims not react to the law that the president of Pakistan had to be a Muslim? If the selection of President depended on his faith and not on merit, no other religious group could ever rise to the position and lead the country. The creation of Islamic Council to facilitate Islamic Provisions was also directed towards marginalising the religious minorities and various denominations within Islam. Its formation raised questions such as which interpretation of Islam were they going to favour? What aspect of social, political or economic law were they going to introduce and how was it going to affect the society? Islam is a complete code of life and so, a few regulations within Islam cannot be chosen and implemented. This may lead to a situation where rights of Muslims are protected and rights of non-Muslims are ignored, which is exactly what happened in Pakistan. Other constitutional laws as outlined in Chapter 1 were aimed at creating a divide within the society, including the teaching of Arabic and Quran. Why did a non-Muslim student need to read the Quran in a non-religious school? The elite could dominate, and so, they did. With the

¹⁸⁷ Daechsel, 146.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 142.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 141.

¹⁹⁰ Saeed, 195.

imposition of Islam, the minority religious groups in Pakistan were marginalised but since the majority population was Muslim, the leadership minimised opposition and established their authority.

Such policies were in line with those of the British imperialists who knew that Indians were driven by religious sentiments and so they could continue ruling the Indians if they manipulated their attachment to religion. Without treating people equally as citizens of Pakistan and by imposing a sense of religious identity, the state of Pakistan compromised its national identity. Pakistanis were not living beings that had rights, they were merely subjects who did not know any better and had to be ruled. This route was influenced by the strategy of the British, as described by Rudyard Kipling in the poem 'White Man's Burden'.¹⁹¹ The British had to be masters of Indians to civilise them and Pakistanis had to be brought to the right path by their own elite rulers.

In the imposition of Islam, we see the division of the Pakistani society in terms of the denominations within Islam. Religion of the majority was imposed to discriminate against the minorities to the extent that an Ahmedi is murdered for his/her faith and denied the right to attain a passport without denouncing their faith.¹⁹² The larger religious group in Pakistan had no intention whatsoever to govern with justice. It is the government's responsibility to exercise control over those who harm others within the society. In Pakistan, we see that the government created an environment, and in some cases, institutionalised laws that compel members of the society to maltreat 'others'.¹⁹³ For example, the responsibility of the government lay in preventing Pakistanis to kill other Pakistanis. Instead, the state introduced laws such as the blasphemy law in the name of Islam and facilitated the removal of any minority that may potentially raise their voice against the state at the hands of other Pakistanis.¹⁹⁴ In this manner, the state divided the society for their own personal interest and developed tensions that impact the sense of nationhood in Pakistan.

¹⁹¹ The 'White' in Kipling's poem were Americans.

¹⁹² "2010 Lahore Massacre," Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, <http://stopthepersecution.org/lahore-massacre/>. See also Mohammed Hanif, "Why Pakistan's Ahmadi Community Is Officially Detested," (2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/8744092.stm.

¹⁹³ Robert P George, "John Stuart Mill and John Henry Newman on Liberty and Conscience," *Saint Anselm Journal* 10, no. 2 (2015): 40. See also John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty (D. Spitz, Ed.)," *New York & London: WW Norton* (1975).

¹⁹⁴ Amnesty International, "Pakistan: How the Blasphemy Laws Enable Abuse," (2016), <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/12/pakistan-how-the-blasphemy-laws-enable-abuse/>. See also ""As Good as Dead": The Impact of Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan," (UK2016).

Exploitation of Urdu challenged national development

Pakistan became an independent state when unitary nation-state was considered the most legitimate form of political action.¹⁹⁵ Perhaps, in the pressure to follow the “trend”, the state of Pakistan deemed it fit to ignore the national communities that had been created, or had gained political autonomy and a distinctive identity during colonial rule. Pakistan adopted the policy of language standardisation as a strategy of state rationalisation and centralisation and when the language of the elite was imposed on all regions, there were cries of internal colonialism in the state.

