

**Australia's local government and counter terrorism in the
contemporary terrorism environment: risks and opportunities**

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Statement of Originality

This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge, the content of this thesis is my own work. It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at Macquarie University or any other university or similar institution. I further state that no substantial part of this thesis has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at Macquarie University or any other university or similar institution except as declared in the text.

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Abstract

Australian counter terrorism governance has necessarily evolved in response to the dynamic nature of terrorism. This evolution has failed in to include a role for local governments within the all levels approach outlined by the government. This thesis demonstrates that the evolution of Australia's counter terrorism governance has led to vulnerabilities at the local government level within the context of the current terrorism environment. A four phased mixed method approach was adopted drawing on a sequential application of a review of academic theory, thematic mapping of Australian counter terrorism governance, case study and the adoption of the SWOT analytical framework. This mixed method approach concluded that the absence of local government from the strategic approach to counter terrorism failed to utilise the significant capabilities and resources available at the local level. This thesis identifies the risks and opportunities for local government involvement, making a number of recommendations to develop a future role at this level.

Key words: Local government, Counter terrorism governance, Australia

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADF	Australian Defence Force
AQ	Al Qaeda
COAG	Council of Australian Governments
CVE	Counter Violent Extremism
DCLG	Department for Communities and Local Government
ICAC	Independent Commission Against Corruption
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
NCTP	National Counter Terrorism Plan
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCT	Office for Security and Counter Terrorism
SCTP	State Counter Terrorism Plan

Chapter One: Introduction

Counter terrorism in Australia is a function not solely owned by one area of government, organization or community and while national coordination is necessarily required, the evolving and dynamic nature of the terrorism landscape requires governments to develop a strategic approach to counter terrorism that is comprehensive and multi-layered. A genuine whole of government and whole of societal involvement extending, in the case of countries such as Australia, to the local level is vital to achieve effective results. Within the three tiers of government (federal, state, local) counter terrorism responsibilities are allocated to the federal, state and territory governments which are conveyed through the national and state counter terrorism plans and national strategies and white papers. Despite local government being responsible for local crime prevention strategies, managing significant resources, delivering a range of services, and authorizing developments and significant community events,¹ local governments have not been allocated responsibilities in countering terrorism. Prior to the 2017 publication of *Australia's strategy for protecting crowded places from terrorism*² there had been no acknowledgement of the diverse roles undertaken by local government in counter terrorism governance material since 2006.

The aim of this research is to explore how Australia's counter terrorism governance has evolved and determine if this evolution has created vulnerabilities, particularly at the local government level in the context of a terrorism environment which is characterized predominantly by less sophisticated attacks carried out by lone actors. The research will demonstrate the lack of inclusion of local government in the strategic approach to countering terrorism in Australia and also explore the strengths, weakness, opportunities and threats that exist in developing a meaningful preventative role for local governments given the diverse range of local governments that operate across Australia. Despite the challenges, the need to address this gap will be demonstrated to ensure a genuine whole of government approach to counter terrorism within Australia.

¹ Homel, P. Fuller, G. 'Understanding the local government role in crime prevention', *Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice*, vol 505, 2015

² ANZCTC, 'Australia's strategy for protecting crowded places from terrorism', ANZCTC, 2017

Research Design

This research will be conducted using a mixed method design, with the quantitative and qualitative methods sequentially building on the previous method. The methods selected for this research include; 1. literature review to explore the evolution of modern terrorism and to establish the current terrorism environment within an academic context, 2. Content analysis to thematically map the evolution of Australia's counter terrorism governance after which a gap analysis will be completed in the context of the terrorism environment established in the previous chapter and 3. Case study of the United Kingdom's counter terrorism strategy with a particular focus on the role of local government.

The literature review completed in Chapter three will provide an overview of the evolution of modern terrorism in an academic context. Relevant theories and debates such as new versus old terrorism will be outlined. In addition the structural evolution within terrorist groups will be demonstrated with specific reference to Al Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (ISIS). The structural evolution will be shown to have influenced the tactics adopted by terrorist groups, the emergence of guerilla tactics, increase in remote radicalization and the shift towards less sophisticated and more basic attack methods using weapons such as vehicles, knives and firearms.

Using content analysis and thematic mapping, Chapter four explored the thematic evolution of Australia's counter terrorism governance material published between 2003 and 2016. Using the research software *NVivo Pro* and the coding framework outlined in Annexure A this chapter thematically mapped the counter terrorism governance outlined in table 1. A gap analysis was conducted in the context of the terrorism environment established in the literature review to demonstrate that despite the Australian government claiming to implement a whole of government approach to countering terrorism, local government has been absent from the strategic national approach to counter terrorism since 2006. This absence reduces the accuracy of the whole of government approach articulated by the government despite an increased emphasis placed on community involvement, social cohesion and community resilience.

Building on the results of the gap analysis and to explore the role of local government in counter terrorism Chapter five will conduct a case study of the United Kingdom counter terrorism

strategy contest specifically the Prevent program and the role allocated to local government. To conduct this case study the United Kingdom counter terrorism strategy Contest will be outlined, specifically the Prevent program and the challenges experienced by local governments in performing their duties within a program which has negative stigma attached to it. The effectiveness of this program will be critically analysed to identify high level learnings for application in the Australian environment and how to learn from criticisms of the United Kingdom. This chapter will highlight the challenges and opportunities for allocating counter terrorism responsibilities to diverse local governments.

Chapter six will adopt the SWOT framework for analysis to draw together the conclusions from each of the mixed methods in this research to explore the opportunities that exist to develop a preventative role for local government in counter terrorism. Through an exploration of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats this chapter will examine how local government can develop holistic capabilities to counter terrorism across the areas of CVE, event approval and protection as well throughout the building, design and development process. This chapter will demonstrate that while there are challenges for developing a meaningful role for local governments in preventing terrorism, continuing without inclusion of local government in the strategic approach to counter terrorism wastes valuable resources and capability available at this level of government.

Chapter Two: Methodology

The nature of the question under research and the limited academic scholarship and data relating to this topic requires a mixed method research design to be adopted. Mixed methods design has been described as a third methodological movement³ and has been adopted across disciplines including nursing, evaluation, public health, education and social and behavioural research.⁴ Definitions of this approach vary though include research in which the investigator collects, analyses, mixes and draws inferences from both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or program of inquiry⁵ and a research design in which the central premises is that the use of quantitative and qualitative approached in combination provides a better understanding of research problems than either approach alone.⁶ A benefit of this approach is that mixed methods combines the strengths of quantitative and qualitative methodologies.⁷

In a review of mixed method designs two characteristics emerged, these were the purpose was to either merge the qualitative and quantitative data together in a concurrent manner or to have one type of data build on the other type of data in a sequential way,⁸ it is the later style that has been adopted for this thesis. A criticism of the mixed methods approach identified by Bryman is that it is often insufficiently justified.⁹ To overcome this issue Morse¹⁰ identifies five checks to ensure all the optional designs and choices have been considered which includes stating the following; the theoretical drives, core component, supplemental component, pacing and the point of interface. This research has adopted an inductive theoretical drive using core components which are qualitative through the conduct of a literature review and case study with a quantitative component adopted through thematic mapping. As previously identified the

³ Tashakkori, A and Teddlie, C. (Eds.) *Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioural Research*, cited in Cameron, R, 'Mixed Methods Research: The five P's Framework', The electronic journal of Business Research Methods, Volume 9, Issue 2, 2011, pg100

⁴ Bergman, M (Ed.) *Advances in Mixed Method Research*, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2008, pg 2

⁵ Journal of Mixed Methods, 2006, cited in Cameron, R, 'Mixed Methods Research: The five P's Framework', The electronic journal of Business Research Methods, Volume 9, Issue 2, 2011, pg 96 (pg 96 – 108)

⁶ Creswell and Plano Clark, cited in Cameron, R, 'Mixed Methods Research: The five P's Framework', The electronic journal of Business Research Methods, Volume 9, Issue 2, 2011, pg 96 (pg 96 – 108)

⁷ Hughes, A, 'Mixed Methods Research', Association for Psychological Sciences', 2016 retrieved from <http://www.psychologicalscience.org/observer/mixed-methodsresearch#.WJqhavKbWQc>

⁸ Bergman, M (Ed.) *Advances in Mixed Method Research*, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2008, pg 2

⁹ Bryman, A, 'Why do researchers Integrate/combine/Mesh/Blend/Mix/Merge/Fuse Quantitative and Qualitative Research?', in Bergman, M (Ed.) *Advances in Mixed Method Research*, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2008

¹⁰ Morse, J, 'Procedures and practice of mixed method design: maintaining control, rigor and complexity', in Tashakkori, A and Teddlie, C. (Eds.) *'SAGE handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioural Research'* 2nd edition, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2010

data will build in a sequential manner with the point of interface occurring at the analytics stage.

Each method will address a specific aspect of the question and the information gathered from each of these methods will be discussed in Chapter six. The following methods were adopted throughout this research; 1. Literature Review 2. Content Analysis and 3. Case Study and 4. SWOT framework for analysis. Each of the selected methods will build sequentially on the previous method. The literature review will establish the security environment in which the gap analysis of counter terrorism governance will be conducted. Building on the results of the gap analysis, the case study will explore the role of local government in the United Kingdom's counter terrorism governance architecture due to the lack of data available from an Australian perspective. The outcomes from these methods will be drawn together and discussed through the application of the SWOT framework for analysis in Chapter six.




Figure 1 Sequential mixed method adopted

Literature review

A foundational component of the research question involves establishing how terrorism has evolved into its current form. It is this evolution which has created an environment in which the current Australian counter terrorism governance has potential vulnerabilities at the local level. A literature review focusing on influential theories, debates and characteristics of the current terrorism threat has enabled the terrorism landscape to be explored within an academic context. The benefit of conducting a literature review as part of the research process is highlighted by Boote who argues that a researcher cannot conduct significant research without first understanding the literature in the field,¹¹ this is further supported by Cooley who states that a literature review allows different strands or aspects of the field to be drawn together which are related to the specific area under study.¹²

The aim of this review is to engage with research and critical debates to establish the nature of the current terrorism threat and demonstrate the evolution of terrorism that has, and continues to occur. There is a significant amount of research that has been conducted on the history and evolution of terrorism which has required the scope of this review to be limited to the evolution of terrorism in the modern period as defined by scholars including Hoffman,¹³ Nacos¹⁴ and Rapoport.¹⁵ Narrowing the period under review has enabled the identification of prominent theorists, debates and evolution to be identified and explored. The scope of the review has been further restricted to Salafi Jihadist groups AQ and The ISIS. This has been undertaken as these groups are referenced within Australia's counter terrorism governance materials as the dominant threat to Australia's national security.¹⁶

The sources used within this review include published text and journal articles, Australian government issued documents including the Australian national counter terrorism strategies, transcripts of speeches from federal government officials, mass media reporting and publications from online strategic bodies. The specific text and journal articles have been identified and selected as they have been through the process of scholarly review where they

¹¹ Boote, D and Beile, P, 'Scholars before researchers: On the centrality of the dissertation literature review in research preparation', *Educational Researcher*, 34:3, 2005, pg3

¹² Cooley, L and Lewkowicz, J, 'Dissertation writing in practice', Hong Kong University Press, 2003, pg 20

¹³ Hoffman, B, 'Inside Terrorism' Revised and Expanded Edition, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006

¹⁴ Nacos, B, 'Terrorism and Counter Terrorism', 5th edition, Routledge, 2016

¹⁵ Rapoport, D, 'The Four waves of Modern Terrorism', in Cronin, A.K and Ludes, J.M (eds.) 'Attacking Terrorism Elements of a Grand Strategy', Georgetown University Press, 2004

¹⁶ Council of Australian Governments, 'Australia's Counter Terrorism Strategy, Strengthening our Resilience', 2015, accessed at www.dpmc.gov.au/guidelines/, pg V

have been evaluated by members of the relevant scholarly community,¹⁷ this has ensured there is a level of rigor applied to the content of these publications. Where mass media reporting has been used in this review the articles have been used to obtain facts relating to terrorist incidents such as times and dates rather than for their critical analysis of an attack. The use of online strategic bodies has been used where there are guidelines for the selection and publication of materials on the site, these online bodies include organisations such as the Counter Terrorism Centre at Westpoint and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. This review establishes the current terrorism environment in which the gap analysis of Australia's counter terrorism governance has been situated.

Content analysis to thematically map Australia's counter terrorism governance

The second method adopted within this research project is the use of Content Analysis, specifically incorporating thematic analysis as outlined by Guest, MacQueen and Namey¹⁸ to map the thematic evolution of Australia's counter terrorism governance and identify gaps within the current framework. It is within this method the research will incorporate a quantitative component. Content analysis is defined as a technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages,¹⁹ as textual policy documents are one of the governments primary way of communicating their strategic approach to the public on a particular issue this form of analysis was deemed most appropriate for this aspect of the research. This method has been selected as it enables the dominant themes within the governance documentation to be identified and the evolution of these themes to be mapped throughout the period subject to analysis. At the completion of the thematic analysis, a gap analysis will be conducted in the context of the current security environment established in Chapter three to identify any vulnerabilities that may exist within the current governance framework.

The method selected is inductive in its approach with links to Grounded Theory with its emphasis on supporting claims with data.²⁰ There are strengths and weaknesses to thematic

¹⁷ Loseke, D, 'Methodological Thinking: Basic Principles of Social Research Design', Sage Publications, 2013, pg49

¹⁸ Guest, G, et al, 'Applied Thematic Analysis', Sage Publications, 2014

¹⁹ Bryman, A, 'Social Research Methods', 5th Edition, Oxford University Press, 2015, pg 305

²⁰ Guest, G, et al, Op Cit, 2014, pg 11

analysis as a research method, Krippendorff²¹ argues the benefit of thematic analysis is the descriptive richness obtained in the thematic units and links to the readers understanding, while a weakness in the reliability of thematic analysis relates to the level of interpretation required by the researcher to identify and describe implicit and explicit ideas within the data which is categorised as themes.²² Despite this weakness Guest, Macqueen and Namey argue this form of analysis is one of the most common and the most useful for capturing the meaning within textual data sets.²³

To identify the appropriate data for analysis, relevance sampling was used in the selection of the counter terrorism governance documentation released by the federal and NSW state levels of Australian government between 2003 and 2016. This period was identified due to the significant restructure of Australian counter terrorism governance that occurred resulting from the 9/11 attack by AQ and the Bali bombing in 2002, this structure has been maintained to the present day. Each of the selected source documents were published by the Australian Commonwealth or New South Wales Government,²⁴ are open source material freely accessible to the public, have no security classification and are the primary reference material for counter terrorism governance in Australia. This ensures the authenticity, credibility, and representativeness of the materials which Bryman identifies as an issue with document analysis.²⁵

²¹ Krippendorff, K, 'Content Analysis, An Introduction to its methodology', Second Edition, Sage Publications, 2004, pg 109

²² Guest, G, et al, Op Cit, 2014, pg 11

²³ Guest, G, et al, Op Cit, 2014, pg10

²⁴ The limited focus to documentation published by the NSW Government will be explained

²⁵ Bryman, A, Op Cit, 2015, pg 305

In chronological order of the date of publication the source documents subject to analysis are outlined in table 1.

