

**‘I don’t like it’: A comparative analysis of
emotions in the political rhetoric of Pauline
Hanson from 1996-1998 and 2016-2018**

A Masters of Research thesis

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Thesis Summary

In Australian politics and popular culture, few politicians have ever been considered as controversial as Pauline Hanson. From 60 Minutes to Pauline Pantsdown, from The House of Representatives to Dancing With the Stars and The Celebrity Apprentice, Hanson has barely left the public imagination since her explosive entrance into politics in the 1996 federal election. Hanson's successful 2016 election to the Senate has once again brought her firmly into the spotlight and raised questions of how Hanson succeeded a second time. While Hanson has been discredited on both the political left and right as the 'ignorant' and 'racist' voice of a minority, our most outcast members of the Government can show us surprising cultural truths. This thesis explores how Pauline Hanson's political discourse has changed over the last 18 years and the role that emotions play in her speeches. Through a content and an applied thematic analysis of Hanson's Parliamentary speeches from 1996-1998 and 2016-2018, this thesis will highlight the mirroring of emotional regimes of the radical populist right in the Australian political sphere.

Statement of Originality

This work has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the thesis itself.

(Signed)  _____ Date: 17. 10 . 18

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Introduction

Pauline Hanson sits in a studio in Brisbane at 7pm on Sky News' *Bolt Report*. Journalist Ben Fordham introduces her as facing an internal crisis on tax policy, but after pushing her on the question of how she is holding One Nation together after Brian Burston sought to join the Shooters Party, Pauline reveals her own internal crisis on national television.

“This isn't the first time Brian's um, Brian's stabbed me in the back and that goes back a long time ago, and you'd think I... This hurts me.... This hurts me deeply because... It means so much to me what I'm trying to do, and for him to turn around and do this to me Ben, it's hard. But I'm going to keep going, and I'm going to get good people in that Parliament beside me because it means so much to me to help the people that need help that feel like no one's listening to them, they're sick of politicians because they don't do anything”.

Hanson's voice breaks multiple times and tears well in her eyes. Rarely do politicians let us see how deeply upset they are and yet in this interview Pauline 'fights tears' (Connifer, Norman & Igguldeh 2018) when she talks about the effect of Brian Burston's actions and how much she cares about the Australian public. Interestingly, the response (in the media at least) was not to criticise her emotional outpouring but to very simply describe it, rolling gently from the headline garnering tears on live television to the practical impact of a Brian Burston-less One Nation. Given the high standard of rationality we place on politics and politicians, what makes us watch Hanson's emotions unfold before us without comment? How is it that we are at the same time so enthralled about the emotional displays of our politicians and yet so un-phased by them? Could it be that this is behaviour we have come to expect?

While Australia has largely avoided radical right populist parties and personalities – with only 'brief flowerings' of far right groups like the League of Rights during our postwar history (Gibson, McAllister & Swenson 2002: 823) – Pauline Hanson and her One Nation Party have been dubbed Australia's first successful postwar radical right political party. This labeling of Hanson is based on her themes of ethno-nationalism, economic populism and hostility to 'out groups' (Deutschman 2000: 51). This hostility was established in Hanson's now infamous Maiden speech to Parliament in 1996 in which she criticised benefits to Aboriginal Australians as 'reverse racism', claimed that Australia was being 'swamped by Asians', and called for an end to foreign ownership of Australian land (Hanson 1996b: 3862).

This style of hostile, sometimes emotive rhetoric about Indigenous people and immigrants saw the term ‘Hansonism’ coined in the years following her electoral success. Although Hanson lost her seat in the 1998 elections, One Nation endured with some scattered representation across the upper and lower houses of Parliament in Western Australia, New South Wales and Queensland (Forrest et al. 2017: 459). One Nation has left a lasting impression on Australian politics with many anti-immigration and white supremacy groups modelling their beliefs and legitimising their actions based on Hanson’s. Since 2004, and in the last three to four years especially there has been a resurgence in the popularity of far right ideology with anti-immigration being a salient issue among Australian far right groups. Organisations such as Reclaim Australia and the United Patriots Front have gained more attention for their physically heated protests against non-white immigration rates in Australia and anger at a factually non-existent but perceived plural legal system ‘allowing’ sharia law to go ‘unnoticed’ (Kenway 2016: 10).

In 2015, the One Nation Party was relaunched and re-branded as Pauline Hanson’s One Nation and Hanson won her seat for the Senate in 2016. One Nation’s success in the 2016 Federal election has been grouped in with the ‘Brexit’ vote and the election of President Donald Trump in the United States of America (USA) as a return to alarming conservative right wing politics (McSwiney & Cottle 2017: 87). With a number of politics ‘stunts’ pulled by Hanson in the last two years, the most controversial of which saw Hanson dramatically remove a burqa she had worn into Parliament, it seems as if Hanson and by extension One Nation has remained unchanged in their tactics of hostility. With Hanson’s most recent success, scholars and political commentators have searched for answers to explain the return of radical right populism to Australian politics.

The questions raised by Hanson’s resurgence have mainly centred around her supporters. Who are they? Why did they choose Hanson? While these questions are important they tend to focus more attention on the rationality of politics. From Hanson’s tears about Brian Burston to her dramatic veil reveal, it is clear that emotions and not simply rationality play a part in her political actions. The sociology and political study of emotions is an emerging field with the ability to add nuance to the questions surrounding how our politicians communicate, who they communicate to and what effect this can have on political success and failure. Considering this gap in our understanding of Hanson, my thesis aims to explore the ways in which Hanson expresses emotion in her political rhetoric and what these expressions relate to thematically.

The main research questions driving my thesis are as follows. What emotions are expressed by Hanson in her political rhetoric? Have these emotions changed between her first election in 1996

and her return to Parliament in 2016? And, what themes emerge in connection to the emotions and is there a change there? To answer these questions, I will use Reddy's (2001) concept of 'emotional regimes' to highlight how the emotions expressed by Hanson mirror the emotional basis of the radical right. To locate this emotional regime and its emotive language, a content and an applied thematic analysis of Hanson's Parliamentary speeches will be undertaken across her 1996-1998 and 2016-2018 terms. The results of these analyses will then be compared to establish Hanson's range of emotive language and to identify changes in her role as a political actor over the last twenty years. As there is little research on both Pauline Hanson's first term in Parliament or her return¹, this comparative approach to her discourse will be a valuable addition to the literature on Australian politics.

Outline

This thesis is structured over five chapters. First, the literature review will provide an overview of Hanson as a political persona and a brief examination of the profile of her supporters. Emotions will be highlighted both when discussing Hanson's supporters and in reviewing the literature on the sociology of emotions and political studies that utilise emotions as a theoretical tool. There will also be a consideration of Hanson as a radical right populist politician through a review of the most pertinent literature on radical right wing populist parties and their rhetoric. Next, the methods chapter will outline the method of identifying emotive language in political speeches that was inductively developed for this project. The methods chapter will also include the preliminary content analysis results, highlighting the prevalence and frequency of emotive language in Hanson's Parliamentary speeches.

The results of the thematic analysis will be presented over two separate chapters, each focusing on one of Hanson's two terms in Parliament. These results chapters will be structured by the focussed discrete emotions that were identified in the content analysis, with a detailed description of the salient themes expressed within those emotions. These results chapters will also include a brief mention about the particular type of speeches that were most prevalent in each of Hanson's terms. Finally, the discussion and conclusion will be presented together in the last chapter. This chapter will draw out the key themes presented in the two results chapter to more thoroughly discuss the substantive changes in Hanson's political rhetoric over these two parliamentary terms.

¹ For the most recent published commentary on Hanson see, Broinowski, A 2017, *Please Explain: The Rise, Fall and Rise Again on Pauline Hanson*, Viking, North Sydney.

Chapter 1

Out of the fish and chips shop and into Parliament: A literature review

Radical right political parties and personalities have been studied by sociologists and political scientists extensively in Europe and America, but not nearly as much in an Australian context. While Australia has historically lacked electorally successful radical right political parties, far right and populist right personalities certainly exist within the Australian political sphere. Arguably our most enduring populist, right wing political figure is Pauline Hanson. In this literature review, I will reintroduce Hanson to an audience that is very likely familiar with her by highlighting key moments in her public history. My aim is to highlight the importance of Hanson as a political personality in the Australian political sphere and to emphasise the role that emotions have played for success in Australian politics. Next follows a description of radical right and populist right political parties and rhetoric, one that places Hanson and her Party, Pauline Hanson's One Nation, within the spectrum of radical right politics. This account establishes a better understanding of her party and how Hanson's political language may be influenced by common right wing characteristics. This section will include a brief overview of her most common and seemingly important political issues, which will be described and analysed in more detail later in this thesis. Finally, there will be a discussion of the sociology of emotions and political research where emotions have been a key analytic tool in a largely western democratic political sphere. A brief theoretical framework for this thesis will then be synergistically developed from this literature review.

Hanson: The Political Persona

Prior to 1996, the name Pauline Hanson was unknown to the Australian public. Friends, family and the people of Ipswich knew her only as the owner of the local fish and chip shop. However, her ambition for politics saw her succeed in being endorsed as the Liberal Party candidate for the seat of Oxley in November of 1995. For the Liberal Party, her selection was low risk; Oxley had traditionally been one of the safest Labor seats in Queensland and it was common practice for the Liberal and Labor parties to select inexperienced women to run for seats that were almost certain to be lost. Despite such a seemingly low risk, Hanson's Labor opponents found and published a letter that Hanson had written to the Ipswich local newspaper in the hopes of destroying any chance of successful election she possibly had. In that letter, Hanson accused the Federal Government of causing "A racist problem" by providing discriminatory welfare services to Indigenous people, showering them "with money, facilities and opportunities that only these people can obtain no matter how minute the Indigenous blood is that flows through their veins" (Hanson 1996a).

Despite the low stakes for the Liberal Party, the consequences of that letter should have proved fatal to Hanson's political career and on February 14th of 1996, Hanson was dis-endorsed as the Liberal candidate. While this would have been the end for others, Hanson embodied the identity of the stoic 'Aussie Battler'. With only a month to campaign as an independent for the federal election she shocked everyone by winning her seat with a swing of 21%, the largest anti Labor swing in the entire country (Manne 1998: 3). Her identity seems to be her biggest asset. Hanson represents her voters almost perfectly; she is a white Australian born woman who came from nothing and worked hard to get herself into middle class prosperity. As Manne (1998: 4) noted following her election, and incredibly controversial Maiden speech, she "became a heroine, an anti-politician who was defying the norms of political correctness, telling it like it was". Some, like Judith Brett, have theorised that this identity popularity comes from the *lack* of 'real' representation of people in Parliament. She argues that since the 1970s there has been a decline in representativeness within Parliament with more 'career politicians' becoming an increasing trend (Brett 1998:29). Hanson and indeed most of One Nation's elected members represent a turn away from this. Elected officials of One Nation range from backgrounds in mechanics, painting, fishing and even a part time Santa Claus. The anti-politician, at least in the 90s, seemed to be making a comeback.

Hanson's contrasting image to the elite career politicians – an uneducated, small business owner – has always made her seem symbolically closer to the lives of her supporters. During her first two years in Parliament she was hardly ever in attendance and gave a grand total of 35 speeches. However, as Richardson (1998: 156) notes, this hardly mattered, it was a positive side effect of being an 'anti-politician'. Hanson could freely speak to other battlers as often as possible and carry their woes back onto the House floor. Hanson clearly positioned herself as an 'Ordinary Australian' and has made a habit of defining ordinary Australians by who they are *not* rather than by who they *are*. By labelling Asians, immigrants and Aboriginals as 'Un-Australian' implies that exclusion from these categories equates to inclusion in Hanson's claimed 'mainstream' (Ahluwalia & McCarthy 1998: 82). This comparison of non-white persons to the self creates a connection to the sons and daughters of settlers and convicts, to those who skin burns red as red as the Union Jack and who identify as white as the stars in the Southern Cross.