The new state did not have a democratic structure that was representative of its people and so, the imposition of Urdu and consequently, the ignorance of the ethnic-national identities was viewed as an act of domination by the ruling elite. ‘Conflicts over language identity are not just about language, but are intertwined with struggles over power and access to it’.¹⁹⁶ Scholars argue that a majority language, in terms of power and prestige, tends to ‘replace a minority language, not in terms of numerical size but without access to power and resources’.¹⁹⁷ Urdu, the majority language, allowed the elite to maintain their position of power and prestige and constrain the people of other linguistic communities from rising to power and replacing the elite.

The language policy of Pakistan led to the rise of internal colonies in Pakistan. The Muslim ‘salariat’ that had demanded independence from marginalisation in India was constrained in Pakistan due to the imposition of Urdu. With Urdu, jobs in the public service became a point of contention in Pakistan. During Raj, English speaking had advantages attached to it, irrespective of religion. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the British had created a class structure in India such that English was reserved for the elite and vernacular languages for the subservient classes, including Nawabs who were kept subservient to the British. In 1947, when the power was transferred from the British to the leaders in Pakistan and India, the colonialists transferred the colonial mindset as well. Much like English was a requirement for high paying jobs during imperial rule and differentiated the elite from the lower classes, Urdu was

¹⁹⁵ François Grin, *Language Policy in Multilingual Switzerland: Overview and Recent Developments* (European Centre for Minority Issues, 1999), 2.

¹⁹⁶ Alyssa Ayres, "The Politics of Language Policy in Pakistan," in *Fighting Words: Language Policy and Ethnic Relations in Asia*, ed. Michael E. Brown Sumit Ganguly (MIT Press, 2003), 52.

¹⁹⁷ Stephen May, "Uncommon Languages: The Challenges and Possibilities of Minority Language Rights," *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 21, no. 5 (2000): 366.

to distinguish classes within Pakistan post-independence. The ruling elite was fluent in English and Urdu while the 'others' had to learn Urdu to compete for entry level jobs. The incentive of the ruling elite was, thus, to constrain the diverse ethnic communities. Moreover, the language of the imperialists also remained significant. For example, military academy students could fail Urdu as a subject and still succeed in becoming a part of the army.¹⁹⁸ This shows the level of importance given to the language of the colonial masters over the national language by those who imposed Urdu language in the first place. The sepoys were spoken to in Urdu, while the Generals would use English. English remained essential for influential positions within the society. With such practises, the language policy of the postcolonial state facilitated the class structure within the society and the state has not been able to phase out English to date. Laitin has described the link of language with ethnic conflict much like it has been apparent in the case of Pakistan. He writes about King Philip V of Spain who issued the Decree of the New Foundation to decentralise Spain:

“Postcolonial states that emerged after World War II, committed to the provision of public education and social welfare, were heavily constrained from following the path of Philip V and other earlier rationalizers. Newly elected political leaders were handed bureaucracies with a vested interest in continued reliance on colonial languages, as fluency in these languages differentiated the high-paid civil servants from their poorly paid brethren in the countryside. Furthermore, these same national leaders were held under suspicion by leaders from regions in which distinct languages were spoken. To impose one indigenous language on all groups would surely threaten the incumbency of any would-be rationalizer. Yet the goals of many postcolonial leaders included superseding the colonial language with an indigenous one. This difficult problem of choosing an official language (used for public administration and as a medium of instruction in schools), under conditions in which greater access to the official language translates into higher prospects for social mobility, has led many analysts to link language conflict with the potentiality of inducing ethnic violence.”¹⁹⁹

Similarly, in Pakistan, the importance attached to the language of the colonialists has not reduced. It was, and is reserved for higher paying and respectable jobs and positions in the society and thus, still facilitates in reinforcing the class structure. However, by imposing Urdu and reducing the importance of languages of the peripheral groups, the core created a

¹⁹⁸ Tariq Rahman, "The Urdu—English Controversy in Pakistan," *Modern Asian Studies* 31, no. 1 (1997): 185.