	Level	Governance Documentation	Year
	Federal	<i>National Counter Terrorism Plan</i> , National Counter Terrorism Committee	2003
	Federal	<i>Protecting Australia from Terrorism</i> , Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet	2004
	Federal	<i>National Counter Terrorism Plan</i> , 2nd edition, National Counter Terrorism Committee	2005
	Federal	<i>Protecting Australia from Terrorism</i> , Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet	2006
	Federal	<i>National Security Statement</i> , Parliament of Australia	2008
	Federal	<i>Defence White Paper 2009 - Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030</i> , Department of Defence	2009
	Federal	<i>Counter Terrorism White Paper 2010 - Securing Australia Protecting our Community</i> , Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet	2010
	Federal	<i>National Counter Terrorism Plan</i> , 3 rd edition, National Counter Terrorism Committee	2012
	Federal	<i>Strong and Secure A Strategy for Australia's National Security</i> , Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet	2013
	State	<i>NSW State Counter Terrorism Plan</i> , State Counter Terrorism Committee	2013
	Federal	<i>Australia's Counter Terrorism Strategy</i> , Council of Australian Governments	2015
	Federal	<i>Defence White Paper</i> , Department of Defence	2016
	State	<i>NSW State Counter Terrorism Plan</i> , State Counter Terrorism Committee	2016

Table 1 Source Material subject to analysis

Qualitative data analysis software *NVivo Pro* was used to code the source documents, each document was coded independently using text segmentation to identify and allocated specific themes across the document, within each of the source documents each paragraph was subject to analysis, photographs and graphs were not analysed. A grounded theory approach to thematic identification was taken with themes identified from an initial detailed analysis of each of the source documents, a detailed outline and definitions of the themes is attached in

Annexure A. Thematic analysis has been used for research on terrorism propaganda including magazines published by AQ and ISIS such as *Inspire* and *Dabiq*.²⁶ Despite the commonality of this method, Thematic Analysis has not previously been applied to the evolution of Australian counter terrorism governance as such there are no a priori thematic frameworks to build on. A hierarchical approach to coding was utilised and during an initial analysis four hierarchical themes and four independent themes were identified with a total of 22 thematic categories identified. The most pervasive theme in each source document was calculated as a result of the percentage of the document covered as calculated by *Nvivo Pro* and provided a numerical result. The most pervasive themes were identified within each source document independently while consistent, emerging or weak themes across the source documents were also identified. Based on the results of the thematic mapping a gap analysis was conducted to assess any vulnerabilities that exist in the governance materials.

Case study of the United Kingdom counter terrorism strategy Contest

Building on the results of the gap analysis, a further qualitative component was adopted in the form of a case study. There is limited literature available evaluating the current or future role of local government in counter terrorism from an Australian perspective. As a result of this information gap this research will include a case study of the role of local government in the counter terrorism in the United Kingdom, specifically focusing on local government in England. The case study will examine the role of local government in the national counter terrorism strategy Contest and the Prevent program and explore the opportunities and challenges experienced as a result of devolving counter terrorism responsibilities to the local government level. The case study will incorporate successive editions and reviews of the strategies and programs. A benefit of conducting a single unit case study as identified by Gerring²⁷ is that it will enable an intensive study to be conducted with a number of observations to be made as a result. This case study does not aim to extract the role of local government from the United Kingdom for application directly into the Australian local government

²⁶ Droogan J and Peattie, S, 'Reading Jihad: Mapping the shifting themes of Inspire Magazine', *Terrorism and Political Violence Journal*, 2017

²⁷ Gerring, J, 'Case study research: principles and practises', Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pg 65

network, it aims to identify and explore the challenges experienced and positive outcomes identified where local governments are engaged in a preventative counter terrorism role.

The United Kingdom was selected for the subject of the case study after considering a number of factors. These include the allocation of a preventative counter terrorism role for local government, the similarity in structure of the United Kingdom's national counter terrorism strategy to the *National Counter Terrorism Plan* utilized in Australia, and the similarity of the roles and responsibilities of local government in the United Kingdom to local government in Australia. The United Kingdom's influence on the development Australia's strategic approach to Countering Violent Extremism²⁸ was also considered. There are differences between the Australia and the United Kingdom which prevent the strategies implemented by the United Kingdom local government from being transferred to the Australian local government framework. There are many cultural similarities between Australia and the United Kingdom though identified difference including different legislation in the United Kingdom and Australia and differing government structure, the Australian government consists of a state level of government which is lacking in the United Kingdom.

To conduct this case study data sources included documents issued by the United Kingdom government including current editions of the strategies, government conducted reviews, advice to practitioners and legislation. In addition to government issued documents peer reviewed journal articles, academic research, published texts and open source media reporting will be explored. One limitation in obtaining evidence for this case study is that statistical information relating to local governments and Prevent may be classified as it relates to terrorism, national security and privacy.

Each method will build sequentially on the previous method, culminating in a discussion in Chapter 6. To draw together the outcomes identified from each method Chapter six will adopt the SWOT framework for analysis to; outline the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats to analyse what a role for local government in counter terrorism should look like, if one needs to exist at this level. This approach, originally designed for corporate planning is a popular analytical method as it can be used with a variety of unstructured data and the focus is not variable dependent.²⁹ This framework takes into consideration both internal and external

²⁸ Bergin, A, 'Contest two and Counter extremism: Lessons for Australia', Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2009, pg 5

²⁹ Pruckun, H, 'Scientific Methods of Inquiry for Intelligence Analysis', 2nd edition. London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015, pg 185

forces when examining current performance (strengths and weakness) and future options (opportunities and threats).³⁰ A strength of this approach is that it can help find the best match between environmental trends which in this instance is the evolving terrorism environment and internal capabilities, while a weakness is that this process is often used to defend a previously decided course of action.³¹ This process will provide a structured approach to the discussion enabling justifiable recommendations to be made at the conclusion.

Conclusion

Through the adoption of this research design this thesis has sought to determine if the evolution of Australia's counter terrorism governance has led to vulnerabilities in the context of the current security environment particularly at the local government level. This chapter has outlined the methodological approach this project has adopted and the justifications for this design. The mixed method approach consists of; 1. Literature review, 2. Content analysis using thematic mapping, 3. Case Study and 4. SWOT framework for analysis. While each of these methods have strengths and weaknesses each method has been selected due to its suitability to explore a specific aspect of the research question and to build on the data obtained from each of the previous methods.

³⁰ Chermack, T and Kasshanna, B. 'The Use and Misuse of SWOT analysis and implications for HRD Professionals', *Human Resource Development International*, Volume 10, No 4, 2007, pg 384

³¹ Ibid, pg 388

Chapter Three: Literature review to establish the current terrorism environment

This chapter will establish the current terrorism environment within an academic context, providing the foundational context the subsequent chapters will build on. Critical debates will be outlined such as the accuracy of labelling terrorism threats as new and the strategic, policy and legislative implications this can have. Following on from this debate with reference to prominent researchers including Sageman,³² Kilcullen,³³ and Bourke³⁴ the evolution of terrorist organisations from hierarchical to networked structures will be outlined. The purpose of this will be to demonstrate how ISIS and AQ have taken advantage of advances in communications technology, the internet and social media to maximise their influence. The adaption by these groups has included significant evolutions in terrorism tactics including leaderless resistance and leaderless jihad, remote radicalisation and emergence of lone actors, each of these will be explored within this chapter. This chapter will demonstrate the current terrorism environment is characterised by attacks carried out by lone actors using less sophisticated weaponry such as vehicles and firearms to attack soft targets such as crowded places. The environment established within this chapter will provide the context in which the following chapter will be based on.

The scope of this review has been limited to the modern period of terrorism as defined by Hoffman, Nacos and Rapoport. Hoffman argues 1968 is the beginning of the modern period religious terrorism due to the nature of the attacks committed.³⁵ This is supported by Nacos who also states this period commenced a period of spectacular international and domestic attacks with incidents such as the campaign of airline hijackings and sabotage by Palestinian guerrilla groups and the Black September attacks on the Israeli Olympic Team during the Munich Olympic Games. The nature of these attacks had not previously been seen by the international community.³⁶ David Rapoport also supports this time frame as he argues a religious wave of

³² Sageman, M. 'Leaderless Jihad, Terror networks in the Twenty-First Century', University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008

³³ Kilcullen, D, 'Blood year, Hurst and Company London, 2016

³⁴ Burke, J, 'The New Threat, the past present and future of Islamic militancy', The New Press, 2015

³⁵ Hoffman, B, 'Inside Terrorism', Revised and Expanded Edition, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006, pg105

³⁶ Nacos, B, Op Cit, 2016, pg 52

terrorism commenced in 1979 with the Iranian Revolution, Islamic Century and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.³⁷

New Terrorism

Research conducted on the evolution of terrorism has led to debates about the accuracy of the use of the term 'new' when discussing trends or changes in tactics. These are not purely academic debates, the importance of the language used in constructing terrorism is emphasized by Crenshaw,³⁸ Gunning and Jackson³⁹ and reinforced by Spencer who agree the way in which terrorism is constructed impacts counter terrorism policy, strategies, and can allow governments to legitimise the introduction of new counter measures⁴⁰ to meet what has been constructed as a new threat. The language used to construct terrorism informs public debate and has serious policy implications,⁴¹ this is demonstrated within the current *Australian Government Counter Terrorism Strategy* which identifies a 'new wave' of terrorism in Australia that commenced post 9/11.⁴² In the period immediately after this attack Australia's response was characterized by traditional hard power⁴³ approaches to counter terrorism introducing significant changes to counter terrorism legislation, policy and increased funding to counter this 'new' threat. Between 2001 and 2006 an additional \$8.3 billion dollars was allocated to counter terrorism⁴⁴ and since 2014 the Australian Government passed four pieces of national security and counter terrorism legislation.⁴⁵ Despite increased government funding

³⁷ Rapoport, D, 'The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism', in Cronin, A.K and Ludes, J.M (eds) 'Attacking Terrorism Elements of a Grand Strategy', Georgetown University Press, 2004, pg50

³⁸ Crenshaw, M, 'The debate over New vs Old Terrorism', presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 2007, pg 28, viewed at <http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/debate-over-new-vs-old-terrorism>

³⁹ Gunning, J., & Jackson, R. What's so 'Religious' about 'Religious Terrorism'? *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, volume 4, issue 3, 2011

⁴⁰ Spencer, A, 'New versus Old Terrorism' in Jackson, R, (eds), 'Routledge Handbook on Critical Terrorism Studies', Routledge, 2016 pg 124

⁴¹ Gunning, J., & Jackson, R, Op Cit, 2011, pg 370

⁴² Council of Australian Governments, 'Australia's Counter Terrorism Strategy, Strengthening our Resilience', 2015, accessed at www.dpmc.gov.au/guidelines/, IV

⁴³ Hard power is a means to achieve desired outcomes through the ostensible use of force and includes strategies such as military intervention, coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions defined in Nasser-Eddine et al, 'Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review', Defence Science and Technology Organisation, 2011, pg 18

⁴⁴ Australian Government, 'Protecting Australia against Terrorism 2006', The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2006, pg I

⁴⁵ Keenan, M, 'Address to the National Security Summit', August 2016 viewed at <https://www.ministerjustice.gov.au/Speeches/Pages/2016/ThirdQuarter/Address-to-National-Security-Summit-Canberra.aspx>

and additional legislation, there is debate on how new the current period of terrorism is, if the nature has shifted or if it is always evolving.

A critical debate occurring within the field of terrorism studies has focused on the distinction between new and old terrorism. Prior to 9/11 a view had emerged that the world faces a 'new' terrorism threat unlike terrorism of the past. For those who supported this argument it meant the development rendered knowledge of the old terrorism irrelevant, obsolete, anachronistic and possibly harmful.⁴⁶ The opposing view argued to disregard this knowledge would be dangerous and could lead to mistakes of prediction and policy.⁴⁷ In their argument against a new period of terrorism Duyvesteyn and Malkki refute the need to disregard previous knowledge arguing it does not change the overall concepts or strategies of terrorism and does not make previous research redundant.⁴⁸ The fundamental differences between new and old terrorism relate to three distinct features; motivation, organisation and behaviour.⁴⁹ Religion has become the dominant motivator rather than previous secular/political motivations, groups are part of transnational networks rather than previous state sponsored hierarchical organisations and there is an increased lethality of attacks with indiscriminate targeting of civilians the latter which has been attributed to the religious motivations of the attackers.⁵⁰ The Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Red Army Faction (RAF) were held up as examples of the old terrorism while AQ was representative of the new.⁵¹ Prominent new terrorism advocates include Simon and Benjamin,⁵² Bolanos,⁵³ Sageman,⁵⁴ Nacos⁵⁵ and Hoffman,⁵⁶ though Hoffman has questioned his own viewpoint on the debate believing the new era he predicted has failed to materialise.⁵⁷

⁴⁶ Crenshaw, M, Op Cit, 2007, pg 1

⁴⁷ Crenshaw, M, Op Cit, 2007, pg 31,

⁴⁸ Duyvesteyn, I and Malkki, L, 'A new terrorism in existence today?' in Jackson, R and Samuel, J (eds), 'Contemporary Debates on Terrorism', Taylor and Francis, 2012, pg 42

⁴⁹ Spencer, A, Op Cit, 2016, pg 124

⁵⁰ Bolanos, A 'Is there a new terrorism in existence today' in Jackson, R and Samuel, J (eds), 'Contemporary Debates on Terrorism', Taylor and Francis, 2012, pg 30

⁵¹ Spencer, A, Op Cit, 2016, pg 124

⁵² Simon, S, and Benjamin, D, 'America and the new terrorism', Survival, 42:1, 2000

⁵³ Bolanos, A 'Op Cit, 2012, pg 29

⁵⁴ Sageman, M. 'Op Cit, 2008

⁵⁵ Nacos, B, 'Terrorism and Counter Terrorism' 5th edition, Routledge, 2016

⁵⁶ Hoffman, B, 'Inside Terrorism' Revised and Expanded Edition, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006

⁵⁷ Roy, O, Hoffman, B, et al, 'America and the new terrorism: an exchange', Survival, 42:2, 2000, pg163

Scholars who argue against this distinction including Crenshaw,⁵⁸Tucker,⁵⁹and Duyvesteyn question it through the provision of historical examples and systematically deconstruct the arguments made for this distinction.⁶⁰Crenshaw argues against the distinction arguing the logical and empirical foundations on which the arguments are based are weak,⁶¹Crenshaw does not argue that change has not occurred rather takes the view that terrorism has evolved and must be grounded in a historical context. This is supported by Burke who also argues the threat from terrorism, particularly Islamic militancy is always evolving and that while it may seem familiar it is always new.⁶²Kilcullen believes the reactive security measures that occur in the aftermath of a successful terrorist attack encourage a constant evolution in tactics.⁶³In his assessment of the threat environment Pantucci agrees with the evolving nature of terrorism claiming a significant evolution has only recently occurred with the shift towards smaller scattered cells and lone actors rather than more ambitious and complex attacks.⁶⁴

Structural evolution of terrorism

Post 9/11 with the surge in terrorism literature a significant amount of research was conducted into the structure of terrorist organisations, their operational capabilities and resilience particularly AQ and more recently ISIS. Research by Gunaratna and Oreg⁶⁵ identify two distinct structures of terrorist organisations, hierarchical or networked. Characteristics of a hierarchical structure include clear lines of authority, functional specialization and centralized decision making, this structure is argued to be best suited for more complex attacks due to the efficiency achieved through this approach. The complex nature of the 9/11 attacks which required significant time and finances to execute are an example of an attack best planned within this organisational structure which Kilcullen holds up as a further example of expeditionary terrorism and dates this style to the 1972 Munich attacks. While this structure is suited to planning complex attacks which was demonstrated by the unprecedented nature of

⁵⁸ Crenshaw, M, Op Cit, 2007, pg 1

⁵⁹ Tucker, D, 'What is New about the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is it?', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 13:3, 2001

⁶⁰ Duyvesteyn, I, 'How new is the new terrorism', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol 27, 2004

⁶¹ Crenshaw, M, Op Cit, 2007, pg 1

⁶² Burke, J, Op Cit, 2016, pg 23

⁶³ Kilcullen, D, Op Cit, 2016, pg119

⁶⁴ Pantuci, Raffaello, 'Britain on Alert: The attacks in London and Manchester and the Evolving Threat', *CTC Sentinel*, vol 10, August, 2017, pg 1

⁶⁵ Gunaratna, R, and Oreg, A, 'Al Qaeda's Organisational Structure and its evolution, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 33:12, 2010, pg 1045

the 9/11 attack it is more vulnerable to disruption which was evident in the successful military targeting of AQ by the United States during Operation Enduring Freedom. The 9/11 attack also resulted in countries including developing counter terrorism measures specifically designed to prevent this type of attack from reoccurring with an external focus on border control and stopping threats from entering the country. This reaction involving military action and increased security postures led to a necessary adaption in terrorist organizational structure and evolution in tactics including networked approach to terrorism.