Despite her popularity, Hanson lost her seat in the 1998 federal election just as abruptly as she won it two years previously. One Nation still had a somewhat scattered presence in Parliament up until 2004 but no one in the Party then or now has come close to Hanson's enduring popularity and fixed presence in the dark recesses of the Australian cultural consciousness. Hanson remained ubiquitous up until her re-election primarily because of her many media appearances from the infamous to

showbiz. Her 2003 trial for fraud, ten week imprisonment and eventually successful appeal alongside David Etteridge gained huge media attention. Even during one of the darkest times in Hanson's life, the public remained enthralled with her, rallying support against what they considered an unjust prison sentence. Media outlets reported an enormous amount of correspondence with thousands of letters and phone calls questioning the length of her sentence, even from those who stated a strict opposition to her political views (Mackenzie 2004:163).

In the years following her first term and time in gaol, Hanson has barely left Australian television screens. Her image has been softened with appearances on both *Dancing with the Stars* in 2004 and *The Celebrity Apprentice Australia* in 2011 where the infamous 60 Minutes phrase 'please explain' was used in promotions to comic effect. These shows replaced the image of an outspoken politician with a funny, relatable, good old girl from the country. It is hard to picture other politicians with such divisive views becoming media darlings by washing cars clad in red and blue underwear while singing the national anthem on national television, and yet that is exactly the kind of duality that follows Hanson wherever cameras fear to tread. In the years between syndicated television shows, Hanson continually ran for every federal election only winning again in 2016 when she was labelled across the world as 'the Australian Donald Trump' for her views on immigration, multiculturalism and Islam.

Hanson's popularity: A window to the importance of emotions

Since the shock of Hanson's win in 1996, scholars have rushed to figure out how it happened. Murray Goot (1998: 57) described four key characteristics that many in her constituency held. They were early school leavers, older, male and largely dependent on blue collar jobs. These older working class men seem to have been drawn to Hanson based on issues of race, law and order and the consequences of modernisation (Goot 1998: 72). Marilyn Lake (1998: 118) suggests that men's support for Hanson largely came from her ability to tap into 'their pervasive sense of loss'. These losses include lost jobs, lost status and in a sense lost sovereignty of the Nation and its culture.

In the 2016 federal election, Hanson's voters were largely the same group: older, working class men. However, there has been an increase in the proportion of women voting for One Nation with the split changing from 35% of One Nation's vote in 1998 to 44% in 2016 (Marr 2017a: 1). Despite this small demographic change, the issues are still very much the same and in some ways more deeply felt than in the 90s. Hanson's voters find immigration extremely important as an issue with 90% agreeing with the boat turn-backs for refugees (Marr 2017a: 8). They are still anti-politician

and anti- elitist and they still seem to have an impending sense of doom and loss about the modern world.

These feelings of loss are commonly interpreted as responses to the world and thus responses in voters to Hanson's solutions for them. However, the responses of voters may not be to rationalised solutions only but also to the emotional world that Hanson responds to and creates. Certain scholars such as Anna Gibbs (2001) have noted that Hanson is an actor whose affect is perfect for media amplification, which may have assisted her success in the 90s. In terms of affect, which is described by Gibbs as more physiological in nature than emotions, Hanson's face and voice are of primary interest. Her face is surprisingly expressive and the trend of late 90s early 2000s television focusing on extreme close ups only helped to amplify Hanson's emotions to the entire nation on nightly television (Gibbs 2001:1). Her voice is described by Gibbs as displaying almost constant acute distress, something mirrored in her supporters.

Barcan (1998) also placed Hanson's appeal as a response to grief and sadness. Supporters of Hanson are described as people who do not see themselves in others in an increasingly multicultural Australia and 'fail to be heard', people who feel deeply uncared about (Barcan 1998: 751). In this light, Hanson presents the sadness of white Australians as ignored and undervalued while also offering a hope of care from Hanson herself. Barcan (1998: 749) wrote that elderly people talking about Hanson had a hopeful edge; in one case, a woman who had her handbag snatched was consoled by an elderly woman who stated "When Pauline Hanon's in power, things will be different".

The return to care that Hanson represented is not the only positive emotional draw that has been discussed by scholars. For Rutherford (2001), love played an important role in both Hanson's initial election and her downfall. Rutherford describes Hanson as a leader promising a return to an Australia that actually never existed, one that would be socially indivisible and that this message was packaged in love. Hanson is described as being 'like a bride high on love' when she interacts with her constituents, who return her love without question (Rutherford 2001: 201). However, this love seemed to wane as Hanson's desire for her One Nation co-founder David Oldfield became more public. Hanson was only ever a loved figure when her love was only for her constituency (Rutherford 2001: 210). From Gibbs, Barcan and Rutherford, it is clear that emotions matter in relation to Hanson's success as a politician.

Hanson, One Nation and the Radical Right

Features of the radical right

Of course, to speak about Hanson as a ‘radical right’ and ‘populist’ politician requires some definition of those terms established. Many political scholars have dedicated time to finding the common features of radical right parties, providing a thorough understanding of their development and enduring features. In the development of radical right parties, Lucardie (2000: 176) includes a definition of right wing parties as ‘purifiers’. Purifiers break from larger established political parties and claim they have done so to defend ‘pure’ versions of the previous party’s ideology. Many radical right parties use this as a strategy to gain short term success by tapping into neglected historical traditions (Lucardie 2000: 182). These traditions include ideas of ‘national enemies’, ‘true’ national identities and nuclear family structures (Wodak 2015: 4). Most scholars who have studied radical right parties for the last thirty years agree they all share three features in common. They are nationalistic, authoritarian and anti-elitist (Mudde 2013: 3; Wodak 2015: 21; Mudde 2010: 1178; Knigge 1998: 225). These common features are theorized as coming from a response to perceived threats to the public initiated by rapid changes to the world through processes of globalization, multiculturalism and economic change, otherwise known as ‘modernisation theory’ (Knigge 1998: 271). Betz (1994: 32) argues the abrupt transition of western nations to multicultural and postindustrial spaces has created ‘losers’ who simply cannot adapt and thus lose their status. It is theorised that these groups of losers are both those who respond best to radical right wing politics and drive the demand for this style of politics.

The term ‘radical’ itself has also been explored with Jens Rydgren’s (2007) article, ‘The sociology of the radical right’, providing a thorough review of the categorization of radical right parties. For Rydgren (2007: 243), radical parties are those that advocate for political monism and are expressed in two ways, either as a rejection of a democratic political system or as a rejection of universalistic and egalitarian values. A further split between right wing extremism and radical right parties is seen where right wing extremism exists only outside of the formal political system and is *completely opposed* to that system, whereas the radical right operates within the political system while remaining *hostile* to its values (Rydgren 2007: 243).

Rydgren goes on to argue that populism is a characteristic of the radical right but not necessarily a distinctive feature of those parties. However, populism is still an important feature of many radical right parties with a worldview of founding members of those parties. They believe that there are ‘pure’ people (like in Lucardie’s work) and a ‘corrupt elite’ that not only includes the traditional understanding of elites but also immigrants, sexual minorities and ethnic minorities (Rydgren 2007:

245). Bonikowski's (2017: 184) definition of populism goes further to propose that ordinary people are not only glorified as pure but are also seen as the "sole legitimate source of political power". This veneration of the mainstream person creates a hatred of elites and a suspicion of representative institutions like the judiciary. These State based institutions are accused of only serving the elite, with populist parties advocating for direct contact between the people and the state to decide political matters (Bonikowski 2017: 185).

Rhetoric and Hanson's place on the right wing spectrum

Many of the common characteristics and categorizations of radical right parties come down to an analysis of their rhetoric. Dryzek (2010: 328) has worked specifically on the topic of political rhetoric and classified rhetoric as either falling within bridging or bonding categories. Bridging rhetoric is described as a difficult task for a speaker as they need to understand and communicate effectively to an audience whose dispositions are often very different to theirs and also need to "hold on to his or her own side" (Dryzek 2010: 328). Bonding rhetoric on the other hand is described as easier as the speaker only needs to mobilise others who are already like them, i.e. bonding or creating a bond of 'us' contrasted with an external 'them' (Dryzek 2010: 329). While bridging rhetoric may seem more acceptable or desirable than bonding rhetoric (Martin Luther King Jr. is an oft cited example of a bridging rhetorician), Dryzek also advocates for a closer examination of the consequences of all rhetoric in a systemic view.

For example, a style of bridging rhetoric can have negative consequences when used by dominant actors to neutralize problematic groups of people. Dryzek (2010: 331) gives the example of Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli using this kind of rhetoric to force an alliance between the landed upper classes and the workers against the liberal urban capitalists by stressing that both disparate and unequal classes are part of 'one nation'. Further, bonding rhetoric, while generally undesirable, can have potentially beneficial consequences. Dryzek (2010: 334) uses Pauline Hanson's speech as an example of a kind of bonding rhetoric that is so hostile to out groups that it has the potential to mobilise liberal and multicultural discourses.

Bonding rhetoric appears to be a potential characteristic of radical right wing parties as the ethno-nationalistic focus draws on support from those considered to be 'native' to the nation. Although what is meant by native in post-colonial nations are primarily those who can identify as white, being born within the nation and in some cases following the dominant religion (Bonikowski 2017: 187). In Hanson's Maiden speech to Parliament in 1996 she spoke about feelings of frustration at being "told" by Indigenous people that Australia is "our land" and explicitly referenced her equal

claim to the nation by right of birth by declaring “Well, where the hell do I go? I was born here, and so were my parents and children” (Hanson 1996b: 3861). It is through this style of bonding rhetoric and the focus on radical right issues that Hanson and the One Nation Party can be placed on the populist radical right of the political spectrum.

The features of nationalism, authoritarianism and anti-elitism fit Hanson’s rhetoric neatly. While hostility to democratic processes may be somewhat absent, Hanson’s innate distrust of political elites and the processes used to debate public issues push her and One Nation over the line and into the radical right category (although they are certainly not part of the extremist right). These common radical right wing characteristics are closely linked to Hanson’s three most prominent political issues in her time in Parliament in both the 90s and currently, which are the economy, immigration and race and its implications for national identity. In terms of the economy, she frequently lambasts the economic and governmental elites as being incompetent and out of touch. David Marr (2017b: 32) notes in his essay, ‘The White Queen’, that for Hanson not only are elites incompetent with the economy, they also have a sinister influence over culture and national identity, pushing progressive ideas and values onto an unwilling mainstream.

One such ideal is multiculturalism, which is seen by Hanson as inherently bad for the nation and stemming the flow of immigration into the country is her solution for this. In her Maiden speech in 1996, she called for the abolishment of ‘the policy of multiculturalism’ which would simultaneously save ‘billions of dollars’ and ‘allow those from ethnic backgrounds to join mainstream Australia’ (Hanson 1996b: 3862). Here she is nationalistic not only in calling for fewer outsiders to join the nation but also in her calls for immigrants to assimilate to ‘mainstream’ or white Australia. The message is loud and clear: if you don’t inherently belong to the nation then you need to make every effort to become the same as everyone who was ‘already here’. Here, of course, race overlaps with issues of immigration and multiculturalism. However, race issues for Hanson include the perceived division of the nation into white and Indigenous Australians where Indigenous Australians are offered more welfare provisions than white Australians. Hanson frequently brings up the notion of equality in her rhetoric, as Marr (2017b: 33) puts it “Colour blind is fine in theory but in Hanson’s world it means cheap loans for farmers but not scholarships for black kids”.

The sociology of emotions: A potentially unexplored rhetorical tool

While the scholars mentioned above rightly recognise valency in the rhetoric and the historical conditions mobilising right wing voters, few political studies have focused specifically on emotions. This may be due to methodological or epistemological difficulties associated with an area of study that is comparatively young. Over the last fifty years of research into the sociology of emotions, theories ranging from purely psychological to purely semiotic and everything in between have been put forward as reasonable explanations for the mechanics of emotions with little consensus. Abu-Lughod and Lutz (2009: 100) highlight in their work that up until the mid 1980s psychological approaches to emotions were the norm, along with an insistence that emotions were purely internal, psychobiological processes that were largely uninfluenced by social or cultural factors.

The current sociological view of emotions is that they are a complex social construction expressed at both the individual and collective level simultaneously. This view is furthered by scholars such as Frijda and Mesquita (1994: 52) who state that emotions are always experienced as the relevant concerns of individuals in reference to others. Emotions occur in social contexts, allowing the transmission of social rules and the building of culture (Frijda & Mesquita 1994: 56-61; Boger & Mesquita 2012: 225). This idea of culture has seen another binary develop within the discipline with some emphasising how cultures prescribe emotional reactions to events (Boger & Mesquita 2012: 226) and others studying the way in which singular emotions are becoming the basis for entire cultures (Glassner 1999; Furedi 2002).