¹⁹⁹ D.Laitin, 535.

further class within the society. The peripheral groups had to learn Urdu for basic-entry level jobs and English for high-paying jobs. In this manner, by merely imposing Urdu, ‘high status occupations’ were ‘reserved for the metropolitan culture while those of the indigenous cultures clustered at the bottom of the stratification system’.²⁰⁰ So, Sindhi’s had to learn Urdu to attain basic level jobs, and had to learn both English and Urdu for higher level jobs.²⁰¹ Their ethnic language had no significance. These nations had supported the idea of Pakistan in writings in their own languages before partition. By leaving their languages unrecognised and declaring their languages anti-Pakistan, the state insulted these nations. Therefore, the state of Pakistan showed a clear preference to be able to secure power for the governing elite, rather than the management of linguistic diversity within the state. Education, too, has a ‘role in allocating occupational and social statuses’ but the peripheral groups had to attain education in Urdu for basic acceptance within the society.²⁰² This was also problematic as the country did not have enough resources to teach a new language to millions of Pakistanis, but that is a discussion for a different research.

Urdu and Islam, thus served the purpose of attaining and maintaining power of the elite. Therefore, within the language and religious policy imposed by Pakistan, we see that the initial advantage to the Punjabi-Muslim military led to the ‘unequal distribution of resources and power’ and the ‘national development that could have been served by strengthening the political power of the peripheral group’ was adversely affected.²⁰³ As the imposition of Islam and Urdu widened the gap within the society, the ‘traditional authorities’ lost power and the military gained legitimacy.²⁰⁴ Had the peripheral groups, as defined earlier, been given power within Pakistan, the rise of secessionist tendencies, communalism and separatism may have been curbed. However, the interests of the Establishment were not in favour of political stability in Pakistan and so, West-Pakistan was treated as One-Unit, as discussed in Chapter 2, up till 1970 and despite the rhetoric of unity based on religion, Bangladesh was created in 1971.

²⁰⁰ Hechter, 30.

²⁰¹ As discussed in Chapter 2, the nations in British-India were not required to learn English, so they remained fluent in their vernacular languages.

²⁰² Hechter, 37.

²⁰³ Ibid., 39-34.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 28.

Bangladesh

The secession of East-Pakistan from Pakistan represents the reality of the policy of internal colonialism in Pakistan. The political, economic and cultural subjugation of East-Pakistan was in line with colonial policies of the British.²⁰⁵ Initially, East-Pakistan was economically better off than West-Pakistan but this situation was reversed due to the policies of the central government.²⁰⁶ In addition to the economic subjugation, the One-Unit scheme strengthened the power of West-Pakistan against the East.²⁰⁷ The representation of Bengalis in civil service, government and armed forces was abysmal. Such policies alienated the Bengalis in the political arena. Moreover, when Bengali language was suppressed, the ruling elite of Pakistan attempted to culturally subordinate Bengalis. 'Cultural subordination allows and facilitates political and economic subjugation'.²⁰⁸ Had the Urdu speaking elite of West-Pakistan established their cultural domination, they would have inculcated the legitimacy of their superiority. So, Bengalis were marginalised economically, politically and culturally- does that not make East-Pakistan an internal colony?

It is a common perception that East-Pakistan broke away from West-Pakistan to form Bangladesh as the two units of Pakistan were culturally and linguistically dissimilar.²⁰⁹ The Bangla Language Movement that started as early as in 1948 shows that Bengalis did not agree with the state ideology of becoming a one-language state and were the first to protest it.²¹⁰ However, this Language Movement ended in 1955 and Bengali was recognised as one of the two official languages of Pakistan in each constitution of Pakistan prior to the 1973 Constitution.²¹¹ Despite this, the country broke up because the strong 'military-bureaucratic industrial complex' of West-Pakistan did not want to share power with the Bengalis even though Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman of the Awaami League had won absolute majority in the general elections in 1970.²¹² The military-bureaucratic framework adopted from the British

²⁰⁵ Hind, 552.

²⁰⁶ These included the policy of tariff walls and import quotas, the diversion of foreign exchange earnings to West-Pakistan. Das, 97.

²⁰⁷ "Pakistan: "One Unit" and the League," *The Round Table* 53, no. 209 (1962).

²⁰⁸ 101.

²⁰⁹ Abdul Rashid Moten, "Nationalism, Elite Politics, and the Break-up of Pakistan," *The Muslim World* 88, no. 1 (1998): 93.