Characteristics of networked organisations include self-organized and self-enrolling actors, connected by ties often via the internet and is suited to less complex methods of attack. While this structure is a characteristic in the argument for a new period of terrorism, it also forms the basis for the concept of leaderless resistance which Kilcullen argues characterizes the current structure adopted by ISIS and AQ⁶⁶ which are the two largest terrorist networks.⁶⁷ Kilcullen argues that groups have necessarily evolved their tactics in response to increased security measures implemented by countries, but have also taken advantage of advances in communications technology including social media. Kilcullen outlines a number of significant evolutions that have occurred post 9/11 all of which he believes have been adopted by ISIS including the use of guerilla terrorism, urban siege, remote radicalization, self-radicalization and leaderless resistance,⁶⁸ it is these adaptations which he argues typifies the current environment. Kilcullen argues remote radicalization which took advantage of advances in communications technology such as social media, Google earth and Youtube was a significant evolution that enabled the implementation of leaderless resistance/leaderless jihad.⁶⁹ The concept of leaderless resistance can be traced to Louis Beam's 1992 essay 'Leaderless resistance' which spoke of moving away from the traditional hierarchical model and adopting a phantom cell structure.⁷⁰ The idea was embraced by the far right as the definitive work on the topic of leaderless resistance⁷¹ but has more recently become associated with Islamic militant terrorism.

⁶⁶ Kilcullen, D, Op Cit, 2016, pg120

⁶⁷ Institute for Economics and Peace, 'Global Terrorism Index 2016', Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016, pg 58

⁶⁸ Kilcullen, D, Op Cit, 2016, pg120

⁶⁹ Kilcullen, D, Op Cit, 2016, pg120

⁷⁰ Beam, L, 'Leaderless Resistance', The Seditonist, 1992, viewed at <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/268d/96058ff94614fd0980faca19d482df8fdb86.pdf>

⁷¹ Burton, F, Stewart, S, 'The Lone Wolf Disconnect', Stratfor Worldview, 2008, viewed at https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/lone_wolf_disconnect

The Islamic militant vision of Leaderless Jihad is attributed to AQ strategist Abu Musab al-Suri and his book 'The call to global Islamic resistance.'⁷² Al-Suri envisioned an uprising that was entirely self-organising, without leaders or structure that would be led by only loosely connected cells. This vision involved the mass mobilisation of young men in the west who could each strike a single blow that would have a cumulative impact. This would result in further radicalisation and further mobilization the sum of which would be greater than its parts, he envisioned a movement that was held together by a set of commonly understood guidelines termed Leaderless Jihad. In his research on Leaderless Jihad Sageman attributes its emergence to the breakup of the global network of terrorist groups, hostile local environments, hardening of national borders and importantly the availability of the internet.⁷³ Sageman argues the internet is what makes leaderless jihad possible providing a broad ideology of anti-western political violence. The influence of the internet is reinforced by Burke who uses the examples of the killing of Lee Rigby in England, the Tsarnaev brothers in the Boston Bombings, and the eight-day shooting spree of Mohammed Merah in France to demonstrate that though these people had never met they used similar language in their public statements and similar target selections.⁷⁴ Through these examples Burke argues the internet is providing the guidelines for the movement envisioned by al-Suri. David Tucker⁷⁵ questions the scientific credibility of Sageman's research and provides evidence contradicting some of Sageman's claims including the role of the internet and its impacting on social relationships, though these criticisms were made prior to the emergence of ISIS and the successes of the tactics employed by the group. Sageman believed that leaderless jihad would fade away as the movement lost momentum,⁷⁶ though the emergence of ISIS has reinvigorated the movement resulting in the mobilization al-Suri had envisioned.

ISIS recognizes the influence of the internet and their ability to remotely radicalize individuals to their cause and have taken advantage of this. The groups spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani instructed individuals 'don't not ask for anyone's permission',⁷⁷ calling for extremists to carry out less sophisticated attacks and providing instructions on how to maximise the

⁷² Sageman, M, Op Cit, 2008, pg 143

⁷³ Ibid, pg 143

⁷⁴ Burke, J, ' Op Cit, 2015, pg 206

⁷⁵ Tucker, D, 'Jihad Dramatically transformed? Sageman on Jihad and the internet', Homeland Security Affairs, 6, 2016

⁷⁶ Sageman, Op Cit, 2008, pg 146

⁷⁷ Callimachi, R, 'Was Orlando shooter really acting for ISIS? For ISIS Its all the same', *The NY Times*, June 12, 2016

effectiveness of an attack in propaganda including English language publications *Inspire*, *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* as well as within audio messaging such as –

“if you are not able to find an IED or a bullet, then single out the disbelieving American, Frenchman or any of their allies. Smash his head with a rock, or slaughter him with a knife, or run him over with your car.”⁷⁸

and

“The smallest action you do in the herat of their land is dearer to us than the largest action by us, and more effective and more damaging to them”⁷⁹

and

“Stab them, shoot them, poison them, and run them down with your vehicles. Kill them where ever you find them”⁸⁰

The effectiveness of these messages was seen around the world, in the days and weeks following the audio release, ISIS inspired lone actor attacks using basic attack methods were seen in Algeria, Australia, Canada and the United States while over a longer period attacks of this nature, and in some instances multiple attacks occurred in London and France.

In tracing the emergence of less sophisticated attack methods Burke uses the murder of Lee Rigby in the United Kingdom in 2013 by Michael Adebowale and Michael Adebolajo to argue this incident elevated basic attack methodology to become a significant threat from where it had previously only been emerging.⁸¹ This assessment is supported by Pantucci in his analysis of the current United Kingdom threat environment in which he argues the model adopted in this attack has become a template many extremists seek to emulate often making direct reference to this attack.⁸² While these attacks are often referred to as lone wolf attacks Burke believes the term lone wolf is a profoundly misleading one and that if they do exist they are extremely rare.⁸³ It is frequently the case that attacks which are carried out by a single actor are later linked to other individuals, terrorist networks or an established group. This can

⁷⁸ Stern, J., and Berger, J.M., ‘ISIS, The state of terror’ William Collins, United Kingdom, 2016, pg 103

⁷⁹ Pantucci, R., ‘Britain on Alert: The attacks in London and Manchester and the Evolving Threat’, CTC Sentinel, vol 10, August, 2017, pg 4

⁸⁰ The Islamic State, ‘Rumiyah’, Al Hayat Media Centre, Vol 1, 2016, pg 17

⁸¹ Burke, J., ‘Op Cit, 2015, pg 181

⁸² Pantucci, R., ‘Op Cit, 2017, pg 5

⁸³ Burke, J., ‘Op Cit, 2015, pg 208

demonstrated by the 2016 Berlin Christmas Market vehicle attack carried out by Anis Amri who was later linked to the Abu Walaa network, a recruiting network for ISIS in Germany.⁸⁴

When the terms lone wolf and lone actor are applied in the context of terrorism the boundary between individuals who have acted alone and coordinated attacks are sometimes unclear.⁸⁵ The Oxford English dictionary defines a lone wolf as a person who prefers to act alone,⁸⁶ though the *Australian Government Counter Terrorism Strategy* states they are home grown, self-initiated or low threshold, involve an individual or individuals operating with little or no direct contact with established terrorist groups.⁸⁷ Byman uses the definition of individuals who are not part of a group or directed by an outside organisation⁸⁸ while Burton and Stewart define a lone wolf as a person who acts on his or her own without orders from – or even connections to an organisation.⁸⁹ There is great variation just within these limited definitions, Burton and Stuart limit their definition to one actor, while Byman allows more than one individual and the Australian Government Strategy allows more than one actor but also adds in the criteria of home grown and low threshold. In his research Spaaij agrees with the definition of Burton and Stuart arguing that attacks carried out by couples or small cells do not strictly qualify as lone wolf terrorism.⁹⁰ Despite the less sophisticated nature of the tactics adopted this style of terrorism is described as a complex challenge due to the scattered and disparate nature of the cells or individuals which are often difficult to track and unpredictable.⁹¹ This challenge is exacerbated when the ideal targets are identified as large outdoor festivals, conventions, celebrations, parades, pedestrian congested streets, outdoor markets and outdoor rallies.⁹² These often have limited or no protection and in Australia are often governed at the local government level with limited counter terrorism involvement.

⁸⁴ Heil, G, 'The Berlin attack and the Abu Walaa' Islamic State recruitment network', CTC Sentinel, February 2017, pg 1

⁸⁵ Byman, D, 'How to hunt a lone wolf: Countering terrorists who act on their own', Brookings, 2017 viewed at <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/how-to-hunt-a-lone-wolf-countering-terrorists-who-act-on-their-own/>

⁸⁶ Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 2017, viewed at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/lone_wolf

⁸⁷ Council of Australian Governments, 'Australia's Counter Terrorism Strategy, Strengthening our Resilience', 2015, accessed at www.dpmc.gov.au/guidelines/, pg 2

⁸⁸ Byman, D, Op Cit, 2017

⁸⁹ Burton, F, Stewart, S, 'The Lone Wolf Disconnect', Stratfor Worldview, 2008, viewed at https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/lone_wolf_disconnect

⁹⁰ Spaaij, R, 'Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism, Global Patterns Motivations and Prevention', Springer, 2012, pg 27

⁹¹ Pantuci, R, Op Cit, 2017, pg 6

⁹² Islamic State, 'Rumiyah', Al Hayat Media Centre, Volume 3, 2016, pg 11

The terrorism threat outlined in this review is characterised as one that is evolving, while the adoption of simplistic attack methodology is likely to be an enduring presence Kilcullen⁹³ and Burke each believe these tactics will coexist with the intent to commit mass casualty attacks.⁹⁴ This position has been reinforced by the disrupted Sydney plot in July, 2017 by a Sydney based cell to bring down an aircraft with an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and to conduct a chemical attack the sophistication of which Australia has not experienced. This plot had the added significance of direct involvement and coordination from members of ISIS in Syria.⁹⁵ The terrorist threat outlined can be demonstrated with Australian examples. Attacks in Australia since the release of ISIS's audio messaging in 2014 include The Lindt Cafe Siege, the attack by Numan Hader at Endeavour Hills and the Murder of NSW Police employee Curtis Cheng with many more disrupted plots. These attacks involved lone actors using basic weapons such as knives and firearms to carry out less sophisticated attacks, inspired by ISIS. This trend has continued globally with countries such as London, France, Spain, Germany, Stockholm and the USA all experiencing this with devastating consequences. The trend has also been adopted by individuals associated with or adhering to the right wing as demonstrated by the attacks at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London and Charlottesville, USA. Australia arguably is not immune from an increase in support for nationalist and far right groups as demonstrated by the increase in support for and the election of One Nation. Far right aligned groups such as Australian Defence League, the Patriots Defence League, True Australian Patriots and the United Patriots front are increasing in prevalence along with events such as the 'reclaim Australia rallies' that were held in 16 locations around Australia in 2015.⁹⁶ This demonstrates the evolving threat is complex and may not be limited to salafist inspired groups.

Conclusion

This review has sought to establish the current terrorism environment and provide a foundation on which the following chapters will be built. Through an exploration of academic literature, critical theories and debates were outlined including the accuracy of new periods of terrorism, and the significant impact the structural evolutions that have occurred had on the

⁹³ Kilcullen, D, Op Cit, 2016, pg123

⁹⁴ Burke, J, Op Cit, 2015, pg 181

⁹⁵ Maley, P, 'From Syria to Sydney: How the airport plot unfolded', The Australian, 5th August, 2017 viewed at <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/national-security/from-syria-to-sydney-how-the-airport-terror-plot-unfolded/news-story/463e4d7d74c27764c07c93df85bdd86c>

⁹⁶ McCormack, A and McVeigh, S, 'The rise of the far right in Australia', ABC, 2016 viewed at <http://www.abc.net.au/triplej/programs/hack/the-rise-of-the-far-right/7858282>

terrorism environment. The current terrorism environment has been characterised as one that is dynamic, and heavily influenced by AQ and ISIS. The tactics encouraged by these groups in their propaganda has been demonstrated to include basic weaponry such as firearms, knives and vehicles, though the adoption of these tactics is not limited to Islamic militant groups and has been adopted by the far right. The environment characterised in this review is likely to endure due to the ease and success of these tactics. The following chapter will thematically map the evolution of Australia's counter terrorism governance across each of the levels of Australian government and conduct a gap analysis to demonstrate that vulnerabilities exist in the context of the terrorism environment established within this review.

Chapter Four: Counter Terrorism Governance Thematic Analysis

Australia's counter terrorism governance necessarily evolves in response to changes in the global and domestic terrorism environment. Using content analysis, specifically thematic mapping this chapter has mapped the evolution of Australia's counter terrorism governance documentation between the period of 2003 and 2016. Mapping was conducted to identify pervasive themes and their evolution across this time frame. This analysis included themes such as the nature of the threat, governance arrangements and the involvement of the community. At the conclusion of the mapping process a gap analysis was conducted within the context of the current terrorism environment established in the previous chapter. This analysis established an absence of local government involvement since 2006. This absence is despite an increased emphasis on the role of the community and the development of social cohesion and community resilience in countering terrorism which will be demonstrated to have strong links with local government.