Discrete singular emotions as the basis for culture has led to very influential works such as Furedi's (2002: 17) *Culture of Fear* which seeks to establish modern western societies as ones that have developed a fear based response to everything from parenting, to health, air travel and immigration. Others like Tudor (2003: 249) have developed typologies of macro-sociological approaches to discrete emotions like fear, which place environments, culture and social structures as the 'sites of fear' for study. Both Tudor and Furedi, while being highly influential, have the issue of placing discrete emotions at the centre of all public life rather than discussing the complex interaction of multiple emotions.

While in the sociology of emotions discrete emotional approaches thrive, scholars in other disciplines have also tackled the problem of theorising emotions and have contributed highly useful holistic approaches. One of the most enduring theories of emotions comes from the discipline of the history of emotions. William Reddy's (2001) *The Navigation of Feeling* sets out a theory that balances the dominant approaches to emotions that Reddy describes as being psychological,

ethnographic and historical (2001: x). Reddy's (2001: 94- 95) definition of emotions is that they are 'a range of loosely connected thought material' which are expressed primarily through language. This definition of emotion keeps them 'loose', allowing for the complex nature of emotion's internal and external attributes to be included in their analysis. Language is utilized as the vehicle through which we can all 'translate' emotions and so can be traced and researched. For Reddy (2001: 323) the collective speech acts of a group can establish what he terms as the 'emotional regime' or "the complex of practices that establish a set of emotional norms and that sanction those who break them". The concept of emotional regimes has been used for studying a wide range of phenomena, from ideas of gender and love in popular ballads (Garrido & Davidson 2016) to Lawyer's practices of loyalty in Swedish Court rooms (Flower 2016).

Emotions in political research

While emotional approaches are often unacknowledged in political research there are some scholars who, like the sociology of emotions, use singular emotions to analyse political parties and systems. For example, Jack Barbalet (1998: 149) utilises emotion in his work, exploring how emotions mobilise actors based on their interests. He uses the concept of 'emotional climates' to describe how emotions lead to political actions like 'containment' where policy is used to counteract negative emotive events (Barbalet 1995:25). In Barbalet's (1995: 30) work, fear is highlighted as an important emotion within the political world where containment is used by elites to maintain political cohesion and identities. Aside from containment practices, Berezin (2002: 38) has also shown how discrete emotions like fear impact politics by showing how it impacts on the enduring public perception of a secure state. In analysing over twenty years of Italian Fascist discourse she found that fear was integral to the fascist political tactic of creating myths around the insecurity of the state and mobilizing public support for anti-Semitic and anti-immigration policies (Berezin 2002: 48).

Fear as a singular emotional basis in political studies is very popular. For example, Appadurai (2009) describes fear as a driving force underlying radical right responses to minorities. For Appadurai (2009: 236) radical right parties have a 'predatory identity', one that requires the extinction of 'others' and understands itself as being a threatened majority. Fear is seen in this model of mobilization as a response to minorities, that even when miniscule in national statistics, are a constant reminder that the whole social group or nation is not pure (Appadurai 2009: 237). Van Prooijen et al. (2015: 485) also describe fear as a singular emotional driver in conservative and right wing groups where they are described as having high levels of anxiety about a rapidly changing world. Even for Betz (1994) a combined concept of fear and anger was represented as

‘resentiment’ in his work to describe the demand for radical right wing groups as a response to rapidly changing worlds.

While not relying on Betz’s concept of resentment, fear and anger combined are popular as discrete emotional underpinnings of political rhetoric. De Castella and McGarty (2011) use the psychologically based ‘appraisal’ theory to code for fear and anger in their work on the rhetoric of George W. Bush and Tony Blair when discussing terrorism. Appraisal theory is used here as a framework to understand emotions not only as reactions to events but contextual appraisals or perceptions and descriptions of those events (De Castella & McGarty 2011: 183). They found that there was a substantial difference in the way that fear and anger were expressed between Bush and Blair, with fear more present in the rhetoric of Bush and anger more present for Blair (De Castella & McGarty 2011: 187). De Castella, McGarty and Musgrove (2009) previously undertook a very similar study on fear in an Australian context where they analysed the political rhetoric of John Howard on the same topic of terrorism. While again appraisal theory is used to establish the conditions for expression of fear in rhetoric, the conditions themselves could be too strict for a political construction of fear.

De Castella, McGarty and Musgrove’s (2009: 5) conditions for a positive identification of fearful rhetoric are that: a) a situation is relevant to the perceiver; b) an appraisal that the situation is in opposition to the goals of the perceiver; and, c) an appraisal that the perceiver has little ability to cope with the threat. The idea that the language must reflect little or no ability to cope with a threat could be taken as too strict for political rhetoric as the intent of political speech is to mobilise a public toward a solution to a problem or threat. Despite this strict construction of fear, De Castella, McGarty and Musgrove (2009: 21-22) found that fear was coded for most often in speeches that Howard made leading up to the Iraq invasion and at times of declining public support for Australia’s military involvement in the Middle East showing that in the case of Howard fear played a role in the tactics of Australian political rhetoric.

The holistic approach to political emotions

While these studies which use singular emotions are insightful one could argue that they are not necessarily rigorous in the establishment of emotional responses or structures within politics where they specifically seek evidence of one to two discrete emotions. Other scholars have sought a more inductive approach to the study of politics and political leaders to find the totality of emotions represented. For example, Carol Johnson (2010) analysed how the identities and rights of citizens are constructed through the historical representations of emotions by their political leaders. Drawing

on political speeches of leaders from the UK, US, Canada and Australia, Johnson has highlighted the varying array of dominant emotions among changing political leaders. As opposed to only searching for the construction of citizenship through expressions of fear or anger, Johnson (2010: 503) inductively found changing emotional regimes over time as exemplified by the shift in 2007 from George W. Bush's political style of fear to Barack Obama's emphasis on hope and pride. This emotional regime of hope saw an attempt to establish compassionate and empathetic citizens, although it remains to be seen as to whether this was ever truly achieved in the wake of a return to populist conservatism.

Another example of those who inductively analyse political emotions are Salmela and Von Scheve (2017) who have written about the emotional basis of right wing political populism. They argue that emotions play a crucial role in generating many of the negative attitudes described previously in this chapter of supporters of the radical right (anti-immigrant sentiment, ethno nationalism, anti-elitism etc.). For Salmela and Von Scheve (2017: 573) it is not only fear that drives the support of right wing populism but also a repressed sense of shame that easily translates in anger. This shame is so avidly avoided that right wing populists actively seek to replace social identities that engender shame with those that create positive emotions of pride or love such as adherence to traditional gender roles, traditional Judeo-Christian religions and customs and strong identification with white nationalism (Salmela & Von Scheve 2017: 587).

Emotional regimes in populist and radical right research

While very few political scholars actively use the concept of emotional regimes in their work there is at least one scholar who has recently applied the concept to the political phenomenon of Donald Trump. Whal-Jorgensen (2018) has utilized the concept in a study on media coverage of Donald Trump and what they call the turn towards 'angry populism'. In this study, anger is, like it is for other studies listed above, a discrete emotion that is searched for in media coverage between the election in 2016 and the inauguration of Trump in 2017 and readily found. Whal-Jorgensen (2018: 767) states that previous theories have outlined the role of 'reactionary anger' and protest voting in the election of Donald Trump as the President of the US, which is to say that anger was vital. The study found that up until Trump's inauguration the terms 'anger' or 'angry' appeared more than twice as many times in the same period that President Barack Obama was elected in, suggesting that anger was a common emotion at the time of Trump's election (Whal-Jorgensen 2018: 772). This anger seemed to be shared by everyone where 90% of actors expressing anger were Trump, his supporters and his opponents (Whal-Jorgensen 2018: 773). However only 23.3% and 13.3% of anger was expressed by Trump and his supporters respectively. These results show that while anger

was an important motivation for support of Trump and played a role in his political rhetoric, most instances of anger (55.5%) were directed *towards* Trump (Whal-Jorgensen 2018: 773-774). This analysis highlights the potential for a positive outcome of the central role of anger in an emotional regime where it is also used by people who oppose the radical right and to re-establish more empathic political systems (Whal-Jorgensen 2018: 776).

Considering the work of the theorists studying politics and emotions listed here, this thesis will be centred on Reddy's (2001) concept of emotional regimes while inductively expanding on the linguistic content analysis methods of Whal-Jorgensen (2018). Reddy's concept has been chosen for its ability to utilise emotion in language as the basis for describing the dominant emotions present within groups that greatly vary in scope. These regimes as described above can range from relatively small networks such as a small nation's judiciary (Flower 2016) up to entire nations (Reddy 2001: 209). While emotional regimes are used most often to describe structures between actors over time, I will be using the concept to describe how Pauline Hanson as an actor either creates or 'mirrors'² an emotional regime for her own political party through speech acts. This will enable me to analyse which emotions help construct the regime and how they have changed over time. It will also enable a starting point for further discussion of how this regime mirrors the emotional regime of the radical right.

² In this thesis the term 'mirror' does not refer to a psychological process. Rather, it is used to denote a potentially unconscious copying of the rhetoric or tactics of other radical right politicians in other western democracies.

Chapter 2

Methodology and Preliminary Results

To analyse the emotional regime that Pauline Hanson mirrors, a content analysis and an applied thematic analysis of her speeches in Parliament in both the House of Representatives and the Senate from all of 1996-1998 and 2016- June 28th of 2018 was performed. These Parliamentary speeches were chosen as the data-set to provide focus for the project as well as explore the discourse of Hanson as a ‘figure head’ politician. While a mixed data-set of media releases, policy texts and campaign data would also be useful in examining Hanson’s discourse, the volume and ethical sourcing of the data would likely make the current goal of this thesis unworkable. There is also the issue of reconciling differing social and political contexts of texts sourced from before and after a politician’s term in Parliament.

Parliamentary speeches provide suitable data on the values and emotions expressed by Hanson, as De Castella and McGarty (2011: 193) note that “one must assume that political leaders are deliberative actors who select their words carefully and strategically in pursuit of a broader political agenda”.³ Parliamentary speeches also offer the opportunity to see a range of emotion and emotive language that are not expressed during campaigns and in media releases. It would have been beyond the scope of this project to include media releases and campaign materials that are more likely to contain ‘mobilising’ emotions which, while potentially adding to the rigor of the establishment of an emotional regime, would require further analysis of context. While comparing different data sources would increase the richness of data and the opportunity for establishing consistent or juxtaposing discourse, this analysis of Parliamentary speeches acts as a model for a larger project that would include other data sources.

Methodology

Data-set one was comprised of Hanson’s first term Parliamentary speeches from 1996-1998 and data-set two comprised of Hanson’s second term Parliamentary speeches from 2016-2018. The speeches used in data-sets one and two were publicly available through online archives of *Hansard*. Parliamentary speeches and debates where Pauline Hanson was the main speaker were sourced in a digital download format from *Hansard* with documents ranging from 1996-1998 making up data-set one and 2016-2018 making up data-set two. Data-set two extended up until June 28th of 2018 for

³ While it should be noted that Hanson does not write all of her own speeches; she is still the political ‘figurehead’ of One Nation and rarely, if ever, can be convinced to give voice to political opinions that are not her own.

sufficient time to be given to the analysis and to make both data-sets equal in length for later comparison. A total of 175 documents were initially sourced prior to exclusion criteria. These speeches were read, analysed and coded in the NVivo qualitative analysis program.

First, a close reading was conducted of both data-sets to establish general themes of political discourse and emotive language. While there are extensive emotion dictionaries used by some sociolinguists available, typically containing up to 1,500 English words used to describe emotion, an emotion dictionary was not sourced for this thesis. This is due to the scale of this thesis and its basis in data rich qualitative texts. Instead of using an established emotion dictionary or keyword list, codes for emotion were generated inductively through the close reading by looking for direct and synonymous language describing and expressing emotions. From this close reading a three step coding framework for emotive language emerged. The first step, as mentioned, looked for direct emotive language. Examples included words like ‘afraid’ or ‘fearful’ to code for fear and ‘angry’ or ‘anger’ to code for anger (see codebook in appendix for complete synonym and phrase lists).