²¹⁰ Tariq Rahman, "Language, Power and Ideology in Pakistan," *Pakistan: Democracy, development and security issues* (2005): 4557.

²¹¹ "The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1956)," 152.

²¹² Awaami League was a Bengali political party, against the domination by Muslim League and centralisation of the government. Ved P Nanda, "Self-Determination in International Law: The Tragic Tale of Two Cities–

created constraints for the Bengalis who could not tolerate the dictatorial and controlling ways of the Establishment. After independence, the elites that dominated the Muslim League became the ruling elite of Pakistan.²¹³ They replaced anyone with whom they were displeased, mostly from Awaami League, and gave power to those who accepted the 'League hierarchy'.²¹⁴ Bengalis felt that they did not have any 'decisive say' which further infuriated them.²¹⁵ The praetorian rule in Pakistan led them to believe that the state of Pakistan was acting like an Empire and it had adopted the policies of its colonial masters.²¹⁶ The final blow came in 1970 when, even though the Awaami League had won absolute majority, Bhutto of West-Pakistan declared '*Idhar hum, udhar tum*' meaning, 'Here us, there you', suggesting that East-Pakistan can be controlled by Bengalis while West-Pakistan will remain under his rule.²¹⁷ As a West-Pakistani, he assumed he could dictate, even though the electoral results indicated otherwise. His power was absolute, much like any political elites' in the post-colonial state of Pakistan. Language issue, thus, even though it was officially resolved and ceased to be about the death of Bengali identity at the hands of the majority language, it became a symbol of oppression of the state elites and strengthened the ethnic identity of Bengalis against the centralised state.²¹⁸

In Bangladesh, we see the impact of internal colonialism. Bengalis had anticipated social, economic and political advantages with the creation of Pakistan, yet the system in Pakistan was such that they became subordinate to West-Pakistanis. Therefore Bengalis, who were already mobilised against the inferior status in society and aspired for better opportunities against British and Hindus, demanded freedom from Pakistan. 'The colonial situation that existed in Pakistan compelled the Bengalis to unite in their struggle for emancipation from their colonial masters'.²¹⁹

Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan)," *American Journal of International Law* 66, no. 2 (1972): 323.

²¹³ Moten, 97.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Joshua B Forrest, "Nationalism in Postcolonial States," *After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States* (2006): 34.

²¹⁷ Moten, 100. See also Stanley A Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times* (Oxford University Press, USA, 1993), 146.

²¹⁸ Tristan James Mabry, "Language and Conflict," *International Political Science Review* 32, no. 2 (2011).

²¹⁹ Das, 104.

Other post-colonial states

This discussion may raise a question as to why India, also a post-colonial state did not become a theocratic Hindu state, and adopt Hindi as its national language. To address this question, it must be understood that Pakistani identity was forged to be an anti-Indian identity. To legitimise the creation of Pakistan, it was argued that Pakistan would be dissimilar to the Indian identity. As India was a 'subcontinent of nationalities', Pakistan was envisioned as one diffused nation-state that could be united under one national language.²²⁰ As Hinduism promoted the hierarchical organisation of the society, social order of Islam was to be adopted to endorse the inclusivity in Pakistan.

Pakistan was challenged by the identity threat through India while India had an existing national identity and had to reinforce that prevailing identity. On 14th August 1947, Pakistan did not just gain independence from British Raj, but also broke away from India and formed a separate state. The issues concerning Pakistan's national identity development, thus, also include the forging of a sense of national identity that is different from the Indian identity. As India was unwilling to accept the 'vivisection of Mother India', there existed a possibility that India would delegitimise the creation of Pakistan.²²¹ To add to these matters, at the time of partition, Pakistan was 'disproportionately affected' and became the weaker state as it inherited the weaker institutions compared to India.²²² Having been created with a looming threat from India, the power of the military in Pakistan was also legitimised. India, even at the time of partition argued against the relevance of Pakistan. The popular belief in India was that Indian identity was not Hindu identity, as the Pakistani elite claimed.²²³ According to Gandhi, there was no need for conflict between Hindus and Muslims as they were all Indians struggling for Swaraj.²²⁴ So, there was no need for India to become a theocratic state, or implement a Hindi-identity.