Australia's counter terrorism governance framework in its current form was established following the 2001 September 11 attacks by AQ and the 2002 Bali Bombing. The Council of Australian Government's Intergovernmental Agreement on Australia's Counter Terrorism Arrangements,⁹⁷ established the National Counter Terrorism Committee. Despite the significant expansion of the number of government and non-government agencies involvement in counter terrorism during the period following 2001, the whole of government and all levels of government approach articulated by the government, this expansion has not included a continued role for local government within the preventative concepts of counter terrorism strategy and planning.

The documentation included in this analysis consists of Australian government issued counter terrorism policy, plans, white papers, strategies and statements issued between 2002 and 2016 by the Australian Federal and the NSW state governments. A detailed thematic analysis of governance documents outlined in *table 1* has been conducted in chronological order to identify the main themes and map the evolution of these themes throughout the policies in chronological order. Identified themes, their definitions and coding framework are outlined in Annexure A.

⁹⁷ Council of Australian Governments, 'Intergovernmental Agreement on Australia's Counter Terrorism Arrangements', 2002, pg 2

2003 – 2006

The period between 2003 and 2006 saw the release of the first editions of Australia's counter terrorism governance material under the current governance framework of the National Counter Terrorism Committee including the National Counter Terrorism Plan (NCTP) and the first version of federal government's strategic approach to countering terrorism in '*Protecting Australia from Terrorism*'. The period between publications and editions was short, with only two years between each edition of the NCTP and strategy. During the later part of this period there were significant global and domestic terrorism events whose influence can be seen within the content of these documents and the measures taken by the Australian government, these include the Madrid train bombing which increased the focus on the protection of surface transport.⁹⁸

National Counter Terrorism Plan 2003

The first edition of the NCTP was released in 2003 by the National Counter Terrorism Committee replacing the National Anti-Terrorist Plan.⁹⁹ The plan developed was prescriptive in nature as the intent of the document was to outline the responsibilities, authorities and mechanisms to manage the consequences of terrorism if it occurs within Australia.¹⁰⁰ As such the structure of the document reflects the three concepts at its core. Reflecting this objective 'Governance Arrangements' are the pervasive theme throughout out this document with the subcategories of 'Federal Government Level', 'State Government level' and 'Interjurisdictional' dominating the document. The document was structured around three key concepts of Prevention, Preparedness and Response and it is within these three concepts responsibility was allocated, the dominant themes reflect the relationship between the federal and state/territory governments in countering terrorism. Despite the whole of government approach articulated consistently across each of the governance documents, 'Local Government Level' does not emerge as a theme in this edition.

⁹⁸ National Counter Terrorism Committee, 'National Counter Terrorism Plan', 2nd Edition, National Counter Terrorism Committee, 2005, pg 3:5

⁹⁹ Council of Australian Governments, Op Cit, 2002, pg 2

¹⁰⁰ National Counter Terrorism Committee, Op Cit, 2003, pg 1:2

Protecting Australia from Terrorism 2004

Protecting Australia from Terrorism 2004 was the first strategic counter terrorism document released by the Australian government under Prime Minister John Howard in the new governance framework, the objective of which was to set out the key elements of Australia's counter terrorism policy and arrangements.¹⁰¹ The dominant themes within this document relate to the 'Nature of the threat' and the 'Governance arrangements'. The 'Nature of the threat' sub-categories are the terrorist 'threat originating outside of Australia' and 'Islamic' while the 'Centralisation of governance' arrangements was the most pervasive governance theme. The most dominant theme evident in this document is that the terrorism threat to Australia is originating outside of Australia's borders and is something that Australia needs to secure its borders against. A focus of this theme is on the measures introduced by the Australian government to secure the nation's borders from external threats such as AQ in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack. This is evident in references for this theme including "as an open society we must maintain a system of border controls that links us with the global economy while minimising the risk of terrorists entering Australia". The second significant theme was 'Islamic' as the nature of the threat, this theme was characterised by references such as "Muslim extremist terrorism is the principal force driving transnational terrorism and it is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future" as well as terrorism "is inspired by an extreme and militant distortion of Islamic doctrine"¹⁰²this is supported with repeated references to AQ and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) as the threat sources. This theme had links to the threat originating outside of Australia as many of the references are to groups situated overseas which reinforces the idea that the terrorism threat is one that Australia has to protect against rather than one that is originating within Australia's border.

The 'Centralisation of Governance' arrangements was a further pervasive theme. Phrases such as "the governments approach to national security recognises the importance of leadership from the centre,"¹⁰³and "the Australian Government recognises it has a critical coordination role"¹⁰⁴typify this theme, in addition the identification of the Prime Minister as the chair of the body which is the focal point of decisions relating to national security¹⁰⁵and consolidating the

¹⁰¹ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, "Protecting Australia from Terrorism 2004, Commonwealth of Australia, 2004, pg vi

¹⁰² Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Ibid, 2004, pg viii

¹⁰³ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Op Cit, 2004, pg viii

¹⁰⁴ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Op Cit, 2004', pg x

¹⁰⁵ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet,Op Cit 2004, pg 9

coordination of counter terrorism policy in his department¹⁰⁶ further reinforce the central role played by the federal government in counter terrorism. The pervasiveness of this theme was significantly reduced in the second edition released in 2006, while theme of 'Federal Government level' responsibility remains strong the theme of 'Decentralisation of Governance' increased significantly.

National Counter Terrorism Plan 2005 2nd edition

The second edition of the NCTP was released in 2005 and had been expanded with the inclusion of the concept of Recovery as a key element of the plan. The three main pervasive themes from the first edition of the NCTP released in 2003 remained consistent in order of dominance though with the inclusion of the concept of Recovery in the NCTP the 'Local Government Level', though weak, emerged as a theme. This theme emerged for the first time in this document despite the whole of government approach appearing within each of the previous editions of the governance documents.

Protecting Australia from Terrorism 2006 2nd edition

The second version of *Protecting Australia from Terrorism* was released by the Federal Government in 2006. The more pervasive themes in this edition remained the 'Nature of the threat' sub-categories of the 'threat originating outside of Australia' and 'Islamic', though in this edition the most pervasive sub category is 'Islamic' as the nature of the threat with the 'threat originating outside of Australia' less pervasive than in the first edition. In this edition two themes have emerged that while not dominant reflect a change in the governance approach; the sub categories of 'Decentralisation of Governance' arrangements and 'Social Cohesion'. Decentralisation of Governance arrangements emerged as a stronger theme in this edition than in previous documents, this theme is typified by terms such as working with, working closely, partnerships with and joint responsibility. 'Social Cohesion' emerged as a theme within this document which is typified by references such as 'measures to build social cohesion and community harmony...are an important part of the broader strategy to combat terrorism in Australia' and 'working towards a national strategy to reinforce social cohesion.' The emergence of this theme may be linked to the results of the special meeting on terrorism COAG

¹⁰⁶ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Op Cit, 2004, pg10

held in 2005 in which the *National Action Plan to build on Social Cohesion, Harmony and Security* was established linking social cohesion and terrorism in government discourse.¹⁰⁷ Social cohesion remained an enduring theme throughout the governance material with varying levels of pervasiveness.

2007 – 2013

During this period non-traditional security threats increased in national security priority including issues such as climate change, energy security and transnational crime. This period saw the first national security statement delivered to Parliament by Prime Minister Rudd, A *Defence White Paper* was released in 2009, *Counter Terrorism White Paper* was released in 2010, the third and current edition of the NCTP was released in 2012, the *NSW State Government Counter Terrorism Plan* was released in 2013 as well as the national security strategy *Strong and Secure – A strategy for Australia's National Security*.

National Security Statement 2008

In 2008 Prime Minister Kevin Rudd delivered an inaugural national security statement to Parliament, the intent of this statement was to set out the national security policy framework for the future and the approach the government is taking to address these threats.¹⁰⁸ The pervasive themes across this speech relate to 'Nature of the threat', and 'Governance Arrangements'. The category of the 'Role of the community', specifically the sub-category of 'Social Cohesion' emerged stronger in this speech though the sub category of 'Islamic' remained the most pervasive theme followed by 'Centralisation of Governance' and 'Federal Government level' responsibility. This speech encompassed National Security in its entirety including non-traditional security issues such as climate change, energy security and transnational crime such as people trafficking rather than specifically focusing on terrorism and counter terrorism measures,¹⁰⁹ the strength of the themes are not as strong in this speech as

¹⁰⁷ Harris-Hogan, S, Barrelle, K and Zammitt, A, 'What is countering Violent extremism? Exploring CVE policy and practise in Australia', *Behavioural Science of Terrorism and political aggression*, 8:1, 2016, pg 13

¹⁰⁸ Rudd, K, 'National Security Statement', Parliament of Australia, Hansard Database, 2008, viewed at <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansard%2F2008-12-04%2F0045%22>

¹⁰⁹ Rudd, K, Ibid, 2008,

they are in governance documents where the document relates specifically to terrorism and counter terrorism.

Defence White Paper 2009 – *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*

The 2009 Defence White Paper, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030* was the first Defence White Paper produced post 9/11 with the previous Defence White Paper published in 2000. The most pervasive themes throughout this document relate to the 'Nature of the threat' and the 'Role of Defence in Counter Terrorism'. The specific sub categories of the 'Nature of the threat' include 'Threat originating outside of Australia' as the dominant theme followed by 'Islamic'. Countering terrorism forms one element of national security and also only forms a small part of the role of the Australian Defence Force, which is reflected in the pervasiveness of these themes and the external focus of the more dominant themes in this document as the Australian Defence Force was engaged in the war in Afghanistan during this period.

Counter Terrorism White Paper 2010 - *Securing Australia Protecting our Community*

The 2010 Counter Terrorism White Paper- *Securing Australia, Protecting our Community* released by the Labour Government in 2010¹¹⁰ outlined the governments strategic approach to countering terrorism, there are a number of themes which have emerged in prominence in this document while others have remained consistent. The most pervasive themes throughout the document relate to the 'Nature of the Threat' and 'Governance Arrangements' specifically the sub-categories of 'Islam', 'Federal Government Level' and 'Threat originating outside of Australia'. These themes remain the three most pervasive themes within government strategy continuing from *Protecting Australia from Terrorism 2006* the previous strategic counter terrorism governance document produced by the Federal government. The emergence of the themes 'Domestic Threat' and 'Violent Extremism' reflect the changing domestic security environment and the increased awareness of the influence of radicalisation and violent extremism by the government. The theme 'Domestic threat' is strongest within this document and is characterised by references demonstrating the increase in people arrested for terrorism

¹¹⁰ Australian Government, 'Counter Terrorism White Paper 2010, Protecting Australia Securing our Community', Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010

offences such as there has been an ‘increase in the terrorist threat from people born or raised in Australia’¹¹¹ and ‘a number of Australians are known to subscribe to this message. Many of these individuals were born in Australia.’¹¹²The increased pervasiveness of ‘Violent Extremism’ as a theme could be linked to this White Paper being the first time the government has outlined its approach to countering violent extremism in the community which would also link to the thematic increase of ‘Domestic threat’. ‘Violent extremism’ as a theme has strong references to the community of Australia including ‘working with the Australian community through a cooperative national approach to lessen the appeal of violent extremism’ as well as ‘communities can contribute to addressing the broader long term causes of terrorism and violent extremism’.¹¹³

National Counter Terrorism Plan 2012 3rd edition

The 3rd edition of the NCTP released in 2012 was the current national counter terrorism plan though under review at the time of writing. The most pervasive themes within this document remained consistent in order of dominance from the previous editions related to Governance arrangements. Federal Government Level, State Government Level and Inter-jurisdictional remained the most pervasive which reflects the objective of the document which is to allocate roles and responsibilities in-line with the four concepts of the plan which is built around Planning, Preparedness, Response and Recovery. A thematic evolution that differentiates this edition from the previous two editions of the plan is the lack thematic representation of the local government, this is a reflection of an overall decrease in local government representation in the governance documentation despite the theme of ‘Whole of Government/All level of government’ involvement in countering terrorism continuing to be represented.

Strong and Secure A Strategy for Australia’s National Security 2013

The National security strategy outlines the government’s strategic approach to national security. Countering terrorism forms one category of what the government calls the ‘eight

¹¹¹ Ibid, 2010, pg ii

¹¹² Australian Government, Op Cit, 2010, pg ii

¹¹³ Australian Government, Op Cit, 2010, pg 65

pillars’¹¹⁴of national security, the themes identified within this document are not as pervasive as they are in terrorism focused governance documents. The pervasive themes within this document relate to the categories of ‘Governance Arrangements’, ‘Nature of the threat’ and the ‘Priority of Terrorism’. The sub category of ‘Decentralisation of Governance’ arrangements appeared as the most pervasive theme in this document for the first time throughout the analysis. This theme is characterised by an emphasis on ‘partnerships’ between all levels of the government, business and the community. The sub category of ‘Threat originating outside of Australia’ remains a pervasive theme which features consistently throughout the strategic governance documents issued by the Federal government. This theme is characterised by references to the number of Australian lives lost in terrorist attacks overseas, the influence of regional terrorist networks and the impact non-state actors including terrorists will have on regional security. The ‘Priority of Terrorism’ emerge as theme, this theme is characterised by references to the inclusion of terrorism as a key pillar of Australia’s national security in this document.

New South Wales Counter Terrorism Plan 2013

The *New South Wales Counter Terrorism Plan* released in 2013 is informed by and developed in line with the NCTP which is reflected in the structure of the document also reflecting the four concepts of Planning, Preparedness, Response and Recovery. The more pervasive themes in this document reflect the relationship between the Federal and State Governments as the dominant themes throughout this plan relate to ‘Governance arrangements’, specifically the sub categories ‘State Government Level’ followed by ‘Federal Government Level’. The objective of the NSW counter terrorism plan is to outline the responsibilities, authorities and the mechanisms to prevent, prepare for and respond to and recover from acts of terrorism within New South Wales¹¹⁵which accounts for the dominance of these themes throughout this plan.

¹¹⁴ Australian Government, ‘Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia’s National Security’, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2013, pg vii

¹¹⁵ New South Wales Government, ‘New South Wales Counter Terrorism Plan’, NSW Government, 2013, pg 3

2014 – 2016

The period between 2014 and 2016 saw significant changes in the global and domestic counter terrorism landscape. Globally this period saw the emergence and military successes of ISIS which instigated a flow of foreign fighters from Australia to Syria not seen in previous conflicts such as in Afghanistan while domestically there was an increase in successful and disrupted attacks involving ‘lone actors’ using less sophisticated weapons such as firearms and knives. During this period the current *Australian National Counter Terrorism Strategy* was published by COAG, the *2016 Defence White Paper* was released and the *NSW State Counter Terrorism Plan* was updated.