This first step is similar to that adopted in other works like Whal-Jorgensen’s (2018) who used instances of direct language of anger to argue for an emotional regime of anger in American politics. However, my thesis also uses synonymous language as the second step in the three step framework. For example anger can be coded for speeches where synonyms such as ‘frustrated’ or ‘outraged’ appear. The third and final step identifies contextual phrasing and valency assignments to consequences arising from emotively described issues. All three steps can be seen in examples of text at once or one to two steps can be seen. For example, sadness is often coded at step one and two with direct language (i.e. ‘sad’) and synonyms of sadness being seen with words like ‘suffering’, ‘despair’ or ‘misery’. Anger was an example that was coded at all steps as Hanson uses direct, synonymous and contextual language to express anger on behalf of the public. Phrases like ‘fed up’, ‘sick of’ or ‘had enough’ were used to describe events and issues given a negative valency and were often paired with step one and step two language.

Coding was quantified by number of speeches involving emotive language at any step over the entire data-sets. Other studies such as De-Castella and McGarty (2011) tend to quantify coding results by sentence, dividing coded sentences by entire sentence count per speech to give a percentage of emotive content per speech. This was deemed to be inefficient for a data-set this large; studies like De-Castella and McGarty’s typically analyse no more than thirty speeches, providing a basis for rich analysis of a singular emotion. In addition to my data-set being more than four times as large as those studies, this thesis also aims to inductively analyse emotive content

rather than searching for a particular discrete emotion. As such, percentage of emotive content per speech would have quickly become an onerous data point as multiple emotions were coded in the speeches, adding an unnecessary layer of difficulty in presenting meaningful quantitative emotive data results for a project of this size.

For the thematic analysis component of the thesis, the work of Guest, MacQueen and Namey (2012) was influential. In their book on applied thematic analysis, they provide a definition of themes as “implicit and explicit ideas within the data” (Guest, MacQueen & Namey 2012: 9). To identify themes in text Guest, MacQueen and Namey (2012: 68) outline the common features of thematic language as the use of repetition, metaphors and analogies, comparisons and omissions/ “missing data”. This last point of missing data refers to the observation of absences of meaning in text. While this thesis uses methods based largely in looking at instances of direct language, themes of absence will also be noted in Hanson’s speeches as direct opposition to enemies is common feature of radical right identity formation. In relation to repetition, this will form the basis for part of the exclusion criteria of emotive coding and discussion of themes. Each emotion must be coded for more than twice to be included in a thematic analysis of speeches containing those emotions. The same criteria applies to themes. In both cases this exclusion criteria ensures that the most significant emotions and themes are discussed given the short length an MRes thesis allows. The only other exclusion criteria set for the data is that to be included for analysis each speech must be over 100 words in length.


Preliminary content analysis results

Data-set one included all 35 speeches given by Hanson in Parliament from 1996-1998. Certain speeches in data-set two however did not meet the exclusion criteria and from an initial 173 speeches spanning from September 14th of 2016 to June 28th of 2018, 44 speeches were excluded, leaving 129 speeches in data-set two. Many of the excluded speeches in data-set two would not meet the common definition of a political speech as they were usually one or two lines long and did not present with rhetorical discussions of political issues. Both data-sets were compared with each other highlighting the consistencies and differences in emotive content and themes. For ease of discussion, data-set one will be referred to as Hanson’s first term and data-set two will be referred to as Hanson’s second term from this point on.

The results presented in this chapter come from a total of 164 speeches spanning four years in Parliament with an eighteen-year gap in between the first and second terms. Six distinct emotions were consistently coded for within data-set one which were Fear (19), Anger (13) Sadness (10)


Pride (6) Guilt (4) and Shame (2). Of these emotions Fear, Anger, Sadness and Pride were the most consistent and discrete emotions expressed, with guilt and shame being referenced alongside other emotions such as anger and sadness (see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1 Coded emotions in Hanson's Parliamentary Speeches from 1996-1998



Similar emotive content was found in data-set two with additional emotions that were not coded for in the first data-set (see Figure 2.2). The most prominent emotions were Anger (33), Fear (31), Sadness (26) and, a new emotion for Hanson's speeches Love (20). Shame (6) and Pride (5) were also included among Hanson's expressed emotions however Guilt was absent. Other new emotions that appeared in data-set two were Happiness (8), Hope (3) and Hatred (3).

Figure 2.2 Coded emotions in Hanson's Parliamentary Speeches from 2016-2018



These preliminary results show that, while the number of speeches vary greatly from Hanson's first and second term, that negative emotions are prominent in both and overlap each other in a large number of speeches. Positive emotions are also present but from content analysis alone appear to be more prevalent in Hanson's second term as can be seen in figure 2.3 and table 2.1 below.

Figure 2.3 Coded emotions over entire data-set




Table 2.1 Coded emotions by Parliamentary Term

Emotion	1996-1998	2016-2018
Fear	54	24
Anger	37	26
Sadness	29	20
Pride	17	4
Guilt	11	0
Shame	6	5
Love	<1	16
Happiness	<1	6
Hope	0	2
Hatred	0	2

(n= percentage of sources coded with each emotion over entire data-set)

With this preliminary content analysis it is clear that emotions are present in Hanson's speeches. The emotions overlap with each other in the first and second terms and also remain relatively consistent over both terms. Both terms include the same three main negative emotions of fear, anger and sadness, and the positive emotion of pride. However, Hanson's second term brings an expansion of emotions with the negative hatred, and the positive love, happiness and hope. While the expansion of positive emotions in particular is potentially a sign of more positive expressions of political issues, it does raise a question which requires the following applied thematic analysis. What rhetorical themes are these positive emotions being used to describe? To understand what political statement the entire range of emotions makes, the following analysis of Hanson's first and second term speeches is both necessary and insightful.

Chapter 3

1996-1998: Establishing a Regime

Hanson's first term speeches were mainly second reading speeches and adjournments. It is interesting to note that despite her popularity and even protests against her, she did not introduce any legislation into Parliament during her first term. On days that she participated in Parliament the majority of her time was spent debating other Members and positioning herself as concerned about the economy and the state of Australian culture. On the point of Australian culture there were several speeches in which she commented on the topic at length even when the legislation in question was not concerned with it. For example, when speaking on a migration legislation amendment bill the Speaker stopped Hanson twice for her irrelevant comments on the idea that migrants would irreversibly change Australian culture (Hanson 1996d: 8094). Themes like this were expressed through a variety of negative emotions as can be seen below.

Fear

Fear was the dominant emotion expressed in Hanson's speeches during this period. The main threats described by Hanson were destruction of the economy, threats to Australian culture and threats to national sovereignty from the Indigenous population. While Hanson presents the nation as being naturally rich in mineral deposits and having large swaths of fertile land for agriculture, fiscal wealth is presented as lacking to point of metaphorical violence. In her Maiden Speech Hanson quotes "... we are \$190 billion in debt with an interest bill that is strangling us" (Hanson 1996b: 3861). This economic situation makes Australia a "third world country with first world living conditions" (Ibid). Hanson's rhetoric on the economy strengthens the link to the emotion of fear as she likens the country's financial state as fragile and close to the edge of destruction, "All we need is a nail hole in the bottom of the boat and we're sunk" (Hanson 1996b: 3861).

Hanson also described specific industries significant for her constituency as threatened. These industries included manufacturing and agriculture with agriculture having specific threats to the nation's people within the meat and timber industry. The strength of the manufacturing industry was spoken about as a past defining feature of Australia when "we were independent and self reliant" (Hanson 1997d: 7706). However, manufacturing and other industries were described as facing "defeat from within" via "a government that for many years has worked against the interests of the majority of the population; a government seemingly prepared to scrap its own people" (Ibid). While "destructive" policies were not explicitly cited, Hanson used comparative statistics from the 1960s to highlight the quantitative decrease in employment in manufacturing and the increase in overall

unemployment to highlight the consequences of Government policies (2.6 per cent unemployed in 1961 and 8.7 per cent in 1997).

Economic policies were also linked to physical danger where Hanson claimed that foreign importation of meats including cooked chicken and pig meat would introduce disease into Australia (Hanson 1997d: 7709; Hanson 1997k: 11610). She stated “Once Australia is infected, the disease is here forever.” (Hanson 1997k: 11610). In other speeches Hanson linked this threat of disease to ideas of contagion from foreign actors. When referencing the 1997 Thailand IMF bailout fund Hanson described Thailand as “one of the countries seeking to export cooked chicken meat to Australia”, and asked if we will consider the threat of disease a “Thank you” for the “loan” (Hanson 1997f: 7981). Any foreign elements influencing the Australian economy, including foreign aid, were labelled as risky. Speaking again about the IMF Thailand fund Hanson stated that it “has set a dangerous precedent for the Australian people to be further exposed to the risk of international instability” (Ibid). Free trade agreements were similarly dangerous as they posed a threat to Australian sovereignty alongside threats to industry. Prior to discussing a free trade agreement Hanson declared that “unless we rid ourselves of this cult like obsession with free trade, Australia will cease to exist as an independent sovereign nation.” (Hanson 1997j: 11015). In other speeches the Government’s commitment to free trade was described as “a weapon of mass social destruction” (Hanson 1998b: 1468) highlighting the contextual language of danger used in her speeches.

Fear was also expressed about immigration, particularly Asian immigration. In a now infamous line in her Maiden speech, Hanson declared that Australia and its citizens were “in danger of being swamped by Asians” (Hanson 1996b: 3862). The threat from Asian immigration was the danger of dismantling the unified culture of ‘mainstream’ Australia. Hanson highlighted this threat by stating that Asian immigrants “have their own culture and religion, form ghettos and do not assimilate” (Ibid). Here the terms ‘swamped’ and ‘ghetto’ imply a natural disaster of overwhelming proportions and criminal spaces. Criminality was further linked to Asian immigrants where Hanson spoke about the “imported problems” of drug trafficking. Hanson raised the examples of Duncan Lam and Duong Van as Australia’s largest Heroin Importer and distributor respectively asking “are we expected to believe these Asian gangsters came to Australia as decent, honest, law abiding human beings who somehow just fell into a life of crime?” (Hanson 1997i: 10688). In the same speech she cited a statistic that “about 90 per cent of Australia’s heroin importations are conducted by Chinese drug gangs” (Ibid) implying that serious drug crime is a uniquely Asian affliction on the nation’s public health and safety. The nexus between criminality, immigrant status and geographical space

was raised in another speech where Hanson stated “it is no good having a rich country if it is falling apart because of violence, gang warfare and ethnic separatism.” (Hanson 1996d: 8093).

Immigrants were also linked to disease, Hanson stated “Australians are sick of imported problems - be they crime, disease or aspects of cultural difference that will never be able to accept the Australian way of life” (Hanson 1997f: 7641) and “We do not allow in people who have disease and we do not allow in people who have criminal records.” (Ibid). Along with disease there was also an implicit threat to the existence of a white majority in Australia. As Hanson stated “if the increase in Asian immigration keeps going up at the rate it has been lately in 50 years there will be more Asian than Anglo-Celtic European Australians here. The current situation cannot be allowed to continue. The social engineering of recent years must cease.” (Hanson 1996d: 8094).

Foreign immigrants are not the only Asian threat faced by Australia. Hanson also highlighted the threat to Australian commerce. The ability to compete with neighbouring Asian countries such as “Japan with 125 million people, China, with 1.2 billion people; India with 846 million people; Indonesia with 178 million people; and Malaysia, with 20 million people” was becoming harder with economic incentives given to these manufacturing centred nations (Hanson 1996b: 3862). Hanson positioned this as being a time sensitive issue, stating that “time is running out. We may have only 10 to 15 years left to turn things around” and urges “Wake up, Australia, before it is too late” (Ibid).

Lastly, fear was also expressed for and about Indigenous people. At one point, Hanson spoke about Indigenous people as being “killed” by the billion dollar welfare system that has left them “worse off than they were 20 years ago” (Hanson 1996c: 6341). Here, Hanson frames Indigenous people as victims. Yet at other points in her discourse Hanson also expresses fear of Indigenous people as a group that threaten to divide the nation and seize sovereignty. They are even described in one instance as if they are inferior beings where Hanson stated they are “A hunter-gather people, with a stubborn sustainable development philosophy and no visible modern industrial economy” (Hanson 1997g: 8899).

