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# LISTENING TO NIETZSCHE: DEMOCRACY, EQUALITY AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT

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**ABSTRACT:** This paper attempts to dissipate much of the political dissonance which surrounds the work of Nietzsche and tap into his original message: to establish a new social, political and cultural élite which will create a hitherto unimagined flourishing of humanity.

For business strategy, this thesis seeks to provide a Nietzschean framework of agonism for managers and leaders to question their thinking by providing a countervailing view to the current assumptions of liberal democracy.

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## PART 1 – INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH

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### 1.1 - RESEARCH CONTEXT

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Some of the greatest achievements in philosophy could only be compared with taking up some books which seemed to belong together, and putting them on different shelves; nothing more being final about their positions than that they no longer lie side by side. The onlooker who doesn't know the difficulty of the task might well think in such a case that nothing at all had been achieved – the difficulty in philosophy is to say no more than we know. E.g. to see that when we have put two books together in their right order we have not thereby put them in their final places.<sup>1</sup>

This quote by Wittgenstein is apposite when writing a philosophical thesis researched through literature analysis as it expresses the difficulty of the task faced by the author: seeking 'right' order while remaining open to this not being the final order. But why make yet another attempt to place the books or analyse the problems? Not because, as is often remarked, it is the task of each generation to re-examine problems previously addressed, but because it is better by far for us to question our absolute convictions and spend a long time 'lost in doubts and uncertainties'<sup>2</sup> than settle for a life deaf to speculative opportunities in which we question little and know little else. Only through a deep

awareness of their own and their thesis's limitations, can researchers rise above their rivals and hope to achieve a truth-claim. And only through the aggregation of truth-claims, can we hope to put books in the great library of human thought in their final order. Nietzsche<sup>3</sup> was acutely aware of the difficulties in establishing truth-claims as thinkers and believers beyond counting, not to mention we ourselves, have asserted a 'truth' of this world, trapping most of us in a matrix which interprets 'falsely and mendaciously, though according to our wish and will for veneration, that is, according to a *need*.'<sup>4</sup> Only through constantly seeking what is 'true as such' can we hope to break out of this miasma of delusion, see this world faithfully, and find better, not just different solutions.

Continuing the metaphor of the library, this thesis was also motivated by Jorge Luis Borges' short story, *The Library of Babel*, which has come to disturbing and dystopic fruition as the initial euphoria of mass access to a seeming infinity of information online has given way to madness with ideology and 'fake news' dominating the landscape. These developments create a relativist's dream of a 'post-truth' world where lay readers and academics alike are seized by a 'hygienic, ascetic rage' which casts some schools of thought as 'analogous to a god,' with acolytes prostrating themselves before approved 'books and like savages kiss[ing] their pages, though they cannot read a letter.' Other texts or outlooks fall victim to 'epidemics, heretical discords' or 'pilgrimages that inevitably degenerate into brigandage;' ultimately extinguishing the fire of any meaningful agonism.<sup>5</sup> Again, Nietzsche had prefigured this

dystopia by observing humanities general ‘incapacity for philology.’ In this context, philology is to be understood in a very wide sense as the art of reading well – of being able to:

read off a fact *without* falsifying it by interpretation, *without* losing caution, patience, subtlety in the desire for understanding. Philology as *ephexis* [undecisiveness] in interpretation: whether it be a question of books, newspaper reports, fate or the weather.<sup>6</sup>

It is with sadness that I see an increasing number of institutions adopting a ‘no platform’ policy because students, staff or external activists feel threatened by the views of potential speakers. Simply because we hear, read or even write a view does not mean we hold or endorse that view. It may simply mean we recognise its importance, if only as something to be rebutted, and think it better to expose and test the assertion against the full weight of evidence than let it stand on hearsay or speculation. Social media provides a near unlimited outlet for any view, no matter how bigoted, anti-logical or ill-informed it may be. Only by bringing such views into institutions filled with the best and the brightest,<sup>7</sup> and having those ideas opened to the scrutiny of debate and analysis, may they finally be put to rest as potential solutions to the present discontents.

This paper is also a reaction to the use and abuse of safe spaces. A safe space is a crucial notion for any institution, but the concept must be extended to mean more than a place in which people who

‘feel’ marginalised can go to discuss their experiences of marginalisation free from any criticism, no matter how constructive. If all counter arguments are suppressed, such spaces, far from equipping people with the tools to combat real, and imagined, marginalisation, will create the ultimate philosophical vacuum and only serve to fuel suspicion of all ‘out groups,’ that is to say groups who are deemed not to be part of the milieu of the marginalised. In such an environment it is little wonder minority and majority groups increasingly feel to be under siege. Such sentiment could be effectively combatted if the concept of a ‘safe space’ was extended to mean a place in which all aspects of thought can be discussed, particularly those which deviate from the ‘marginalised’ consensus. Émile Durkheim observed ‘if purely moral rules are at stake, the public conscience restricts any act which infringes them.’<sup>8</sup> Without divergence from safe views, without an opposing system of thought or differing set or moral rules, consciousness will ‘petrify too easily into an immutable form. For it to evolve, individual originality must be allowed to manifest itself.’<sup>9</sup> In this context, Nietzsche’s thinking on democracy needs re-examining as decades of political bias and moral normalisation have sought ‘to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest.’<sup>10</sup> This thesis seeks to strip away these interpretations and create a safe space in which Nietzsche’s voice may be heard, absent of the modulations which seek to only allow for a ‘gentle Nietzsche’<sup>11</sup> to reverberate.



For management practice, one of the more recent attempts to put a case for a thesis such as this was made by Leanne Meyer, co-director of a new leadership department at the Carnegie Mellon Tepper School of Business:

There's a turning point in what's expected from business leaders. Up until now, business leaders were largely responsible for delivering products. Now, shareholders are looking to corporate leaders to make statements on what would traditionally have been social justice or moral issues.<sup>12</sup>

While such an argument does put the case for restressing the importance of philosophical enquiry, and the implications for management, it does so by way of negation.\* Carrying as it does implicit criticism of executives up until now, many of whom have made statements and acted on justice and moral issues, and because for those alive to the very real social problems which have gripped the world in each age, we are at no more of a turning point today than we were twenty or one hundred years ago. To imagine 'our time' is more awake and aware is to adopt a Whig view of history and, as a remedy, recycle the myth of the revolution which states: now, with this generation, we have

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\* I also disagree with the notion of 'social justice' as justice needs no qualifier. To ignore this fundamental, and qualify justice from a social stand point, brings with it explicit discrimination as it pre-supposes a person's group identity is a factor in providing justice. If justice is to be truly blind, then it can't see a social group, much less shape the judgement based on a group or person's age, colour, culture, creed or sex.

recognised the injustices and our 'new' formulations will address them. At which point, still shining and fresh from the factory, a framework is presented which promises to reform business and society at large, while making one's clothes cleaner than ever!

As a philosopher of history my thinking always looks back to project solutions forward. In doing so I am cognisant that each generation has seen a 'turning point,' asked very similar questions and, in a manifestation of Santayana's prophetic phrase, often repeated the mistakes of the past. Part of the cause for this repetition of error is, as R. G. Collingwood noted, we too often ask the wrong questions by only enquiring about what people did, rather than trying to understand what they thought.<sup>13</sup> In such a context we often give the right answer to the question, but, because it is the wrong question, fail to resolve the issue which persists for the next generation. This process failure can be seen in the notion of a turning point in executive responsibility and is often motivated by the misquotation of an argument by Milton Friedman that claims executive responsibility stops after they make as much money for shareholders as possible. Misquoted as his actual argument asserted '[a] corporate executive ... has direct responsibility to conduct business in accordance with [shareholder] desires ... [i.e.] to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.'<sup>14</sup> With Friedman asking the right question and answering responsibility also entails law and ethical custom, we can only be at a turning point for business if we understand why executives, academics and journalists continue to miss the key

questions by asking ‘what’ rather than ‘why,’ and in doing so fail to see that some of the answers to our present discontents have already been given. If community leaders continue this trend of asking the wrong questions, no matter how well they may answer, the history of our time, far from being a turning point, will be described using A. J. P. Taylor’s famous phrase: ‘history reached its turning point and failed to turn.’<sup>15</sup>

With business playing an ever greater rôle in the development of society, Friedman’s words remain prescient. What was once solely the province of Church or State increasingly falls into the purview of corporations. Companies shape the political and social landscape in ways scarcely seen since the East India Company was wound up,<sup>16</sup> and the decision making of senior management teams is more akin to drafting policy for the many than marketing products for the few. In such a variegated and responsibility-laden landscape, there is increasing need to define and refine both law and ethical custom, a task for which Nietzsche’s thinking offers invaluable tools since his philosophy can be placed on the scales and weighed against current business practices to ask questions such as, ‘is it a ‘bro’ culture or a necessary deviation from cultural norms to facilitate greater creativity?’ ‘Is it notions of invincibility mixed with arrogance or ground-breaking individuals accomplishing that which was not thought possible?’ ‘Are the 20-somethings running billion-dollar companies really flying too close to the sun or merely flying too high for current social norms?’ ‘Is current corporate governance truly best practice or nepotism favouring a different ‘in’ group?’

## 1.2 - RESEARCH AIMS AND PURPOSE

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The purpose of this thesis is to examine and analyse the writing of Friedrich Nietzsche with particular regard to his thinking on democracy, equality and the constitution of society. This aim will be achieved through a detailed study of Nietzsche's writing and analysis of the secondary sources which have previously attempted to interpret his rationale.

This thesis will also seek to broaden our current understanding of Nietzsche's writing, to further the debate which seeks to answer what Nietzsche really meant, and to ascertain the implications for management of a Nietzschean school of thought.

## 1.3 – RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

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The research aims will be achieved through the following objectives:

1. To ascertain by way of literature analysis the variegated reception Nietzsche's writing has received and the current perceptions of his thinking on grand politics, the importance of castes in society, aristocratic radicalism, and his anticipation of the two extremes of totalitarianism and liberalism.
2. To undertake a comprehensive study of Nietzsche's writing to determine the difference between what Nietzsche is thought to have said as opposed to what he wrote.

3. To use Nietzsche's thinking on society and politics to provide a Nietzschean framework of agonism for managers and leaders to question their thinking by providing a countervailing view to the current assumptions of liberal democracy.

#### 1.4 - ABBREVIATIONS

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A	<i>The Antichrist</i> , translated by R. J. Hollingdale.
BGE	<i>Beyond Good and Evil</i> , translated by Marion Faber.
BT	<i>The Birth of Tragedy</i> , translated by Douglas Smith.
D	<i>Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality</i> , translated by R. J. Hollingdale.
EH	<i>Ecce Homo</i> , translated by Duncan Large.
GM	<i>On the Genealogy of Morals</i> , translated by Douglas Smith.
GS	<i>The Gay Science</i> , translated by Josefine Nauckhoff, poems translated by Adrian Del Caro.
HAH	<i>Human, All Too Human: A Book for free Spirits</i> , translated by R. J. Hollingdale.
SE	'Schopenhauer as Educator,' in <i>Untimely Meditations</i> , translated by R. J. Hollingdale.
TI	<i>Twilight of the Idols</i> , translated by Duncan Large.
WP	<i>The Will to Power</i> , translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale.
WS	<i>The Wanderer and His Shadow</i> , in HAH, translated by R. J. Hollingdale.
Z	<i>Thus Spoke Zarathustra</i> , translated by Graham Parkes.

## 2 - A LIBERAL ORDER

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Given the brevity of this thesis, there is not the space for a detailed discussion of liberalism. Yet a few words need to be allotted since liberalism has taken many forms over the years. Because this thesis is concerned with Nietzsche's reaction to 'it' [liberalism] I must first establish what 'it' is before progressing to liberalism's reaction to Nietzsche and finally stripping away this dissonance to understand Nietzsche's considered position. From there I will be able to give proper context to his prophesy of what was to come should democratically accountable liberal institutions become prevalent in Europe, and the implications for management if more Nietzschean, and less liberally democratic, modes are adopted.

### 2.1 - CLASSICAL LIBERALISM

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A term coined in retrospect to distinguish it from newer liberal forms, and largely applicable to liberalism prior to the twentieth century,<sup>17</sup> was the by-product of increasing urbanisation and the Industrial Revolution, coupled with responses to French Revolutionary and reactionary sentiment, with the central notion of liberty under law. Although Nancy Hirschman and others<sup>18</sup> have argued for John Locke as the father of liberalism, I would militate against a 'founder' methodology and, while affirming the centrality of Locke to liberal evolution, assert it was more the result of a long tradition of European thinkers, before and after Locke, notably Immanuel Kant, David Hume, Thomas Malthus, James Mill, John-Stuart Mill, David Ricardo, Jean-Baptiste Say and Adam Smith. Their

philosophical and economic theories initially propelled liberalism, formed the antecedents of modern liberalism, and help to explain the agonism which is present in contemporary debate about liberal policy and thought.

Agreeing with Thomas Hobbes, and in reaction to the notion of ‘war of everyone against everyone,’<sup>19</sup> or as Kant would put it, man’s ‘unsocial sociability,’<sup>20</sup> which had seen Europe rent by conflict for generations, classical liberals viewed the purpose of government as protecting individuals from each other, or at least to minimise the natural state of conflict which would otherwise exist, and provide defence for the population against external aggressors.<sup>21</sup> Classical liberals married this belief in the ‘egoistic, coldly calculating, essentially inert and atomistic’<sup>22</sup> view of humanity with the theories of Thomas Malthus who adopted an economic approach to issues of population.<sup>23</sup>

With economics at its base, classical liberals tended to seek solutions to social problems through the free market and were critical of nascent versions of ‘the welfare state’ since they interfered with the concept of *laissez-faire*.<sup>24</sup> A universal basic income was also opposed on the grounds that the poor, who had failed to achieve financial prosperity in a free market, would merely dissipate any revenue doled out to them.<sup>25</sup> Perhaps the zenith of classical liberal policy, in Britain at least,<sup>26</sup> is to be found in the shape of the ‘Poor Law Amendment Act 1834’ which abolished income supplementation for those on the lowest wages, prohibited relief for those outside the workhouse, sought to make

workhouse conditions less amicable than those of the lowest paid labourer, and established the segregation of different classes of paupers.<sup>27</sup> Classical liberals also privileged individual rights over labour's group rights, despite Smith's recognition of the importance and value of labour.<sup>28</sup> For all their assertion of the free market and the importance of individuals seeking sustenance without the support of the state, classical liberals did see government as crucial in providing institutions and services which a free market could not, or would not, supply.

Although in more recent times liberalism has become synonymous with democracy, classical liberalism did not mandate democracy as there were fears among liberal thinkers that majority rule could subjugate the right of property and rule of law to the whims of the masses. As James Madison noted: 'common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole ... and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party.'<sup>29</sup>

## 2.2 - SOCIAL LIBERALISM

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Social or 'modern' liberalism is a much more difficult ideology to describe because, unlike classical liberalism which is predominantly a historic phenomenon, social liberalism is a current movement which is continuing to develop and mutate as issues are fought in the arena of contemporary life. In this context for every social liberal label, there is a score of social liberals for whom the label does not apply. For all that, there are some key elements to social liberalism that can be stated with certainty



and which form the basis of an ideology and vision for humanity which Nietzsche perceived in its earlier incantations and against which his rebuttal can be justly aimed.

By the end of the nineteenth century classical liberalism was under attack as the franchise was extended to the classes who bore the brunt of social and economic hardship and who perceived classical liberalism and the free market as the cause, rather than the cure, of their ills. Early social liberals shifted the emphasis from how much individual freedom was permitted by the state to how effective the state was in enabling people to satisfy their needs as individuals.<sup>30</sup> In time this would lead social liberals to a fundamentally opposing view to classical liberals, who in contrast are more akin to conservatives, as social liberals would argue against *laissez-faire*, champion the welfare-state, and move toward a Marxist line which asserted 'the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.'<sup>31</sup> In this context liberalism, as a mass movement, was largely subsumed by socialism as increasing numbers of people shrank from the horrific working conditions of the nineteenth century and sought shelter from the impacts of globalisation, *laissez-faire* economics and the cycles of boom and bust. With this liberalism endured something of a living death as it shifted away from being a force for reform and became a force to defend reforming interests, typically working class interests.

The rise of totalitarianism in the 1920s and 1930s, coupled with the horrors of the Second World War, sparked another offshoot from the trunk of liberalism. Yet it would be wrong to envisage the

liberalism emerging from the period as a single movement or ideology. Rather it would be better described as a loose collection of warring tribes united more by what they oppose than by what they believe. This is not a mere case of individuals are individuals and there will always be outliers in any belief system. Rather it is to do with the systemic shock inflicted by the totalitarian movements of both the right and left which crushed all notions of rights and individualism and sought to make all outgroups – much like the Nazis had made the Jews – into people ‘for whom human rights do not exist, and whom society would gladly exclude from its privileges.’<sup>32</sup> The twin liberal assumptions of the equal moral worth of all people and the importance of concern for the weak were at stake in such a crucible, and these regimes, some of which survived the Allied Victory since they were Allied powers (the Soviet Union being the most obvious example), showed no signs of allowing liberal beliefs to gain ground in areas they controlled. In the face of such intractable opposition, the keepers of the egalitarian flame hunkered down in their own ideological camp and concluded that public debate must start at a point which takes for granted notions of equality and move to the adjudication of rights and procedures of justice. Thankfully, not all liberals became ideologues and the flames of meaningful agonism were kept ablaze by two key thinkers, Friedrich von Hayek and Karl Popper, who challenged the increasingly entrenched ideology of social liberals.

Even before the lustre of being Time Magazine’s 1938 man of the year had worn off, Adolf Hitler was already an excruciated figure of the left. With the bulk of intellectuals, reeling from the effects of

the great depression and clutching for any solution but 'let the free market decide,' leaning more toward Moscow than Berlin, it should come as no surprise that by 1944 the prevailing orthodoxy held that National Socialism was the very antithesis of welfare socialism. It is always worth bringing together the Time Magazine award, the high point in Hitler's popularity in America, and his subsequent reputation, derived largely from *die Endlösung* [the final solution], because there is a predominant view which seeks to validate intellectuals who lurched toward the Soviets prior to, and immediately after, the war based on the truly horrific legacy of Nazism. While Hitler and the Nazis' brutal reputation is justly deserved, if the preference for socialism, communism and the subsequent Soviet Bloc were based upon the political murders of the Nazis, Stalin and Soviet style communists should have come in for an equal measure of opprobrium for their mass murders of those deemed 'enemies of the people.'<sup>33</sup> Yet they rarely did, and thus the fight against Nazism was expanded to include a fight against anything which stood against welfare socialism.<sup>34</sup> Into this deeply partisan environment Hayek dropped his own intellectual bomb,<sup>35</sup> *The Road to Serfdom*,<sup>36</sup> and appalled supporters of welfare socialism by arguing that National Socialism, far from being diametrically opposed to welfare socialism, was an analogous movement because both fascism and the welfare state sought control over free and undirected markets. When control is exerted, Hayek observed, it destroys the capacity for spontaneous order which is not the result of a conscious plan.<sup>37</sup> In many respects, Hayek was seeking to right the ship of liberalism and return it to a classical course, and by doing so

stave off the depredations to which Nietzsche predicted it would inevitably succumb. To understand why Hayek's project largely failed, and why social liberalism took the course it did, we need to apprehend the work of Karl Popper.

Popper observed there are two types of laws, natural and normative. Of natural law Popper noted:

If we do not know whether a law of nature is true or false, and if we wish to draw attention to our uncertainty, we often call it an 'hypothesis'. A law of nature is unalterable; there are no exceptions to it. For if we are satisfied that something has happened which contradicts it, then we do not say that there is an exception, or an alteration to the law, but rather that our hypothesis has been refuted, since it has turned out that the supposed strict regularity did not hold, or in other words, that the supposed law of nature was not a true law of nature, but a false statement.

Since laws of nature are unalterable, they can be neither broken nor enforced.

They are beyond human control<sup>38</sup>

Normative laws, according to Popper, are legal enactments or moral commandments created by people, therefore alterable, and open to judgements of right or wrong.<sup>39</sup> Exponents of social liberalism have too often neglected Popper's thinking and fail to grasp that their core ideology - liberty under law - is normative not natural. In consequence, they have come to assert their laws are 'natural' or

immutable and label as fascist – a clarion call reminiscent of their *ad hominem* rebuttals in the 30s and 40s – any who argue otherwise. To pick up on the Wittgenstein library analogy: only by placing liberal books in their correct normative position, and interrogating their claims, can we hope to find their true place in the library of human thought. Nietzsche's thinking provides an invaluable tool in this process, but first a discussion of reactions to his writing is needed.

### 2.3 – INTELLIGENTSIA CONTRA NIETZSCHE

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Nietzsche is difficult to read, and harder to understand. Such is the problem in undertaking any study of Nietzsche. Like many great figures in history, he comes to us through decades of claim and counter claim and is generally read, when read at all, through a strong lens of bias and paradigm. This is particularly the case among the partisans of the liberalism who posit a return to the pre-Walter Kaufmann era where all Nietzschean notions of an *Übermensch* (see Appendix 6.2) are banished to a bestiary, away from serious philosophical scrutiny.<sup>40</sup> Such reactions are not entirely unexpected as Nietzsche, and other keen nineteenth-century European observers of Western civilisation, feared that the increasing emphasis on liberal rights and democratic equality was eroding the conditions which had historically seen the dominion of greatness. Alexis de Tocqueville noted the penchant of 'democratic man' for the 'pitiable comforts' of modern life and warned of the 'levelling' of modern culture<sup>41</sup> which seemed to harken back to earlier attempts at egalitarian reform:

When Adam dalf, and Eve span,

Who was thanne a gentleman?<sup>42</sup>

Although de Tocqueville shared many of Nietzsche's concerns, his writing is perhaps more palatable for the egalitarian-minded because his qualms are mollified by an undercurrent of genuine admiration for the virtues of democracy, since he thought countervailing forces would alleviate overweening materialism and maintain a sense of purpose and determination for the betterment in the population. Nietzsche, as we will see, would allow no such equivocation.

The Danish critic and contemporary of Nietzsche, Georg Brandes, was the first to refer to the philosopher as an aristocratic radical. We have it from Nietzsche's own pen, in a letter to Brandes in December 1887:

The expression 'aristocratic radicalism' [*aristokratischer Radikalismus*], which you use, is very good. That is, if I may say so, the shrewdest remark that I have read about myself till now.