Australia’s Counter Terrorism Strategy 2015

Australia’s Counter Terrorism Strategy was released by COAG in 2015 in the wake of the Lindt Café siege by Haron Monis and is the current counter terrorism strategy for the Australian Government. The three most pervasive themes within this document relate to the ‘Nature of the threat’ specifically the sub categories of ‘Islamic’, ‘Violent extremism’ and ‘Less sophisticated,’ the latter category reflecting an evolution that had occurred within terrorism tactics towards more basic attacks by ‘lone actors’ as outlined in Chapter three. This edition of *Australia’s Counter Terrorism Strategy* demonstrates a shift in the governments strategic counter terrorism focus from protecting against a threat originating outside of Australia and outlining the governance arrangements which were the pervasive themes throughout the earlier government strategies to a domestic emphasis specifically working with Australian community, and focusing on its resilience and cohesion. Throughout these themes the Australian community features with references including the ‘groups violent ideology, persuasive propaganda, and its grooming of young people online is directly responsible for the radicalisation to violent extremism of a significant number of individuals in our community,’¹¹⁶ and ‘exerting an influence in Australia through propaganda flowing into our communities’.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ Council of Australian Governments, ‘Australia’s Counter Terrorism Strategy’, Commonwealth of Australia, 2015, pg V

¹¹⁷ Ibid, pg 1

Defence White Paper 2016

Analysis of the *Defence White Paper 2016* identifies a dominance of externally focused themes. Continuing from the *2009 Defence White Paper* the most pervasive theme was the 'Nature of the threat' sub-category 'threat originating outside of Australia'. As previously noted in the analysis of the 2009 Defence White Paper, counter terrorism forms a small role of the ADF with the ADF primarily operating external to Australia. The pervasiveness of the themes in this document reflect this, though there is an increase in the pervasiveness of the dominant theme in comparison to the 2009 Defence White Paper which indicates an increase in pervasiveness of terrorism and counter terrorism as a defence consideration within the white paper. Despite an increase in discussions within the community and the media about increasing the domestic role of the ADF in terrorism and counter terrorism operations in the period following the Lindt Café siege and subsequent inquest this has not been reflected thematically in this document.

NSW Counter Terrorism Plan 2016

The current edition of the *NSW Government Counter Terrorism Plan* was released in December 2016 updating the previous plan issued in 2013. The objective of the plan remains the same as the previous edition released in 2013. The pervasive themes which relate to Governance Arrangements have continued from the previous edition of the plan with the sub category of 'State Government Level' significantly more dominant, while 'Interjurisdictional', 'Federal Government Level' and 'Decentralisation of Governance' each have a similar thematic representation throughout the plan.

Thematic Evolution and Gap Analysis

Whole of government/ All levels of government

A consistent theme throughout the governance documentation for the period subject to analysis was identified as a ‘whole of government’ and ‘all levels of government’ approach to counter terrorism. A whole of government approach and the involvement of all levels of government in countering terrorism is articulated in each of the governance documents subject to analysis as demonstrated in figure 1. The Australian Public Service Commission defines a whole of government approach as

“Public service agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues¹¹⁸...Whole of government initiatives can result from top down decisions though alternatively many can begin at the local level where people from different agencies work together to achieve shared goals for one community, whole of government can span any or all three levels of government.¹¹⁹”

An approach involving all levels of government remains consistent across the source documents despite the Local Government not appearing throughout the governance documentation after the release of *Protecting Australia from Terrorism 2006* as identified in figure 2.

Local government thematic evolution

During the period 2003 - 2006 the counter terrorism governance documentation produced by the Australian Government included specific references to the local government. *Protecting Australia from Terrorism 2006* is the governance document in which the theme of local government appears most pervasive, this theme is weaker in the 2004 edition of *Protecting Australia from Terrorism* and in the 1st and 2nd editions of the NCTP. This theme is characterised by references including ‘the Australian government seeks to achieve this aim by working with state, territory and local governments,’¹²⁰ and ‘all states and territories will

¹¹⁸ Australian Public Service Commission, ‘The whole of government challenge’, 2012 viewed at <http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/archive/publications-archive/connecting-government/challenge> on 20th August, 2017

¹¹⁹ Ibid

¹²⁰ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, ‘Protecting Australia from Terrorism’, Commonwealth of Australia, 2006, pg i

maintain well developed recovery plans extending to the local government level.’¹²¹This theme and specific mention of local government do not appear in later governance documentation produced by either a Labour, Coalition, federal or state government, this is despite the emergence of social cohesion as a theme which is used often in the context of a cohesive community.¹²²Policy,¹²³research¹²⁴and often funding¹²⁵ in Australia and overseas to foster social cohesion are directed to the local government and community organisation level which suggests cohesion is best fostered at the local and grass roots level, as local governments are the closest level of government to the community, and know and understand their communities better than any other level of government.¹²⁶The complex relationship between counter terrorism, local governments and the development of community cohesion will be explored further in next chapter in the context of the United Kingdom. How this exclusion of local government from the strategic approach to counter terrorism will be explored further in Chapter six.

¹²¹ National Counter Terrorism Committee, ‘National Counter Terrorism Plan’, 1st edition, National Counter Terrorism Committee, 2003, pg 5:2

¹²² Council of Australian Governments, Op cit, 2015, pg iii

¹²³ The Australian Human Rights Commission has developed resources directed to the local government titled ‘Building Social Cohesion in our Communities’, Australian Human Rights Commission, 2015.

¹²⁴ Scanlon Foundation, ‘Community Discussion Paper’, Scanlon Foundation, 2016

¹²⁵ Multicultural NSW offers Celebration Grants of up \$5,000 which are available to Local Councils and non-profit community organisations to promote and celebrate social cohesion. Multicultural NSW, ‘Celebration Grants’, viewed at http://multicultural.nsw.gov.au/grants/celebration_grants/

¹²⁶ Australian Human Rights Commission, ‘Building social cohesion in our communities’, 2015, viewed at <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/race-discrimination/publications/building-social-cohesion-our-communities>




Figure 2 Local government thematic evolution

Islamic versus other threat representation




Figure 3 Islamic versus other threat representation

The category of the nature of the threat as ‘Islamic’ remained consistently pervasive throughout the strategic governance documents across the analysis period, the pervasiveness of this theme demonstrates the significant focus that is directed towards the threat of Islamic extremism in comparison to terrorism threats that are ‘Other than Islamic’ in origin. While threats ‘other than Islamic’ feature in four of the strategic governance documents the theme is weak, characterised by references to State sponsored terrorism such as Hezbollah¹²⁷ which features in two of the governance documents and reference to the attack by Anders Brevik in Norway in 2011.¹²⁸ The government outlines the approach taken to counter terrorism as intelligence led and risk based¹²⁹ and emphasises that Islamic extremism is the main terrorism threat to Australian and its interests in comparison to terrorism motivated by other sources.

External focus versus domestic focus




Figure 4 External focus versus domestic focus

¹²⁷ Australian Government, Op cit, 2013, pg16

¹²⁸ Council of Australian Governments, Op Cit, 2015, pg 2

¹²⁹ National Counter Terrorism Committee, ‘National Counter Terrorism Plan’, 3rd Edition, National Counter Terrorism Committee, 2012, pg 8

During the first phase of Australia's counter terrorism governance there was a focus on protecting Australia from threats that would originate outside of Australia's borders and present a threat to Australian interests or citizens outside the countries border which was the case with the Bali bombing in 2002. As the threat environment evolved this external focus necessarily evolved, with an increase in acknowledging the existence of a domestic threat within Australian borders. This is evident from 2008, peaking in 2010 though again evident in 2015 with the release of *Australia's Counter Terrorism Strategy*.

Complex versus less sophisticated




Figure 5 Complex versus less sophisticated

Figure 5 supports the conclusions made in the previous chapter that an evolution has occurred in the terrorism environment which is currently characterised by less sophisticated tactics. In the period following 9/11 Australian governance was focused on the threat of more complex attack methods though this has evolved with less sophisticated attacks methods becoming more dominant in policy focus with the publication of *Australia's Counter Terrorism Strategy* in 2015.

Conclusion

This chapter adopted thematic analysis to map the evolution of Australia's counter terrorism governance from 2003 – 2016. The pervasive themes were identified, outlined and a gap analysis conducted in the context of the terrorism environment established in the previous chapter. Through an analysis of 13 source materials published between 2003 and 2016 this chapter identified trends, consistencies and absences. The absence of local government from the national strategic approach to counter terrorism since 2006 was confirmed. The absence was despite the emergence of social cohesion as a theme from this point. This chapter also demonstrated there had been a reduced emphasis on more complex threats, while less sophisticated threats increased in pervasiveness. This chapter also demonstrated the government had shifted its focus from an external focus on border controls to protect against threats originating outside of Australia to develop a more balanced approach between external and internal focus. The thematic evolutions identified within this chapter correspond with the broader current terrorism environment established in chapter three. Through this analysis in the context of a terrorism environment that is characterised by less sophisticated tactics carried out by lone actors, the absence of local government was identified as a gap, this has been explored in Chapter six.

Chapter five: United Kingdom Case Study

Introduction

Through thematic mapping the previous chapter sought to determine whether the evolution of Australia's counter terrorism governance had led to vulnerabilities in the current terrorism environment. This analysis determined local government had been absent from the governance framework since 2006. There is limited academic data or research available within Australia on the current and future role of Australian local government in countering terrorism. As such this chapter will conduct a case study on the United Kingdom's counter terrorism strategy known as Contest, the Prevent program and the role played by English local governments within this program. Through a review of academic literature, media reporting and government publications this chapter will explore how local government's role in the United Kingdom's counter terrorism governance has positively and negatively impacted their communities and the government's ability to achieve its counter terrorism objectives. This chapter has identified outcomes for consideration in Australian local government framework.

Australian counter terrorism governance has been influenced by the United Kingdom's strategic approach to counter terrorism, particularly in relation to the development of the national CVE strategy.¹³⁰ In the same manner as the United Kingdom, Australia has linked the development and maintenance of social cohesion and resilience with counter terrorism in policy discourse.¹³¹ While after a 2011 governmental review the United Kingdom made changes to the organisational structure of Prevent,¹³² in theory separating the two policy areas, in Australia they remain aligned.

It is important to note that while there are many similarities between the United Kingdom and Australia there are differences which prevent strategies implemented in the United Kingdom from being discussed for application directly in the Australian local government framework. These include government structures and responsibilities as well as different population demographics. In the Australian 2016 census it was identified that out of a population of

¹³⁰ Bergin, A, Op Cit, 2009, pg 5

¹³¹ Harris-Hogan, S, et al, 'What is countering violent extremism? Exploring CVE policy and practice in Australia', Behavioural Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 8:1, 2016, pg13

¹³² Thomas, P, 'Divorced but still co-habiting? Britain's Prevent/Community Cohesion policy tension', British Politics, volume 9, issue 4, 2014, pg 474

23.4million, 2.6% of the population identified as Muslim,¹³³ in NSW the percentage is slightly higher at 3.2%.¹³⁴ This compares with the population in England where there is 53.5million people with 5.6% of the population identifying as Muslim.¹³⁵ These statistics do not breakdown the many differences that exist within Muslim communities which include unique religious and cultural characteristics. Islam is not singular in its interpretations, not all individuals are practising and people should not be defined purely by their religion to the exclusion of all other identifiers. In addition there are many divisions under the umbrella of Islam, the two major divisions are Sunni and Shi'a though within these two categories there are again different schools of practise. In addition to religion, ethnic division exist based on cultural heritage originating from north Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, Central Asia and south Asia, and these can again be broken down into country and language.¹³⁶

Australia has arguably had a greater success with multiculturalism than the United Kingdom with Australia having one the largest number of overseas born populations of all large OECD nations.¹³⁷ The model adopted in Australia assumes that migrants are able to contribute to Australian society while also keeping their birth countries and traditions¹³⁸ which has resulted in a high degree of social cohesion. This contrasts to the less successful model of multiculturalism adopted in the United Kingdom which has resulted in multiculturalism being rejected by the government in recent years.¹³⁹ The policies adopted in the United Kingdom have led to polarisation and ghettoisation of society on religious and ethnic lines with these minority communities often inhabiting different social and cultural worlds that reduce social mobility, reinforce inequalities¹⁴⁰ and have led to greater levels of poverty and unemployment.¹⁴¹ The challenges experienced in the United Kingdom in relation to community cohesion may be

¹³³ Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Cultural Diversity in Australia', viewed at <http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/2071.0~2016~Main%20Features~Cultural%20Diversity%20Data%20Summary~15>, 2nd August, 2017

¹³⁴ Multicultural NSW, 'NSW The state of community relations in NSW', NSW Government, 2016, pg 7

¹³⁵ Office for National Statistics, 'Annual population survey data for England, Wales and selected Local Authorities showing total population, and those who reported their religion as Muslim for the period 2011 to 2014', viewed at <https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/adhocs/005254annualpopulationsurveydataforenglandwalesandselectedlocalauthoritiesshowingttotalpopulationandthosewhoreportedtheirreligionasmuslimfortheperiods2011to2014> 3rd august, 2017

¹³⁶ Appleby, N, 'Labelling the innocent: how government counter terrorism advice creates labels that contribute to the problem', *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 3:3, 2010, pg431

¹³⁷ Scanlon Foundation, 'Multicultural discussion paper', Scanlon foundation, 2016, pg 2

¹³⁸ Ibid, pg 3

¹³⁹ Scanlon Foundation, Op Cit, 2016, pg 4

¹⁴⁰ Fomina, J, 'The failure of British Multiculturalism: lessons for Europe', *Polish sociological review*, 165, 2006, pg 415

¹⁴¹ Bergin, A, Op Cit, 2009, pg 5

greater due to the much larger population though they will still have relevance to the Australian community.

It is anticipated that despite these differences through this case study the positive and negative aspects of local governments preventative counter terrorism role can be identified for discussion in the Australian local government environment particularly in relation to the challenges that occur from blurring of lines between the delivery of social policy and counter terrorism. This chapter will briefly outline the structure of government in the United Kingdom, specifically outlining the roles and responsibilities of local governments, their similarities and differences to local government in Australia. The United Kingdom counter terrorism strategy Contest will be outlined, focusing one of the four workstreams known as the Prevent program. This program has resulted in significant academic literature being produced highlighting the negative impact experienced by the Muslim community as well as issues experienced by local governments in applying this policy. This chapter will demonstrate the challenges and opportunities experienced by local governments for consideration while exploring a role for Australian local governments in the following chapter.

Structure of the United Kingdom government

The United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy with a central government operating from Westminster in England. Devolved administrations operate in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland which are responsible for a domestic policy issues. These areas include health, education, transport, culture and the environment.¹⁴² In areas of England there may be two tiers of local government known as County Councils or District, Borough, or City Councils while in other parts of the country there is one level of local government which provides all local services, known as unitary authorities in shire areas, London boroughs or Metropolitan boroughs. County councils are responsible for services in their designated area including education, transport, planning, fire and public safety, social care, libraries, waste management and trading standards. District and borough councils are generally smaller and provide services such as rubbish collection, recycling, council tax collection, housing and planning

¹⁴² Gov.UK, 'How Government Works', viewed at <https://www.gov.uk/government/how-government-works> on 31st July, 2017

applications.¹⁴³ Responsibility for counter terrorism and therefore Contest and the Prevent program are a reserved matter for the central government though the sectors in which the Prevent program is executed are devolved to the local level. This has meant the way Prevent has been delivered has varied between England, Scotland and Wales,¹⁴⁴ the scope of this chapter will be focused on the delivery of the Prevent program in England due to the limitations imposed by the thesis. The devolved nature of the government has meant local governments have a responsibility for implementing the central government policies including the community cohesion policy and Prevent program in their respective area, and it is the operational responsibility for each of these policies at the local government level that has resulted in many of criticisms of the Prevent program which will be explored.