The treatment of Indigenous people in other parts of the world triggered Hanson to describe a UN draft declaration of Rights of Indigenous People in 1998 as “dreadfully dangerous”, implying that it created a possibility for Australian Indigenous people to establish a separate state and government within Australia just as the Nunavut state in Canada had been established (Hanson 1998d: 4696). She warned that the signing of the UN treaty by the Australian Government would be “a

treacherous sellout of the Australian people” and that “it will tear the heart out of our country and deliver that heart to one of our very smallest minority groups” (Hanson 1998c: 4502). This emphasis on the size of the Indigenous population of Australia was a common occurrence in Hanson’s first term speeches and highlights the threat of native title, which she called “paralyzing”. For Hanson, the *Native Title Act (1993)* was representative of a national division between the majority of Australians and the minority of Indigenous people. She stated that “up to 79 per cent of Australia is under the threat of native title by less than two per cent of the population” (Hanson 1998c: 4504) making the consequences of the minority appear very large. Hanson expressed an unshakeable conviction that native title will create a separation of Australia into Indigenous and non-Indigenous states as she declares “There is no doubt the long-term goal of the aboriginal industry is to create a separate Indigenous nation within Australia... This is a clear and indisputable fact that will disturb all Australians who believe we are working for the future as one people” (Hanson 1997g: 8899).

Anger

Anger featured in speeches concerned with the same issues as fear, but also speeches about family law issues. Economic problems were framed as Government failures, with foreign competition and a ‘sell out mentality’ of globalisation attracting the most anger. In September of 1997, Hanson characterised the economic climate of globalisation in Australia as “sacrificing our jobs and the future of our children on the altar of economic rationalism and globalisation”; globalisation was seen as a policy “of betrayal” and she voiced collective anger when she stated that “we are sick of” these policies (Hanson 1997d: 7709). Contextual phrases like “we are sick of” were used alongside similes of bullying to put the Government in the place of insulter, attacker and abuser of the Australian people. A prime example is Hanson’s description of fruit growers where she stated “the citrus industry is on its knees and, like a bully, the government is kicking sand in the face of these Australian growers” (Hanson 1997d: 7708). Hanson’s reference to the public being ‘sick of’ this kind of treatment with the Government positioned as betrayer steers the discourse towards anger.

In other speeches, Hanson uses herself as a barometer of public opinion and references her own anger, “I must voice my deep concern, indeed anger, at both the federal government and the New South Wales state government’s savage and unnecessary cuts to timber resources” (Hanson 1997h: 10493). In the same speech, Hanson posed the idea of the Government merely being a front for global corporations where she describes the “sacrifices on the altar of free trade may pay homage to your lords the internationalists, but they reduce your own people to a life of bitterness and in some cases poverty” (Hanson 1997h: 10494). While this is similar to the fear discourse, the feeling of

bitterness aligns these speeches with anger. Hanson perpetuates the idea of the ‘internationalist lords’ when speaking about multinational corporations and taxation, arguing that free trade agreements increase this problem. Here is an issue where Hanson claims that the Australian people are directly angered by policy, stating “More and more Australians are becoming aware of these facts and they are getting angry and becoming tired of being used. It is time to make multinationals and foreigners pay their share of tax” (Hanson 1998a: 766).

The Indigenous community are another point of anger for Hanson. This anger centres around ideas of discrimination against non-Indigenous Australians and fraudulent claims of Indigenous heritage for financial gain. In her Maiden speech Hanson declared that “like millions of Australians, I am fed up to the back teeth with the inequalities that are being promoted by the government and paid for by the tax payer under the assumption that aboriginals are the most disadvantaged people in Australia” (Hanson 1996b: 3860). Later in 1998, she stated that

“Identifying as an aboriginal has definite financial advantages, as aboriginality allows them to claim a share of the booty of the native title scam as well as various other publicly funded perks not available to other Australians. This is reducing the resources available to real aboriginals in need and promoting discontent among Australians who are appalled by the scandalous waste of their money and the government’s overall incompetence in dealing with the issue” (Hanson 1998c: 4503).

Here Hanson is claiming discrimination but also attempts to cancel out racism but talking about the consequences for “real aboriginals”. Hanson never outlines who ‘real’ Indigenous people are, suggesting that the real anger is towards all Indigenous people with the “scam” of native title and “discriminatory” government welfare policies potentially accessible to all aboriginal people.

Issues concerning family law also featured as sites of anger with an implicit focus on the anger of men. Hanson described the current child support scheme as one where “Children are being used as pawns in an often bitter and unpleasant experience which often results in the noncustodial parent being left angry and frustrated by what appears to be an arbitrary and unjust system” (Hanson 1997c: 5458). The focus on non-custodial parents is an implicit focus on men and male anger as fathers are usually the non-custodial parent in divorce outcomes. This male anger seems to legitimate the consequences that Hanson describes next: “Those who perceive themselves as losers in the process sometimes become suicidal, depressive and vindictive. It is no coincidence that some have turned to murder or other forms of violence as a consequence” (Ibid). At no point in this or

other speeches does Hanson place the blame for homicidal consequences on the non-custodial parent, only on the system that has let them down and left them angry.

Finally, immigrants are a source of anger: their drain on the economy and lack of desire to assimilate are “affronts” to the Australian people. One such drain was the money spent on hearings for residency of criminal or illegal immigrants as an “expenditure you cannot reasonably justify and it is a bill the Australian people do not want. It is an affront to the Australian people that so much time and money is spent expelling from our shores people who, in most cases are little more than opportunistic invaders taking advantage of our reputation as a soft touch” (Hanson 1997e: 7640). This expression of anger ascribes characteristics of villainy and power to immigrants who are posed as scheming to gain as much as possible from Australia and its people without giving anything back in return.

Sadness

Sadness was framed most often as the Australian people struggling and suffering from a lack of care from the Government. Instead of caring about the average Australian, Hanson declared that “this Government” instead “continues to pander to international business, to unworkable socialist engineering doctrines and to the political correctness that Labor perfected whilst it was in power” (Hanson 1997a: 1913). Hanson ended this admonishment with a reference to hurt to show how ignorant the Government is of the Australian people; she asks “Don’t any of you understand how much our people are hurting out there?” (Ibid).

The Government’s ignorance or failure to connect was raised again about rising unemployment and loss of local industries to global competition. She states that “our politicians fail to see or feel the anguish of our own people. Are politicians isolated from Australians and removed from the truth seen in cities, suburbs and country towns across Australia, or is it something more sinister?” (Hanson 1997e: 7707). The loss of industry was variously described as “another kick in the guts for a community already isolated and suffering” (Hanson 1997d: 7708). Declining agricultural industries are “the victim of an extremist and unrelenting conservation agenda allied with the federal government hell bent on globalisation regardless of the resulting misery and destruction” (Hanson 1997h: 10493).

Sadness was also expressed in relation to Indigenous people where their historical suffering unfairly displaced that of non-Indigenous people. For example, in one speech, Hanson spoke of a ‘Stolen Generation’, but not the culturally well established Stolen Generation of Indigenous Australian

children. Instead she spoke about the thousands of British children removed from their families and relocated to Australia during the 50s and 60s as the Stolen Generation. She spoke of these children deliberately in the same way that we now speak of the Indigenous Stolen Generation. She stated “Evidence shows that some suffered sadistic treatment and sexual abuse – horrors that can never be excused. Many of the records have been destroyed and very few of these innocent children were ever reunited with their relatives. Indeed, it was a dark period in our young nation’s past” (Hanson 1997l: 11972). This deliberate comparison boils down to the theme in Hanson’s discourse that there has been at least an equality of suffering in the history of white and Indigenous people if not more suffering for non-Indigenous people. In terms of greater suffering, Hanson referenced the larger numbers of forcibly removed British children over Indigenous children where she stated “not only did those sent to Australia apparently outnumber their aboriginal counterparts but it seems that, with very few exceptions, they did not return home or experience any family reunion” (Hanson 1997l: 11972). This was followed with, “that the stolen British children sent to Australia and indeed the removal of children from the slums of Melbourne in the early part of the century put more into context the equality of suffering. I do not wish to attempt to justify what happened to the aboriginal people. Rather the point is that they do not have a monopoly on suffering and history clearly shows that be the truth” (Hanson 1997l: 11972).

Pride

Pride was the only positive emotion expressed in Hanson’s speeches and was used primarily to establish an Australian identity. However, this identity was spoken about largely in terms of its loss. Patriotism was one such loss. In one speech Hanson lamented “patriotism is something that we are losing in this country. It is not being taught in our schools to our children. We must be proud Australians and we must all be Australians together” (Hanson 1997e: 7641). While this is an obvious reference to loss, Hanson does not clearly define what patriotism means in this or any other speech in her first term. However, it is obvious that for Hanson to be a true Australian is to have patriotic pride in the nation. This is not only the sole positive emotion Hanson explicitly allows, she also prescribes it.

Another source of pride is the identity marker of being an ‘Aussie Battler’. This identity is shaped by hard work and independence with employment being a key source of pride for Hanson. Phrases like “a proud, strong manufacturing nation” and “independent and self reliant” appeared alongside other statements about employment like “50,000 people paying tax instead of being paid welfare; 50,000 people with a sense of purpose, pride, self esteem and a future” (Hanson 1997d: 7706-7708). These precious few instances of positive identity-establishing language are usually found in

speeches that are concerned with anger and fear at the loss of jobs and rising unemployment especially within rural areas of Australia.

Guilt

Guilt was one of the least mentioned emotions in Hanson's first term. This absence may be explained by the way in which guilt was spoken about but not necessarily expressed. Guilt was only mentioned in reference to the Indigenous community, with the guilt that white Australians were being *forced* to feel by the Indigenous community being the primary theme. Hanson personally claimed to feel no guilt about the "terrible things" done to Indigenous people in the past of Australia's often violent history. Instead, she described her resentment at others trying to make her and by extension, the Australian people feel guilty. She highlighted this in a speech where she stated "I, like many other Australians, am sorry for the fact they occurred. This does not mean, however that I am in some way responsible for what has happened, and I resent being made to feel guilty for something I did not do" (Hanson 1997b: 4126).

Hanson rejects guilt as a response to past wrongdoing. Hanson described guilt almost like an insult to her with "I do not like to be accused of being responsible for things that were done by other people. I was not responsible for the stolen generation..." (Hanson 1997c: 5457). This resentment towards guilt seems to be a threat to the emotional stability of "Ordinary Australians". Referencing the stolen children, Hanson described Indigenous activists as starting a "PR war", with their actions said to be a "public relations exercise aimed at raising the level of guilt in white Australia" (Hanson 1997l: 11972). This 'weaponised' guilt was also instigated in the potential loss of sovereignty where "we are about to give perhaps as much as 80% of our country to about 2% of our populations all in the name of compensation and to free ourselves of the guilt so carefully cultivated and effectively massaged into our minds" (Hanson 1997l: 19973).

Shame

Shame was the least coded emotion in the Hanson's first term. Like guilt, shame was not expressed as being felt by Hanson or the Australian people. Instead, it was positioned as an emotion that was forced upon the Australian people and that should be felt by others. For example, in a speech on 'the working class poor' Hanson stated that the discussion paper (that the speech was based on) "should be a document of shame for the governments, both previous and current, of Australia" (Hanson 1997a: 1912). This shame should be felt by the Government for not incentivising people in middle to low income employment to remain in the workforce. Hanson stated that "The previous

ALP government had allowed the situation to develop where many workers in full employment would be better off on the dole” (Hanson 1997a: 1913).

An example of forced shame was presented by Hanson when she spoke about a journalist in Melbourne who had stated that “Few countries have a past they are as rightly embarrassed about as we do”. Hanson stated that the comments were “Trendy, politically correct rubbish! People like these try to make us ashamed to be Australians, when we have everything to be proud of. This sort of things does not build Australians; it knocks it down. There have been too many knockers in recent times. It is about time someone said something positive about Australia” (Hanson 1996d: 8092). As was seen in her discourse about guilt, shame is an emotion being forced upon the Australian people seemingly unjustly. There is a definite turn away from shame and guilt for Hanson toward positive emotions like pride in the nation and a sense that negative, reflective emotions are for others to feel.