How far this way of thinking has carried my thoughts, how far it will still carry me – I am almost too frightened to conceive. But there are paths which forbid one to travel them backward, and so I go forward, because I must [*und so gehe ich vorwärts, weil ich vorwärts muß*].<sup>43</sup>

For Nietzsche, such aristocratic radicalism meant there was a simple choice: democracy, misarchism, equality, cultural atrophy or aristocracy, homage, inequality and cultural apotheosis. Liberal analysis has answered this 'either / or' with a mix of silence and obfuscation which seeks to ignore or marginalise any discussion of 'perfectionism.' In short, liberalism asserts there is a consensus among 'sane thinking people' which treats as givens the twin beliefs in the equal moral worth of all people and an importance and concern for the weak. The keepers of this egalitarian flame conclude that public debate must start at a point which takes for granted notions of equality and move to the adjudication of rights and procedures of justice; an attitude typified by thinkers such as John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. When space is given to talk of perfectionism, it is strictly to be in the private sphere. A self-proclaimed 'postmodern liberal,' Richard Rorty, claimed that the optimal organisation of the lives of those who share the 'moral institutions' of liberalism is one of public debate of basic values and private perfectionistic and expressivist urges.<sup>44</sup> Attempts at such easy compartmentalisation ignore Nietzsche's profound scepticism of a 'private' capacity for expression in a communal environment which militates against innovation. As Daniel Conway correctly notes: "healthy' self-creation is never strictly private... [because it involves] a Dionysian (see Appendix 6.4) element of excess or superfluity' which cannot be contained to a private sphere."<sup>45</sup>

It is here that we come to the crux of the issue when reading Nietzsche: interpretation. If we accept that Nietzsche's thought is infinitely malleable, we enter the cavalier and arguably dangerous realm of

Michel Foucault and his followers who asserted that ‘the only valid tribute to [Nietzsche’s] thought... is precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest.’<sup>46</sup> Entering this twilight of infinite malleability, it becomes possible to read Nietzsche in almost any way. Tracy Strong managed this feat when he argued that China and Cuba represent ‘the very Nietzschean proposition of creating ‘new men,’<sup>47</sup> but that those of the more democratic left who are attracted to Nietzsche will ‘conclude that it is necessary to set aside Nietzsche’s particular political judgements.’<sup>48</sup> Not to be outdone for intellectual gymnastics, William Connolly cautioned democrats against harshly criticising Nietzsche’s antidemocratic writing as this ‘represses dimensions in those same formulations that speak critically to the democrat as democrat.’<sup>49</sup>

Strong and Connolly’s positions are only possible because Nietzsche is frequently appropriated as a ‘protean’ thinker who can be, and some argue should be, made to conform to the argument *in quo*.<sup>50</sup> As a result, far from understanding the thinking of Nietzsche, we end up with a kind of universal *quod erat demonstrandum* which may be curated and wheeled out in support of the cause of the day. Mark Warren even went so far as to write of a postmodern ‘gentle Nietzsche’ who thinks in juxtaposition to a ‘bloody Nietzsche’ and only once the latter has been dispatched can the former come into his legacy.<sup>51</sup>



Intellectuals of the right do not fare much better in interpreting Nietzsche's philosophy correctly. Eric Voegelin lumped Nietzsche and Marx together when he saddled the two with responsibility for 'egophanic' history, a term Voegelin used to designate 'the pathos of thinkers who exist in a state of alienation and libidinous<sup>52</sup> obsession.'<sup>53</sup> Although Voegelin was less averse to Nietzsche's unvarnished thinking than his opposite numbers of a left-wing ideological persuasion, in placing Nietzsche in the same category as Marx suggests Voegelin saw Nietzsche in a reductionist way. He made this categorisation explicit in the *New Science of Politics* where he quoted a passage from *Daybreak* in which Nietzsche recommended to Christians that instead of seeking God's love they should love themselves. For Voegelin this placed Nietzsche in the Gnostic school of thought for which eschatological fulfilment would be achieved 'through the civilisational contributions of the liberals and progressives, and, finally, through the revolutionary action that will establish the Communist or some other Gnostic millennium.'<sup>54</sup> Yet such a reading essentially ignores Nietzsche's insistence on *amor fati* in which the only eternal is the eternal return and its recurring conflict, there is no possibility of arresting this circle or converting it to a paradisiacal stasis.<sup>55</sup>

Leo Strauss was much more adept at reading Nietzsche, that is reading his philosophy '*without* falsifying it by interpretation, *without* losing caution, patience, subtlety in the desire for understanding.'<sup>56</sup> Yet such a reading left Strauss ultimately disillusioned with a thinker who had initially so 'dominated and charmed'<sup>57</sup> him. For Nietzsche had:

... used much of his unsurpassable and inexhaustible power of passionate and fascinating speech for making his readers loathe, not only socialism and communism, but conservatism, nationalism and democracy as well. After having taken upon himself this great political responsibility, he could not show his readers a way toward political responsibility. He left them no choice except that between irresponsible indifference to politics and irresponsible political options.<sup>58</sup>

Yet having learned, through understanding Nietzsche's philosophy, to read 'without falsifying,' Strauss remained alive to the importance of Nietzsche's *amor fati*, and argued such love created the ultimate conservative:

By saying Yes to everything that was and is Nietzsche may seem to reveal himself as radically antirevolutionary or conservative beyond the wildest wishes of all other conservatives, who all say No to some of the things that were or are.<sup>59</sup>

The 'No' for most anti-Nietzschean conservatives seems to be Nietzsche's atheism. For Strauss, arguably the most accurate interpreter of Nietzsche among political conservatives, this point is crucial to Nietzsche's importance since Strauss sees him as 'the inventor of an atheism of the political right.'<sup>60</sup>

Of the writers of left and right who seem deaf to Nietzsche's own exhortation to read 'without falsifying,' Walter Kaufmann presented a general rebuttal by noting any apparent contradictions in

Nietzsche's thinking, which could be leveraged for an alternative understanding, are 'characteristic of legend and not typical of Nietzsche... [and that such] utterly superficial inconsistencies dissolve as soon as one checks the quotations and recognises the meaning they had in their original context.'<sup>61</sup>

Against possible misreading Kaufmann posited:

[I]n the face of attempts to claim his sanction for... relativism in matters of truth, it seems important to remember that Nietzsche himself was a fanatical seeker after truth and recognized no virtue above intellectual integrity... His intentions are singularly unequivocal, and he was not one to sit on both sides of the fence at once.<sup>62</sup>

Where I differ from Kaufmann is that I don't think it enough simply to cast Nietzsche's self-professed 'aristocratic radicalism' onto the scales of judgement and watch the weight of the literary evidence tip the balance. To get to grips with Nietzschean thought we must grasp not only his epistemology and politics, but the very underpinning of his writing, which rests on his concept of nature and how Western civilisation has evolved. To begin this task, let us delve into Nietzsche's politics, sans postmodernist or liberal democratic scruples, for here, as Laurence Lampert put it, 'Nietzsche's politics broadens the political perspective instead of shrinking itself into some modern option.'<sup>63</sup>

This is still something of a challenge as, ironically thanks to the work of Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche retains a reputation as an apolitical thinker who is at best disinterested and, at his most strident, contemptuous of politics: ‘the *leitmotif* of Nietzsche’s life and thought [was] the theme of the antipolitical individual who seeks self-perfection far from the modern world.’<sup>64</sup> Although not part of the same Anglo-American academy, Peter Berkowitz asserts a similar reading in concluding that Nietzsche ‘radically denigrates’ political life.<sup>65</sup> Yet within Nietzsche’s writing, in lockstep with his condemnation of petty politics, there is a nobler form of politics.<sup>66</sup> While it has been argued that Nietzsche ‘has no political philosophy, in the conventional sense of a theory of the state and its legitimacy,’<sup>67</sup> and in consequence is better understood as a thinker who seeks to communicate ideas about the good life to a select few, I argue this view is in error. Nietzsche does offer theories of the state and the nature of political legitimacy<sup>68</sup> which ultimately inform his thinking about democracy.

### 3 - NIETZSCHE'S POLITICAL THOUGHT

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#### 3.1 – THROUGH THE LABYRINTH OF THE BREAST<sup>69</sup>

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‘No doubt it sounds better to academic ears to interpret these things as Dionysus, but Wotan might be a more correct interpretation. He is the god of storm and frenzy, the unleasher of passions and the lust of battle; moreover he is a superlative magician and artist in illusion who is versed in all secrets of an occult nature.’<sup>70</sup>

Nietzsche often derided what he called ‘the long-drawn-out comedy of [Europe’s] small-state system’ and argued ‘the multiple wills of its dynasties and democracies would finally come to an end.’<sup>71</sup> He poured scorn on nationalistic movements and imperial pretensions, which he viewed as a ‘*névrose nationale* [national neurosis] that ails Europe ... [and through] the perpetuation of Europe’s petty-stater, of petty politics [*kleinen Politik*] they have robbed Europe of its meaning, its *reason* – they have led it up a blind alley.’<sup>72</sup> Nietzsche is clear that much of this pettiness has to do with the democratic notion of catering to the majority which sees rulers ‘haggling and bargaining for power – with the rabble!’<sup>73</sup> This is the result of a herd society (see Appendix 6.1) in which only the ‘superfluous [*Überflüssigen*] ... strive towards the throne.’<sup>74</sup>

This condescension toward a politics of the herd does not automatically equate to all politics being beneath the dignity of *Übermenschen*. Rather, as Bruce Detwiler has observed, it is a criticism of the

modern state and democratic politics.<sup>75</sup> This reading is made clear by Nietzsche when he noted in *Ecce Homo*: ‘Does anyone beside me know *a way* out of this blind alley? ... A task great enough to *bind together* the nations again? ...’<sup>76</sup> If such a way could be found, Nietzsche prophesied, there would be a struggle for ‘mastery over the earth – [where people would be] *forced* into politics on a grand scale [*großen Politik*].’<sup>77</sup> On the face of it this seems contrary to our received understanding of Nietzsche as a philosopher, brought about by a misreading of his emphasis on the individual as an artist of the self, which casts Nietzsche’s body of work in a light wholly incompatible with a social or political programme. As Walter Kaufmann put it:

[Nietzsche] was concerned with the artist, the philosopher, and those who achieve self-perfection ... affirm their own being and all eternity, backward and forward, have no thought of tomorrow.<sup>78</sup>

According to this school of interpretation, Nietzsche was uninterested in politics as these ought to be ‘left to the statesmen, of whom Nietzsche held no high opinion.’<sup>79</sup> But such readings display a very narrow codification of Nietzsche’s aestheticism and imply ‘some sort of amoral aestheticising of existence, a playful overturning of all moral and political categories in the name of detached aesthetic values,’<sup>80</sup> and view democracy and politics as synonymous. In this light, it is easy to view any thinker as apolitical who sets out to write ‘in such a way that neither the mob, nor the populi, nor the parties

of any kind'<sup>81</sup> want to read him. But such views are in error as they disregard Nietzsche's argument that does not see a rivalry between the aesthetic, political and ethical.

This close relationship between ethics, politics and aesthetic runs through Nietzsche's work, often blurring the line between philosopher, artist and politician.<sup>82</sup> An association which is natural as Nietzsche sees a broad aesthetic impulse in all *Übermenschen*<sup>83</sup> as they need to take man, 'a formless material, an ugly stone in need of a sculptor,'<sup>84</sup> and produce a society from this coarse material. In a philosophy of transformation, it is clear that Nietzsche is construing politics as an aesthetic activity.<sup>85</sup>

As Julian Young noted:

art, in short, is ... *action*. Nietzsche's activist vocabulary for talking about artists – he refers to them as *creators, makers, doers, violators* and as *rapists* (*TI*, IX.8) – continually emphasises this. And it is this perspective on the artist that provides the basis for inclusion of conquerors and builders of states and empires among the ranks of 'artists.'<sup>86</sup>

Or as Nietzsche would put it, the *Übermensch* feels the desire 'to give a single form to the multifarious and distorted' and is 'always intent on *making* something out of ... their marble, whatever the cost in men.'<sup>87</sup> The *Imperium Romanum*, Confucius and Napoleon are considered by Nietzsche as examples of the 'great artists of government so far.'<sup>88</sup> Christianity, by contrast, is denounced as:

the most disastrous form of human presumption yet. Humans who were neither high-minded nor tough enough to claim the power to work on mankind as its shaping artists [*Künstler gestalten*].<sup>89</sup>

Such remarks make grand politics and artistic activity contemporaneous. Only at the hands of an ‘artist-philosopher’ can the great project be achieved of redeeming humanity from:

the people who have controlled Europe’s destiny so far, with their ‘equal in the eyes of God’ [*Gleich vor Gott*], until they have bred a diminished, almost ludicrous species, a herd animal [*Herdentier*], something good-natured, sickly, and mediocre, today’s European [*heutige Europäer*] ...<sup>90</sup>

In Nietzsche’s eyes a master race of the future is needed to act ‘as artists upon ‘man’ himself,’ and in such a future ‘politics will have a different meaning.’<sup>91</sup> This *magnum opus* of the *Übermenschen*, to act ‘as artists upon ‘man’ himself,’ reveals an important strand in the tapestry of Nietzsche’s thinking because it asserts the importance of deeds. Passages such as 287 from *Beyond Good and Evil* emphasise the importance of motivation in determining a person’s nobility and have been used to conclude that Nietzsche ‘does not write to endorse a course of action’<sup>92</sup> nor, in the grand scheme of things, is his primary concern with actions,<sup>93</sup> rather it comes from ‘the self-knowledge of the noble soul.’<sup>94</sup>



As the rule of the rabble begins, under this heavy, cloudy sky that makes everything opaque and leaden, how is a noble person [*vornehmen Menschen*] revealed, by what do we recognise him?

It is not his actions that identify him (actions are always ambiguous, always unfathomable [*immer vieldeutig, immer unergründlich*]). Nor is it his 'works' ... it is faith [*Glaube*] that is decisive here and establishes a hierarchy, to take up an old religious formula again ... The noble soul reveres itself [*Die vornehme Seele hat Ehrfurcht vor sich*].<sup>95</sup>

But do such passages truly reveal Nietzsche's thinking as stressing motive at the expense of the content and outcome of actions? As with much 'misreading' of Nietzsche, they do only when taken in isolation. Set in the proper context of his work, they do reveal a need for self-reverence by a noble soul, but they also dismiss the notion that evaluation alone can substitute for works as 'one must practice deeds, not [merely the] strengthening of one's value-feelings.'<sup>96</sup> Inherent then, in Nietzsche's definition of nobility is constant contradiction of the great majority, not through words but through deeds.<sup>97</sup> Through works and actions individuals may reach their full potential.<sup>98</sup> The importance of actions is also evident in one of Nietzsche's core criticisms of Christians: that they do not conjoin in

‘the works which Jesus demanded.’<sup>99</sup> Moreover, for Nietzsche, such purely ‘moral works’ are doomed to oblivion.<sup>100</sup>

This sense of ‘worth’ forms the basis of Nietzsche’s *Rangordnung* [ranking] of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ humans within a hierarchy that differentiates based on deeds. Only ‘great works that have remained and not been washed away by the waters of time’<sup>101</sup> can distinguish a superior individual who will press their ‘hand upon the millennia as upon wax.’<sup>102</sup> This is unmistakably a political blueprint and endorses the Machiavellian claim ‘the great goal of statecraft should be *duration*, which outweighs everything else.’<sup>103</sup> Here my metaphor of a blueprint is no coincidence:

The most powerful men have always inspired architects; the architect [*der Baumeister*] has always been influenced by power. Pride, victory over weight and gravity, the will to power, seek to render themselves visible in a building; architecture is a kind of rhetoric of power, now persuasive, even cajoling in form, now bluntly imperious.<sup>104</sup>

But Nietzsche cautions, ‘there are contrary ages, the truly democratic ones in which people unlearn this faith.’<sup>105</sup>

[Beginning with] the Athenian faith that first became noticeable in the Periclean age; the American faith which is increasingly becoming the European faith as

well, where the individual is convinced he can do just about anything and is up to playing any role; ... When the Greeks had fully accepted this faith in roles ... they underwent, as is well known, step by step an odd metamorphosis that is not in every respect worthy of imitation: they really became actors; as such they captivated and overcame the whole world – finally even the ‘power that overcame the whole world’ itself (for it was not, as innocents tend to say, Greek culture that conquered Rome, but the *graeculus histrio* [little Greek actor]) ... But what I fear ... is that we modern men are pretty much on the same road ... [because of this] the strength to build is now paralysed; the courage to make far-reaching plans is discouraged; the organizational geniuses become scarce ...<sup>106</sup>

Like Aristotle and Machiavelli, Nietzsche compares lawmakers with architects as both seek to create something that lasts. The architect, a building that withstands the millennia, the legislator ‘a grand organisation of society, the supreme condition for the prosperity of life.’<sup>107</sup> For Nietzsche, perhaps the zenith of a grand organisation of society was Rome:

The Romans were the strong and noble men [*Starken und Vornehmen*], stronger and nobler than they had ever been on earth, or even dreamed themselves to be;

every vestige left behind by them, every inscription is a delight, as long as one has an inkling of what is behind the writing.<sup>108</sup>

In the works and deeds of Rome, Nietzsche saw the establishment of institutions which were millennial in scope:

everything before and everything since is patchwork, bungling, dilettantism ... [by contrast the Imperium Romanum is the] most admirable of all works of art in the grand style, was a beginning, its structure was calculated to prove itself by millennia – to this day there has never been such building, to build in such a manner *sub specie aeterni* [under the aspect of eternity] has never been so much as dreamed of!<sup>109</sup>

In contrast to the monumental eternalism of Rome's 'master ethics,'<sup>110</sup> Nietzsche contrasts a 'slave morality' (see Appendix 6.3) of Christian egalitarianism which can only ask:

what is the point of public spirit, what is the point of gratitude for one's decent and one's forefathers, what is the point of cooperation, trust, of furthering and keeping in view the general welfare? ... So many 'temptations,' so many diversions from the 'right road.'<sup>111</sup>

Drawing on Machiavelli,<sup>112</sup> Nietzsche criticizes the Apostle Paul for his political quietism, because he found a following from an ‘absolutely unpolitical and withdrawn species of *little people*.’<sup>113</sup> For Nietzsche, the Christian policy of turning the other cheek is devastating for political and social cohesion and development because it:

Detaches the individual from people, state, cultural community, jurisdiction; it rejects education, knowledge, cultivation of good manners, gain, commerce – it lets everything go that comprises the usefulness and value of man ... Unpolitical, anti-national, neither aggressive nor defensive – possibly only within the most firmly ordered political and social life, which allows these holy parasites to proliferate at public expense.<sup>114</sup>

Christians as ‘parasites’ [*parasiten*] is an important central theme in Nietzsche’s political thought as it underpins his thinking about liberalism, egalitarianism and democracy in general. Such systems denigrate the worldliness and political-architectural achievements of others, yet they will gladly live off these very achievements and use them as a rock on which to build their society. This is the case even for temporal modern political movements, such as the French Revolution, which was ‘the daughter and continuation of Christianity’<sup>115</sup> because what, above all else, such political movements inherit from Christianity, is a devaluation of grand politics which in turn ‘destroy[s] the instinct for a

grand organisation of society.’<sup>116</sup> The pervasiveness of Christianity in much of the politics of the West accounts for Nietzsche’s condemnation of the politics of modernity.<sup>117</sup>

The only way out of this mire is to overthrow all anti-political Christian notions and return to the will to politics which enthralled Rome. A civilisation whose vision was matched by their will. One day, Nietzsche hopes, Europe could reach the same heights, but it would have to ‘make use of a new ruling caste [*herrschen den Kaste*] in order *to gain a will*, a terrible, long-lived will of its own that could set itself goals over millennia.’<sup>118</sup> But he sees this as no easy task:

In Europe today ... it is only the herd animal who is honoured and bestows honour; ‘equal rights’ [*Gleichheit der Rechte*] can all too easily be transformed into equality of wrong [*Gleichheit im Unrechte*] (I mean, into a shared struggle against everything rare, strange, privileged, against the higher human [*höheren Menschen*], the higher soul [*höheren Seele*], the higher duty [*höheren Pflicht*], the higher responsibility [*höheren Verantwortlichkeit*], the creative abundance of power and elegance).<sup>119</sup>

Nietzsche insists, ‘strength of the will ... [is an integral part of the] preparation for becoming the legislators of the future, the masters of the earth,’<sup>120</sup> because:

These days, the spirit of the times [*Zeitgeschmack*] and the virtue of the times [*Zeittugend*] are weakening and diluting the will; nothing is so fashionable as weakness of will [*zeitgemäß als Willensschwäche*]. Thus it is precisely strength of will [*Stärke des Willens*] ... and a capacity for lengthy decisions that are integral to the philosopher's ideal concept of 'greatness.'<sup>121</sup>

Bernard Williams observed: 'it has been in every society a recognisable ethical thought ... that one can be under a requirement ... simply because of who one is and of one's social situation.'<sup>122</sup> This concept of ethical requirement is integral in understanding the nature of Nietzsche's writing as it is all too easy to view comments such as "equal rights' can all too easily be transformed into equality of wrong'<sup>123</sup> as fostering notions of selfishness. But when taken in the context of ethical requirement, it becomes clear that Nietzsche does not view obligation toward self and obligation toward others as mutually exclusive, rather it is a case of 'how *far* a person could extend his responsibility.'<sup>124</sup> As William Lamb, better known as Lord Melbourne, put it in 1817: 'the possession of great power necessarily implies great responsibility.'<sup>125</sup>

This is one of the core tenets of Nietzsche's political vision in which higher types [*höheren Menschen*] of people can't be seen in isolation from the higher types of responsibilities they bear.<sup>126</sup> These Nietzschean nobles will be 'excessive precisely where the dwarfed species was weak and

growing weaker (in will, responsibility, self-assurance, ability ...)'<sup>127</sup> The great question then arises, among who Nietzsche refers to as *Freigeist* [free spirits], as to whether their leaders will be able to bear the heavy responsibility of transmuting democratic values which have caused the:

*overall degeneration of man*, right down to what socialist fools and flatheads call their 'man of the future' ... this degeneration and diminution of man into a perfect herd animal [*vollkommen Herdentiere*] (or, as they call it, man in a 'free society' [*freien Gesellschaft*]).<sup>128</sup>

Only those 'who hold a different belief – ... who consider the democratic movement not merely a decadent form of political organisation, but a decadent (that is to say, diminished) form of the human being, one that mediocrity [Vermittelmässigung] ... and debases,'<sup>129</sup> can 'bear the *greatest* responsibility and not collapse under it'<sup>130</sup> and through their endurance create a *großen Politik*. Through the ethical requirement of *Freigeist* to achieve a grand politics, Nietzsche, as Laurence Lampert put it:

... assigns the greatest responsibility to the philosopher as one who knows what religions are good for, who knows how to order the politics of fatherlands, who commands and legislates how the world ought to be, and who has the whole future of mankind on his conscience.<sup>131</sup>



Nietzsche's thought, far from being selfish, should be understood as being concerned with 'the most wide-ranging responsibility, whose conscience encompasses mankind's overall development,'<sup>132</sup> and is concerned with 'the collective evolution of mankind,'<sup>133</sup> not just the lot of the individual. However, evolution is a struggle and one which involves sacrifice, so it would be wrong to envision this concern for the 'collective' as being a concern for each person who comprises the collective, as liberal democracy requires. Quite the contrary, in fact. Nietzsche's *großen Politik* effectively reverses the *status quo* of democracy, where those of greatness are bound to the many, and sees the many bound to those of greatness with society's justification found in its rôle as the 'foundation and scaffolding to enable a select kind of creature to ascend to its higher task and in general to its higher existence.'<sup>134</sup> Put another way: 'the mass of humanity sacrificed to the flourishing of a single *stronger* species of man ...'<sup>135</sup> Only through this sacrifice and flourishing can collective evolution be achieved. The core concept for this 'stronger species' is the 'art of command [*die Kunst des Befehlens*],'<sup>136</sup> an art which the herd, and many who exercise power, are not just ignorant of but actively disavow and subsequently seek to discredit.<sup>137</sup>

Echoing the Aristotelean notion, 'it is better for the same persons to govern always,'<sup>138</sup> and drawing on his own aristocratic radicalism, Nietzsche assigns the 'will and capacity to command'<sup>139</sup> to the noble personality, for whom rule of others must be coupled with the 'severest self-legislation.'<sup>140</sup> For only through mastery over oneself, as an 'autonomous supra-moral individual,' can 'mastery over

circumstances, over nature, and over all less reliable creatures with less enduring wills'<sup>141</sup> be given into their hands.<sup>142</sup>

As the great individual finds the will to power, the lesser individual finds the will to submit for 'small spirits must *obey* – hence cannot poses *greatness*.'<sup>143</sup> Here it is important to note the philology of the translation, as 'spirit' doesn't fully convey the greatness or smallness of which Nietzsche speaks. Rather, *Geist* and *geistig*, in Nietzsche's vocabulary, go beyond the English word spirit, conveying notions of intellect, mind, wit and *esprit*. As the individuals Nietzsche most admired were without exception great intellects, it is within this context all talk of 'spirit' must be read.