Australia is both a constitutional monarchy and a representative democracy in a federal system of government, this structure divides powers between the central Commonwealth federal government and the each of the states and territories. Constitutional responsibility for local governments rests with the states and territories which results in the roles and responsibilities of local governments differing between each of the states and territories.¹⁴⁵ In NSW local governments receive their powers from the *NSW Local Government Act 1993* and provide services broadly described as planning for sustainable development, protecting the environment, safeguarding public health, providing and maintaining infrastructure and supporting community development¹⁴⁶ many of these services are in-line with those provided by local government in the United Kingdom.

Contest Outline

The United Kingdom has a long history with terrorism resulting from the ongoing issues with Northern Ireland related terrorist organisations which continue to pose a threat to security. Right wing extremism, though it has become less widespread and less systematic¹⁴⁷ still remains an ongoing issue that is seeing an increase not only in the United Kingdom but

¹⁴³ Gov.UK, 'Understanding how your council works', viewed at <https://www.gov.uk/understand-how-your-council-works/types-of-council> on 3rd August, 2017

¹⁴⁴ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy', 2011, pg 12

¹⁴⁵ Australian Government, 'How Government works', viewed at <http://www.australia.gov.au/about-government/how-government-works> on 12th August, 2017

¹⁴⁶ Department of Premier and Cabinet, 'Councilor Handbook', 2012, pg 14, viewed at <https://www.olg.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/Councillor-Handbook.pdf> on 12th August, 2017

¹⁴⁷ HM Government, 'CONTEST The United Kingdom's Strategy for Counter Terrorism', 2011, pg 30

globally. The United Kingdom counter terrorism strategy Contest was first launched in 2003,¹⁴⁸ an updated version released in 2009 and the current edition was released in 2011 after significant review by the government.

Contest in a similar manner to *Australia's National Counter Terrorism Plan* (NCTP) has a structure that reflects the four elements at its core, though while the Australian NCTP is structured around Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery, Contest is based on Prevention, Pursuit, Protection and Preparation. The four elements provide a logical distribution of responsibilities for addressing the issues that are real and potential in the context of international terrorism¹⁴⁹ and are interrelated. Pursue and Prevent reduce the threat from terrorism through detecting and investigating threats at the earliest possible stages and by stopping people from becoming terrorists, while Protect and Prepare reduce the UK's vulnerabilities¹⁵⁰ by strengthening protection against a terrorist attack and mitigating the impact of an attack where it cannot be stopped.¹⁵¹ A significant body of academic and government literature as well as media reporting has developed critiquing one of the key elements of the strategy known as the Prevent program.

PREVENT - Preventing Violent Extremism

The Prevent program was initially conceived by the United Kingdom government in 2004 as an attempt to win the hearts and minds¹⁵² of younger British Muslims away from the extremist narrative, reflecting a reorientation of the United Kingdom's strategic approach to counter terrorism to a domestic focus. The necessity and priority of this policy approach was further emphasised following the 7/7 bombings in London by homegrown terrorists.¹⁵³ The development of the Prevent program occurred through a number of stages the first of which was the Preventing Extremism Together (PET) Taskforce which was initiated by the government following the 7/7 bombings,¹⁵⁴ the PET taskforce was followed by the initial phase

¹⁴⁸ O'Toole, T, Meer, N, et al, 'Governing through Prevent? Regulation and Contested Practise in State-Muslim Engagement', *Sociology*, 50(1), 2016, p162

¹⁴⁹ Husband, C and Alam, Y, 'Social Cohesion and Counter Terrorism', Policy Press, 2011, pg 67

¹⁵⁰ HM Government, Op Cit, 2011, pg 17

¹⁵¹ Ibid, pg13

¹⁵² O'Toole, T, Meer, N, et al, Op Cit, 2016, p161

¹⁵³ Kundani, A, 'Spooked!', The Institute of Race Relations, 2009, pg 10

¹⁵⁴ Briggs, R, 'Community engagement for counter terrorism: lessons from the United Kingdom', *International Affairs*, 86:4, 2010, pg 974

of the Prevent program in 2006 when it began with a 6 million pound fund by the Department of Communities and Local Government. Prevent became mainstream in 2008 with the publication of the governments full Prevent strategy¹⁵⁵officially embedding a decentralised approach to preventing violent extremism in government strategy.¹⁵⁶

Local government involvement in counter terrorism

The 7/7 bombings in London in 2005 significantly contributed to the United Kingdom's reorientation to a preventative countering radicalisation policy.¹⁵⁷ Local government has played a role in this domestically refocused strategy from the initial stages and while there have been significant criticisms about the preventing violent extremism strategy these criticism have not been in relation to the allocation of a role for local government but have been centred around the development of the program. The importance of the allocation of a role for local governments within the national counter terrorism strategy and legislation, specifically in relation to preventing violent extremism is highlighted by the New Local Government Network in their report *Stronger together* in which they state that –

‘terrorism does not operate within local, regional or indeed national borders, so it is important that our response is multi-layered and flexible...it is at the local level that radicalisation can take root and it is in the social fabric of our local communities and neighbourhoods that the strength and resilience to reject and condemn violent extremist ideologies can be found’¹⁵⁸

Local governments as the closest level of government to the community have unique understanding of local needs, context and tensions which become removed as government distances itself from the community. The benefit of local understanding was demonstrated at the delivery level in the early stages of Prevent. Despite a lack of clear national local governments were able to rework the contentious nature of the program to meet locally identified priorities and needs.¹⁵⁹ While this led to differences and inconsistencies across the

¹⁵⁵ Turley, A, ‘Stronger Together: A new approach to preventing violent extremism’, New Local Government Network, 2009, pg 5

¹⁵⁶ Briggs, R, Op Cit, 2010, pg 975

¹⁵⁷ Thomas, P, ‘Britain’s Prevent Programme: An end in sight?’, In Critical Perspectives on Counter Terrorism, Routledge Critical Terrorism Studies. Routledge, London, UK, 2014, pg 169

¹⁵⁸ Turley, A, Op Cit, 2009, pg6

¹⁵⁹ O’Toole, T, Meer, N, et al, Op Cit, 2016, p161

various local governments in their interpretation and application of Prevent it resulted in the development of programs that met local needs.

With the introduction of the *Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015* local governments have undertaken a range of diverse methods to meet their duty for Prevent reflecting the local contexts which are unique to each local government. Birmingham Council which is second to London in terms of identified risk to extremism has prioritised engagement with schools in their area and also strengthened local governance arrangements to ensure all local partners are working in line with the new prevent obligations.¹⁶⁰ The Royal Borough of Greenwich developed a community based football program working with the local mosque to run twice weekly sessions the success of this program was reflected in participation of soldiers from Woolwich Barracks which was the home base of Lee Rigby at the time of his murder in 2013.¹⁶¹ The positive outcomes identified here may be a reflection of the willingness of local government and local community groups to work together rather than the effectiveness of the legislation but it does indicate that local governments can undertake a positive and successful role to prevent violent extremism and can do so due to their understanding of the complex needs of local communities.

Negative Criticisms

The aim of the Prevent program is to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism¹⁶² and while the objectives evolved over the successive editions of the strategy, the focus of Prevent has remained risk based and resource allocations are prioritised according to the nature of the threat facing the United Kingdom. The prioritisation according to risk has resulted in a focus on what the strategy describes as Al Qaeda inspired terrorism and has resulted in a distinct focus on Muslim communities in Britain.¹⁶³ A number of criticisms have resulted from this focus specifically in relation to the experience of local governments, many of which have been identified and reaffirmed through various researchers such as Husband and

¹⁶⁰Local Government Association, 'Councils role in preventing extremism', 2015, pg 12, viewed at <https://www.local.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/councils-role-preventing--d11.pdf>

¹⁶¹ Ibid, pg 12

¹⁶² HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy', The Stationary Office, London, 2011, pg6

¹⁶³ Ibid, pg6

Alam,¹⁶⁴ Kundnani,¹⁶⁵ Briggs,¹⁶⁶ O'Toole et al¹⁶⁷ and Thomas.¹⁶⁸ The criticisms include claims the Prevent program targets Muslim communities, blurs the lines between the delivery of social policy and counter terrorism, has led to the alienation of and spying on the community as well as the securitisation of the state engagement with Muslim communities.

A number of the above identified criticisms can be linked to the blurring of the lines between the delivery of the social policy of community cohesion and the counter terrorism focused Prevent Program by local governments. Each of these policies has a strong focus on successful integration of the community at the local level though originate from two different government portfolios. Through its implementation community cohesion had taken the form of traditional community work¹⁶⁹ while Prevent with its origins in counter terrorism relied on a securitised form of engagement.

The community cohesion policy had been in place for a significant period of time before the Prevent program was developed for delivery parallel to community cohesion, while each policy relied on successful integration they were to be delivered as distinctly separate but also linked¹⁷⁰ policies. A national focus on community cohesion emerged in Britain as a result of civil disturbances that occurred in northern English towns in 2001.¹⁷¹ The subsequent government response to these incidents resulted in a policy agenda that focused on ethnic and cultural difference¹⁷² with the resulting reports¹⁷³ identifying that community cohesion had been impacted by divisions based on identifiable communities, generally on the basis of faith or ethnic divisions. The reports argued that community cohesion is undermined by a lack of trust and understanding resulting from segregation and social separateness.¹⁷⁴ The need for greater integration of minority communities was identified which the reports claimed were self-segregated, detached and living parallel lives to the greater British society which, following the 7/7 bombings became associated with Islam and Muslim communities. Community

¹⁶⁴ Husband, C and Alam, Y, Op Cit, 2011

¹⁶⁵ Kundnani, A, Op Cit, 2009

¹⁶⁶ Briggs, R, Op Cit, 2010

¹⁶⁷ O'Toole, T, Meer, N, et al, Op Cit, 2016, p161

¹⁶⁸ Thomas, P, Op Cit, 2014

¹⁶⁹ Husband, C and Alam, Y, Op Cit, 2011, pg 144

¹⁷⁰ Parliament UK, 'Prevent and Cohesion', viewed at

<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/6508.htm> last updated 30th March, 2010

¹⁷¹ Home Office, '*Community Cohesion: A report of the independent review team*', London, 2001

¹⁷² Husband, C and Alam, Y, Op Cit, 2011, pg 20

¹⁷³ Home Office Op Cit, 2004

¹⁷⁴ Husband, C and Alam, Y, Op Cit, 2011, pg 20

cohesion became a national policy that local governments were allocated leadership roles in and required to incorporate into their daily operations.

Despite civil disturbances kickstarting the community cohesion agenda which in a similar manner to Prevent had a strong focus of Muslim communities, local governments were able to develop projects to stimulate cross cultural contact and interfaith dialogue which were aimed at bridging the gaps between communities and overcoming fragmentation.¹⁷⁵ The community cohesion policy had developed positive outcomes for local communities during its implementation though the introduction of Prevent had a significant impact on this.

The overall strategic direction of the Prevent program remained a central government responsibility though the delivery of the Prevent program was to be implemented by local governments in parallel to the delivery of the community cohesion policy as a distinct and separate program. Despite the intention to keep the policies separate there was significant organisational overlap of the programs at the national and the local level. The Prevent program was initially delivered by both the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) and the Department of Communities and Local Governments (DCLG) each with its own budget for implementation, though the DCLG also maintained responsibility for the delivery of the community cohesion policy.¹⁷⁶ The confusion around the delivery of Prevent started at the national level with each of these government bodies having different ideas about how prevent was to be implemented at the local level. The confusion was further magnified by the multi-agency nature of the prevent program which led to Prevent influencing a wide range of policy areas.¹⁷⁷ The origins of Prevent in counter terrorism and delivered by the OSCT built the negative community perceptions that the program was an intelligence gathering vehicle for the police, facilitated state surveillance and spying on Muslim communities¹⁷⁸ all of which threatened the positive relationships that had been developed with Muslim communities through community cohesion. Two conceptual problems were identified within Prevent; firstly the program had a mono-cultural focus on Muslims working with simplistic notions of Muslim identity and communities and secondly there was an explicit securitisation of the state's

¹⁷⁵ Kundnani, A, Op Cit, 2009, pg 23

¹⁷⁶ O'Toole, T, Meer, N, et al, Op Cit, 2016, p167

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, p163

¹⁷⁸ Richards, A, 'The Problem with 'radicalization: the remit of 'Prevent' and the need to refocus on terrorism in the UK', *International Affairs*, 87:1, 2010, pg 149

relationship with British Muslims.¹⁷⁹ These issues were contradictory to the community cohesion agenda.

The initial funding process to local governments contributed to the program being described as constructing the whole Muslim population as a suspect community¹⁸⁰ rather than acknowledging there were a small number of individuals within the community that adhered to a violent and extreme interpretation of Islam. In his research Kundnani identified a strong correlation between the amount of Prevent funding received by a local government and the size of the Muslim population.¹⁸¹ This correlation was acknowledged by the DCLG in the review of Prevent stating that areas with a Muslim population over 2,000 were allocated Prevent funding rather than funding being allocated on a risk based approach.¹⁸² This reinforced the perception that Prevent was targeting Muslim communities which made it difficult for local governments to engage with community partners to develop Prevent funded initiatives, this often led to Prevent funded programs being designed in-line with community cohesion objectives and local governments positioning the Prevent program within the cohesion strategy.¹⁸³ In a review the United Kingdom Parliament identified that over 90 per cent of projects developed with Prevent funding were community cohesion projects though delivered to the Muslim community to meet the limited funding criteria.¹⁸⁴ The impact of this meant that Prevent was being used to meet community cohesion objectives rather than preventing violent extremism and also meant that the stigma associated with Prevent was impacting the effectiveness of community cohesion work.

With local governments blurring the lines between the two programs and also the lack of clarity about the initial scope of the program, Prevent with its multi-agency approach was seen to permeate the local level approach to engagement with the Muslim communities. The perception the program targeted Muslims served to alienate the communities and fatally undermining the cohesion work that had occurred prior to the introduction of Prevent.¹⁸⁵ An example that created significant community outrage occurred when the guardian newspaper revealed that

¹⁷⁹ Thomas, P, Op Cit 2014, pg 485

¹⁸⁰ Kundnani, A, Op Cit, 2009, pg8

¹⁸¹ Ibid, pg12

¹⁸² House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee, 'Preventing Violent Extremism', 6th Report, 2010, London, pg50

¹⁸³ Parliament UK, 'Prevent and Cohesion', viewed at <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/6508.htm> last updated 30th March, 2010

¹⁸⁴ Ibid

¹⁸⁵ Thomas, P, Op Cit, 2014

counter terrorism funding had been used to install concealed closed circuit television camera (CCTV) monitoring systems in two predominantly Muslim suburbs in Birmingham,¹⁸⁶ this reinforced the negative perception that Muslim communities as a whole were being targeted for counter terrorism initiatives which had a surveillance and intelligence gathering agenda. At a lesser end of the scale, though more prevalent in its occurrence was a general reluctance of established grass roots communities to engage with local governments to develop programs using Prevent funding, the lack of willing partners created a vacuum which was filled by newer groups that did not have the level of community standing to achieve the objectives of the program.¹⁸⁷

Conclusion

The lack of a role for Australian local government in the strategic approach to counter terrorism was identified in the previous chapter as a potential vulnerability. In light of this finding this chapter has sought to learn from the experience of local government in the United Kingdom's counter terrorism strategy Contest due the lack of data available from an Australian local government perspective. From the outset this case study recognised there were differences between the United Kingdom and Australia that prevented the role of local government being discussed for direct application in the Australian framework. Despite these differences this case study was anticipated to provide high level outcomes for discussion. Importantly the strategy implemented by the United Kingdom is multi layered though despite the benefits of this approach the negative stigma attached to the Prevent program, which was a focus in this study, has been difficult for the government to shake. This resulted in significant backlash from the academic and Muslim communities as well as local governments who had been allocated a role in its delivery. As demonstrated, the criticism have included targeting of Muslim communities, lack of clarity and defined scope in the early stages of Prevent as well as blurring lines between the Prevent and community cohesion policies. One aspect of the program that has not been criticised has been the allocation of a role to local governments in the strategy.