Chapter 4

2016-2018: Expanding an Emotional Regime

During her second term, Hanson's participation in Parliament has at least quadrupled in comparison to her first term. While second reading speeches (and the similarly procedural Bills in committee) make up the majority of the 129 speeches Hanson has given, she has also introduced legislation into Parliament during this period. These bills are centred on her main issues of the economy and the protection of her perception of Australian culture; for example a bill about introducing a debt ceiling, one to limit the salaries of 'certain office holders' (a response to the Australia Post CEO salary scandal) and one to 'strengthen the commitments' of new Australian citizens. Her style of debate and address remain similar to those of her first term, where most speeches are used to establish her position on her most pertinent issues. For example, her fixation on Islam and Muslims is exemplified by her reference to the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001 as 'setting the stage' for the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (Hanson 2018e: 80). Hanson's second term expanded on her first with the addition of new emotions and new themes.

Anger

Anger is the most frequently coded emotion in the second term. The loss of culture is a key site of anger with Hanson personally expressing anger about the divide between true Australians and those unwilling to integrate. In one speech, she states "We are one people. We are all Australians. I'm sick and tired of seeing the division that is actually happening between us, whether it be Australia Day or Anzac Day or whatever" (Hanson 2018a: 24). In another speech Hanson decried the loss of cultural norms and expressed anger at tolerance by stating "I am sick and tired of seeing them stand up for one race or other people in this country, who do not see themselves as Australians and who have no intentions of ever assimilating" (Hanson 2016d: 3167). Along with this perceived loss of culture, Hanson described the Australian people as being angry at "reverse racism". She stated "There is reverse racism in Australia. Australians are feeling the brunt of this and are fed up." (Hanson 2017e: 2561).

While Asians were previously the group most unlikely to assimilate, in Hanson's second term, she turns her attention to Muslims. They are described as disgraceful for abusing the pension system, fighting in Syria and Iraq for ISIL and for choosing "to be separate from other Australians" (Hanson 2017m: 5190). Anger is also directed at Muslims for their perceived lack of reciprocation of respect. When speaking on racial discrimination, Hanson asked "Are we that pathetic as a nation that we would give up our values and who we truly are because we're worried about hurting

someone's feelings?" following with "...I am getting fed up with the fact that we stand up for these Muslims who stand and protest" (Hanson 2017s: 7293).

The economy was another issue that was discussed with varying levels of anger. Foreign ownership of national economic assets was described by Hanson as "reckless and a national disgrace" regarding water security. It was also "a national disgrace that we do not get royalties paid on the vast majority of gas taken from Commonwealth water and that we allow foreign-owned multinationals to lock up our gas and oil until it suits them to sell it at a profit" (Hanson 2018b: 1076). Anger at the foreign stake in Australian gas was again expressed where Hanson stated "It is outrageous that we give away our natural gas for free to foreign multinationals" (Hanson 2018c: 2968). Hanson not only referenced personal anger at foreign ownership but also claimed "the people of Australia have been very angry about the multinationals and what is happening in our country" (Hanson 2017k: 4376).

Another angering issue has been the perception of economic elitism within the public sector. The salary of the CEO of Australia Post was raised multiple times as a point of "complete outrage" (Hanson 2017b: 1016). Other instances of economic elitism included the salary and pensions of politicians where Hanson cited public comments about politicians being "greedy parasites". Hanson stated "that is what the public are angry about, and I do not blame them" (Hanson 2017d: 1169). In another speech about the Australia Post CEO, Hanson claimed that "... people are furious about it, and I do not blame them" (Hanson 2017i: 3601). The high salary of the CEO of the national broadband network was described as "Equally outrageous" (Hanson 2017n: 6016).

Lastly, anger was expressed about marriage equality. Hanson used anger over the marriage equality debate to highlight the seeming unimportance of it in the face of other issues. She stated that "What I find disgraceful about this whole thing is we have people in this country living on the streets, kids on ice and the problem of not enough jobs- and we're having a debate about the issue of a couple of people being able to get marriage. There are most important things in this country than worrying about and pushing for this. It's disgraceful." (Hanson 2017v: 8929). Not only did she express personal anger but also frustration on behalf of the Australian people, stating "The people are so sick and tired of hearing about this. Just pass an act and make it a civil ceremony" (Ibid). In another speech, she again referenced the anger of the Australian people, claiming "Same-sex marriage is a very contentious issue, and I'm continually getting emails from people who are very, very upset. They don't agree with marriage between people of the same sex." (Hanson 2017u: 8913).

Fear

Fear has featured heavily in Hanson's second term. Similar to anger, Muslims have been a focus within the discourse of fear. Muslims were referenced fearfully multiple times in Hanson's second Maiden speech. For example, she 'repurposed' her "swamped by Asians" phrase to exclaim "Now we are in danger of being swamped by Muslims, who bear a culture and ideology that is incompatible with our own" (Hanson 2016a: 937). In other parts of the Maiden speech, she explicitly linked Muslims to organised crime, violence, misogyny and "collapsing social cohesion", in addition to stating that "Australians, in general, are more fearful" (Hanson 2016a: 938). Here Hanson implied that Australians are directly afraid of Muslims.

Hanson has referenced terrorism numerous times and always in connection to Muslims. She claims that terrorism is now a part of daily life Australia where she stated that "We are now faced with terrorism, murder on our streets and the threats of bombings" (Hanson 2016h: 3946), and "I think the majority of Australians feel very afraid, because we are now seeing terrorism on our streets. People live in fear. I hear from many people who say they are afraid to go on trains or to shopping centres or sporting venues; they are in fear" (Hanson 2016c: 2214). Terrorism is also referenced in relation to immigration as one of the ways that Muslims threaten "our way of life". This is not necessarily an implied fear from Hanson's language but an explicitly stated sentiment. In one speech, Hanson stated it as a threat to democracy where she says "There are no democratic Islamic countries in the world. If we don't ban further immigration from Islamic countries, our way or life will be lost and the freedoms we take for granted will be gone" (Hanson 2017m: 5190). At one point, Hanson very explicitly stated that "everyone has the right to their own religious beliefs, but it is only Islam that threatens our way of life." (Hanson 2017o: 6027).

Muslims are also posed as threatening Australian values and culture. In her second Maiden speech, Hanson stated "If we do not make changes now, there will be no hope in the future. Have no doubt that we will be living under sharia law and treated as second-class citizens with second-class rights if we keep heading down the path with the attitude, 'She'll be right, mate'" (Hanson 2016a: 938). On multiple occasions, Hanson called for a ban on any further immigration and a ban on the burqa as solutions to issue of cultural hegemony. Hanson claims that the Australian people also want this ban and cited surveys that claim "49 per cent of Australians said, 'No further Muslim immigration into this country.'" The main reason was that they do not assimilate into our society and they have no intention of doing so" (Hanson 2016f: 3907). This failure to assimilate is exemplified by the burqa and other religious garments worn by Muslim women that cover the face. In one speech, Hanson

stated “Full face covering offends a lot of people. They find it offensive and they find it confronting” (Hanson 2017s: 7291).

Expressing emotions similar to anger, Hanson has also described marriage equality in terms of fear and threat. The threat comes from minorities pushing their “agenda” on the majority. In a debate on the right of marriage celebrants to refuse to marry a same sex couple, Hanson asked “Why are we being dictated to, again, by the minority?” and stated that marriage celebrants may “throw in their professions because they’re in fear of being dragged before the courts” (Hanson 2017v: 8928). For Hanson this is the equivalent of “minorities...taking our country” (Hanson 2017w: 9147). Societal cohesion and traditional family constructs were also posed as being threatened. Hanson claimed that marriage equality denied children the right to a mum and a dad. She asked “What will happen when you go to school, the teacher says, ‘I want you to draw a picture of your mum and dad or grandma and grandad and your house’ and all the rest of it? The kids will be saying, ‘What do I do? I don’t have a mum,’ or ‘I don’t have a dad’. ‘It’s Peter and Sam’... They’re not known as mum and dad.” (Hanson 2017w: 9147).

Lastly, similar to Hanson’s first term, foreign ownership of assets is a prominent threat. The Government is seen as a willing participant in the “foreign takeover” of assets and the destruction of the economy. Hanson stated that successive governments have “destroyed” the Australian economy by selling assets that now make three times as much profit as they used to like Telstra (Hanson 2017l: 4972). In a speech on the 2018 federal Budget, Hanson described foreign ownership with a stronger emphasis on sovereignty and national resilience. She stated “Bit by bit Australia is losing its economic sovereignty and, with it, the capacity to withstand economic and political events that will inevitably occur” (Hanson 2018c: 2966). In other speeches, Hanson describes the Government’s renewable energy plans in a similar fashion chaos where she states “We are destroying our own country because you’re headed down this path where we’ve got to appease everyone else without protecting ourselves” (Hanson 2017t: 8569).

Sadness

Sadness has made a significant appearance in Hanson’s second term. Sadness was expressed mainly as suffering of the Australian public from the same issues that were seen in Hanson’s first term with the addition of Islamic immigration as an emerging source of suffering. Islam is blamed for the suffering of Australians in relation to terrorism and “collapsing social cohesion and a fear of crime” (Hanson 2016a: 938). However, Muslims themselves are also described suffering as a result of

Islamic ideals. Hanson specifically referenced Muslim women as victims who suffer at the hands of their religion and the men who she sees as dominating it. She stated “Many women are silently suffering by being forced to wear the burqa. The burqa condemns many women to be perpetual minors, obedient to their male guardians. It is these women and their children who are most at risk of genital mutilation” (Hanson 2017q: 6487).

The economy was a major source of sadness, with foreign ownership causing the most distress. Foreign ownership was often referred to by Hanson as a “foreign takeover” leading to pain and suffering among small business owners and farmers. Farmers were described as “the backbone of this nation” (Hanson 2016g: 4072) but also seemingly in perpetual suffering. For example, when talking about cane growers Hanson stated “I have cane growers just about on their knees and their wives are distraught... They have no future” (Hanson 2017c: 968). In another speech about the Budget with specific reference to water allowances, Hanson again referenced farmers as “on their knees” (Hanson 2017h: 3508). Farmers’ anguish was also used in some places to distract attention from non-material issues such as the marriage equality debate where Hanson stated “I don’t think you realise that we have farmers and others suiciding in our country. One in 10 people are depressed and you are worried about same sex and people getting married, about giving a vow to each other.” (Hanson 2017v: 8929). The outcome of economic distress was often referenced by Hanson as suicide. In a speech about an inquiry into lending to primary production customers, Hanson stated “I have experienced and seen the impact of the recovery practices used by certain senior managers of a number of banks which have not only in some cases physically removed farmers from their homes, but also abused, threatened, intimidated and divided families to the point of unnecessary suicide” (Hanson 2017x: 9950).

Suicide was also referenced in relation to family law issues. In her Maiden speech to the Senate Hanson stated “until we treat mums and dads with the same courtesy and rights, we will continue to see murders due to sheer frustration and depression and mental illness caused by this unworkable system. Suicide is the only way out for those who feel there is no hope after facing years of costly legal battles. Their lives having been destroyed and the pain of missing their children are the reasons many end up in a state of depression” (Hanson 2016a: 940). In fact, family law is never mentioned in Hanson’s second term without reference to suicide or violence. For example in one speech she mentioned that “too often one hears of another tragedy, another domestic-violence incident, another lost life or another family torn apart by division” (Hanson 2017p: 6172). As seen in Hanson’s first term, suffering from family law issues is mainly centred on men’s experienced in her second term. Hanson cites personal experiences of seeing the family breakdown of her sons

where she stated “I’ve seen DVOs put on them that were not warranted. I feel for the men out there that are going through this, because it’s unjustified. They have no recourse, they are missing seeing their children and they are devastated by it to the extent that they suicide. How many men do we know that suicide because of this? They are heartbroken” (Ibid).