In another throwback to Aristotle,<sup>144</sup> Nietzsche asserts a herd individual 'can be only a means, he has to be *used*, he needs someone who will use him.'<sup>145</sup> As liberal-democratic ideology became more ingrained in society, Nietzsche thought that any instinct for deference was being exchanged for a 'repellent intemperance, a certain narrow envy, a clumsy self-righteousness (these three together have made up the true rabble type).'<sup>146</sup> Any attempt to eradicate these three traits from the rabble would be, to invoke Horace's metaphor, like trying 'to drive nature out [*naturam expelles*] with a pitchfork, [which is ultimately pointless as] it always returns.'<sup>147</sup> It also gives rise to what Nietzsche regards as a 'rank falseness,' namely to will beyond one's capacity,<sup>148</sup> because such willing arouses 'mistrust of great things' as it becomes hard to differentiate between the counterfeits, which are destined to fall, and acts

of true greatness.<sup>149</sup> Those who work for democratic reform, far from acting in the best interests of the majority, are selling the masses down the river for ‘he who makes the lame man walk does him the greatest harm: for no sooner can he walk than his vices run away with him.’<sup>150</sup> While it is true, as Mark Warren observes, that this is a mark of Nietzsche’s ‘sympathy for the working classes,’<sup>151</sup> it should not be read as a form of sympathy in solidarity, rather as a mark of pathos for how egalitarian ideas have corrupted the spirit of the masses and set them up for disappointment, which is ‘a wasteful use of the spirit.’<sup>152</sup> Instead, Nietzsche proposes that a hierarchical political order be adopted which will redeem the masses by best using the ‘herd virtues’ [*Heerdentugenden*].<sup>153</sup>

Under such a system, the mediocre would find a true sense of liberation, specifically from false hope, and could find contentment in virtues which are within their reach: ‘If you have to serve, then seek the one to whom your service is of most use!’<sup>154</sup> Invoking the Law Code of Manu, Nietzsche expounds on a properly ordered society, in which natural slaves can find satisfaction in their capacities.<sup>155</sup>

For all Nietzsche’s disdain of liberal-democracy and the herd instinct, which has given rise to the ‘moral hypocrisy of commanders [*die moralische Heuchelei der Befehlenden*],’<sup>156</sup> Nietzsche nonetheless envisions a nascent ‘will to command’ arising from the very liberal institutions he abhors; something of an unintended consequence of democracy, by spreading a general weakening of people’s will.<sup>157</sup>

To take advantage of this situation is something the new elite will need to grasp, as there is no historical inevitability about their rise. Only if they heed Nietzsche's warnings and utilise:

... their superiority in will, knowledge, riches, and influence, employ democratic Europe as their most pliant and supple instrument for getting hold of the destinies of the earth, so as to work as artists upon 'man' himself ... for the trainability of men has become very great in this democratic Europe; men who learn easily and adapt themselves easily are the rule: the herd animal, even highly intelligent, has been prepared. Whoever can command finds those who *must* obey; I am thinking, e.g., of Napoleon and Bismarck. The rivalry with strong and unintelligent wills, which is the greatest obstacle, is small.<sup>158</sup>

Much like the pendulum of a clock, with its dual 'tick-toc,' Nietzsche sees in democracy the conjoined action of 'procreating a type that has been developed in the subtlest sense to be *slaves* ... [while] at the same time [being] an involuntary contrivance for the breeding of *tyrants* – understanding the word in every sense, even the most spiritual.'<sup>159</sup>

Instead of ignoring 'the changed conditions of work through modern industrialised production'<sup>160</sup> or showing a 'lack of concern for social and economic questions,'<sup>161</sup> Nietzsche is revealed, through his discussion of the interplay between 'masters' and 'slaves,' as alive to the possibilities wrought by the

industrial revolution to help the herd find 'its best meaning as a machine in the service of [the] economy – as a tremendous clockwork, composed of ever small, ever more subtly 'adapted' gears,'<sup>162</sup> 'to be a public utility, a cog, a function ... [an] intelligent machine.'<sup>163</sup> Modern industrialism, in Nietzsche's eyes, will provide a steady supply of 'weak-willed, and extremely handy workers who *need* a master, a commander, like their daily bread.'<sup>164</sup> Much like the slaves on the estates of nobles in bygone ages, these new industrial times call for:

new orders as well as for a new slavery – for every strengthening and enhancement of the human type also involves a new kind of enslavement ... with all this, can we really be at home in an age that loves to claim the distinction of being the most humane, the mildest, and most righteous age the sun has ever seen?<sup>165</sup>

Unlike previous conditions of serfdom, these 'new slaves' must be comprised of more than only manual labourers, a new caste must be wrought from experts, technical specialists and scientists:

the *ideal* scholar in whom the scientific instinct blossoms fully and finally after thousands of complete or partial false starts, is certainly one of the most precious tools that exist: but he needs to be put into the hand of someone more powerful.

He is only a tool; let's say that he is a *mirror*, not an 'end unto himself'<sup>166</sup>

Only with this more advanced, cultivated and educated ‘new slave’ can the ‘new order’ elite effectively command and achieve ‘the collective evolution of mankind.’<sup>167</sup> Yet for all its concomitant benefits to evolution, industrialism and capitalism bring numerous pitfalls, typified by:

the notorious manufacturer’s vulgarity with ruddy, plump hands give him the idea that it is only accident and luck that elevated one above the other in this case: well, then, he infers, let *us* try accident and luck! Let *us* throw the dice! And thus socialism is born.<sup>168</sup>

The horrors of Saint-Simonist utopias aside,<sup>169</sup> Nietzsche’s views on industrialism, capitalism and the unintended consequences of democracy open a paradox in his thinking as a noble self-sufficiency or autarchic ideal, in which masters and slaves share no interdependence,<sup>170</sup> become chimera as superior types need lower castes upon which to build their edifice creating a symbiotic relationship between the two. As Zarathustra put it: ‘For must there not exist that *over* which one dances and dances away? Must there not exist, for the sake of the light and the lightest, moles and heavy dwarves?’<sup>171</sup>

### 3.2 – STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY OVER THE EARTH<sup>172</sup>

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In 1931, Hermann Broch observed:

[Nietzsche anticipated] the immense tension between good and evil, the almost unbearably tense polarisations which mark this age and give it its extremist character, this pressure on people to incorporate into their lives both the highest ethical challenge and a reality which has terrors that often surpass comprehension – so that life may be lived at all.<sup>173</sup>

With the horrors of World War II, which bore witness to *die Endlösung*, yet to come, Broch was both prescient and unaware how far comprehension would be surpassed by events. Events which affirm the pressing need to understand the latent impulses within a society are often blind to ethical challenges as individuals struggle to live day to day.

Nietzsche resolves the tension between the highest ethical challenges and the quotidian realities of life by declaring: ‘creating values is truly the *master’s privilege*.’<sup>174</sup> Apolitical readers of Nietzsche, such as Nehamas,<sup>175</sup> assert an ‘either / or’ reading of such passages because, they argue, Nietzsche would revile the notion of masters and slaves being ruled by the same set of values, therefore it must mean there is an egoism in the elite which is purely self-serving. I have already shown that this reading is in error since Nietzsche clearly ascribed to the notion of great power entailing great responsibility. However, it is worth raising again because it helps to explain another misunderstanding when reading Nietzsche’s work: the rôle of Christianity.

*Pace* Nehamas' comment, 'the view that Christianity and its morality have outlived their usefulness run through the whole of Nietzsche's later work,'<sup>176</sup> and the even more infamous refrain that 'the new master of the earth shall 'replace God' for the unbelieving masses,'<sup>177</sup> it seems religion ought to be the first to go in the development of a 'Nietzschean' political system.<sup>178</sup> This, to say the least, marginalises Nietzsche's explicit view to move 'beyond good and evil ... demand[s] that herd morality should be held sacred unconditionally.'<sup>179</sup> Rulers should in consequence observe Zarathustra's remark: 'For small people small virtues are needed.'<sup>180</sup> I am not implying, let alone stating, that Nietzsche had any love of religion; rather it is to acknowledge the nuanced and symbiotic relationship between master ethics and slave morality.<sup>181</sup> It is also to recognise Nietzsche's requirement for a clear structure and hierarchy, if society is to fulfil its ultimate potential, and to this end Nietzsche saw religion as an indispensable tool:

[the] philosopher, in his efforts to improve education and breeding, will make use of religions just as he makes use of the political and economic circumstances of his time. The influence that can be exerted with the help of religion is an influence for selecting and breeding, and is always necessarily as destructive as it is creative and formative; depending on the sort of people who come under the spell and protection of religion, its influence can be manifold and diverse.



For those who are strong and independent, prepared and predestined to command, who embody the intellect and the art of a governing race, religion is one further means to overcome obstacles, to learn to rule: as a bond that ties together rulers and subjects...<sup>182</sup>

This raises one of the central questions for Nietzsche's political thought: if religion is a key tool, how can it be optimally used?

Echoing Machiavelli, Nietzsche argued that religion benefits the state by quietening 'the heart of the individual in time of loss, deprivation, fear, distrust ... [times] in which the government feels unable to do anything towards alleviating the physical sufferings of the private person.'<sup>183</sup> Yet religion, as envisaged by Nietzsche, goes beyond a mere '*Opium des Volkes*,'<sup>184</sup> it is the 'principal means by which one can make whatever one wishes out of man, provided one possesses a superfluity of creative forces and can assert one's will over long periods of time – in the form of legislation, religion and customs.'<sup>185</sup> In the development of Western civilisation, Nietzsche viewed religion as invaluable to the state as it taught obedience, which in turn made Christians 'easier to rule than non-Christians.'<sup>186</sup> Religion, Nietzsche asserted, is also a powerful indoctrinator, making 'subjects useful and submissive'<sup>187</sup> by causing 'the unknowledgeable [to] think they see the hand of God and patiently

submit to instructions from *above* (in which concept divine and human government are usually fused).’<sup>188</sup>

‘God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him!’<sup>189</sup> is not, as is commonly read, an atheistic statement; it is an admonition and clarion call. An admonition to a society which, in Nietzsche’s view, is losing all sense of order and hierarchy as it sheds the divine reverence which made the herd submissive to instruction from above, and a clarion call to masters who he thinks can ‘will’ a restoration of structure by harnessing the latent religious impulse. In Nietzsche’s view, the clash between the spiritual and secular only comes when religions seek to be *sovereign*:

There is always a dear and terrible price to pay whenever religions hold sway *not* as the philosopher’s means to breed and educate, but rather on their own and *absolutely*, when they claim to be an ultimate end, rather than one means among others ... *absolute* religions are among the main reasons that the species ‘human’ has been stuck on a lower rung of development – they have preserved too much of what *ought to perish*.<sup>190</sup>

One final paradox yet remains, how could Nietzsche think any system capable of a rôle in grand politics if it teaches the equality of souls? Even if some benefits are accrued to the apparatus of control by inculcating subservience in the herd, surely the inequality, required for a renaissance of aristocratic

radicalism, would be hindered rather than helped by the notions of equality implicit in Christianity?

The apparent paradox is resolved by traditional Christian thinking, where it is argued that because we are all God's creatures we are all spiritually equal, making our temporal status of no importance.<sup>191</sup> If worldly status is of no importance to God, there is a reading of Christianity that allows for an equality of the spirit without requiring concomitant secular egalitarianism. Because of this, and in full acknowledgement of his many coruscating attacks on Christianity and the lameness of action it has bequeathed Europe, it is clear that Nietzsche saw religion as crucial in the ordering of society. After all, rulers, *pace* Plato, do not need to believe in the myths they tell their subjects. Another Platonic notion to which Nietzsche is indebted is a tripartite structure for society.<sup>192</sup>

Unlike other philosophers who have devised societal systems to promote the good life, Nietzsche had little interest in the base of the pyramid, apart from ensuring it is solid enough to support the activities of the masters. The 'main consideration' is 'not to see the task of the higher species in leading the lower (as, e.g., Comte does),<sup>193</sup> but the lower as a base upon which higher species performs its *own* tasks – upon which alone it can stand.'<sup>194</sup> But what are the tasks of the masters? Their rôle is more than simply to rule over the herd; they must be creators within their 'own sphere of life, with an excess of strength for beauty, bravery, culture, manners to the highest peak of the spirit; [they must be] an affirming race that may grant itself every great luxury – strong enough to have no need of the tyranny of the virtue-imperative, rich enough to have no need of thrift and pedantry.'<sup>195</sup>

To the accustomed reader of Nietzsche, it may seem odd to assert so much indebtedness to Plato's ideas for the state given the commonly held view Nietzsche was deeply opposed to his philosophy. Certainly, Nietzsche utterly rejected Plato's Forms, but as far as politics were concerned they were very much bed-fellows<sup>196</sup> – as several Nietzsche scholars have shrewdly noted.<sup>197</sup> Perhaps the Platonic notion of state control to which Nietzsche is most enamored is the idea of guardians.<sup>198</sup>

Here we ought to pause for a moment and remember Leopold von Ranke's<sup>199</sup> famous interdict: '*wie es eigentlich gewesen*' [as things actually are].<sup>200</sup> 'The German phrase which Ranke used ... is better translated as 'how it essentially was.' By it, Ranke meant that he wanted to penetrate by a kind of intuitive understanding to the inner being of the past.'<sup>201</sup> Much the same is true of Nietzsche's political system; although it is 'actually' bicameral, ordering society into Master and Slave classes, it is 'essentially' tricameral, with a guardian class to shield the elite from 'everything *coarse* in the work of ruling.'<sup>202</sup> The need for this caste system is seminal for Nietzsche's political thought as 'the separation of the three types is necessary for the preservation of society, for making possible higher and higher types – *inequality* of rights is the condition for the existence of rights at all. – A right is a privilege.'<sup>203</sup> In this regard, Nietzsche seems to have been greatly influenced by the *Law Code of Manu*<sup>204</sup> and is effusive in his praise for the Brahmins for having 'the power to appoint the kings for the common people, while they themselves remained apart and outside, feeling that their own duties were more important than those of royalty.'<sup>205</sup>

As it was in the aristocratic societies of antiquity, where ‘in some instances such a distinction does exist, when slavery for the one and mastership for the other are advantageous and just, and it is proper for the one party to be governed and for the other to govern by the form of government for which they are by nature fitted.’<sup>206</sup> Nietzsche envisions rulers using ‘the establishment of law [*die Aufrichtung des Gesetzes*], the imperious explanation of what in its eyes passes as permitted, as right, and what as forbidden, as wrong.’<sup>207</sup> Yet the use of law for controlling the masses should be seen as caste specific, abhorrent to Nietzsche<sup>208</sup> is the core principle of liberal-democracy which asserts inalienable rights for all. As such egalitarianism is ‘a principle *hostile to life*, [which] would represent the destruction and dissolution of man, an attack on the future of man, a sign of exhaustion, a secret path toward nothingness’<sup>209</sup> which is perpetrated by the weak who have long sought to leverage the notion of rights as ‘a sacred, immutable state of affairs upon which every generation had to continue to build.’<sup>210</sup> Once we renounce the concept of inalienability, preferring not to ‘believe in any right that is not supported by the power of enforcement,’ we come into a world view which sees ‘all rights to be conquests,’<sup>211</sup> effectively repudiating ‘all legalistic approaches to political thought.’<sup>212</sup> This places the elite in a position which witnesses the ‘self-cancellation of justice: the beautiful name it goes by is well enough known – *grace*, needless to say, it remains the prerogative of the most powerful man, even better, his domain beyond the law [*Jenseits des Rechts*].’<sup>213</sup>

In what at first seems like a contradiction, it was through this renunciation of equality that Nietzsche saw the birth of meritocracy. If we conceive of his society as being composed of concentric rings, with the herd forming an outer, the elite an inner, and the guardians a middle ring – to separate the master and slave castes – we have a vision of society unequal in whole, but whose constituent parts are ‘equally entitled equals’<sup>214</sup> [*Gleichberechtigten*] through the medium of their ability. So long as there is mutual ability, a system of ‘mutual reverence and rights ... [which is] the *essence* of all society and also part of the natural state of things’<sup>215</sup> comes into being and creates a state of noble equality. This can be contrasted with liberal-democratic equality that seeks to undermine or destroy any who may rise above the herd to force an equality of all. Nietzsche sees this latter equality as sheer hypocrisy, as those of no ability who have a ‘lust for power’ [*Herrschaft*], but, being too weak to take it, find consolation in pulling down those who achieve it.

Although the equilibrium struck here is far from a ‘social contract,’ more a sense of cautious respect for those of equal strength, it does create circles which:

refrain from injuring, abusing, or exploiting one another; to equate another person’s will with [their] own: in a certain crude sense this can develop into good manners between individuals, if the preconditions are in place (that is, if the

individuals have truly similar strength and standards and if they are united within one single social body).<sup>216</sup>

Of the three circles, the inner has one further element, that of being a self-policing citizen-legislator who ‘must become judge and avenger and sacrificial victim.’<sup>217</sup> In Nietzsche’s society, ‘justice can be hoped for ... only *inter pares*.’<sup>218</sup>

On first imagining, such a society might evoke a notion of trampling on others, akin to Orwell’s sentiment: ‘If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face — forever.’<sup>219</sup> But such views are in error, at least if Nietzsche has his way. From *Daybreak* onward, Nietzsche is alive to what he terms ‘the evil of the weak’ [*das Böse der Schwäche*] which ‘wants to harm others and to see the signs of the suffering it has caused.’<sup>220</sup> ‘For them, easy prey – and that is what those who suffer are – is something enchanting.’<sup>221</sup> They are ‘just avenged!’<sup>222</sup> With their virtue they want to claw out the eyes of their enemies, and they exalt themselves only in order to abase others.’<sup>223</sup> If such attitudes stand, ‘the rabble would become master, and all of time be drowned in shallow waters.’<sup>224</sup> This contrasts with Nietzsche’s concept of a ‘master ethics,’ for them ‘an easy prey is something contemptible.’<sup>225</sup> But more than mere contempt, it comes back again to notions of *noblesse oblige*: ‘When an exceptional human being handles the mediocre more gently than he does himself or his equals, this is not mere politeness of the heart<sup>226</sup> – it is simply his *duty* ...’<sup>227</sup> It is also practical,

instead of picking endless quarrels with ‘the basest people,’ a prickly attitude akin to ‘the wisdom of a hedgehog,’<sup>228</sup> Nietzsche, echoing Aristotle’s thinking that ‘the great-souled man does not run into danger for trifling reasons,’<sup>229</sup> counsels: ‘there is often more bravery in restraining oneself and passing by: *so that* one might save oneself for a worthier enemy!’<sup>230</sup> In notions of forbearance by the strong and ‘the evil of the weak,’ we see again the hand of the ancients at work, *pace* Aristotle: ‘it is vulgar to lord it over humble people: it is like putting forth one’s strength against the weak.’<sup>231</sup> Instead, Nietzsche, perhaps recalling *De Clementi* in which Seneca counselled mercy to the Emperor Nero<sup>232</sup> – or as Nietzsche would phrase it the ‘self-cancellation [*aufhebend*]<sup>233</sup> of justice,’<sup>234</sup> viewed mercy to be ‘the prerogative of the most powerful men, even better, is domain beyond the law.’<sup>235</sup> Where Nietzsche breaks from Seneca, and Aristotle, is in his radical elitism – which asserts higher castes are not accountable to their inferiors. Instead, a master’s kindness is established through ‘considerations of enlightened self-interest.’<sup>236</sup> This is a particularly challenging concept for modern liberal sensitivities in which accountability and responsibility are often conjoined states. For Nietzsche’s aristocratic radicalism, there is no inherent connection between the two. Higher types have, due to their power, responsibility for the herd, but are accountable only to their peers.

This lack of accountability to the herd is also glimpsed in one of the darker passages of Nietzsche’s work, on ‘*frohlockende Ungeheuer*’ [rejoicing monsters].<sup>237</sup> In *The Genealogy*,<sup>238</sup> which seems indebted to



Pericles funeral oration,<sup>239</sup> Nietzsche reveals a predator's conscience lurking at the heart of exceptional men.<sup>240</sup>

Acceptance of the master's destructive dimension also appears in *Ecce Homo*, with a distinctive commentary on the Bible, in which Nietzsche suggests the serpent in the Garden of Eden is none other than God 'recuperating from being God... He had made everything too beautiful... The Devil is just God being idle on that seventh day...' <sup>241</sup> Here, as Bruce Detwiler shrewdly notes, 'the Dionysian is associated not only with the sensuality of creation and coming-to-be but also with the cruelty of destruction and passing away.' <sup>242</sup> Yet this destruction is not a modern day 'rape' <sup>243</sup> of the Sabine Women. <sup>244</sup> It is Nietzsche's reaction to 'the arrival of the Christian God, as the uttermost example of godliness so far realised on earth, has brought with it the phenomenon of the uttermost sense of guilt.' <sup>245</sup> To assuage this guilt, or 'indebtedness towards [ones] origins,' <sup>246</sup> masters need a kind of 'second innocence' [*zweiter Unschuld*] <sup>247</sup> to 'do things that would convict a lesser man of vice and immoderation.' <sup>248</sup> For Nietzsche, there is a clear distinction between destruction for the sake of being malicious, and destruction in the Dionysian sense of purging the tensions which arise from great acts of creation. 'Evil of the strong' [*das Böse der Stärke*], <sup>249</sup> in contrast to *das Böse der Schwäche* already discussed, is essentially life-affirming in nature.