Local governments are in a unique position as the closest level of government to their community, they understand local needs and local context becomes removed as the levels of government become higher and adopt a wider focus. In this case study local governments were

¹⁸⁶Lewis, P, 'Birmingham stops camera surveillance in Muslim areas', The Guardian, 2010 viewed at <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jun/17/birmingham-stops-spy-cameras-project>

¹⁸⁷Parliament UK, Op Cit, 2010

subject to pressure to execute a flawed national program with a detrimental impact on their relationships with their communities which demonstrates the need for local government consultation in policy development that requires execution at the local level. This case study has highlighted the challenges experienced by local governments in developing programs for delivery at the community level that originate from a counter terrorism agenda and implementing a national strategy that did not effectively recognise the complex nature of local communities and their cultural identities. The risk based approach to counter terrorism adopted by the United Kingdom and Australian governments is necessary to ensure an appropriate allocation of resources, though as demonstrated this approach can lead to alienation of minority communities particularly if there is a lack of clarity in the approach undertaken by government which is perceived to broadly target communities rather than individuals, which has been the case in the deployment of the Prevent program.

Two outcomes can be broadly identified from this case study:

- First a centrally coordinated, multi-layered and flexible approach to counter terrorism is necessary to ensure all levels of government and non-government organisations are involved in countering terrorism. This must extend to the local level of government to remove any perceptual barriers that exist between local and state governments that do not reflect the expanding roles, responsibilities and capabilities of local governments. Any approach must be developed in consultation with local governments to avoid conflicting responsibilities at the delivery level.
- Second the development of community based programs from a counter terrorism agenda can create a level of securitisation of engagement, suspicion and alienation within the communities the programs are designed for if there is not a transparent approach to the objectives or the program. Is it necessary to separate counter terrorism and social and community cohesion objectives in Australia as the aims of each, while related, remain distinct, and their conflation has been demonstrated to lead to a host of negative effects.

Chapter Six: Discussion chapter

This chapter will draw on the conclusions of the mixed methods adopted within the previous chapters to consider what a role for local government within the national counter terrorism framework could look like. In considering this role the analytical SWOT framework will be adopted and the chapter structured around this process. Through the identification of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats this process looks at both current performance (strengths and weaknesses) and future capabilities (opportunities and threats).¹⁸⁸ The adoption of the process will enable justifiable recommendations for action to be made that are evidence based, considering internal and external factors. Internal strengths such as local knowledge, proximity and the current legal obligation already attached to local government roles and responsibilities will be considered against weaknesses such as integrity issues and ongoing conflict with state governments. Opportunities such as the release of *Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism* and the dynamic nature of terrorism will be contrasted with the threat an inconsistent development of guidance for local government will occur reducing the state wide effectiveness of any role undertaken in this field. Through this analysis this chapter will demonstrate local governments have detailed local knowledge and undertake increasingly varied roles that make them an effective and necessary layer in Australia's counter terrorism framework. This chapter concludes with a number of recommendations for local government for consideration.

Strengths of local government

This analysis will explore the internal attributes of local government that are conducive to achieving the objective which is a meaningful role for counter terrorism.¹⁸⁹ There are 537¹⁹⁰ local governments within Australia and though their roles and responsibilities vary between the states and territories they provide significant services to the local community including community welfare services, cultural facilities, road maintenance, planning and

¹⁸⁸ Chermack, T and Kasshanna, B. Op Cit, 2007, pg 384

¹⁸⁹ Pruckun, H, 'Scientific Methods of Inquiry for Intelligence Analysis', 2nd edition. London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015, pg 186

¹⁹⁰ Australian Local Government Association, viewed at <http://alga.asn.au/?ID=42&Menu=41,81> on 1st September, 2017

infrastructure.¹⁹¹ All of these services are informed by their unique local understanding of community needs which are often only available at the local government level.

Additional strengths of local governments include the ability to develop strong relationships with locally based community organisations, business, schools and community services providers which enable them to identify legitimate spokespeople for different sections of the community and engage with a broad cross section of the community. Further more local governments have an established role in the development of crime reduction and community safety programs. Across NSW local governments provide a broad range of community safety programs covering issues such as domestic violence, anti-social behaviour, emergency management, drug and alcohol¹⁹² and suicide prevention¹⁹³ all which are designed and delivered to suit the unique needs of the specific local government area. While it may be argued that adding programs to counter terrorism could further securitise local government engagement with their communities, local governments already provide the above outlined programs as well as programs to enhance social cohesion and build community resilience.¹⁹⁴

*Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism*¹⁹⁵ acknowledges that local governments have expanded their role beyond the administration and maintenance of local services and infrastructure and recognises the important role local government plays as the owners and operators of public spaces in the form of event protection, space design and building and construction approval.¹⁹⁶ Through the nature of their role in community engagement, the closest level of government to the community and the level of government that people more frequently come into contact with for daily services, local governments have already developed the capability through the provision of these services to undertake a significant role in counter terrorism.

¹⁹¹ NSW Office of Local Government, 'My local council', viewed at <https://www.olg.nsw.gov.au/public/my-local-council> on 20th September, 2017

¹⁹² City of Sydney Council, 'Health and Safety' viewed at <http://www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/community/health-and-safety> on 3rd September, 2017

¹⁹³ The Hills Shire Council, 'Communities Matter – Suicide Prevention', viewed at <https://www.thehills.nsw.gov.au/Services/Our-Community/Communities-Matter-Suicide-Prevention> on 3rd September, 2017

¹⁹⁴ Burwood Local Council has developed the Different People Different Voices Project under grants from the Living safe together scheme.

¹⁹⁵ Australia and New Zealand Counter Terrorism Committee, 'Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism', Australian and New Zealand Counter Terrorism Committee, 2017

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, pg 7

Weaknesses

While there are strengths of local government supporting an argument for increased responsibilities, there are weaknesses that may be detrimental to undertaking a more meaningful role in this area. These relate to the actions of councillors which negatively impacts public perception, challenges in the delivery of certain programs and the inability to assess their effectiveness, and potential lack of capability at the local level due to exclusion from counter terrorism governance since 2006.

A high level of public trust in government is associated with the delivery of national security and counter terrorism objectives which includes preparing and protecting the community for a terrorist attack. Frequent allegations and investigations into abuses of power can erode public confidence in the capability of local government to achieve such sensitive outcomes. The community perception of, or the actual lack of integrity of councillors, undeclared conflict of interests and/or high levels of corruption within local government could impede community or government willingness to accept the development of a role in counter terrorism program delivery or expansion of a role in counter terrorism. These perceptions could add to the challenges in CVE program delivery as the nature of CVE programs already has significant trust issues associated it particularly when delivered by government.

Media reporting has frequently focused on conflicts of interests of councillors as they relate to building and development approvals in their electorate, with the recent example of the suspension of Auburn Local Government in 2016¹⁹⁷ as well as almost systemic corruption issues at both Wollongong and Canterbury Local Government resulting in investigations by ICAC.¹⁹⁸ There have been measures taken by the NSW government to address issues of integrity at the local level by introducing reforms to the local government integrity regime¹⁹⁹ though these have been criticised for being rushed through parliament and watered down reducing their overall efficacy. It is important to note that these issues are not restricted

¹⁹⁷ McNally, L, 'Salim Mehajer's Auburn Council suspended by NSW government during public enquiry', ABC, 10th February, 2016 viewed at <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-02-10/auburn-council-suspended-for-public-inquiry-by-nsw-government/7155110>

¹⁹⁸ McClymont, K, 'Potential corruption at Canterbury is bigger than Wollongong, but without the sex', Sydney Morning Herald, 15th July, 2017 viewed at <http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/potential-corruption-at-canterbury-is-bigger-than-wollongong-but-without-the-sex-20170714-gxbhga.html>

¹⁹⁹ NSW Government, 'Reforms to strengthen council integrity', 12th May, 2016 viewed at <https://www.nsw.gov.au/your-government/the-premier/media-releases-from-the-premier/reforms-to-strengthen-council-integrity/>

to local governments or even only government representatives, these issues are evident across both government and private industry.

In addition to integrity issues, lack of capacity due to either funding restrictions or capability of local governments to implement appropriate protective measures for events and public spaces could lead to events being cancelled due to the financial viability of the event or public backlash due to perceived inappropriate security measures adopted. These issues were recently highlighted by the inability of Blue Mountains local government to finance security measures to protect ANZAC day marches in 2017²⁰⁰ and in June 2017 the public alarm that was experienced when Sydney City council installed temporary protection measures in Martin Place. Despite the measures being implemented in consultation with police, media reporting which emphasised conflicting state and local government responses created the perception of local government overreaction²⁰¹ and tension between the two levels of government.

While the provision of programs to develop resilience and social cohesion are more readily accepted by the communities and are the majority of the programs delivered at the local government level, research suggests the broad nature of the programs makes their effectiveness in addressing the objectives of CVE hard to assess.²⁰² Programs aimed at promoting social cohesion are more acceptable than specifically labelled CVE programs despite the strong links between social cohesion and terrorism. There are challenges associated with the delivery of counter terrorism based programs by the government, particularly CVE due to the predominantly negative stigma associated. These challenges are frequently identified and reinforced through research conducted by the academic communities and the Australian government, research conducted by Cherney et al,²⁰³ Nasser-Eddine et al,²⁰⁴ and Harris- Hogan et al²⁰⁵ outline the numerous challenges experienced by those who provide CVE programs which include the need to overcome the negative stigma often associated with the programs, short term and lack of sustainable funding, concerns regarding service providers standing

²⁰⁰ ABC, 'Blue Mountains ANZAC day marches cancelled as anti-terrorism measures drive up costs', ABC News, 11th January, 2017 viewed at <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-11/anzac-day-marches-cancelled-anti-terrorism-costs/8176290>

²⁰¹ Clennell, A, Godfrey, M, 'Martin Place Barriers a bit of Clover-Kill on terrorism, say new police minister', The Daily Telegraph, 29th June, 2017, viewed at <http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/martin-place-barriers-a-bit-of-cloverkill-on-terrorism-says-nsw-police-minister/news-story/df97164b56a70c7764b69a63a6cba1a4>

²⁰²

²⁰³ Cherney, A et al, 'Local service provision to counter violent extremism: perspectives, capabilities and challenges arising from an Australian service mapping project', *Behavioural Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 2017

²⁰⁴ Nasser-Eddine et al, Op Cit, 2011

²⁰⁵ Harris-Hogan, S, et al, Op Cit, 2016

within their community and the perception the programs target and stigmatise Muslim communities.

Many of the programs that have been financed under government grant programs such as the 'Building Community Resilience Youth Mentoring Grants Program,' 'Building Community Resilience,' and 'Living Safe Together' were identified by Harris-Hogan et al²⁰⁶ as primary prevention initiatives which are designed to educate individuals about violent extremism and to prevent the emergence of conditions, behaviours, and attitudes which may be conducive to the radicalisation of individuals. This research argues the effectiveness of the programs is hard to evaluate and may have little demonstrable effect on CVE. The lack of an effective evaluative process is a significant issue with the development and delivery of CVE, social cohesion or resilience programs and is made difficult as success is often measured in changing attitudes which are complex and difficult to measure.²⁰⁷ If the effectiveness of programs primarily delivered at local government level are classified as primary intervention programs and have objectives that are so broad it makes them ineffective in relation to counter terrorism it may risk the perception that government funding is wasted on unfocused or irrelevant projects. This was a criticism in the United Kingdom as a result of either a misunderstanding or a lack of willingness of local authorities to deliver this type of program.²⁰⁸ This does not mean these programs are not having a significant impact on the communities and the people attending them, change in attitudes are hard to assess and the short time frame enabled through funding programs makes it difficult to accumulate data over a longer period to demonstrate success.

While the release of '*Australia's national strategy for protecting crowded places*' provides national coordination and guidance to organisations including local government, how they will meet their responsibilities under this strategy and if there will be a consistent approach across the vastly different local government areas remains to be seen. After being absent from national counter terrorism governance since 2006 it is possible many local governments do not have the resources, internal capability or knowledge to make informed and proportionate judgements on the terrorist threat and how it relates to their daily operations.

²⁰⁶ Ibid, pg

²⁰⁷ HM Government, 'Prevent Strategy', The Stationary Office, London, 2011, pg36

²⁰⁸ Ibid, pg30

Opportunities

In this context opportunities are identified as external conditions such as legal, economic, or political that would assist in achieving the objectives.²⁰⁹ As previously indicated there has been limited academic focus on the role of local governments in counter terrorism, though in his research in this area Anthony Bergin identified opportunities for development which includes determining how local governments can be better integrated into domestic security plans and assist in strengthening national preparedness to a mass casualty attack.²¹⁰ The 2017 release of *Australia's strategy for protecting crowded places from terrorism* acknowledged the important role played by local government as owners and operators of public spaces as well as their role in designing and approving developments specifically including local governments in national strategy for the first time since 2006.

The publication of *Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism* provides the necessary national coordination required in this space²¹¹ and acknowledges local government's ownership of civic spaces, public activities, celebrations, agricultural shows and community days. This document provides a snapshot of the range of public events provided or authorised by local government²¹² though the services provided at the local level extend beyond those listed. Though this strategy was published in 2017 the responsibility held by local governments over these activities has existed prior to its publication regardless of local or national acknowledgment of local government's role under legislation.²¹³ There is no discretion in the ownership of the risk and responsibility of protecting users of public spaces or events owned and operated by local governments. By acknowledging this responsibility includes all forms of terrorism local governments can expand their role to ensure capable execution of this duty.

Local government legal obligation extends from event protection to building and development application approval. The NSW *Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979* places an obligation on consent authorities, which local government fall within the definition of²¹⁴ to consider the social impacts of a development on the community. Guidelines produced by the

²⁰⁹ Pruckun, H, Op Cit, 2015, pg 186

²¹⁰ Bergin, A, Williams, D, Op Cit, 2017

²¹¹ Bergin, A, Williams, D, Op Cit, 2017

²¹² Australia and New Zealand Counter Terrorism Committee, Op Cit, 2017, pg 7

²¹³ Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) and the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)

²¹⁴ *Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979*, Part 1, section 4, NSW, 1979

NSW Department of Urban Affairs and Planning released in 2001 include the risk of crime as a social impact consideration outlining local government responsibility to ensure that developments provide safety and security to users and the community, if a development presents a crime risk local government can modify or refuse the application.²¹⁵ Despite the complexities associated with terrorism, it is a crime under commonwealth legislation and a factor for local government when considering building and development applications, particularly those which may be defined as a crowded place.