Love

Love was a newly coded emotion in Hanson’s second term. Hanson most often referenced romantic love when talking about the marriage equality plebiscite and subsequent legislation that was passed in 2017. When referencing love in other contexts it was about what Hanson personally loves. For example, she has briefly spoken about her love for her children (Hanson 2016a: 941) and her love for Australia as a nation (Hanson 2016a: 937). Familial love was also referenced about the availability of medicinal cannabis. The love between family members was emphasised as a motive for their actions and a moral excuse for actions that might be illegal. Hanson stated “I will not stand in the way of a loving parent who is trying to care for their child. I am tired of governments, both state and federal, turning these good people into criminals for the sake of loving decisions” (Hanson 2017j: 3544).⁴

The marriage equality debate was where love was referenced the most. Within mentions of marriage equality, love is referenced as an emotion that negates the need for formalised marriage between people of the same sex. Hanson states in one speech on the matter that “If you truly love someone, do you really need to have a certificate that says you are married? That commitment can be made to anyone.” (Hanson 2016b: 2037). In another speech that seems to point to the actual reason that love is referenced in this way; Hanson describes marriage equality as a strictly LGBTIQI community desire that is being “pushed” onto the heteronormative majority of Australia that does not want to recognise formal marriage among sex couples. She states “These people are pushing for what they want – equality and love. I’ve got no problems with people being in love and doing what they want to, but why do you have to push this on the majority of the population?” (Hanson 2017v: 8928).

⁴ While there are multiple uses of the word love as a phrasing tool where it replaces words such as ‘like’, it contextually is not expressive of the emotion of love. For example, “I would love to know where all this money is supposed to come from” (Hanson 2016e: 3883). This is obviously not an expression of the emotion love but a common phrasing placing emphasis on a desired action of others.

Happiness

Happiness was mainly used to discuss the marriage equality debate. Hanson repeatedly asserted that “Everyone has a right to live their life with happiness” in respect to who they choose to love. This right to happiness though was described as a right to happiness in private and not at the expense of anyone else’s values regarding marriage. This private right to happiness was variously described as a right to happiness “how they want to in their own homes” (Hanson 2016b: 2037) and “to find happiness within themselves” (Hanson 2017u: 8913). However, in all but one of Hanson’s speeches on marriage equality, the happiness of people in same sex relationships was less important than the happiness of those who wanted to retain the traditional definition of marriage. Hanson went as far to lament that it was “all about them [LGBTQI individuals] what they want. I’ve never heard anyone come out and say: ‘What about the other side? What about the people who have grown up here or who are in this country where the majority of people live in a relationship between a man and woman?’” (Hanson 2017r: 7092).

Pride

Pride is often presented as a personal state of being for Hanson which doubles as an expression of an ideal Australian identity. In her Maiden speech to the Senate, she states “I love my country, culture and way of life. My pride and patriotism were instilled in me from an early age when I watched the Australian flag raised every morning at school and sang the national anthem; watching our athletes compete on the world stage, proud to salute the Australian flag being raised to honour them as they took their place on podiums” (Hanson 2016a: 937). Here, Hanson is describing that the moments that should instil pride in us are ones of almost blind nationalism. Another function of pride in Hanson’s second term appears appear to be an excuse of racism.

Hanson has implied over multiple speeches that pride negates racism. In one speech, she said “There are many people – and I am sure everyone in this chamber – who are a bigot in their own way, because you can be intolerant of another person’s culture or religious beliefs. That is the human race. That is who we are because we are proud of our cultural background” (Hanson 2017e: 2526). In another speech, she further emphasised that “Australians are not racist. Australians are very proud of their culture, their country and their heritage” (Hanson 2017g: 2740). These examples highlight a notion that racism and pride are mutually exclusive concepts. Given Hanson’s previous discourse this would seem to mean that white Australians are not racist for not particularly liking non-white Australians, they are just preserving their culture.

Shame

Shame has always been directed at others i.e. mainly the Government which should feel shame economic failures. One issue is the taxation of multinational corporations, with Hanson stating “The length of the list of multinationals not paying tax in Australia should be a matter of shame to the Government and the previous Labour government” (Hanson 2018d: 12). Other economic issues have included the “shameful sale” of Queensland’s water rights to foreign companies and the refusal of certain parties to vote for the Prepare, Trial, Hire (PaTH) youth internships. In these speeches, while shame is not the central theme of the speech, Hanson appears to be using shame to cast doubts on the Government’s ability to follow the interests of the Australian people. Hanson has also positioned the Government as deeply interested in its own preservation where she state “You should be absolutely ashamed of yourselves” (Hanson 2017a: 645-646) for trying to “do deals” with one another to keep their seats in the Senate instead of pursuing the interests of the public.

Hope

Hope is mentioned most often in reference to Hanson herself as a bringer of hope to the Australian people. In her Maiden speech to the Senate, she stated “it has been 20 years and four days since I last delivered my first speech in this house, a speech that shook a nation, woke up many Australians and gave hope to those who thought no one was listening” (Hanson 2016a: 937). In a speech about introducing a cashless welfare card trial, Hanson again positions herself as a personal saviour for the downtrodden. She referenced a past meeting she had in 1998 with Indigenous people. She stated “I had about 12 Aboriginal women and children who were in the room. They held up my hand and said ‘We have been hoping and praying for someone like Pauline Hanson to come along, because our women are being bashed and raped, and our kids are glue sniffing’ “ (Hanson 2017f: 2680). Here, her mere presence brings people hope to solve their problems regardless of whether these events actually transpired as Hanson described them.

The only other place where Hanson mentions hope is as a positive descriptor of Lebanon as a nation of Christians in the middle of the Muslim world. Lebanon was used as an example of what could happen to Australia if Muslims were allowed to live unchecked in Australia. She stated that “Modern day Lebanon was built, by the efforts of Christians, to be a beacon of freedom and hope to all its inhabitants” (Hanson 2016f: 3906). Here, hope takes on more religious baggage but also functions as an emotion that represents a “better” world, presumably a Christian world that is linked with a notion of freedom.

Hatred

In her second term, Hanson has only referred to hate when speaking about terrorism and immigrants. Hate was only mentioned alongside references to Muslims and Islam as an “ideology”. When speaking about racial discrimination legislation, Hanson described these laws as limiting the ability to fairly criticise what she considers dangerous elements of society. Hanson stated that “I do not believe it is just about words. I think it is about hatred of a religion that is casting their hate and their political ideology onto the rest of the world. That is what is behind this” (Hanson 2016d: 3167). The religion she is referring to is Islam.

In another speech on counter-terrorism legislation, Hanson again had a thinly veiled reference to Muslims actively hating Australians. She stated “what has happened now is that people are coming here not to assimilate, not to integrate, not to be one of us, not to abide by our culture, our laws or our way of life. They do not have respect for us. Some carry a hatred towards us ...” (Hanson 2016c: 2214). This hatred is described by Hanson as deeply situated. When referencing murders committed by young Muslims, Hanson describes these people as those who do “not believe in our culture of our way of life and who bears us hate in their heart” (Ibid). Hate and hatred are framed as unacceptable traits held by Muslims, emotional states that lead to danger and are incompatible with Australian life. In another instance, Hanson described “those people with the intention of committing terrorist acts on Australians” as “gutless” and “the worst people that I could ever imagine speaking about” (Hanson 2016f: 3907). She positioned these “people” who are implicitly Muslims as having a “hatred for the Western World” (Ibid).

The themes described within these last two chapters show that through a type of bonding rhetoric, Hanson is establishing an emotional regime where all ‘others’ can only be described with the use of negative emotions. Positive emotions are reserved for ‘mainstream’ or ‘ordinary’ Australians, who are defined via their opposites, i.e. elites, non-Christians, Indigenous people and immigrants. While this regime is established in Hanson’s first term speeches, it appears to have intensified with the expansion of emotions described over her second term. Even where there is an expansion of positive emotions, they are reinforcing the divide between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ people, between the majority and the minority. Not only do the expanded positive emotions deepen the chasm between ‘us’ and ‘them’ but the added negative emotion of hate also serves this function; targeting Muslims as the ultimate ‘Other’.

Chapter 5

Discussion and Conclusions

The results and analysis in the previous two chapters have helped to establish the dominant emotions that Hanson expresses in political discourse and what these emotions relate to in terms of themes. During the late 90s, Hanson mirrored an emotional regime that fits with Salmela and Von Scheve's (2017) assessment of radical right wing parties, expressing primarily negative emotions about 'enemy' Others. This can be seen in my results; fear, anger and sadness are coded in a clear majority of speeches. Hanson is also characteristic of radical right politicians where she rejects negative reflective emotions like guilt and shame, insisting they are unjustly forced upon her and the Australian public unjustly. Instead, as Salmela and Von Scheve (2017) note, reflective negative emotions are replaced by the positive identity based emotion of pride.

However, certain changes appear over Hanson's first and second term that provide insight into the construction of radical right rhetoric. For example, while the negative emotional foundations of the regime remain, Hanson's second term saw an expansion of emotions with both the negative and positive emotional range increasing. Content wise, the emotions of love happiness and hope were described and expressed for the first time in Hanson's speeches as was the negative emotion of hatred. In terms of positive emotions, pride remained consistent in both Hanson's first and second term. During Hanson's first term, pride was used to establish who true Australians are. Hanson's true Australians are hardworking 'battlers', and presumably white, or at least ready to forgo racial connections to non-white backgrounds. Hanson's ideal of a proud Australian has roots in the historical notion Australian national identity that was formed in the mid-19th century, in the days of the gold rush. The gold rush was the birthplace of enduring Australian identity symbols. The digger, the working man, self-sufficiency and white settlers emerged in the popular consciousness in this time period against a backdrop of racism specifically toward Chinese immigrants (Hogan 2009: 20).

In Hanson's second term, pride has functioned in much the same way, although her support of sporting heroes was added to descriptions of the behavior of 'true blue' Australians. An interesting development with the description of pride was the way it was used to deny negative actions of Australians. Specifically, it was given as an excuse for racism. This is a distinct change from Hanson's first term where racism was usually referred to in expressions of anger as 'reverse racism' against white people. Pride in Hanson's second term has been implicitly stated as a reason that someone could be considered *not* to be racist. This sets up the emotion of pride as an expressive tool of bonding rhetoric, where the bonding is achieved by encouraging negative views and actions against foreign immigrants or Indigenous Australians, essentially non-white people. This reflects

the notion of the 19th and 20th century ‘proud’ Australian, where whiteness was prized, and racism was simply not on the political agenda.

Positive emotions that were new in Hanson’s second term included love and happiness. Love was positively associated with Hanson herself and to familial bonds. Hanson positioned herself as a loving mother and a loving citizen of Australia. She also briefly described the actions of loving families forced to the brink of criminality when trying to treat their sick children with medicinal marijuana. However, the most common use of love was more complicated than simple positive expressions. The majority of speeches where love was mentioned were related to the marriage equality debate and was used to reinforce the traditional legal unions between men and women. Both anger and fear were expressed about marriage equality creating a ‘domino effect’ of changing the traditional boundaries of not only marriage but also familial and gender norms. This is a key example of what Furedi (2005) calls ‘the conservatism of fear’, which refers to a hostility of the political right to changes that threaten traditional ways of living as the future becomes completely uncertain and uncontrollable (Furedi 2005: 64). This fear sustains the divide between the LGBTIQI community and ‘mainstream’ or ‘ordinary’ Australians, implicitly perceived by Hanson to be heterosexual.

Heterosexual traditions of marriage are protected by the use of love where love itself replaces the need for equal rights. Hanson has repeatedly asserted in her second term speeches that same sex couples did not need to encroach on the tradition of heterosexual marriage so long as they loved each other enough. This thematically negates the positivity of love and instead entrenches a conservatism of fear by reinforcing heteronormative ideas of marriage. Love itself is equal: Hanson refers to it as an emotional basis of a bond that can be shared by anyone of any sexuality and thus does not require marriage. But, in Hanson’s view, the love felt by a minority does not qualify as a reason to introduce uncertainty and risk to the traditional boundaries of marriage which in turn introduces uncertainty to the definitions of mainstream Australian culture. In the same fashion, happiness was only mentioned in relation to marriage equality and was referenced as an emotion that can be equally felt by LGBTIQI individuals privately. Again, this ability to feel happiness *privately* means that there is no need to encroach on the ‘majority’s’ dearly held tradition of heteronormative marriage.