This notion of collateral damage of lesser types is not only to be found in an act of release, following an act of creation, it can also be part of the act of creation. As Zarathustra notes, ‘what is that to me?’<sup>250</sup> If fragments of stone fly, as the hammer<sup>251</sup> of the creator works the stone of humanity, and if those fragments strike lesser types.<sup>252</sup>

In this passage the *Übermenschen* of Nietzsche’s *Nachlaß* seem to draw upon Hegel’s ‘world-historical individuals’ who ‘necessarily trample on many an innocent flower, crushing much that gets in his way.’<sup>253</sup> The difference in Nietzsche’s thinking: trampling, crushing and harming are the by-products of a deliberate act of masters for whom ‘necessity is a law that justifies itself’<sup>254</sup> with the act of creation obviating all other concerns, while Hegel’s world-historical individuals are often unwitting servants of the *Geist*.<sup>255</sup>

It seems clear that Nietzsche’s higher types are alive to the connections between good and evil and engage in:

a mode of thought that prescribes laws for the future, that for the sake of the future is harsh and tyrannical toward itself and all things of the present; a reckless, ‘immoral’ mode of thought, which wants to develop both the good and the bad qualities in human beings to their fullest extent, because it feels it has the strength to put both in their right place – in the place where each needs the other.<sup>256</sup>

Or as Nietzsche put it succinctly in *Twilight of the Idols*, the price of creation is ‘being rich in opposites.’<sup>257</sup> Yet, to describe a historical process, warrior violence or masters’ cruelty, is not tantamount to endorsement or, as postmodernists would have it, without categorical rejection there is only quiescence. Due to the lack of categorical rejection in Nietzsche’s writing, liberal-democratic readings necessitate a twisting of Nietzsche’s thought, so violence is sublimated.<sup>258</sup> Instead of sublimation, a more nuanced reading is needed, for it is clear that Nietzsche does link an interiorisation of violence with the rise of culture, but he does not consider this ‘high culture,’ with the sentiment of a culture that is noble or aristocratic. Rather, Nietzsche terms such sublimated forms of culture as *Zivilisation* and compares it unfavourably with *Kultur*,<sup>259</sup> which is the truly noble province and pinnacle of human achievement. As Eric Blondel notes, ‘*Kultur* and *Zivilisation* are opposites from the point of view of values: the former implies the ‘noble’ values of an intellectual or spiritual end, while the latter is linked to the pejorative appreciation of realisations considered ‘simply’ material.’<sup>260</sup> Once these two forms of culture are separated, Nietzsche’s writing takes on a clear and even prophetic form:

Only after me are there hopes, tasks, paths to prescribe to culture [*vorzuschreibende Wege der Kultur*] once again – *I am their evangelist...* And that is why I am also a destiny [*Eben damit bin ich auch ein Schicksal*].<sup>261</sup>

Indeed, Nietzsche specifically writes against the emasculating effects of sublimation:

Perhaps the possibility might even be entertained that pleasure in cruelty need not actually have died out: considering the extent to which pain hurts more nowadays, all that it had to do was sublimate and refine itself [*Sublimierung und Subtilisierung*]<sup>262</sup> – that is, it had to appear translated into the imagination and the psyche [*Imaginative und Seelische*], embellished only with such harmless names as were incapable of arousing the suspicion of even the most delicate hypocritical conscience (‘tragic sympathy’ is such a name; another is ‘*les nostalgies de la croix*’).<sup>263</sup>

While postmodern sensitivities seek to dial down any notions of violence or cruelty, to do so fundamentally unhinges Nietzsche’s intent from the subsequently received understanding and projects unintended meaning onto his writing. For Nietzsche, only through a ‘*Dionysian* pessimism,’<sup>264</sup> which contains elements of the ‘sensuality of creation... but also with the cruelty of destruction,’<sup>265</sup> can humanity advance beyond its current *Zivilisation* and achieve the higher plane of *Kultur*. Only through ‘tragic myth’ and images of ‘everything fearful, evil, enigmatic, destructive, disastrous [which lies at the] base of existence,’<sup>266</sup> and for which Nietzsche lauds Hellenic tragedy, can a society avoid the inevitable doom: to go under at the hands of a rival *Kultur* which has not sublimated or spiritualised the mercilessness implicit in existence. As Nietzsche intones in his *Nachlaß*:

Terribleness is part of greatness: let us not deceive ourselves.<sup>267</sup>

Only when connected to their inner ‘evil’ [*das Böse*], a ‘desire for *destruction*,’<sup>268</sup> can masters ascend to the next rung in the evolutionary ladder. As Zarathustra puts it, “the human is evil’ ... For evil is the human’s best strength. [but] ‘the human being must become better and more evil’ ... [for] what is most evil is necessary for the superhuman’s best [*Übermenschen Bestem*].’<sup>269</sup> In this sense ‘man is beast and superbeast [*Untier und Übertier*].’<sup>270</sup> While modern sensibilities tend to view ‘beast’ and ‘inhuman’ in a pejorative light, for Nietzsche they are anything but. To his mind ‘[within] all well-constituted and well-disposed mortals... [there is] a delicate equilibrium between ‘animal and angel.”<sup>271</sup> A sensibility which explains why Nietzsche saw Napoleon as ‘this synthesis of the *inhuman* and the *superhuman* [*Unmensch und Übermensch*].’<sup>272</sup>

Talk of tyrannical or predatory actions, with all their modern overtones, should not lead us to misread Nietzsche’s work as being a philosophy of negation, much less one trying to achieve a dystopic new world. Rather, it is about allowing higher types to have *carte blanche* in their creative choices, regardless of the caustic side effects.<sup>273</sup> By way of example, Nietzsche parallels the lives of people with those of trees:

Examine the lives of the best and the most fruitful people and peoples and ask yourselves whether a tree which is supposed to grow to a proud height could do without bad weather and storms.<sup>274</sup>

Continuing the arboreal metaphor, just as a tree does not pity another which is unable to weather the storm, so too Nietzsche argues against higher types from feeling pity toward their equals, much less toward their inferiors. As Martha Nussbaum observed of pity: '[it] contains a thought experiment in which one puts oneself in the other person's place, and indeed reasons that this place might in fact be, or become, one's own.'<sup>275</sup> In this regard Nietzsche's aversion to pity is militating against a long tradition of sentiment, an example of which can be seen the writing of Rousseau:

One pities in others only those ills from which one does not feel oneself exempt.

*Non ignora mali, miseris succurrere disco.*<sup>276</sup>

I know nothing so beautiful, so profound, so touching, so true as this verse.

Why are kings without pity for their subjects? Because they count on never being mere men. Why are the rich so hard toward the poor? It is because they have not fear of becoming poor. Why does the nobility have so great a contempt for the people? It is because a noble will never be a commoner.<sup>277</sup>

For Nietzsche, it is absurd to ‘let number decide when value and significance are at issue!’<sup>278</sup>

Instead:

The question is this: how can your life, the individual life, receive the highest value, the deepest significance? How can it be least squandered? Certainly only by your living for the good of the rarest and most valuable exemplars [*seltensten und wertvollsten Exemplar*], and not for the good of the majority, that is to say those who, taken individually, are the least valuable [*wertlosesten*] exemplars.<sup>279</sup>

### 3.3 – PRETENDED VIRTUES<sup>280</sup>

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*Ressentiment*<sup>281</sup> is a recurring theme in Nietzsche’s work and is usually found in the context of a responsive feeling toward the noble or higher type by individuals, slave classes or a dispossessed priestly class.<sup>282</sup> Its *sine qua non* is the herd’s inability to promote itself unless pulling down anything it sees on a higher level. *Ressentiment* is often accompanied by vanity, a servile trait in Nietzsche’s thinking as he observed in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*: those with vanity are like singers ‘for whom only a full house loosens their throat, makes their hand loquacious, their eye expressive, their heart awake.’<sup>283</sup> This need for applause, this vanity, is a particularly base characteristic and is witnessed in the herd’s use of big moral words.<sup>284</sup>

In both the vain and those filled with *ressentiment*, Nietzsche observes the similar characteristic of finding strength in numbers, while in higher types there is a solitariness of nature which evinces courage with or without supporters.<sup>285</sup> This links back to the earlier discussion of pity and the acceptance of the twin aspects of ‘*Dionysian* pessimism.’ Only by separating oneself from the herd, can a higher type be free to engage in the elevated aspects of human excellence, to dance with ‘light feed.’<sup>286</sup> For the vain and those of the herd instinct are a ‘poor sick kind, a mob-kind ... they have the evil eye for this earth ... they have heavy feet and sultry hearts: – they know not how to dance.’<sup>287</sup> And much like a dancer’s ‘muscle memory,’ so too must higher types act from an unconscious motivation, they simply *have* ‘to do certain actions and instinctively [shy] away from others.’<sup>288</sup>

It is here we find the roots of *ressentiment*, for although those of the herd may try to escape the reality of their condition, finding consolation in thwarting the lives of others or succor in the companionship of like minds, those filled with *ressentiment* will remain haunted by a sense of inadequacy; of not being equal to the rigours and demands of *Kultur* and at best only creating a lower order of *Zivilisation*. Nietzsche observes in them an:

introspective look of the man deformed from the outset, a look which reveals the way in which such a man speaks to himself – that gaze which is a sigh! ‘I wish I were anyone else but myself!’ this gaze sighs: ‘but there is no hope of that. I am



that I am [*Ich bin, der ich bin*]: how could I escape from myself? And yet – *I have had enough of myself*’<sup>289</sup>

Having become aware of their capacities, or rather limitations, instead of calm and even happy acceptance of fate, creatures of *ressentiment* adopt a stance of vitriolic outrage ‘with life and the earth.’<sup>290</sup> It is here, at the very point of refusal to accept ‘I am that I am,’<sup>291</sup> the seeds of nihilism lie.<sup>292</sup>

Much as Nietzsche spoke of the need for higher types to be ‘unconscious artists’ [*unbewußtesten Künstler*],<sup>293</sup> we find a similar ‘unconscious envy’ [*ungewußter Neid*]<sup>294</sup> at the pinnacle of the herd; albeit, pace Dante, a pinnacle of negation. At this purgatory of the *Übermensch* we find the most pervasive of the herd’s pretended virtues: equality. Although acceptance and inclusion is preached by those with herd instincts, it is an acceptance of those weaker than them, an inclusion of those who can give them strength to overcome and defeat stronger, higher types – the epitome of ‘tall poppy’ syndrome. As Zarathustra cautions all higher types about a herd who buzz around like ‘poisonous flies’<sup>295</sup> ... they punish you for all your virtues.’<sup>296</sup> Zarathustra continues, in an allusion to Nietzsche’s own experiences with scholars, ‘when I lived among them, I lived above them. Over that they became angry at me. / They want to hear nothing of it when someone passes over their heads ...’<sup>297</sup>

*Ressentiment* is nothing short of a desire to have revenge upon ‘everything that has power.’<sup>298</sup>

This milieu of reactionary vengeance toward nobility stirred Nietzsche's aristocratic radicalism to categorise notions of a slave morality, in contrast to the higher form of noble ethics. The principle which seems to divide slave morality from noble ethics is the way in which the individual establishes a notion of 'good.' For the higher type, good flows from the abstract as it emanates from the self. For the herd, good is only found through an act of negation, of stigmatising 'others' and seeing oneself as good through the act of not being evil. That Nietzsche should take a dim view of purely negative forms of elevation is of no surprise, what is harder to explain is why he did not call for the eradication of such forms of morality. The answer seems to lie in his continuing acceptance of the religious life.

Much as Nietzsche saw Christianity as having a rôle in grand politics, slave morality also has a place in an evolved society as it can, so long as its most destructive urges are kept in check, and if the guardian class prevents the herd from interfering with the works and days of higher types, bring accrued benefits in keeping the herd subservient by way of a thought experiment which compels them to think they have pulled down their superiors and castrated the very system that keeps them in check. Delusions can be crucial tools as long as rulers do not, *pace* Plato, believe in or allow themselves to be bound by the myths and systems put in place to control their subjects. Here, we see another reason Nietzsche never calls for the eradication of religion or slave morality: it provides succor and relief to those whose lives appears 'empty and monotonous.' So long as religiosity doesn't get out of hand and place demands upon 'those whose daily life is not empty and monotonous,'<sup>299</sup> it remains an

invaluable tool. As Nietzsche makes clear in his *Nachlaß*, ‘the ideas of the herd should rule in the herd – but not reach out beyond it.’<sup>300</sup>

When slave morality gets out of control and demands to be ‘a truth for everyone,’<sup>301</sup> then it becomes a destructive menace as it will seek to banish all competing forms of thought. Some iterations of Christianity fall into this dangerous category, as Nietzsche outlined in the preface to the 1886 edition of *The Birth of Tragedy* when he writes of ‘especially Christian, that is, unconditional morality’ [*insonderheit christlichen, das heißt unbedingten Moral*].<sup>302</sup> If the herd is to be permitted to set the societal framework for all, then all will be bound under notions of *ressentiment* with the lower order’s feelings of jealousy, fear and suffering imposed upon even the most noble type. Such a state of affairs, Nietzsche insists, can’t be allowed to prevail, just as there are different orders of people, so too are there different orders of right.<sup>303</sup>

To Nietzsche’s thinking, the most egregious example of a universal morality is the ascetic attack on pleasure, especially carnal delights, found in puritan or leveler campaigns for moderation. In a way Nietzsche is paralleling the French moralist tradition of writers like La Rochefoucauld, who observed:<sup>304</sup>

Moderation has been turned into a virtue to limit the ambition of great men, and  
to comfort average people for their lack of fortune and lack of merit.<sup>305</sup>

Indeed, it is likely that Nietzsche's notion of moderation as a plot to subjugate the strong traces its roots back to Plato's *Gorgias* in which the speeches of Callicles<sup>306</sup> attest to ideas of inferior types employing morality to make 'slaves of those who are naturally better.'<sup>307</sup> This is what Brian Leiter termed the 'Prudence Thesis,'<sup>308</sup> and it is viewed with contempt by Nietzsche who has Zarathustra say: 'I have often laughed at the weaklings who think themselves good merely because they have lame paws!'<sup>309</sup> The concern for Nietzsche is not the existence of petty virtues or small-minded morals, much as his fears in the space of religion were not about the doctrines themselves, rather that the concept such systems will be universally applied – what he termed 'Christian, absolute morality,'<sup>310</sup> this way lies a narrowing of human potential.<sup>311</sup> 'For human beings are *not* equal: thus speaks justice. And what I want, *they* would have no right to want!'<sup>312</sup>

Again, it concerns what is fitting for an individual based on their type. Nietzsche would have been very familiar with the Delphic Oracles injunction γνῶθι σεαυτόν [Know thyself],<sup>313</sup> which, as Plato makes clear in his *Charmides*<sup>314</sup>, is an admonition for people to know their place. Yet in Nietzsche, 'know thyself' isn't simply a command to lower types not to overreach themselves, but a clarion call for *Übermenschen* to realise their potential and reach much farther.<sup>315</sup> Nietzsche's opposition to universal moralisation in a future society is clear, where some ambiguity remains is his attitude toward society as it stands, steeped as it is in the West with Christian values or, for more secular communities,

Christian-influenced values. Nietzsche feared higher types had largely lost the ability to dance with their worldly instincts and this deficiency challenges notions of reality and the ‘myth of free will.’<sup>316</sup>

Reality has been robbed of its value, its sense, its truthfulness insofar as an ideal world was *faked up* ... The ‘real world’ [*wahre Welt*] and the ‘apparent world’ [*scheinbare Welt*] – in plain words: the *fake* world and reality ... The *lie* of the ideal has till now been the curse on reality; on its account humanity itself has become fake and false right down to its deepest instincts – to the point of worshipping values *opposite* to the only ones which would guarantee it a flourishing, a future, the exalted *right* to a future [*hohe Recht auf Zukunft verbürgt wäre*].<sup>317</sup>

Nietzsche’s reaction to what he terms the ‘myth of free will’ comes from his abhorrence of a slave morality in which the strong are not shackled, but instead shackle themselves through choosing to be other than they are: strong. By example, Nietzsche argues the case from the standpoint of the weak:

we weak men are, after all, weak; it would be good if we refrained from doing anything *for which we lack sufficient strength*<sup>318</sup> ... [this lack of power to retaliate clothes itself in the] magnificence of self-abnegation, clam, and patient virtue, exactly as if the weakness of the weak man itself – that is, his *essence*, his action, his

whole single, unavoidable, irredeemable reality – were a free achievement,  
something willed, chosen, a *deed*, a *merit*.<sup>319</sup>

In a kind of self-imposed internal exile from their true spirit, higher types become ‘fools,’ ‘yearning and desperate prisoner[s]’ who invented ‘bad conscience’ ... [and introduced] the greatest and most sinister sickness which still afflicts man even today, man’s suffering *from man, from himself*.<sup>320</sup>

Nietzsche regularly speaks against the herd who have to club together to bring down the strong, but in this slave morality he sees a much deeper disease in the body politic. Morality, which has ‘every diabolical nuance of the art of persuasion’ at its disposal, can bring great people low; much ‘like the scorpion, it drives its sting into its own body.’<sup>321</sup> The enchantment of this slave morality has engaged the strongest and best to serve as ‘shield-bearers and followers ... repeating so naïvely ... what is characteristic of morality ... selflessness [*Selbstlosen*], self-denial [*Selbstverleugnenden*], self-sacrifice [*Selbst-Opfernden*] ... sympathy and compassion.’<sup>322</sup> ‘Almost from the cradle on they endow us with weighty words and values: ‘good’ and ‘evil.’<sup>323</sup> Nietzsche is clear in his thinking that society has been deceived into associating equal rights for all with true justice and higher types who allow themselves to be fooled ‘are bleeding on secret sacrificial tables ... burning and roasting to the honour of old idol-statues.’<sup>324</sup> Thus equal rights transcend a mere deception and become a system of subjugation:

On the first stage one demands justice from those who are in power. On the second, one speaks of ‘freedom’ – that is, one wants to get away from those in power. On the third, one speaks of ‘*equal rights*’ – that is, as long as one has not yet gained superiority one wants to prevent one’s competitors from growing in power.<sup>325</sup>

Having got to the root of Nietzsche’s thinking on the ‘pretended virtues’ of slave morality and how these contrast with masters’ ethics, one question yet remains. How did the ancient nobles allow themselves to be deceived, bequeathing would be masters of the present an inheritance of oneness with the herd? Nietzsche identifies three key factors. First, ‘their indifference and contempt for safety, life limb, comfort.’<sup>326</sup> Second, they were cavalier, in Zarathustra’s words: “I am not on my guard against deceivers; I *must* be without caution: thus my lot wills it.”<sup>327</sup> Third, ancient masters were undermined by their lack of critical self-understanding as ‘all human concepts from earlier times were ... initially understood in a crude, clumsy, external, narrow, and frankly, particularly *unsymbolic* way.’<sup>328</sup>

All three of these features share a common heroic thread and are distinctly lacking in the more Machiavellian virtues. They also all stem, as Martha Nussbaum has pointed out, from Greek culture.<sup>329</sup> Of all the figures in the history of Greek thought, Socrates (see Appendix 6.6) comes in for

the most coruscating attack from Nietzsche: 'Socrates belonged by extraction to the lowest of the people: Socrates was rabble [*Pöbel*],'<sup>330</sup> for he was indeed guilty of corrupting the youth of Athens with his dialectics which subtly pulled down noble types with 'little minds and capacious souls.'<sup>331</sup> Masters, use to acting on instinct, were thrown into a world of cunning and deception of 'thinking, drawing conclusions, calculating, combining causes and effects, to their 'consciousness', their most meagre and unreliable organ!'<sup>332</sup> In this context cleverness, intelligence and self-consciousness, far from being attributes, are something of a disease of the body politic which allow 'time and again the weak [to] become the masters of the strong.'<sup>333</sup>

However, it does not naturally follow that Nietzsche repudiates critical self-understanding and yearns for a return to the pre-Socratic understanding of life in a 'crude, clumsy, external, narrow, and frankly, particularly *unsymbolic* way,'<sup>334</sup> as a '*regression*, an about-turn of any kind or to any extent, is just not possible ... It's no use: we *have* to go forwards.'<sup>335</sup>

Bernard William correctly observed Nietzsche's attitude to modernity when he wrote:

From his ever-present sense that his own consciousness would not be possible without the developments that he disliked. In particular his view of things ... depended on a heightened reflectiveness, self-consciousness, and inwardness that,



he thought, it was precisely one of the charms, and in deed the power, of the Greek to have done without.<sup>336</sup>

As Nietzsche had Zarathustra say to his imagined disciples: ‘neither into the incomprehensible nor the irrational could you have been born.’<sup>337</sup> In this passage Nietzsche is recalling the Machiavellian school of thought, as evinced in the preface to *The Prince* and *The Discourses*, and is alive to the limitations of ‘antiquarian history’ which provides ‘instruction without invigoration ... knowledge not attended by action ... [it is] a costly superfluity and luxury ... to use Goethe’s word,<sup>338</sup> [it must] be seriously hated by us.’<sup>339</sup> As Nietzsche famously declared in *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*: ‘We must overcome even the Greeks.’<sup>340</sup> Though Nietzsche decried mimicry, he still embraced the Renaissance notion of *imitation*.<sup>341</sup> This allowed him to reject aspects of the pre-Socratic nobility which would be a regression, while allowing an admiration and even emulation of some elements of ancient aristocracy. In a sense this is crucial to an understanding of Nietzsche’s platform for the development of the *Übermensch*, as he needs to retune our understanding of the heroic ideal and achieve a new type which retains the heroic strength and relish of bodily virtues, while having the intellectual faculties to avoid the crippling self-conscious ‘selflessness, self-denial, self-sacrifice ... sympathy and compassion’<sup>342</sup> which brought low masters of previous *Kultur* and bequeathed us modern *Zivilisation*. As Nietzsche succinctly put it of the pretended virtues of the modern age:

The concept 'sin' invented, along with its accompanying torture instrument, the concept of 'free will', so as to confuse the instincts and make mistrust of the instincts into second nature! ... *Écrasez l'infâme!*<sup>343</sup>

### 3.4 – BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL

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A field of study during my undergraduate years was art history, and in many ways the study of Nietzsche is much like the restoration of an old and damaged masterpiece. Years of atmospheric debris and general abuse by previous custodians have coated the original work in a thick veneer, obscuring much of the image, but careful restoration can bring back the full color and texture of the work. So our task of listening to Nietzsche started with texts much misunderstood and years of 'interpretation' layered over the original philosophy, with successive generations trying 'to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest.'<sup>344</sup> As a result, more work is needed to understand one of the greatest thinkers in history, with this short work being but a part of the continuing process of revealing the colour and texture of Nietzsche's original<sup>345</sup> ideas.