Prior to the publication of the national strategy physical, procedural or human protection measures for community events may have considered general public safety and crime prevention strategies as required under workplace health and safety obligations. Any consideration given to acts of terrorism and specific tactics such as a hostile vehicle, where the threat has historically been external or more complex in nature may have been minimal if at all. If terrorism has not been a factor considered by local governments in their daily operations, the capability to do so now under the release of the national strategy may be limited to those areas which have a history of high profile events or attractions such as Sydney City Council or larger metropolitan areas. While the strategy provides national guidance, to maximise the opportunity this strategy provides there needs to be guidance at the state and local level to address the practical implications for those who have the responsibility to implement it, and guidance which extends to all local governments across the state, rather than only the larger metropolitan governments.

The release of this strategy provides an opportunity for local government to capitalise on its momentum and develop consistent state wide local government counter terrorism capability that will increase capability locally across metropolitan and regional areas, potentially extending capability to areas where it is currently lacking. The ease in which the extremist influence can reach all regions and demographics of a community and the low capability required to conduct an attack means the possibility of a terrorist attack occurring outside of a metropolitan area in regional Australia exists. That regional areas are not removed from this threat has been demonstrated with the arrest of a 42 year old male in Young, a regional town

²¹⁵ Department of Urban Affairs and Planning, 'Crime Prevention and the assessment of development applications', NSW Department of Urban Affairs and Planning, 2001, pg 2

in south west NSW in March, 2017.²¹⁶Anthony Bergin²¹⁷highlighted the scarcity of resources that form the backbone of counter terrorism planning in regional areas. It is likely this resource gap would extend to capability at the local government level to consider and/or address protective security threats from a terrorism perspective. This is despite similar scale events and activities being authorised and conducted in these areas that have been targeted in metropolitan areas such as ANZAC parades and increases in right wing sentiment in regional areas. The importance of local government inclusion in counter terrorism can be reinforced through the assertion that any attack against a crowded place will occur within a local government area.²¹⁸Consistent development of capability at the local level would widen the focus of terrorism to include regional areas where right wing extremism may be a more relevant concern. The creation of the crowded places partnerships and crowded places forums provides the opportunity for this to occur and local networks to be developed enabling information and capability sharing tailored to the local context and local needs.

The link between terrorism and social cohesion remains strong in government policy particularly in relation to CVE measures and is a key focus in building strength and diversity and social participation.²¹⁹In aligning the agendas of social cohesion and counter terrorism Australia has followed the United Kingdom in this policy area, though where the United Kingdom has separated the two approaches after review,²²⁰social cohesion and terrorism though administered through different government bodies and departments remain linked in Australian policy. In light of the weaknesses explored in relation to the provision of CVE, social cohesion and resilience programs at the local level which were demonstrated in the previous chapter through the experience of the United Kingdom. Is it time to separate counter terrorism from social and community cohesion policy and enable programs to develop social cohesion and resilience to be developed and provided without the stigma of counter terrorism or the need to evaluate these in terms dictated by a counter terrorism agenda.

²¹⁶ Hayne, J, Doran, M, 'Man arrested at Young, NSW for allegedly researching missiles for Islamic State', The Sydney Morning Herald, 1 March, 2017 viewed at <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-28/young-arrest-alleged-terrorism-offences-canberra/8311270> on 14th September, 2017

²¹⁷ Bergin, A, Williams, D, 'Protecting Mass Gatherings: lets leverage private security professionals', Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 13th February,

²¹⁸ 2017Bergin, A, Williams, D, Op Cit, 2017

²¹⁹ Attorney Generals Department, 'Countering Violent Extremism', Australian government, viewed at <https://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counteringviolentextremism/Pages/default.aspx> on 10th September, 2017

²²⁰ Harris-Hogan, S, et al, Op Cit, 2016, pg 19

Threats

This section will explore the threats to achieving a role for local government, in this context a threat is an external condition such as a social, economic or legal condition that might be detrimental to achieving the objectives.²²¹ An issue highlighted in the case study conducted in Chapter five was the development of a national strategy that had significant negative implications for delivery at the local level. It is possible that without sufficient willingness from all levels of government (federal, state and local) to support local government involvement in counter terrorism there will be an ad hoc, inconsistent approach to this strategy that is not supported over the longer term, actions that conflict with state government responsibilities and does more harm than good. Previously identified tensions between the state and local level governments may also impact the ability for cooperation in this area despite its importance. In addition the threat that the dynamic nature of terrorism will mean that any changes or developments needed in this role for local governments may be reactionary, only occurring once an incident has occurred highlighting the gaps in capability, responsibility or policy in this area.

Conclusion

Through the adoption of the analytical SWOT framework this chapter has sought to draw together outcomes from the literature review, thematic mapping and case study to develop practical recommendations for local government in counter terrorism. There are no insurmountable weaknesses or threats identified that should impact counter terrorism development at the local level, while the identified strengths and opportunities demonstrate the benefits that could be achieved through this development and the legal foundation many of them can be built on. In light of this the following recommendations for how local governments can develop in the counter terrorism realm have been outlined below -

- The publication of the national strategy acknowledges the expanding role of local governments and the opportunity exists with prominence of this strategy to capitalise on the national focus on protecting crowded places and build holistic local government capacity in the area of counter terrorism. Locally based capability development should

²²¹ Pruckun, H, Op Cit, 2015, pg 186

occur in counter terrorism protective security for event and public space protection, and building design and approval which would enable local government to develop informed and proportionate responses to the evolving terrorist threat.

- Maximise on the opportunities the establishment of Crowded Places Partnerships and Crowded Places Forums provided by the national strategy. The strategy recognises the need to develop locally based forums for local stakeholders to engage on the terrorism threat. Crowded Places Forums provide the opportunity to develop locally based networks involving local governments, police and local community organisations. These should look at information and capability sharing, sharing of lessons learned, and develop resources for event or public space protection in both regional and metropolitan areas.
- Education and development of local governments to develop national capacity across all local governments that will empower local government to make informed decision and take an active role to protect their communities particularly outside of the metropolitan areas.
- Inclusion of local government in National and State Counter Terrorism Plans in the preventative concepts, recognising the important layer of counter terrorism this level of government provides and ensure consistent national and state wide capability development.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion

This thesis has sought to determine if the evolution of Australia's counter terrorism governance has led to vulnerabilities in the current terrorism environment particularly at the local government level. The significant body of academic literature and research that exists in the field of terrorism reflects the dynamic and diverse nature of the discipline, despite this, the unique nature of the question under research limited the data available. The nature the research question required the adoption of a mixed methods research design that incorporated the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative methods consisting of a literature review, content analysis and thematic mapping, a case study and the adoption of the SWOT framework for analysis. These methods were applied in a sequential manner and the thesis was structured to reflect this.

Summary of findings

The literature review sought to provide a foundation on which the later methods would rely on. Through an exploration of academic debates and theories this review sought to provide historical context, identify significant evolutions that have occurred and explore characteristics of the current threat environment. The need to situate this threat in a historical context reinforces the view held by scholars such as Kilcullen, Burke and Crenshaw that terrorism undergoes constant evolutions which are influenced by global and societal trends such as evolving security architecture, the internet and social media. A significant evolution was outlined as the shift from hierarchical structured organisations to networked actors facilitated by the internet.²²² Attacks such as 1972 Munich Olympic Games and 9/11 which were best orchestrated by hierarchical organisations have given way to attacks carried out by lone actors or lone wolves using basic weapons such as knives, firearms and vehicles. The attack of Lee Rigby in the United Kingdom in 2013 was held up as a turning point where basic attack methods rose in prominence, this methodology has been recognised and encouraged by ISIS and al Qaeda within propaganda which encourages extremists to conduct attacks at home. The spread of this method has been successful with attacks carried out in London, Spain, USA, France and Australia. This less sophisticated nature of attacks carried out by lone actors targeting traditionally soft targets such as crowded streets and public events remains a dominant feature of the current terrorism landscape and with the ease of implementation and the success

²²² Sageman, M, Op Cit, 2008

of the tactic, it is likely to be an enduring feature. It is this environment in which the gap analysis of thematic mapping was conducted in chapter four.

The evolution of Australia's counter terrorism governance was the next focus of the research project which sought to determine through thematic mapping how governance had evolved during the period from 2003 – 2016. Through an exploration of data obtained during the mapping process a gap analysis was conducted in the context of the terrorism environment established in the previous chapter. In the context of a terrorism environment that is characterised by less sophisticated attacks by lone actors targeting crowded places the gap analysis identified four significant evolutions which were charted and explored. Figure two demonstrated the absence of local government from counter terrorism governance from 2006 which was compared with the emergence of social cohesion from this point which has strong links to the community. The absence of local government was also demonstrated despite the enduring theme of a whole of government and all levels of government approach to countering terrorism in Australia through the period subject to analysis.

It was demonstrated in figure four that Australia's governance focus had decreased from predominantly protecting against a threat that was originating outside of Australia, while the domestic threat had increased over time. This trend corresponded with a decrease in the focus on more complex threats while less sophisticated threats had emerged in focus. This supports the conclusions reached in chapter three of a terrorism environment that is characterised by less sophisticated attack methods conducted by lone actors within the community. This chapter concluded the absence of local government from counter terrorism governance material presented vulnerabilities within the context of a terrorism environment characterised by less sophisticated attack methods targeting crowded places which often fall within local government responsibility.

In light of the findings of the gap analysis which identified local government absence from the preventative and strategic approaches to counter terrorism as a vulnerability, Chapter five sought to explore how local governments have undertaken roles in counter terrorism in the United Kingdom. An international case study was selected due to the lack of academic research available from an Australian perspective. This chapter sought to identify high level outcomes for discussion in an Australian context. After outlining the positive and negative aspects of the approach undertaken in the United Kingdom two outcomes were identified which included; First the importance of a multi layered and flexible approach to counter terrorism which is

developed in consultation to include local governments and ensures all levels of government are involved in countering terrorism. Second, the challenges experienced in delivering programs at the local level from a counter terrorism agenda can result in suspicion, alienation and securitisation of engagement, this chapter questioned if it was necessary to follow the examples of the United Kingdom and separate social cohesion and counter terrorism agendas in Australia.

Chapter seven sought to draw on conclusions made throughout the research chapter to discuss what a role for local government should look like and explore the positive and negative aspects of the development of such a role. Through the adoption of the SWOT framework for analysis this chapter argued that despite the lack of recognition of local governments in counter terrorism governance, particularly in the preventative aspects, local governments have significant roles and responsibilities in this area which should be developed and acknowledged in national and state counter terrorism plans. This chapter made four recommendations; 1. Building holistic local government capacity in the areas of countering terrorism, 2. Maximising on the opportunities offered by the crowded places forums to develop local networks, partners and capability. 3. Developing nationwide capability at the local government level to empower local governments to make informed and proportionate decisions to counter terrorism at the local level and 4. Inclusion of local government in National and State Counter Terrorism Plans.

The principle outcome of this research is that local government have significant capability to contribute to counter terrorism in a preventative manner. To continue to articulate an all levels of government approach to counter terrorism without the inclusion of local government will continue to ignore to opportunities available at this level. It is hoped this research may enable further discussion of how local government can contribute to nationwide counter terrorism.

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Local Government Act 1993 (NSW)

Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth)

Annexure A

Codebook for governance analysis

Name	Description
Governance Arrangements	
Centralisation of Governance	This relates to the national security and counter terrorism arrangements in Australia being coordinated centrally by the Commonwealth Government. Key words and phrases include leadership, centre, national coordination and where the commonwealth government takes control of the arrangements or security.
Decentralisation of Governance	This relates to an emphasis of the government working with business and community in a preventative manner to share the responsibility of countering terrorism, key words include shared, partnerships between, cooperation, a sector taking responsibility for their own security.
Nature of the threat	This primary category refers to the inherent features, characteristics or qualities of threat of terrorism
Complex Threat	This relates to a terrorist threat which is complex, coordinated, and/or transnational in nature. This includes references to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear, biological or attacks targeting mass passenger transport. Attacks which require a degree of coordination to carry out such as 9/11, Bali, Madrid, Mumbai and Paris are examples of this.
Domestic Threat	This category is to be used when the threat is described as one that is originating within Australia's borders, by members of the Australian community. Key words in context include - home grown, cancellation of passports, foreign fighters, returned fighters
Islamic	References to Islamic extremism as the predominant terrorist threat facing society, this category includes references to established terrorist groups such as ISIS, Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Boko Haram, and affiliated groups, and Islamist extremism, Muslim, Afghanistan in the context of terrorism, Iraq in the context of terrorism, Syria in the context of terrorism and the jihadist movement.
Less sophisticated	This code refers to threats which are described as involving lone actors using basic weaponry such as knives, vehicles, firearms or vehicles. Not coordinated in nature and no involvement from established terrorist groups. key words include lone actor and lone wolf
New Threat	This category relates to the threat when it is described as new, not previously seen before and requires new legislation, counter measures or tactics to combat.
Threat originating outside of Australia	The theme relates to a threat which is described as occurring externally to Australia but that poses a risk to Australia. A threat which requires the Australian government to secure its borders against, terrorists that will try

Name	Description
	to gain entry to Australia to carry out an attack, groups or actors situated in overseas countries and within the region. Countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Indonesia, Thailand.
Threat other than Islamic	This refers to the terrorism where the motivator is described as other than Islamic in origin. Examples include right wing extremism, state sponsored terrorism, groups such as Hezbollah. This does not include references to the cyber threat.
Violent extremism	Key words for this theme include violent extremism, radicalisation, countering violent extremism.
Priority of terrorism	This theme relates to an increase in the priority allocated to terrorism from a national security or government perspective. Key phrases include increased priority
Role of Defence in Counter Terrorism	This theme relates to the roles and responsibilities allocated to the Australian Defence Forces to Counter Terrorism in Australia and internationally.
Role of the Community	
Public information	This relates to the importance and priority of information being provided to the community, this includes references to media, communications before during and after a terrorism incident, and about changes in threat level
Resilient communities	This refers to references to the need for communities to be resilient and the need to build resilience.
Social Cohesion	mentions of social and community cohesion
Roles and Responsibility allocation	This relates to committee, agencies, departments, forces or bodies that are allocated a role within the governance arrangements
Federal Government level	Bodies that operate at the national/federal level of government
Interjurisdictional bodies	Committees or roles which have representation across states and territories or representation from states and territories as well as Federal government.
Local Government Level	Bodies that have a local government responsibility
State Government Level	Bodies that operate at the state level of government or enforcement e.g NSW Government, NSW Police Force
Whole of Government	The approach outlined by the Australian government to Counter Terrorism and National Security encompasses a whole of government approach key words/phrases include - Whole of government
All levels of Government	Text search for the phrase all levels of government, this is to compliment the text search for whole of government approach.