The final change in positive emotions was the addition of hope in Hanson’s second term speeches. Hanson mainly referred to herself when talking about hope and positioned herself as a bringer of hope to the Nation and those within it. In particular, Hanson has described herself as inciting hope

in Indigenous communities, moving Indigenous people from the previously established, negatively viewed ‘others’ to victims of circumstances and supporters of Hanson. While this particular description of Indigenous people holding up Hanson as a beacon of hope may point to an effort to include them within Hanson’s fold, there were not enough mentions to thoroughly establish it as a rhetorical theme. However, the marked absence of Indigenous people from expressions of fear and anger over Hanson’s second term speeches may indicate a focus on another, much more threatening ‘other’. This new threat is seen in the only other mention of hope in Hanson’s second term speeches where she speaks briefly about religion. Hanson cited Christian nations in the Middle East as being examples of hope for a better, more peaceful world in comparison to the hateful savagery of Islamic nations. The religion of Islam was another key change in Hanson’s second term but only in relation to negative emotions.

While in Hanson’s first term mentions of negative emotions were linked to Indigenous people and Asians, her second term focussed on Muslims as threatening outsiders due to their perceived influence over Australian culture and links to terrorism. Muslims featured so much in discussions concerning negative emotions that a new negative emotion was expressed in Hanson’s second term, hatred. Hatred was not described as an emotion being expressed towards Muslims, but rather an emotional response of Muslims toward the western world. This characterisation emphasised the consequences of Muslim immigration to Australia as physical violence based on a deep-seated hatred of the ‘free world’. In her first term, Hanson focused on Asians who were said to bring disease and drug related crime into Australia and create separate cultural communities. However, in her second term, Muslims are positioned as threatening our very “way of life”. This threat ranged from the actual loss of life through violent crime and terrorism, to fears over sharia law coming to Australia and to changing social norms around women’s activities such as swimming at the beach.

Because of these threats to Australian lives, Muslims were also discussed as causing anger and suffering. In Hanson’s first term, anger was centred on the economy, family law issues and Asian immigration and the Indigenous community. The Indigenous community were said to be fueling discrimination against non-Indigenous Australians and immigrants were framed as “opportunistic invaders”, setting out to divide the nation and drain its resources. In Hanson’s second term however, Indigenous people and immigrants were replaced as the instigators of reverse racism and national division by Muslims. Hanson labels Muslims as “disgraceful” and proclaims them as a group not worthy of respect and protection. Instead, Hanson insists that Muslims do not respect Australians and their values. This lack of respect even extended into expressions of sadness over the suffering

of other Muslims. Muslim women were described by Hanson as “silently suffering” from the perceived misogynistic constraints of Islam and its followers.

This shift in focus of Muslims as the ultimate 'Other' may be due to the changing demographics of immigration to Australia in the last twenty years coupled with the increased visibility of Muslims after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center. It is true that immigration from nations where Islam is the major religion have increased since Hanson's first term. Between 1991 and 2001 alone, Turkish and Lebanese Muslim immigration to Australia doubled, with the highest population of these immigrants being found in Melbourne and Sydney (Cleland 2001: 26; Kabir 2004: 255). Despite this demographic change, fear and hatred being associated with Muslims is not an entirely new theme isolated to Hanson and her rhetoric. Studies across Australian media have shown that, since the early 80s, Islam has been strongly associated with violence, militancy and misogyny due to events like the Iranian revolution (Brasted 2001: 207; Kabir 2007: 257).

Hanson herself started to reproduce this discourse directly after her term in 2001, with statements like “a lot of these Muslims, they have no respect for the Christian way of life that this country's based on” (Kabir 2004: 297). Terrorism itself is also seen as more brutal and emotively charged in relation to Islam. As Furedi (2007: 41) notes this occurs regardless of historical facts and contexts, where Islamic terrorism is viewed as far worse and damaging than acts of terror preceding the 9/11 attacks. Hanson's updated discourse has included the idea that all Muslims are potential suspects i.e. that you cannot differentiate a 'good Muslim' from a 'bad Muslim'. This intensified focus on Islam and the negative emotions surrounding it could possibly be caused by the stark cultural differences to Australian norms and values as perceived by Hanson. If the only positive emotions expressed relate to a view of Australia as a white, Christian, democratically free nation then Islam and what it represents are an obvious choice for the subject of negative emotions.

The main consistent issue for Hanson across both of her terms was the economy, which was discussed with varying shades of anger, fear and sadness. The threat of foreign ownership to the economic sovereignty of Australia was introduced multiple times in both terms. This ranged from foreign ownership of water and gas to foreign ownership of industries, particularly agricultural industries that now rely on outside nations to function. The fear expressed around industries and their loss was linked to sadness. A slight change in the way sadness and the economy were discussed in Hanson's second term was that suicide was referenced more often as an outcome of economic distress. In fact, suicide was referenced more often in Hanson's second term as the outcome for a range of distressing situations, including divorce.

Finally, noted absences from Hanson's second term discourse (that appeared in her first term) were mentions of guilt. This is largely due to the replacing of Indigenous people by Muslims as the most threatening out group. Where guilt was mentioned in Hanson's first term, it was referenced as an emotion that should be felt by others, not by Hanson and certainly not by her supporters. Guilt was described as being forced upon Australian by the Indigenous community in their actions surrounding Native Titles. In this way, guilt itself was represented as a deceitful emotion used only to meet the ends of the Indigenous agenda towards the division of Australia into two separate nations. Hanson also accused the Indigenous community of entrenching this forced guilt by claiming an unequal share of national suffering for themselves in a "PR war". She claimed that this amounted to the erasure of 'white' sadness by highlighting the "stolen generation" of British children – removed from their parents and homes in the 50s and 60s who were transported to Australia – as a forgotten narrative in competition with the Indigenous Stolen Generation.

Conclusions

While there are some new emotions expressed in her second term, Hanson's rhetoric has a consistently negative emotional basis. These negative emotions are also consistent across their use in the main theme that emerges in Hanson's rhetoric: her efforts to establish that there is a nation of Australians, independent, proud, working, and presumably white people, who are under threat by others. While the 'others' that Hanson positions as threatening to divide the nation or even take it over completely change, the fact there are 'others' who wish 'us' harm is unchanging. Whether it is the terrorist threat from Muslims, reverse racism spurred on by Indigenous people, or even the threat to familial and gender norms from the LGBTQI community; there is a consistent thread of fragility in the 'Australian' cultural values that Hanson defines through opposition to these out groups.

This fragility is the driving force in an emotional regime that prescribes negative reactions to enemy others and only positive responses to the self and the 'in' group, in Hanson's case white, middle class Australia. An intense bonding rhetoric is displayed within the negative aspects of the regime. All others who threaten the unity of the mainstream are cast as the cause of negative, unwanted emotions. Those who cause fear, anger, sadness, shame and guilt must be dealt with and cast as far away from 'us' as possible (banning immigrants, sacking elites etc.). The in group, the self can only ever be described as good and causing positive emotional responses. In Hanson's (and other radical right emotional regimes) the in group can only ever be proud because by the circumstance of birth they possess the most desirable, powerful, populist trait, belonging to the 'mainstream'.

This thesis has not only highlighted the extensive appearance of emotive language in Hanson's rhetoric. It has also raised the idea that this emotional regime is a mirror to other radical right and right wing political parties as their rhetoric is also centred on emotive negativity, exclusionary identity practices and the protection of tradition. As with almost all other right wing populist rhetoric, Hanson's rhetoric identifies a good, pure 'us' and a deceptive, unjust 'them'. This populist narrative of opposition is carried on waves of negative emotion, with the supporters of the radical right framed as battlers against a world that is changing so rapidly it is simply leaving them behind.

While examining the rhetoric of the radical right through a lens of emotion could be seen as difficult to validate due to subjectivity, it is the subjective nature of emotions that is important to analyse to gain a better understanding of how radical right personalities like Pauline Hanson appear to have consistent peaks of popularity. Voters are not purely rational actors; emotions play a role in the way we perceive ourselves and others within political systems and potentially who we support to represent us in that system. If large groups of people believe in their subjective feelings of their traditions and place in world crumbling around them then it stands to reason that a politician expressing these same emotions and channeling them towards an easily identifiable 'enemy' will garner support. While other scholars have examined some of the discrete emotional underpinnings of support for Hanson, a comparative exploration of her expression of emotions between her first and second terms in Parliament has not been previously undertaken on the scale of this thesis.

In the future, the approach of this thesis could be used as a model for examining and comparing other radical right parties and personalities and their expressions of emotion with Hanson. While this could not be achieved in a Master's thesis, there is potential for using the same three step method of identifying emotions in language and analysing the themes within that language to construct an overarching radical right emotional regime. A project like this would not only test the validity of this thesis but may also provide a more nuanced understanding of the role that emotions play in rise and fall of radical right populist parties in western politics. This thesis establishes that radical right personalities can employ a variety of both negative and positive emotions in their rhetoric that contribute to consistent populist themes of exclusionary identity. On the question of what emotions occur in Pauline Hanson's rhetoric and how they are used, it would seem there is now no longer a need to "please explain".

*Appendix***Code book**

Top Level Code	Description	Direct language (1) Synonymous language (2) Phrasing (3)
Anger	<p>Definition: Feelings of annoyance, displeasure or hostility.</p> <p>References to anger. Can also include frustration and resentment. Can include references made about groups who are angry.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Angry, Anger 2. Angst, disgrace, disgraceful, exasperated, furious, fury, infuriated, irritable, irritation, mad, outrage, outrageous, rage, shocking. 3. 'Fed up with', 'mad at', 'over it', 'sick and tired of'.
Fear	<p>Definition: Feelings of threat of danger, pain or harm.</p> <p>References to fear as an abstract concept or to groups or individuals who are afraid. Consequences that are described as drastic, fatal or catastrophic are examined more closely for contextual references to fear. This contextual coding includes references to threats.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Fear, fearful 2. Afraid, anxiety, anxious, distress, dread, fright, frightful, horror, panic, scare, scared, threat, threatening, worried, worry. 3. 'In danger', 'In danger of', 'This is a crisis', 'Taking over'.
Guilt	<p>Definition: Negative feeling of responsibility for a wrong</p> <p>References to the feeling of guilt or the responsibility to feel guilt.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Guilty, guilt ridden 2. Blame, blameworthy, dishonour, fault, onus, regret. 3. 'At fault'.
Hatred	<p>Definition: Feelings of intense dislike.</p> <p>Does not refer to hate speech but to references of hate and hatred. This can be a reference to issues or phenomena that are hated, groups or individuals who are hated, groups or individuals who received hatred and groups and individuals who express active hate and hatred towards others.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Hate, hated, hating, hatred. 2. Abhor, abhorrence, animosity, antagonism, antagonist, contempt, enmity, grudge, hostile, hostility, loathing, malice, unwanted, venom. 3. 'Do not have respect for us'.

Hope	<p>Definition: Feelings of expectation.</p> <p>References to hope and the act of hoping. Can involve descriptions of groups who anticipate positive outcomes.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Hope, hoping, hopeful 2. Aspiration, optimism 3. 'A beacon of freedom'.
Love	<p>Definition: Strong feelings of affection.</p> <p>References to familial, romantic or abstract love. Can include the abstract statement of love as in 'would love to know' which is not explicitly romantic.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Love, Loving 2. Admirable, admire, adore, affection, amour, ardor, cherish, cherishing, devotion, fondness, passion. 3. 'Would love to'.
Pride	<p>Definition: Feelings of pleasure derived from achievements, status or admired possessions.</p> <p>References to pride or being proud of a group of people, the self or of abstract ideals such as the nation or a country.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Pride, Proud 2. Ego, egoism, egotism. 3. "I am a proud..." "I am proud of".
Sadness	<p>Definition: The absence of positive feelings.</p> <p>References to suffering or sadness. Can include instances of death or suicide. Relates to both personal (Hanson's own) and national or external person's suffering and sadness in reaction to certain issues.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sad, sadness 2. Anguish, despair, despairing, despondent, depressed, depressing, dismal, distress, distressing, grief, grieved, grieving, heartbreak, heart-breaking, heartbroken, Hopeless, Melancholy, mournful, pessimistic, sombre, sorrow, sorrowful, stress, suffering, sombre, tragedy, tragic. 3. 'It's a tragedy'
Shame	<p>Definition: Feelings of humiliation or distress caused by knowledge of bad behaviour.</p> <p>References to shame including the act of feeling shame and prescribing shame on others. Can also include descriptions of phenomena as shameful.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Shame, shamed, shameful. 2. Ashamed, contrition, remorse. 3. 'It's unacceptable'.

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