The first aspect of Nietzsche's philosophical sketches for grand politics is clear, the sketches are just that, sketches. While it is wrong to assert Nietzsche had 'no political philosophy, in the conventional sense of a theory of the state and its legitimacy,'<sup>346</sup> it would also be inaccurate to assert a Nietzschean blueprint for a new society. The second aspect of his philosophy for grand politics is avowed belief in

a caste system. Much like the Brahmins, who had ‘the power to appoint the kings for the common people, while they themselves remained apart and outside, feeling that their own duties were more important than those of royalty,’<sup>347</sup> Nietzsche views it as essential to provide a similar caste system in which higher types are shielded from the herd by a guardian class, so they may be the truest type of free spirits, spirits who are not free, simply in the sense of do as they will, but free to reshape laws and societies; they are to be the makers of laws and the makers of people. Like Aristotle and Machiavelli before him, Nietzsche compares lawmakers with architects as both seek to create something that lasts. The architect, a building that withstands the millennia, the legislator ‘a grand organisation of society, the supreme condition for the prosperity of life.’<sup>348</sup> However, it is here we find one of the key unresolved tensions within Nietzsche’s political philosophy: how can a society be stable, an attribute greatly prized by Nietzsche, if its builders are totally unrestrained, notwithstanding any checks put on the nobles by their peers?

Much as many postmodern liberal-democrats can’t see beyond their ideology, here we find blinkers on Nietzsche’s outlook, a result of his strident aristocratic radicalism. Indeed, this radicalism threatens to undermine the durability of his grand politics. Yet within Nietzsche’s writing there is a solution to this apparent deficit, in that nobles do not exist in a vacuum and in consequence they have:

no right to any *isolated* act whatsoever: to make isolated errors and to discover isolated truths are equally forbidden ... [all are] connected to one another and evidence of a *single* will, a *single* health, a *single* earth, a *single* sun.<sup>349</sup>

In earlier quoting the words to Lord Melbourne, ‘the possession of great power necessarily implies great responsibility,’<sup>350</sup> I sought to elucidate both the tension and resolution which is within Nietzsche’s aristocratic radicalism. The notion that higher types of people can’t be seen in isolation from the higher types of responsibilities they bear in instinctively seeking heavy responsibilities and in constantly contradicting the great majority not in words, but most importantly in deeds.<sup>351</sup> Nietzschean nobles will be ‘excessive precisely where the dwarfed species was weak and growing weaker (in will, responsibility, self-assurance, ability ...)’<sup>352</sup>

The question then arises, for those who are *Freigeist* [free spirits], as to whether their leaders will be able to bear the heavy responsibility of transmuting democratic values which have caused the ‘*overall degeneration of man*, right down to what socialist fools and flatheads call their ‘man of the future’ ... this degeneration and diminution of man into a perfect herd animal [*vollkommen Herdentiere*] (or, as they call it, man in a ‘free society’ [*freien Gesellschaft*]).’<sup>353</sup> Only those ‘who hold a different belief ... who consider the democratic movement not merely a decadent form of political organisation, but a decadent (that is to say, diminished) form of the human being, one that mediocrity

[*Vermittelmässigung*] ... and debases,'<sup>354</sup> can 'bear the *greatest* responsibility and not collapse under it,'<sup>355</sup> and through their endurance create a *großen Politik*.

Nietzsche's thought, far from being selfish, should be understood as being concerned with 'the most wide-ranging responsibility, whose conscience encompasses mankind's overall development,'<sup>356</sup> and is concerned with 'the collective evolution of mankind,'<sup>357</sup> not just the lot of the individual. However, evolution is a struggle and one which involves sacrifice, so it would be wrong to envision this concern for the 'collective' as being a concern for each person who comprises the collective, as liberal democracy requires. Quite the contrary, in fact. Nietzsche's *großen Politik* reverses the *status quo* of democracy, where those of greatness are bound to the many, and sees that the many bound to those of greatness as society is justified through being the 'foundation and scaffolding to enable a select kind of creature to ascend to its higher task and in general to its higher *existence*.'<sup>358</sup> To put it another way: 'the mass of humanity sacrificed to the flourishing of a single *stronger* species of man ...'<sup>359</sup> Only through this sacrifice and flourishing can collective evolution be achieved.

Here, largely as a result of nineteenth-century imperial and twentieth-century totalitarian programmes, we find the drive to create what Mark Warren described as a 'gentle Nietzsche' who thinks in juxtaposition to a 'bloody Nietzsche.'<sup>360</sup> Such misreading is understandable, living as many of us do in relatively free and comparatively safe societies, to the extent that such thinkers as William

Connolly can picture an absolutely benign political agonism in which ‘friends, lovers, and adversaries ... [are restrained] through mutual appreciation of the problematical bases from which they proceed.’<sup>361</sup> Nietzsche, as I have shown, allowed no such equivocation.

Whom among today’s rabble do I hate the most? The Socialist rabble ... apostles  
who undermine the worker’s instinct, his pleasure, his feeling of contentment with  
his little state of being – who make him envious, who teach him revengefulness ...

Injustice never lies in unequal rights, it lies in the claim to ‘*equal*’ rights ...<sup>362</sup>

While these sentiments seem harsh to modern ears, and positively brutal to liberal-democratic sensibilities, truly to listen to their message it is necessary to remove any innate sense of absolute value which would render Nietzsche’s thinking as pitching a tiny band of higher types against a multitude of slaves. Instead, Nietzsche is arguing for a future of humanity in which evolution is not necessarily served by granting voice to all, much less trying to assuage the desires and wishes of the multitude. Rather, it requires sacrifice, toil and service to a higher cause. In a way postmodern liberal-democracy assents to this notion in arguing for the French Revolutionary ideals of *liberté, égalité, fraternité* as though reification will act as a spell to bring about utopia and if not, any deviants from their ideals can be brought into line through laws or ochlocratic pressure which seeks to deny any action or thought outside the proscribed norms. Nietzsche, alive to the failures of reification and mass hypnosis to bring

order from chaos, takes the approach of arguing for selective freedoms to enable the few to stretch the limits of human achievement; not exclusively for their benefit, but for a general raising of the tide of humanity.

In a sense this is little more than the definition of civilisation: individuals contributing, and in some cases sacrificing, their physical and ideological self to and for the creation and improvement of a greater whole. Placed in a contemporary setting, access to public infrastructure requires a mass of people contributing taxation and services for a few to enjoy a life that would otherwise be denied to them. This is not a call for an elitist group sitting in leather arm chairs sipping brandy, it is necessary for things like social security for the destitute or political and physical protections for refugees. Without a 'higher type' of society which can shelter individuals from forces beyond their control, all countries would endure the same fate of famine, violence, slavery and moral turpitude as those places in the world at which we look and shudder at the conditions in which the mass of their population are forced to live. As Nietzsche puts it in *BGE*:

[the philosopher is] a person with the most wide-ranging responsibility, whose conscience encompasses mankind's overall development: this philosopher, in his efforts to improve education and breeding, will make use of religions just as he makes use of the political economic circumstances of his time. The influence that

can be exerted with the help of religion is an influence for selecting and breeding, and is always necessarily as destructive as it is creative and formative; depending on the sort of people who come under the spell and protection of religion, its influence can be manifold and diverse.<sup>363</sup>

The perfectionism Nietzsche asserted is more than an aristocratic *cri de cœur*, much less, as I have repeatedly argued, a clarion call for pure selfishness – though it is all too easy to be read that way. Rather, it is to express the unresolved tensions engendered by democratic values which unsuccessfully try to straddle the two stools of individualism and collectivism. Of which Philip Blond memorably observed:

Despite their rhetoric, all they really believed in was unlimited choice and unrestricted personal freedom. They seemed in important ways to have been stripped of integral values to have embraced a rootless cultural relativism. They loved ‘choice’ but could never tell you what to choose or why. It was as if they preferred the act itself, rather than considering carefully the object of their volition to see whether it was good or not.<sup>364</sup>

Nietzsche’s thinking anticipates the coming economic and cultural disasters of totalitarianism at the one extreme and modern liberalism at the other. Yet the Nietzschean third way is no ‘middle of the



road' compromise solution, which would hardly be expected from the exponent of '*der Wille zur Macht*' [Will to Power].<sup>365</sup> Instead Nietzsche focuses on the inherent problems in a humanity driven by liberal-democratic values on the one side or the disturbing selflessness of totalitarian adherents on the other, positing the enhancement of humanity through a third structure.<sup>366</sup>

Totalitarianism, as witnessed in its most absolute form under Nazi and Soviet regimes, came decades after Nietzsche's life, and in consequence he saw the horn of liberal democracy as the more pressing concern when facing the monster of herd movements which, despite its claims to universal pluralism, was seen by Nietzsche as a system which privileges the interests of one class or group over the fate of the entire species of humanity. Nietzsche saw this contradiction between perception and reality in the democratic disjuncture between compassion for all and the hard choices necessary for universal human survival. Put another way, can the inalienable rights of the individual and the concepts of the equal moral worth of all be always compatible with the general good of humanity? Nietzsche thinks not; for his society, 'justice can be hoped for ... [but] only *inter pares*.'<sup>367</sup>

Such thinking saw Thomas Mann connect Nietzsche with the 'guilt of the intellect, its unpolitical disregard of the actual world, surrender to the aesthetic enjoyment of its own audacities ... In those secure bourgeois times, nobody realised how easily a people can be made to believe that there are no longer any iniquities which cry out to heaven.'<sup>368</sup> I would argue against this view; that far from

creating somnambulists, blind to iniquities who greet 'deeds of violence with the admiring remark: it may be mean but it is very clever,'<sup>369</sup> Nietzsche's philosophy challenges the very notion of iniquity and equality and forces a reader truly to think. It is here that the benefit of a Nietzschean politics resides, for although his radical aristocratic thinking may be repugnant to many readers, it can be an important tool to force egalitarians to justify their beliefs and political assumptions and, through an agonistic political process, find a renewed, more articulate and better calibrated form of equality.

'The human is hard to discover and its own self hardest of all; often the spirit lies about the soul.'<sup>370</sup>

## 4 – NIETZSCHE AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT

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Although broad implications for management can be drawn from Nietzsche's thinking on politics and society, the reassessment of the rôle and requirements of managers under a Nietzschean philosophy is not entirely to posit something of a brave new world, as it would not require holistic social engineering. Instead, reformist piecemeal social engineering could achieve management along Nietzschean lines. In this context, examining the implications for management of Nietzsche's thought can have practical implications, as well as being an exercise worth undertaking as it provides a useful tool to assess the qualities and failings in current management practice, much as Nietzsche's thinking on liberalism and democracy provides an invaluable tool for their analysis.

### 4.1 – ARISTOCRATIC RADICALISM AND WILL TO POWER

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The manager is the dynamic, life-giving, element in every business ... In a competitive economy, above all, the quality and performance of the managers determine the success of a business, indeed determine its survival. For the quality and performance of its managers is the only effective advantage an enterprise in a competitive economy can have.<sup>371</sup>

With these words, Peter Drucker began his seminal book *The Practice of Management*. Replace business with society and you would have an apt description of *Übermenschen*, whose quality and

performance, according to Nietzsche, determine the success, indeed survival, of society. But for quality and performance to make a difference to society or industry, it must have some form of power to emanate its effects over people or resources. In the case of *Übermenschen*, if their power is lacking, it does not just result in the loss of a throne or political office, though it may do that as well, or, to give it a business context, a company's position in the market, it results in the irresistible disintegration of civilisation. A disintegration which isn't only physical but also ethical and moral; this distinction is worth making as technological prowess and civilisation are too often conflated. In this context, Nietzsche's notion of power needs to be read as psychological. This transubstantiation of power, from the physical to the psychological, is recondite for managers who, in an industrialised country, seldom have any physical power over workers, but for whom psychological power abides.

Will to Power is, in its most basic form, a measure of the psychological strength of a person's power to act, not merely react, in a situation. Nietzsche's writing asserts that masters in a society have an overabundance of this type of power, a superhuman, hence *Übermensch*, ability for self-overcoming. The herd distinctly lack this type of power and are overcome by earthly life, in both the physical and psychological sense, and yearn for a 'tomorrow,' be that when they win the lottery or, for the spiritually inclined, in the afterlife. This contrast, between what could be labelled the Platonic and Homeric modes of thought, are central to Nietzsche's thinking:

Plato versus Homer: that is the complete, the real agonism – on one side, the sincerest ‘man of the beyond’, the philosopher who most defames life; on the other, the poet who involuntarily deifies it, the *golden* nature.<sup>372</sup>

Homer’s heroes abound with will to power and in consequence elevate strength and nobility to the top of the table of values. By contrast, Plato’s characters, in Nietzsche’s view, are consumed by a fear of earthly existence and in consequence are obsessed with eternal bliss.<sup>373</sup> Yet even in Achilles, Nietzsche saw an internal struggle between higher and lower psychological traits. I have shown Nietzsche argued an internal agonism caused ancient nobles to be deceived, bequeathing would-be masters of the present an inheritance of oneness with the herd. Nietzsche’s three key factors which brought about this fall are worth mentioning again as they bear directly on his notion of will to power.

First, ‘their indifference and contempt for safety, life limb, comfort.’<sup>374</sup> Second, they were cavalier, in Zarathustra’s words: “I am not on my guard against deceivers; I *must* be without caution: thus my lot wills it.”<sup>375</sup> Third, ancient masters were undermined by their lack of critical self-understanding as ‘all human concepts from earlier times were ... initially understood in a crude, clumsy, external, narrow, and frankly, particularly *unsymbolic* way.’<sup>376</sup> Will to power is a system for management of the self, as it represents an alternative to the other two key methods for self- or societal management: rationality and otherworldliness. While the herd is obsessed with discussion or the hereafter, masters

with will to power prioritise action, knowing how to balance the Apollonian and Dionysian. In this context, the struggle of life itself is will to power.<sup>377</sup> But how can post-Nietzschean will to power avoid the pitfalls which brought low masters in past ages?

Nietzsche suggests that the modern noble can maintain their position through a deep suspicion of both the unfamiliar and too-familiar alike. Instead of considering everything to have an inherent worth, Nietzsche exhorts a master to react ‘to every kind of stimulus slowly, with the slowness which years of caution and a willed pride have cultivated in him – he examines the stimulus as it approaches and has no intention of going to meet it.’<sup>378</sup> In short, a master ought to be of discriminating taste and adopt the preferred stance of caution, even hostility instead of “*largueur du coeur*”, and other kinds of ‘brotherly love’.<sup>379</sup> This last injunction is classic Nietzsche, who considered the Judeo-Christian virtue<sup>380</sup> of ‘love thy neighbour’ as the epitome of a false virtue, designed to cause those of discerning intellect to refrain from disparaging that which ought to be disparaged. Against this false virtue, Nietzsche posited a noble’s position of negating that which ought to be negated, and of eschewing brotherly love, is not the ‘glorious selfishness’ or ‘sick selfishness’ of the ‘self-seeking cattle and mob,’<sup>381</sup> rather it is bringing about the ‘greater perfection of all things.’<sup>382</sup>

Earlier I showed notions of ‘worth’ not only form the basis of Nietzsche’s *Rangordnung* [ranking] of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ humans within a hierarchy that differentiates based on deeds,<sup>383</sup> but that such an

ordering forms the basis of a Nietzschean political blueprint in which the Machiavellian claim, ‘the great goal of statecraft should be *duration*, which outweighs everything else,’ is effectively endorsed.<sup>384</sup>

What required more background before I could unpack it was the interplay of negation in a Nietzschean concept of nobility. ‘To chew and digest everything – that is truly the way of the swine!’, better to have ‘rebellious and selective tongues and stomachs, that have learned to say ‘I’ and ‘Yes’ and ‘No’.<sup>385</sup> Through discernment, nobles acquire the knowledge of good and evil. Yet this discernment carries with it a psychological problem. Because there is likely to be more bad than good,<sup>386</sup> much as there are more herd than masters, a noble soul will endure, even if shielded by guardians, constant agony and torment as they try to remake this world in the shape of the one they have conceived. For Nietzsche, this psychological struggle was the Eternal Return<sup>387</sup> and required a Tychic (Appendix 6.7) element – *amor fati*.<sup>388</sup>

In Nietzsche’s thought, the embrace of all events, be they affirmative or negative, is an essential element of noble ‘self-preservation – of *egoism*.’ ‘From this point of view even life’s *mistakes* have their own sense and value, the temporary byways and detours, the delays, the ‘modesties’, the seriousness wasted on tasks which lie beyond *the* task.’<sup>389</sup> On the face of it this seems an odd turn of phrase for the great discerner, lambasting the herd as a swinish multitude who chew and digest everything, as the passage brings with it notions of an embracing of everything; a condition Nietzsche acknowledge in his *Nachlaß*.<sup>390</sup> Yet a closer reading sees the notion as no contrarian statement, much less a

contradiction. Instead the notion is part of Nietzsche's rejection of the Platonic Forms and the reason-based philosophies which have flowed therefrom. For Nietzsche, will to truth can only be achieved by rejecting a 'reality' based on reason, which he sees as possessing only one criterion: 'to misunderstand reality in a shrewd manner' and thereby create a *false* world based on the properties *they* construe as reality. In this context the nuance becomes clear, Nietzsche is advocating a rejection by masters of the embrace of *everything*, which enables the herd to posit a desirable reality, and embrace *everything* which may befall or benefit a noble as 'all eternally, all chained together, entwined'<sup>391</sup> events constitute will to truth. This unflinching resolve in the face of all past horrors is a challenging notion, against which Nietzsche's own initial reaction was one of horror.<sup>392</sup> Would it not be better, as Maudemarie Clark observed, to wish the eternal return of 'a world that is just like ours except for the absence of Hitler.'<sup>393</sup> To do so would be un-Nietzschean since it ignores the core of the eternal return: acceptance of and capacity to re-endure all that has gone before, not an edited or idealised form of the past which may be reasonable to want, but is unrealistic to expect. In Nietzsche's view, such rationalisation only prepares the ground for a *ressentiment* in which people long for a world that has never existed and is only manifest in an idealised form of a world unlikely to ever come.

The implications of will to power and the eternal return for management are profound. In a period that is witnessing a deepening moral perturbation, cultural decline and a grasping for the fruits of science, that the growing ethical and cultural void which was rent through the damaging influence of



Western-style economic development may be filled, many managers and politicians are continuing to use the very psychological powers which created the current discontents in a vain attempt to solve them. As Max Nordau observed: 'repetition four or five times of the same imbecile expressions, gives the truest conceivable clinical picture of incurable cretinism.'<sup>394</sup>

Given the social and ethical implications of management, it is no longer enough for managers only to focus on converting resources to product, they must comment on and take accountability for issues of justice. In such a milieu, Nietzschean aristocratic radicalism would revitalise management by rejecting hitherto established modes and the latest paradoxical shibboleth of borderless atomisation in which self-identification and a godlike incantation – 'I am that I am'<sup>395</sup> – can be invoked to remove all definable boundaries and though this act of negation, affirm, define and guarantee individuals and their human rights. Without doubt, this is one of the greatest feats of wish fulfilment yet undertaken. By legitimising though definable objective quality, rather than subjective self-identification, not only would Nietzschean radical aristocratism counter the hazards of egalitarian democracy, it would also propagate notions of self-restraint. Not because aristocrats necessarily have better morality or display less selfishness than non-aristocratic groups, but because their structure causes them to oppose absolutist rule, be it the absolutism of a despot or the mob.<sup>396</sup>

With managers increasingly being thrust into the rôle of leaders, responsible for the well-being and even survival of employees and the wider community, they are, even if psychologically unwilling to admit, eschewing the Comtean considerations of merely directing labour<sup>397</sup> and instead practically using the employees of an organisation as the base upon which management performs its own tasks – ‘upon which alone it can stand.’<sup>398</sup> Such conditions are already making *de facto* the transubstantiation of managers into *Übermenschen*, all that remains is the *de jure* element of acknowledging and formalising this status. A Nietzschean aristocratic radicalism would provide such a structure and check the worst excesses of management which are occurring because all too often great power has been accrued, but little or no framework for responsibility, above fiscal, is in place for its use.

In this context the manager’s rôle is more than simply to rule over the workers and balance the budget: they must be creators within their own field of expertise, with an excess of knowledge, energy, bravery, culture, manners and insight into personal behaviour to the highest peak of the spirit.<sup>399</sup> Managers must be affirming, strong enough of character not to engage in petty tyranny and capable enough to build organisations that are capable of providing every luxury. Most of all, for managers to lead they must understand their workers’ virtues.<sup>400</sup> If managers were able to transcend the herd mentality, and rule according to a Nietzschean aristocratic radicalism, the rank and file could find a true sense of liberation, specifically from false hope, and contentment in virtues which are within their

reach, or in modern parlance a pay grade within their abilities: 'If you have to serve, then seek the one to whom your service is of most use!'<sup>401</sup>

But to create managers who are *Übermenschen* would require, much like the slaves on the estates of nobles in bygone ages, the creation of a new serfdom. These 'new slaves' must be comprised of more than only manual labourers, a new caste must be wrought from experts, technical specialists and scientists.<sup>402</sup>

Only with this more advanced, cultivated and educated 'new slave' can the 'new order' elite effectively command and achieve 'the collective evolution of mankind.'<sup>403</sup> Those committed to the ideals of democracy and egalitarianism will no doubt see this as a deluded utopia. But as the dystopic version has effectively come to pass with some executives making more in two days than their employees make in a year,<sup>404</sup> it seems clear that previous methods of reform have failed time and time again to build egalitarian societies. In such a world we need a system, not protest and *ressentiment*, to change the methods and output of the *de facto* elite for the better.

Nietzsche's thinking anticipated the coming economic and cultural disasters of totalitarianism at the one extreme and social liberalism at the other. Totalitarianism, as witnessed in its most absolute manifestation yet under Nazi and Soviet regimes, came decades after Nietzsche's life, and in consequence he saw the horn of liberal democracy as the more pressing concern when facing the

monster of herd movements which, despite their claims to universal pluralism, were seen by Nietzsche as a system which privileges the interests of one class or group over the fate of the entire species of humanity. Nietzsche saw this contradiction between perception and reality in the democratic disjuncture between compassion for all and the hard choices necessary for universal human survival. Put another way, can the inalienable rights of every individual and the concepts of the equal moral worth of all be always compatible with the general good of humanity? Nietzsche thinks not; for his society, 'justice can be hoped for ... [but] only *inter pares*.'<sup>405</sup>

As is now clear, the Nietzschean third way is no 'middle of the road' compromise solution, which would hardly be expected from the exponent of '*der Wille zur Macht*' [Will to Power].<sup>406</sup> Nietzsche sees his philosophy as offering society a way of coming back from its existing maladies and, through the flourishing of higher types, subsume the present ignobility. Failing that, Nietzsche offers a vision of the future in which there is a:

distrust of all government, insight into the uselessness and destructiveness of these short-winded struggles will impel men to a quite novel resolve: the resolve to do away with the concept of the state, to the abolition of the distinction between private and public. Private companies will step by step absorb the business of the state: even the most resistant remainder of what was formerly the work of

government (for example its activities designed to protect the private person from the private person) will in the long run be taken care of by private contractors. Disregard for and the decline and *death of the state*, the liberation of the private person ... is the consequence of the democratic conception of the state; it is in this that its mission lies.<sup>407</sup>

In the wake of Trump and the re-emergence of populism, events which are as much product of – as reaction to – democracy and egalitarianism, Nietzsche's warning retains its prescience. A Nietzschean philosophy for management, with its radical aristocratism, could be a salve for the present discontents. If not, one thing is clear, the general trend of legislating to redress grievances, no platforming of dissenting opinions, further extension of the democratic franchise and 'direct democracy,' in the form of referenda, are too often having the reverse effects that they intend by undermining the very liberal-democratic institutions they purport to defend. A thesis the growing disparity between the 'haves' and 'have nots' and ever-increasing feelings of marginalisation seem to support. In this 'post-truth' age, Nietzsche's ideas retain their vitality and while his philosophy may not provide a cure-all solution, it does teach us to read off a fact without falsification and creates a mirror to reflect the flaws in competing doctrines. Thus, it can help us to separate what is true for oneself from what is true as such.