²²⁰ Ainslie Thomas Embree, *Utopias in Conflict: Religion and Nationalism in Modern India*, vol. 3 (Univ of California Press, 1990), 60. See also Van Jay Symons and Suzanne Wilson Barnett, *Asia in the Undergraduate Curriculum: A Case for Asian Studies in Liberal Arts Education* (Routledge, 2016), 138.

²²¹ Peter Lyon, *Conflict between India and Pakistan: An Encyclopedia* (ABC-CLIO, 2008), 74. 'The strain of irredentism was inescapable' : A. R. Desai, *Social Background of Indian Nationalism*, 4th edition ed. (Bombay: Popular Press, 1966), 422.

²²² Talbot, 35.

²²³ Richard Sisson and Stanley A Wolpert, *Congress and Indian Nationalism: The Pre-Independence Phase* (Univ of California Press, 1988), 308-09.

²²⁴ Sagarika Dutt, *India in a Globalized World* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 169. 'Swaraj Movement' led by Gandhi was a movement for self-governance and freedom from British.

Conclusion

In Pakistan, the state acts like an empire that constrains and enables human behaviour at its whim. The ‘state overrules civil society and the masses’.²²⁵ The discussion in this chapter shows that the military inherited power through the British and gained absolute power by legitimising their authority through elements of religion and language. This was made possible as the military establishment filled the power vacuum and helped sustain Pakistan soon after independence. The military bureaucratic framework in the post-colonial state of Pakistan was strong and discouraged the growth of democratic, political institutions that may have served the interests of the citizens of the country. With Islam and Urdu, the elite managed to please the majority population and minimise opposition to their rule. No one could speak against an Islamic policy to criticise the ruler, and by imposing a ‘foreign’ language, the elite managed to curb the rise to power of the ‘others’. The colonialists operating within Pakistan manipulated religious and linguistic elements to keep power in their own hands. This resulted in the rise of frustrations within the diverse nations that were left unrecognised. Therefore, due to the actions of the core, internal colonies were developed that challenged the sense of nationhood in Pakistan. Their identity was challenged as Pakistani state imposed uniform policies, without considering the impact on the society, which cost the country to divide in 1971 and induced instability within what is left of Pakistan.

²²⁵ Kumar, 940.

Conclusion

Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has faced numerous existential challenges that are not unique to the case of Pakistan. Identity-threats are common in post-colonial states. However, there were some imminent questions that needed to be explored. In this thesis, I have looked at the challenges to national identity in the post-colonial state of Pakistan. Soon after Jinnah's death the ideology of Pakistan underwent a shift and Pakistani state adopted the policy of imposing a degree of uniformity on the diverse society in Pakistan. While Chapter 1 and 2 of the thesis have outlined this shift, Chapter 3 attempts to explore the shift through the theoretical perspective of Internal Colonialism. I have argued that the state's policy of imposing one-religion and one-language on the multilingual society that associated with different faiths has led to the rise of ethno-nationalist and separatist movements that hinder the political stability in Pakistan. Military Establishment dominates the state and considering the British-influenced circumstances inherited from the imperialists, diffusion of the diverse nations in Pakistan was impacted and so, the state adopted the policy of internal colonialism which led to the rise of grievances within the society and challenged the cohesive national identity of Pakistan. As 'others' were created, people distanced from the Pakistani-identity and aggressively adhered to their ethnic-religious identity.

Post-colonial nationalism is a forged sense of resistance against the colonial powers.²²⁶ The nationalist leaders that demanded Pakistan were interested in relieving the nations from colonial rule and establishing a distinct nation-state with a strong sense of national identity.²²⁷ For the state of Pakistan, the dilemma was that it not only had to develop resistance against the colonial powers to establish a sense of national identity, but it also had to impose an anti-Hindu identity to keep the partition of India relevant. In these circumstances, the influence of imperialists misled the state of Pakistan and instead of establishing a cohesive national identity in the diverse state, it adopted policies of internal colonialism. With Pakistan adopting policies of internal colonialism, internal nationalisms erupted. Pakistan thus, due to state policies, broke up in 1971 to form Bangladesh. Other, less mobilised but active internal nationalisms include the Baloch Separatist Movement, the demand for the creation of

²²⁶ Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (Zed Books, 1986).