## 5 - ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Preliminary Studies for the 'Philosophical Investigations': Generally Known as the Blue and Brown Books* (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1964), 44-45.
- <sup>2</sup> Edmund Burke, *A Note-Book of Edmund Burke*, ed. H. V. F. Somerset (London: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 89.
- <sup>3</sup> Peter Berkowitz has correctly observed in N.'s exhortation to 'use big words sparingly' (*GM*, III.8.) and that N.'s ideal philosopher 'refrains from presenting himself as a martyr to truth, and even avoids using the word *truth*. This avoidance does not stem from an aversion to truth but, quite the contrary, reflects a kind of love that recoils from the degradation through common usage that the word *truth* has suffered...' [his emphasis] Peter Berkowitz, *Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995), 91.
- <sup>4</sup> *GS*, 346.
- <sup>5</sup> Jorge Luis Borges, "The Library of Babel," in *Collected Fictions* (New York: Penguin, 1998), 116 & 18.
- <sup>6</sup> *AC*, 52.
- <sup>7</sup> Here I am using the phrase in all sincerity to imply quality, not in the mockingly ironic tones of Junius from where the phrase originates. Junius, *The Letters of Junius* (London: Printed for J. Mundell & Co. Edinburgh; and for J. Mundell, College, Glasgow, 1796), 29.
- <sup>8</sup> Émile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method* (New York: The Free Press, 1982), 51.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 101.
- <sup>10</sup> Michel Foucault, *Power / Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, trans. Colin Gordon (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980), 53-54.
- <sup>11</sup> Mark Warren, *Nietzsche and Political Thought* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1988), 211.
- <sup>12</sup> David Gelles and Claire Cain Miller, "Business Schools Now Teaching #Metoo, N.F.L. Protests and Trump," *The New York Times*, 25 December 2017.
- <sup>13</sup> R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, ed. W. J. van der Dussen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 115.
- <sup>14</sup> Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 135.

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- <sup>15</sup> A. J. P. Taylor, *The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of Germany since 1815* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1946), 68.
- <sup>16</sup> Niall Ferguson, *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World* (Melbourne: Penguin, 2008), 154.
- <sup>17</sup> James L. Richardson, *Contending Liberalisms in World Politics: Ideology and Power* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 52.
- <sup>18</sup> Nancy J. Hirschmann, *Gender, Class, and Freedom in Modern Political Theory* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008), 79; W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, *A History of Political Philosophy: From Thucydides to Locke* (New York: Global Scholarly Publications, 2010), 291.
- <sup>19</sup> Hobbs, *Leviathan* XIV.4. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
- <sup>20</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Kant: Political Writing*, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 44.
- <sup>21</sup> E. K. Hunt, *Property and Prophets : The Evolution of Economic Institutions and Ideologies* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 2003), 51-53.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.
- <sup>23</sup> 'The constant effort towards population... increases the number of people before the means of subsistence are increased... the poor consequently must live much worse... the price of labour must tend toward a decrease... while the price of provisions would at the same time tend to rise. The labourer therefore must work harder to earn the same as he did before.' Thomas Robert Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 19.
- <sup>24</sup> Alan Ryan, "Liberalism," in *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 293.
- <sup>25</sup> Hunt, *Property and Prophets : The Evolution of Economic Institutions and Ideologies*, 49-51.
- <sup>26</sup> As this is the briefest of sketches of classical liberalism, I don't have space for a discussion of the different forms it took from country to country, nor of Hayek's topology which posits a 'British tradition' and a 'French tradition' in classical liberalism. Instead I have attempted an amalgam of the similarities, which will suffice for the purposes of this thesis. For Hayek's typology see Friedrich A. von Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty*, ed. Ronald Hamowy, XIX vols., vol. XVII, *The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011); Friedrich A. von Hayek, *Individualism and Economic Order* (London: Routledge, 1949).

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- <sup>27</sup> John Tidd Pratt, *The Act for the Amendment and Better Administration of the Laws Relating to the Poor, in England and Wales* (London: B. Fellowes, 1834).
- <sup>28</sup> Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations: A Selected Edition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), I.viii.
- <sup>29</sup> James Madison, Federalist No. 10 (22 November 1787) in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist, with Letters of "Brutus"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 43-44.
- <sup>30</sup> Peter Weiler, *The New Liberalism: Liberal Social Theory in Great Britain 1889-1914* (Oxon: Routledge, 2017).
- <sup>31</sup> Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3.
- <sup>32</sup> Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, 1976), 117.
- <sup>33</sup> 'Between January 1935 and June 1941, there were just under twenty million arrests and at least seven million executions in the Soviet Union. In 1937-1938 alone the quote for 'enemies of the people' to be executed was set at 356,105, though the actual number who lost their lives was more than twice that.' Niall Ferguson, *The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West* (New York: Pnegin, 2006), 210.
- <sup>34</sup> The Nazi party's consistent persecution of the left caused many in Britain to see Nazism as either a capitalist driven movement or, if they were Marxists and took the view capitalism was doomed, as the last spasm of a bourgeoisie trying to prevent the inevitable victory of socialism. As Hayek put it: 'A very special situation arose in England, already in 1939, that people were seriously believing that National Socialism was a capitalist reaction against socialism.' Friedrich A. von Hayek, *Hayek on Hayek: An Autobiographical Dialogue*, ed. Stephen Kresge and Leif Wenar (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994), 102.
- <sup>35</sup> Hayek thinking on socialism and the importance of the free market and pricing in coordinating consumers and producers in an economy, was prefigured by his mentor at the University of Vienna, Ludwig von Mises, whose formative work in the early 1920s on socialism provided the blue print for Hayek's later arguments against a planned economy. In perhaps his most compelling passages, von Mises argued: *Es ist eine Illusion, wenn man glaubt, man könnte die Geldrechnung in der sozialistischen Wirtschaft durch die Naturalrechnung ersetzen. Die Naturalrechnung kann in der verkehrslosen Wirtschaft immer nur die genußreifen Güter erfassen, sie versagt vollkommen bei allen Gütern höherer Ordnung. Sobald man die freie Geldpreisbildung der Güter höherer Ordnung aufgibt, hat man rationelle Produktion, überhaupt unmöglich gemacht. Jeder Schritt, der uns vom Sondereigentum an den Produktionsmitteln und vom Geldgebrauch wegführt, führt uns auch von der rationellen Wirtschaft weg* [It is an illusion to imagine that in a socialist state calculation *in natura* can take the place of monetary calculation. Calculation *in natura*, in an economy without exchange, can embrace consumption-goods only; it completely fails when it comes to dealing with goods of a higher order. And as soon as one gives up the conception of a freely established monetary price for goods of a higher order, rational production



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becomes completely impossible. Every step that takes us away from private ownership of the means of production and from the use of money also takes us away from rational economics.]. Ludwig von Mises, "Die Wirtschaftsrechnung Im Sozialistischen Gemeinwesen," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, vol. 47 (1920): 99-100. An English version of the text was published as Ludwig von Mises, "Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth," in *Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies on the Possibilities of Socialism*, ed. Friedrich A. von Hayek (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1935), 87-130.

<sup>36</sup> Although those who think outside the ideological norms in academic circles are no strangers to *ad hominem* attacks, this phenomenon reached something of a nadir with Herman Finer's response to Hayek in *The Road to Reaction*. 'Here is a joy for all conservatives. In spite of the world's desperate travail to overthrow Hitler and Mussolini and what they stood for, many conservatives need the new joy [*Road to Serfdom*] because secretly they have just lost the old one.' Herman Finer, *Road to Reaction* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1945), 15.

<sup>37</sup> This was an argument which had been put some two hundred years earlier by Adam Ferguson who observed: 'The establishments of men, like those of every animal, are suggested by nature... [They] arose from successive improvements that were made, without any sense of their general effect; and they bring human affairs to a state of complication, which the greatest reach of capacity with which human nature was ever adorned, could not have projected.' Adam Ferguson, *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 174.

<sup>38</sup> Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 56.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Alasdair C. MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, vol. 2nd (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 22.

<sup>41</sup> See Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America and Two Essays on America*, trans. Gerald Bevan (London: Penguin Classics, 2003). Vol. 1, Part 1, chaps. 3 & 5; vol. 2, part 2, chaps. 1 & 14 and part 4, chaps. 6 & 7.

<sup>42</sup> Thomas Walsingham, *Thomae Walsingham, Quondam Monachi S. Albani, Historia Anglicana* (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1863). II, 32; Raphael Holinshed, *Holinshed's Irish Chronicle: The Historie of Irelande from the First Inhabitation Thereof, Unto the Yeare 1509* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1979). II, 749; Sylvia Resnikow, "The Cultural History of a Democratic Proverb," *The Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, vol. 36, no. 3 (1937): 393.

<sup>43</sup> Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche*, trans. Christoopher Middleton (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996), 279.

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- <sup>44</sup> Richard Rorty, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy," in *Philosophical Papers* (New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
- <sup>45</sup> Daniel W. Conway, *Nietzsche & the Political* (New York; London: Routledge, 1997), 129; Prior to Conway a similar point had been made by Keith Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker: The Perfect Nihilist* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 170-72.
- <sup>46</sup> Foucault, *Power / Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, 53-54.
- <sup>47</sup> Tracy B. Strong, "Nietzsche and Politics," in *Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Robert C. Solomon (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), 291.
- <sup>48</sup> Tracy B. Strong, "Nietzsche's Political Misappropriation," in *The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. Bernd Magnus and Kathleen Higgins, *Cambridge Companions to Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 128.
- <sup>49</sup> William E. Connolly, *Identity / Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991), 191.
- <sup>50</sup> William E. Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 26, 206.
- <sup>51</sup> Warren, *Nietzsche and Political Thought*, 211.
- <sup>52</sup> Here Voegelin is using libidinous in the sense of being ruled by passions.
- <sup>53</sup> Eric Voegelin, *The Ecumenic Age*, vol. IV, Order and History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1974), 260-61.
- <sup>54</sup> Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics: An Introduction* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 130.
- <sup>55</sup> And do you know what 'the world' is to me? Shall I show it to you in my mirror? This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expend itself but only transforms itself; as a whole, of unalterable size, a household without expenses or losses, but likewise without increase or income;...not something endlessly extended, but set in a definite space as a definite force, and not a space that might be 'empty' here or there, but rather as force throughout, as a play of forces and waves of forces, at the same time one and many, increasing here and at the same time decreasing there; a sea of forces flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back...with an ebb and a flood of its forms...without goal, unless the joy of the circle is itself a goal... *this world is the will to power...* (WP, 1067).

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<sup>56</sup> *AC*, 52.

<sup>57</sup> Laurence Lampert, *Leo Strauss and Nietzsche* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 5.

<sup>58</sup> Leo Strauss, *What Is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies 1st Edition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 55.

<sup>59</sup> Leo Strauss, *Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 180.

<sup>60</sup> *History of Political Philosophy*, ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 849.

<sup>61</sup> Walter Arnold Kaufmann, *Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 4th ed. (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1974), 14.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>63</sup> Laurence Lampert, *Nietzsche and Modern Times: A Study of Bacon, Descartes, and Nietzsche* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 431.

<sup>64</sup> Kaufmann, *Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 418.

<sup>65</sup> Berkowitz, *Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist*, 2, 19, 91, 102, 23, 48, 51, 61, 66, 238, and 46-47.

<sup>66</sup> Among those alive to Nietzsche's grander and more nuanced message I am indebted to the work of Bruce Detwiler, *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Nancy Sue Love, *Marx, Nietzsche, and Modernity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker: The Perfect Nihilist*; Lampert, *Nietzsche and Modern Times: A Study of Bacon, Descartes, and Nietzsche*; Fredrick Appel, *Nietzsche Contra Democracy* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1999); Peter R. Sedgwick, *Nietzsche's Justice: Naturalism in Search of an Ethics* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2013).

<sup>67</sup> Brian Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality* (New York; London: Routledge, 2002), 296; see also Bernard Arthur Owen Williams, *Shame and Necessity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 10-11.

<sup>68</sup> For example, see *GM*, II, 17 where Nietzsche offers an account of the violent and tyrannical origins of the state. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, trans. Duncan Large (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, trans. Duncan Large (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

<sup>69</sup> 'Durch das Labyrinth der Brust,' from Goethe's poem *An den Mond* (To the Moon), quoted by Nietzsche in *GM*, II, 18.

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<sup>70</sup> Carl Gustav Jung, *Essays on Contemporary Events*, trans. R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 12-13.

<sup>71</sup> *BGE*, 208.

<sup>72</sup> *EH*, XIII, 2. See also *GS*, 377; *WP*, Preface 2; *WP*, 748.

<sup>73</sup> *Z*, II, 6.

<sup>74</sup> *Z*, I, 11.

<sup>75</sup> Detwiler, *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism*, 59.

<sup>76</sup> *EH*, XIII, 2.

<sup>77</sup> *BGE*, 208.

<sup>78</sup> Kaufmann, *Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 322; See also Alexander Nehamas, *Nietzsche, Life as Literature* (Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge, Mass : Harvard University Press, 1985), 136-37; Bonnie Honig, *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 231.

<sup>79</sup> Leslie Paul Thiele, "The Agony of Politics: The Nietzschean Roots of Foucault's Thought," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 84, no. 3 (1990): 913.

<sup>80</sup> Martha Craven Nussbaum, "The Transfigurations of Intoxication: Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Dionysus," *Arion*, vol. 1, no. 2 (1991): 101.

<sup>81</sup> *HAH*, I.327-8.

<sup>82</sup> 'What does all art do? does it not praise? does it not glorify? does it not select? does it not highlight? ... [this is] the prerequisite for the artist's being an artist at all.' *TI*, IX, 24.

<sup>83</sup> *WP*, 941. 'The strong, the mighty want to form.'

<sup>84</sup> *EH*, IX, 8.

<sup>85</sup> Such is the beginning of the 'state' on earth [*Staat auf Erden*] ... He who is capable of giving commands, who is a 'master' by nature [*Natur Herr*], who behaves violently in deed and gesture ... they arrive like fate [*sie kommen wie das Schicksal*] ... their work is an instinctive creation and impression of form, they are the most involuntary, most unconscious artists [*unbewußtesten Künstler*] there are – wherever they appear something new quickly grows up. *GM*, II.17.

<sup>86</sup> Julian Young, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 121.

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<sup>87</sup> *WP*, 964; *WP*, 962; *WP*, 975.

<sup>88</sup> *WP*, 129.

<sup>89</sup> *BGE*, 62.

<sup>90</sup> *BGE*, 62.

<sup>91</sup> *WP*, 960.

<sup>92</sup> Kaufmann, *Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 248; A similar reading is taken in Nehamas, *Nietzsche, Life as Literature*, 203.

<sup>93</sup> Tracy B. Strong, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration*, Expanded ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 13, 91.

<sup>94</sup> Berkowitz, *Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist*, 252.

<sup>95</sup> *BGE*, 287.

<sup>96</sup> *WP*, 192.

<sup>97</sup> *WP*, 944.

<sup>98</sup> *HAH*, I.263.

<sup>99</sup> *WP*, 191; *A*, 38.

<sup>100</sup> 'How few 'works' for the sake of which life on earth is worth while! And alas no more 'deeds' whatever! All *great* works and deeds that have remained and have not been washed away by the waters of time – were they not all in the profoundest sense immoralities?' *WP*, 395.

<sup>101</sup> *WP*, 395.

<sup>102</sup> *Z*, III.29.

<sup>103</sup> *HAH*, I.224.

<sup>104</sup> *TI*, IX.11.

<sup>105</sup> *GS*, 356.

<sup>106</sup> *GS*, 356.

<sup>107</sup> *A*, 58.

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<sup>108</sup> *GM*, I.16.

<sup>109</sup> *A*, 58.

<sup>110</sup> In preferring the term ‘ethics,’ instead of ‘morality,’ in the context of masters or nobles, I am following the thinking of Frederick Appel, who I would argue correctly associates morality with general systems of religious or secular societies, which Nietzsche regarded as questionable due to their egalitarian values (*BGE*, 228). In this context it is better to speak of ‘slave morality’ and ‘master ethics.’ Appel, *Nietzsche Contra Democracy*.

<sup>111</sup> *A*, 43.

<sup>112</sup> See *The Discourses*, II.2. c.f. Rousseau *The Social Contract*, IV.8. But unlike Rousseau, Nietzsche follows Machiavelli in thinking quietism appropriate for ordinary people. Niccolo Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, trans. Julia Conaway Bondanella and Peter Bondanella (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, trans. Christopher Betts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Niccolo Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, trans. Julia Conaway Bondanella and Peter Bondanella (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, trans. Christopher Betts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

<sup>113</sup> *WP*, 175; ‘There is nothing more false or deceitful in the world ... [than to say] ‘Let him who wants to slaughter and kill and harass and swindle the people, do not raise a finger against it!’” *Z*, III.12 & 15.

<sup>114</sup> *WP*, 221; c.f. *WP*, 201 & 211.

<sup>115</sup> *WP*, 184.

<sup>116</sup> *WP*, 90.

<sup>117</sup> ‘No one any longer possesses today the courage to claim special privileges or the right to rule ... the courage for a pathos of distance ... Our politics is morbid from this lack of courage!’ *A*, 43.

<sup>118</sup> *BGE*, 208.

<sup>119</sup> *BGE*, 212.

<sup>120</sup> *WP*, 132.

<sup>121</sup> *BGE*, 212.

<sup>122</sup> Bernard Arthur Owen Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (London: Fontana, 1985), 7.

<sup>123</sup> *BGE*, 212.

<sup>124</sup> *BGE*, 212.

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<sup>125</sup> T. C. Hansard, "Parliamentary Debates from the Year 1803 to the Present Time," vol. (1803).Vol. 36, Comprising the Period from the Twenty-Eight Day of April to the Twelfth Day of July, 1817, Topic: Habeas Corpus Suspension Bill, Speaker: Mr. Lamb (William Lamb), Date: June 27, 1817, Start Column Number 1225, Quote Column Number 1226 and 1227

<sup>126</sup> 'That one instinctively seeks heavy responsibilities ... That one constantly contradicts the great majority not through words but through deeds.' *WP*, 944.

<sup>127</sup> *WP*, 898.

<sup>128</sup> *BGE*, 203.

<sup>129</sup> *BGE*, 203.

<sup>130</sup> *WP*, 975.

<sup>131</sup> Laurence Lampert, *Nietzsche's Teaching: An Interpretation of "Thus Spoke Zarathustra"* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 247.

<sup>132</sup> *BGE*, 61.

<sup>133</sup> *BGE*, 61.

<sup>134</sup> *BGE*, 258.

<sup>135</sup> *GM*, II.12.

<sup>136</sup> *BGE*, 213.

<sup>137</sup> 'The herd instinct of obedience is inherited best, and at the cost of the skill in commanding. If we imagine this instinct taken to its ultimate excess, we find a complete absence of commanders or independent people; or else they suffer inwardly from a bad conscience and feel the need to dupe themselves first in order to be able to give commands, but acting if they too were only following orders ... I call it the moral hypocrisy of commanders [*die moralische Heuchelei der Befehlenden*].' *BGE*, 199.

<sup>138</sup> Aristot. *Pol.* 2.1261a.Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. H. Rackham(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1932).Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. H. Rackham(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1932).

<sup>139</sup> *WP*, 98.

<sup>140</sup> *WP*, 960.

<sup>141</sup> *GM*, II.2.

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<sup>142</sup> 'Where I found the living, there I found will to power; and even in the will of one who serves I found a will to be master. That the weaker should serve the stronger, of this it is persuaded by its will, which would be master over what is weaker still ...' Z, II. 12.

<sup>143</sup> WP, 984.

<sup>144</sup> See Aristot. Nic. Eth. Book 2. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1926). Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1926).

<sup>145</sup> A, 54.

<sup>146</sup> BGE, 264.

<sup>147</sup> Hor. Ep. 1.10. Horace, *Satires. Epistles. The Art of Poetry*, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1926). Horace, *Satires. Epistles. The Art of Poetry*, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1926).

<sup>148</sup> Z, IV. 13. 8.

<sup>149</sup> Z, IV. 13. 8.

<sup>150</sup> Z, II. 20.

<sup>151</sup> Warren, *Nietzsche and Political Thought*, 224.

<sup>152</sup> D, 107.

<sup>153</sup> 'That which is available only to the strongest and most fruitful natures and makes their existence possible – leisure, adventure, disbelief, even dissipation – would, if it were available to mediocre natures, necessarily destroy them – and actually does. This is where industriousness, rule, moderation, firm 'conviction' have their place – in short, the 'herd virtues': under them this intermediate type of man grows perfect.' WP, 901.

<sup>154</sup> Z, II.8.

<sup>155</sup> 'To be a public utility, a cog, a function, is a natural vocation ... it is the kind of *happiness* of which the great majority are alone capable, which makes intelligent machines of them. For the mediocre, it is happiness to be mediocre ... specialisation, is for them a natural instinct.' A, 57.

<sup>156</sup> BGE, 199.



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- <sup>157</sup> '[For it] brings to light the weaker and less secure ... and promotes an order of rank according to strength, from the point of view of health: those who command are recognised as those who command, those who obey as those who obey.' *WP*, 55.
- <sup>158</sup> *WP*, 960; *WP*, 128.
- <sup>159</sup> *BGE*, 242.
- <sup>160</sup> Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker: The Perfect Nihilist*, 214.
- <sup>161</sup> Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought*, trans. David E. Green (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), 176.
- <sup>162</sup> *WP*, 866.
- <sup>163</sup> *A*, 57.
- <sup>164</sup> *BGE*, 242.
- <sup>165</sup> *GS*, 377.
- <sup>166</sup> *BGE*, 207.
- <sup>167</sup> *BGE*, 61.
- <sup>168</sup> *GS*, 40.
- <sup>169</sup> *GS*, 377.
- <sup>170</sup> Strong, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration*, 353.
- <sup>171</sup> *Z*, III.12.2.
- <sup>172</sup> 'Kampf um die Erd – Herrschaft.' *BGE*, 208.
- <sup>173</sup> Hermann Broch, *Gesammelte Werke: Essays*, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Zurich: Rhein Verlag, 1931), 313-14.
- <sup>174</sup> *BGE*, 261.
- <sup>175</sup> Alexander Nehamas, "Who Are the Philosophers of the Future? A Reading of Beyond Good and Evil," in *Reading Nietzsche*, ed. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen Marie Higgins (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 57.
- <sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, 60.

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<sup>177</sup> Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought*, 262.

<sup>178</sup> Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker: The Perfect Nihilist*, 42-43, 51, 153-58.

<sup>179</sup> *WP*, 132.

<sup>180</sup> *Z*, III.5.2.

<sup>181</sup> 'Good Europeans ... are atheists and immoralists, but for the present we support the religions and moralities of the herd instinct: for these prepare a type of man that must one day fall into our hands, that must *desire* our hands.' *WP*, 132.

<sup>182</sup> *BGE*, 61.

<sup>183</sup> *HAH*, I.472.

<sup>184</sup> Karl Marx, "Zur Kritik Der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie," in *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, ed. Karl Marx and Arnold Ruge (Paris: Darmstadt: Im Bureau des Jahrbücher, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1844), 72.

<sup>185</sup> *WP*, 144. It should be noted the final clause of this fragment from *Will to Power* is first found in the 1911 edition and may have been a posthumous addition to Nietzsche's original thinking by Dr. Otto Weiss, who also contributed an appendix and some invaluable scholarly notes on the original manuscripts.

<sup>186</sup> *WP*, 216. Nietzsche notes in this fragment it is why the 'pope recommends Christian propaganda to the emperor of China even today.'

<sup>187</sup> *WP*, 216.

<sup>188</sup> *HAH*, I.472.

<sup>189</sup> *GS*, 125.

<sup>190</sup> *BGE*, 62.

<sup>191</sup> Aug. *City*. XIX.12&15 St. Augustine, *City of God*, trans. William Chase Greene (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960). St. Augustine, *City of God*, trans. William Chase Greene (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960).; Martin Luther, "On Secular Authority," in *Luther and Calvin on Secular Authority*, ed. Harro Höpfl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Robert Filmer, *Patriarcha and Other Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

<sup>192</sup> Plat. *Rep.* 415a Plato, *Republic*, trans. Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2013). Plato, *Republic*, trans. Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy (Cambridge,

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Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2013).. Plato's myth, which is an adaptation of Hesiod's four metals for the four ages, Hes. *WD* 109Hesiod, *Theogony. Works and Days. Testimonia.*, trans. Glenn W. Most(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007).Hesiod, *Theogony. Works and Days. Testimonia.*, trans. Glenn W. Most(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007)., does not express the whole of his apparently undemocratic theory, of which the biologist Thomas Huxley wrote, in his essay on Administrative Nihilism: 'The lapse of more than 2000 years has not weakened the force of these wise words.' Thomas Henry Huxley, "Administrative Nihilism," in *Collected Essays*, 9 vols., vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1894).

<sup>193</sup> Auguste Comte, *Système De Politique Positive, Ou Traité De Sociologie Instituant La Religion De L'humanité* [System of Positive Polity], trans. Frederic Harrison, 4 vols., vol. 1 (Paris: Carilian-Goeury, 1851-1854), 50.

<sup>194</sup> *WP*, 901.

<sup>195</sup> *WP*, 898.

<sup>196</sup> See Nietzsche's essay 'Schopenhauer as Educator' in *Untimely Meditations* [*Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen*]. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 125-94.

<sup>197</sup> Although more blunt instrument than surgeons scalpel, Nehemas is alive to Nietzsche's indebtedness to Plato, see Nehamas, *Nietzsche, Life as Literature*, 24-34; Berkowitz, *Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist*, 45.

<sup>198</sup> Plat. Rep. 3.412c-421c.

<sup>199</sup> Ranke was born in Wiehe, roughly 30 miles west of N.'s birthplace in Röcken, and was an alumnus of Schulpforta.

<sup>200</sup> Leopold von Ranke, "Preface: Histories of the Latin and Germanic Nations from 1494-1514," in *The Varieties of History: From Voltaire to the Present*, ed. Fritz Richard Stern (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 57.

<sup>201</sup> Richard J. Evans, *In Defense of History* (New York: Norton, 2000), 14.

<sup>202</sup> *A*, 57.

<sup>203</sup> *A*, 57.

<sup>204</sup> *TI*, VII.3. Nietzsche first came into contact with the text of the *Law Code of Manu* in the spring of 1888 via a French translation, Louis Jacolliot, *Les Législateurs Religieux : Manou, Moïse, Mahomet: Traditions Religieuses Comparées* (Paris: C. Marpon et E. Flammarion, 1876). For a detailed discussion of Nietzsche's Hindu influences see David Smith, "Nietzsche's Hinduism, Nietzsche's India: Another Look," *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, vol. 28, no. 1 (2004).

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<sup>205</sup> *BGE*, 61.

<sup>206</sup> Aristot. Pol. 1.1255b

<sup>207</sup> *GM*, II.11.

<sup>208</sup> Here I argue against Warren who contends Nietzsche, during his middle period, viewed with approval 'political cultures that include equal rights.' Warren, *Nietzsche and Political Thought*, 72.

<sup>209</sup> *GM*, II.11.

<sup>210</sup> *WS*, 39.

<sup>211</sup> *WP*, 120. A view also found in much of Nietzsche's major works: *BGE*, 259; *GM*, II.11; *Z*, II.10 & 12.

<sup>212</sup> Detwiler, *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism*, 192.

<sup>213</sup> *GM*, II.10.

<sup>214</sup> Here N. is drawing on an Aristotelean tradition in which 'it is thought that justice is equality, and so it is, though not for everybody but only for those who are equals.' Aristot. Pol. 3.1280aAristotle, *Politics*. Aristotle, *Politics*.

<sup>215</sup> *BGE*, 265.

<sup>216</sup> *BGE*, 259.

<sup>217</sup> *Z*, II.12.

<sup>218</sup> *WP*, 943.

<sup>219</sup> XXXXXX

<sup>220</sup> *D*, 371.

<sup>221</sup> *GS*, 13.

<sup>222</sup> This is *ein Wortspiel* by Nietzsche, as the words for 'just' [*gerecht*] and 'avenged' [*gerächt*] sound the same.

<sup>223</sup> *Z*, II.5; c.f. Luke 18:14 – where Jesus ends the parable of the Pharisee and the publican: 'For every one that exalteth himself shall be abased; and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted.'

<sup>224</sup> *Z*, III.12.11. Here, 'Shallow waters' [*seichten Gewässern*] is more than a literary allusion, it is a sentiment echoed later in an unpublished note from 1881, where Nietzsche invokes the importance of 'the family tree of

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spirit ... without this we are all mayflies and rabble.' Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe*, 15 vols., vol. 9 (Munich 1980), 9.

<sup>225</sup> GS, 13.

<sup>226</sup> 'Politeness of the heart' [*Höflichkeit des Herzens*] is a phrase from Goethe's poem *Elective Affinities* [*Die Wahlverwandtschaften*].

<sup>227</sup> A, 57.

<sup>228</sup> Z, III.5.2.

<sup>229</sup> Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1124b.

<sup>230</sup> Z, III.12.21.

<sup>231</sup> Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1124b.

<sup>232</sup> 'Sternness I keep hidden, but mercy ever ready at hand.' Sen. Cl. 1.1.4.

<sup>233</sup> '*Aufhebend*' is an ambiguous term, carrying with it both the sense of suppression and preservation. It is important to note, in the context of '*Aufhebung*' being an important Hegelian term in the discussion of how historical forces confront and transform each other, that Nietzsche, in this instance, doesn't seem to be influenced by Hegel. Rather, he is exclusively using '*aufhebend*' in the sense of cancellation of suppression.

<sup>234</sup> GM, II.10.

<sup>235</sup> GM, II.10.

<sup>236</sup> Berkowitz, *Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist*, 120.

<sup>237</sup> GM, I.11.

<sup>238</sup> GM, I.11.

<sup>239</sup> 'For we have opened unto us by our courage all seas and lands and set up eternal monuments on all sides both of the evil we have done to our enemies and the good we have done to our friends.' Thuc. 2.41.

<sup>240</sup> '[free from] all social constraint, in the wilderness they make up for the tension built up over a long period of confinement and enclosure within a peaceful community, they *regress* to the innocence of the predator's conscience, as rejoicing monsters [*frohlockende Ungeheuer*], capable of high spirits as they walk away without qualms from a horrific succession of murder, arson, violence, and torture, as if it were nothing more than a student prank, something new for the poets to sing and celebrate for some time to come. There is no mistaking the predator beneath the surface of all these noble races, the magnificent *blond beast* roaming

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lecherously in search of booty and victory; the energy of this hidden core needs to be discharged from time to time, the animal must emerge again, must return to the wilderness...' *GM*, I.11. N.B.: 'Blonde beast' is one of the most misinterpreted phrases in the Nietzsche pantheon. It is a reference, as the development of the passage makes clear, to a lion or other predatory animal, and carries with it no racial or Aryan connotations.

<sup>241</sup> *EH*, III 'BGE' 2; c.f. Genesis 2 ff. in which the completion of the Lord's work is described.

<sup>242</sup> Detwiler, *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism*, 167-68.

<sup>243</sup> Given the considerable, and justified, sensitivities around rape, it is worth noting in this context the Latin *raptio* is perhaps better translated as abduction and does not necessarily carry with it notions of sexual violation. This is borne out by the myth in which the Sabine leaders refused to allow their women to marry Romans, fearing the emergence of a rival society. In this context it is unclear if the Romans were 'abducting' otherwise willing brides, though less willing after the bloodshed between Roman and Sabine men, or if it was an instance of forced intermarriage. For discussion see Zola M. Packman, "Rape and Consequences in the Latin Declamations," *Scholia: Studies in Classical Antiquity*, vol. 8 (1999).

<sup>244</sup> C.f. Liv. 1.13. Livy, *Ab Urbe Condita*, trans. B. O. Foster, 13 vols., vol. 1 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1919). Livy, *Ab Urbe Condita*, trans. B. O. Foster, 13 vols., vol. 1 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1919).

<sup>245</sup> *GM*, II.20.

<sup>246</sup> *GM*, II.20.

<sup>247</sup> *GM*, II.20.

<sup>248</sup> *WP*, 871.

<sup>249</sup> *D*, 371

<sup>250</sup> *Z*, II.2.

<sup>251</sup> For a discussion of the use of hammer imagery in the writing of Nietzsche, see Eric Blondel, *Nietzsche, the Body and Culture: Philosophy as a Philological Genealogy*, trans. Seán Hand (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1991), 106.

<sup>252</sup> 'One must learn from war: (1) to associate death with the interests for which one fights – that makes *us* venerable; (2) one must learn to sacrifice *many* and to take one's cause seriously enough not to spare men; (3) rigid discipline, and to permit oneself force and cunning in war..' *WP*, 982.

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- <sup>253</sup> Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History: With Selections from the Philosophy of Right*, trans. Leo Rauch (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co, 1988), 35.
- <sup>254</sup> ‘*Necessitas dat legem non ipsa accipit.*’ Publius Syrus, *The Moral Sayings of Publius Syrus: A Roman Slave*, trans. Darius Lyman (Cleveland: L.E. Bernard & Company, 1856), 35.
- <sup>255</sup> I am indebted to Frederick Appel’s book, *Nietzsche Contra Democracy*, where I first read of this parallel. Appel, *Nietzsche Contra Democracy*, 149. f. 8
- <sup>256</sup> *WP*, 464.
- <sup>257</sup> *TI*, V.3.
- <sup>258</sup> For examples of the sublimation of violence in Nietzsche’s writing see Kaufmann, *Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 228 & 46; Nehamas, *Nietzsche, Life as Literature*, 217-18; Richard Schacht, *Nietzsche* (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1983), 276 & 331.
- <sup>259</sup> An example of the unfavorable light in which N. casts *Zivilisation* is found in *The Will to Power*: ‘struggling ‘civilization’ (taming) needs every kind of irons and torture to maintain itself against terribleness and beast-of-prey natures.’ *WP*, 871; ‘increasing civilization, which necessarily brings with it an increase in the morbid elements, in the neurotic psychiatric and criminal. An intermediary species arises: the artist, restrained from *crime* by weakness of will and social timidity, and not yet ripe for the *madhouse*, but reaching out inquisitively toward both sphere with his antennae.’ *WP*, 864.
- <sup>260</sup> Blondel, *Nietzsche, the Body and Culture: Philosophy as a Philological Genealogy*, 42.
- <sup>261</sup> *EH*, III ‘*TT* 3.
- <sup>262</sup> Here N. anticipates Freud’s notion of sublimation as the basis of culture. Sigmund Freud, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. James Strachey, XXIV vols., vol. XXI (London: Hogarth Press, 1961), 79-80.
- <sup>263</sup> *GM*, II.7. This passage is a reaction to Pope Innocent III’s *De miseria condicionis humane*, whose main thesis Nietzsche summarizes at the beginning of *GM*, II.7. For the text of *De miseria* see Lotario dei Segni, *De Miseria Condicionis Humane*, ed. Robert E. Lewis (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1978).
- <sup>264</sup> *GS*, 370.
- <sup>265</sup> Detwiler, *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism*, 167-68.
- <sup>266</sup> *BT*, Preface 4.
- <sup>267</sup> ‘*Zur Größe gehört die Furchtbarkeit: man lasse sich nichts vormachen.*’ *WP*, 1028.

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<sup>268</sup> GS, 370.

<sup>269</sup> Z, IV.13.5.

<sup>270</sup> WP, 1027. While *Untier* is an established German word, meaning monster or beast, *Übertier* is a coinage and analogous to *Übermensch*.

<sup>271</sup> GM, III.2

<sup>272</sup> GM, I.16; c.f. 'Harshness, violence, enslavement, danger on the street and in the heart, seclusion, stoicism, the art of the tempter and every kind of devilry, that everything evil, frightful, tyrannical, predatory, and snake-like about humans [*alles Böse, Furchtbare, Tyrannische, Raubtier – und Schlangenhafte am Menschen*] serves to heighten the species 'human being' as much as does its opposite [*zur Erhöhung der Spezies 'Mensch' dient, als sein Gegensatz*].' BGE, 44.

<sup>273</sup> 'there is always a bit of madness in loving [*Wahnsinn in der Liebe*]. But there is also always a bit of reason in the madness [*Vernunft im Wahnsinn*].' Z, I.7; c.f. William Connolly who passes by 'those fools who think this [N.'s aristocratic radicalism] sanctions murder.' William E. Connolly, "Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth by Alan White," *Political Theory*, vol. 20, no. 4 (1992): 705.

<sup>274</sup> GS, 19.

<sup>275</sup> Martha Craven Nussbaum, "Pity and Mercy: Nietzsche's Stoicism," in *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals*, ed. Richard Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 157.

<sup>276</sup> 'Not ignorant of ill I learn to aid distress.' Rousseau is quoting Virgil's Aeneid. Vir. *Aen.* 1.630. Virgil, *Aeneid*, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999). Virgil, *Aeneid*, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999).

<sup>277</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile: Or on Education*, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 224.

<sup>278</sup> SE, 6.

<sup>279</sup> SE, 6.

<sup>280</sup> 'Aushänge-Tugenden.' Z, IV.13.8

<sup>281</sup> It should be noted the French word *ressentiment* only appears from GM onward, prior to that N. used the German word *Rache* [revenge].

<sup>282</sup> For examples see Z, I.12; Z, II.7; GS, 359.

<sup>283</sup> Z, III.11.1



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<sup>284</sup> ‘Always the boom-boom of justice, wisdom, holiness, virtue ... always the cloak of prudent silence, of affability, of mildness, and whatever the other idealistic cloaks may be called under which incurable self-despisers, as well as the incurably vain, go about..’ *GS*, 359.

<sup>285</sup> ‘Do you have courage, O my brothers? Are you stout-hearted? *Not* courage before witnesses but solitaires’ and eagles’ courage, which not even a God witnesses any more? / Cold souls, mules, blind men, drunkards, I do not call stouthearted. Stout of heart is he who knows fear, but *conquers* fear, who see the abyss, but with *pride*. / Whoever sees the abyss, but with an eagle’s eyes, whoever with an eagle’s talons *grasps* the abyss: he has courage.’ *Z*, IV.13.4.

<sup>286</sup> Here I am referencing one of N.’s favorite metaphors: *Tänzers Tugend* [dancing virtue]. *Z*, III.16.6.

<sup>287</sup> *Z*, IV.13.16.

<sup>288</sup> *TI*, VI.2; ‘All perfect acts are unconscious and no longer subject to will; consciousness is the expression of an imperfect and often morbid state in a person. Personal perfection as conditioned by will, as consciousness, as reasoning with dialectics, is a caricature, a kind of self-contradiction – A degree of consciousness makes perfection impossible – [it is a] Form of *play-acting*.’ *WP*, 289.

<sup>289</sup> *GM*, III.14.

<sup>290</sup> *Z*, I.4.

<sup>291</sup> *Ich bin, der ich bin* [I am, who I am]. It is interesting N. should choose the literal translation of this most rabbinical of phrases from the Torah אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה [*Ehyeh asher ehyeh*]. In most instances, what is Exodus 3:14 in the Christian Bible and which Luther translated as ‘ICH WERDE SEIN, DER ICH SEIN WERDE’ [I will be who I will be], אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה is more accurately rendered by N. as ‘I Am That I Am,’ as ancient Hebrew lacks a future tense. *Biblia, Das Ist: Die Heilige Schrift Altes Und Neues Testaments*, trans. Martin Luther(Germantown [Pa.]: Gedruckt bey Christoph Saur, 1763). *Biblia, Das Ist: Die Heilige Schrift Altes Und Neues Testaments*, trans. Martin Luther(Germantown [Pa.]: Gedruckt bey Christoph Saur, 1763).

<sup>292</sup> ‘On such a ground of self-contempt, a real quagmire, every weed will grow, every poisonous plant, and all so tiny, so hidden, so dishonest, so sweet. Here the worms of the vindictive feeling and reaction squirm; here the air stinks of things kept secret and unacknowledged; here the net of malicious conspiracy is continually spun – the conspiracy of the suffering against the well-constituted and the victorious, here the sight of the victor is the object of *hatred*.’ *GM*, III.14.

<sup>293</sup> *GM*, II.17.

<sup>294</sup> *Z*, I.4.

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<sup>295</sup> Here, N. appears to be drawing inspiration from Emerson: 'The smallest fly will draw blood, and gossip is a weapon impossible to exclude from the privatest, highest, selectest.' Ralph Waldo Emerson, *The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson: Comprising His Essays, Lectures, Poems and Orations* (London: Bell & Daldy, 1866), 403.

<sup>296</sup> Z, I. 12.

<sup>297</sup> Z, II.16.

<sup>298</sup> Z, II.6

<sup>299</sup> *HAH*, I.115.

<sup>300</sup> *WP*, 287.

<sup>301</sup> *BGE*, 43.

<sup>302</sup> *BT*, Preface 5.

<sup>303</sup> 'What is right for the one may certainly *not* be right for the other, that to demand *one* morality for all is precisely to encroach upon the higher sort of human beings – in short, that there is a *hierarchy* between human and human, and therefore between morality and morality as well.' *BGE*, 228.

<sup>304</sup> For an in-depth analysis of the influence on Nietzsche by two of the great French moralists, François de la Rochefoucauld and Sebastien Roch Nicolas Chamfort, see Ruth Abbey, "Descent and Dissent: Nietzsche's Reading of Two French Moralists" (Ph.D dissertation, McGill University, 1994).

<sup>305</sup> *Maximes* 308: 'On a fait une vertu de la moderation pour borner l'ambition des grands hommes, et pour consoler les gens médiocres de leur peu de fortune, et de leur peu de mérite.' in François de La Rochefoucauld, *Collected Maxims and Other Reflections*, trans. E.H. Blackmore, A.M. Blackmore, and Francine Giguère (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 86-87.

<sup>306</sup> I am indebted to the Ph.D dissertation by Brian Leiter which opened my eyes to the Calliclean influence on N. Brian Leiter, "Nietzsche and the Critique of Morality: Philosophical Naturalism in Nietzsche's Theory of Value" (Ph.D Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1995), 124-26.

<sup>307</sup> 'Makers of the laws are the weaker sort of men, and the more numerous. So it is with a view to themselves and their own interest that they make their laws and distribute their praises and censures; and to terrorise the stronger sort of folk who are able to get an advantage, and to prevent them from getting one over them, they tell them, that such aggrandisement is foul and unjust, and that wrongdoing is just this endeavour to get the advantage of one's neighbours: for I expect they are well content to see themselves on an equality, when they are so inferior. So this is why by convention it is termed unjust and foul to aim at an advantage over the

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majority, and why they call it wrongdoing: but nature, in my opinion, herself proclaims the fact that it is right for the better to have advantage of the worse, and the abler of the feebler.' Plat. *Gorg.* 483b-d. Plato, *Gorgias*, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1925). Plato, *Gorgias*, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1925).

<sup>308</sup> Leiter, "Nietzsche and the Critique of Morality: Philosophical Naturalism in Nietzsche's Theory of Value," 9 ff.

<sup>309</sup> *Weil sie lahme Tatzten haben!* Z, II.13.

<sup>310</sup> *Christlichen, unbedingten Moral.* BT, Preface 5.

<sup>311</sup> Z, III.5.2.

<sup>312</sup> Z, II.16.

<sup>313</sup> Paus. 10.24. Pausanias, *Description of Greece*, trans. W. H. S. Jones (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1935). Pausanias, *Description of Greece*, trans. W. H. S. Jones (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1935).

<sup>314</sup> Plat. Charm. 165a. Plato, *Charmides*, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1927). Plato, *Charmides*, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1927). Aeschylus uses the same connotation when Oceanus chides Prometheus for railing against his punishment, Aesch. *PB* 300. Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound*, trans. Alan H. Sommerstein (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009). Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound*, trans. Alan H. Sommerstein (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009).

<sup>315</sup> 'that what is right for the one may certainly *not* be right for the other, that to demand *one* morality for all [*einer Moral für alle*] is precisely to encroach upon the higher sort of human beings [*höheren Menschen*].' BGE, 228.

<sup>316</sup> *Aberglauben des freien Willens.* GS, 345.

<sup>317</sup> *EH*, Foreword 2.

<sup>318</sup> *GM*, I.13.

<sup>319</sup> *GM*, I.13.

<sup>320</sup> *GM*, II.16.

<sup>321</sup> *D*, Preface 3.

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<sup>322</sup> GS, 345.

<sup>323</sup> Z, III.11.2

<sup>324</sup> Z, III.12.6. Here N. is calling upon imagery from the Old Testament, Ezekiel 40:39 ff where there are ‘tables ... to slay thereon the burnt offering ... whereupon they slew their sacrifices.’

<sup>325</sup> WP, 86.

<sup>326</sup> GM, I.11.

<sup>327</sup> Z, IV.5.2.