²²⁷ Forrest, 33.

Sindhudesh and Jinnahpur, among others.²²⁸ Therefore, the state policies in Pakistan have adversely affected the state, encouraging people to refer to it as a 'failed state' and gaining it a spot on number 14 of the Fragile States Index.²²⁹

The states perception that Pakistan is a uni-national state, created challenges for the sense of national identity in Pakistan. Within West-Pakistan, the provincial boundaries were based on ethnicities. Punjabis had their own language and culture, Baloch had their own language and customs. East-Pakistan was mainly composed of the Bengali nation. In these circumstances, the state's policy of imposing a degree of uniformity in Pakistan to previously autonomous nations created feelings of underrepresentation and alienation. These regions were relatively autonomous under imperial rule but had demanded independence from 'foreign' domination, yet their powers were taken away under Pakistani government, as has been outlined in Chapter 2. The territorial division of ethnic groups can impact the course of nationalist evolution and generate secessionist claims which has been verified in the case of Pakistan.²³⁰

Created against the dominating forces in British-India and Hindu-India, Muslim-Punjabi-Urdu-speaking-Pakistan adopted the policies of internal colonialism and created a divide within the society. Suny's analysis of the situation in Ukraine may be applied to the case of Pakistan to show 'the dilemma of the modern nation state in formation'.²³¹ He suggested that 'as early modern dynastic states carried out projects of cultural and administrative homogenisation that eventually allowed them to be considered nations, so post-colonial states of the late 20th century may find themselves acting like little empires, promoting the ruling nation, discriminating against minorities or, even if the opportunity arises, expanding into neighbouring territories to make the ethnic and state boundaries conform'.²³² Similarly, practises such as frequent interventions by the military, introduction and implementation of draconian laws and violation of human rights are common in Pakistan. The state miscalculated that by adopting the Machiavellian policy, Pakistan would remain united as is evident in the case of Bangladesh and the rise of ethno-nationalist movements in Pakistan.

²²⁸ Baloch Separatist Movement demands a state of Balochistan, separate from Iran and Pakistan; Sindhudesh is the demand for a separate Sindh country; Jinnahpur is the proposed homeland for the Urdu-speaking Muhajir community.

²²⁹ Kumar, 941.

²³⁰ Lowell W. Barrington, *After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 11-12.

²³¹ Suny, "Nationalism, Nation Making, & the Postcolonial States of Asia, Africa, & Eurasia," 286.

²³² Ibid.

To effectively modernise the new state, an ideal situation was to incorporate the diversity within the state to build a national identity. This proved to be a difficult task considering the divisive boundaries created by the imperialists as outlined in Chapter 2 and explored in Chapter 3. These borders seem to have been defined in a hurry without historical and administrative references, not unlike other states born of the decolonization process.²³³ So, as British left without clearing the organizational ambiguities, ethno-nationalist movements emerged.²³⁴ For the incorporation of diversity in a diverse state, an important precedence is that institutional checks are placed on the powerful and dominant group in the society.²³⁵ This was not possible in the post-colonial state of Pakistan as it lacked strong democratic institutions and power was vested in the hands of a few who were not willing to share it.²³⁶

It may be argued that the imposition of uniform policies by the state was aimed at acculturation but in reality, it led to a divide within the society. Provided that the 'larger nationality' governed with justice, the smaller nationalities would have incorporated with and diffused into the larger nationality which may have developed a cohesive national identity.²³⁷ So, in order to amalgamate the nationalities, it was important for the society to be governed with 'tolerable justice'.²³⁸ However, no such policy was implemented in the post-colonial state of Pakistan, as has been outlined in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. Religion and language of the ruling elite was adopted to create the 'others' and generate constraints for those others, rendering acculturation impossible. Had the policies been incorporative, acculturation could have been achieved which may have developed a strong Pakistani identity. In that case too, however, the ethnic identity may still have suffered as successful acculturation may have meant the death of culture and language of the nations.²³⁹

Had Islam been the uniting force in Pakistan, there would not have been a Bangladesh on the world map today. Had Pakistan been a nation-state that would have accepted the imposition of one-language, the reactions from Bengali students against elite domination would not have forced the state to give Bengali language a constitutional status as well. These divisive

²³³ Pierre Lafrance, "And yet, Pakistan Exists," in *Pakistan Nationalism without a Nation*, ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2002), 337.

²³⁴ Nina Swidler Paul Titus, "Knights, Not Pawns: Ethno-Nationalism and Regional Dynamics in Post-Colonial Balochistan," *International Journal Middle East Studies* (2000): 47.

²³⁵ Finlay, 209.

²³⁶ Shahid Javed Burki, "Pakistan's Politics and Its Economy," in *Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal*, ed. Paul Brass (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 92.

²³⁷ The nationality is not necessarily numerically large but considered 'larger' in terms of power. Mill. In the case of Pakistan, this 'larger nationality' was the Punjabi, Urdu speaking, Muslim-Military.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ May.

policies, in terms of religion and language, led to the breakup of Pakistan in 1971 and the rise of ethno-nationalist movements within various parts of the country.²⁴⁰ Some nationalists have politically organised themselves and joined together to form the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement in 1998. In these movements, we see that limited access to power became a catalyst for the rising instability in Pakistan.

In making the policy on language, the state of Pakistan crossed a thin line that distinguished the associations with language pre- and post-partition. The nations that made up Pakistan were not against Urdu, they were against the replacement of their own ethnic languages by Urdu. As the replacement of ethnic languages by Urdu could not be understood by the distinct, mobilised nations that had demanded Pakistan, the politically motivated intentions of imposing Urdu become clear and the policy on language became a symbol of 'perceived domination and injustice' of the ruling elite.²⁴¹ As Urdu was the language of the elite that was in power, it was perceived that their linguistic bias had granted Urdu the national language status. Thus the 'relationship between language and ethnic identity' was created as a reaction to the states policy.²⁴² If there was any lesson to learn from this, it is that the 'Herderian principle of linguistic ethnicity' is valid in Pakistan as people who share a common vernacular language are an ethnic group and their distinctiveness should be treated with respect.²⁴³ Punjabi and Urdu speaking elite were politically active pre-partition, and continued controlling the state in its initial years. By choosing Urdu, they restricted other nations from rising to power and fed ethno-nationalist movements that were to destabilise Pakistan. Applying Mill's analysis to the case of Pakistan, Punjabis 'impaired the growth of' the other nations 'since those who begin by being the strongest, have almost always hitherto used their strength to keep the others weak'.²⁴⁴

It is unfortunate that Pakistani state could have controlled the instability it experiences today but the power-seeking leadership had little interest in the democratic and progressive governance of Pakistan. The post-colonial state of Pakistan, although it achieved independence, has inherited colonial values 'in both its material and ideological

²⁴⁰ These include the Balochistan National Movement, Seraiki Movement, the demand for Sindhudesh, among others.

²⁴¹ Tariq Rahman, "Language Problems and Politics in Pakistan," in *Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal*, ed. Paul Brass (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 234.

²⁴² Ibid., 236.

²⁴³ Eisenlohr, 190.

²⁴⁴ Finlay, 208.

manifestations'.²⁴⁵ It could not disassociate with the past and so, implemented the colonial policies that the people had demanded freedom from.²⁴⁶ The nations had strived for political, social and economic powers, not subordination to the powerful elite. Instead of managing the diversity within the state, Pakistan adopted the policy of dividing the people into different classes and imposing uniformity on the diverse society to legitimise and maintain the power of the elite which presented challenges to nationhood. Repression of the nations and their demands has been counterproductive, but the state has continued with its policies and feeds the secessionist tendencies.²⁴⁷ Instead of creating a federal, democratic structure that was representative of the diverse society, the state imposed a degree of uniformity in both religious and linguistic policies, which challenged the sense of nationhood in Pakistan.

²⁴⁵ Daechsel, 152.

²⁴⁶ The state has not distanced from the colonial policies. For example, according to all three constitutions of Pakistan, English was to be phased out and replaced by Urdu but English remains the Official Language.

²⁴⁷ Talbot, 37.

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