<sup>328</sup> GM, I.6.

<sup>329</sup> ‘Euripides, Aristotle, and Thucydides concur in the view that ... a mistrustful suspiciousness, which can come to an agent through no moral failing, but only through experience of the bad things in life, can be a poison that corrodes all of the excellences, turning them to forms of vindictive defensiveness.’ Martha Craven Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* / Martha C. Nussbaum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 418.

<sup>330</sup> TI, II.3.

<sup>331</sup> Z, II.4.

<sup>332</sup> GM, II.16. N. also draws the analogy of creatures of the sea: ‘In a similar way to the creatures of the sea when they were forced either to adapt to life on land or to perish – in a single stroke, all their instincts were devalued and ‘suspended’ ... The simplest tasks made them feel clumsy, they were without their old guides in this new, unknown world.’ GM, II.16.

<sup>333</sup> TI, IX.14. N.’s attached on the depredation of time continued later in TI: ‘Species do not grow in perfection: time and again the weak become the masters of the strong – for they are the great number, they are also cleverer ... the weak are more intelligent ... You must have need of intelligence in order to gain it ... anyone who has strength dispenses with intelligence (- ‘let it go!’ people think in today’s Germany, ‘for the Reich must still be ours’ ...) by ‘intelligence’ it is clear that I mean caution, patience, cunning, disguise, great self-control, and all that is mimicry.’ TI, IX.14. Interestingly N. uses ‘mimicry’ in the English in his original text.

<sup>334</sup> GM, I.6.

<sup>335</sup> TI, IX.43.

<sup>336</sup> Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, 9.

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<sup>337</sup> Z, II.2.

<sup>338</sup> N. is recalling the line from Goethe he quotes at the beginning of *UD* 2: 'In any case, I hate everything that merely instructs me without augmenting or directly invigorating my activity.'

<sup>339</sup> *UM*, 2 *Foreword*. For a more detailed discussion of N.'s writing on the limitations of 'antiquarian history' see Nacona Nix, "Nietzsche's Historiography: History and Culture in the Second Untimely Meditation" (Ph.D dissertation, University of North Carolina, 2008).

<sup>340</sup> *GS*, 340.

<sup>341</sup> For a good discussion of historical uses of 'imitation' see Wayne C. Booth, *The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 227-60.

<sup>342</sup> *GS*, 345.

<sup>343</sup> *EH*, IV. 8. 'Crush the infamy' was a phrase Voltaire began to use in 1759 and would repeat hundreds of times, even using it as a signature in letters. Voltaire, *Correspondence*, 59 vols., vol. 36 (Paris: Institut et Musee Voltaire Les Delices, 1958). Letter 7584.

<sup>344</sup> Foucault, *Power / Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, 53-54.

<sup>345</sup> I wasn't able to address the notion of 'originality' in N.'s work, so here I am using the term loosely in the sense of what he actually meant, rather than what he pioneered. To offer a thesis for his lack of demonstrating an indebtedness I would posit is to be found in *GM* in which N. writes about 'indebtedness towards [ones] origins' (*GM*, II.20). In this passage N. elucidates some of the baggage which is hindering the progress of mankind as we have 'inherited along with the gods of the race and the tribe the burden of its still-outstanding debts and the desire to have them redeemed' (*GM*, II.20). Perhaps this begins to unpack why N., in general, does not show his indebtedness to other thinkers, e.g. Schopenhauer, as he is wanting to dance with light feet, unencumbered by any notions of redemption which may come with indebtedness to others.

<sup>346</sup> Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality*, 296; see also Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, 10-11.

<sup>347</sup> *BGE*, 61.

<sup>348</sup> *A*, 58.

<sup>349</sup> *BGE*, Preface 2.

<sup>350</sup> Hansard, "Parliamentary Debates from the Year 1803 to the Present Time." Vol. 36, Comprising the Period from the Twenty-Eight Day of April to the Twelfth Day of July, 1817, Topic: Habeas Corpus Suspension

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Bill, Speaker: Mr. Lamb (William Lamb), Date: June 27, 1817, Start Column Number 1225, Quote Column Number 1226 and 1227

<sup>351</sup> *WP*, 944.

<sup>352</sup> *WP*, 898.

<sup>353</sup> *BGE*, 203.

<sup>354</sup> *BGE*, 203.

<sup>355</sup> *WP*, 975.

<sup>356</sup> *BGE*, 61.

<sup>357</sup> *BGE*, 61.

<sup>358</sup> *BGE*, 258.

<sup>359</sup> *GM*, II.12.

<sup>360</sup> Warren, *Nietzsche and Political Thought*, 211.

<sup>361</sup> Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization*, 29.

<sup>362</sup> *A*, 57.

<sup>363</sup> *BGE*, 61.

<sup>364</sup> Phillip Blond, *Red Tory: How Left and Right Have Broken Britain and How We Can Fix It* (London: Faber and Faber, 2010), 26-27.

<sup>365</sup> *Z*, II.12.

<sup>366</sup> *BGE*, 44, 212, 225, 257.

<sup>367</sup> *WP*, 943.

<sup>368</sup> Thomas Mann, *Leiden an Deutschland: Tagebuchblätter Aus Den Jahren 1933 Und 1934* (Stockholm: Fischer Verlag, 1946), 151.

<sup>369</sup> Quoted from the German edition of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* [*Die Zionistischen Protokolle mit einem Vor- und Nachwort von Theodor Fritsch*] (1924) by Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 307.

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<sup>370</sup> ‘*Der Mensch ist schwer zu entdecken und sich selber noch am schwersten; oft lügt der Geist über die Seele.*’ Z, III.11.2.

<sup>371</sup> Peter F. Drucker, *The Practice of Management* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 3.

<sup>372</sup> GM, III.25.

<sup>373</sup> Z, I.12.

<sup>374</sup> GM, I.11.

<sup>375</sup> Z, IV.5.2.

<sup>376</sup> GM, I.6.

<sup>377</sup> WP, 1067.

<sup>378</sup> EH, I.2.

<sup>379</sup> EH, II.3.

<sup>380</sup> In the Christian faith, attested to in Matthew. 22:37-40 and one of the seminal works in Christian teaching as it takes the Jewish Decalogue and condenses the Commandments into two basic principles, love thy God and love thy neighbour. ‘Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. / This is the first and great commandment. / And the second *is* like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. / On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets.’

<sup>381</sup> Z, III, 10.2; Z, I, 22.1; WP, 752.

<sup>382</sup> Z, III.3.

<sup>383</sup> WP, 395; Z, III.29.

<sup>384</sup> HAH, I.224.

<sup>385</sup> Z, III.11.2.

<sup>386</sup> I am alive to the Nietzschean counter pose and meaning of beyond good and evil, in this context I am leveraging the trope of ‘good’ to imply that which is good for a Nietzschean nobility, not that which the herd may deem good.

<sup>387</sup> One of the paradoxes of reading Nietzsche is his well-known contempt for the Platonic ‘hereafter’ is often coupled with reading the Eternal Return as a form of Nietzschean cosmology. This mis-reading is expertly dispatched by Maudemarie Clark who correctly sees it ‘as a practical doctrine, a directive concerning how to

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live, rather than a theory concerning the nature of the universe.’ Maudemarie Clark, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 247. See also Nehamas, *Nietzsche, Life as Literature*, 141-69.

<sup>388</sup> Latin ‘love of fate’ is a notion Nietzsche first introduced into his writing in *GS*, 276: ‘*Amor fati*: let that be my love henceforth! I do not want to wage war against what is ugly. I do not want to accuse; I do not even want to accuse those who accuse. *Looking away* shall be my only negation. And all in all and on the whole: some day I wish to be only a Yes-sayer.’

<sup>389</sup> *EH*, II.9.

<sup>390</sup> ‘In the actual world, in which everything is bound to and conditioned by everything else, to condemn and think away anything means to condemn and think away everything. The expression ‘that should not be,’ ‘that should not have been,’ is farcical – If one thinks out the consequences, one would ruin the source of life if one wanted to abolish whatever was in some respect harmful or destructive.’ *WP*, 584.

<sup>391</sup> *Z*, IV.19.10.

<sup>392</sup> *GS*, 341.

<sup>393</sup> Clark, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy*, 281.

<sup>394</sup> Max Simon Nordau, *Degeneration*, 7th ed. ed. (New York: D. Appleton, 1895), 238.

<sup>395</sup> *Ich bin, der ich bin* [I am, who I am]. It is interesting N. should choose the literal translation of this most rabbinical of phrases from the Torah אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה [*Ehyeh asher ehyeh*]. In most instances, what is Exodus 3:14 in the Christian Bible and which Luther translated as ‘ICH WERDE SEIN, DER ICH SEIN WERDE’ [I will be who I will be], אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה is more accurately rendered by N. as ‘I Am That I Am,’ as ancient Hebrew lacks a future tense. *Biblia, Das Ist: Die Heilige Schrift Altes Und Neues Testaments*, trans. Martin Luther (Germantown [Pa.]: Gedruckt bey Christoph Saur, 1763). *Biblia, Das Ist: Die Heilige Schrift Altes Und Neues Testaments*, trans. Martin Luther (Germantown [Pa.]: Gedruckt bey Christoph Saur, 1763).

<sup>396</sup> Kennedy Library. Box 462, HAK to Bowie, July 8, 1961. Quoted in Niall Ferguson, *Kissinger: Volume I: 1923-1968: The Idealist* (New York: Penguin Random House, 2015), 457-58.

<sup>397</sup> Comte, *Système De Politique Positive, Ou Traité De Sociologie Instituant La Religion De L'humanité*, 50.

<sup>398</sup> *WP*, 901.

<sup>399</sup> Here I am using spirit in the Nietzschean sense of *Geist* and *geistig*, which goes beyond the English word spirit, and conveys notions of intellect, mind, wit and *esprit*. Because the individuals Nietzsche most admired were without exception great intellects, it is within this context all talk of ‘spirit’ must be read.



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<sup>400</sup> *WP*, 901.

<sup>401</sup> *Z*, II.8.

<sup>402</sup> 'the *ideal* scholar in whom the scientific instinct blossoms fully and finally after thousands of complete or partial false starts, is certainly one of the most precious tools that exist: but he needs to be put into the hand of someone more powerful. He is only a tool; let's say that he is a *mirror*, not an 'end unto himself.' *BGE*, 207.

<sup>403</sup> *BGE*, 61.

<sup>404</sup> Grace Donnelly, "Top Ceos Make More in Two Days Than an Average Employee Does in One Year," <http://fortune.com/2017/07/20/ceo-pay-ratio-2016/>.

<sup>405</sup> *WP*, 943.

<sup>406</sup> *Z*, II.12.

<sup>407</sup> *HAH*, I.472.

## 6 - APPENDIX OF TERMS

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### 6.1 - HERD [*HEERDE*]

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When N. refers to herd, his terminology is predominantly and deliberately derogatory. Not specifically of the individuals who make up this ‘mass’ but for the type of humans who make up ‘the people.’ In N.’s works the term *heerde* is rarely used until GS, and then in something of a neutral manner to simply denote those who live communally. By Z (e.g. Z, I.15, 2.4 *etc.*) the derogatory use of *heerde* is almost exclusive. Following Z, N. further develops his use of *heerde* to denote people who are the product of a particular type of moral or religious system, such as Christians, who have been culturally bred to possess drives and needs which are predominantly passive. In this context *heerde* behaviour is more a result of nurture than nature (*BGE*, 202; *A*, 3 & 42). However, while N. holds derogatory views of the *heerde*, that is to say he views people of the herd existing on a lower plain of development, N. does have praise for these mediocre people who may possess, in their simpler way, forms of excellence. For N., the *heerde* are essential to any cultured society as ‘A high culture is a pyramid: it can stand only on a broad base, its very first prerequisite is a strongly and soundly consolidated mediocrity’ (*A*, 57).

The *heerde* contrasts with the mob [*Pöbel*] or rabble [*Gesinde*] who, in N.’s view, are thoroughly degenerate. For N., the mob or rabble are associated with cities (Z, IV.3), and carry with them

notions of dirt, noise and mass political or social movements such as socialism (*A*, 57). *Pöbel* or *Gesinde* emerge from slave revolutions and are most notably characterised by *ressentiment* or revengefulness toward power and all forms of nobility (*Z*, II.6, IV.8). The *Pöbel* are thus irreverent, even toward the religion which bred them (*BGE*, 58 – though it should be noted N. states they are ‘not hostile to religious customs ... they do what is required as they do other required things’ *op. cit.*), they suffer from life (*Z*, IV.13, 16 & 20) and need someone to blame (*HAH*, II.386). They are the product of the democratic mixing of classes (*Z*, IV.3.1; *BGE*, 264), they ask ‘what are ‘poor’ and ‘rich’ today still! I have unlearned this distinction – I fled from it all ...’ (*Z*, IV.8). But perhaps for N, their most despoiled trait is an intent ‘to live *gratis*’ without giving back (*Z*, III.12.5) – a notion found in Revelations: ‘And whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely’ (Rev 22:17). Though N’s use of *Pöbel* or *Gesinde* is predominantly in the context of modern Europe, he also uses it to denote similarly affected ages in history such as the ‘rabble in Greece’ (*BGE*, 49).

## 6.2 - NOBLE (*VORNEHM*, *EDEL*), HIGHER TYPE, AND ULTIMATELY *ÜBERMENSCH*

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Nobles and nobility are among the most important concepts in N.’s writing and cover a vast, though poorly charted and little understood, intellectual space. In his earlier writing N uses the term *edel*, but in later works prefers *vornehm*. In either case, he does not mean ‘the aristocracy,’ as typified in the Second Estate of *Les États-Généraux*, rather it is to refer to higher types of human beings who

will ultimately evolve into *Übermensch*. In N.'s writing, nobility and the noble are associated with insight into the Dionysian nature, but who are also able to fully participate in the Apollonian (see Appendix 6.5) aspects of life. Because of their ability to see and experience the dual aspects of life they are associated with a wider perspective and deeper understanding of the world. This truer grasp of life grants them insight into justice and enables them to better see what is important with respect to the functioning of culture (Z, 3, 11, 12; GM, 2, 11). This higher station in life enables nobles to embody benevolence, in that they can give without seeming to evince pity, which would elicit reciprocal feelings of *ressentiment*, which in turn enables reciprocity (Z, 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 12, 19; BGE, 265).

Nobility is also concerned with singular values and with exceptions to the common weal. This involves the most noble things while leaving no mark on the herd (UM, 2.9). An example of this is the scientist whose endeavors and achievements are seldom regarded with house hold fame (HAH, II.206). This does not mean the noble is cutoff from society, on the contrary nobles are outstanding communicators and in consequence vital instruments of cultural, read human, development (BGE, 268).

In N.'s writing, nobles are also a distinct class with a distinct form of justice, in that for them, justice is only *inter pares* (HAH, 1.451). Nobles are also characterized by activity and do not sit idly waiting for something to which they can react. In this respect even something like the idealism of

Plato, whose forms N. rejected, could be 'noble' as it demanded mastery of the passivity of the senses (*BGE*, 14). This creates one of the key points of difference between nobles and slaves as the latter are only reactive and therefore not capable of self-command.

Nobles are also intrinsically natural., though not in the Stoic sense, as in N. 'natural' refers to being in tune with one's drives, not controlled by reason (*GM*, I.10; *TI*, 2.5). Here the emphasis is on being wild as nature without fear of oneself (*D*, 502). This enables nobles to:

bear and to be able to bear this monstrous sum of all kinds of grief and still be the  
hero who, on the second day of battle, greets dawn and his fortunate as a person  
whose horizon stretches millennia before and behind him... (*GS*, 337)

This greeting of the dawn is also crucial for nobles whose primary concern is for the future (*Z*, I.8, III.12). Nobility in the final analysis is overwhelmingly concerned with the future, in the sense of the evolution of the human race, as such the mantle of nobility may pass from class to class – such as from aristocracy to barbarians and back again and explains why the chapter in *BGE* on nobility is preoccupied with the future.

### 6.3 - SLAVE (SKLAVE)

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N. writes about many societies which were slave owning, in the sense of people without physical liberty to travel, such as ancient Greece or Rome. But in his philosophical works he is using the term

in the sense of a person who engages in group think and is essentially incapable of independent action (GS, 18). In this respect N. agrees with Marx in thinking workers in a capitalist state, regardless of their democratic trappings, remain slaves (HAH, I.457). However, N. would also argue that company owners and state representatives are also part of the slave class (HAH, I.283). This 'slavery in a higher sense' (AC 54) is key in understanding N.'s opposition to democracy and socialism as these movements merely substitute one form of slavery for another.

However, N. should not be read in an entirely emancipatory manner as he also makes clear the need for a slave class so that nobles may be free to create and have leisure (BGE, 259; AC, 57). Slaves in this context form a crucial rôle in the tripartite segregation of society into slaves, guardians and masters.

Where N. finds slavery dangerous, is in the context of Jews and Christians who he asserts, as a result of spending much of their history as slaves in the classical sense of bondage, developed a value system which undermines notions of master's ethics and is the bedrock of modern democracy and socialism; these in turn stimulate the desire for *ressentiment* which threatens to derail any future attempts at establishing a new caste system for the evolution of humanity. In consequence, modern society experiences an inversion of morals: what was formerly good, is now seen as bad. In this connection N. contrasts Epictetus, a stoic philosopher who spent his early life as a slave, with

Christian attitudes (*D*, 546). N. also views the resulting Christian slave revolution as a campaign by the priestly class to displace the nobility and claim power for themselves (*GM*, I.6-7).

#### 6.4 – DIONYSUS AND DIONYSIAN

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Dionysus (*Διόνυσος*), known also as Bacchus (*Βάκχος*), a name adopted by the Romans who also associated Dionysus with their own god *Liber Pater* (the free father), is the Greek god associated with wine, the harvest and fertility more generally. N. uses many aspects of the god, such as his association with plenty and sex, and Dionysus' capacity for both kindness and cruelty. Just as there are variegated accounts of Dionysus' birth across the ancient records, so too does the Dionysian concept change over the course of N.'s own intellectual output.

In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Dionysian forms a tripartite set of cultural drives, the others being Apollonian (see Appendix 6.5) and Socratic (see Appendix 6.6), and is associated with impulses, drives, will, ecstasy (from the Greek *ἔκστασις*, to stand outside of oneself) and with many aspects of art such as lyric poetry (epic poetry was associated by N. with the Apollonian drive) and music. Because of the cultural drive of the Dionysian, it inherently contains elements of the metaphysical, in the context that it provides a way of understanding the nature of reality,

N. continues to develop his thinking in *TI*, where he contrasts his initial concepts of the Dionysian and Apollonian by introducing a third art drive; architecture (*TI*, IX.10-11). Yet later in the book (*TI*,

X.4-5) N. develops his thinking further and formulates a concept of the Dionysian which will become central to his future writing, in which Dionysus stimulates humanity to new heights (*BGE* 295). In this understanding of Dionysus, instead of seeing the Dionysian and Apollonian as distinct drives, N. comes to think of them as dual creative and destructive cycles of a single godhead (*Z*, 1.1 and 2.13). Though it could be argued in the context of N. as a disciple to a god (*TI*, X.5) he is a theological thinker, it would be better to understand Dionysus in N.'s work as a personification or an ideal of growth and overcoming, rather than a deity in the theistic or deistic sense. This reading of N. is witnessed in *EH* in which N. portrays Zarathustra as a Dionysian ideal (*EH*, III.Z.6).

## 6.5 – APOLLO AND APOLLONIAN

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Apollo (Ἀπόλλων), is a complex deity in both the Greek and Roman pantheon of gods embodying archery, healing, music, prophecy, the sun and light, and music. For N., the Apollonian is the drive which originates cultural forms which emphasis perception, synthesis, classical form, intuition and beauty, such as sculpture or epic poetry. As with the Dionysian, the Apollonian in N.'s writing carries with it notions of the metaphysical. However, awareness of the Apollonian is akin to awareness of an illusion, and recognition of it analogous to a dream in which we are aware we are dreaming. This contrast between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, the lyric and the epic, is implicit in N.'s



contrasting of Plato and Homer. The former, ‘the sincerest ‘man of the beyond,’ the philosopher who most defames life; ... the other, the poet who involuntarily deifies it, the *golden* nature.’ (*GM*, 3.25)

## 6.6 - SOCRATES AND SOCRATIC

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Socrates (Σωκράτης), c. 470 – 399 B.C., was an Athenian philosopher and often credited as one of the founders of the Western philosophic tradition. If he produced any, none of his writings survive, and his legacy is extant only in the works of later writers, most prominently his students Plato and Xenophon. The Socratic in N.’s writing is characterized by language, analysis, logic, rationality and an unerring adherence to the notion of unchanging forms. This classification puts the Socratic not so much in opposition to the Dionysian and Apollonian, as that would entail an agonism, but as a drive which denies all others as mere misunderstandings of reality. This makes Socrates, and by extension the Socratic drive, deeply enigmatic in N.’s writing. At one moment an important counter-culture to Christian ‘slave’ morality which will break the hold of morality and custom (*D*, 544), at another, originating a form of philosophical totalitarianism in which ‘reason’ brings about the annihilation of all that augments and improves life (*TY*, II.1-12).

## 6.7 – TYCHIC

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In addition to the established Dionysian and Apollonian elements, N.’s writing on *amor fati* brings a third element into play I have called Tychic. My nomenclature for this term comes from

maintaining N.'s choice of Greek deities for his virtues. Tyche ((Τύχη) was, according to one legend, the daughter of Ocean and Tethys and governess of fortune (Hes. *Th.* 337).

I have chosen to originate a term for the discussion of N. as the core of his thinking, his will to power, is predicated on the notion of drives as the *Übermensch* is an active individual with the psychological power of self-overcoming. This is achieved in the standard reading of the Nietzschean framework by balancing the Dionysian and Apollonian, yet to imagine *amor fati* as purely a love of fate is, I think, to sell the requirements of the *Übermensch* short and undermine their potential as fate can be of the past, present or future. To accept, let alone love, all three states would see masters of the future succumb to the same forces which brought low masters in ages past. N. counsels the modern noble against such pitfalls by exhorting them to maintain their position through a deep suspicion of both the unfamiliar and too-familiar alike. Instead of considering everything to have an inherent worth, N. exhorts a master to react 'to every kind of stimulus slowly, with the slowness which years of caution and a willed pride have cultivated in him – he examines the stimulus as it approaches and has no intention of going to meet it (*EH*, I.2).' In short, a master ought to be of discriminating taste and adopt the preferred stance of caution. This in no way brings with it notions of picking and choosing from the past, as N. stresses the interconnectedness of all things (e.g. *GS*, 337), rather it situates *amor fati* as an antiquarian function in the context of the eternal return, leaving *Übermenschen* free to be

architects of the future and build ‘a grand organization of society, the supreme condition for the prosperity of life (A, 58).’ In this context there must be a balance between three drives, not two, and as the other virtues take on the nomenclature of deities in Nietzsche’s writing, a natural extension is to originate this third drive from a goddess.

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